

9 December 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William M. Baker
Director, Public Affairs Office

SUBJECT: Address to the Steering Committee
of the Council on Intelligence and Policy
John F. Kennedy School of Government

1. This is background information for your remarks to the Steering Committee of the Council on Intelligence and Policy sponsored by Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government on Monday, 14 December, 7:00 - 10:00 p.m., at Bacon House, 1801 F Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Phone: 682-0502. A business suit is the dress for the occasion.

2. Arrangements: You are asked to be at Bacon House at 7:00 p.m. where you will be met by Professor Ernest May who will escort you to the reception on the next floor. There will not be a receiving line. Dinner will be served at 7:30 p.m. and the program will begin at 8:30 p.m. Graham Allison, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, will present welcoming remarks and the DCI will give 5 minutes of remarks "blessing" the program. Professor Ernest May will speak for 10 - 15 minutes describing the project and then introduce you at approximately 9:00 p.m. You are asked to speak for approximately 10 minutes before turning the program back to Professor May to moderate remarks from other members of the Steering Committee. You will be seated at a table for 8 people with Professor Richard Neustadt. (See opposite for biographies.) Since the room and group are small, a microphone will not be necessary. DCI Security will tape your remarks for the Agency's historical records. Adjournment is at 10:00 p.m. I will remain throughout the program.

Approximately 25 - 30 members of the Steering Committee, which includes high-level current and former government officials from both the intelligence and policymaking communities and academics and Agency employees will attend the dinner. (See opposite for list of attendees.) Members of the media will not be present.

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3. Background: As you are already aware, early in 1986 members of the Kennedy School faculty began exploratory talks with the Agency about new programs that both the Agency and the University believed met their interests, standards, and requirements. After successful negotiations were completed, a Steering Committee for the Council on Intelligence and Policy was proposed to oversee the activities of the Project on Intelligence Assessment and Policy. The DCI and Dean Graham Allison consented to be Co-Chairmen of this Committee which includes representatives of the intelligence, policy, and non-governmental (academic) communities. You also agreed to be a member. (See opposite for list of those invited to serve.)

The contract between CIA and Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government establishes a 3-year unclassified program of research and training regarding intelligence and the policymaking process. The long range goal of the Program on Intelligence Assessment and Policy is to promote greater understanding by intelligence and policy professionals of each other's world, values, and practices. Projects are to be conducted by Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and funded by the Agency at \$400,000 per year. (See opposite for press release, news articles, and background information.)

The project is directed by the Kennedy School faculty members Professor Ernest May, Professor Richard Neustadt, Dr. Gregory Treverton, Associate Dean Peter Zimmerman and Ms. Lynn Whittaker. The program will have four components: a seminar on intelligence assessment and decisionmaking will be held twice a year at Cambridge; intelligence-specific case studies on providing effective analytic support to policy decisionmakers will be developed; a Council on Intelligence and Policy will meet several times a year to review case studies produced under the contract; a CIA officer will serve in residence as a referent on intelligence. Mr. Bill Kline from Foreign Broadcasting Information Service will be the Agency's officer in residence at the Kennedy School this year.

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William M. Baker

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PROPOSED REMARKS BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
STEERING COMMITTEE
COUNCIL ON INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
BACON HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
14 DECEMBER 1987

UNCLASSIFIED

THANK YOU DEAN ALLISON.

(YOU MIGHT WISH TO MAKE A PERSONAL REFERENCE TO HIS REMARKS)

OUR PURPOSE TONIGHT IS TO CELEBRATE THE BEGINNING OF AN
IMPORTANT VENTURE, AND TO BEGIN OUR PART IN MAKING THAT VENTURE
SUCCEED.

THE PROJECT ON INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND POLICY HAS HAD A
PROMISING BEGINNING--WE HAVE HAD TWO EXPERIMENTAL EXECUTIVE TRAINING
SESSIONS AND BOTH WERE USEFUL AND PROVOCATIVE. ¹ THE SUCCESS OF
THESE INITIAL SESSIONS IS THE RESULT OF THE WORK OF DEAN ALLISON;
OUR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BOB GATES; PROFESSOR ERNEST MAY, AND
STAT WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF OUR OFFICE OF TRAINING AND
EDUCATION.

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THE GOAL OF THE PROJECT--TO MAKE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF POLICY MORE EFFECTIVE--IS CLEARLY STATED, IS AN END WORTH PURSUING, AND IS SOMETHING WE CAN ALL AGREE UPON. AND WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN THIS PROJECT OPENLY AND COOPERATIVELY IN A WAY THAT SEEMS TO ME TO BE EXACTLY RIGHT--A WAY THAT, FOR ONCE, SHOULD NOT REQUIRE MY PRESENCE BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

THOSE OF US WHO WILL GUIDE THIS PROJECT ARE TO PROVIDE THE BENEFIT OF OUR EXPERIENCE. I HAVE HEARD IT SAID THAT "EXPERIENCE IS THE NAME EVERYONE GIVES TO THEIR MISTAKES."² BUT KNOWING WHAT THOSE MISTAKES WERE IS USEFUL HERE. WHAT THOSE OF US ON THE STEERING COMMITTEE WILL REALLY BE DOING IS PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE. WE WILL OFFER ADVICE ON THE RESEARCH AGENDA AND SERVE AS A RESOURCE FOR THE PROGRAM.

YOU WILL HEAR FROM OTHERS TONIGHT WHO WILL DESCRIBE THE PROGRAM IN DETAIL. MY PURPOSE IS TO WELCOME YOU AND TO COMMEND YOUR SENSE

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OF PRIORITIES, YOUR EXPERTISE, AND YOUR INNATE WISDOM IN JOINING
US. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT PROGRAM--IMPORTANT TO THE ACADEMIC,
INTELLIGENCE, AND POLICY INTERESTS WE REPRESENT AND IMPORTANT TO ALL
OF US WHO ARE AFFECTED BY THE DECISIONS OF POLICYMAKERS. I HOPE YOU
WILL FIND YOUR PART IN THIS PROJECT REWARDING. I WELCOME YOUR
PARTICIPATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

Footnotes

¹The Office of Training and Education has sent the course evaluations that were prepared by Harvard University. The evaluations show the following quantitative results: The 22 participants in the March seminar gave the course an average rating of 3.31 with 1 indicating unsatisfactory, 5 excellent. The 29 participants in the fall 1987 running rated the course at 3.79. The students' narrative comments are varied. Most participants have suggestions for future runnings of the course, but most seem to feel the course was useful for them (see answers to question 2 "In what ways do you think the program will be of use to you in your work?"). Evaluations attached.

² Oscar Wilde is the author of the phrase "Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes." It is taken from Lady Windermere's Fan, written in 1892.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~



25 NOV 1987
OTE 87-6719

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM:
Director of Training and Education

SUBJECT: Harvard Program on Intelligence and Policy:
Expected Benefits for the Agency

STAT

Bdb

1. The establishment of the Program on Intelligence Assessment and Policy by Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government represents a major success for your efforts, as DDI, to improve relations between the intelligence and academic communities.

2. Harvard University has been a prominent source of criticism of CIA relations with academics. Thus, public acknowledgement of CIA funding of Harvard's new program will be seen as evidence that intelligence agencies and universities can work together in the national interest.

3. The Program--essentially case studies and a seminar for intelligence managers--will focus on an area of continuing challenge to the Agency: Increasing the impact of analysis on the policymaking process.

4. The Program will demonstrate to Congress the seriousness of our interest in improving the professional quality and utility for policymaking of our analysis.

5. The Seminar on Assessment and Policymaking, which has already been held twice, brings to bear (1) the Kennedy School faculty's understanding of relations between governmental experts and decisionmakers generally, and (2) the hands-on experience (and frustrations) of intelligence managers with the challenge in the national security arena.

6. The case studies funded under the Program will increase understanding of what works, what does not, and why--ultimately to the benefit of both parties to the intelligence-policy relationship.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~




ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Harvard Program on Intelligence and Policy:
Expected Benefits for the Agency

7. The Council sponsored under the Program will enable us to use the good offices of Kennedy School to raise questions (and table suggestions) regarding the practices of our policy colleagues that affect the relationship.

STAT



ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Handwritten signature

19 November 1987

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM :
SUBJECT : Kennedy School Contract: 14 December Dinner Meeting

Allan:

Sorry about the confusion regarding the 14 December dinner meeting. In addition to uncertain lines of communication, some groping to define a new institution is at play.

As I understand matters, the Steering Committee of a Project on Intelligence Assessment and Policy mentioned in Graham Allison's 6 November letter to the DDCI, refers to the same Intelligence-Policy-Academic Council cited in the 16 September memo from D/TE to the DDCI. The most likely name for the new beast is the Council on Intelligence and Policy.

The Steering Committee dinner scheduled for 14 December is intended to bless the overall program under the CIA-Harvard contract (Seminars for Intelligence Managers, Case Studies, etc.) and to explain its purposes and character to the members who were not in on the planning stage.

Judge Webster and Dean Allison will do the blessing. Professor May is prepared to do the explaining. The issue at hand is whether the DDCI wants to share that role with May. As I get it, the DDCI would be introducing Host Allison, speak informally for 5 minutes or so on how the program fits in with his vision of the Agency and then join Professor May in answering questions from the other members.

The above is no more than a suggestion. We can work toward whatever role the DDCI wishes to play at the dinner.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

GRAHAM ALLISON
DEAN

79 JOHN F. KENNEDY STREET
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138



November 6, 1987

Dr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

I am writing to invite you to become a member of the Steering Committee of a Project on Intelligence Assessment and Policy, being conducted by the Kennedy School of Government. The goal of the project, funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, is to improve the interaction between intelligence and policy in assessing foreign governments and making foreign policy. To that end, the project comprises three sets of activities: developing case studies on intelligence assessment and decisionmaking; undertaking a series of one-week training programs at the Kennedy School for intelligence analysts; and organizing a series of study group meetings on specific issues of intelligence assessment and policy.

The Steering Committee consists of high-level current and former government officials from both the intelligence and policy communities, as well as experts from the academic community. We anticipate that this Committee will meet twice a year to discuss general issues in intelligence/policy relations and to provide advice and recommendations for the development of project activities. A list of those we are inviting to become members is attached, along with a project description.

We would be honored to have you as a member of this Steering Committee and to join us for its first dinner-meeting, December 14, 1987, from 7:00 to 10:00 p.m., at Bacon House, 1801 F Street, in Washington. Judge Webster and I will speak briefly about the project. Professor Ernest May of the Kennedy School will then provide a further description of the project and moderate the discussion.

One of my colleagues directing the project will call you in the next few days to answer any questions you may have. We look forward to what we hope will be your favorable response and to your participation in this important project.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Graham T. Allison".

Graham T. Allison

Enclosures

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138



STEERING COMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND POLICY PROJECT

Co-Chairmen:

Dean Graham Allison, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Judge William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence

Invitees for Membership:

Morton I. Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and
Research Bureau
Michael Armacost, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
Senator Bill Bradley, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Counselor, Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Frank Carlucci, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Congressman Richard Cheney, House Select Committee on Intelligence
Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Lt. Gen. Edward Heinz, Director of Intelligence Community Staff
William Hyland, Editor, *Foreign Affairs*
Admiral Bobby Inman, Westmark Systems, Inc.
Professor Robert Jervis, Columbia University
General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Richard Kerr, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency
Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of
Defense
Congressman Dave McCurdy, House Select Committee on Intelligence
Senator Sam Nunn, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Lt. Gen. William Odom, Director of the National Security Agency
Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
James Schlesinger, Counsel, Center for Strategic and International Studies
General Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
George Shultz, Secretary of State
Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense
James Woolsey, Shea & Gardner

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INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND POLICY PROJECT *Project Structure and Planning*

I. Overview

The Intelligence Assessment and Policy Project aims to understand better how assessment relates to policymaking and, especially, how policymakers do--and might--use assessments. The three-year program of research and curriculum development is designed to draw on the expertise of both academics and practitioners. By examining and drawing lessons from a series of historical and contemporary cases, the project will develop teaching materials and methods for university courses and training programs for analysts, and produce a variety of publications.

II. Analytic Categories for Assessments

An idealized process by which assessments assist policymaking might be the following. First, a situation exists in which policymakers want to influence or make a decision regarding a foreign government. They need appraisals of the foreign government in order to understand its make-up, resources, objectives, governmental processes, etc. In the course of defining the problem in hand, U.S. objectives, and U.S. options, the policymakers need estimates of the possible effects of U.S. actions on the foreign government and hence of new conditions that the United States may face at some later point. We think of "assessment" as analysis of U.S. problems and policy choices informed by analysis of how other governments may perceive *their* problems and choices. It is hence inherently an activity requiring cooperation and interaction between decision-makers and experts.

In hope of learning how this interactive relationship might be made more efficient and effective, we propose to analyze and to invite informal debate about a variety of cases in which assessment played, or should have played, an important role in policy decisions. We have established an initial framework for these analyses by focusing on six abstract "difficulties" an analyst may face that must be overcome if his/her goal is to be attained. These difficulties fall into three general categories, defined by the reason for the difficulty.

A. NATURE OF THE ASSESSMENT

1. *The unwelcome news difficulty.* In this situation, the analyst's estimate will be bad news to the policymaker, e.g., it provides intelligence that undermines or calls into question the policymaker's current policy or inclinations. The difficulty the analyst faces is that his/her estimate will be ignored.
2. *The too-welcome news difficulty.* In this situation, the analyst knows that his/her estimate will be good news to the policymaker. However, the difficulty the analyst faces is that the estimate will be so welcome that it will be used to justify more comprehensive or extreme policy actions than can be appropriately supported.

B. ABSENCE OF CRUCIAL ELEMENTS

3. *Missing market difficulty.* In this situation, the analyst has created what he/she views as an important estimate, but discovers that there is no apparent market for the news. The difficulty here is that the estimate will not be utilized, unless the analyst finds or creates the market.
4. *Missing or inadequate product difficulty.* In this situation, the policymaker has specifically requested an estimate or the policy process itself is clearly in need of it, but the intelligence an analyst needs is missing or inadequate. The difficulty here is that the intelligence community is unable to fill its assigned role of contributing to policymaking. Policy may thus be made in ignorance of vital information, and the reputation of the intelligence community itself could be harmed.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING

5. *"Intragovernmental" difficulty.* In this situation, the analyst provides an estimate in which he/she has confidence, but the different policymakers who receive the estimate have different policy preferences, and the estimate becomes a pawn in their internal games. Here, the estimate may eventually be well-utilized, but the difficulty is that it may be misused, ignored, or used selectively or only after delay.
6. *"Transition" difficulty.* In this situation, a newly appointed official or a new presidential administration faces a policy decision, but the newcomer or newcomers are unfamiliar with the structures and offices of the government and not only may not know which questions to ask but also may not know how to go about finding the necessary answers. The difficulty for the analyst is, again, that policies will be made in absence of adequate assessment, and while it may not do harm to the intelligence community, it will deprive it of early opportunities to make a positive contribution.

The cases to be examined will be chosen on the basis of potential for helping to answer the question, "What makes for assessments that are better than usual?" Partly for sound logical reasons but also because much prior study has focused on mishaps, other cases will contribute by answering, "What made for assessments that were worse than usual?" The following list of questions suggests some of the points to be addressed in each case: Did education, training, and/or career pattern seem to make any difference? What did individuals on the policy side stand to gain or lose from acquiring working expertise about a foreign government? Did the nature of organization or process make a difference? How were analyses of foreign governments affected by the make-up of the analyzing agencies and the mix of types of intelligence (human, signal, etc.) or types of expertise (regional, functional, etc.)? Were overall assessments better to the extent that intelligence analysis was kept separate from decision-making or to the extent that the two meshed? Who asked for (or got) what kind of information, when, and to what result? Did experts and policymakers have different judgments

about how to communicate with or influence the foreign government? If so, why? To the extent one can judge, who was more nearly right? What propositions are most nearly validated by experience? How and in what circumstances have experts induced alteration in the preconceptions of policymakers? How and in what circumstances have policymakers induced alteration in the preconceptions of experts?

The cases will be crosscut in four categories defining the relationship between the assessing government and the foreign government: familiar friends, unfamiliar friends, familiar foes, and unfamiliar foes. Possible cases are listed under these categories below, although the process of examining them will help to determine if their initial placement is correct or if they, in fact, fit into more than one category. For example, a situation that a policymaker might characterize as "Unwelcome News" may look to an analyst like news for which he faces a "Missing Market." In addition, as cases are studied, the categories may well need to be refined.

DIFFICULTIES	Familiar Friends	Unfamiliar Friends	Familiar Foes	Unfamiliar Foes
Unwelcome News	Suez '56	Marcos Shah	France '40	Iran/contra
Too-welcome News	France '36		Hitler tractable	Arms control treaty violations
Missing Market	Skybolt		Vansittart (UK 30s)	PRC '50
Missing or Inadequate Product	INF '78/9 Yom Kippur War	Shah		
Intragov. Politics	Six-Day War (US)	Lebanon '82/3	Six-Day War (Israel)	
Transition	Truman & Japan		SALT '77	Bay of Pigs

III. Cases

All the historical situations above are possible candidates for case studies. We will also solicit ideas for cases from analysts in the project's training programs and Council participants. We expect to prepare twelve to eighteen cases; for the immediate future, we are focusing on five.

The first is a comparison and contrast of the contribution of assessments to policymaking during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Although the two wars were similar, the first was an intelligence and policymaking success for the U.S. and Israel and the second was a failure,

so we expect to be able to draw some instructive contrasts. The case will examine both U.S. and Israeli assessments of the situation.

The second will focus on the fall of the Shah in Iran and its aftermath. Drawing on the excellent literature on the subject and the reflections of participants, the case will make explicit the lessons from this intelligence failure. The case may also be broadened to consider more generally the question of why the U.S. has had some successes but mostly failures in its history of assessing Iran.

The third will examine the performance of the intelligence community in the Iran-*contra* case. This case will focus especially on the interaction of the estimating process with the politics of the situation. The purpose of studying this case will, of course, be pedagogic rather than investigative.

The fourth case will consider the Vietnam war--an intelligence success but a policymaking failure. The case will focus on high-level assessment in Washington, especially the evidence and procedures that produced accurate or inaccurate assessments of Vietnam and of the United States.

The fifth case concerns the French in 1940, when extraordinarily accurate estimates of German military plans seem to have been known to analysts but totally ignored or rejected by decision-makers.

IV. The Council

The project will be shaped in part by a series of consultations with current and past senior officials involved in intelligence assessment, policymaking, or congressional oversight. This group, known as "The Council," will consider plans for the project, review its research and case products, and act as both resource and sources of guidance to the effort.

The Council will include a select steering group of about twenty members co-chaired by the Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and the DCI. This steering group will meet twice yearly to provide overall guidance and review of the project. Steering group membership will include senior intelligence community leaders, current or past senior officials with policy roles, and members of Congress involved in oversight of intelligence activities.

In addition, a working-level group will meet more frequently (four to six times each year) to consider particular research products, cases, and other aspects of the project. The working-level group will be somewhat larger (25-40) and will include a core group of regular members. Other individuals with specialized knowledge of the particular topics under discussion will be invited to each meeting.

The format of the meetings may vary, but will generally consist of a late afternoon discussion, followed by a working dinner. Most meetings will be held in Washington.

The first council meeting--which will be for steering group members and Kennedy School project directors--is scheduled for Monday, December 14, 1987, in Washington. This meeting will include presentations by the Harvard participants of the outline of the overall project and an opportunity to discuss its content with the steering group. Dean Graham Allison and Judge William Webster will co-chair this initial meeting.

Coordination and arrangements for all of these meetings are the responsibility of the School's project staff.

V. Training Programs

The next one-week training program for mid-level intelligence analysts will be held at the Kennedy School the first week of November. Project members have taken careful note of the participants' evaluations of the first, experimental program, and are endeavoring to take account of their primary concern that the cases and discussion more explicitly address the role of intelligence assessment in policymaking. The discussions will also attempt to draw more directly on the experience of the analysts participating. Some existing cases will be modified for this program, and new cases are being prepared.

VI. KSG Staff

The project is directed by Kennedy School faculty members Ernest May, Richard Neustadt, Gregory Treverton, and Peter Zimmerman. Administrative assistance is provided by Nancy Huntington; research coordinator is Lynn Whittaker.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

GRAHAM ALLISON
DEAN

79 JOHN F. KENNEDY STREET
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138



October 21, 1987

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

We are delighted to be finally moving ahead with the program on intelligence assessment and policy. The successful completion of negotiations, which stretched our respective bureaucracies a bit, mark an important milestone in the relationship between the intelligence community and the academy.

An important issue that arose in the negotiations was the question of how we make public our joint venture. Our institutions come at this from different perspectives:

The agency has a strict policy prohibiting publicity of its contracts or the use of the agency's affiliation in promotional materials;

Harvard has an unalterable policy regarding public disclosure of all grants and contracts. We have no desire to publicize the project in a promotional way. Nonetheless, we believe it is in the interest of both institutions to work closely over the next few days to craft an appropriate announcement and to coordinate its release.

My instincts are that we move quickly, before someone "discovers" a relationship that we have no intention of keeping secret.

I've enclosed the proposed text of an announcement that could be issued here in Cambridge.

I've asked my associate dean, Peter Zimmerman, who is overseeing the project at this end to be in touch with your office in the next few days.

Again, I want to express my gratitude and enthusiasm for the confidence and commitment you have shown in us. We look forward to the opportunity to work with you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'GTA', written over a horizontal line.

Graham T. Allison

GTA/lcg

Enclosure

November 6, 1987

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add

Dear sal :

I am writing to invite you to become a member of the Steering Committee of a Project on Intelligence Assessment and Policy, being conducted by the Kennedy School of Government. The goal of the project, funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, is to improve the interaction between intelligence and policy in assessing foreign governments and making foreign policy. To that end, the project comprises three sets of activities: developing case studies on intelligence assessment and decisionmaking; undertaking a series of one-week training programs at the Kennedy School for intelligence analysts; and organizing a series of study group meetings on specific issues of intelligence assessment and policy.

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One of my colleagues directing the project will call you in the next few days to answer any questions you may have. We look forward to what we hope will be your favorable response and to your participation in this important project.

Sincerely,

Graham T. Allison

Enclosures

Executive Registry

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
79 JOHN F. KENNEDY STREET
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

Gregory F. Treverton
Lecturer in Public Policy
Senior Research Associate,
Center for Science and International Affairs

(617) 495-9004

November 13, 1987

Judge William Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:


I know that you have been dealing with your colleagues, especially [redacted] about our Intelligence Assessment and Policy Program, but I wanted to close the loop from Harvard's end. Let me repeat how much we look forward to the program -- by now, I imagine you have a read-out from the first two executive seminars we have held here in Cambridge. We also look forward to your participation in the kick-off dinner for the Program's Steering Committee, in Washington on December 14th. I know I speak for my colleagues as well, especially Graham Allison, Ernest May and Richard Neustadt.

STAT

For your information, I enclose the list of those on the Steering Committee, Graham's letter of invitation for the dinner, and a brief description of the Program that was sent with the letter.

We look forward to seeing you on the 14th. With all best wishes,

Yours sincerely,



Gregory F. Treverton

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138



INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND POLICY PROJECT
Project Structure and Planning

I. Overview

The Intelligence Assessment and Policy Project aims to understand better how assessment relates to policymaking and, especially, how policymakers do--and might--use assessments. The three-year program of research and curriculum development is designed to draw on the expertise of both academics and practitioners. By examining and drawing lessons from a series of historical and contemporary cases, the project will develop teaching materials and methods for university courses and training programs for analysts, and produce a variety of publications.

II. Analytic Categories for Assessments

An idealized process by which assessments assist policymaking might be the following. First, a situation exists in which policymakers want to influence or make a decision regarding a foreign government. They need appraisals of the foreign government in order to understand its make-up, resources, objectives, governmental processes, etc. In the course of defining the problem in hand, U.S. objectives, and U.S. options, the policymakers need estimates of the possible effects of U.S. actions on the foreign government and hence of new conditions that the United States may face at some later point. We think of "assessment" as analysis of U.S. problems and policy choices informed by analysis of how other governments may perceive *their* problems and choices. It is hence inherently an activity requiring cooperation and interaction between decision-makers and experts.

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B. ABSENCE OF CRUCIAL ELEMENTS

3. *Missing market difficulty.* In this situation, the analyst has created what he/she views as an important estimate, but discovers that there is no apparent market for the news. The difficulty here is that the estimate will not be utilized, unless the analyst finds or creates the market.
4. *Missing or inadequate product difficulty.* In this situation, the policymaker has specifically requested an estimate or the policy process itself is clearly in need of it, but the intelligence an analyst needs is missing or inadequate. The difficulty here is that the intelligence community is unable to fill its assigned role of contributing to policymaking. Policy may thus be made in ignorance of vital information, and the reputation of the intelligence community itself could be harmed.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING

5. *"Intragovernmental" difficulty.* In this situation, the analyst provides an estimate in which he/she has confidence, but the different policymakers who receive the estimate have different policy preferences, and the estimate becomes a pawn in their internal games. Here, the estimate may eventually be well-utilized, but the difficulty is that it may be misused, ignored, or used selectively or only after delay.
6. *"Transition" difficulty.* In this situation, a newly appointed official or a new presidential administration faces a policy decision, but the newcomer or newcomers are unfamiliar with the structures and offices of the government and not only may not know which questions to ask but also may not know how to go about finding the necessary answers. The difficulty for the analyst is, again, that policies will be made in absence of adequate assessment, and while it may not do harm to the intelligence community, it will deprive it of early opportunities to make a positive contribution.

The cases to be examined will be chosen on the basis of potential for helping to answer the question, "What makes for assessments that are better than usual?" Partly for sound logical reasons but also because much prior study has focused on mishaps, other cases will contribute by answering, "What made for assessments that were worse than usual?" The following list of questions suggests some of the points to be addressed in each case: Did education, training, and/or career pattern seem to make any difference? What did individuals on the policy side stand to gain or lose from acquiring working expertise about a foreign government? Did the nature of organization or process make a difference? How were analyses of foreign governments affected by the make-up of the analyzing agencies and the mix of types of intelligence (human, signal, etc.) or types of expertise (regional, functional, etc.)? Were overall assessments better to the extent that intelligence analysis was kept separate from decision-making or to the extent that the two meshed? Who asked for (or got) what kind of information, when, and to what result? Did experts and policymakers have different judgments

about how to communicate with or influence the foreign government? If so, why? To the extent one can judge, who was more nearly right? What propositions are most nearly validated by experience? How and in what circumstances have experts induced alteration in the preconceptions of policymakers? How and in what circumstances have policymakers induced alteration in the preconceptions of experts?

The cases will be crosscut in four categories defining the relationship between the assessing government and the foreign government: familiar friends, unfamiliar friends, familiar foes, and unfamiliar foes. Possible cases are listed under these categories below, although the process of examining them will help to determine if their initial placement is correct or if they, in fact, fit into more than one category. For example, a situation that a policymaker might characterize as "Unwelcome News" may look to an analyst like news for which he faces a "Missing Market." In addition, as cases are studied, the categories may well need to be refined.

DIFFICULTIES	Familiar Friends	Unfamiliar Friends	Familiar Foes	Unfamiliar Foes
Unwelcome News	Suez '56	Marcos Shah	France '40	Iran/contra
Too-welcome News	France '36		Hitler tractable	Arms control treaty violations
Missing Market	Skybolt		Vansittart (UK 30s)	PRC '50
Missing or Inadequate Product	INF '78/9 Yom Kippur War	Shah		
Intragov. Politics	Six-Day War (US)	Lebanon '82/3	Six-Day War (Israel)	
Transition	Truman & Japan		SALT '77	Bay of Pigs

III. Cases

All the historical situations above are possible candidates for case studies. We will also solicit ideas for cases from analysts in the project's training programs and Council participants. We expect to prepare twelve to eighteen cases; for the immediate future, we are focusing on five.

The first is a comparison and contrast of the contribution of assessments to policymaking during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Although the two wars were similar, the first was an intelligence and policymaking success for the U.S. and Israel and the second was a failure,

so we expect to be able to draw some instructive contrasts. The case will examine both U.S. and Israeli assessments of the situation.

The second will focus on the fall of the Shah in Iran and its aftermath. Drawing on the excellent literature on the subject and the reflections of participants, the case will make explicit the lessons from this intelligence failure. The case may also be broadened to consider more generally the question of why the U.S. has had some successes but mostly failures in its history of assessing Iran.

The third will examine the performance of the intelligence community in the Iran-*contra* case. This case will focus especially on the interaction of the estimating process with the politics of the situation. The purpose of studying this case will, of course, be pedagogic rather than investigative.

The fourth case will consider the Vietnam war--an intelligence success but a policymaking failure. The case will focus on high-level assessment in Washington, especially the evidence and procedures that produced accurate or inaccurate assessments of Vietnam and of the United States.

The fifth case concerns the French in 1940, when extraordinarily accurate estimates of German military plans seem to have been known to analysts but totally ignored or rejected by decision-makers.

IV. The Council

The project will be shaped in part by a series of consultations with current and past senior officials involved in intelligence assessment, policymaking, or congressional oversight. This group, known as "The Council," will consider plans for the project, review its research and case products, and act as both resource and sources of guidance to the effort.

The Council will include a select steering group of about twenty members co-chaired by the Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and the DCI. This steering group will meet twice yearly to provide overall guidance and review of the project. Steering group membership will include senior intelligence community leaders, current or past senior officials with policy roles, and members of Congress involved in oversight of intelligence activities.

In addition, a working-level group will meet more frequently (four to six times each year) to consider particular research products, cases, and other aspects of the project. The working-level group will be somewhat larger (25-40) and will include a core group of regular members. Other individuals with specialized knowledge of the particular topics under discussion will be invited to each meeting.

The format of the meetings may vary, but will generally consist of a late afternoon discussion, followed by a working dinner. Most meetings will be held in Washington.

The first council meeting--which will be for steering group members and Kennedy School project directors--is scheduled for Monday, December 14, 1987, in Washington. This meeting will include presentations by the Harvard participants of the outline of the overall project and an opportunity to discuss its content with the steering group. Dean Graham Allison and Judge William Webster will co-chair this initial meeting.

Coordination and arrangements for all of these meetings are the responsibility of the School's project staff.

V. Training Programs

The next one-week training program for mid-level intelligence analysts will be held at the Kennedy School the first week of November. Project members have taken careful note of the participants' evaluations of the first, experimental program, and are endeavoring to take account of their primary concern that the cases and discussion more explicitly address the role of intelligence assessment in policymaking. The discussions will also attempt to draw more directly on the experience of the analysts participating. Some existing cases will be modified for this program, and new cases are being prepared.

VI. KSG Staff

The project is directed by Kennedy School faculty members Ernest May, Richard Neustadt, Gregory Treverton, and Peter Zimmerman. Administrative assistance is provided by Nancy Huntington; research coordinator is Lynn Whittaker.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

18 November 1987

STAT MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Chief, Media Relations, PAO

STAT FROM: [REDACTED]
Office of Training and Education

SUBJECT: Background Information on Harvard University
Program on Intelligence Assessment and Policy

1. The contract between CIA and Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government establishes a 3-year unclassified program of research and training regarding intelligence and the policymaking process. The long range goal of the Program on Intelligence Assessment and Policy is to promote greater understanding by intelligence and policy professionals of each other's world, values, and practices.

2. As Dean Allison has stated, "This is a path breaking venture for both Harvard and the intelligence community." CIA and Harvard University will be working together--openly and on an unclassified basis--to advance the national security interests of the United States.

3. Exploratory talks for this new relationship began in early 1986, including during the 13 February visit of Dr. Gates, then DDI, to Harvard to deliver an address on "CIA and the University." Dr. Gates and the Kennedy School faculty sought new programs that both the Agency and the University believed fully met their interests, standards, and requirements.

4. The Program consists of the following elements:

A. A SEMINAR ON INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND DECISIONMAKING. The Seminar will be held twice a year at Cambridge, for branch and division chiefs, mostly from the Directorate of Intelligence, but also from other parts of the Agency and Intelligence Community. The course features case studies on how policy officials have related to the assessments of government experts in making key decisions.

The initial running of the Seminar, under a special contract, was held in March 1987. Intelligence managers from CIA, State/INR, DIA, NSA, National Intelligence Council, and Intelligence Community Staff participated in the 1-7 November running of the Seminar.

B. INTELLIGENCE-SPECIFIC CASE STUDIES. The Kennedy School faculty is to develop case studies to help identify what works and what doesn't in providing effective analytic support to policy decisionmakers. The selected cases will examine various patterns and challenges, such as how best to deliver "bad news." Harvard will use these case studies in their programs for policymakers as well as for intelligence analysts and managers. Intelligence Agencies will be able to employ the case studies in their own training courses.

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One case study already underway searches for the "lessons" in the performance of the intelligence communities of both the United States and Israel regarding the 1967 Middle East War (which is thought of as an intelligence "success" for both countries), and the 1973 Middle East War (which is regarded as an intelligence "failure").

C. AN INTELLIGENCE-POLICY-ACADEMIC COUNCIL. Harvard will sponsor and run a Council on Intelligence and Policy. A Steering Group will provide general guidance to the overall Program. Working Groups of the Council will meet several times per year, principally to review the case studies produced under the contract.

Judge Webster and Dean Graham Allison will serve as Co-Chairmen of the Council. The first meeting is scheduled for Washington in mid-December. Both the Steering Group and the Working Groups will have representatives from the academic and non-governmental communities as well as from intelligence and policy organizations. Members of Congress and congressional staff members will be invited to participate, along with representatives of the Executive Branch.

D. OFFICER IN RESIDENCE PROGRAM, under which a CIA manager ^{will soon be} ~~is already~~ at Harvard for a year to serve as a referant on the world of intelligence.

E. Expanded CIA participation in Kennedy School's midcareer and executive programs, where again the findings of the case studies will be employed.

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30 SEP 1987
OTE 87-6715

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Public Affairs

FROM:

[Redacted]

Director of Training and Education

SUBJECT:

Request for Attendance of DCI and DDCI
at Kennedy School Function on 12 November

1. CIA has contracted with the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University for a program of activities in support of improved relations between intelligence and policy officials. A key aspect of the program is a Harvard-sponsored Council on Intelligence and Policy.

2. Kennedy School would like to launch the Council with a dinner meeting in Washington, with both the DCI and DDCI in attendance. The President of Harvard University and the Dean of Kennedy School would be in attendance. The Secretaries of Defense and State, the National Security Council Advisor, and the Directors of other Intelligence Agencies would also be invited.

3. Kennedy School would like to extend invitations to the DCI and the DDCI for Thursday evening, 12 November, and has asked for my good offices to ascertain their availability. I agree with their decision to make every effort to have the DCI and the DDCI in attendance at the inaugural meeting of this dramatic departure for both institutions (Harvard and CIA working together in the national interest). Thus, if 12 November is not a suitable date, they will seek a date that is.

4. I am attaching a copy of my memorandum on the overall program, with which the DDCI planned to brief the Director on this enterprise. Please let me know how you see this working out.

[Redacted]

Attachment

STAT

STAT

OTE 87-6713

16 SEP 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Executive Director
Deputy Director for Administration

FROM:
Director of Training and Education

SUBJECT: Kennedy School Program

STAT

1. The program you initiated for expanded relations between CIA and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government is ready to take off. It is dedicated to increasing the understanding by intelligence and policy professionals of each other's world, values and practices. The program:

a. A SEMINAR ON INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND DECISIONMAKING held twice a year at Cambridge for branch and division chiefs, mostly from the Directorate of Intelligence, but also from other parts of the Agency and Intelligence Community. The seminar features case studies on how policy officials relate to government experts, and includes units on the roles of both Congress and the media. The first seminar was held in March 1987 under a special contract. The second is scheduled for early November.

b. INTELLIGENCE-SPECIFIC CASE STUDIES undertaken by the Kennedy School faculty to identify what works and what doesn't in providing analytic support to policymakers. The selected cases will examine various patterns, such as the deliverance of "bad news." Harvard will use these in their programs for policymakers as well as for us. Intelligence Agencies will be able to employ them in their own training courses.

c. AN INTELLIGENCE-POLICY-ACADEMIC COUNCIL will meet twice per year under Harvard's auspices to discuss recurring issues in policy support (e.g., relevance and objectivity); and will also sponsor working groups to review the case studies produced under the program. The first meeting is tentatively scheduled for Washington in late November. Kennedy School will invite both you and the DCI, and is thinking about Frank Carlucci as keynote speaker.

d. OFFICER IN RESIDENCE PROGRAM, under which we already have a CIA manager at Harvard for a year to serve as a referant on the world of intelligence.

SUBJECT: Kennedy School Program

e. Expanded CIA participation in Kennedy School's midcareer and executive programs, where again the findings of the case studies will be employed.

2. The programs are covered by a three-year contract, with an annual cost of some \$400K. A good bit of defining and shaking down remains. But it sure looks like a winner: CIA and Harvard University working together in the national interest.



OTE/ITD:  (16Sep87)

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ALLISON, GRAHAM TILLET, JR., educator; b. Charlotte, N.C., Mar. 23, 1940; s. Graham Tillett and Virginia (Wright) A.; m. Elisabeth Kovacs Smith, Aug. 23, 1968. A.B., Harvard U., 1962. Ph.D., 1968; B.A., M.A., Hertford Coll., Oxford (Eng.) U., 1964. Asst. prof. John F. Kennedy Sch. Govt., Harvard U., Cambridge, Mass., 1968-70, asso. prof., 1970-72, prof., 1972--; asso. dean, 1975-77, dean, 1977--; fellow Center for Advanced Studies, Stanford, Palo Alto, Calif., 1973-74; asso. Center for Internat. Affairs, Harvard U., cons. Rand Corp., U.S. Dept. Def., others.; mem. numerous Nat. Acad. Sci. panels; mem. Trilateral Commn., Council on Fgn. Relations.; mem. Fgn. Affairs Task Force Democratic Adv. Com., 1974-80; mem. vis. com. on fgn policy studies Brookings Instn. Author: *Essence of Decision*, 1971. *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection*, 1976. *Sharing International Responsibility Among the Trilateral Countries*, 1983. (with Carnesale and Nye) *Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War*, 1985; contrb. articles to profl. jous. Home: 69 Pinehurst Rd Belmont MA 02178 Office: John F Kennedy Sch Govt Harvard U 79 John F Kennedy St Cambridge MA 02138

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

ERNEST R. MAY
*Charles Warren Professor
of History*

*John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 Kennedy Street
Tel.: (617) 495-1109*

May 1986

ERNEST RICHARD MAY

Ernest R. May is an authority on American diplomatic history. He has been professor of History since 1963. He was Dean of Harvard College from 1969 to 1971 and Acting Associate Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences during the academic year 1971-72. He was Director of the Institute of Politics from 1971 to 1974 and Chairman of the Department of History from 1976 to 1979. In 1981 he was named Charles Warren Professor of History.

Born in Fort Worth, Texas, Professor May holds A.B. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California at Los Angeles. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has been a consultant at various times to the office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Smithsonian Institution, and committees of the Congress.

His publications include "The World War & American Isolation 1914-17" (1959), "The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief" (1960), "Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power" (1961), "American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay" (1968), "'Lessons' of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy" (1973), "The Making of the Monroe Doctrine" (1975), and "A Proud Nation" (1983). He is author of two volumes in the "Life History of the United States" (1964) dealing with the years 1900-1929 and co-author of "Land of the Free" (1964), and "Careers for Humanists" (1981). He was the general editor of the four-volume study of "The American Image" (1963), and the co-editor of "American-East Asian Relations: A Survey" (1972) and "Campaign '72: The Managers Speak" (1973). His most recent publications are "Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars" (1985) and (with Richard E. Neustadt) "Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers" (1986).

In addition to teaching courses on the international relations of the United States and the uses of history in public policy analysis, Professor May has served as co-director of a project for developing careers in business for Ph.D.'s in the humanities and social sciences and of a project for developing a curriculum in historical analysis for schools of public administration and business administration. He was chairman of an American Council of Learned Societies-Social Science Research Council-Council on Library Resources Committee on the Records of Government. He is currently chairman of the committees that oversee doctoral programs in the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT

Richard E. Neustadt is Douglas Dillon Professor of Government in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He teaches in Harvard College and in the Kennedy School's graduate programs of education for public service. From 1965 to 1975 he served as Professor of Government at Harvard and Associate Dean of the Kennedy School. From 1966 to 1971 he was the first director of the Kennedy School's Institute of Politics, which offers non-curricular programs for faculty and students interested in politics and public policy. From 1978 to 1987, before assuming his present chair, he held the Lucius N. Littauer professorship of public administration.

Born in Philadelphia, PA., on June 26, 1919, Professor Neustadt received the A.B. degree from the University of California at Berkeley in 1939, and the M.A. degree from Harvard in 1941. He received the Ph.D. degree from Harvard in 1951.

He became a Visiting Professor at Cornell University for the year 1953-54. From 1954 to 1965 he was Professor of Government at Columbia University. In 1961-62 he visited at Nuffield College, Oxford University, and subsequently was an Associate Member of the College (1964-67). He has lectured extensively in Britain on American governmental subjects, and also at various times in Germany, India, Poland, and Yugoslavia. In 1966 he delivered the William Radner Lectures at Columbia University. In 1975 he visited Japan as the guest of International House. In 1976 he delivered the William W. Cook Lectures at the University of Michigan. In 1978-79 he was a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. In 1986 he delivered the third Brewster C. Denny Lecture at the University of Washington.

Professor Neustadt worked for the Office of Price Administration in 1942, then spent four years in the U.S. Navy. From 1946 to 1950 he was a member of the Budget Bureau staff. He then served as a member of President Truman's White House staff to 1953. In 1959 Professor Neustadt became a Consultant to the Jackson Subcommittee of the Senate on National Security Staffing and Operations. In 1960 he served as a Special Consultant to President-elect Kennedy, and in 1961 became a Consultant to the President, advising on problems of government organization and operation at home and abroad. He served as such under President Kennedy and again under President Johnson through 1966. At various times during the 1960s Professor Neustadt also served as a consultant to the Bureau of the Budget, the State and Defense Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Rand Corporation. In 1952 and 1956 he served as staff and in 1972 as chair of the Platform Committee for the Democratic National Convention. In 1977 he became a consultant to the President's Reorganization Project in the Office of Management and Budget. The next year he completed an administrative study for the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, done in collaboration with Harvey V. Fineberg. This was published as The Swine Flu Affair (1978) and republished as The Epidemic That Never Was (1983).

Professor Neustadt is known for his most recent book, Thinking in Time (with Ernest R. May, 1986) and for two earlier books, Presidential Power (1960; rev. 1980), and Alliance Politics (1970). He has written numbers of articles in scholarly journals on aspects of the Presidency and on Anglo-American comparisons. He serves on the board of the Harry S. Truman Library Institute. He is a member of the American Philosophical Society, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a member of the American Political Science Association, the National Academy of Public Administration, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Institute of Strategic Studies. He is a member of the Cosmos Club in Washington.

In 1961 Presidential Power received the Woodrow Wilson Award of the American Political Science Association. In 1983 Professor Neustadt received the Charles E. Merriam Award of the same Association.

Professor Neustadt is a widower with two children, Elizabeth of Boston and Richard M. of New York. He lives in Cambridge and Wellfleet, Massachusetts.

June 1987

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Peter B. Zimmerman

Peter B. Zimmerman is Associate Dean and Director of Executive Training and Program Development. His duties include coordinating the development and operation of the School's training programs for senior executives in government, the public management research and case development programs. A graduate of the Kennedy School's Public Policy Program, Mr. Zimmerman has worked for the Navy's Security Council staff. He has consulted for the National Security Council, the Murphy Commission, the Senate Intelligence Committee, and other public and nonprofit organizations.

DAVE McCURDY, Democrat, of Norman, OK; born in Canadian, TX, March 30, 1950; attended Yukon, OK, public schools; graduated, Yukon High School, 1968; B.A., 1972; J.D., 1975, University of Oklahoma; Rotary graduate fellow, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, international economics, 1977-78; Captain, U.S. Air Force Reserve; lawyer; admitted to the Oklahoma State Bar in 1975 and commenced practice in 1975; assistant attorney general, State of Oklahoma, 1975-77; member, firm of Luttrell, Pen-darvis & Rawlinson, 1978-79; private practice, 1979-80; member: Rotary; Jaycees; Chamber of Commerce; Young Lawyers Division of the Oklahoma Bar Association; University Lutheran Chapel; 1 of 10 Outstanding Young Men of America by United States Jaycees, 1984; chairman, CDM Task Force on Foreign Defense and Foreign Policy; married to the former Pamela Mary Plumb, M.D., 1971; three children: Joshua David, Cydney Marie, and Shannon Rose; elected to the 97th Congress, November 4, 1980; re-elected to each succeeding Congress.

WOOLSEY, ROBERT JAMES, JR., lawyer; b. Tulsa, Sept. 21, 1941; s. Robert James and Clyde (Kirby) W.; m. Suzanne Haley, Aug. 15, 1965; children—Robert Nathaniel, Daniel James, Benjamin Haley. B.A. with great distinction, Stanford U., 1963; M.A. (Rhodes scholar), Oxford (Eng.) U., 1965; LL.B., Yale U., 1968. Bar: Calif. bar 1969, D.C. bar 1970. Atty. firm O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, 1968; program analyst Office Sec. Def., Washington, 1968-70, NSC, Washington, 1970; gen. counsel Com. Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 1970-73; asso. firm Shea & Gardner, Washington, 1973-77, partner, 1979—; undersec. of navy, 1977-79; advisor U.S. del. SALT, Helsinki and Vienna, 1969-70. Trustee Stanford U., 1972-74. Served with U.S. Army, 1968-70. Danforth scholar, 1963; Woodrow Wilson fellow, 1963. Mem. Council Fgn. Relations, Stanford Assos., Phi Beta Kappa. Presbyn. Club: Metropolitan (Washington). Home: 6808 Florida St Chevy Chase MD 20815 Office: Shea & Gardner 1800 Massachusetts Ave NW Washington DC 20036

Members of the Steering Committee:

The Honorable William Webster Dean Graham Allison	Director of Central Intelligence Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
--	---

The Honorable Michael Armacost	Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
Dr. Robert M. Gates General David Jones	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Richard J. Kerr	Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
The Honorable Dave McCurdy Lt. Gen. William E. Odom	U.S. House of Representatives Director National Security Agency
The Honorable Caspar Weinberger Mr. R. James Woolsey Lt. Gen. Edward Heinz	former Secretary of Defense former Undersecretary of the Navy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

Other Agency Guests:

James H. Taylor William F. Donnelly John Helgerson	Executive Director Deputy Director for Administration Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence Director of Training and Education Office of Training and Education
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Kennedy School Project Members:

Professor Ernest R. May
Professor Richard Neustadt
Dr. Gregory F. Treverton
Associate Dean Peter Zimmerman
Ms. Lynn Whittaker

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138



STEERING COMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND POLICY PROJECT

Co-Chairmen:

Dean Graham Allison, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Judge William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence

Invitees for Membership:

- * Morton I. Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and Research Bureau
- Michael Armacost, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
- Senator Bill Bradley, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Frank Carlucci, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - Declined
- Congressman Richard Cheney, House Select Committee on Intelligence
- Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Lt. Gen. Edward Heinz, Director of Intelligence Community Staff
- William Hyland, Editor, *Foreign Affairs* - Declined
- * Admiral Bobby Inman, Westmark Systems, Inc.
- * Professor Robert Jervis, Columbia University
- General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Richard Kerr, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
- * Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Congressman Dave McCurdy, House Select Committee on Intelligence
- Senator Sam Nunn, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Declined
- Lt. Gen. William Odom, Director of the National Security Agency
- Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
- * James Schlesinger, Counsel, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- General Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- George Shultz, Secretary of State - Declined
- Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense
- James Woolsey, Shea & Gardner
- * Will be a member of the Steering Committee, but unable to attend dinner 14 Dec.



John F. Kennedy
School of Government
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

NEWS

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Wednesday, December 2, 1987

CONTACT: Steve Singer
617/495-1115

HARVARD ANNOUNCES PROGRAM ON INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING

CAMBRIDGE--- Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government announced today a new program of research and training on intelligence assessment and policy. The three-year program, which is sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, will be inaugurated at a dinner in Washington on Monday, December 14, 1987.

Professor Ernest R. May, Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard and a distinguished military and diplomatic historian, is the program director. Professor Richard E. Neustadt, Dr. Gregory F. Treverton and Associate Dean Peter Zimmerman are other Harvard faculty participating in the research.

"This is a path breaking venture for both Harvard and the intelligence community," Professor May said. "In the modern world, our very lives depend on effective assessment of foreign intelligence. We hope our research will be illuminating to intelligence analysts and policymakers alike."

"The overall purpose of the program is to help those who prepare assessments of foreign events, and those who make foreign policy decisions, better understand one another's needs, interests, cultures, and perspectives," said Professor Neustadt. "In our country, the gap between them has often been wide, with bad effects on foreign policy. Our hope is that our research can make a modest contribution toward narrowing that gap."

--more--

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM -- 2 -- 2

The program has four components, including: preparation of a number of case studies examining how intelligence assessments were made, how they were communicated to policymakers and with what results; meetings with current and past officials to discuss possible lessons of these cases; twice a year, one-week executive training sessions for senior analysts seeking to make the work of the intelligence community more useful in policymaking; and an intelligence analyst, who will participate in the project and who will be one of the school's research associates in national security.

The program will be launched at the inaugural meeting of the program's steering group, which will advise on the research agenda and serve as a resource for the program. The group includes a number of current and former members of Congress, cabinet officers and other government officials with oversight, policy, and intelligence responsibilities.

None of the work associated with the program will involve any classified information. The work is consistent with university policy and the principles of academic freedom, and all research products and case studies will be freely available for use at Harvard and elsewhere, according to program officials.

"As with all other research at this university, our ultimate aim is increased public understanding," said Professor Neustadt.

The three-year program is funded at approximately \$400,000 per year.

Other national security seminars offered by the School include the eight-week Program for Senior Officials in National Security, and the two-week Program in National and International Security. The School also conducts a short Defense Policy Seminar in Washington twice a year.

The Washington Post _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 2A
 Date 5 Dec 1987

CIA says it will fund Harvard research project

By George Jahn
Associated Press

BOSTON — The CIA has agreed to lift some of the secrecy surrounding programs it funds at universities by acknowledging for the first time that it is financing a major project at a Harvard institute, officials said yesterday.

And, also for the first time, the agency will permit unrestricted publishing of results.

The \$1.2 million project at the John F. Kennedy School of Government will begin Dec. 14, associate dean Peter Zimmerman said.

It will try to bridge "the large gap between the assessments of foreign situations done by the intelligence analysts ... and the foreign policy decision-makers," project member Richard E. Neustadt said.

"I think this can be seen as a small victory for academia and in favor of more openness in discussing historical issues that have nonetheless been quite sensitive and have not been open to scholarly research," Zimmerman said.

CIA spokesman Bill Devine confirmed that the CIA had never before agreed to go public with news of university research or allowed free publishing of program conclusions.

It took more than eight months of negotiations for the two sides to agree on the program, officials said.

"The reason it took so long was because ... we are not in the habit of having such open contracts," Devine said in a telephone interview. "Most of our work is done on contracts that are kept secret, and that's the way it's been done for years."

Deputy CIA Director Robert M. Gates approved the project, he said.

The three-year program will have four components: preparation of case studies on how intelligence assessments were made; seminars with government officials to discuss intelligence decisions; three one-week training sessions for senior analysts, and the participation of a CIA analyst.

It will be directed by Ernest R. May, the Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard. Professor Gregory F. Treverton and Zimmerman also will participate in the research.

Some information could be declassified because of the program, although that was not its primary purpose, Neustadt and Zimmerman said.

"We're hoping that in some instances we can get some material declassified," Zimmerman said. "One of our strict rules is we will not sign any contracts that require for anybody on staff to have access to classified information."

C.I.A. Aids Harvard Study on Intelligence Policy

The New York Times A19
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 4 DEC 87

By **MARTIN TOLCHIN**
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 3 — The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University announced today that the Central Intelligence Agency had provided \$400,000 for a three-year program of research and training on intelligence assessment and policy.

The program will have four components: preparation of case studies examining how intelligence assessments were made; meetings with current and former officials to discuss possible lessons of these cases; one-week executive training sessions, held twice a year, for senior analysts, and the participation of an intelligence analyst.

None of the work will involve information classified for security reasons.

"The work is consistent with university policy and the principles of academic freedom," the school said in a statement, "and all research products and case studies will be freely available for use at Harvard and elsewhere."

'Knowing Your Own Government'

The program will be directed by Ernest R. May, the Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard. Prof. Richard E. Neustadt, Dr. Gregory F. Treverton and Associate Dean Peter

Zimmerman will also participate in the research.

Professor Neustadt said in an interview that the program was an outgrowth of a recent book he had written with Professor May, "Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Making."

"A couple of years ago," Professor Neustadt said, "we started a course called Foreign Assessment, dealing specifically with the problem of how you think about another government when you have something specific in mind that you want to do with it, or you think it might want to do with or to you."

"As we see it, it's a double problem," he added. "It's not just a problem of looking at the other government, but also a problem of knowing your own government, and what's on the minds of decision makers. We think that the second task is much harder than the first one."

Other national security seminars offered by the Kennedy school include an eight-week program for senior officials in national security and a two-week program in national and international security.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY GAZETTE, December 4, 1987.

Intelligence Policy Program Announced at Kennedy School

A new program of research and training on intelligence assessment and policy has been announced by the John F. Kennedy School of Government (KSG). The three-year program, sponsored by the US Central Intelligence Agency, will be inaugurated at a dinner in Washington on Monday, December 14.

Ernest R. May, Charles Warren Professor of History, is the program director. Professor Richard E. Neustadt, Dr. Gregory F. Treverton and KSG Associate Dean Peter Zimmerman are also participating in the research.

"This is a path-breaking venture for both Harvard and the intelligence community," May said. "In the modern world, our very lives depend on effective assessment of foreign intelligence. We hope our research will be illuminating to intelligence analysts and policy makers alike."

"The overall purpose of the program is to help those who prepare assessments of foreign events and those who make foreign policy decisions better understand one another's needs, interests, cultures, and perspectives," said Neustadt. "In our country, the gap between them has often been wide, with bad effects on foreign policy. Our hope is that our research can make a modest contribution toward narrowing that gap."

The program has four components, including: preparation of a number of case studies examining how intelligence assessments were made, how they were communicated to policymakers and with what results; meetings with current and past

officials to discuss possible lessons of these cases; twice a year, one-week executive training sessions for senior analysts seeking to make the work of the intelligence community more useful in policymaking; and an intelligence analyst, who will participate in the project and who will be one of the school's research associates in national security.

The program will be launched at the inaugural meeting of the program's steering group, which will advise on the research agenda and serve as a resource for the program. The group includes a number of current and former members of Congress, cabinet officers, and other government officials with oversight, policy, and intelligence responsibilities.

None of the work associated with the program will involve any classified information. The work is consistent with University policy and the principles of academic freedom, and all research products and case studies will be freely available for use at Harvard and elsewhere, according to program officials.

"As with all other research at this University, our ultimate aim is increased public understanding," Neustadt said.

The three-year program is funded at approximately \$400,000 per year.

Other national security seminars offered by the KSG include the eight-week Program for Senior Officials in National Security, and the two-week Program in National and International Security. The school also conducts a short Defense Policy Seminar in Washington twice a year.

CIA waives secrecy rule for \$1m Harvard study

By Ross Gelbspan
and Jerry Ackerman
Globe Staff

In a major policy departure, the US Central Intelligence Agency has agreed to accept Harvard University's guidelines and waive its traditional secrecy requirements for a research project it will fund at the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

The three-year, \$1.2 million project, announced yesterday, will examine why intelligence assessments are frequently ignored, misconstrued or overridden by US foreign policy decision-makers.

The agency's shift follows eight months of negotiations that focused on Harvard's guidelines, set by university president Derek Bok, that bar faculty members

from accepting government contracts requiring that either the existence or the results of the work be kept secret.

The CIA has traditionally insisted that all its contracts with research institutions - as well as the results of such sponsored research - be kept secret.

CIA spokesman Bill Devine said CIA deputy director Robert Gates decided to approve the unclassified project "because Harvard wanted it that way."

But Devine said the agency regarded the contract as an experiment, rather than a precedent. "Whether we will fund other open, declassified university programs in the future depends on our experience with this effort," he said

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In a telephone interview.

The project will be administered by Ernest May, a history professor; Richard Neustadt, a professor of government and one-time aide to former President Kennedy; Gregory F. Treverton, a lecturer in foreign policy at the Kennedy school, and Peter Zimmerman, associate dean at the Kennedy school.

The fall of the shah of Iran, the more recent Iran-contra affair and the collapse of the Marcos regime in the Philippines may be among cases to be studied, Neustadt said in a telephone interview last night.

Subject choices, however, will depend in part on whether the CIA allows access to case files, he said. "They may declare that some information can't be made available," he said.

May said he and Neustadt believe that communication difficulties between intelligence specialists and policy-makers seem chronic and may be rooted in both sides failing to understand how the other thinks.

Describing the CIA's need for such a study, Devine said: "It is

ironic that we have analysts and case officers who can describe the workings of foreign governments - and how policy is made around the world - and still have little knowledge of how such policy is made in this country. The purpose of the project is to make people smarter about how to use intelligence analysis in formulating US foreign policy."

Devine noted that case studies of differing intelligence assessments can be conducted without compromising sensitive information. "Experienced researchers can separate out the information and analysis and still protect intelligence sources and methods at the same time. It's a fine line, but there are experienced, sophisticated people in the program," he added.

The Kennedy school project will also include six seminars for CIA executives to discuss the historic cases that May, Neustadt and Treverton will prepare. Two such seminars were held on a pilot basis in the last academic year, May said.

In a debate about academic freedom and sponsored research two years ago, Gates said he doubted the agency could enter into open contracts with university researchers, according to John

Shattuck, a Harvard vice president and former legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union.

Shattuck, a longtime specialist in academic freedom and government secrecy, speculated that Gates' recent approval of the open contract with Harvard may reflect a new approach to the academic community by CIA Director William Webster. Webster, former FBI director, took over the reins of the agency several months ago, following the death of former CIA chief William Casey.

The agreement "is a harbinger of new directions for the CIA in its relations with the academic world," Shattuck said.

Shattuck explained that Harvard's guidelines require that every research grant the university accepts be publicly disclosed; that no sponsored research involve classified information; and that all results of sponsored research be available for open publication and distribution.

The director of Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Nadav Safran, was forced to quit his post two years ago after it was learned he had secretly accepted \$150,000 in grants from the CIA and had given the agency the right to censor his work.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1987

C.I.A. Aids Harvard Study on Intelligence Policy

By MARTIN TOLCHIN

Special to The New York Times

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CIA to Fund K-School Project

Terms of \$400K Grant Made Public In Novel Arrangement

By NOAM S. COHEN

The Central Intelligence Agency will fund a \$400,000 Kennedy School of Government research project to assess how policy makers use the agency's intelligence information, the school announced yesterday.

The three-year long project, organized by faculty members Warren Professor of History Ernest May and Dillon Professor of Government Richard Neustadt and K-School Lecturer Gregory F. Treverton, is being called a major change in CIA-university relations, because the research will be made public and the intelligence agency will be identified as the funder of the project.

"The funding is totally above board and the results will be unclassified," Kennedy School Dean Graham T. Allison '62 said last night. Public acknowledgement of funding and unclassified results are "unprecedented [for the CIA], but a necessary condition for University research," the dean said.

In recent years President Bok and other academics have expressed concern over the ethics of scholars agreeing to not disclose their CIA funding and allowing the agency to make changes in manuscripts. According to Kennedy school offi-

cial Bok and other top University administrators had no misgivings about the recently finalized contract with the agency.

Under the terms of this grant, the project will fund the publication of case studies and the training for senior CIA analysts. The grant also will be used to pay for a CIA analyst to become a research associate at Harvard this January.

Kennedy School officials said the school negotiated with the CIA for more than a year to convince the agency to break with its normal policy of keeping all research contracts and their results secret. The agency approved the Harvard contract on a "non-precedent" basis, officials said.

Openness the Issue

"In the negotiations [openness] has been one of the toughest issues," said Associate Dean Peter Zimmerman, who will help administer the program. "It is harder to deal with this policy because Harvard has an invariable policy. Eighty percent of the discussions with the CIA were about openness."

Under the terms of the agreement, which will be inaugurated at a Washington, D.C. dinner later this month, for two weeks each year

Kennedy school faculty will hold "executive training sessions," for senior CIA analysts. The rest of the grant will support the creation of case studies.

Neustadt said he and May will publish the research in a book. Neustadt said he expects to study such recent foreign policy intelligence activities as those in the Phillipines and in Iran. The former aide to President Harry S Truman said he did not think the research would be completed in three years and that the arrangement with the CIA may need to be extended.

"We have hopes that over a long period of time we will learn enough and get enough case material declassified to sharply illustrate very simple questions" about how policy-makers use CIA fact gathering, said Neustadt.

As an example, the professor pointed to a famous incident during the Korean War, where a military strategist ignored the advice of his intelligence officers.

"It lead to the longest retreat in American military history," Neustadt said.

"Without some people on the inside saying 'help these people because they will help the government,' we
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will never get enough material we need to understand the process," Neustadt said.

In recent years, Harvard and the agency have clashed over traditional

restrictions placed on research funded by CIA grants. These restrictions include pre-publication review of books and a requirement that contracts must remain secret.

In January 1986 Albertson Professor of Middle Eastern Studies Nadav Safran resigned as director of Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies after his acceptance of more than \$150,000 in CIA grants became public. In one of the contracts, Safran agreed to give the agency pre-publication review and the right to censor his work, and agreed to keep the contract secret.

Soon after the uproar about the Safran disclosures, Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert M. Gates gave a speech at the K-School indicating that the agency had to be more accommodating of academic rules, like Harvard's, which require public disclosure of research funding. He said that it would be up to individual scholars whether CIA funding would

be publicly acknowledged.

Allison said the K-School's contract was a natural progression from Gates' accommodating language in that 1986 speech.

"It is an encouraging sign that Gates came here to take one step and now we have taken another," Allison said.

According to organizers of the Kennedy School program, negotiations began with Gates during his February, 1986 visit.

Prompted by the Safran case, President Bok wrote an open letter to the Harvard community in November of that year, saying that professors had to disclose whether a work of scholarship was subject to pre-publication review.

According to Neustadt Bok approved the agreement and "didn't think that it was a turn-around" from his earlier statements.

Bok could not be reached for comment.

HARVARD CRIMSON,

Friday, Dec. 4, 1987