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1 October 1988

AFIO NEWS COMMENTARY

Most of the intelligence-related developments in the news since we sent you the last *News Commentary* were less than dramatic. Soon after an Army sergeant had been convicted of attempted espionage, a former Navy enlisted man turned up on Moscow television, obliging his hosts by spreading anti-American propaganda. A Silicon Valley computer specialist received a prison sentence for his part in a scheme to sell sensitive data to the Soviets. Former Navy analyst Samuel Morison, who had given classified material to a British publication, found the U.S. Supreme Court unwilling to let him stay out of prison pending further appeal. Canada, meanwhile, closed its doors to a total of 19 Soviet diplomats for attempted naval espionage, a move which met with relatively mild Soviet retaliation. There appeared to be no letup in the KGB's worldwide disinformation campaign, and, as CIA Director William Webster indicated, Soviet attempts to recruit U.S. sources had been increasing. His deputy, Robert Gates, also noted that the KGB had not been affected by current Soviet reform programs.

Terrorist incidents were on the rise on several continents, and Libya's Qaddafi, seemingly having recovered from the American air raid of April 1986, was believed to be a major helper and instigator. A Greek terrorist group claimed responsibility for the murder of a U.S. military attache near Athens - the third such assassination there in recent years. It may be symptomatic of our era that, after an aircraft explosion had killed President Zia of Pakistan, the U.S. ambassador and military attache and many others, few Western observers were ready to exclude the Afghan secret police and its KGB backers from the list of suspects.

Soviet espionage, and our attempts to cope with it, are among the primary topics of this issue. The ramifications of the Soviet-inflicted death in March 1985 of then-Major Nicholson in East Germany, for which the Soviets were said to have apologized during this year's Moscow summit, are the subject of a lively discussion. One of our domestic adversaries, the so-called Christic Institute, gets its share of attention. Several articles deal with the British and German intelligence systems. Computer security continues to interest our readers. And we have a new subject: the implications of the drug program.

We thank all our contributors, old and new, for sending us such a rich supply of material.

Please take note of the attached one-page membership application form. As you know, our president is greatly interested in membership recruiting. The form is designed to facilitate it. We hope everyone will try to get at least one new member!

Hans Moses
Editor, *News Commentary*

THE LAST WORD

BY RICHARD STARR

Shielding KGB's Right to Know

Gennadi F Zakharov, a U.N. official who moonlighted as a KGB agent, or vice versa, was arrested in 1986 by the FBI for purchasing classified documents. The case is a celebrated one, because it prompted Mikhail Gorbachev's operatives to frame an American reporter in Moscow, Nicholas S. Daniloff. The spy and the journalist were then traded after Zakharov pleaded no contest in a pro forma trial.

Less celebrated is the story of a college student from Guyana who moonlighted for 3½ years as a double agent for the FBI and did Zakharov in by selling him the documents.

The saga of Leakh Bhoge was told by Michael Daly in fascinating detail in the April 6, 1987, New York magazine. Bhoge, a student at Queens College in New York at the time, went to work for Zakharov in 1983. The KGB agent posed as a professor with the "Moscow Institute" and at their first meeting asked Bhoge to do research for him at various libraries. The student agreed, though he had immediate suspicions. In fact, he contacted the FBI within two weeks of taking the job. Shortly thereafter, as New York tells it, "Zakharov asked Leakh to photocopy magazine articles from the microfiche files at the Queens College library. Zakharov advised Leakh to take certain precautions. 'He told me to put wrong name on call slip, wrong Social Security number,'" the student later recounted.

Bhoge began making more and more photocopies, at Zakharov's request. Indeed, the amount was so great that it attracted attention. He told other students that he was working on a book and parried the joking comments of a library guard: "The guard would say, 'Here comes the little spy.' I would

smile and laugh a little. I say, 'You must be kidding me.'"

Sometime later the KGB agent asked his young charge to begin stealing from the library. Bhoge did this and was eventually given other assignments. Among these was providing Zakharov with a map of Princeton University's engineering library. In the end, with FBI help, Bhoge obtained a job with a defense contractor and the documents that snagged Zakharov.

According to the FBI, the methods the KGB used in hiring and training Leakh Bhoge are fairly typical. According to America's librarians and civil liberties experts, the methods the FBI uses in tracking the likes of Zakharov violate our constitutional right to privacy and, in the words of Duane E. Webster, executive director of the Association of Research Libraries, have a "chilling effect on the life of the mind."

The proximate cause of outrage is that among those FBI methods is an effort of several years' standing known as the Library Awareness Program, which is under investigation on Capitol Hill and the target of a lawsuit. The FBI's program involves teaching librarians to recognize possible intelligence agents from Soviet bloc countries and then volunteer information on the activities of these patrons. Unfortunately for the FBI, such activities collide head-on with the ethical codes and self-image of the major associations of professional librarians. Among other things, the librarians point out that laws in 38 states require records of patrons' borrowings to be kept confidential. The official position of the American Library Association, for example, is that librarians should provide no information unless the FBI obtains a court order.

Unofficial statements are more interesting. Washington has a small library, the National Security Archive, on whose behalf the lawsuit was filed. The archive mainly holds recently declassified documents, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. "We want the Soviets to come in and use our information and find out about our government," its director has said.

Then there was the fascinating exchange on ABC's "Nightline." An FBI official defended the program as a way of helping to establish which of the thousands of Soviet bloc officials in this country are actually spies. Something is probably amiss, he said, if an agricultural expert from Bulgaria spends his spare time poring over technical publications outside his field. A librarian responded that she would only draw the conclusion that this person was interested in understanding "other aspects of our society."

At times like this, one wonders if the joking library guard at Queens College would have been fired had he reported any suspicions to the FBI. And one wonders at the fact that the FBI has been cast as the morally obtuse party to this dispute.

The Last Word is personal commentary on issues of the day. Starr is the assistant managing editor/news of Insight.

GAZETTE TELEGRAPH

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1988

Soviets spying on U.S. libraries, FBI report says

Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The Soviet Union has directed a massive espionage operation against U.S. libraries in an effort to gain sensitive technical knowledge and recruit agents, an FBI report said Tuesday.

The report said a 26-year Soviet operation has targeted the Library of Congress, along with scientific and technical sections of public libraries, specialized departments of university libraries and large information clearinghouses.

(AFIO COMMENT: The FBI's Library Awareness Program has been widely condemned in the national press. We glad to give you the other side of the argument. Both entries on this page were part of the large volume of clippings received from Henry N. Schladt of Colorado Springs, CO. You find a related clipping in today's Comic Corner. Many thanks!)

: None of the information is classified, but the Soviets try to recruit some agents at libraries who are first asked to obtain public information, and later requested to turn over classified material, the FBI said.

: The FBI said the Soviet effort even targets term papers and theses written by U.S. students.

: The report, "The KGB and the Library Target 1962-Present," was released as FBI Director William Sessions defended the bureau's Library Awareness Program — a counterespionage operation against the Soviet collection effort.

: The 50,000-member American Library Association has strongly criticized the FBI operation, in which the bureau attempts to gain the cooperation of librarians in helping identify Soviet agents.

The left in Disneyland

The Christic Institute was one of the lesser stars in the orbit of the American left until 1986, when it hit the big time with a lawsuit against 29 individuals, some of whom were connected to the Iran-Contra business. Accusing them of murder, kidnapping, bribery and drug-dealing and of constituting a sinister conspiracy that came to be known as the "Secret Team," the Washington-based foundation got lots of publicity and backing — until last week, when a federal judge in Miami threw its bizarre \$24 million suit out of court. But much of the nation's liberal establishment seems to remain enamored with the fables concocted by the Christic mystics.

The centerpiece of the plot imagined by the institute was a supposed covert group of bad guys who it alleged had spent 25 years trying to wipe out communism with assassinations, to take over U.S. foreign policy and to help arm the Nicaraguan resistance through drug trafficking. The "Secret Team," the institute claimed, was a "powerful criminal network, fanatically right-wing, financed by drug profits and closely connected to the Reagan administration."

Most of the "evidence" for the grand conspiracy consisted of what attorney Theodore Klein, who represented some of the defendants, calls "a hodge-podge of dead informants, lost witnesses, character actors with first names only and assorted shadow figures who shriveled when exposed to the light." All the witnesses named by the institute recanted or denied statements attributed to them, and U.S. District Judge James Lawrence King finally dismissed the suit as being without merit.

The defendants — some of whom now face financial ruin as a result of the institute's litigation — included former CIA Deputy Director Theodore Shackley, Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, Nicaraguan resistance leader Adolfo Calero and conservative activist F. Andy Messing of the National Defense Council, among others. A later affidavit filed in the case charged President Reagan, the late CIA Director William Casey and Attorney General Edwin Meese III with directing the Secret Team.

Gen. Singlaub says he has spent about \$500,000 to fight the suit, and Mr. Messing says some of his group's donors fell away

because of negative publicity. The taxpayer also took a drubbing, with court costs amounting to about \$2 million over the past two years, and the scars on the reputations of some of the defendants may never be healed.

Aside from the damage done to innocent men, the Christic Institute's fairy tales seem to have been swallowed whole by many of its cohorts on the left. As publicity about the suit mounted, the institute gathered the donations of some leftish high rollers, including musician Jackson Browne and actress Jane Fonda, who no doubt will some day apologize. It forged relationships with such groups as Americans for Democratic Action, the National Organization for Women and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and its literature now sports endorsements from Jesse Jackson and Richard Gephardt.

Sen. John Kerry's staff is reported to work closely with Christic personnel in trying to prove that the Nicaraguan resistance is involved in drug smuggling. The "Secret Team" theory, as the left-wing monthly Mother Jones noted, is "fast becoming the official explanation of the Iran-Contra events in progressive circles around the country."

Historian Richard Hofstadter once wrote about what he called "The Paranoid Style in American Politics," referring to those political causes that throughout American history have launched crusades against imaginary dark forces conspiring against the Republic. Hofstadter saw political paranoia as being largely the property of the right wing, but it recently seems to have migrated leftward.

Conspiracy ideologies such as the Christic Institute's Secret Team theory, as Insight's David Brock has written, attempt to "criminalize foreign policy differences." The far right has used such tactics in the past to portray liberals as tools of the Trilateral Commission or other bogies, while the political left exploits such demonology to try to discredit anti-communists in and out of government.

Such radical intolerance is reprehensible in any form, and is especially dangerous when groups use nuisance suits to destroy the lives and wreck the finances of their political opponents. The judge was right to dismiss the suit and protect a framework of civility for the public discourse.

(AFIO COMMENT: This editorial pretty well summarizes what the Christic Institute is all about. With its unsubstantiated allegations, the group developed a credibility gap even in liberal quarters. It nevertheless appears to be successful in raising funds, and its spokesmen have won applause on some college campuses. Its strident assaults on covert action, and on the people connected with it, make it a subject of our continuing interest and attention. — Many thanks to Capt. J. E. Dolan of Garrett Park, MD, for a wealth of information on this institution.)

Star Tribune Thursday/May 12/1988**A Soviet murder rampage? Not quite**

Like other Americans, we were angered three years ago when a Soviet sentry in East Germany killed Arthur Nicholson Jr., a U.S. Army major. The anger remains. But recent reports suggest that Nicholson was carrying out an assignment with far higher risk and far higher stakes than portrayed at the time. If those circumstances do not excuse Soviet conduct, they do help explain how Nicholson became a Cold War casualty.

The gory event — Nicholson bled to death — alerted Americans to intelligence practices of which few were aware. Under an agreement among World War II victors, Western allies for four decades have maintained military liaison missions in East Germany; the Soviets have reciprocal rights in West Germany. Intelligence officers of each side use the opportunity to learn what they can about military installations of the other. Sentries of both sides stop overeager learners who get too close to restricted areas, but not until 1985 had a military observer been killed.

Further insights come this week from Newsweek magazine's account of the East-West tank race. It is an unending competition to develop stronger armor, more lethal antitank shells to pierce the

stronger armor, still stronger armor to resist the stronger shells. In the 1980s the United States began producing a new tank, the M-1. Now the Army evidently is withdrawing its 1,400 M-1s and 4,000 older M-60s from Europe as fast as newer and more powerful M-1s can be built. The rapid exchange is necessary, according to the Army, because of faster-than-expected Soviet developments. As a result, most U.S. tanks are vulnerable to new Soviet tank guns and most U.S. antitank weapons are unable to penetrate new Soviet armor. The one-year cost to upgrade American tanks is about \$5 billion.

U.S. officials confirmed in 1985 that Nicholson had been photographing military equipment. Now Newsweek says that he had been pressed to determine whether Soviet T-80 tanks had new armor; that he had photographed one T-80 from inside it; that he was shot while breaking into a Soviet tank garage. In a column on these pages soon after Nicholson's death, George Will called it evidence of the Soviet "murder rampage." If Newsweek's account is correct, different terms would be more appropriate. Nicholson fell victim to tank-development warfare whose intensity only now is becoming widely known.

Star Tribune/Saturday/May 28/1988

Liaison officer's killing unjustified

Your May 12 editorial concerning the shooting of Major Arthur Nicholson by a Soviet soldier seems to imply some possible justification for the Soviets killing Nicholson. I have not read the Newsweek article to which you refer, but I examined thoroughly the complete reports of the incident, the reports of our investigation of the incident and the reports of the negotiations with the Soviets resulting from the incident.

The plain facts are these:

■ Nicholson was a member of the U.S. Liaison Mission in the Soviet Zone of Germany. He was in an area in which he was authorized to be and he was doing what he was authorized to do (he was observing Soviet military forces) in accordance with our agreement with the Soviets for the conduct of the liaison missions. He was not trying "to break into a Soviet tank garage" or trying to get into a restricted area or trying to do anything not permitted by the agreement.

■ He was shot by a Soviet soldier on sentry duty and was permitted to bleed to death while an array of Soviet noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers kept Nicholson's driver and assistant (who, incidentally was a very experienced non-commissioned officer) from helping. They seemed to be more interested in trying to create an excuse for the incident than in saving a life. In fact, one senior Soviet officer tried to badger the U.S. sergeant into admitting that he had shot Nicholson.

■ The Soviet Liaison Mission in the U.S. zone has been observing U.S. military operations for the 40 years the agreement has been in effect. In typical Soviet fashion, they've pushed the agreement to the limits and beyond; they have frequently been apprehended inside restricted areas. None of their members has ever been shot or shot at! The U.S. Forces, as well as the forces of the other NATO countries, have the procedures, training and discipline to be able to deal with the Soviet mission

members without killing them, even when they are not complying with the agreement.

We may never know whether Nicholson's death was a mistake by an untrained, undisciplined sentry or an ordered murder. Just as in the case of the Korean airliner shot down in the Far East, the Soviet authorities seemed to be unable to face up to the facts when addressing such incidents with the rest of the world. One point is clear: He did not fall victim to tank-development warfare. He fell victim to a senseless, unjustifiable Soviet bullet.

Whatever the Soviet problem, Nicholson's death was a tragic loss. We are now trying to work out more complicated interactions with the Soviets in conjunction with the INF Treaty verification measures. I hope they can get their act together. Gen. John W. Vessey, Garrison, Minn. Retired chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(AFIO COMMENT: Many thanks to fellow member Hugh O. Strawn of Hopkins, MN, for sending us the Star Tribune editorial and Gen. Vessey's quick and convincing reply. One wonders how this attempt to explain the killing ever got started.)

The Dallas Morning News

Friday, July 8, 1988

Mum's the word with the British



**SAM
KINCH JR.**

LONDON — It is always a curiosity, and usually a learning experience, to see how other countries deal with governmental secrecy. That is particularly true when Americans are exposed to journalism in Great Britain, where our sort of national obsession with openness often is held up to ridicule.

And right now it is more interesting, because even the staid, conservative British government of Margaret Thatcher is proposing the elimination of some secrecy provisions that date back to 1911.

Mrs. Thatcher's government won't do away with the Official Secrets Act, to be sure. Nor would she have the government adopt a public-access presumption similar to the federal and state laws of the United States. But the current Thatcher proposal at least would bring the British statute into the modern (and real) world.

For a perspective on the difference between current laws in the two countries, one need only know that the British system is essentially the opposite of ours: Whereas U.S. law generally makes information about governmental activities public, then lists exceptions, the Official Secrets Act makes everything in the nature of governmental information confidential.

And the further rod up the back is that not only is it illegal for a government official to disclose secret information, it also is illegal for a news medium even to receive — much less publish — information that is covered by the Official Secrets Act. The giver or receiver of secret information can be sent to prison.

Again, for perspective, one need only know that even the most trivial information is covered by the law. As the peppery *Times of London* recently noted, even the color of the carpet in the Foreign Office and the menu in the Ministry of Defense cafeteria would be regarded as "official secrets." And under the current law, even the publication of information that had been published elsewhere could be punished under British law.

It is true that the law is not often imposed on the news media, except in clear-cut national security cases. Legitimate whistle-blowing by civil serv-

ants is not usually prosecuted, either, especially where the whistle blower is performing a public service.

But the harshness of the possible penalty for violation and the all-encompassing breadth of the Official Secrets Act combine to make it a formidable barrier to the free flow of government-related information that American society has come to regard as routine.

Some prominent British political commentators and satirists have suggested, in fact, that far from suffering under the Official Secrets Act, journalists have hidden behind it — as an excuse to avoid hard-hitting reportage on the inner workings of government. The law as written is not simply a censorship tool for after-publication determination of penalties. It acts as a prior restraint precisely because it makes an offense out of receiving information that is officially secret.

Attempts have been made in the past to open up some of that information. The last Labor government, then on its final political legs, tried a decade ago. And in 1979, Mrs. Thatcher's initial reform attempt floundered — largely because it would have allowed government ministers (akin to our Cabinet members) to decide whether disclosures could be made about matters within their own departments.

In its latest configuration, the Thatcher proposal more nearly approaches the current law in federal and state governments in the United States. The mere receipt of unauthorized information no longer would be an offense. A judge and jury would decide whether informants and publishers threatened national security or otherwise would harm the public interest. And the burden would be on the prosecution to show that the informant and publisher knew or should have known the harm that could be caused.

Further, the information covered by the catchall clause of the Official Secrets Act would be reduced to specific categories covering defense, security and intelligence, international relations, information useful to criminals, etc. Those categories are broader than but similar to those in U.S. federal law. (The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the Pentagon Papers case that pre-publication restraint, even in the name of national security, is unconstitutional; that concept is foreign to British law.)

London newspapers did not greet the newest Official Secrets Act reform proposal with uniform enthusiasm, obviously. There is not, for example, a public-interest exception for a civil servant leaking to the news media information about internal government misdeeds. And it clearly is not a proposal that would guarantee public access to governmental information — as, with statutory exceptions, federal and state laws in the United States routinely guarantee.

But the Thatcher government's Official Secrets Act proposal is an interesting development to watch in the country from which many of our laws and political traditions came.

Sam Kinch Jr. is editor of the political newsletter Texas Weekly in Austin and a regular contributor to Viewpoints.

(AFIO COMMENT: How has British democracy survived without First Amendment protection? The answer is: very nicely. — Many thanks to our most generous Dallas, TX, contributor.)

THE (LONDON) SUNDAY TIMES
WEEK IN REVIEW
May 15, 1988

Espionage: boom business but few secrets

MOST OF the charismatic anti-heroes of late 20th century espionage are dead. So, too, are many of their contemporaries, the spycatchers from MI5, MI6 and the CIA, the friends and assorted lovers who were essential sources in the creation and evolution of enduring legends, writes *Simon Freeman*.

Blunt, Burgess, Maclear, and now Philby, are history, closing another chapter, albeit intriguing and evocative, in the long and dishonourable story of spying. The business, however, is booming.

Superficially at least, espionage bears little resemblance to the world of eccentric double-agents which Philby joined nearly half a century ago. Computer and satellite technology allows the Americans to eavesdrop on the car phone conversations of a Soviet Politburo member general in Moscow, or the Soviets to read the insignia on uniforms of troops exercising on US military bases.

But, as spy pundits constantly remind us, nothing is ever quite as it seems in "the world of mirrors". Intelligence agencies still value the services of the human agent, the person who can steal a document or describe the atmosphere of a top-level meeting, above the photo-

(AFIO COMMENT: On May 11 1988, when Moscow announced the death of British-born KGB spy Kim Philby, AFIO member Irene U. Boublik of McLean, VA, happened to be in England and picked up stacks of Philby-related news coverage. The item selected offers a broader perspective than most.)

graph which reveals the exact range of a missile. The sprawling bureaucracies of the intelligence community — the CIA, FBI, KGB, GRU, MI5, MI6 *et al* — have been forced over the years to rely increasingly on electronic surveillance. But they remain, at heart, traditionalists, convinced that a human spy on the ground is worth many satellites in space.

Nobody is sure how many people are involved in espionage worldwide, but one recent estimate puts the figure at nearly 1.5m. Nor is anyone sure how much it all costs. Ten billion pounds annually is a conservative guess. The biggest spenders are the Americans and the Russians, although countries such as Britain, anxious to retain their own independent agencies, spend hundreds of millions of pounds.

Critics of the Western intelligence agencies argue that it is mostly wasted effort. They contend that there are only a few genuine secrets — such as the routes used by the West's nuclear submarines or Nato's battle plan.

The rest is either known through the Western media, specialist and scientific publications or books; or it is so obvious that the Kremlin

already knows it.

Few members of the East-West intelligence community would agree. Western agents argue that the Russians are as committed as ever to undermining capitalism. The Russians are insatiable; they want to know everything because they believe information is power.

The Kremlin, for its part, is still haunted by the fear that the Western agencies are plotting revolution in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. And both sides agree that in regional conflicts — such as Afghanistan, Central America, or the Middle East — old-fashioned spying pays dividends.

The fundamentals of espionage might not have changed since Philby first learnt his craft. What has changed, without doubt, are the sort of people who become the pawns and the victims in the game.

There are few ideological traitors in the West. In America, the 1980s have seen a spate of espionage trials, but all those convicted of spying for the Soviet Union were motivated solely by money and/or a perverted sense of adventure.

Many of these spies were middle or low-grade technicians in the military or industry, proof of the Russians' appetite for technological

information and the shrewd realisation that the most likely traitor is not the fulfilled, highly-paid person at the top of an organisation but the resentful subordinate.

The British can, at least, claim a spy in the ignoble tradition of Philby. Michael Bettaney was a senior MI5 officer who decided to betray his country because he no longer believed in the West. But Bettaney, who is now serving a 23-year jail sentence in near-total isolation, was a sad, rather than a dramatic figure, described in court as "puerile", who seems unlikely to warrant more than a footnote in the history of espionage.

In West Germany the espionage business is even more depressingly low-key. Although there was a brief flurry of excitement in the early 1980s with the defection of Hans-Joachim Tiedge, a heavy-drinking senior officer in the West German intelligence service, most Soviet spies turn out to be spinster secretaries seduced into giving information by male agents in the guise of lovers. Only the Israeli Mossad continues the traditions of flamboyant and dramatic covert operations.

The future for spy enthusiasts looks bleak.

DALLAS MORNING NEWS

SPY NEST

27 August 1988

Maximum penalties must be pressed

Once again, Americans are reminded that spies are real creatures, not just the figments of fiction writers' imaginations. We also are reminded that spies usually do not come with the classic trench coat, or with James Bond wit and style. The United States' latest alleged traitor is basically middle-American, former Army Sgt. 1st Class Clyde Lee Conrad.

Mr. Conrad's alleged activities appear to have included passing secrets that could seriously compromise the ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to defend Europe against a Soviet invitation. He is accused of selling the location of NATO missiles, the route of a super-secret pipeline and plans for blunting a Warsaw Pact thrust into central Germany.

(AFIO COMMENT: A hard-hitting editorial, sent in by our anonymous source in Dallas, TX. Many thanks!)

The Conrad flap should first remind every American that the smiling face of *glasnost* notwithstanding, there are enemies in the world who are prepared to do us and our allies harm.

The Conrad flap also raises the question of how a low-level, non-commissioned officer could have gotten access to super-sensitive files for so long without his conduct being regularly monitored by intelligence agencies. The military bureaucracy has fallen down on the job.

Above all, the Conrad flap raises the question of why a professional military man would betray his country. The answer appears to have been handsome sums of money. If so, it may serve as fresh evidence that enemies makes peacetime all the more fragile.

that the United States has become too worshipful of dollars, and too condescending toward patriotism, honor and duty. If a man lacks the respect of his countrymen for the job he does, he may feel free to betray them for the coin of their civilization: money.

The death penalty is not used in Germany, where Conrad is being charged, so if found guilty, he will not have to forfeit his life for jeopardizing the life and safety of millions. That's regrettable. The Conrad case is a reminder that the death penalty should be applicable in peacetime as well as during a declared war. The world is a precarious place even during peacetime; having tactical and strategic information sold to potential enemies makes peacetime all the more fragile.

LONDON / FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY AUGUST 3 1988

David Marsh interviews the head of West Germany's counter-intelligence service

An open door to secrecy

In Britain, Mr Gerhard Boeden would - officially at least - simply not exist. The stocky, 63-year-old head of West Germany's counter-intelligence agency, the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV), is, however, alive and well and can be interviewed in his well-protected office building in Cologne.

Mr Boeden is in charge of the West German equivalent to Britain's MI5, which is wrapped in official secrecy like MI6, the foreign arm of the UK intelligence services. Britain's Parliament has been debating a recent government White Paper that would shroud the security service in even greater secrecy. In the Federal Republic, as a reaction against the crimes of the Third Reich, the intelligence services set up by the post-war state are discreet, but open to scrutiny. In fact, they insist on it.

After a long career in the police force, anti-terrorism and counter-espionage work, Mr Boeden took over the Cologne agency in April last year. Set up in 1950, the BfV's name literally means "Office for the Protection of the Constitution". Its task is to collect information on foreign spies and on left- and right-wing extremists. These are all people deemed to represent a threat to the country's 1949 Basic Law or constitution and thus to the stability of the country.

Apart from foreign spies, the agency has to keep tabs, at the latest count, on 62,000 members of extreme left-wing organisations, above all the German Communist Party, and 25,200 radical right-wingers grouped in neo-Nazi and other organisations. The figures are given annually in public reports, nearly always accompanied by self-congratulatory pronouncements from the Interior Minister that democracy during the year in question "remained stable".

Mr Boeden wants to be thought of more as a kindly uncle rather than big brother. He says it is "terribly important" that his agency, which employs about 2,300 people and comes under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, should have "a human face". Indeed, his job is partly one of public relations. He needs to convince West Germans mindful of the Nazis' misuse of power that the BfV is not, as he says, full of "shady characters in slouch-hats and dark glasses who want to keep everyone under control".

Against this unique German background, the BfV's work is becoming more challenging and complicated. East-West detente and the much greater flow of East Europeans travelling to West Germany increase the opportunities for East bloc spying. At the same time, perhaps over the longer term, the receding threat to the Federal Republic caused by the manifest ebbing of the Cold War could lower public support for the agency's work.

Mr Boeden is adamant about the need

(AFIO COMMENT: Many thanks to Col. Richard L. Temple of Santa Barbara, CA, for sending us this revealing article on German intelligence, a subject not often discussed hereabouts. While the author compares German with British intelligence, you might view it in the context of our system.)

to learn from the lessons of the past. "Our citizens should know that this institution was founded, after our bitter experiences, to protect one of the most liberal constitutions that Germany has ever had from a situation where political forces - either from the right or the left - could try to abolish parliamentary democracy," he says.

The BfV is answerable to a Parliamentary Control Commission to check sensitive cases and operations. A special committee of the Bundestag has to approve interception of mail and telephone tapping since this contravenes Article 10 of the Basic Law.

There are two other arms of the intelligence service. The foreign arm is the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) or Federal Intelligence Service, run by Mr Hans Georg Wiek, a high-powered diplomat. The Militaerischer Abschirmdienst (MAD) or Military Intelligence Service is responsible for security within the armed forces. None of the three have police powers. BfV officials cannot arrest or interrogate suspects or search premises, but instead have to hand over these matters to the federal police or public prosecutor.

The BfV even puts out a brochure, carefully translated into English, on the basic tenets of its operations. Under "intelligence methods", it informs readers that these include: "The infiltration or recruitment and handling of agents in extremist or terrorist organisations; the surveillance of suspects; secret photography; interception of post and telecommunications; other measures to conceal certain BfV operational activity by the use of non-attributable vehicle registration numbers or identity cards with cover names."

It is hard to imagine MI5 being so helpful, even if the Official Secrets Act was abolished.

Mr Boeden talks with almost exaggerated politeness about the people he is up against. Most espionage in West Germany is carried out by the East German Ministry for State Security. Not surprisingly, Mr Boeden has never met Mr Erich Mielke, the legendary 80-year-old East German Minister for State Security, who has been East Berlin's chief spymaster for more than 30 years.

"I know him very well," says Mr Boeden, "and I imagine he knows me too. This has always been my method, also as a police officer - to try to find out who my opponent is. This is necessary in order to understand and evaluate him better."

Perhaps as many as 3,000 eastern "agents" of various kinds may be operating on West German soil. This would range from professional spies to a much larger number of small-fry "collectors" of information. "Eastern services, in our experience, in times of detente have a special desire for information. They want to know more, and they want to

know it early," says Mr Boeden.

Additionally, opportunities for spying tend to increase at a time of political thaw. This year, about 160,000 German-national emigrés from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe are expected to settle in West Germany. Although the Bonn government welcomes the sharp increase in arrivals, the emigré stream also provides a golden opportunity for the East bloc to bring in spies.

"We have a system, although it is not perfect, for registering when emigrés have been approached and asked about procuring information," says Mr Boeden. "The numbers have been growing."

"We cannot and do not want to say that each German-origin emigré is suspect. The people who come to us are German by constitutional right. This gives us a special problem compared with other western counter-intelligence services."

Although he says that not too much meaning should be attached to the increase, 34 people were arrested in West Germany up to mid-July on suspicion of spying. This is the same number as in the whole of last year.

The most spectacular coup this year was the detention of seven men in March on suspicion of working for the KGB. Charges have yet to be preferred. The first court case comes up later this month. Several of the suspects are Soviet emigrés who had settled in the Federal Republic.

The spate of arrests has helped underpin the BfV's claim that it has succeeded in making good damage done by the defection to East Germany in 1985 of one of its top spy-hunters, Mr Hans-Joachim Tiedge. Mr Tiedge fled after the BfV failed to help him sort out his drink and debt problems. Mr Boeden says he has introduced a system under which any employee in similar personal difficulties can come in and talk things over. He sees about three people a week on this basis. "It is inevitable that in an institution like ours, employees can have problems," he says.

The KGB clamp-down in March came a week after the BfV was reminded of another constant preoccupation, with the arrest in Bonn of Ms Elke Falk, a 43-year-old secretary working for the Development Ministry. Ms Falk is alleged to have passed on information from her jobs in various government offices to a "romeo" East German agent with whom she fell in love. About a dozen "secretary affairs" have come to light in the past 10 years, confirming Mr Mielke's passion for setting loose his agents on single, middle-aged Bonn women.

Mr Boeden says these cases are "tragic". He uses the Falk affair to underline a security point. He says it confirms the need for a new vetting system introduced this summer which allows the intelligence services to investigate the personal friendships of government workers.

"If it had been possible to investigate Frau Falk's man-friend, we would have established that he had a false identity. At the beginning of the affair, that would have saved Frau Falk a lot of pain - and the state a lot of damage."

June 26, 1988

Post on guard against computer tampering

Viruses, hackers can be stopped but spies pose another question

BRODIE FARQUHAR
Staff Writer

Computer espionage, viruses, sabotage — these are the ongoing concerns of Col. Preston Holtry, deputy chief of staff for intelligence at the U.S. Army Information Systems Command at Fort Huachuca.

Holtry and his staff have devised a formidable system to protect the Army's worldwide information management and communications systems.

While university, business and government computer systems around the world have been attacked by skillful hackers, malcontent employees and even spies, Holtry notes there are significant differences in security between his organization and others.

According to Associated Press reports, viruses have within the last year, "infected" computers at NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, information systems on Capitol Hill, George Washington University and Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Tactics that can be used to disrupt computer operations include:

- Viruses, which are essentially small programs that can hide in the computer's operating system, giving orders that range from a relatively benign message that flashes on the screen to destruction of data files or erasure of disks. A virus differs from other sabotage in that it clones itself and spreads.

- "Trojan horses," programs that look and act like normal ones but contain hidden commands that eventually take effect and cause havoc.

- "Logic bombs," small sets of instructions surreptitiously entered into other software, where they remain undetected and inactive until the computer arrives at a certain result during normal computation.

- "Time bombs," which go into action at a set date and time.

The supersécret National Security Agency, based at Fort Meade, Md., is responsible for safeguarding the security of U.S. government computer systems. It has set up the National Computer Security Center at Fort Meade to help the military, defense contractors and other private companies cope with software warfare and other threats to vital computer systems.

At ISC, Col. Holtry's computer system protections include:

- Passwords and password controls.

- Software control from the vendor to customer. "Sometimes, vendors will leave a 'trap door' for future updates and maintenance. The trouble is, if a vendor built it, a hacker can find and open it. This is why control is so important to us. We exhaustively analyze all software so there are no surprises. All our software can deny access and has an audit trail capacity, so if someone tries to get into the system, we know when it happened," said Holtry.

- Hardware devices. ISC security includes dial back delay and filtering systems. If someone makes even a small procedural error in getting into a system, security can monitor, trace or even feed phony information to the hacker or

would-be spy.

- Personnel procedures. "As we develop greater technical proficiency, we become more dependant on personal trust and accountability. People are our greatest strength and weakness," said Col. Holtry.

ISC places a great deal of emphasis on personal accountability, so that each individual is responsible for what happens to or with his personal computer. While Holtry has not banned his staff from communicating with computer bulletin boards, they know the risk of picking up a hidden virus, and have the software and procedures to detect, quarantine and destroy the virus before it can spread through the system.

All software is kept under lock and key, "booted up" on individual machines, then locked back up. Since no copying or bootlegging of software is allowed, the spread of viruses is kept to a minimum.

Given the above set of defenses, Col. Holtry believes the ISC enjoys "an acceptable level of risk."

"There is no such animal as 100 percent protection. Given the resources, any system can be penetrated. I sleep very well at night, because I think we're 99 percent secure, using a very expensive, complex security system. The question is, how much are you willing to spend to get that extra 1 percent? That could cost again, what we've spent already," said Holtry.

While hackers occasionally "knock on the front door, rattle the windows and try the back door," said Holtry, no one has ever gotten into "the inner sanctum."

University or even government research computer systems are much easier to get into and sabotage, simply because they are in a knowledge sharing business. The Army is a "need to know" organization, so the security is more complex, noted Holtry.

"Hackers keep us on our toes, even though they are an irritant," said Holtry. What he deeply worries about, is not the show-off hacker, but the insider who has sold out his country for money. "This guy is deadly because we don't know he's there, accessing information and selling it," said Holtry.

Spies such as the Falcon and the Snowman or John Walker have taught the defense establishment that espionage is now a growth industry, in which Americans with access to military information are now seeking out the enemy and selling secrets to make a buck.

"We've learned that we have to look more carefully, and more frequently, at our personnel. We're not Big Brother, with cameras in every room, but we are emphasizing security awareness. If you see a janitor driving a Mercedes, you should do more than wonder about it," said Holtry.

Col. Holtry is well-equipped to deal with the technical and the human aspects of computer system security. A graduate of Virginia Military Institute and Boston University, Holtry has a liberal arts education and is a career military intelligence officer.

"I've had to become technically adept in order to ask the right questions and make sure I was getting the right answers," said Holtry. He recognizes his own limits in computer science, yet credits his liberal arts background as he deals with the human equation.

For Col. Holtry, the ISC security systems are not a complete answer to the challenges of hackers and spies. "We have no answers to some questions, and we don't even have all of the right questions. Technology is evolving faster than our ability to secure it," he said, emphasizing again that security is a people problem.

(AFIO COMMENT: Our last issue included two items on computer security problems. Many thanks to fellow member Edmund C. Jilli of Sierra Vista, AZ, for sending us this informative follow-up.)

Getting ready for Soviet spies

June 27, 1988

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

Devotees of espionage fiction no doubt would recognize it as the only plot that *hasn't* been spun out yet in paperback: Soviet agents infiltrate America's most sensitive military installations, gaining access to the innermost recesses, where they snoop eagerly for secrets. The twist? This time, the Soviet spies are invited by Washington. Any reputable publisher would reject such a plot out of hand as just too implausible. Yet starting July 1, a team of highly trained Soviet agents, under the aegis of their Pentagon hosts, will be swarming all over U.S. bases. The Soviets have been given this right, just as U.S. teams will have the right of access to Soviet missile bases, under terms of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed recently in Moscow by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. But now the U.S. must make sure the Soviets who come here don't walk away with more than was bargained for.

And despite official Pentagon protestations to the contrary, there are serious questions about how ready the Defense Department is, according to the findings of a *U.S. News* inquiry. To prepare for Soviet arrivals, the Pentagon has run a series of 30 mock inspections over the past four months at U.S. missile sites, with "Soviet" teams played by Russian-speaking U.S. inspectors. The exercises have been mostly successful, though some mistakes—not entirely unexpected—have occurred.

Nine hours' notice. The preparation for the Soviet visit are being orchestrated by specialists from a brand-new Pentagon outfit known as the On-Site Inspection Agency. It is the job of these hastily assembled experts to coordinate the U.S. inspection of some 133 Soviet-bloc missile sites and oversee the Soviet inspection of 26 sites in the United States and Western Europe. To say that the agency has its work cut out doesn't begin to get it: The logistics of its job are nightmarish. The Soviets, like the Americans, will be permitted to station permanent teams of 30 inspectors. But scores of other inspectors will be allowed to make additional visits—on as little as 9 hours' notice—at missile facilities around the U.S.

With so little time to prepare, the U.S. may not be ready for the Soviets just yet. It was only in the past few weeks that the On-Site Inspection Agency completed its final selection and training of the 200 inspectors who will travel to the Soviet Union. But there are potentially greater problems for the estimated 400 agents who will escort the Soviet monitors coming here. Although the escorts will have to deal with every possible contingency, ranging from defection to accidents, one of their most important tasks will be to make sure the Soviets do not see any more than they're allowed under the treaty.

(AFIO COMMENT: Thanks to Henry N. Schladt, Colorado Springs, CO, and Howard E. Steen, Aurora, CO, for this timely article, slightly abridged here. Also see chart on next page.)

That's precisely what the Soviets will attempt to do, U.S. intelligence officials say. The Soviet teams will include agents from the military-intelligence agency, known as the GRU, and they are certain to have been instructed to collect other military and industrial intelligence at and near the base. High on the Soviet priority list will be the location of major research-and-development facilities, the configurations of sensitive weapons systems—and even mere confirmations of their existence. "The Soviets will be expertly trained," says Peter Zimmerman, a former official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "to look at what they're not supposed to see."

Of bugs and body searches. The risks for the U.S. go way beyond what the Soviets might see here, however; intelligence officials say that, regardless of the precautions taken, the value of on-site visits cannot be overestimated. The Soviets will be allowed to bring into the U.S. a few measuring and detection devices, subject to American inspection and control. Though all Soviet luggage can be checked, American officials will not be allowed to conduct body searches. Officially, the Pentagon has been playing down the threat, but counterintelligence specialists within the Pentagon say it would not be impossible for the Soviet inspectors to plant small bugging devices or delay-activated equipment that could be triggered months or years later to spy on workshops or other sensitive areas. Whenever the Soviet monitors are visiting such sensitive areas, precautions will have to be taken to prevent them even from making physical contact with sensitive materials, especially things like coatings on advanced weapons systems. "Unless they have gloves on," says Zimmerman, "the Soviets will be able to collect intelligence through their fingernails."

While a specialized Army unit, the classified Offensive Counter-Intelligence Operations Program, can handle some of the load, a program that is critical to it lacks necessary manpower, Pentagon sources say. The program, called the Technical Surveillance Counter-Measures Program—TSCM in the Pentagon's acronymic parlance—has been cut back so severely in recent years that it may take up to a year before an adequate technical counterintelligence operation is safely in place. For years, TSCM agents have conducted electronic countersurveillance at U.S. military installations to protect them against penetration by hostile intelligence agencies. But in the past six years, government officials say, the number of TSCM agents has been cut back from 160 to 32. Fewer than 10 are in the U.S. today, the rest having been assigned to military-

intelligence units overseas. Pentagon sources say they need at least 30 TSCM agents to provide adequate security for the Soviet monitors here, but it's unclear where they'll come from: It takes at least eight months to train new TSCM agents.

Another problem, defense sources say, involves a sensitive, and very costly, operation to camouflage and transfer several major weapons and research programs not pertaining to INF on military sites without triggering Soviet satellite disclosure. Though mutual satellite reconnaissance of each country's bases is accepted as a key method to assure compliance with the INF Treaty, defense experts are deeply concerned about the extent to which Soviet inspectors, through observation on the ground, could enhance or refine intelligence—on areas other than INF—collected by satellite reconnaissance. Says retired Col. Calvin Sasai, a veteran military-intelligence officer and president of RDR, Inc., a firm that specializes in pinpointing vulnerabilities and designing security systems for government programs: "The Soviet visual inspections will easily be able to analyze our R&D [research and development] and military capabilities."

The threat is more acute at some sites than others. Redstone Arsenal, a missile base in Huntsville, Ala., is not only home for an elaborate research-and-development project for future battlefield nuclear weapons but it is also the headquarters for production and launch plants of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. A third program involves the testing and replication of secretly obtained non-American weapons systems. Though the Soviet monitors will have no rights under the INF Treaty to view areas housing any of these programs—and are entitled to see only a minute fraction of Redstone's 38,000 acres—the anxiety among U.S. officials is understandably high that no slipups occur that could result in a breach of security. Reporters shown the inspection at Redstone last week saw no security lapses.

If there is any consolation for the U.S., it is that the Soviets—who are required to open five times as many sites as the U.S.—are going to face the same type of problems as the Americans. U.S. inspectors no doubt will be just as aggressive there as their Soviet counterparts here in collecting intelligence. "At least their headache," says one Department of Defense specialist, "is just as big as ours." ■

by Steven Emerson with Orri Low

HOW UNCLE SAM'S CLOAK-AND-DATA BOYS ARE FIGHTING BACK

Breaking into computer systems might be a lark for hackers. But penetration of government computers—particularly military systems—is a deadly serious matter for the National Security Agency (NSA) and for counterintelligence agents at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After all, who's to say whether a break-in is a hacker's harmless prank or an attempt by Soviet spies to steal defense secrets?

The supersecret NSA, an arm of the Pentagon that for many years didn't even exist officially, has a double-edged mission. It gathers electronic intelligence from the Soviet bloc by intercepting and decoding telecommunications traffic, including signals sent from spy satellites. And to prevent foreign nations from doing the same to the U.S., the NSA spends untold millions devising sophisticated cryptographic codes and trustworthy computer systems.

Protecting government computer systems is becoming increasingly taxing. Intelligence organizations, the military, and other federal agencies now operate more than 100,000 computer sites—most with multiple computers and communications links. Many thousands of additional computers used by defense contractors and high-tech manufacturers hold data that the Administration doesn't want leaked.

The Soviets leave no stone unturned in their hunt for the tiniest morsels of information. Even a routine electronic mail message between a defense supplier and a bank might provide an im-

portant clue. That's why the Soviet missions in Washington, New York, and San Francisco bristle with antennae. They pick up phone conversations and data transmissions relayed by cellular radio and microwave links. In Cuba, a giant KGB-operated dish pulls in signals beamed down from satellites to any point in the lower 48 states. And Soviet snoop ships monitor both coasts


communicating with ships or planes. So the NSA has developed elaborate cryptographic ciphers for turning English into digital gibberish. These codes are so convoluted that any given string of characters, such as this sentence, would never yield two identical series of encoded characters. The cipher is changed frequently, so that the digital code for an "e" in one word might

mean "k" in the next.

To decode such a message, you need the key: the starting cipher plus the formula for switching to the next variant. For computers that handle the most sensitive information, crypto keys are created in pairs, then delivered by courier to the two computer sites. So even if the key for the link between the Pentagon and a particular base is copied, it won't help decode traffic between any other points.

Still, nothing offers total protection. Just as private-sector computer crime is usually traced to employees, the NSA's worst fear is that turncoats will sell cryptographic secrets. Crypto details are so secret that even the names used to classify them are classified. That's why federal officials say that former Navy radiomen Jerry A. Whitworth and John A. Walker, Jr., who for years passed top-secret crypto materials to the KGB, did more harm than any other spies in decades. Officials estimate that the Kremlin used its ill-gotten gain to decode 1 million military messages. That could make it the computer crime of the century—so far.

By Otis Port in New York



ALL EARS: SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

from just outside U.S. territorial waters. One intelligence expert estimates that the Soviets listen in on more than half of all U.S. telecommunications traffic, one way or another.

SPOOK-PROOF. Because almost any transmission runs a high risk of being intercepted, Washington goes to great lengths to protect its secrets. Its most secure lines are fiber-optic cables buried deep below the surface and sealed in gas-filled pipes. There are no connections to outside phones, so no hacker can gain access. If a spy cuts a pipe to tap the cable, the drop in gas pressure instantly sounds an alarm.

But buried cables are of no use in


private-sector computer crime is usually traced to employees, the NSA's worst fear is that turncoats will sell cryptographic secrets. Crypto details are so secret that even the names used to classify them are classified. That's why federal officials say that former Navy radiomen Jerry A. Whitworth and John A. Walker, Jr., who for years passed top-secret crypto materials to the KGB, did more harm than any other spies in decades. Officials estimate that the Kremlin used its ill-gotten gain to decode 1 million military messages. That could make it the computer crime of the century—so far.

(AFIO COMMENT: Many thanks to Capt. John R. Lengel of Strongsville, OH, for another follow-up on computer security.)

(AFIO COMMENT: This chart came with the U.S. News & World Report article titled "Getting ready for Soviet Spies," printed in abridged form on page 9 of this issue.)

KEEPING TABS ON THE SOVIETS

U.S. bases the Soviet monitors will visit. Some sites have other sensitive installations that the Soviets will have to be prevented from seeing



1. San Diego, Calif. 2. Magna, Utah: 63 United States firms working on defense contracts in the immediate area; production site for missile-guidance systems. 3. Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. 4. Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. 5. Fort Huachuca, Ariz.: Army intelligence base and Army Communications Command. 6. Pueblo Army Depot, Colo. 7. Fort Sill, Okla.: Army field

artillery headquarters. 8. Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Tex. 9. Redstone Arsenal, Ala.: Research-and-development center for battlefield nuclear weapons; production site for National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 10. Middle River, Md. 11. Titusville, Fla. 12. Cape Canaveral, Fla.: Launch sites and assembly facilities for military test flights.

DRUG BATTLE

United States must take lead

International drug trafficking is fast shoving communism aside as the world's most destabilizing influence. It is not just nations that are threatened with the instability created by multibillion-dollar drug cartels. The international banking system is affected by the massive sums of money being laundered. Panamanian banks alone laundered \$275 million emanating from the Colombian cocaine trade in three years. The money laundering points out a systemic problem in that nation, where the drug indictment of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega is just one element in the entangled web of Panamanian drug dealing.

The Reagan administration has succeeded in interdicting more illegal shipments than any other administration. Its reward, however, has been increasing sophistication of the traffickers.

First lady Nancy Reagan has become a leading anti-drug crusader, motivating the formation of nearly 10,000 clubs for kids learning to withstand peer pressure for drug use. But neither the administration nor Congress, which has made a \$2 billion budget commitment to law enforcement this year, can hide the fact that even small victories

have been elusive. The State Department recently reported that the production of coca, marijuana and opium poppies in most drug-producing countries has grown substantially this past year.

The White House has been rightly criticized for acting too lethargically in the past on evidence of drug trafficking, especially among friends and allies.

The certification process by which President Reagan determines which major drug-producing or -trafficking countries are cooperating to fight drugs and are therefore eligible for aid has been severely criticized. The administration has tended to decertify only countries like Iran and Syria, with

(AFIO COMMENT: An intelligent discussion of a problem that is both difficult and important. We are obliged, once again, to our fellow member from Dallas, TX, who does not wish to be named.)

which the United States has minimal relations and provides no aid.

The National Drug Policy Board has emphasized eradication programs in drug-producing countries. But they have had virtually no effect. When an eradication program was undertaken last year in Peru, whose crop for cocaine is believed to be the world's largest, only 850 of the 100,000 acres were destroyed.

The administration now faces an even more embarrassing issue. How much should it expect impoverished countries to sacrifice when the administration's efforts to eradicate marijuana growing in the U.S. have flopped? Legislation to require U.S. companies to license chemicals used in cocaine manufacturing is held up in Congress while the State Department is pressuring other nations to draft laws that would do the same.

U.S. drug policy is not working. In the United States alone, estimates of the gross revenue generated by all narcotics sales range from \$60 billion to \$120 billion. The White House can be faulted for focusing too much on interdiction and not enough on domestic demand for drugs. But Congress also has emphasized tougher stances against drug-producing nations while offering no coherent statement on domestic drug use. Similarly, a recent *New York Times*/CBS poll found the public believes, 50 to 35 percent, that government should concentrate more on reducing the supply of drugs than on getting people to stop using illegal drugs.

The drug war will not be won through facile initiatives, excess melodrama and the whiff of hypocrisy suggested by such proposals as sending in the Marines to destroy coca crops in Latin America while imposing no such action to get rid of California's marijuana crop.

There is still half a year in the Reagan term; it is not too late to press a firmer federal approach that would escalate education as a means of curbing domestic demand for drugs while continuing law enforcement efforts against drug trafficking.

The drug problem, quite rightly, has become one of the hottest issues of the presidential campaign, thanks largely to the emphasis Jesse Jackson has given the issue.

Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis has been helped by polls showing that the public feels the Democrats are handling this problem more effectively than are Republicans, a matter of no little importance now that the drug issue has emerged as the public's choice as the country's most pressing problem.

Vice President George Bush wisely has begun distancing himself from the president's efforts to drop drug charges against Gen. Noriega in return for his leaving Panama. And Mr. Bush has beefed up his anti-drug positions by proposing that businesses establish programs to discourage drug use in the work place, a hemispheric drug summit, an international drug-eradication task force and wider testing of people responsible for public safety. He also has supported the use of the military in combating drug dealers and capital punishment for dealers of lethal drugs.

But we need more debate on how to reduce the demand side of the equation. Do we need national drug treatment centers? How can we improve more effective anti-drug programs in public schools? Do we need a cabinet-level "drug czar"?

If the United States is to retain its position as a global leader, it must evolve a comprehensive policy on drugs. Curbing the demand for drugs must take on a greater significance than attempts to solve the problem strictly through halting trafficking.

The world is looking to the United States for leadership in a war as destructive as any that have menaced the globe in this uncertain nuclear age. Given the destructive power of illegal drugs to wear down the institutions of a country, the U.S. cannot afford to fail.

EDITORIAL

FOR HEAVEN'S SAKE, ACT!

Earlier this year, the *Toronto Star* ran a series of articles about Trinidad and Tobago's role in the immensely profitable international drug trade. The gist was nothing new: that this country, like many others in the region, is now being used as a trans-shipment point for heroin and cocaine on its way to North America, and is developing as a drug market in its own right. But the Canadian paper was able to send two reporters into Trinidad to interview people who they identified as drug barons, photograph them, quote them, describe their homes and the arms they were carrying and the bodyguards they had around. And in spite of this publicity, nothing happened.

Well, not quite nothing. The Prime Minister denounced the articles in Parliament for giving us a bad name. He said discussions had been going on, collaboration was occurring with North American police forces, an expert was arriving to advise us on white collar crime. The local press reported that a special team of police had gone "underground" to crack the drug business, that "top-level" meetings had been taking place. The Defence Force plunged heroically into the bush to burn marijuana trees, taking some adventurous journalists with them.

But nobody touched the man who graciously granted an interview to the Canadian reporters; he boasted that nobody could touch him, and he was right. An investigation by the *Sunday Express* produced the same boast from plenty of other dealers. The reason is obvious, and there's no point glossing it over. The drug trade produces so much money, and therefore so much power, that it can buy off silence, intimidate, or in the last resort eliminate anyone who seriously stands up to it. It can pay producers far more to grow marijuana or coca or whatever than to produce mere food; it can pay pilots and sailors far more than they could dream of earning from airlines and fishing; it can buy the protection of police and the power of

judges; it can buy whatever high technology is necessary to keep a hundred jumps ahead of ill-equipped police forces. In Colombia, one of the three main cocaine producers, the death tally includes 62 judges, a Justice Minister and an Attorney General.

In Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Mexico, production cannot be controlled with any real success; the appetite of the outside world is simply too big. The US market is said to be worth US\$110 billion a year. When the New York cops closed in on a modestly successful Jamaican operator this year — it took 40 of them, wearing bullet-proof vests — he was said to be grossing \$100,000 a day; 12 year old kids in New York get US\$150 a day as lookouts. In the US, one in six Americans is now a drug user; there is scarcely a family which is untouched by addiction — broken parents, battered kids, whole neighbourhoods terrorised by the cocaine gangs, executions, urban violence at an all-time high. The police won an emergency grant of \$1.7 billion and have been arming themselves with hot pursuit jets, machine guns, helicopters, high-speed patrol boats, radar balloons. Last year, US authorities seized 35,000 kilos of cocaine, an increase of 1,800% in six years, and barely a quarter of consumption.

The Caribbean has been sucked into this war because its poorly policed and often under-populated islands make perfect way — stations for entry into the US. Government officials from several regional countries have been jailed — Belize, Suriname, the Chief Minister of the Turks and Caicos Islands — and plenty more have been accused (Cuba, the Bahamas, Haiti). Jamaican businessmen are screaming for better policing before their US trade is mortally wounded; Air Jamaica has paid millions in fines because of smuggling, BWIA has slapped an extra charge on passengers for more rigorous security, the Cayman-based Kirk shipping line was fined US\$103 million for a haul of ganja.

But the region is essentially unpoliceable; and the drug barons are generously paying their dealers in kind, so that the Caribbean becomes a market as well as a transit area. In this country, cocaine arrests soared from 3 in 1978 to 619 in 1985, and seizures from an eighth of an ounce to 16 kilos, but it made no impact. Thousands of people know who the big dealers are and how the drugs are moved; but nobody can touch them. Meanwhile the stories multiply — kids in school, contaminated sno-cones, laced drinks at kids' parties, amusing games like *Blue Star* using tattoos soaked in LSD.

There are heroic efforts by such bodies as New Life Ministries and Samaan House; but so far the response of those authorities with any real power has been utterly pitiful. The Scott Drug Report came and went; there are sporadic ganja raids, a few minor arrests, periodic official assurances and flurries of top-level meetings. But the big boys go about their business confident that they are untouchable. In the US, the Customs Department is clamouring for the confiscation of the passport of any American merely found carrying a joint; slowly it is dawning on people that this is a national security threat far more dangerous than communists, and that America's huge appetite for drugs guarantees that production will continue to expand. US grants to the big three cocaine countries for anti-drug programmes last year was merely \$48.8 million, less than half the Contras got. Here at home, we talk earnestly about changes in bail regulations, the legality of property seizures, ways of cutting out court delays. We fiddle while the country burns, while the kids are entangled, while the pay-offs multiply. This is no party or partisan issue; it's a national emergency with widespread support for a return to law and order. Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Police Commissioner — for heaven's sake, for pity's sake, some real action!

(AFIO COMMENT: The intelligence connection in this case is indirect, but nonetheless real: Not only is the narcotics trade a subject of interest to various intelligence agencies, but adversaries have frequently tried to link our intelligence personnel to narcotics traffic. This outcry in a Caribbean publication deserves our attention. Many thanks to the sender, who does not wish to be named.)

THE BOSTON GLOBE

14 May 1988

CENTERPIECE

Trying to put the CIA on '88 agenda

By Leonard Bushkoff
Special to The Globe

CAMBRIDGE - Something is missing thus far from the presidential campaign: the CIA.

Even Jesse Jackson has shunned an issue over which rival candidates have either stumbled or soared since the mid-1970s. In 1976, Carter proposed a reformed and restrained CIA; in 1980, Reagan demanded an aggressive and unleashed CIA; and in 1984, Mondale used the contra conflict to denounce CIA-sponsored undeclared wars. By contrast, this election promises bipartisan discretion on the intelligence front.

It won't last if John Stockwell and the other members of ARDIS (Association for Responsible Dissent) have their way. They see the CIA as the operational arm of an "invisible government" whose members they allege are running American foreign policy as they choose, independently of Congress and the public.

Stockwell, an ex-Marine officer and former CIA case officer in sub-Saharan Africa, contended in a recent interview while in Cambridge for a speaking engagement that "the CIA poses the ultimate threat to democracy, and should be dismantled for the good of the United States and the world." He does not exempt CIA intelligence-gathering: "It is necessary and legitimate, but is tainted by the association with covert operations, which continues to dominate the CIA."

Stockwell served in the CIA for 13 years; he perceives it now as a self-perpetuating power elite, dedicated to controlling the Third World, and - in some cases - to feathering its own nest. He cites retired CIA bigwigs who immediately join companies they have backed while in the agency, and others who allegedly dip into the till:

"When you're involved in a really big operation - as I was in Angola in 1975 - there's a lot of money floating around, all in cash. Say you have family problems, and one way out is a psychiatrist, or a big vacation, or a fancy Swiss boarding school for

the kids. It's pretty hard not to take some of that cash, which you're handing out anyway to crooked provincial chiefs or officers who just scribble an illegible receipt in return."

One answer - of sorts - is the lie detector, but Stockwell has doubts. "The Soviets and Cubans have courses in how to beat the box, and I've seen perfectly innocent people who were so nervous that they threw it out of whack. When I was a case officer, I sweated to get my accounts absolutely right, because I never knew when I was going to be 'boxed.' But you just don't 'box' a top guy with 30 years service. It's the old double standard: the higher you go, the less they check on you."

So Stockwell and ARDIS are working to get the CIA - especially covert operations - back on the political agenda. "We've been going to states where primaries were under way, trying to get candidates to publicly discuss the CIA," said Stockwell. "All the Republicans have refused, though the staff people were willing to talk with us."

The Democrats were somewhat more responsive. "Gore and Gephardt were against contra aid, but wouldn't commit themselves on the CIA; they wanted a case-by-case approach. The Simon people sent a staffer to several public forums in New Hampshire, and his position was that the covert action mechanism should be preserved, but used very sparingly." The Jackson camp refused to commit itself, citing the need to reinforce its moderate image.

Stockwell finds that Dukakis strongly opposes big covert operations such as overthrowing the Guatemalan government in 1954 and conspiring against Allende in Chile during the early 1970s. "Dukakis was a student in Peru in 1954," Stockwell said, "and he felt the backlash from the Guatemalan coup." And Dukakis position papers demand strict control and accountability for all intelligence operations, with prosecution for anyone breaking the law.

Stockwell, who has been publicly criticizing the CIA since he resigned in 1977,

wrote "In Search of Enemies," an autobiographical account of CIA operations in Angola, and went on the lecture circuit. He speaks to about 100 audiences a year, primarily at universities, but also to business and other groups in central Texas, where he lives.

"I had a lecture in 1984 before an Air Force group, about 50 or so pilots and others," he remembers, "and I thought they were going to eat me alive: you know, former CIA guy turned lefty. So they started throwing tough questions at me, and I threw answers right back, and we kept at it, went on for hours, and some of those fellows said I really made them think, gave them a different view of things. And that made me feel great."

The birth of the Association for Responsible Dissent in June 1987, resulted from Stockwell's lecturing. "You go around the country, and you meet people, and they say to you, 'John, you really should help get people together, do something about the contras and the Angola fighting.' So I finally did."

Stockwell approved a core group of 30 well-known political activists, many of whom had been part of the foreign policy system but had turned against it: Daniel Ellsberg; David MacMichael, a former CIA analyst; Charles Clemens, a Vietnam veteran-turned-doctor in El Salvador; Brian Willson, who gained national prominence when struck by a military train while picketing in California; Wilbur Crane Eveland, a government Middle East specialist in the 1950s and after; and Philip Agee, the highly controversial ex-CIA officer. Stockwell offers no apologies for backing Agee, whose close Cuban connections disturbed some ARDIS members.

ARDIS also has attracted 1,500 supporting members, particularly after a well-reported press conference in Washington during late November that brought inquiries from more than 100 former CIA officers who have been questioning their service.

(AFIO COMMENT: This interview/article is unintentionally revealing. Stockwell has now been on his anti-CIA crusade for eleven years. While he continues to preach to the choir in academic institutions, the political winds have shifted direction, and no serious political figure will have anything to do with him. So, having no other place to go, he remains at the fringes of political discourse. - Many thanks to the sender, Lt. Col. W. W. Buhl, Syracuse, NY.)

COMIC CORNER

Note: All items on this page are excerpts.

From a Letter to A Soviet Editor

NEW YORK TIMES

12 June 1988

"A permanent commission concerned with internal affairs and state security should be organized in the Council of Ministers. It would be required to conduct regular, mandatory reviews of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee for State Security (the K.G.B.).

"Democratic Perestroika Club" *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 7.

(AFIO COMMENT: The sender, Joseph C. Goulden of Washington, DC, wonders if we might be seeing the first stirrings of a "Churchski Committee." It's a delightful thought. Supporters of our Church Committee should sign on!)

Libertarian Librarians

ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS

25 August 1988

LIBRARIES may be for sleeping, but they certainly are not for spying.

It never occurred to the millions of us who charged out of the schoolhouse door daily to enter these portals of pensiveness that sleuths and saboteurs lurked around the Dewey decimal system.

We now are told, however, that in this modern world of microfiche and retrieval systems, the Russians are coming, the Russians are coming. They are coming to absorb, copy, photograph, recruit, subvert — and anything else stack operatives do.

No less an austere body than the Federal Bureau of Investigation is asking librarians to keep a sharp eye out for suspicious-looking characters, to monitor what they read and check out, and then to tell all to the bureau.

Judith Krug, director of the American Library Association's Office for Intellectual Freedom, says this type of FBI request is in "direct contradiction to what the Library Association stands for." She adds that it is a misuse of library records, which are private and confidential. Krug points out that 38 states have statutes making it illegal for librarians to make public the names of individual users and what materials they are using.

(AFIO COMMENT: We've wondered when it would come to this: Telling the FBI is the same as telling the public! — Thanks to our top contributor, Henry N. Schladt of Colorado Springs, CO.)

Penetrating Nicaraguan

ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS

20 May 1988

MANAGUA, Nicaragua (AP) — The government newspaper quoted Interior Minister Tomas Borge yesterday as saying a Nicaraguan journalist penetrated the CIA as a Sandinista agent.

The reporter was identified as Maria Lourdes Pallais Checa, a graduate of Columbia University in New York. She is a niece of the late Anastasio Somoza, the Nicaraguan dictator overthrown by the Sandinistas in July 1979.

Barricada, the Sandinista newspaper, quoted Borge as saying Pallais was "a counterintelligence agent who worked in enemy ranks." It said he made the remarks Sunday during a tour of Nicaragua's remote Caribbean coast.

(AFIO COMMENT: What about the reputation of Nicaraguan journalism? Doesn't anybody care? — Again, many thanks to Howard E. Steen.)

Artist Rejects Commission

DENVER POST

2 July 1988

The details are still secret, but what's known is that the CIA is expanding its headquarters in northern Virginia, with new offices covering 1 million square feet. The CIA agreed to commission art for the new digs — one artist to adorn the new lobby, one to beautify the grounds outside.

But Mullican approached the issue just as an artist would — which is to say, impressionistically. "It's like, when I think CIA, I think guns," he says. "I hate guns. Whenever I see a gun, I crack out."

(AFIO COMMENT: His brush probably wasn't bullet-proof. — Thanks to Howard E. Steen of Aurora, CO, and Rinehart S. Potts of Glassboro, NJ.)

"Whispery" Secret

ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL

26 July 1988

WASHINGTON — Psst! Tucked away on the sixth floor of a downtown Washington office building is a bookstore for spies, where you can learn how to change your identity, determine if your telephone is bugged, look inside the KGB or get some self-help guidance on becoming an agent.

But you almost have to engage in espionage to find the National Intelligence Book Center, which specializes in books, magazines, computer software and tapes on spies, cryptography, surveillance, the CIA, the KGB and spooks of all kinds.

It is one of Washington's secrets, this whispery one-room shop.

(AFIO COMMENT: Not only did they discover the "secret" book center, but the director and her customers were interviewed and pictures were taken. Such genius! Well, we hope it helps business. — We can't name all contributors; the clipping we used came from Lt. Col. William F. Frick of Tucumcari, NM, and Lt. Col. A. Lipp of Sao Paulo sent a Portuguese version!)

Wrightfully Bored

PUNCH MAGAZINE

22 April 1988

Anyway, my friend Mr Dickin-son who runs the Bear Hotel in Devizes, the finest watering-hole in the West, secreted me a copy of *Spy-catcher* the other night, having smuggled it back from Australia (we're way behind the times down here in Wiltshire) and I've come to the conclusion after just a few pages that old Peter Wright and company are just as boring as the spies they never seemed to catch.

(AFIO COMMENT: He's got a point. — Thanks again to Howard E. Steen of Aurora, CO.)

Where was George?

DALLAS TIMES HERALD

20 July 1988

WASHINGTON — A report that Vice President George Bush worked for the Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1960s as an operative appears to be a case of mistaken identity, the CIA said Tuesday.

The agency has identified a George William Bush, who worked at CIA headquarters during that period and who is apparently the one mentioned in a recently discovered FBI memorandum, said CIA spokeswoman Sharron Basso.

(AFIO COMMENT: Good thing the other Bush was only CIA Director; Many thanks to our anonymous Dallas, TX, contributor.)

From A Book Review

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

1 August 1988

This book is highly tendentious; its data is shaped and manipulated to bolster Casey's rationale for strong intelligence systems, and not to investigate what the OSS actually accomplished.

(AFIO COMMENT: In making a case for strong intelligence, Casey was clearly out of line! — Thanks to Rinehart S. Potts of Glassboro, NJ.)

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF AFIO

It is my pleasure to invite you to join the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. Our Association was organized in 1975 by David Atlee Phillips and former intelligence personnel from the Federal military and civilian agencies.

AFIO:

- ▶ Provides a forum for former intelligence people to continue to serve.
- ▶ Promotes public understanding of the need for strong U.S. intelligence.
- ▶ Has about 3400 members nationwide and 20 local chapters.
- ▶ Promotes education programs explaining the importance of intelligence and provides over 90 college professors with the opportunity to receive books and monographs relating to intelligence and, if requested, provide speakers.
- ▶ Distributes a quarterly journal news, views and book reviews related to intelligence, and a quarterly digest of current intelligence news commentary.
- ▶ Responds to congressional requests for AFIO views and proposed legislation.
- ▶ Through local chapters, provides speakers to civic, academic and professional groups.
- ▶ Responds to press queries and suggests participants for radio and TV programs on intelligence and national security issues.
- ▶ Holds an annual convention with distinguished speakers and panelists.
- ▶ As an educational foundation it is tax exempt [IRS 501(c)(3)]. Annual dues (\$25.00) and donations are tax deductible.

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Full Membership is available to U.S. citizens who have served with any U.S. Government intelligence or counterintelligence organization. Only full members have the right to vote.

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