




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


# National Intelligence Daily

**Tuesday  
19 January 1988**



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
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
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**HAITI:**

**Low Voter Turnout**

***Voter participation was minimal during the presidential election Sunday in which the military appears to have backed centrist candidate Leslie Manigat, but the result may not be known for several days.*** 



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Press reports estimate voter turnout at about 5 percent 

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 US officials in Port-au-Prince say the election was characterized by widespread disorganization and apparent fraud. The military and police presence in the capital and other areas was heavy, and few incidents of violence were reported. 

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 the police in some places escorted busloads of voters to polling stations. 

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**Comment:** Fear of violence probably contributed to the sparse voter participation as much as opposition calls for a boycott, despite government efforts to provide security and to encourage voter turnout. The heavy presence of security forces may have discouraged Duvalierist and leftwing extremists from attempting to disrupt the balloting. Nevertheless, tensions probably will remain high at least until the inauguration of a civilian president on 7 February. 

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In the event no candidate wins a majority of the vote, a runoff election between the two top contenders is scheduled for 31 January. 

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 a runoff seems unlikely. 

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## Key Results of the Central American Summit

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### Summit Joint Communique

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<i>Provisions</i>	<i>Comment</i>
Immediate and total compliance with peace accord, especially on dialogue, cease-fires, amnesty, and democratization.	Rejection of Nicaragua's attempt to condition compliance on verified end to US aid to the insurgents.
Honduran obligation to cut aid to anti-Sandinistas implicit in demand for full compliance.	No criticism of US aid to Nicaraguan guerrillas or joint appeal to US to respect agreement.
Central American Foreign Ministers to review report of International Verification Commission and have principal role in future verification.	Contadora countries removed from verification role because of the pro-Sandinista slant of their presummit report; no progress on creation of border-monitoring force; no dates for review of compliance.
Importance of Central American parliament underscored.	No timetable given for elections to parliament.
Commitment to deal with arms levels and foreign military advisers.	Topics probably received scant attention; joint meeting with Contadora countries next month on security issues.

### Nicaragua's Announcement

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Nationwide state of emergency suspended immediately.	No comment yet on other communique demands including total press freedom and end to special tribunals; arrest of internal opposition leaders intended to discourage ties to insurgents.
Government to participate in direct cease-fire talks with rebels in San Jose.	Not following Salvadoran example of high-level talks with insurgents in national capital; foreigners probably will still form part of government team.
Broader amnesty to be implemented on cease-fire accord; if no agreement, prisoners will be released if US or non-Central American governments accept them.	Contrasts with approach of democracies, which immediately released prisoners; Duarte says Nicaraguan plan not in compliance.
Central American parliament elections "within previously established time limit."	Probably means by mid-1988, target date in peace accord; Sandinistas probably hope to force attention on election while dragging out cease-fire talks.

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**CENTRAL  
AMERICA:****Summit Demands Immediate Compliance**

*The democracies have put Nicaragua on the defensive by insisting on immediate compliance with the peace accord, but the Sandinistas calculate their concessions will be enough to help defeat renewal of US aid to the insurgents.* [redacted]

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US Embassy and press reports indicate Salvadoran President Duarte and Honduran President Azcona took the lead in opposing extensions of the deadline for compliance. The summit communique issued Saturday underscored the need for full democratization without conditions or excuses. Nicaragua, which previously had maintained its commitments were contingent on verification that US aid to the insurgents had ended, announced it was lifting the state of emergency, ready to begin direct talks with the rebels, and willing to release all political prisoners. [redacted]

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The communique did not call on the US to end aid to the anti-Sandinistas. Nicaragua, however, has warned that approval of additional funds will kill the peace agreement. [redacted]

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The five Presidents also decided to strip the International Verification Commission—dominated by the Contadora countries—of principal responsibility for verification, assigning that role to the Central American Foreign Ministers. The summit, however, set no new date for evaluating compliance and made no progress toward creating a border-monitoring force. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Although Nicaragua probably entered the meeting ready to make concessions to influence the vote on aid to the insurgents, pressure from the democracies probably forced more rapid changes than the Sandinistas wanted. Nevertheless, Managua's gestures on cease-fire talks and amnesty fall far short of measures San Salvador has taken, and recent detentions of Nicaraguan internal opposition leaders suggest the regime does not intend to relax all political restrictions. [redacted]

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The democracies may not issue a joint evaluation of Nicaraguan compliance before the US aid vote. For the long run, however, they have increased their prospects for holding Nicaragua to account by removing the Contadora group from verification. [redacted]

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Nicaragua probably will try to keep the spotlight on Honduras, which is obligated to end aid to the anti-Sandinistas. Azcona, however, probably believes that his offer to allow inspections and the delay in creating a border-monitoring force will give his government breathing room. [redacted]

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### Military Units in Rebellion, 18 January



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**ARGENTINA:****Army Rebels Surrender**

***Although Army rebels led by Lt. Col. Aldo Rico surrendered yesterday, President Alfonsin must move quickly to reimpose his authority over the armed forces to prevent additional disobedience.*** [REDACTED]

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The clash between Rico's group and government forces at Monte Caseros lasted several hours and resulted in casualties on both sides. Four other rebel units scattered throughout the country capitulated yesterday without incident, as did a group of Air Force commandos who briefly seized control of a Buenos Aires airport. The government has announced it will court-martial at least 13 officers from the 21st Mountain Infantry at Las Lajas; it is holding Rico—and several of his followers—at undisclosed military installations pending a decision regarding prosecution. [REDACTED]

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The US Embassy reports rumors continue to circulate that other units—including some at the large Campo de Mayo installation in Buenos Aires and the 22nd Infantry regiment at Marquesado—may attempt additional acts of insubordination. The Embassy adds that the government is closely monitoring these units and has readied troops to quash any further uprisings. Press reports indicate that representatives of all of Argentina's major political parties, along with labor and business organizations, have given their support to Alfonsin and the democratic system. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** Alfonsin's success in mustering troops has strengthened his hand, but civil-military tensions will remain acute over the next few days. Many officers—although not Rico supporters—probably harbor resentment against the Army Chief of Staff for using force against his own troops. Moreover, the issues of greatest concern to the military institution, such as the continued threat of human rights trials and budget grievances, remain unresolved. [REDACTED]

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The government must move quickly to reestablish its authority and prosecute at least the instigators of the rebellion, the second major challenge in a year. Disgruntled officers would probably view concessions by Alfonsin as a sign of weakness and might again confront the administration. [REDACTED]

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**TAIWAN:**

**Political Developments**

***Taipei remains quiet as funeral arrangements for the late President proceed, but the conviction of two oppositionists for sedition over the weekend could heighten tensions with the Democratic Progressive Party.*** [Redacted]

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The Kuomintang announced Saturday that Chiang Ching-kuo will be buried 30 January, and his body will lie in state at the Martyrs Shrine in Taipei until then. [Redacted]

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The American Institute in Taiwan reports Premier Yu Kuo-hua will submit his resignation to President Li Teng-hui. Li has said, however, that Yu will be asked to stay on. At the same time, the Kuomintang Central Standing Committee has decided not to name an acting party chairman but will elect Chiang's replacement at the Kuomintang Congress in July. Leading candidates for the job reportedly are Yu, Li, party elder Huang Shao-ku, and Secretary General Li Huan. Meanwhile, Chief of Staff Hao Po-ts'un and Defense Minister Cheng Wei-yuan have pledged to support the new President. [Redacted]

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A Taipei high court Saturday convicted two opposition members for 10 and 11 years, respectively, for sedition for supporting Taiwan independence. The Democratic Progressive Party has protested and promised new demonstrations but said it will not violate the ban on protests until the official mourning period ends 12 February. [Redacted]

**Comment:** Premier Yu's resignation is an attempt to strengthen his own standing in political maneuvering by securing President Li's endorsement now. The decision not to name an acting party chairman works to Li Huan's advantage because he will continue to run the Kuomintang on a day-to-day basis and oversee the arrangements for the congress. [Redacted]

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The Democratic Progressive Party probably decided to delay any demonstrations to avoid a confrontation with the security services. More radical members of the opposition may use the visit of US Congressional delegations this week to protest the convictions. [Redacted]

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**AFGHANISTAN:****Views on Possible Soviet Initiatives**

***The Afghan insurgents would talk directly to Moscow about a political settlement of the war, but they almost certainly would reject any plan that did not include a short withdrawal schedule and the abandonment of the current Kabul regime.***

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According to the US Embassy in Moscow, the Soviets may increase their direct dealings with the resistance in the effort to find a face-saving political settlement. They have talked with various insurgents since 1979, and the guerrillas consistently claim they want to meet the Soviets.

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Foreign Minister Shevardnadze recently told the US Ambassador that Moscow is considering plans for province-by-province troop withdrawals. Kabul's media have repeatedly claimed the Soviets will leave pacified provinces. Moscow says it has left 12 of the 29 provinces in Afghanistan.

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The Soviets, according to US officials in Moscow, may see their recent spate of economic agreements with Kabul as, in part, a way to buy insurgent cooperation during a withdrawal with promises of aid for postwar reconstruction. Moscow and Kabul have recently concluded accords on trade, agriculture, and energy.

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**Comment:** Neither the insurgent political leaders in Peshawar nor their commanders believe Moscow is sincere in its oft-stated desire to leave Afghanistan. And the resistance will accept none of Moscow's rhetoric until the Soviets come up with a short timetable and actually begin to withdraw.

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Soviet efforts to conclude province-by-province cease-fires with the guerrillas probably would not succeed. Although some field commanders would make deals with the Soviets, the fragmented nature of the insurgency makes it difficult for a single commander to guarantee tranquility in an entire province. Moreover, Afghan feelings are such that commanders could not prevent attacks on the withdrawing Soviets by some of their men intent on revenge.

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Most insurgent leaders who are aware of the new Soviet-Afghan economic accords probably regard them as a sign that Moscow will stay in Afghanistan. Although an insurgent regime in Kabul would seek proper ties to the USSR, it almost certainly would declare that it was not bound by any agreement the Afghan Communists reached with Moscow.

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**IRAN-IRAQ:**

**Developments in the Ground Fighting**

*Iran has increased its joint operations with Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq over the past few days, probably as a prelude to more intensive attacks on the southern front where preparations for a large offensive continue.* [Redacted]

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Iran claims its forces, assisted by Kurdish guerrillas, captured several hundred square miles of new territory and killed or wounded more than 1,000 Iraqi soldiers in fighting on the northern front over the weekend. Iraq denies the claim and says it has contained all the Iranian attacks. [Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Block]

**Comment:** Iran's limited gains on the northern front are unlikely to pose an immediate threat to Iraqi strategic interests there, and Baghdad almost certainly will be able to contain the Iranians without committing many of its reserves or moving a large number of forces from the south. The Iranian attacks probably signal the beginning of more intensive—albeit still limited—fighting in the ground war, however, as a prelude to a large offensive. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the main thrust of Iran's offensive this year will again be on the southern front.

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[Redacted]

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**CHINA:****Officials Debating Farm Problems**

***The somber tone of the Agricultural Minister's yearend report to the Standing Committee of China's parliament Saturday and the overdue annual party document on rural policy indicate officials are grappling with tough choices in agriculture—once the showpiece of reform.*** [redacted]

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The Minister's report highlighted the failure of grain and cotton to meet production targets and the return to rationing of sugar and pork—which accounts for more than 85 percent of China's meat consumption. He blamed below-market state prices for the production shortfalls as well as stepped-up consumer demand. [redacted]

As a result of the farm problems, China's top party agricultural advisor has spearheaded a move to transfer land-use rights, which will allow farmers to purchase rights from other peasants and to benefit from larger scale operations. Beijing hopes this will allay peasants' lingering doubts about the permanence of rural policy and increase their stake in the land's upkeep. Moreover, the US Embassy reports the Chinese are debating a proposal that calls for a rise in state procurement prices to improve grain's profitability over cash crops. To counter chronic fertilizer shortages, the proposal also recommends spurring domestic production by about 25 percent over the next few years while supplementing current stocks with imports.

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[redacted]

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**Comment:** The Agricultural Minister's report and the absence of the party's annual farm policy guidelines—issued early this month to local officials and farmers—indicate Chinese leaders are undecided about how to proceed with rural reforms. The transfer of land-use rights almost certainly will generate ideological controversy because of its capitalist overtones and may be resisted by peasants who work in rural industries but guard their land-use rights as insurance against shifts in rural policy. In addition, only marginal price hikes for grain are possible this year because of the current budget deficit, and state investment in the countryside will probably see only a small increase.

[redacted]

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**ISRAEL: Relative Calm Over Weekend**

Israeli security enforced strict curfews on most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip over a weekend marred by violent clashes on Jerusalem's Temple Mount on Friday. Several Palestinians were wounded, and tear gas was used at Muslim holy shrines—the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. By yesterday, however, disturbances throughout the territories had subsided, allowing some Palestinians to return to jobs in Israel proper and UN food deliveries to Gazan refugee camps, according to press reports. Scattered commercial strikes continued in the occupied territories and East Jerusalem.


[Redacted]

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**Comment:** As a result of the violence in Jerusalem, Israeli Arab citizens have decided to increase humanitarian aid to Palestinians in the occupied territories and also plan sympathy demonstrations on Saturday. Concern over the effects of continuing unrest may have prompted the Israeli army decision yesterday to begin gradually replacing regular troops with reservists. Israeli commanders are clearly concerned that military readiness has already suffered from disrupted training cycles as regular units have been diverted to police duties in the occupied territories.

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**MOZAMBIQUE: Expanding Military Ties to West**

France will soon provide nonlethal military assistance to Mozambique and may send several civilian security advisers, according to the US Embassy in Maputo. Spain recently agreed to train Mozambican police and militia units, and Portugal this month is dispatching a delegation to discuss military cooperation, including logistic support and training, according to Embassy reports. The UK, which has been training a small number of Mozambican military personnel in neighboring Zimbabwe for the past two years, last month promised \$900,000 in nonlethal military aid to improve security along Mozambique's Nacala and Limpopo rail lines. [redacted]

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**Comment:** West European governments want to encourage President Chissano's pragmatic policies, especially his efforts to reduce Mozambique's dependence on the USSR. The relatively small scale of Western military aid, however, suggests Maputo is likely to remain militarily dependent on Moscow for the foreseeable future. Last year, Moscow provided approximately \$140 million in equipment and some 800 military advisers to support the struggle against the RENAMO insurgency. [redacted]

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**ETHIOPIA-SUDAN: Relations Deteriorating**

Relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum are increasingly tense; according to diplomatic reporting, Ethiopia's President Mengistu is unwilling to negotiate his differences with Sudan's Prime Minister Sadiq. A senior Ethiopian official contends Addis Ababa refused to participate in bilateral talks last week because of Khartoum's "vicious propaganda," but [redacted] most senior Sudanese officials believe Ethiopia wanted to embarrass Khartoum. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Addis Ababa's avoidance of serious talks with Khartoum reflects in part Mengistu's anger at Sudan's continuing support for Ethiopian rebels. Mengistu considers the Sadiq regime vulnerable and hopes his backing for Sudanese insurgent leader Garang, which has included cross-border artillery support and aerial reconnaissance, will help topple it. Recent military successes by Sudanese rebels in the dry season—usually a time for government advances—will probably encourage Mengistu to provide additional training, equipment, and logistic support. The Ethiopian famine will further complicate relations. Thousands of refugees, primarily from areas supporting anti-Mengistu rebels, are likely to cross into Sudan seeking food. [redacted]

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**USSR: Further Restructuring of Foreign Trade Sector**

TASS reports the USSR has abolished the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations—which administered foreign aid—and created the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations to replace them. Konstantin Katushev, Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations since November 1985, was chosen to head the new ministry. The announcement gave no indication as to the new ministry's authority.

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**Comment:** The restructuring probably is designed to prepare for further decentralization of the foreign trade sector by improving high-level coordination and trimming the bloated bureaucracy. The latter would allow foreign trade experts to be reassigned to ministries and enterprises with severe shortages and would give the leadership the opportunity to eliminate personnel who are foot-dragging on implementing reforms. A reorganization of the sector in 1986 established the State Foreign Economic Commission, which oversees all foreign economic activity, including supervising the Foreign Trade Ministry and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. It also ended the Ministry's monopoly over trade by transferring some of its foreign trade associations to ministries and other central bodies and granting more than 20 ministries and 70 enterprises the right to engage directly in importing and exporting activities.

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25X1**BANGLADESH: Parliamentary Elections Rescheduled**

The five-day postponement of parliamentary elections by the Bangladesh Election Commission to 3 March should buy President Ershad more time to split the opposition and give some credibility to the elections. Ershad is currently offering concessions to moderates of the Awami League and the Bangladesh National Party, two major opposition parties, to break their cohesion.

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**Comment:** The rescheduling of elections probably is an attempt by Ershad to undermine opposition strikes scheduled for this week. The Awami League and the BNP will continue to press for Ershad's resignation and the supervision of the elections by a caretaker government. Ershad claims he would win a presidential election, but he is reluctant to step down to become a candidate. The Army, however, might pressure him to take this drastic step if he is unable to co-opt enough opposition moderates to participate in the March polling.

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**In Brief**

**Middle East**

— US Embassy in Sanaa reports discovery of two more oilfields in **North Yemen** . . . further drilling required to determine size . . . likely to boost Sanaa's oil reserves by 250 million barrels to 800 million barrels. [Redacted]

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— Shia Amal announced end of two-year siege of Palestinian camps in **Lebanon** in support of Palestinian unrest in **Israeli**-occupied West Bank, Gaza . . . **Syria** probably behind gesture . . . more than 2,500 killed in camps struggle, renewed conflict likely. [Redacted]

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**East Asia**

— **South Korean** forces on alert as Seoul implicates, threatens **North Korea** in airliner bombing . . . move to reassure public, intimidate North . . . Olympics, political transition, senior officials' comments suggest military retaliation a long shot. [Redacted]

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— **China** asking **Japan** for \$13 billion in seven-year concessionary loan—triple last loan—with disbursement in 1991 vice 1989 . . . Tokyo, at most, will double loan and disburse in 1990. [Redacted]

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— **China** and **Portugal** exchanged documents of ratification Friday for Macau's return to Chinese rule in 1999 . . . joint groups now begin hammering out technical details . . . revising legal system, localizing civil service may be difficult. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Europe**

— **French** Prime Minister Chirac announced candidacy for president Saturday . . . probably hopes to exploit strong campaign skills, increase pressure on others to enter, talk specifics . . . reflects growing concern about his low popularity. [Redacted]

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**Africa**

[Redacted]

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— **Algerian** President Bendjedid apparently unable to get **Tunisia** to accept **Libya** joining treaty linking countries . . . Tunis reportedly demanding Tripoli end support to Tunisian dissidents . . . Qadhafi postponed visit while US 6th Fleet Commander in Tunis. [Redacted]

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## **Domestic Implications of Unrest in the Occupied Territories**

All three states face domestic constraints on their reactions to the Palestinian violence. **Syria's** President Assad, for example, will need to ensure that his strong public approval of the unrest does not provoke pro-Arafat protests in Syria that turn against his own regime. US Embassy reporting suggests that his control over 250,000 Palestinians in Syria will continue to be sufficient to discourage such protests.

**Jordanian** officials and the public are strongly in sympathy with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, according to the US Embassy in Amman. Government statements have been crafted to reflect righteous anger, but media coverage has stopped well short of urging continued unrest. Although Jordan hopes the disturbances signal the beginning of serious Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories, Amman fears the violence might strengthen PLO support on both banks of the Jordan River.

Jordan will continue to impose implicit limits on permissible ways of showing Palestinian solidarity in order to balance public support with internal control. A few, mainly symbolic demonstrations have been permitted, but Jordan's security forces arrested most of the leaders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine late last month to prevent them from staging an unauthorized rally.

The Palestinian uprising has again made relations with Israel a focus on domestic protest in **Egypt**, especially on campuses and around mosques. According to Embassy reporting from Cairo, the violence has given ammunition to radical shiekhs and student leaders trying to turn Egyptians against the government. So far, the disturbances have been easily controlled, but Egyptian officials fear that pro-Palestinian demonstrations might catalyze protests of economic grievances.

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### Special Analysis

**EGYPT-JORDAN-SYRIA:**

#### Reaction to Gaza, West Bank Unrest

*Syria is using the continuing violence in the occupied territories as a propaganda weapon against Israel, while Jordan and Egypt are trying to avoid damage to the peace process. All three states are attempting to prevent pro-Palestinian sympathies among their own people from spilling over into antigovernment demonstrations.* [Redacted]

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Syria argues the violence vindicates its hard line on Arab-Israeli peace issues, and Damascus has tried to encourage the unrest by giving it full media play. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

— Syria's Palestinian surrogates nonetheless have little influence in the occupied territories. [Redacted]

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For both **Egypt** and **Jordan** the violence underscores the need for a revived peace process, including an international conference, but neither appears to be contemplating foreign policy initiatives to address the problem. Instead, Cairo and Amman will look to the US to urge Israeli Prime Minister Shamir to be more accommodating on peace negotiations and a workable plan for disposition of the occupied territories. The violence adds new urgency to President Mubarak's peace agenda when he visits Washington this month.

[Redacted]

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Egypt almost certainly will not sever relations with Israel—despite official embarrassment and harshly critical comments in both the establishment and opposition papers—as long as the violence does not intensify beyond current levels.

— Cairo might consider recalling its Ambassador, but it wants to preserve lines of communication with Tel Aviv.

— Egypt will have to balance its relationship with Israel, however, with the need to maintain close ties to its Arab benefactors, who are almost certain to increase pressure on the Egyptians to take action. [Redacted]

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**Special Analysis**

**CAMBODIA:**

**Diplomatic Maneuvering Intensifies**

*Hints that Vietnam may be willing to withdraw from Cambodia by the end of the year without a political settlement are the latest in a series of moves by Vietnam, the USSR, and China to test the diplomatic waters and to improve the negotiating environment. Much of the maneuvering is tactical, and Prince Sihanouk and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen face a number of unresolved issues as they resume talks this week.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Vientiane, with Hanoi's approval, agreed last month to exchange ambassadors with China for the first time since the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979. Beijing believes the move signals Vietnam's desire for better relations with China and possibly Thailand, according to US diplomats. Vietnam last month also announced a pulling back of troops from the Thai-Cambodian border, except near guerrilla bases in Thailand, partly in response to Bangkok's claimed withdrawal from the area. [Redacted]

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**Soviets Seeking a Settlement**

[Redacted] the Soviets have begun to prod the Vietnamese more energetically to seek a political settlement. They are asking Vietnam to temper its objectives in Cambodia, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the Soviets are emphasizing their growing impatience with the stalemate in Cambodia and the economic burden on Moscow of Vietnam's occupation. The Soviets seem ready to continue logistic and financial assistance for the talks between Sihanouk and Hun Sen in France. [Redacted]

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**China Showing Flexibility**

China has adjusted its position in the past few months to demonstrate a willingness to compromise. China's press is offering tentative support for Sihanouk's efforts, and Chinese officials have not tried to restrain him. Beijing has indicated it no longer supports the Khmer Rouge as the "main body" in a future government, although it does want the group to be represented. In other moves, China has eased military pressure on Vietnam's northern frontier and, according to the US Embassy in Bangkok, has discussed with Thailand ways to negotiate a settlement in Cambodia. [Redacted]

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**Near-Term Objectives**

Vietnam and the USSR want a political solution in Cambodia, [redacted] but they also have in mind more immediate objectives. Vietnam almost certainly wants to press the ASEAN nations and China to curb support for the resistance effort, which is spearheaded by the internationally detested Khmer Rouge. [redacted] Hanoi also hopes to divide and isolate the Khmer Rouge itself, particularly its most radical elements. [redacted]

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Moscow wants to convince Beijing that it is trying to overcome the primary obstacle to better Sino-Soviet relations; it hopes diplomatic pressure on Vietnam and highly visible efforts to promote negotiations will suffice. The Soviets do not appear to be willing to risk strained relations with Hanoi through more coercive action such as threatening to reduce aid or adopting positions that undercut Vietnamese interests. [redacted]

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The Chinese reportedly want to appear interested in a political settlement in part because they believe their control over Sihanouk has diminished; they worry he might try to negotiate a separate peace with Hun Sen if he concludes Beijing is intransigent. They also want to stay close to ASEAN's position to avoid isolation and to preserve close relations with Thailand, which are based largely on compatible policies on Cambodia. Beijing also will continue to press Moscow to edge Vietnam toward withdrawal as a precondition to improved Sino-Soviet relations. [redacted]

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**Effect on Negotiations**

The recent moves probably will not produce a breakthrough in the next round of talks between Sihanouk and Hun Sen, but the two will be under pressure to show some results in order that the process does not appear to stagnate. Moreover, the probing and subtle shifts by the key players might eventually move them toward compromise. A more flexible Vietnamese position on early withdrawal from Cambodia would help accelerate the process, although Hanoi is not likely to follow through without guarantees that the Khmer Rouge will be neutralized and that outside support for the guerrillas will cease. Moreover, the limits are vague on how much political control over Cambodia that Vietnam is willing to relinquish for a settlement. [redacted]

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