

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 6-1

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## An Incredible Mole Who Wo

Several weeks ago the world was stunned to learn that a former head of British intelligence was officially suspected of being a Soviet agent. The suspect, now deceased, was Sir Roger Hollis, who as head of MI-5 from 1958 to 1966 was roughly the British equivalent of J. Edgar Hoover.

During this period, other officers in the British intelligence service had been identified as "moles," but if the actual head of the British service turned out to be a mole, the entire secret world of intelligence during this period would have to be agonizingly reappraised. After this charge was made, Prime Minister Thatcher told Parliament that two secret investigations of Sir Roger had failed to produce any credible evidence that he had worked for Soviet intelligence; yet, the swirl of suspicions and allegations continued.

During this entire controversy, one of the few men who could cast some light on Sir Roger's bona fides sat quietly in his small apartment in Kew Gardens, in Queens, N.Y., shunned by all the intelligence services in the Western world.

A pale man in his early 70s, with a distinctive walrus mustache, this man is perhaps the only important CIA mole to have successfully penetrated the secret world of Soviet intelligence and survived to tell his tale in the West. (The CIA's other top moles — Oleg Penkovsky and Peter Popov — were both captured by the KGB and executed). He now is an American citizen living under the name Aleksei Romanoff, who ekes out a living editing a small newsletter.

Twenty-three years ago, however, he turned the entire universe of intelligence inside out when he revealed the existence of KGB agents who had risen to the top echelons of British, German, French, and American intelligence. These KGB penetration agents, or "moles," had been actively undermining and betraying the secret activities of Western intelligence.

This incredible "mole" case began nearly a quarter of a century ago. Romanoff, who then went by the name of Michael Goleniewski, was the vice chairman of military intelligence in Poland. Since he had a special re-

sponsibility for counter-intelligence — or catching enemy spies — he worked closely with representatives of Soviet and East German intelligence.

Occasionally, his KGB liaison officer, a clever but boastful Russian named Col. Ivan Andreievich Raina, would allude to very sensitive sources that the KGB had established inside the CIA and other Western intelligence services. He provided only hints — but no names.

On one occasion, for example, Col. Raina warned that the CIA would attempt to recruit a Polish diplomat in Switzerland. He gave the approximate time and place that the CIA approach would be made.

How did Raina know the CIA plans? Romanoff deduced from such tidbits of information that the KGB had indeed succeeded in placing one or more "moles" in the CIA.

Then, through a series of accidents, he was called upon by the Russians to open the safe of a Soviet intelligence officer in Poland who had committed suicide. The contents of the safe provided more pieces in the jigsaw, and led Romanoff to conclude that the KGB had "moles" operating in West German, British and French intelligence. Then, in 1958, he decided to defect to the United States — and provide this valuable information to Western intelligence.

In April 1958, Romanoff crossed the border into West Berlin, and posted a letter addressed to Henry J. Taylor, the U.S. ambassador to Switzerland. In this letter, he gave neither his name nor his nationality. He explained to Ambassador Taylor that the KGB had penetrated Western intelligence; and if he identified himself, his identity would soon be known to the KGB.

Instead, he proposed to help the United States ferret out these moles by supplying information that could be traced to them. He suggested that the FBI should set up a "mail drop" for him, and inform him of the address through a classified ad in a West German newspaper. He preferred the FBI — since he believed

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CL, which by law was the proper channel. In a matter of weeks, the CIA advertised an address for the anonymous mole in a Frankfurt newspaper. It then began to receive incredibly detailed reports from "Heckenschultze."

These reports quickly identified no fewer than seven spies. These included a British admiralty aide named Harry Houghton, who had furnished the Soviets with secret information about U.S. nuclear submarines; Col. Israel Beer, an Israeli military historian who had gained the confidence of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion; and Col. Stig Wennesstrom, the Swedish air attache in Washington, D.C.

While the CIA was still hotly debating the bona fides of this mystery agent, a document arrived at the mail drop that caused considerable consternation. It was a list of 26 Polish officials that had been compiled by the British Secret Service as potential targets for recruitment.

Such a list should have been kept in the most protected vault of British intelligence, and known only to a few top British intelligence officials. The CIA therefore wondered how their mystery agent had obtained a copy.

In his next report, "Heckenschultze" explained that he had gotten this British secret list from the KGB. The implication was clear: The KGB had one or more moles deep within British intelligence who had stolen the list for the KGB.

Allen Dulles, then director of the CIA, personally brought the matter to the attention of British Intelligence. Among the top British officials queried about this list was Sir Roger Hollis, who then, in 1960, headed MI-5. The CIA wanted to know if the list was genuine; and if so, who was in a position to leak it to the KGB.

Several weeks later, British intelligence reported back to the CIA that, after a thorough investigation of the matter, it was determined that the list was nothing more than a clumsy fabrication. It suggested that the names could have been taken out of the Warsaw phone book.

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