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John Norton Moore, Chairman

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Secretary Shultz Addresses Conference On Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs

Pleads for Support of Central America Policy

Secretary of State George P. Shultz was the lead-off speaker at a one-day conference on "Restoring Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs" conducted at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., on May 23, under the sponsorship of the Standing Committee on Law and National Security and the Committee on Executive-Congressional Relations of the Section of International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association. Other speakers included Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeremiah Denton; Congressmen Henry J. Hyde, Dante B. Fascell and Richard B. Cheney; and from the public sector, Lloyd N. Cutler, former White House counsel to President Carter and William G. Hyland, editor of Foreign Affairs.

The secretary said that the United States had achieved great things when it pursued a bipartisan foreign policy. A very large part of his speech, however, was devoted to the situation in Central America where, he said, no such bipartisan support existed.

All of the speakers agreed with the principle that bipartisan support was essential for foreign policy initiatives to be successful. Some were frankly pessimistic, some were optimistic on the possibility of stimulating bipartisanship by appeals or remonstrations. Although a number of the participants made outstanding contributions, constraints of space compel us to limit ourselves here to printing excerpts from the remarks of Secretary Shultz. The conference proceedings will be printed in brochure form and should be available in a few months.

I have given these remarks the title: "Restoring Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs."

When I began work on this speech, I used a different

word—"nonpartisanship"—to describe the American tradition of cooperation on foreign policy. But on reflection, I decided it wasn't quite right. I prefer the term that most of us do use: "bipartisanship." Parties make our system work. Our political leaders and legislators are strong-minded individuals, but our democratic process works by the contention of ideas, organized around two parties, tempering policy by the heat of debate. Bipartisanship means that our parties care about an issue, work it through by the process of compromise, and then unite behind the policy that has been formulated.

A bipartisan foreign policy achieved great things in the years after World War II, such as the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the foundation of the world economic system. At other times, partisanship and domestic division have seriously harmed our interests, notably in the defeat of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, and during the periods of McCarthyism and then Vietnam.

Modernization of our defenses is essential. [But] despite our profound differences with the Soviet Union, the American people recognize we have a common interest in averting nuclear holocaust. Every president in the nuclear age has sought negotiations to control nuclear weapons and reduce the danger of war. We must continue to resist Soviet encroachments firmly while holding open the door to more constructive relations. In the past, we have tended to alternate between building up our strength and negotiations. But both must go together. That is the consistency and coherence that should discipline our strategy.

The Situation in Central America

Today, over 90 percent of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean lives under democratic governments—in contrast to only one-third in 1979. This heartening development should inspire us as we reawaken to our historic interest and moral responsibility to promote and support democracy around the world.

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Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs

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We have broad bipartisan agreement that U.S. policy in Central America should foster democracy, economic progress, social reform, and regional security. We also agree on the underlying economic and social causes of instability in Central America. In the past four years, 77 percent of our aid to the region has been economic, not military. At the suggestion of a giant of bipartisanship, the late Senator Henry Jackson, President Reagan in 1983 appointed a distinguished commission to find a basis for a bipartisan policy for the region. Headed by Henry Kissinger, the commission included three leading Democrats, Robert Strauss, a former party chairman, Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO, and Mayor Henry Cisneros of San Antonio. As recommended by the commission, we have requested enactment of an \$8 billion aid program over five years. Congress has approved \$1.8 billion, and the authorization of the balance is in the foreign aid bills now pending. The Caribbean Basin Initiative to give countries of that area open access to the U.S. market is another example of bipartisan cooperation.

Thanks to the support of Congress, we are starting to achieve our goals in El Salvador, which has held four fair elections in three years. Under President Duarte, the army's performance is improving, human rights violations are down sharply, and the roots of democracy are growing. The guerrillas are weaker, and President Duarte is seeking a dialogue with them.

In all but one of the other countries in Central America, democracy is taking hold. Nicaragua is the one exception. Our policy toward that country has been hindered, to some extent, by misconceptions and confusion about our policies. Political partisanship, I am compelled to say, also has burdened our task.

We seem to have general, and growing, agreement that the Nicaraguan communist regime poses a threat to the security of the region. We have general, and growing, agreement that, rather than fulfill the democratic promises of the 1979 revolution, the Nicaraguan leaders are increasing repression. We also seem to have general, and growing, acceptance that their huge military build-up and the large presence of foreign communist military advisers in the country are obstacles to a peaceful settlement. The dispute in this country is about some of the tactics of addressing the problem.

This country has made a major effort to cooperate with Nicaragua from the outset. When the Sandinistas took power in July 1979, until 1981, we gave Nicaragua \$118 million in aid, more than they received from any other country. The Carter administration initially halted our aid because of the Sandinistas' attempts to subvert El Salvador. Thereafter, we made major attempts to resolve our differences in August 1981 and April 1982,

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London ABA Conference: National Security Leaks— Is There A Legal Solution?

The Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association will present a panel discussion on the important and timely subject of national security leaks at the ABA annual meeting in London. The program will take place at the Royal Garden Hotel, Kensington, on Wednesday, July 17, from 2 to 5 p.m.

Controversy over leaks of national security information has made headlines in both the U.S. and Britain in recent months. The U.S. administration is reported to be seeking new legislation to reinforce its powers against government employees who disclose classified information, while at the same time senior U.S. government officials have accused members of the U.S. media of irresponsibility in publishing certain information disclosed to them and have taken steps to try to reduce media access to classified information. In Britain, the trial of Clive Ponting under the Official Secrets Act for disclosing information to a member of Parliament has provoked intense controversy over the validity of the Official Secrets Act.

The discussion, entitled "National Security Leaks—Is There A Legal Solution?", will bring together a distinguished panel of U.S., British and Canadian experts in matters of national security, the media, and legal controls on the dissemination of information. The panel will focus on whether new legislation is needed in the U.S. and, if so, what form that legislation should take. The discussion will include an assessment of the magnitude of the problem and of the feasibility of controlling leaks, and debate on the public policy and legal ramifications of the problem. Comparisons will be made to the British and Canadian experience under their respective Official Secrets Acts.

The panel will include such experts as Brian Raymond, who was Clive Ponting's solicitor; Douglas Rutherford, Q.C., assistant deputy attorney general (criminal law) of Canada; Kathleen Buck, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense; Richard Willard, acting assistant attorney general, Civil Division, Department of Justice; Carl Stern, NBC-TV News; Daniel Schorr, journalist; Mark Lynch, staff counsel with the ACLU National Security Project; and Thomas Martin, formerly acting assistant attorney general, Civil Division, Department of Justice. The panel will be moderated by Daniel B. Silver, former general counsel, Central Intelligence Agency.

Reflections on Anniversaries, Detente, And Disinformation

By Frank R. Barnett

Editor's Note: There is a strong historical bond between the National Strategy Information Center, of which Mr. Barnett is president, and the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security. Frank Barnett, whose speech on April 30 to the committee's final breakfast session of the 1985 spring series is reproduced below, has been educational consultant to the committee since its inception. The two groups have conducted educational efforts in close cooperation, and as John Norton Moore, chairman of the committee, has indicated, they will continue to do so.

Mr. Barnett was introduced by William J. Casey, director of central intelligence, whose remarks are also reproduced below.

Mr. Casey. Frank Barnett is an educator, a foundation executive, a specialist in Soviet strategy, in European theater politics, and in defense innovation, an author and lecturer, and consultant on national security affairs.

Frank and I go back a long way. He was discovered on the banks of the Wabash, teaching literature at Wabash College. He had worked with the army in Berlin, and had come to know the Russians as have few Americans, either now or then. He wanted more action, and turned up in New York. At that time, some of us were trying to set up an organization called the American Friends of Russian Freedom. We wanted to help those Russians whom the Soviet regime sought to repatriate. There was good reason to believe that their fate, if repatriated, would be execution or the concentration camps of the gulag archipelago. We persuaded Frank to become the executive director of that organization, and he carried on that work nobly for several years.

Since that time, he has done a great many things. I think the most notable is the creation and the development of the National Strategy Information Center. I credit him with being an extremely effective director of that organization. I have always taken particular pride in watching the organization take shape under his direction, and in watching the many things that Frank Barnett has done to contribute to our national security. Let me cite just one example. It was Frank Barnett and his team who were responsible for the fact that there are now national security courses offered on 500 college campuses in the United States. I recall that when this program started, the ROTC was being driven off the campuses. Frank and his colleagues had the concept of enriching the curricula of the ROTC, and they developed this into formal programs of national security studies. At that time, there were probably not half a dozen professors of national security in the United States. I recall asking at a NATO meeting in 1970 how many such programs there were in Europe. Not surprisingly, the answer was that

there were only a handful. Since that time, thanks in large measure to Frank's considerable influence in Europe, a number of similar programs have been established.

Frank and I have had a few escapades together. There was a time when we were supporting Robert A. Taft for the Republican nomination in Chicago, and our opponents campaigned on the slogan that Taft couldn't win. This was, I think, the first covert action of a foundation called the Liberty Fund. We had Pierre Goodrich and a few others—I think Frank was the key person among them—who produced a full-page news memorandum which said, "Ike can't win." It was very persuasively done and we almost convinced him!

The work that Frank has done for some 20 years has made an important contribution to the development of our military defenses and to the ongoing modernization of our defense establishment. But, the enemy has learned how to get inside our defenses, how to manipulate our public opinion, how to manipulate our political process, and how to conduct a propaganda campaign using the techniques of semantics and various kinds of psychological skills. This is something we have to learn to cope with. Out at Langley we are holding a two-day seminar on this question: the manipulation of public opinion by our adversaries. This is a subject that I think Frank could well add to his repertoire.

And with that, I'll introduce Frank. It's a real pleasure to be here today.

Mr. Barnett. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm very grateful to Bill Casey, not only for that generous introduction, but for serving as a founding director of NSIC, and even more for being a friend and tutor for over three decades.

While I have the chance, I want to add something: Bill, I have the absolute conviction that if General "Wild Bill" Donovan were with us today, he would be just as happy as the rest of your friends that his shoes fit you so comfortably. And I also would take this opportunity to refute the rumor that General Donovan used to call you "The Mumbling Pimpernel."

I owe other debts of gratitude to a number of men in this room. The ABA Committee on Law and National Security has been my regiment for nearly 25 years. In fact, NSIC owes its genesis to the prompting and support of former and present members of this committee—like Lewis Powell, Morry Leibman, Bill Mott, Jack Marsh, and John Norton Moore—to all of whom I pay deep tribute and thanks.

If NSIC has had some small success in implanting courses on national security policy in universities both here and in Europe, it's partly because we've tried to emulate the modus operandi of this committee. That "m.o.," as I see it, is to build consensus on unimpeachable research; avoid "hardening of the categories" in

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Anniversaries, Detente, and Disinformation

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the body politic; and enlist liberals and conservatives on the same team, animating people who agree to disagree on secondary issues but are willing to stand together against all forms of totalitarian aggression.

One of the few compensations of becoming a senior citizen is that people seem slightly more tolerant of your banalities; or perhaps it's rather that your antennae have atrophied, and you don't really notice the impatience with which your modest gifts of wisdom are really received. In either case, counting on your forbearance, I ask leave to reminisce about World War II anniversaries, detente, and disinformation.

Soviets and U.S. Meet on the Elbe

Let me begin with anniversaries: 40 years ago last Thursday, the American 69th Infantry met the First Ukrainian Army at the Elbe River, cutting Nazi Germany in two. By random luck, I was there, and by an even more improbable chance, I became the interpreter for the U.S. military government unit that worked with the Red Army to repatriate Soviet displaced persons and POWs. At first, the Russian and American GIs got along famously. The Russians were boisterous and friendly; we sang together, we applauded while they danced, we traded souvenirs, drank too much vodka, and relished those glorious weeks in May following the end of the war in Europe. As the troops from both sides of the Elbe got to know each other better, GIs would pull out sweat-stained wallets, to show a Russian pal photos of home back in Denver or Des Moines. Quite often the pictures would show a small house, a Ford in the driveway, and handsome shoes on the feet of wives and children.

Soviet soldiers were astonished. It was not that great affluence was on display; rather it was that ordinary GIs, the American proletariat, carried visible proof that workers under capitalism were not so oppressed as Stalinist mythology contended. Fraternization began to spread a dangerous virus to the East. And then the picnic ended.

In the first days of June 1945, the Iron Curtain came down on the Elbe. Regular units of the Red Army were withdrawn, and replaced by an MVD detachment, with Mongolian cadres who in effect created a "cordon sanitaire" between Russians and Americans. The Mongolians spoke no German, and didn't even appear to speak Russian. They carried Al Capone-type tommyguns, with which they unpredictably blasted birds and shot up the river. So we stayed prudently on our side. The era of friendship on the Elbe was short-lived. And despite propaganda charades it has never been renewed. The Mongolian machine-gunners have been replaced with barbed wire, minefields and the Berlin wall; but whether we refer to "cold war," or the cosmetics of detente, the

reality of protracted conflict remains. In fact, the ceremony on the Elbe last week was overshadowed by the recent murder of Major Nicholson, for which the Kremlin offers neither remorse nor apology.

Nazi Genocide and the Soviet Record

No one can doubt the need to honor the victims of Hitler's war and reaffirm the righteousness of the crusade against fascism. We must never forget Dachau. But not every holocaust has been perpetrated by the SS, nor have European Jews been the only objects of state terror. Yet, if "never again" is to have operational meaning today, the world must direct effective outrage against the gauleiters of Lenin and Mao as well. We shall master the fearful lesson that Hitler taught the democracies only when we comprehend that the "killing fields" of Cambodia are the moral equivalent of Auschwitz. Thus, in light of communist genocide in Southeast Asia, and the ongoing butchery of Afghan civilians by the Red Army, the relevant lessons of World War II must include anniversaries the Kremlin prefers to forget.

Most historians cite September 1, 1939, the date of Germany's invasion of Poland, as the start of World War II. But on August 23, with the signing of a non-aggression treaty in Moscow between Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia, the red dictator freed the hands of his Nazi counterpart for the prelude to the Holocaust. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had a secret blueprint for the partition of Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence. As early as 1935, according to historian Paul Johnson, Stalin privately put out periodic feelers to persuade the Nazis to relinquish their anti-Soviet crusade, and settle for a totalitarian brotherhood of mutual respect and divided spoils.

Not only did the Hitler-Stalin accord loose the dogs of war in Europe; the Soviet Union provided crucial material support to fuel the Luftwaffe in the skies above Britain and drive the Panzers in the invasion of the Low Countries and France. Soviet oil, rubber, zinc, copper, manganese and grain were all supplied to Nazi Germany during the first 22 months of the war. Moscow, to this day, accuses the U.S. and West Germany of "pro-fascism." We should never forget that the first wave of the Nazi "blitzkrieg" was fed with Soviet supplies.

Stalin's designs "metastasized" during the period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration. Soviet armies invaded Galicia on the 17th day of the German-Polish war, attacking Polish troops from the rear. More than a million and a half Poles were deported in 1939 and 1940 by the Red Army. The eastern half of Poland was submerged in the gulag, in the context of fraternal collaboration between the NKVD and the Gestapo. And then thousands of Polish officers were massacred in the Katyn Forest to further Stalin's goal of decapitating Polish nationalism, which would otherwise prove an obstacle to the Kremlin's post-war expansion.

Next came Russia's winter war with Finland—an un-

provoked power grab against a peaceful neighbor, frustrated in part by the tenacity of Finnish arms. And then the three Baltic nations, independent since 1918, were smuggled into Soviet dungeons in 1940. The horror of Hitler's "final solution" for the Jews was foreshadowed when Stalin's boxcars transported—by the tens of thousands—the future of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to extinction in the Siberian permafrost.

And finally, another neutrality pact—this one between the Soviet Union and Japan in April 1941—stabilized Japan's rear, while the Tojo cabinet completed its plans for Pearl Harbor.

Thus Stalin was either a bumbling broker of World War II, or at least a co-sponsor of many state crimes that led to its outbreak. That he was ultimately betrayed by Hitler, his partner in genocide, scarcely entitles him to our sympathy.

Our sincerest sorrow and gratitude, however, can rightly be reserved for the millions of Soviet citizens who shed their blood fighting Hitler's armies. Humanity also owes compassion to other millions: Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tartars and the like, all victims of the Kremlin's internal war against its own people, which continued despite the war against Hitler.

Some may ask if this is "ancient history," with no meaning for today. Well, the Polish nation knows better. The workers who built "Solidarity," only to see it crushed on orders from Moscow, had fathers who were even more brutally betrayed by Russians. To decimate the potential leadership of post-war Poland, Stalin deliberately halted the Red Army offensive outside of Warsaw for two months in 1944, to give the Germans ample time to wipe out the resistance forces in Warsaw. Cordell Hull's memoirs tell us that Stalin refused to grant landing rights to American bombers so they could drop arms and supplies to the Poles. With 200,000 anti-Soviet Poles in their graves, it was easy for Stalin to imprison the handful of pro-Western leaders who returned from exile in London after the war, and install Moscow's puppets in their stead.

The Soviet People and the Leninist Oligarchy

Stalin's crimes do not diminish the bravery and suffering of the Soviet people during the war against Hitler. The Russians are not our enemies. Rather, it is the Leninist oligarchy, which uses Russia as a base for projecting power, which is the enemy of all of us. Thus it would be folly to ignore the legacy of Lenin and Stalin as we celebrate the victory over the Nazis. For while Adolph Hitler's regime was obliterated forever in 1945, Joseph Stalin's political and ideological heirs occupy offices in the Kremlin today.

Some will object to that assertion and will postulate yet again another "thaw," another Prague spring, another helping of goulash communism with a human face. But so far, every detente has resulted in more Soviet throwweight, fresh communist insurrection,

more refugees and new bases for the export of subversion.

Some American entrepreneurs, anxious to sell technology to Moscow, still profess to believe that the Russian leaders are simply Slavic-speaking graduates of the Harvard Business School. They are not. They are an ideological "mafia," who control an empire and possess the guts and guile to carry out their ambitions. Our political heritage, as we all know, derives from Magna Carta, Locke and Jefferson. The Soviet legacy is from Genghis Khan, Ivan the Terrible and Lenin, which means that the "culture gap" is wider than the missile gap, and has a bleak impact on policy.

Gorbachev's "Camelot"

Today, two years after the disinformation about Andropov's penchant for Johnny Walker Black and Jacqueline Susanne, we are now digesting stories describing the off-Kremlin tryout of *Camelot*. We should remember that the Soviet Union has regularly initiated peace offensives, without abandoning ideological warfare, since Trotsky returned from Brest-Litovsk. Gorbachev's political biography suggests little will change in the years ahead, nor does the appointment of an Andropov protege as his patronage chief offer much comfort.

Mikhail Gorbachev was born in 1931 in a village near Stavropol in the Caucasus. After the war he began work at a Machine Tractor Station, the agricultural machinery depots which insure party control of the peasants. Later, at Moscow State University, he was appointed head of the Komsomol apparatus at the University. Gorbachev is said to have participated in the mid-50s "cleansing" of the university of Soviet student elements who were supportive of the Hungarian uprising. Returning to Stavropol, Gorbachev rose in the party ranks due to his patient nurturing of personal ties with vacationing Soviet politicians in the resort areas of the Black Sea coast. In short, he enhanced his career by playing "good old boy" to Moscow's visiting bosses in a holiday mood.

One of the officials with whom Gorbachev developed close links was Suslov, ideological czar and the most inveterate Stalinist of his generation. Suslov became patron and teacher of the younger apparatchik. His fellow countryman in the nomenklatura, Yuri Andropov, also a native of the Stavropol region, became another mentor.

Gorbachev was moved to Moscow in the mid-1970s to take over the agricultural portfolio after the death of Kulakov, an old Brezhnev crony. In spite of repeated Soviet crop disasters, Gorbachev attained full rank in the Politburo, a singular success at age 48. After the death of Andropov, Gorbachev moved to secure control of Party ideology—Suslov's former fiefdom.

Soon after Gorbachev became ideological secretary,

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Pravda and other official organs began to mention the name of Josef Stalin in favorable terms. It was, as the Soviets say, "no accident." The rehabilitation of Stalin is proceeding as the Soviets prepare for the 40th anniversary of Victory Day over Hitler.

Moreover, Gorbachev's first public announcement as General Secretary was a bald threat to Pakistan about the consequences of continued aid to the Afghan rebels. Recently, this well-pressed dictator has tried to blackmail the West into abandoning research on SDI, for fear that otherwise the Kremlin will again abrogate the arms talks. This is scarcely a Russian Dubcek or a re-born Kerensky. In fact, given his vitality and the tutoring from Suslov and Andropov, Gorbachev may prove to be a more formidable adversary than Stalin, who after all, had neither ICBMs nor a four-ocean navy at his disposal.

The Twilight War

May I offer one recommendation. Certainly, the Pentagon is justified in expending large resources to avert worst-case scenarios. Yet the most terrible danger may be the least likely to materialize. Hence, while we constantly strive to ward off Armageddon, we cannot ignore lesser threats that recur with disturbing frequency: terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and the other black arts of the "twilight war," so difficult to counter by a society based on pluralism and the rule of law.

But if we cannot cope with the export of guerrilla war into the resource-rich areas of the world, upon which the economies of Japan, Europe and the United States depend, then eventually even NATO, and an effective SDI may prove to be maginot lines. The Kremlin has crafted a Special Operations cadre that includes East Germans, Cubans, Bulgarians and the PLO, as well as the Soviet Spetsnaz. This conflict consortium is engaged in low-cost, low-visibility warfare. The targets are: the oil of the Middle East; the strategic minerals of Africa; the vital sea lanes of the Caribbean; and within a decade, perhaps even sooner, Mexico. If and when U.S. divisions earmarked for the reinforcement of NATO are pinned to the defense of the Texas and Arizona borders, the current game of dominoes in Central America will not, in retrospect, seem so trivial to many observers.

One reason why the West is muddled in its ability to counter the "twilight war" is that Soviet covert operations in the Third World are coordinated with a cloud of propaganda and other active measures in Europe and the U.S. In effect, Moscow seeks to interdict the Third World battlefield not with airstrikes, but with political warfare that discredits anti-communist resistance and dries up its logistical support from natural allies. This

tactic is effective against the West precisely because it is so difficult to distinguish Soviet active measures from the quite legitimate dissent and honest doubts that invariably arise among free men.

Disinformation, Disagreement, Disloyalty

Certainly, we do not wish to confuse disagreement with disloyalty. How then do we protect ourselves from Soviet disinformation? I know of no conclusive answer. Perhaps we begin by persuading more leaders in the private sector to emulate the work of this ABA committee—to simply do their homework in geopolitics, comparative ideology, world strategy and national security. Hopefully, from a more professional analysis may emerge a more workable consensus on how to deal with Leninism, without curtailing our own liberties.

I again salute this ABA committee for its elan and finesse in the battle of public opinion. In an open society, that struggle is crucial and never-ending—especially now that totalitarian elites have learned how to exploit the customs of fair play and democratic discourse.

May I conclude by repeating some lines I wrote 25 years ago to socialize my own frustrations over the propaganda war. I wish these lines were totally obsolete. I'm afraid they're still partly relevant.

If our nation should ever be pushed into a narrow corner by a combination of Soviet nuclear blackmail and political warfare, then all our affluence, all our stockpile of weapons, might be as impotent as were the walls of Troy, against the cunning of the Greeks. Either we create for ourselves a sophisticated public opinion based on a passion for the facts and responsible dissent—or we may find some parts of our intellectual climate polluted by alien forces, who have borrowed a little bit from Goebbels, Pavlov, Lenin and Mao, and use this witches' brew to sow disinformation and despondency in the national psyche. Should we permit that to happen, the epitaph on America's tombstone might read as follows: "Here lies the only civilization that perished at the peak of its power, with its power unused. Here lies a decent people who wanted love, not empire, and got neither; who tried to trade power for popularity, and lost both; here lies a nation of advertisers who knew how to change consumer tastes in cigarettes, but were themselves manipulated on the issues that really mattered to their salvation. Here died a sort of Lancelot in the court of nations, who, granting all his grievous flaws, was still perhaps the noblest knight of all: except this Lancelot, crippled with an undeserved guilt complex, let his weapons and ideals fall unused, and so condemned all mankind to the thousand year winter of the Russian bear."

Personally, I don't believe that epitaph will ever be written, but whether it's written or not, will depend not exclusively on decisions in the White House or the Pentagon or the Department of State, but on the courage, wisdom and civic commitment of such leadership groups as this ABA Committee on Law and National Security. Thank you.

Messages were received by the Standing Committee from Morry Leibman, a former chairman, and from Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, regretting their inability to be present at the breakfast meeting.

Morry Leibman, in a message that evoked much laughter, said: "Long live Frank Barnett and the League to Save Carthage."

Justice Powell said: "I have known and admired Frank for more than 20 years. Frank's National Strategy Information Center has been a uniquely constructive organization in helping to educate policy makers and the public as to matters vital to the security of our country and the western democracies."

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offering to restore aid if they would reverse their policies. The regime refused both times. More recently, we held nine rounds of direct negotiations, conducted on our side by Ambassador Shlaudeman.

A second argument occasionally heard is that we are driving the Nicaraguans into the arms of the Soviets. The fact that some were surprised by Daniel Ortega's journey to Moscow—his third in the past year—and to Eastern Europe, the day after Congress voted against any kind of aid to the democratic resistance, shows that we have a wide information gap, which needs to be closed. The record demonstrates that the Nicaraguan leaders are *already* dedicated communists aligned with the Soviet Union:

- From the beginning, Nicaragua aligned itself with the Soviet bloc in the United Nations. Only five months after taking power, when our aid was still flowing in, the Nicaraguan government refused to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nicaragua has voted against us—and Israel—on every issue.
- In March 1980, when our aid was still flowing in, Mr. Ortega made his first visit to Moscow, where he signed a political cooperation agreement with the Soviet Communist Party. That was like the party-to-party agreements the Soviets sign with foreign communist parties.

- The regime's internal policies of censorship, oppression of the Roman Catholic Church, hostility to the private sector, its massive military buildup and widening control of the population, add up to an effort to consolidate totalitarian control. The regime is also connected with drug trafficking and terrorism.
- The large influx of communist military personnel began in January 1980, only months after the revolution. Today there are 50 to 75 Soviet military and 150 civilian advisers in the country. There are 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban military and security personnel, and 3,500 to 4,000 civilian advisers, as well as personnel from other communist countries, Libya, and the PLO.
- As documented in the House Intelligence Committee Report of May 1983, the Salvadoran communist guerrillas have their command-and-control center outside Managua and receive vital logistics support from Nicaragua. Documents captured with a guerrilla leader in April provide extensive new evidence of Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran communists.
- Commandante Bayardo Arce, the regime's chief ideologist, in May 1984 gave a secret speech, revealed last July, in which he said, "[t]he Nicaraguan people are for Marxism-Leninism." Arce explained the Nicaraguan strategy of neutralizing American opinion by hiding behind a facade of progressive rhetoric. This is similar to the policy of the late Maurice Bishop's regime, as revealed in documents we captured in Grenada in 1983. These documents are highly illuminating in what they reveal of communist tactics to manipulate our media and our democratic ideals.

I understand the desire of our critics to find a peaceful accommodation. I share their desire. But the critics err in failing to see the Nicaraguan communists for what they are. Mr. Ortega is a man who, in Warsaw on May 9, described our policies as "fascist" and said he suspected that during World War II President Reagan "had Hitler's portrait hanging in his room." Two days later, at a press conference in Madrid, Mr. Ortega again compared our president to Hitler. Prime Minister Gonzalez had to remind his guest that the United States had liberated Europe from the Nazis.

Some say they would favor the military option if all else fails and a real threat comes. But by refusing to help the freedom fighters, even with humanitarian aid, they are hastening the day when the threat will grow and when we will be faced with an agonizing choice about the use of American combat troops. That is not our policy, and I am sure it is not their intention. We want a negotiated settlement, but like all adherents of the post-war bipartisan consensus, we understand that negotiations, especially with communists, cannot succeed unless backed by strength.

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Further, a failure to aid the freedom fighters endangers the progress that has been made in El Salvador. President Duarte said he is "very concerned" by Congress' action last month. How paradoxical that those who purport to back President Duarte are, at the same time, giving the Nicaraguan communists a free hand to undermine him.

A third argument is that in helping the freedom fighters we are supporting the Somocistas. In truth, the opposition is led by former opponents of Somoza, many of whom fought or worked with the Sandinistas to overthrow Somoza. Arturo Cruz, who served on the revolutionary junta and in 1981 as ambassador to the United States, was the presidential candidate of the unified opposition last November; Alfonso Robelo, head of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, was one of the original five members of the junta in 1979; Adolfo Calero, commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the largest resistance group, was once imprisoned by Somoza for directing a general strike. Five of the six leaders of the FDN were long-time civilian opponents of Somoza. I could go on.

The so-called contras, along with others, are in fact the democratic resistance of Nicaragua. They comprise about 15,000 men and women, many peasants, in a country of only 2.9 million. This would be equivalent to over one million Americans under arms; clearly it is a popular revolt.

When communist countries back communist guerrillas against democratically elected governments, as in El Salvador, should not the United States back demo-

cratic forces fighting for their freedom against a communist regime? How is it that we can all agree on our obligation to aid the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, or the anti-communist guerrillas in Cambodia, but are so divided over aiding freedom fighters near our very borders? There is no logical distinction.

Obstacles to a Bipartisan Foreign Policy

Bipartisanship must include the recognition that we have only one president at a time. Under the Constitution, the president alone conducts foreign negotiations. In addition, at times he has to make critical decisions quickly and decisively. Bipartisanship should mean an acknowledgement of the burden that rests on the president's shoulders. In October 1983, after news of the Grenada rescue mission was announced, several members of Congress took the floor to denounce our action even before I went up to Capitol Hill that day to brief them. A few even proposed impeaching the president for the mission. But when they learned the facts that the president had, and saw the overwhelming support of the American—and Grenadian—people for the operation, many came to regret their criticism.

The American people are in broad agreement on the ideas, ideals, and interests that define America's role in the world. Naturally, there will be legitimate disagreements on specific issues. But we have made a good start on renewing a bipartisan consensus. We have more work ahead of us, as we endeavor to restore fully, in principle and practice, the bipartisan conduct of foreign policy that so successfully safeguarded peace and freedom in the postwar era. The president and I are ready to play our part. We ask all Americans to join us.

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