



PERISCOPE

VOL. XI, NO. 1, WINTER 1986

Haig Offers Challenging Assessment of International Affairs

"I did not favor covert actions in Nicaragua," former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., acknowledged at AFIO's winter luncheon. "I asked the President, please, not to do it. Is it because I am against covert action?" he asked, then responded quickly, "God forbid, we are entitled to conduct covert action just as long as there is no international regime prohibiting it which others subscribe to."

Noting that "covert action is a contradiction in modern Washington," Haig recalled, "I said, Mr. President, your staff will be briefing the press before the ink is dry." "And," he continued, "they were, and I can tell you who they were!" There was another reason, Haig recalled. "I said, Mr. President, its a cop-out which enables you to go to bed every night saying, 'Well, I'm doing something against those Nicaraguan Marxists' and get up every morning and still be loved by the American people."

"I believe that the issues are so black and white in Central America — Cuban interventionism, Soviet involvement," the former Secretary of State said, "that the American people understand that and they should be given that message and they will support actions, not covert, that are necessary . . ."

Suggesting that current policy invites escalation and confrontation with the Soviets, Haig insisted, "If its worth one drop of American blood, then we must go in with a scenario that visualizes victory, and early on, or best we stay out. Now that's not a criticism of covert action; it's just simply an expression of reality in this city."

In his December 9th talk to AFIO at the Ft. Myer Officers Club, Haig pulled no punches in addressing other issues of the day, such as protectionism, economic policy, terrorism, intelligence and the rumors he would be a candidate for the presidency in 1988.

Of intelligence: "I would like to reflect the concern I have had about American intelligence, and I remember first touching upon it as early as 1965 when I sensed, at least in the Defense Department, a tendency to move away from the most important asset our nation has, and that is the human element in our intelligence structure, towards a preoccupation with modern technology. To the point where at that time, and it continues very largely til this day, Presidents cannot accept a fact as a fact unless they are provided with a satellite photograph or a hard communications intercept." He had no illusions.



Secretary Haig

"As you know, that is a rebuilding job which I am pleased that Bill Casey is acutely conscious of — that must take place with all our intelligence community." Haig specifically noted the necessity of building respect for and the career development of intelligence personnel. Recalling criticism of the intelligence community in the past, the former secretary of state noted, "And how important it is to remember that whether it be government or business, the human species is never perfect and that qualified, capable people must be permitted a misjudgment or two along the way, provided their track record justifies the kind of overall confidence that the right time and performance would justify."

The speaker then confided to the unwary audience, "You can say you heard it first here today, but I had lunch with Bill Casey the other day and got the lowdown on Yurchenko. He wasn't a double agent. He didn't have girl problems. It seems that Bill foolishly scheduled him for the David Brinkley show the following Sunday, and the guy just couldn't face Sam Donaldson."

Terrorism also drew the speaker's attention: "The second area where the administration, I think, and in fact every administration and most of the countries in the free world have been confused is a clear-headed approach to the phenomena of international terrorism . . . It has, with its ambiguity, created a means and methodology for smaller states to achieve political change at the expense of larger states."

(Continued on page 2)

Haig Assesses International Affairs

(Continued from page 1)

He cautioned, "We too frequently focus our attention on the blood-shed and the injustice to the innocent victims of terrorism. We too infrequently ask ourselves, 'Is this terrorist act an effort to circumvent classic deterrents in order to achieve a political objective which is not in the best interests of the American people. If we conclude that it is, then we have no alternative but to act.'"

Haig suggested we have been handicapped by four misjudgments in recent months and years. "The first is that in our decision-making circles we tend to be more concerned about how our potential action will be received by the American electorate here at home, rather than how it will be perceived by the perpetrators of that crime. If we continue to be dominated by such populist notions, we're going to fail . . . A second delusion has been our tendency to believe that counteraction that risks innocent lives somehow dirties our hands. Well, the practical consequence of this has just achieved increased credibility — this specious theory — as the result of the high costs of the Egyptian action on the airplane. But, you know the practical consequence of being totally constrained by that concern is to raise the perpetrator of the crime to the same moral plane as the victims of the crime, and insures paralysis and lack of action and continuation of the phenomena at greater cost to the American people and to world resolve." The clear-headed judgment to be made, he said is "whether or not the risking of the lives of innocent hostages is justified in the final analysis by the greater protection it will provide to all Americans."

"The third fallacy," Haig said, "has been our tendency to peel over or camouflage the active role of known government support for terrorist activities, especially the recent event in Lebanon, because we feel that if we label a terrorist government as such, we may put in jeopardy a larger objective such as the peace process in the Middle East. This is precisely what has dominated our unwillingness on at least two particular occasions to label Syria as the catechist, the logistician and the overall director of terrorist attacks against the American people. I don't have to tell this group the cost we paid when our embassy was destroyed in West Beirut . . . I don't have to tell you that there was no doubt in the highest circles of this government that the government of Syria was behind the attack. Instead, we've sublimated it, and tended to point our finger exclusively at Iran."

"It was an easy calculation in Damascus," the speaker continued, "to move from that attack to the murder of over two hundred, young, brave American peacekeepers. How important it is that we understand more clearly that we cannot sit down at a peace table with Syria and arrive at a negotiated settlement that will have any credibility if we continually overlook violation of accepted rules of law by that government."

"And, finally, there's a great tendency in our country with our sensitivity toward social justice and human rights and values to view terrorism as a phenomena, too frequently as a justified manifestation of a frustrated quest for social justice by a legitimate cause, whatever it may be. My friends, we are a nation of law. Our foreign

policy, our security policy, our intelligence policy must always give utmost credence and recognition to the desirability of kneading it into the national consensus to accept the rule of law and peaceful change rather than bloodshed, terrorism and wars of liberation. And, how important it is we get to the task of doing so to meet this terrorist challenge."

Haig also spoke of his concerns of the growing crisis of international economics and the nation's failure to recognize that in an interdependent world everything that the United States does at home has an immediate impact abroad. "Therefore, before pursuing actions here at home we should calculate what the price will be of the impact abroad." He also spoke of a trend toward "intellectual religiosity" (which he labeled "Haig-speak"), and its tendency to rush through simplistic economic theories such as supply side, monetarism, "and now the legislation of economic morality as a panacea for our economic recovery." The speaker warned of "hits" on revenue, a "fiscal flabbiness we face today," as being "like the Chinese water treatment, a steady dripping which skewed the vitality and health of a balance economic policy." He warned of trends toward international protectionism, giving as an example recent textile protection legislation. That legislation, which it has been estimated will cost the U.S. taxpayer some \$28 billion, has also resulted in Chinese cutbacks in purchase of wheat from that economically strained sector of the American economy and has resulted in significant airplane construction cutbacks. "The United States imports about 30% of the dollars necessary to service this horrendous [national] debt we have created. And, if retaliatory action were taken by our friends abroad in Europe or Japan, and that flood of money were snuffed out, the impact here for investment in the growth of American economy could be devastating." He noted, too, that U.S. policy in Latin America has made it dependent on trade with the U.S. to service the debt created by that policy. "If we suddenly turn off that trade they are going to be facing default and the growing attraction for the silent call of Fidel Castro who has urged them to tell the United States to go to in terms of paying their debt obligations," Haig said.

In extended remarks about the recent Summit meeting and Soviet perception of U.S. policy and will, the Soviet so-called "correlation of forces," the former Secretary of State noted that "I suppose that after 20 years of dealing with Soviet bureaucrats at one level or another I have concluded irrevocably that the Soviets don't give a damn about western rhetoric; all they care about is objective reality." He criticized recent balanced budget legislation as "an executive cop-out." The effect of the bill will be sizable cuts in defense spending, he noted. "Every calculation made in Moscow is going to be dominated by the perception of whether or not the United States' people are going to be willing to sacrifice for these vital defense needs."

The question of Haig's candidacy arose early during the question and answer session, and the speaker took the high ground in response. "It is a disservice for any aspirant for the presidency in 1988 to be in the hustings campaign today . . . it does a disservice to our president, whoever he may be of whatever party. He has an

(Continued on page 3)

Stillwell Defends Polygraph as Essential Security Tool

Former AFIO president Gen. Richard G. Stilwell (USA-Ret.), a former deputy undersecretary of defense, and chairman of the Department of Defense Security Review Commission, has responded to wide-spread and ill-founded criticisms of the use of the polygraph as one of the elements in screening government employees for access to highly-classified, sensitive national security information and intelligence data. In the following, which appeared in the *Washington Post* of January 6th, he takes exception to an op-ed by Amb. Jeane Kirkpatrick which appeared in that publication on December 29th.

I have never before been at odds with the views of Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. But I must take issue with her categoric rejection of polygraph examinations as a means of deterring and detecting spies. The analysis underpinning her conclusion was short on fact, long on assertion.

Kirkpatrick confuses the device known as the "polygraph" with the examination process in reaching a verdict of unreliability. The polygraph simply records three or more physiological reactions, as one input to a trained examiner who makes provisional judgments of truth or deception in the context of extended dialogue, before and after the recording, with the individuals concerned. Humans are not infallible. However, to cite the American Foreign Service Association as authority for unreliability of the process is as bereft of credibility as relying only on the American Polygraph Association in rebuttal.

A wide range of professional organizations and scientists have pursued the subject exhaustively for many years. Assessments vary, but the weight of evidence is that under regulated conditions the combination of electro-mechanical instrument and qualified examiner is a very useful investigative tool. On the basis of its intensive research, the National Security Agency concludes that, conducted by experienced personnel in a setting that assures quality control, the reliability of the process is 90 to 95 percent. That's far from perfect; and for that reason no action can be taken against any government employee solely on the basis of the polygraph examination.

Polygraphers face their greatest challenge in working across linguistic and cultural barriers. The case of Larry Wu-Tai Chin is illustrative. There's a report circulating, which the aforementioned State Department affiliate saw fit to repeat without checking, that Chin passed numerous polygraph tests. Not so. He was administered a single examination and that in 1970 before the establishment of the sophisticated control procedures in effect today.

Actually, the better gauge of reliability — and therefore utility — of the polygraph examination is comparison with other investigative techniques. In the experience of the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, the examination has repeatedly produced information relevant to an individual's trustworthiness that failed to surface in background investigations or by other means. It is unrealistic to expect background investigations — on which Kirkpatrick would place full reliance — to turn up evidence of espionage. Character flaws, probably; vulnerability to blackmail, perhaps; but intent to commit espionage, no. Yet, there are numerous cases on record where the polygraph examination has unmasked persons seeking employment for the purpose of espionage.

Moreover, one must take heed of the testimony of convicted spies such as Christopher Boyce and William Bell that they would not have

even considered espionage if they had had to undergo a periodic polygraph examination. And why did David Barnett, Edward Howard and Ronald Pelton allegedly not become spies until after they had left their respective agencies and their value to the KGB was dramatically reduced?

All this said, Kirkpatrick would apparently object to polygraph examinations for counter-espionage purposes even if they were adjudged to be errorless. Her overriding concern is that examinations of even limited scope (confined to such questions as "Are you a spy?") given to a limited community (say, 1 percent of those holding security clearances) would represent a gross intrusion upon the privacy of government employees, leading to the "institutionalization of distrust." That perception is baffling. Certainly the conduct of background investigations, whose pervasiveness varies with the sensitivity of the position to be occupied, is an intrusion upon privacy; yet employees are routinely asked to consent thereto. Certainly, too, the reporting of personal information that may have security significance is an intrusion upon the individual concerned; yet commanders and supervisors are required to tender such reports on their subordinates.

Access to classified information is, after all, a privilege — not a right. And, given its primary responsibility for ensuring that its citizens and institutions survive in freedom, our government must have the requisite means to assess on a continuing basis those to whom it entrusts the secrets sought by nations with hostile interests.

My entire adult life has been spent in the service of the United States, on and off the battlefield, with the West Point motto my constant lodestar. Rank and record notwithstanding, I deem it mete and proper for my government to ask me to confirm, via a limited polygraph examination, that I have but one allegiance. It seems only prudent to do so before giving me the capability, should I wish to exploit it, to do our nation incalculable harm. Moreover, I am ready to be the first volunteer to set the pattern for sergeants and secretaries, communicators and engineers who will share the capability.

Prior to 1983, the polygraph had never been used for any purpose in the United Kingdom. In the wake of an espionage case involving convicted spy Jeffrey Prime that rocked Britain, the government concluded that it had no choice but to institute polygraph examinations of limited counter-intelligence scope. Prime Minister Thatcher personally addressed the Parliament to explain this break with tradition:

"The polygraph is the only measure of which it could be said with any confidence that it would have protected [government secrets] from Prime's treachery, either because it would have deterred him from applying to join or would have exposed him in the course of examination. The [government] recognizes that a polygraph examination would be seen by some as an unwarranted invasion of their privacy, but we are dealing with matters of the highest national security, and those who have access to the nation's most sensitive secrets must expect to be subject to the most rigorous vetting procedures."

No one could have put it better.

[The commission's report, which examines the security posture and practices in the Department of Defense and recommends corrective measures, is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Request "Keeping the Nation's Secrets," stock number 008-000-00435-8. The cost is \$2.50 per copy.]

Haig

(Continued from page 2)

agenda which is urgent . . . and it's a diversion from the energies and attentions of the American people for that urgent agenda." He also noted that many young, bright candidates will be seeking election in the congressional races of 1986. They will need, Haig said, America's resources, attention and the concentration of the apparatus of the political parties for this campaign. "And I think that for candidates to be running around the country looking for the '88 nomination is wrong, ill-timed and I'm not going to do it."

AFIO Spring Luncheon

Monday, April 14, 1986
Officers' Club, Ft. Myer, Virginia
Speaker to be announced

A luncheon flyer will be sent to all members in the Washington area

On the Intelligence Bookshelf . . .

Ten Years Later:

Intelligence and Policy

Godson, Roy (Ed.) *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Intelligence and Policy*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985.

One principal purpose of intelligence is to assist in the formulation of correct and feasible policy. Yet, experience too often leaves those who have dealt with national security matters with the feeling that the connection between the two is, in many instances, hard to discern or elusive. Consequently, any effort to tackle this relationship, as did a colloquium held in November 1984 — and whose proceedings comprise this volume — is welcome, especially by those who recognize the intrinsic importance of the connection to intelligence's *raison d'être*. For them, the Preface to this seventh and last volume in the series by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) does not exaggerate in ranking the subject first in importance.

The end of the CSI series allows us the perspective to discern the meaning of its effort and to identify and isolate any significant contribution made. CSI's appearance was one of the events that both heralded the change in the American climate of the 1970s toward intelligence and helped change that climate in academia and in the thrust of public discussion. It also brought together, helped to identify and gave prominence to a new species: those this author calls the "intelligence intellectuals," a relative of that post-World War Two phenomenon, the defense intellectual.

It was the first concerted effort outside the confines of the intelligence world to examine the elements and principal aspects of this world, with particular reference to American experience and conditions. CSI spurred the interest of the academic world in the teaching of and research into the subject, one of its stated goals. And though there is an absence of hard evidence that it contributed to the improvement of U.S. intelligence (another of the CSI goals), it was not for lack of trying, as some of the papers in this volume alone will attest.

The format follows those of previous volumes: an introductory essay by the editor; major essays (five); discussion papers (ten); and short summaries of the general discussions that followed each segment. As to be expected in a collection of this sort, the quality and pertinence of papers vary. Surprisingly, the thinnest presentation is that on foreign policy by Richard Pipes, formerly of the NSC and now at Harvard. His paper was meant either to be provocative or is the consequence of a heavy work schedule. In addition to the patent expertise of the participants and contributors, certain items and themes stand out: a rare treatment of and spirited discussion on the subject of U.S. strategic deception in peacetime; insights into Soviet foreign policy by a former member of the *Nomenklatura*; the favorable atmosphere toward the Team B concept; vigorous criticism of the House intelligence committee by one of its former staff members; and the highlighting of intelligence's failures and limitations. In regard to the latter, lacking is sufficient treatment for that phenomenon familiar to the intelligence profession — instances of failure of policy makers to heed good intelligence. Noticeable, too, is the absence of any meaningful career U.S. Foreign Service participation in the colloquium.

It is, however, the lead essay entitled "Intelligence and the Oval Office" that immediately heightens one's interest and is worth the price of admission due to its implications for the real world. The author, Kenneth de Graffenreid, is with the NSC and deals with intelligence matters. Consequently, what his paper conveys requires the closest scrutiny since his views may adumbrate the present administration's plans for dealing with and directing U.S. intelligence in the future. de Graffenreid rejects the traditional view of the separation of the intelligence community from the making of policy, and believes that there is no such thing as apolitical intelligence. He also sees the Oval Office more involved in matters of intelligence process and organization as a means of insuring the integration of intelligence policy with national security policy. If what he postulates comes to pass, only those who have not bothered to read his paper will be surprised. But, read on, for it is the totality of these papers and their inquiry into an important subject that make for a full plate.

George C. Constantinides

[George Constantinides is the author of the award-winning *Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography*, published in 1983. Presently, he is a consultant to the BDM Corporation.]

Johnson, Loch K., *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation*. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1985.

When you pick up Loch Johnson's history of the Church Committee investigations of U.S. intelligence, be prepared to shed a tear. No, not for the foot-soldiers of intelligence subjected to probing interrogation by the committee and its staff. No, not for the Intelligence Community executives whose careers, and personal lives in several instances, were shattered by the charges, leaks and innuendo spawned by Congress' investigative bodies. In *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation*, the victims are the poor, beleaguered members of the Church Committee staff.

Crocodile tears aside, this is an important work, an insider's narrative of the workings of the Senate committee in its discoveries of alleged abuses by components of the Intelligence Community, principally the CIA, FBI and NSA. The author served both as an investigator and as a personal aide to Senate Church during that period, and except for an occasional spurt of adulation for his mentor and a lingering tinge of paranoia about U.S. intelligence, Johnson approaches the topic with a remarkable degree of scholarly detachment. As he describes it, the committee had its own share of warts, including serious problems stemming from the political aspirations of its chairman.

Johnson's recollections focus clearly on, as he describes it, "the tangled lines of conflict and cooperation that stretch between the executive branch and Congress. It underscores how jealously, friendship, suspicion, pique, ambition, fatigue and other human traits intervene in the affairs of man to alter the anticipated course of events. It shows the difficulty of achieving any change whatsoever in a government where power is fragmented among a large number of people within the executive branch, the Senate and the House, where individual policymakers respond to different constituencies and hold divergent conceptions of the 'common good,' conflicting aspirations, and varying time frames for the achievement of goals."

The human element remains in the forefront as the chronology follows the committee's investigation, its headline-seeking public hearings, the ill-fated presidential campaigning of its chairman, the preparation of the most detailed report in this nation's history of the activities and methodology of its secret services and crafting legislation to provide for a permanent oversight body. To this is joined the author's assessment of the committee's impact and what he sees as the unfinished agenda of intelligence reform.

This is one of those works where it would be unfair for a reviewer, particularly one who was not unaffected by the events of the time, to summarize its content or to paraphrase the author's words. The history is too fresh, most of the players are still active participants in the intelligence debate. The author's first-person account is an essential adjunct to the committee's volumes, as the following excerpts demonstrate:

Organization . . . Senator John O. Pastore (D-RI) introduced Senate Resolution 21 to establish the investigating committee . . . Pastore called for the yeas and nays and, following the slow litany of a Senate roll-call vote, the result was announced: yeas, eighty-two; nays, four . . . [Pastore] told a reporter that "this investigation, because of the very nature of it, will have to be in executive session." It soon became clear, though, that the chairman had a different conception. Appearing on the show *Face the Nation* the following Sunday, Church promised to hold as much of the investigation as public as possible. (p. 15)

Bill Bader (the Foreign Intelligence, or CIA, Task Force leader) suggested . . . the search for documents, perhaps reflecting his training as an historian. He had concluded that the first priority of the committee was "to document and analyze the legislative and organizational history and practice of the CIA . . . Fritz [F.A.O.] Schwarz was interested in gathering as many documents as possible and as quickly as possible, too, but his perspective was less historical than abuse oriented . . . the difference in epistemology between Bader and Schwarz was of more than academic interest; these two views drove a deep wedge into the staff . . . "The document requests, under Schwarz's influence became a grab bag," [Bader] recalls. "He wanted everything. The requests were unstructured, rambling, unfocused. We didn't know where we were, let alone where we were going." . . . Schwarz and his assistants, though, were not content to wade

The Church Committee Investigations Reexamined

through agency histories alone. Gimlet-eyed, tireless, they pursued practically every lead that came along in search of one major objective: dramatic evidence . . . [William] Miller preferred yet a third approach. For him, the most promising pathway was the interview — and the more civil, the better . . . "Each document we were able to pry loose led to more documents, more questions, more witnesses. It was like pulling back the layers of an onion, each time we thought we had come to the last layer, we discovered another" [Frederick Baron recalled]. (pp. 33-35)

Phillips and ARIO. The committee was also aware of the burgeoning counteroffensive from the CIA. On March 22, 1975, for example, chief of CIA Latin American operations David A. Phillips, retired from the agency to rally former intelligence officers as private citizens to defend the organization from outside criticism. Phillips' targets, ostensibly, were former CIA officers who had written critical books and articles on the agency, but his Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (ARIO) had all the earmarks of a grassroots lobbying effort against any criticism, including that of our committee. (p. 36)

Suspicious. Troubling, too, were various editorials discussing the high probability that intelligence officials would simply lie to the congressional committees, rather than tarnish the image of their agencies or take the chance of making revelations that could jeopardize the security of the nation or of agents and informants in the field . . . Senator Church, for one, was already firmly convinced that former CIA Director Richard Helms had committed perjury in 1973 before his Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, which examined CIA involvement with American corporate interests in Chile. How could he now trust Helms to be truthful in this investigation, even under oath? (p. 37)

The Honey Jar. [Bader] was so enthusiastic over some of the top-secret paper relinquished by the White House, however, that he could not resist literally underlining the importance of the committee successes so far: "This is the first time that these classes of documents, namely the various NSC directives, NSAMs, NSDMs, NSC Memoranda and reports have been turned over to a congressional committee." . . . The Badar CIA Task Force had asked for six thousand pages drawn from case studies on covert action — the most sensitive of all CIA programs. "Why does the committee want to go through these old history books," the CIA liaison people complained . . . To Bader's researchers, who had a glimpse of the details in these histories, this question was like asking an advance party from the ant colony why they wanted the honey jar. (p. 41)

The Rockefeller Commission Papers. For the committee, access to these documents was equivalent to finding the Rosetta Stone: the file on "Operation MONGOOSE" meant nothing less to the assassination phase of the investigation. MONGOOSE was the code name for several covert-action schemes directed against Fidel Castro in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the file contained a thousand leads — names, dates, locations. These specifics were our lifeblood: the key to new vaults, new files, new memoranda hidden somewhere within the bowels of CIA . . . The Church committee, in staffer Frederick Baron's words, had "hit pay dirt." "From the cables," he remembers, "we developed facts so dramatic that the CIA had to put them in context. We would get a certain amount of information, then they had to supply the missing link." (p. 48)

A Red Herring? My colleague on the White House Task Force, Greg Trevorton, joked over coffee one morning that "the only successful CIA assassination plot has been against the Church committee itself." He hated to see our work pushed to the back burner for so long, and strongly suspected this whole issue might be a diversion tactic by the CIA to steer us off course. He was not alone in this viewpoint. "The assassination inquiry was a bottomless pit, remembers [Burton] Wides, a committee staffer. "It became impossible to get the committee to focus on other subjects. We were mired down in the details of the various plots, and time was running out. We were at the peak of our powers in January on the day we were established; from that point on, we were losing momentum. We had to act quickly, instead we plodded along the assassination trail." "It was a red herring," Bill Miller concludes. Another key staffer thought it was a setup: "The CIA said, 'Oh, please don't throw us in the assassination bribe patch!' and that's exactly what we did — to their delight." A senior staffer told a journalist: "By the time we finished the assassination report, we had lost three things — the public's attention, much of our own energy and will power, and our leadership. Quite candidly, we had lost Frank Church." (pp. 54-55)

A House Divided. The normally loquacious senators, it seemed, could no longer bear their own self-imposed rules against speaking out on these issues; the steam building up in the committee kettle had popped off the lid . . . When the committee held a special meeting on Monday, the air in S407 was tense. "We're beginning to polarize," warned Senator Tower. The selective leaking of findings on the assassination plots, and the public exchanges between committee members about the CIA-as-rogue-elephant, had irritated the vice chairman. Senator Baker, too, was upset: "We've got to stop making counter-statements." Senator Goldwater complained that "all we've been hearing is to protect Kennedy witnesses" . . . Let's remove the gag rule altogether," said Baker . . . "Gary Hart said flatly: "We must exercise restraint. I take the contrary to Baker: We must keep our mouths shut. I'll quit this committee if we all start talking out: it will tear us apart." (pp. 57-58)

While the committee smoked, rumbled and sparked at the top like a volcano coming out of dormancy, tremors of greater intensity — undampened by the traditions of civility normally found among the senators — erupted below at the staff level . . . tensions seemed to rise with the summer heat. Schwarz became more insistent about shifting key responsibilities to a team of lawyers selected by him . . . Rumors rapidly circulated that Schwarz planned a showdown between the lawyers and non-lawyers on the staff . . . All eyes turned toward [John] Eiliff . . . Eiliff and his FBI Task Force — heavily staffed by attorneys, several of whom had already been tapped for Schwarz's new group — had evidently been won over to the Schwarz position before the meeting. The alliance was understandable (though not everyone in the FBI group endorsed the idea) since Schwarz and Eiliff were chiefly interested in domestic abuses of the intelligence agencies . . . [David] Aaron could take no more: "This is a natural culmination of Schwarz' statement about eight weeks ago about lawyers being the only ones equipped to get this job done," he burst out . . . As Schwarz rose, he looked over at David Aaron and said, "For the first three and a half months the task forces were fine, but . . ." His voice trailed off. "But now the task forces are not any good," finished Aaron. He turned to Bader. "I guess we better look for another job." Glowering he left the room. (pp. 65-68)

The Cave of Bugs. Preparations for the hearings on CIA poisons took longer than Church had hoped . . . Church grew alarmed about newspaper leaks from "White House sources" concerning the Cave of Bugs. With the press nibbling away daily at the case, by the time the 16th [hearing date] arrived nothing would be left but a skeleton . . . Church felt he could wait no longer. "I regret to announce," he told the press, "the Senate committee has evidence that quantities of biological toxins of a highly lethal character have been retained by the CIA in contravention of presidential orders that such materials be destroyed" . . . Sensitive to the possibility (scientifically unwarranted) that talk about shellfish toxin might create a public scare about eating shellfish, Church nodded; "Let it be clear that they ought not be concerned about the shellfish they buy." . . . The cat was out of the bag. If it had to happen before September 16, Church was going to make sure the committee got the credit — not anonymous sources in the White House. But the committee members were less than uniformly pleased about Church's announcement and his efforts to build up the importance of the case. "Frank, what we have here," said [Charles] Mathias on September 11, "is a rogue mouse." I later told [Gregory] Trevorton of Mathias' observation. "A rogue microbe is more like it," he suggested. That afternoon I ran into Bill Miller near a Senate elevator. "Church is wrong and the others are right," he said. "The chairman is too abuse oriented." He told me that some thought this was Fritz Schwarz's influence; others believed Church was "dazzled by the kleig lights" and was going for whatever would attract the cameras. The senators were fed up with the assassination report, Miller told me, and some were beginning to phase themselves out of committee activities" (pp. 74-75)

On the first day of hearings, Senator Church asked Colby for the dart gun. The senators passed it among themselves, holding it up for reporters to see. Cameras moved in, clucking and whirring like an advancing army of mechanical insects. Here was theater to give life to the hearings, as Church had anticipated . . . Throughout the hearings, designees passed notes to their senators suggesting possible questions. Daniel Schorr and other TV correspondents signaled "roll 'em" (index finger moving in a circle) or "cut" (finger sliding across the

(Continued on page 6)

Ten Years Later . . .

(Continued from page 5)

throat) depending on their sense of what was newsworthy, and photographers circulated, snapping the shutters of elaborate cameras. Sometimes the questioning grew rather strained as senators quickly exhausted the limited subject of the shellfish toxin. Senator Mondale belabored some obscure symbols that appeared on the label of one bottle of chemicals. After discussing their possible meaning for a quarter of an hour, the committee finally decided the symbols simply referred to the room number in the building where the substance was stored. Gary Hart sent a note down the table to Walter Mondale: "In light of these startling discoveries, suggest extension these hearings additional week to call label manufacturers, can manufacturers, vault contractor, Public Health Service and GSA janitors at South laboratory!" (p. 76)

The Witnesses. Questioning [James Angleton], however, was like trying to find a new planet through an earthbound telescope; it took constant probing, a sensitivity to nuance, and a willingness to endure vast oceans of silence. Angleton might begin an important story, then let it trail out like a vanishing comet and disappear into a black hole of ambiguity . . . I wondered if Angleton's ploy was to lead the Church committee into his "wilderness" [of mirrors], where everything revealed reflected something concealed and the maddening multiplicity of images spun dizzily in the mind. Angleton was not the only expert in legerdemain at the CIA. He had his equal in Richard Helms . . . I tried to refresh his memory, but none of my papers of details from other witnesses chased away the great, gray clouds drifting through Helms's own wilderness of mirrors. (pp. 82-83)

The Spice of Hearings. Senator Church desperately wanted something to spice up the hearings, as the dart gun had done the week before. Fritz Schwarz came up with an idea only hours before the second day of hearings. Why not use some of the startling findings the FBI Task Force had been gathering for hearings on mail opening, which were scheduled later in the year? The staff aide working on that project objected to having his findings used prematurely, but his protests were overruled. Church opened the session with the announcement (which made bold headlines the next day) . . . As Church recited the litany of names, the caucus rooms buzzed with excitement. (p. 86)

Drift. . . . The committee was well into its "public phase" and seemed on the surface, to be organized and prepared to lay out its findings before the American people. Behind the scenes, though, lay a different reality, for in fact, ten months after its creation, the Senate intelligence committee was still in search of an agenda. The lack of direction did not stem from an absence of blueprints . . . The problem was essentially one of uncertainty amongst the senators about which topics would be most fruitful . . . When the senators found out . . . that the hearings on the IRS didn't promise to be very 'sexy' they cancelled all but one day of the scheduled IRS hearings, and weeks of preparation by the staff went down the tube [quoting from an interview of a committee staffer in the *Harvard Law Record*] . . . As the meeting ended, I walked with one of the staff aides responsible for the IRS investigation. "The only kind of hearing this committee is interested in is pure theater," he said bitterly, "whatever will goose the public best." (pp. 90-91)

More Disclosures. With Mondale's important support, Church had won the initial argument over NSA public hearings by appealing to his colleagues' faith in the ability of the committee to keep sensitive secrets. This point, though, lost much of its persuasiveness with committee members as Mondale hit the college lecture circuit over the weekend . . . In the course of his remarks, Mondale revealed previously undisclosed testimony from the assassination report which, by committee agreement, was to have remained secret until officially released. Senator Church appeared on ABC's *Issues and Answers* after Mondale's speech and was asked to comment on Mondale's references to the assassination report. He did, and perhaps at greater length than necessary. Members of the committee fumed as they read press accounts of Mondale's speech and watched their chairman on national television; they had understood that no one could discuss the details of the committee findings in public. Now, that agreement had been broken — and only a day after the chairman had urged NSA hearings on the grounds that members had proved their responsibility in maintaining secrecy . . .

Senator Goldwater, who had missed the meeting the prior week when Church had received tacit committee approval for public hearings on NSA, spoke . . . "We're flirting with real trouble," he observed, and asked for a formal roll-call on the question of public hearings . . . I was astounded: Gary Hart had supported the Goldwater position! . . .

[the vote] was a victory for Church but a hollow one, as he knew. The fact was that his committee was badly divided — and in moments things would grow worse . . . On the way back to the auditorium, I asked Rich Inderfurth about Hart's surprising vote. He said that Hart was deeply troubled by the indiscretions over the weekend. The committee leaders seemed unable to keep the secrecy understanding on the assassination report, what would happen if this carelessness extended to the delicate operations of the National Security Agency? A public hearing on the NSA, Hart feared, might just invite further unnecessary disclosures . . .

The sense of drift permeating the Senate committee was noted by Miller in early October. Part of the problem derived from the "natural clash of egos and ambition," he wrote, especially as the result of the "large group of aggressive litigators who are seeking in part glory and are prone to the phototropism of televised hearings" . . .

The FBI Task Force attorneys in charge of the mail-opening hearings had done a superlative job in marshaling the evidence. Everything seemed to be in good order except for one missing ingredient: the interest of committee members . . . The chairman's lack of interest was apparent on the opening day of the hearings . . . His attention wandered throughout the interrogation, and I could understand why. In the first place, he was locked in a wrestling grip with the Ford administration over an acceptable format for the NSA hearings. Pressure was building daily, and not just from the executive branch. The press was steadily nibbling away at the NSA story, revealing in a piecemeal fashion the very facts the Ford administration had feared might be exposed through the Church committee hearings. Moreover, rumors buzzed around the auditorium that either the Pike committee or the House subcommittee chaired by Bella Abzug (D-NY) would go public with the NSA story any day . . . Together, these stories gave the impression, first, that the committee members (even the most junior ones) were now speaking out as individuals instead of through the chairman (as in the past) and, second, that the panel had sprung a serious leak. Would the whole assassination story, like the NSA findings, begin the dribble out before the report was published? (pp. 92-100)

NSA Hearings. The chairman explained to the public why the arguments against a SHAMROCK open hearing were insubstantial. The arguments said, first, that the disclosure of the identities of the companies would make other corporations hesitant in the future to cooperate with the intelligence community; second, that disclosure would embarrass the three companies that had aided the government in the SHAMROCK program. In rebuttal, Senator Church observed, first, that corporations indeed should be hesitant to comply with the government's requests — at least long enough to assure themselves that such requests were lawful and ethical: that "fairness to the companies themselves requires that the facts be fully and fairly stated." (p. 106)

Hallway Security. Cheered by having SHAMROCK off his chest and by these spirited legal exchanges, Church walked with a new spring in his step after the hearing. As we strode down the corridors toward his car, I told him about the voluminous information the staff had assembled for subsequent hearings and asked him how he wished to absorb this material . . . "Just walk me over to the hearings, and we can discuss the issues on the way," he said. "That's the best." I was flabbergasted by this response. All the weeks that were poured into the production of these briefing books, and the chairman wanted a quick review as we walked to each hearing . . . The two or three snippets of information that could be imparted in a peripatetic briefing would become, presumably, concise cues for the direction of the hearing . . .

David Aaron and I were out of breath for another reason — the chairman was racing along at a near jog. He was headed for the next committee meeting with the buoyancy I had not seen for weeks. The meeting was a closed session on the use of secret agents . . . to gather intelligence — usually referred to in the trade as "human intelligence" or, simply, "humint." With Church's request in mind ("Just walk me to the hearing") I had asked Aaron to come along, since he had been studying the subject. The "briefing" turned out to be about what I had expected: between standing in elevators, striding down hallways, sitting in the Senate subway car, and admiring the rotunda — all crowded by tourists and other non-committee people — Aaron had about eight minutes to convey, in hushed tones, some information about the hearing as we rushed toward S407. (p. 114)

Bush Nomination. The nomination of George Bush to succeed Colby disturbed [Church] and he wanted to wind up the speech by opposing the nomination. I was sorry to hear this. The speech was designed to be a balanced critique of the Agency's performance as an intelligence gatherer; now it would become political . . . Inside

Senate Investigations Reexamined

(Continued from page 7)

feverishly wrote chapters on various topics for possible inclusion in the final reports. Then, on December 23, 1975, the committee was struck by a bolt of lightning that, in essence, sheared off its mast and made further progress close to impossible. Two days before Christmas, Richard S. Welch, CIA station chief in Athens, Greece, was gunned down in front of his home by masked assassins . . . Immediately rumors and allegations arose that the Church committee was to blame for the death . . . Nothing in the entire sixteen months of the Church investigation was more unfair than this and similar pronouncements . . . Whether or not it was orchestrated in order to turn public opinion against the investigation, the ceremony surrounding the Welch burial had that effect. (pp. 151-162)

Whether or not attributable to the White House public relations work, by January 1976 the simple fact was that both of the congressional intelligence committees was less than highly regarded by the public. In December 1975, a Louis Harris survey had asked Americans how they would rate the job being done by the two committees. The results for the Church committee were 38 percent positive, 40 percent negative, and 22 percent unsure. For Pike, 36 percent positive, 40 percent negative, and 24 percent unsure. Even at that date, the image apparently held by the public was extremely disappointing. Our long hours and careful research to uncover and guard against abuses by the intelligence services seemed to go largely unappreciated or misunderstood. And to see ourselves rated virtually neck-and-neck with the House committee, even though we had avoided most of its pitfalls, was truly disheartening. Moreover, the image had no doubts grown worse, since the poll had been taken before the Welch murder and the presidential flag-waving at Arlington Cemetery. (pp. 185)

* * *

The foregoing only skims the first half of the book, and no doubt a reviewer more inclined toward the committee's efforts would have cited excerpts other than those displayed here — there is meat for every taste. On only one theme throughout the work will there be some unanimity, the author's continuing criticism of the parallel investigation in the House of Representatives (the Pike Committee) and the avalanche of leaks flowing from it. Johnson's objections are carefully explained; it is not simply a case of the pot calling the kettle black.

The committee's efforts, over Administration objections, to release its reports illustrates effectively the never-ending struggle between the executive and legislative branches, a struggle not confined to the intelligence arena. This proves true, as well, in Johnson's narrative of the conflicting interests of members of the Senate in bartering and concessions which brought forth the successful resolution establishing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The book is not without howlers stemming from the author's suspicions of the intelligence establishment. Two will suffice here.

In discussing Senator Church's reelection defeat in Idaho, Johnson notes: "While several influences contributed to this loss, he was often thrown on the defensive during the campaign by (in his own words) the 'hit-and-run attack' against him by opponents of his intelligence investigation. Conservative groups financed 'speaking engagements' during the campaign, bringing to Idaho former intelligence officers. . . . Methinks he overestimates the political clout of the valiant corps of former intelligence officers."

Another, in the same vein, addresses a popular SSCI appointment under its chairman, Senator Barry M. Goldwater: "One of his first decisions as chairman was to appoint as staff director, John F. Blake, previously a high-ranking officer in the CIA and president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. With the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee holding the door, the fox suddenly found himself in the henhouse. The CIA had achieved one of its most notable penetrations." (!)

There is little to chuckle about, however, in reviewing Johnson's reflections on the unfinished agenda of intelligence reform which "calls for uncommon dedication." Among the issues he addresses are the insertion of the Congress into the decision process for covert action, "not simply to receive reports on these operations but to help determine in advance whether they should go forward." One proposal discussed is that all paramilitary operations, including those of a "common garden-variety," would require the specific authorization of Congress, presumably in secret sessions of both houses. The only exception would be for those secret military operations the President determines to be "essential in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the United States"

Such a secret vote in Congress, "with all the high probability for leaks that a debate among 535 individuals would entail," admits Johnson, would effectively bar all paramilitary operations short of those absolutely essential "or lead to a devaluation of the word 'essential' by the executive branch in order to bypass congressional debate." Another proposal discussed by the author would ban covert financing from the Contingency Fund of amounts over \$2 million unless approved by the two intelligence oversight committees.

Johnson also faults present legislation limiting the number of legislators briefed by CIA, and suggests briefings of a wider scope. He is also concerned that present legislation seems to condone non-reporting of sensitive collection programs "intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence." In the author's view, . . . this clause subverts significantly from the principle in an earlier provision calling for reports on "all intelligence activity." To these, Johnson adds other "challenges" to force change in the intelligence community.

The "unfinished agenda" is perhaps the most chilling portion of this book. This is the stuff of current headlines. Congressional options of dissuasion and control of the purse seem to have given way to "media veto" whenever a Presidential Finding on covert action reaches the intelligence committees. Sensitive information and views briefed in closed session of the Senate oversight committee are discussed openly by senior members. Despite the constitutional authority of the President to "manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest" [*The Federalist*, No. 64], the leadership of the present SSCI appears hell-bent on usurping it. The committee's chairman has stated publicly that he seeks a long-range "plan" of intelligence operations in contemplation. Even the operation in which U.S. fighters forced down the airliner carrying the *Achilles Lauro* terrorists has drawn the chairman's fire because it was carried out with "secrecy and despatch" [also urged as necessary in *The Federalist*], and not in advance consultation with his committee.

It is for these reasons that Loch Johnson's chronicle of the Senate intelligence investigation takes on increased meaning. It is not just a worthy companion volume to the Church Committee reports. Rather, it serves as a warning that, a decade later, there are those who rather than learning from the lessons of the Church Committee, seem intent on emulating it.

Edward F. Sayle

[Edward F. Sayle, the editor of *Periscope*, served as Curator, Historical Intelligence, CIA, during the period of the Church Committee investigation.]

Notes from Here and There

Denver's Hal D. Seward has signed a contract with Paladin Press of Boulder, Colorado, to publish his book *Spies I Have Known or How to Become a Spy*. Seward, who has authored five books, is a frequent contributor to major military journals.

The *Lee Constitution*, published in Fort Myers, Florida, has reprinted in pamphlet form a series of editorials written by Herman O. Bly. Bly, a veteran of 25 years with the FBI and 5 years with CIA, addresses such issues as internal security, US-USSR relations, national defense, foreign policy, "secular humanism," and the media, and offers his comments on several noteworthy espionage cases. Members who wish to add the pamphlet to their libraries or speakers' kits may write: The Lee Constitution, 390 Pondella Road, Suite 5, North Fort Myers, FL 33903. The pamphlets cost \$1.25 per single copy, \$6 for 5 copies, \$10 for 10 copies.

Those with a CI bent might be interested in the latest word regarding the book *Industrial Espionage*, co-authored by Norman R. Bottom, Jr. of Miami. After it was reviewed in *Periscope*, the Soviets purchased Russian-language rights from the U.S. publisher. Says Bottom, "Now look what's happened. Obviously your publication is read thoroughly in Moscow!"

Senate Investigations Reexamined

Church's office I was introduced to Jeff Shields. Later I asked a friend on the staff about the new face. "Haven't you heard?" he answered. "Shields is supposed to be helping put together a presidential campaign" . . . On *Face the Nation* [CBS correspondent George] Herman asked a tough question. If Church wanted to disqualify Bush as CIA director on political grounds, then "should the investigation of the CIA and other intelligence agencies be headed by a man whose aides say he is 80 percent certain to enter politics and run for the presidency?" Church seemed to blanch, then replied that he had "done everything a man can do" to keep himself and the committee out of presidential politics. "I've said it again and again," he stressed, "that until the active investigation has ended, which will come sometime in December, I will not be a candidate." I smiled at the phrase "active investigation." Church used to say "until the investigation is ended"; now an important modifier had been added, allowing him to enter the campaign after the final public hearings but long before any windup meetings or the writing of the final report had been completed . . .

On November 11, I walked Church to the Senate floor. On the way he was stopped by reporters who quizzed him about his first major speech on intelligence, which he was about to give. Also, for the hundredth time, one correspondent wished to know if Church still stood by his "earlier assessments that the CIA acted like a rogue elephant." Without noticeable annoyance, Church replied: "Of course . . . you will find, as I said originally, much evidence in certain cases that would suggest that higher authority was not fully advised in a timely way of the activities that were going on." The Senate floor was virtually deserted — as usual except for a vote . . . "Our objective has never been to wreck the intelligence agencies, but to reform them where necessary," Church began with his deep, rich voice. "As the weeds are pruned from the garden, so the garden flourishes" . . . Church said he remained undecided whether it was appropriate for him as chairman of the intelligence investigation, to lead the fight against the confirmation of Bush, "but these are the reasons," he asserted, "why I will certainly vote against his nomination." (pp. 111-120)

The Chairman Angers. Church clenched the arms of his chair. "Why do you do this to me?" he said, a mixture of anger and frustration in his voice. "No one listens to me. They get locked in, and they go ahead and do what they want. We'll never get all our work done. We've only got a month to go." Schwarz and I winced, stared at our shoes and wished we were somewhere else . . . The next day I accompanied a group of the FBI Task Force to Church's office for a briefing about plans for a hearing on domestic intelligence abuses. Church took the opportunity to vent his spleen once more. "The only public hearing we've been prepared for was on the shellfish toxin," he said, scornfully, then looked at me and added, "and the Huston Plan," the last phrase was so obviously an afterthought that I drew little comfort from it. He ordered the staff to reduce the number of days planned for the FBI hearing, and urged us again to do whatever we could to bring public television coverage back to the hearings. Cynics viewed this last request as a further indication of presidential publicity-seeking. A more charitable interpretation was that Church strongly believed reform would come only through public pressure, and public pressure would arise only if stimulated by extensive media coverage of the committee's findings. I was reasonably sure that the elements of both perspectives entered into the chairman's calculations in an alloy only he could assay with certainty. (pp. 121-122)

Releasing a Report. The assassination report had been ready for over a week and required only one last minute change. United States District Court Judge Gerhard Gessell had agreed with Church committee attorneys that the name of the CIA scientists in charge of the shellfish toxin (as well as the poison for Lumumba) should appear in the report . . . The CIA attorneys immediately appealed the decision . . . through fear of further delays the committee (at Church's direction) decided to do an abrupt about-face on the scientist's name so as not to jeopardize the plans to release the report on November 20. Any delay would have postponed the release of the report until December, since the Thanksgiving recess was about to begin. The choice between holding out for one name and possible postponement was easy for the chairman . . . The Massachusetts primary was only fifteen weeks away and "Draft Church" groups had already formed . . .

We came to the Senate on the morning of November 20 with nervousness over the fate of the controversial report. Only a dozen secret sessions had taken place in the Senate since World War II. At nine o'clock the heavy doors of the Senate chamber swung shut . . .

One o'clock had come and gone. The assassination report had been laid before the Senate and the Senate had taken no meaningful action on it . . . The scene at the entrance to the Dirksen auditorium was one of bedlam. Reporters from all over the country and around the world crowded into the lobby where harried committee secretaries were handing out copies of the report to a field of grasping hands. The minute the secret session ended at one o'clock, the committee staff had been instructed to give out copies to anyone with press credentials. It was a masterful tactic on Church's part, though one that failed to endear him to many of his colleagues who — as the debate amply revealed — did not enjoy being on the receiving end of a *fait accompli*. Church was determined to issue the report. If the Senate voted, fine; if it didn't vote at all, that was fine, too. Only if the Senate had voted to delay or curb release would the chairman be forced to hold it back — and even then, since it was already printed, the chances of a copy's "escape" to the press would have been high. (pp. 130-136)

The Non-Campaign Continues. Immediately following the Chile hearings, Church boarded a plane for Massachusetts and addressed three hundred people at one meeting in Lincoln and another five hundred at Boston College — peculiar behavior, some observed, for a non-candidate . . . Speaking before the World Affairs Council a few days later, he struck a presidential stance. If he were president, he told the luncheon group of over five hundred people, he would take the covert operations wing out of the CIA, reduce its personnel by 90 percent, and place the remaining 10 percent in the Department of State, "where it would be subject to the overall policy considerations of our government in connection with the conduct of our foreign policy." In a neat bit of semantic legerdemain, Church told reporters in Los Angeles that he was about to form an exploratory committee on the presidential race the next week, when the "investigative work" of the intelligence committee would be completed . . . this was the first time I'd heard that phrase. It was true that by the next week the public hearings would be over, culminating in three final days on the FBI. Church had ingeniously decided to call this the end of the investigative work, despite the fact that each of the task forces had several investigations underway (some in mid-stream), and some committee members strongly supported the completion of these important projects.

Visions of the White House danced in the heads of other committee members, too. Later in the campaign session, Senator Schweiker would become the vice-presidential candidate for the GOP ticket led by Ronald Reagan . . . Howard Baker, by all accounts, longed for (and almost achieved) the vice-presidential slot on the Ford ticket . . . After Church, though, the most audible presidential noises were those of Senator Mathias . . . as a "third force" independent candidate. (pp. 150-151)

The Final Hearings. On December 8, only two junior members appeared in S407, and they soon departed . . . The next morning we had a larger complement of senators . . . As a general rule, the more well-known the witness, the greater the attendance of committee members (a phenomenon related to the increased numbers of media representatives as well on such occasions.) This time the witness was FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley . . . The FBI Task Force gathered its documents from the hearing table. Bulging briefing books had lain there for three hearings, untouched by most of the committee members. Question after question written on three-by-five cards, yellow legal pads, and hastily torn scraps of paper were scattered where senators' elbows had rested. Placed there by staff, these suggestions for the most part perished on the green baize sea like so much discarded flotsam. The senators were hesitant to ask staff questions when they themselves had failed to prepare thoroughly, uncertain where the dialogue might lead . . .

The good ship *Church Committee* labored ahead sluggishly through these heavy December seas, tossed by powerful waves of opposition from the executive branch, plagued by internal dissension among the crew, the captain distracted by thoughts of buried treasure in the primary states, blown off course by strong crosswinds (like the Bush controversy), her sail torn by periodic blasts of cold air from critical journalists, and now caught up in the angry maelstrom of Hurricane Angola. Members and staff alike looked uneasily toward the lifeboats as the ship began to founder . . . The perception that their constituents cared little about the committee further depleted energy and interest among the members . . . So the ship continued to pitch about, uncertain of its course. Below decks the crew worked on an oversight bill to create a permanent committee on intelligence, and

(Continued on page 8)

Senate Investigations Reexamined

(Continued from page 7)

feverishly wrote chapters on various topics for possible inclusion in the final reports. Then, on December 23, 1975, the committee was struck by a bolt of lightning that, in essence, sheared off its mast and made further progress close to impossible. Two days before Christmas, Richard S. Welch, CIA station chief in Athens, Greece, was gunned down in front of his home by masked assassins . . . Immediately rumors and allegations arose that the Church committee was to blame for the death . . . Nothing in the entire sixteen months of the Church investigation was more unfair than this and similar pronouncements . . . Whether or not it was orchestrated in order to turn public opinion against the investigation, the ceremony surrounding the Welch burial had that effect. (pp. 151-162)

Whether or not attributable to the White House public relations work, by January 1976 the simple fact was that both of the congressional intelligence committees was less than highly regarded by the public. In December 1975, a Louis Harris survey had asked Americans how they would rate the job being done by the two committees. The results for the Church committee were 38 percent positive, 40 percent negative, and 22 percent unsure. For Pike, 36 percent positive, 40 percent negative, and 24 percent unsure. Even at that date, the image apparently held by the public was extremely disappointing. Our long hours and careful research to uncover and guard against abuses by the intelligence services seemed to go largely unappreciated or misunderstood. And to see ourselves rated virtually neck-and-neck with the House committee, even though we had avoided most of its pitfalls, was truly disheartening. Moreover, the image had no doubts grown worse, since the poll had been taken before the Welch murder and the presidential flag-waving at Arlington Cemetery. (pp. 185)

* * *

The foregoing only skims the first half of the book, and no doubt a reviewer more inclined toward the committee's efforts would have cited excerpts other than those displayed here — there is meat for every taste. On only one theme throughout the work will there be some unanimity, the author's continuing criticism of the parallel investigation in the House of Representatives (the Pike Committee) and the avalanche of leaks flowing from it. Johnson's objections are carefully explained; it is not simply a case of the pot calling the kettle black.

The committee's efforts, over Administration objections, to release its reports illustrates effectively the never-ending struggle between the executive and legislative branches, a struggle not confined to the intelligence arena. This proves true, as well, in Johnson's narrative of the conflicting interests of members of the Senate in bartering and concessions which brought forth the successful resolution establishing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The book is not without howlers stemming from the author's suspicions of the intelligence establishment. Two will suffice here.

In discussing Senator Church's reelection defeat in Idaho, Johnson notes: "While several influences contributed to this loss, he was often thrown on the defensive during the campaign by (in his own words) the 'hit-and-run attack' against him by opponents of his intelligence investigation. Conservative groups financed 'speaking engagements' during the campaign, bringing to Idaho former intelligence officers . . ." Methinks he overestimates the political clout of the valiant corps of former intelligence officers.

Another, in the same vein, addresses a popular SSCI appointment under its chairman, Senator Barry M. Goldwater: "One of his first decisions as chairman was to appoint as staff director, John F. Blake, previously a high-ranking officer in the CIA and president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. With the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee holding the door, the fox suddenly found himself in the henhouse. The CIA had achieved one of its most notable penetrations." (!)

There is little to chuckle about, however, in reviewing Johnson's reflections on the unfinished agenda of intelligence reform which "calls for uncommon dedication." Among the issues he addresses are the insertion of the Congress into the decision process for covert action, "not simply to receive reports on these operations but to help determine in advance whether they should go forward." One proposal discussed is that all paramilitary operations, including those of a "common garden-variety," would require the specific authorization of Congress, presumably in secret sessions of both houses. The only exception would be for those secret military operations the President determines to be "essential in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the United States."

Such a secret vote in Congress, "with all the high probability for leaks that a debate among 535 individuals would entail," admits Johnson, would effectively bar all paramilitary operations short of those absolutely essential "or lead to a devaluation of the word 'essential' by the executive branch in order to bypass congressional debate." Another proposal discussed by the author would ban covert financing from the Contingency Fund of amounts over \$2 million unless approved by the two intelligence oversight committees.

Johnson also faults present legislation limiting the number of legislators briefed by CIA, and suggests briefings of a wider scope. He is also concerned that present legislation seems to condone non-reporting of sensitive collection programs "intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence." In the author's view, " . . . this clause subtracts significantly from the principle in an earlier provision calling for reports on 'all intelligence activity'." To these, Johnson adds other "challenges" to force change in the intelligence community.

The "unfinished agenda" is perhaps the most chilling portion of this book. This is the stuff of current headlines. Congressional options of dissuasion and control of the purse seem to have given way to "media veto" whenever a Presidential Finding on covert action reaches the intelligence committees. Sensitive information and views briefed in closed session of the Senate oversight committee are discussed openly by senior members. Despite the constitutional authority of the President to "manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest" [*The Federalist*, No. 64], the leadership of the present SSCI appears hell-bent on usurping it. The committee's chairman has stated publicly that he seeks a long-range "plan" of intelligence operations in contemplation. Even the operation in which U.S. fighters forced down the airliner carrying the *Achilles Lauro* terrorists has drawn the chairman's fire because it was carried out with "secrecy and despatch" [also urged as necessary in *The Federalist*], and not in advance consultation with his committee.

It is for these reasons that Loch Johnson's chronicle of the Senate intelligence investigation takes on increased meaning. It is not just a worthy companion volume to the Church Committee reports. Rather, it serves as a warning that, a decade later, there are those who rather than learning from the lessons of the Church Committee, seem intent on emulating it.

Edward F. Sayle

[Edward F. Sayle, the editor of *Periscope*, served as Curator, Historical Intelligence, CIA, during the period of the Church Committee investigation.]

Notes from Here and There

Denver's Hal D. Seward has signed a contract with Paladin Press of Boulder, Colorado, to publish his book *Spies I Have Known or How to Become a Spy*. Seward, who has authored five books, is a frequent contributor to major military journals.

The *Lee Constitution*, published in Fort Myers, Florida, has reprinted in pamphlet form a series of editorials written by Herman O. Bly. Bly, a veteran of 25 years with the FBI and 5 years with CIA, addresses such issues as internal security, US-USSR relations, national defense, foreign policy, "secular humanism," and the media, and offers his comments on several noteworthy espionage cases. Members who wish to add the pamphlet to their libraries or speakers' kits may write: The Lee Constitution, 390 Pondella Road, Suite 5, North Fort Myers, FL 33903. The pamphlets cost \$1.25 per single copy, \$6 for 5 copies, \$10 for 10 copies.

Those with a CI bent might be interested in the latest word regarding the book *Industrial Espionage*, co-authored by Norman R. Bottom, Jr. of Miami. After it was reviewed in *Periscope*, the Soviets purchased Russian-language rights from the U.S. publisher. Says Bottom, "Now look what's happened. Obviously your publication is read thoroughly in Moscow!"

The following list of new members since the last issue is incomplete in that it does not include those who requested that their names be kept restricted.

Mr. Charles J. ALLEN P. O. Box 418M 3 Oakridge Way Shrewsbury, MA 01545	Mr. Lloyd D. BURTON 733 Kline Street La Jolla, CA 92037	Mr. John E. GERLING 5921 West 215 Street Fairview Park, OH 44126
Mr. James A. ANDERSON 4400 East West Highway, #903 Bethesda, MD 20814	Mr. Axel M. CHRISTIANSEN 6352 S. Eudora Way Littleton, CO 80121	Mr. Robert H. GRIFFITH 1036 George Avenue Rocledge, FL 32955
Col Jack W. AUGUST USAF(Ret.) 18919 Crooked Lane Road Lutz, FL 33549	Mr. Ron L. CLARK P. O. Box 2569-SS Westport, CT 06880	Mr. John Manning GRINNAN 5526 Dyer St, #131 Dallas, TX 75206
CDR Douglas A. BATEMAN USNR Box 610125 Houston, TX 77208	Mr. Thomas J. COOK 9537 Dudley Drive Westminster, CO 80020	Mr. Judson B. GRUBBS II 1001 Wilson Boulevard, #607 Arlington, VA 22209
Mrs. Harriot C. BEGOLE 134 Monroe Street Denver, CO 80206	Mr. Floyd R. DILLON 12400 Lexington Ave. NE Albuquerque, NM 87112	Mr. Lunsford Otto HEALY 410 Artemis Blvd Nerit Island, FL 32953
Mr. William H. BELT 456 E. Gladys Avenue Hermiston, OR 97838	Col Paul E. DUPLESSIS USAF(Ret.) P. O. Box 626 Oakton, VA 22124	Mr. Robert A. HEBER 200 Cold Spring Drive Rocky Hill, CT 06067
Maj Eugene C. BERG USAF(Ret.) 1330 Winding Ridge Tr. Colorado Springs, CO 80919	Miss Ann M. FALLON 82 Ivy Street, #2 Brookline, MA 02146	COL Albert F.P. JONES 2 Wingate Place P. O. Box 689 Palm Coast, FL 32037
Mr. Paul C. BISHOP 209 Alder Street Liverpool, NY 13088	Mr. Robert G. FANNIN P. O. Box 112007 Salt Lake City, UT 84147	Mr. Anthony V. KROCHALIS P. O. Box 11009 Alexandria, VA 22312
Mr. Robert C. BLOOMING- DALE 209 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01701	Mr. Thomas N. FARRELL 337 West Caroline St. Fenton, MI 48430	Mr. Nino John LO SCHIAVO P. O. Box 1221 Redwood City, CA 94063
Col William T. BONNER Jr. USAF(Ret.) 8485 Middle Run Dr. Springfield, VA 22153	Mr. Jose A. FIERRO Box 2434 APO New York, NY 09283	Mr. Charles M. LYDY 7401 W. 83rd Street Los Angeles, CA 90045
Mr. Edward S. BRAZAS 7726 Lisle Avenue Falls Church, VA 22043	Mr. Thomas D. FOX 614 Laura Drive Falls Church, VA 22046	Mr. Joseph J. MACIEL 785 Old Best Road North Attleboro, MA 02760
	Mr. Thomas J. GERARD SFPD/Intel.Div. 850 Bryant Street, Rm 532 San Francisco, CA 94103	Mr. Charles R. MAYER 5835 Bartow Road South Highland City, FL 33846

Mr. Luke F. MAYER Jr.
1007 N. Pitt St.
Alexandria, VA 22314

LtCol Donald B. McBRIDE
USAF(Ret.)
9549 Elvis Lane
Seabrook, MD 20706

Mr. Bert H. McGILL
Box 5
Amherst, NH 03031

Mr. George C. MOORE
6715 N 27th Street
Arlington, VA 22213

Mr. William B. MUIR
4100 N. Calle Del Risco
Tucson, AZ 85745

Mr. Robert E. NELSON
4102 Mt. Hukee Avenue
San Diego, CA 92117

Mr. Edward J. O'MALLEY
8707 Crystal Rock Lane
Laurel, MD 20708

Mr. Lester G. PALDY
6 Setalcott Place
Setauket, NY 11733

Col Joe W. PARRIS
USAF(Ret.)
77 East Andrews Drive,
N.W., #167
Atlanta, GA 30305

Mr. David R. PICKERING
1739 S. Dayton Place
Kennewick, WA 99337

COL Rodney K. ROBERTS
7005 Springfield Vlg.
Court
West Springfield, VA
22152

Mr. Ben RUSSAK
3 E. 44th Street
New York, NY 10017

Mr. Robert F. SANDERSON
406 Willow Valley
Lamar, CO 81052

Dr. James M. SCHNEIDER
2748 Elm Drive, N.E.
Palm Bay, FL 32905

RADM Donald Mac SHOWERS
3829 N. 26th Street
Arlington, VA 22207

LtCol Burton SLOANE
USAF(Ret.)
109 Oxford Boulevard
Great Neck, NY 11021

Mr. Gene S. STEIN
11 Parkwood Dr.
Garnerville, NY 10923

LtCol Sherman R. STRAND
USAF(Ret.)
2231 N. Chelton Rd.
Colorado Springs, CO
80909

Mr. Howard T. STUMP Jr.
1024 Guadalupe del
Prado, N.W.
Albuquerque, NM 87107

Mr. Arthur H. SULLIVAN
4613 Harling Lane
Bethesda, MD 20815

Mr. Willis L. THOMAS
11804 Enid Drive
Potomac, MD 20854

Dr. M. Christine
TORRINGTON
211 Sutter Street, #318
San Francisco, CA 94108

Mr. John J. TRAVESKY
9125 Copper NE, #706
Albuquerque, NM 87123

Mr. George UREKE
3604 Tallwood Terrace
Falls Church, VA 22041

Mr. Ralph E. WEBER
7420 Grand Parkway
Wauwatosa, WI 53213

COL Norman S. WELLS
USA(Ret.)
5707 N. 9th Road
Arlington, VA 22205

Vice President Dedicates CIA Headquarters Expansion

Vice President George Bush, who served as DCI a decade ago, returned to Langley, Virginia, November 1st to dedicate a major expansion to CIA's headquarters facility. Speaking at the cornerstone ceremony, the Vice President reflected on the quarter of a century that had passed since President Eisenhower dedicated the site:

"It's a pleasure to be here this morning. It always gives me a great deal of pleasure to come out here. I have so many good memories of my days as DCI . . . so many friends in the agency . . . or who are by now alumni of the Agency. And I have such respect for surely one of the greatest DCIs of all, your current director, Bill Casey.

"And something else. I have so much respect for the work that all of you are doing for our country . . . respect from my first hand experience here a decade ago . . . and respect because I see so much of your product or hear about it every day. And in so much of what you do, you produce some of the best work being done in the government today. You set the standard. You lead the way.

"And so, as I say, it's a pleasure to come here.

"Today is 26 years, almost to the day, since President Eisenhower laid the cornerstone for the main building.

"It's been a turbulent quarter century for the Agency, as well as for the country. Challenges have arisen both abroad and at home. For a while the CIA — together with others in the national service whose jobs are to protect our liberties — came under greater and more critical scrutiny than even our adversaries.

"A principle objection of mine was that a lot of hill hoppers came arrogantly charging out here showing no concern for classified material, determined that they were ferreting out wrong-doing. And in the process that they did was insult the patriotism and dedication of the entire intelligence community. It was insulting and uncalled for.

"Another change in the last quarter century has been the expanding scope of the intelligence challenges you must address. Terrorism, theft of technology, narcotics trafficking, Third World debt, nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation . . . these are just some of the issues that weren't even on the radar screen, or were just faintly there, in the late '50's.



AFIO's Larry Houston briefs Vice President Bush and DCI Casey on the "secret" concerning President Eisenhower's cornerstone ceremony for the original CIA building.

"These new challenges require new kinds of analysis, and new and more searching application of both old and new disciplines. And, as I said, I've been impressed again and again that you are meeting these challenges and meeting them superbly.

"So much has changed since the first cornerstone was laid. But there's much reason for satisfaction and for confidence in the future. For me that confidence comes most of all because one thing hasn't changed . . . and that's the truth of the words President Eisenhower spoke when he stood not far from here all those years ago.

"He said:

[In the world of intelligence] "Success cannot be advertised; failure cannot be explained. In the work of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism — their reward can be little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. [And, he concluded,] the reputation of your organization for quality and excellence of performance is a proud one."

"It was then. It is today. May each of you and this new building long serve the cause of America and of peace."



Honored Guests: former DCI Richard Helms, former DDCI Amb. Vernon A. Walters (LTG, USA-Ret.), former DCI William E. Colby, former DCI VADM William F. Raborn, Jr. (USN-Ret.), and former DDCI Hon. Frank C. Carlucci. Unavoidably, former DCI Hon. John A. McCone had to return to the West Coast prior to the ceremony.

Chapter Activities

Arizona

Arizona Chapter. The chapter met on Saturday, November 16th at the Airport Central Inn in Phoenix. Eighteen members plus guest Jack Bryant and the speaker, Mrs. Helen Corbin, wife of the State Attorney General, were on hand. Mrs. Corbin, whose topic was "The History of Drugs," is the author of eight books. Her presentation was provocative and left the audience with a sense of caution and greater awareness of the ongoing drug war.

During the business session, a slate of nominees for office next year was selected. Chapter president Ed Barley also presented an update on other topics of interest concerning the intelligence world.

California

San Diego Chapter. The speaker at the chapter's October meeting was Deputy Sheriff Mike Williams who, with five other deputies, is responsible for collecting, evaluating and disseminating intelligence within the Sheriff's Department and to other law enforcement agencies. He told the gathering how his mission is accomplished and who the target groups are. Specifically, he cited the Hell's Angels motorcycle gangs as a prime example of organized crime.

Once viewed as just a "hell-raising bunch of beer-swilling rowdies," the Hell's Angels have lately entered into the immensely lucrative field of drug production and distribution, specializing in metaamphetamines, sometimes called "designer drugs" because they are manufactured from easily obtained chemicals, and for their appeal to the Yuppie generation as well as street people.

Williams also stated that the Hell's Angels, like the Mafia, is investing its ill-gained wealth from drugs in legitimate businesses, often using intimidation and strong-arm methods to eliminate the competition. Unlike the Mafia, however, the Hell's Angeles eschew three-piece, \$1,000 suits, preserving a rough, motorcycle hooligan image, perhaps as a cover for entrance into sophisticated crime.

Mike Williams' talk preceded the October 31st raid on the "Rich Man Poor Man Limousine Service" office which served as a legitimate front for the distribution of metaamphetamines by the local chapter of Hell's Angels. While Williams did not hint that such a raid might be forthcoming, an astute intelligence person might have gathered as much.

More than sixty persons attended the November 22nd meeting at the Admiral Kidd Navy Officers' Club to hear Don Perry speaking about the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the High Frontier organization. We all left with a better understanding of these projects.

The chapter held its annual Christmas party aboard the ferryboat *Berkeley* on December 18th. Don Perry served as auctioneer for the oldies but goodies, raising funds for the chapter's expenses during 1986. Fun, singing and general harraging it up was accompanied by Charlie Chaucer at the piano.

Announced for upcoming meetings: Charles Wiley of Accuracy in Media, January; Admiral Bill Richardson speaking on the "code breakers," February.

San Francisco Bay Area Chapter. The chapter met on November 13th at the Magic Pan restaurant. Following a no host cocktail hour, President Roger McCarthy called the meeting to order and led the Pledge of Allegiance. Father Tom Dowling offered the convocation.

Vice President Ed Rudka led tributes to the Hon. Janet Aitken who passed away unexpectedly on November 8th. Miss Aitken was a strong supporter of AFIO and an active member of the chapter's board of directors. A third-generation lawyer, Miss Aitken served in the office of the Navy general counsel in Washington during WWII and for twenty years was assistant district attorney in her native San Francisco. In 1967, she was appointed a municipal court judge by Gov. Reagan, and later was the first woman to be appointed an assistant U.S. attorney in Northern California.

Following dinner and introductions, Dr. Alvin Buckelew treated members and guests to his version of a mini-profile of Roger McCarthy. Col. Charlie Hayden, Dr. Buckelew and Don Davis were appointed to serve as a nominating committee to propose a slate of officers for 1986 at the January meeting.

Vice President (Programs) Rudka introduced the speaker, Cdr. Milton Croom (USN-Ret.). A resident of North Carolina, Cdr. Croom spoke of his recent travels in West Germany. Cdr. Croom said it is his impression that the West German people he met did not want their country led into the Soviet sphere of influence. Cdr. Croom displayed examples of the political handouts used by the political factions in that country. He suggested that such people do not want the communists, but do not trust the United States' ability to defend them.

During the question and answer period, several guests took the opportunity to provide their own analyses of the political climate in West Germany.

Kudos were extended to Jim Quesada for his address to the Ignacio Valley Republican Women's Club in November. A six-line announcement in a local paper was sufficient to bring out a group of "US-Out of Latin America" protesters, complete with signs, press coverage and a photographer. The protesters were well-organized and ensuing media coverage abbreviated Jim's talk on Nicaragua but the news photograph was predictably large enough for readers to read the protesters' signs.

The nominating committee offered, and the membership elected, the following slate of officers for the new year: Capt. William Greene (USN-Ret.), president; Col. Edward Rudka [SMR], vice president (programs); Thomas J. Dickson, vice president (membership); Mrs. Jean Wright, secretary; Gonzalo "Jim" Quesada, treasurer; and Roger McCarthy, Mrs. Sue Davis, LTC Emanuel (Max) Peters (USA-Ret.), and Col. G. Russell Wiley (USAR), executive board.

Two history-making chapter meetings were announced. Following the January meeting, at which Dr. William B. Shuler, deputy director of the "star wars" program spoke in advocacy of the program, the February speaker is Vladimir Lomotslev, deputy counsel general of the USSR consulate who will speak in opposition.

New England

New England Chapter. The chapter met January 11th at the Stamford Plaza Hotel, Stamford, CT., to hear Peter Crooks of the New Haven FBI regional office. He briefed the members on the Bureau's "development of

counterintelligence awareness" (DECA) program which is used to heighten awareness of defense contractors to the nature of the threat posed by hostile intelligence services as well as to address the problem of technology transfer at the source.

The method approach was used at the individual level of analysis, first examining in detail the William Bell-Marian Zacharski espionage case to explain the recruitment process. It was noted, generally, that the motivations and "danger signs" are applicable throughout the defense industry.

Crooks' program was illustrated with slides and video excerpts from the CBS "Sixty Minutes" program.

Texas

Gulf Coast Chapter. The chapter held its organizational meeting on November 25th and elected the following officers for the new year: Richard Partch, president; Miss Shelly Lea Bennett, vice president; Wilford L. Kimble, treasurer; M. A. Ruebright, secretary. Outgoing president Fred Rodell expressed his hopes that AFIO will continue to grow and prosper.

Special Report

Clearing the Waters in Vermont

The New England Chapter of AFIO has drawn on its talented membership to mount successful public discussion of the role of intelligence in society, efforts which might serve as a model for other chapters in developing similar programs.

From initial contacts at the University of Vermont, Jeff Kingry brought together the heads of the History and Political Science departments with Dr. Winn Taplin, a professional historian and former career operations officer with CIA. The result was Taplin's popular course "U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Policy." Throughout the course, for guest lectures Taplin was able to draw on the chapter's resources: Michael Speers, Frank Binder, Bruce Lawlor and Col. Robert Evans. The first meeting of the Fall semester course was standing room only, surpassing both enrollment and the classroom.

Another program on the university campus was the "American Intelligence Symposium" arranged by Kingry with the cooperation of the university's Church Street Center for Community Education. Each Thursday night from the end of September to the first of November, AFIO members lectured and responded to questions from the audience. The individual presentations drew from 35 to 50 people, who paid a \$10 fee. The fee served two purposes, both to assist the non-profit Center to defray expenses (including advertising the series) and to act as a screening device to discourage those who had only incidental or antagonistic interest.

The audience was a mixed group, changing in makeup from week to week. There were extreme left-thinking radicals and some extreme right-wingers, but in the main the listeners were students, teachers and interested children. Although the Church Street Center had received some critical phone and telephone messages threatening disruption if the series was not cancelled, the reception was polite and very respectful, and

everyone behaved well. The speakers found it particularly gratifying to be able to reach some of the leftmost radicals with meaningful discussion. Although it is doubtful any of them were converted, it gave the activists an opportunity to discuss certain intelligence issues rationally with speakers who knew what they were talking about.

Several of the speakers made their presentations at great personal expense. "Jan DeVries," aka Bob Van Beaver, drove up from the coast during a hurricane, sick with the flu, delivered his presentation, then returned home the same night. One AFIO member noted that if AFIO ever gave a medal for service above and beyond the call of duty, Van Beaver deserves it; his topic covered the problem of collaboration. The only draw-back in giving the talk, he indicated, was his inability to deal with some of the sensitive questions asked from a personal standpoint. As with other speakers, recalling what was or might continue to be classified remained a problem.

Col. Robert Evans, from Stowe, VT., spoke on the history, culture and personality of the Russian people under the Soviet system. His command of the Russian language permitted a unique insight into Russian thinking, and his predictions, on the eve of the Summit, proved accurate. The open discussion was both spirited and interesting.

Frank Binder, from Montpelier, VT., an extremely colorful OSS veteran, spoke on "Eastern Europe: Legacy of Lost Opportunity," during which he noted that "the best intelligence, analyzed and presented in the most timely and graphic manner, can never take the place of national political will." Binder chronicled the methodology of Soviet assumption of power in the power vacuum of post WWII eastern Europe. Unfortunately, he said, "the most loyal lovers of American-style freedom and liberty were those eastern European nationalities that were given by default to the Soviets in 1945."

Mike Spears held forth on the use of foreign aid in the Third World. To this he linked the intelligence side of the equation: some of the practical problems associated with helping, overtly or covertly, a nation to become self-sufficient and strong amidst the pressures of world-reality.

Col. Edmund Thompson's presentation, "Counter-terrorism," was timely and well-received. With the hijacking of the *Achilles Lauro* and the bombings in Paris, the difficulties associated with gathering counter-terrorism intelligence were a clear issue, ably dealt with. Gen. Thompson, at some personal sacrifice, made the journey from the coast of Maine to Burlington to participate in the series.

The last lecture in the series, presented by publisher John Quirk, dealt with "Soviet Disinformation in the Publishing Industry." Quirk, who is credited with one of the best lectures of the series, offered some eye-opening revelations. Item: The KGB makes massive purchases of books favorable to Soviet communism or policy as a means of stimulating the market to produce additional works favorable to the Soviet cause. Item: The KGB publishes an annual plan of topics the USSR would like to see written and published in the West. Quirk, recalling conversations with the KGB agent at the Frankfurt International Book Fair last summer, noted

(Continued on page 14)

Durenberger and Hollings Pay Tribute to Intelligencers

Two prominent members of the Soviet Select Committee on Intelligence have made it known that the current contest over management of the nation's intelligence does not diminish the esteem they hold for the men and women of intelligence.

Speaking November 7th, Sen. David F. Durenberger, chairman of the oversight committee said:

"As you are aware, the CIA has come under a great deal of public and congressional scrutiny in the past decade, and certainly in the past week. Unfortunately what you are not seeing or hearing are the thousands of actions they are doing right on a daily basis. In particular, we are consistently demanding that our intelligence officers abroad provide more and more information on hostile intentions, especially those of terrorists. This involves risks. More and more of our CIA field personnel are being subjected to threats and abuse. Two years ago we witnessed an example of this when a number of them were killed by a terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. And as their assignment became more hazardous and demanding, the special mental and physical requirements necessary of the intelligence officer increase dramatically.

"To meet this standard the CIA must continually replace its officers overseas with younger personnel whose identities are not known and who can stand up to the stresses of their environment. Our intelligence

officers face hazards unknown to other overseas or law enforcement personnel. They and their families must lead their lives undercover, never telling friends and acquaintances of their true mission and responsibilities. In a world filled with terrorism, their very safety and lives are at stake if their cover is revealed. Most of these officers also work two jobs — their cover employment and their agency duties. And, finally, the nature of this work is very exacting, dangerous and difficult. In short, it is unlike any other work in government . . . there is a great need for a strong and effective human intelligence service in today's international environment. My service on the Select Committee on Intelligence has made me well aware of how much we depend on the fine men and women of our intelligence community. Their responsibilities are unique and their contribution is unparalleled."

He was joined by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings, who noted:

"The men and women who serve in the Central Intelligence Agency are some of the finest we have in public service. They are first class in terms of experience, expertise and special skills. Their responsibilities are difficult, unique and often life-threatening. And, their successes are never publicly acknowledged. They are truly the front line of a 'silent war' against terrorism, subversion and attacks upon the United States and its allies . . . our overseas intelligence officers face hazards unknown to the Foreign Service or law enforcement personnel. They and their families must lead their lives undercover, never revealing their true mission to friends and acquaintances. If their cover is ever revealed, their very safety and lives are at risk. At this moment there is a memorial at Langley for over 70 intelligence officers who have given their lives in service to their country. More names will be added as a result of the Embassy bombing in Beirut and other recent acts of terrorism. And, finally, most of these officers work two jobs — their cover employment and their agency duties.

"In short, the work of an intelligence officer is very exacting, difficult and dangerous. It is unlike any other work in government. Yet the Government cannot offer top salaries to this talented and highly skilled group of professionals. Instead, we have to largely rely on their sense of duty, loyalty and idealism."

Clearing the Waters

(Continued from page 13)

that the call had gone out for books critical of the Geneva Summit slated for the following November. Soviet policy, as early as summer, he said, was to depict the Summit as a failure and KGB efforts to influence the western press were already in evidence.

Mike Jacobs acted as chairperson for the series, introducing the speakers and, more importantly, keeping the lively seminars on time. Copies of AFIO monographs and Dave Phillips' *Careers in Intelligence* were donated by Jeff Kingry and given away to enrolled members of the seminars.

Further opportunities have appeared as a result of the seminars. One of those enrolled was Serge C. Gart, coordinator of the university's Conferences and Institutes. He was impressed by the series, and has explored the possibility of a university-sponsored educational conference on intelligence. As conceived, the scope would be much greater than done before and would be supported through either the history or the political science department. Chapter president Mike Speers and Dr. Winn Taplin have held preliminary talks with Gart for a New England Conference of Intelligence, History and Political Science Scholars.

Kingry notes that "Great oaks from little acorns . . .", and suggests that other AFIO chapters might find it rewarding to work with the continuing education departments at their local colleges to develop similar courses, symposia and lectures on intelligence matters. "There is plenty of talent and experience out there and, in most instances, there is also a public thirsty for first-hand knowledge," he said.

Varounis Warns About Writer Inquiries

AFIO member John Varounis calls reader attention to a recent letter in the *Air Force Magazine*. In it, the author of the recently published exposé, *U.S. Intelligence Community*, solicits information on U.S. intelligence operations directed against the USSR between 1945-1960. The writer indicates an interest in "hearing from anyone involved in airborne peripheral photography or electronic reconnaissance missions during those years plus anyone who was involved in 'Collection Operations' concerning Soviet nuclear testing."

Varounis cautions that responding to this type of solicitation could lead to unauthorized disclosure since the information requested may still be classified or be subject to Department of Defense security review prior to release. Responding to such requests, reminds Varounis, leaves one open to expanded questioning in areas beyond the author's claimed scope of interest and could be a means by which the researcher can confirm hints, clues or information from other sources.

Intelligence Issues

Keeping Eyes on Spies: An Unresolved Friction

by Roland Powell

Washington — Leaks to the press have long played a major role in governing here. Leaks are used:

- As trial balloons designed to test the measure of public response and therefore determine whether an idea should be pursued or dropped.
- To make a case in public for an idea which has been scorned by higher-ups in a department, agency or Congress.
- To attack, in a behind-the-back manner, some official or some idea — one of the least socially acceptable approaches to a civilized nation.

And quite often there are leaks just because this place leaks. There is a penchant by many for sounding off on this or that subject because they are unable to keep quiet.

A mixture of about all those reasons appeared in recent "leak" battles involving William Casey, the CIA director, on one side and the ranking members of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the other . . .

The give-and-take comments by Mr. Casey, Sen. David Durenberger (R., Minn.), chairman, and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.), the ranking Democrat, of the Intelligence Committee, involved the simplest and most important conflict between the agency and Capitol Hill.

The CIA likes to do things in secret. Members of Congress argue that this has caused serious problems in the past, that Congress must keep an eye on the spy agency and go public when it feels the national

interest requires.

Basically, the determination of the national-interest need is made by three men: Senator Durenberger and Senator Leahy, who operate in tandem on the Senate side, and Rep. Lee Hamilton (D., Ind.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, a respected lawmaker who rarely is heard in public talking about or criticizing the CIA. Hence, it was Casey vs. Durenberger-Leahy.

The whole idea of some senators and representatives keeping an eye on the CIA is not popular at the agency. Intelligence people, by their nature, apparently, assume that their successes and failures shouldn't be known to the outside world . . .

The CIA's handling of Vitaly Yurchenko — the reported Soviet defector, and his fingering of Edward Lee Howard, a former CIA officer, as one who gave the Soviets sensitive information about U.S. intelligence gathering — came under harsh criticism, especially from leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

This led Mr. Casey to charge that the committee leaked like a sieve and no wonder the CIA was reluctant to take the committee into its confidence.

On the other side, Senator Leahy said there were many occasions when the committee learned about things from leaks, that is, stories in the press which he suggested had to come from CIA.

In short, everybody leaks, but "my leak is good for the country, yours is not." . . . The question is, in general, is the nation better off? There is no simple or easy answer.

[Roland Powell is with the Washington Bureau of the *Toledo Blade*. This analysis is excerpted from a longer article which appeared in that publication.]

Henry J. Hyde U.S. House of Representatives

My concern about Congress' current intelligence oversight arrangement was heightened by the furor last year over the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors. Whether one supported this action or not, that episode illustrates a problem of overwhelming importance. Specifically, one must ask how capable Congress is of practicing *responsible* oversight of intelligence activities once those activities are viewed as an integral part of a foreign policy that has become controversial and the subject of partisan debate.

After Vietnam and Watergate, both Houses of Congress decided to establish select committees on intelligence following extensive investigations of United States intelligence activities by panels headed by then Congressman Otis Pike and the late Senator Frank Church. Early on, both of these committees appeared to conduct their business in an amicable and bipartisan manner with little evidence of politicization. Unfortunately, such a turn of events was too good to last, and in recent years congressional oversight has become increasingly politicized . . . It appears the only way to mount a successful covert operation these days is for such an activity to have the nearly unanimous support of both intelligence committees and the involved agencies of the Intelligence Community. Anything short of that is doomed to failure, as opponents can selectively leak material to their acquaintances in the media with the express purpose of torpedoing the operation. Moreover, you can count on a flurry of those leaks just before anticipated congressional action on the issue in dispute.

What is especially disturbing is that those who are doing the leaking probably never stopped to think what the short- and long-term implications of their revelations will be with respect to United States intelligence efforts, let alone to United States foreign policy. They are so preoccupied with scoring political points that they do not begin to realize how their actions may impact on the lives of United States intelligence and foreign service personnel overseas . . . We cannot afford to allow what presently masquerades as congressional intelligence oversight to continue any longer. With politics intruding so heavily on the process, more debacles are inevitable. While nothing equaling the sensationalism of the mining disclosures has occurred since, I am personally aware, as a new member of the House Intelligence Committee, of subsequent leaks that damaged United States intelligence interests in Asia, the Middle East and Central America. Overriding security concerns preclude me from elaborating any further. It is certainly time, therefore, for a major overhaul.

David F. Durenberger United States Senate

There is, unfortunately, no sure-fire system for preventing unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information from either the legislative or executive branches. The record of the intelligence committees in protecting the sensitive information imparted to them has been excellent, and there certainly is no doubt that many more unauthorized disclosures have come from the executive branch than from the Congress.

The Senate Intelligence Committee meets in a hearing room that is state-of-the-art in protection against hostile penetration. Document, physical and communications security is impressive on both the House and Senate sides. In some cases the precautions taken exceed anything done within the Intelligence Community. This is not to say there is no room for improvement — we always can try to do better . . .

Congressman Hyde perceptively asks whether Congress is capable of practicing *responsible* congressional oversight of intelligence once those activities are viewed as an integral part of a foreign policy that has become controversial and the subject of partisan debate. I believe the answer is yes, and that we do not have to dismantle an oversight system that is basically effective and beneficial to the Intelligence Community. Instead, what we need to do is ensure that we keep the distinction between foreign policy and intelligence firmly in mind and not allow contentious foreign policy issues to be fought out over implementing mechanisms in the context of intelligence oversight.

To this end, we should agree on the following basic principles and, working with the executive branch, do our best to ensure that they are followed:

(1) The role of the Intelligence Committee is to provide impartial information and analysis upon which knowledgeable foreign policy decisions can be made, and to serve in certain circumstances as the instrument of United States policy when special activities are required for policy implementation;

(2) The role of the intelligence committees of the Congress is to provide congressional oversight necessary to ensure that budgetary resources are efficiently allocated and that the Intelligence Community is effectively accomplishing its mission with due regard to the rights of Americans;

(3) Neither the Intelligence Community nor the intelligence committees of the Congress are, or should be, responsible for the formulation of United States foreign policy.

[The statements by Rep. Hyde and Sen. Durenberger are excerpted from longer presentations which appear in *A Joint Committee on Intelligence?* published by the Nathan Hale Institute, 422 First St. S.E., Suite 208A, Washington, D.C. 20003, \$2.50.]

Nicholson Memorial Fund Established by S-CIC-R

The Senior Counter Intelligence Corps Retired, Inc., meeting in annual reunion at San Antonio, Texas, has announced establishment of the Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., Memorial Scholarship Fund. The proceeds will be used as scholarship assistance for Nicholson's daughter, now nine years old. Nicholson, it may be recalled, was murdered by a Soviet guard on March 24, 1985, while performing his official duties in East Germany as an Army member of the U.S. Mission at Potsdam. He was posthumously promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel in a special ceremony conducted by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger at the Pentagon.

Marion R. Panell, chairman of S-CIC-R's board, has invited tax-deductible contributions to be mailed to: Corporation Treasurer, Custodian of the Nicholson Memorial Scholarship Fund, Frank L. Perkins, 2048 Keyes Lane, Deltona, FL 32738.

A Letter From the Deanery

Dr. Walter L. Pforzheimer, the dean of intelligence bibliophiles, writes of his embarrassment at a recent thumbnail sketch of himself in *Washingtonian* magazine. In it, the reporter described Pforzheimer as the "pink-faced dean of Washington's retired intelligence corps." Walter assures us his complexion is "ruddy," not "pink-faced," but sees the remainder as an affront to "the real deans of the retired intelligence profession who have carried the load while I have been collecting books." While many of us have had to deal before with inaccuracies in the press, he writes, in this case "I hasten to apologize for the unpardonable error of the press and retreat to my possible claims as a book collector in the intelligence field."

DONATIONS

The following members have generously contributed an amount equal to or exceeding one year's annual dues.

Miss Mildred S. BRANNAN
Falls Church, Virginia

The Honorable Hugh S. CUMMING, Jr.
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Joe Wilson ELLIOTT
Los Angeles, California

Mrs. Jeanne B. GRIFFITH
Evanston, Illinois

COL Walter S. HAMMOND, USAF(Ret.)
Melrose, Florida

Mr. Otto T. HESS
Bradenton, Florida

Mr. Robert L. KEUCH
Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Ms. F. Catherine RIGSBEE
Saluda, North Carolina

Eleanor Madge STEIN
In memory of:

Margaret George KENNA and
COL Clair S. KENNA

New Life Members

Charles J. ALLEN
Shrewsbury, Massachusetts

CPT Richard G. BERLIN, AUS(Ret.)
St. Petersburg, Florida

COL George Combs BERGER, USAF(Ret.)
Alexandria, Virginia

Robert C. BLOOMINGDALE
Framingham, Massachusetts

COL Daniel M. COLLIER, Jr.
New York, New York

COL Owen L. GREENBLATT USAF(Ret.)
Alexandria, Virginia

COL William T. HORNADAY, AUS(Ret.)
Bonita Springs, Florida

Robert A. JOY
San Rafael, California

COL Herman W. LANGE, USA(Ret.)
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida

LCDR Eston D. LAWRENCE, USN(Ret.)
Santa Barbara, California

LTC Gale LOVE, MI, AUS(Ret.)
Martinez, California

Edward F. McGRATH
Vienna, Virginia

Joseph F. McMANUS
Columbia, South Carolina

COL Edgar T. MARTIN, USAR(Ret.)
Arlington, Virginia

Joseph D. OBUCINA, Jr.
Maitland, Florida

Mrs. William R. REED (Ellen)
Bordentown, New Jersey

Michael J. ROLLERI
San Francisco, California

Donald O. SHAW
Walnut Creek, California

Gene STEIN
Garnerville, New York

Middleton TRAIN
Washington, D.C.

Nominations for the Board of Directors

Major General Richard X. Larkin, (USA-Ret.) has been named Chairman of the nominating committee for the 1986 elections to the Board of Directors. The following members' terms expire this year: Ann Caracristi, Lawrence R. Houston, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., David Lee Phillips, John Anson Smith, Dr. Louis W. Tordella, and W. Raymond Wannall. It is our goal to have at least twelve names on the ballot which will be sent to all AFIO members with the Summer issue of *Periscope*. In order to nominate an AFIO member it is necessary to have the member's written permission as well as a black and white picture and biographic data. The committee will edit all biographies so as to make them of equal size to fit on the ballot. It is our desire to have members nominated to the Board who have actively supported the goals of AFIO. It is through the nomination process that the voice of the members is heard. We request that nominations be sent to AFIO headquarters before *April 1, 1986*. This deadline is required in order to have the ballot presented and approved by the Board of Directors at the AFIO Spring Luncheon on April 14, 1986.

The following is a list of members who have served, as well as those currently serving, on AFIO's Board of Directors:

BOARD OF DIRECTORS LIST

ANDRY, Mr. Robert F., Jr.
 ANDRES, CAPT Richard W., USN(Ret.)
 ANDREWS, Mr. Richard M.
 ANDRUS, Mr. John F.
 ANDRUS, Mr. Cecil
 ANDRUS, Ann
 ANDRUS, LTG Joseph F., USAF(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, LTG Marshall S., USA(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, Mr. George
 ANDRUS, Hon. William J.
 ANDRUS, Dr. Ray S.
 ANDRUS, Hon. William E.
 ANDRUS, GEN Robert E., Jr., USMC(Ret.)*
 ANDRUS, LTG John J., USA(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, Helen Priest
 ANDRUS, Mr. Lee E.
 ANDRUS, COL Carl F., AUS(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, Mr. James E.
 ANDRUS, LTG Daniel O., USA(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, BG Harry T., USMC(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, Mr. Samuel
 ANDRUS, COL Walter S., USAF(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, VADM Frederick J., II, USN(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, Mr. Lawrence R.
 ANDRUS, Mr. Donald G.
 ANDRUS, ADM Bobby R., USN(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, Mr. Lyman B.
 ANDRUS, MG Richard X., USA(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, Mr. Derek*
 ANDRUS, The Honorable Clare Booth
 ANDRUS, Mr. John M.*
 ANDRUS, Mr. Newton S.
 ANDRUS, LTG W. Ray, USA(Ret.)*
 ANDRUS, Mr. Donald W.
 ANDRUS, DR. WALTER L.
 ANDRUS, Mr. David Atlee
 ANDRUS, Mr. Stanton V.
 ANDRUS, E, CDR Robert B., USN(Ret.)
 ANDRUS, Mrs. Anita A.

ROSITZKE, Harry
 SCATTERDAY, Mr. George
 SMITH, Mr. John Anson
 STEWART, MG Richard R., USAF(Ret.)
 STILLWELL, GEN Richard G., USA(Ret.)
 STORER, E. Barbara
 TAYLOR, VADM Rufus, USN(Ret.)*
 THOMAS, MG Jack E., USAF(Ret.)
 TIGHE, LG Eugene F., Jr., USAF(Ret.)
 TORDELLA, Dr. Louis W.
 WALLER, Mr. John H.
 WANNALL, Mr. W. Raymond
 WARNER, Mr. John S.
 WATSON, MG Harold, USAF(Ret.)
 WEINBRENNER, COL George R., USAF(Ret.)
 WIGGINS, Mr. Lloyd George
 WILSON, LTG Samuel V., USA(Ret.)

*Deceased

In Memoriam

LT Janet AITKEN, USNR(Ret.)
 Belvedere, California

Mr. Richard L. ARMSTRONG
 Honolulu, Hawaii

CAPT Richard F. COOPER, USN(Ret.)
 Rochester, New Hampshire

CAPT Edward H. C. FREDERICKS, USN(Ret.)
 San Diego, California

Mr. Thomas B. JONES
 Clifton, Virginia

RADM J. O. KINERT, USN(Ret.)
 San Diego, California

Mrs. Sarah C. MESSER
 Virginia Beach, Virginia

CDR Raymond H. NICKERSON, USN(Ret.)
 Cambria, California

LT John S. SALZER, USNR(Ret.)
 Tampa, Florida

LTCOL Sammy V. C. SNIDER, USAF(Ret.)
 Wellsville, PA

Employment Opportunities

Freelance writers wanted in the U.S. and abroad to report on activist movements and their pressures on business for the monthly newsletter *International Barometer*. Arion N. Pattakos, the publication's executive editor, advises that it will pay \$50 to \$150 per 750 words of text used. For more details write him at 1120 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 330, Washington, D.C. 20036.

From the President's Desk

I heartily recommend that each of you read the excellent report of the Stilwell Commission "Keeping the Nation's Secrets" which reviews the DOD policies and procedures in light of recent security incidents. Go to your Government Printing Office and get a copy. It puts a lot of light on the U.S. Security problem where there has largely been only heat.

Succinctly, the U.S. in its very fortunate position of being able to acquire vast amounts of information via classified means has not been very efficient at determining how much of this information needs to be classified. Most of it is classified not for what it says but because of how it was acquired. The challenge is simple, then:

- 1) Establish the means of classifying only that *very important information* that deserves very expensive and extensive protection.
- 2) Disseminate the material only on the strictest "need to know" basis and only to trusted personnel.
- 3) Make sure the classified material is properly protected by an adequate administrative force and secure environment.

This oversimplified approach to security requires that only information, the loss of which will truly harm the United States, as an institution, be protected. In my experience the least discipline in our security system is found in the hands of those who wield the various clas-



sification stamps. It just seems easier to stamp than worry. Thus, the extraordinary volume of classified data, most of which stays forever in our vaults and files — to be inventoried by over-burdened clerical personnel; occasionally stolen by venals prowling for a fast buck.

As priority number one, the Secretary of Defense will do well to direct the reduction of classified data held throughout the DOD, raw and processed, by at least 80%. The necessary discipline imposed, then, on the system that continually adds to that remaining library of 20% will allow proper security for *real* secrets.

Happy New Year
Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.

Notes from National

One of the main functions of the AFIO headquarters has been to respond to requests from the media when news stories have developed concerning intelligence; Some of the more recent have been in response to inquiries about defectors, spies against the United States and espionage trials. We feel that AFIO is performing an educational function for the American people in responding to these queries, and are pleased that the TV networks and national news magazines continue to call us on a daily basis for information and referrals to members for interviews. If any AFIO members are interested in participating in this effort, please let us know your area of interest. In granting such interviews, residual security obligations remain an individual responsibility.

In furthering our education program, I gave two presentations in November. The first was an address to the Brookings Institution Seminar for Senior Government Officials at Williamsburg, Virginia. The second was to a study group at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. At the latter session I found it surprising that the greatest interest of the students was in the chance of gaining positions in the Intelligence Community.

The AFIO Directory, included with this issue of *Periscope*, was prepared in our office through the diligent keyboarding efforts of Mrs. Gretchen Campbell and Miss Suzanne Phillippe who programmed the project for our IBM PC. Their work has increased the accuracy and speed in preparing the Directory. We are truly grateful for their efforts.

AFIO is much in need for proposals and manuscripts for additional pamphlets in the Intelligence Pro-

fession Series. At the present time we do not have any material in pipeline for the series.

For AFIO members who might like to accept some part-time consulting work we are fortunate that a new Life Member, Gene Stein, has made an offer which should help. Gene is the Senior Partner in HR Consultants Resource, 301 Route 19 North, Rutherford, New Jersey 07070, telephone (201) 939-0610. The firm maintains a database of the qualifications of potential consultants, as extracted from a registration form supplied by the company. Gene has generously agreed to accept the registration of AFIO members at no charge (the normal registration is \$68), if they identify themselves as such. All inquiries should be directed to the company at the address, above, and not to AFIO headquarters. Please remember that the data furnished HRCR must be unclassified.

The deadline for submission of chapter reports and photographs for the next issue of *Periscope* is April 5th.

— John K. Greaney

PERISCOPE is published quarterly by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, McLean Office Building, 6723 Whittier Ave., Suite 303A, McLean, VA 22101. Phone (703) 790-0320.

Officers of AFIO are:

LG Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.	President
Dr. Walter L. Pforzheimer	Vice President
Robert J. Novak	Treasurer
Charlotta P. Engrav	Secretary
John K. Greaney	Executive Director
Edward F. Sayle	Editor of PERISCOPE