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CIA and Georgetown

The Hilltop Connection?

By Philipp Borinski

Georgetown University's special position within the political establishment of this country is not any hot news. Nixon kept referring to Kissinger and his political circle as the "Georgetown-Set", and in these days it has almost become a commonplace to speak of the SFS—faculty and the GU-run "Center for Strategic and International Studies" (CSIS), sprinkled as they are with former high government-officials, as a (republican)" government in exile". What strikes, however, is the "special relationship" GU seems to enjoy with a particular part of the political establishment—the CIA, or, more accurately, the "pre-Carter-CIA".

"Unholy alliance" or "Entente cordiale"? These terms appear to characterize the respective viewpoints of the two camps in which the GU-community is split over the issue and who all too often fail to discuss it seriously. This article is meant to shift the debate somewhat from emotional or self-righteous mutual accusations, based on moral and political principles, to a more objective approach toward the matter, based on the available, for a *Voice*-reporter naturally limited information.

To the student-observer, the mentioned "special relationship" presents itself mainly in the form of personal bonds, on the academic level, between the CIA and CIA-related private organizations on the one side and GU on the other. Beyond that, however, these "CIA-academicians" do engage in open political activities, chiefly in the context of the current efforts to beef up a supposedly impotent CIA and of the Bush-campaign. Finally, the CIA, qua CIA operated and presumably still operates on Campus—both overtly and covertly. It is those three points—academic relations, political activities and CIA-operations on Campus—that are worth illuminating in GU's "CIA-connection".

The list of former high CIA-officers now associated to GU/CSIS is indeed impressive. It even includes two retired Directors of Central Intelligence, James Schlesinger, now senior adviser and chairman of a study-group with the CSIS, and William Colby, a "friend of the School of Foreign Service". In the "Second rank" one finds names of CIA-career-officers who held crucial positions during their time of active duty: Cord Meyer, formerly station chief in London, now senior research associate at the SFS; Jack Maury, formerly station chief in Athens till shortly after the coup of the colonels in April 1967, then legislative counselor to the CIA, now member of the MSFS-faculty; Ray Cline, formerly deputy director for intelligence, now executive director of the CSIS; George Carver, formerly station chief in Saigon and West Germany, now senior fellow at the CSIS. And Allan Goodman, professor of international politics at the SFS, is also an active CIA-officer, serving on Turner's presidential briefing staff.

To be sure, there remained a gray-zone between the politically oriented research-interests of retired CIA-officers and the limits GU could possibly go to in offering these individuals facilities for teaching and publishing, without compromising its reputation for academic freedom and practiced Catholic ideals. This gray-zone was filled out by the National Intelligence Study Center, founded and organized by Ray Cline, and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, with Cline as a prominent member and Roy Godson, professor of government at GU, as chief-coordinator. Comprised of former CIA-people, other retired government-officials and scholars of some of the country's top-universities, these organizations, according to Cline, "serve the purpose of encouraging serious study and writing on the role of intelli-

gence in the American society and thus represent an educational and constructive long run-effort". Yet again, with Cline and Godson as the respective heads, a direct connection to GU is established. On top of that Cline helped to organize the Association of former intelligence-officers, in his words a "public interest group" with 3000 members.

Whatever the role of all those institutions and no matter whether Cline distinguishes himself in them in his capacity as a former CIA-officer or as a scholar at Georgetown, by virtue of their extracurricular activities alone people like Cline and Godson cannot help providing for a certain intimacy between Washington's intelligence community and GU. This aspect applies even more to the staff of the CSIS. In a *Voice* interview CSIS senior fellow George Carver did not preclude the possibility that some colleagues of his "may privately engage in classified research". But who else except some "good old friends" being still on the government-payroll can turn up the necessary sources?

In the eyes of Father McSorley, well-known on Campus for his pacifist opinions, all these facts are simply a "disgrace". According to McSorley it is "harmful for GU to have persons on Campus who represent an organization guilty of severe violations of law, morality and human dignity". Only if they disassociate themselves from the values embodied by the CIA, he said, may they teach here. One may well assume that Father McSorley does not stand aloof with this view on our Campus.

In defending their presence at GU the persons in question themselves usually cite its high academic calibre and advantageous location as reasons for their decision to join it. "Most retired CIA-people want to stay in D.C., because they cannot do without their daily fix of interesting information and political action", Cline says. "When I started to look about for a place with the right atmosphere, administrative support and good research facilities, I discovered that Georgetown, in its kind of curriculum, faculty and students, came closer to my ideas than any other institution. In so far Cline sees "a natural affinity, especially between the SFS and the intelligence-community".

However, both he and George Carver denied any institutional connections or even affiliations between GU and the CIA. Carver even went so far as strictly to negate a clear institutional line within the CSIS itself. "All are individuals, whatever we write is not going to sound unified, for instance, that James Schlesinger and I share the same office and spend some time during the day talking to each other does not mean at all that we also share the same opinions on every issue. Ours and some other people's CIA-background does not mean anything in itself", Carver stated.

Taking the two irreconcilable positions at face-value we find ourselves in a deadlock. It surely cannot be in GU's interest to have its name tainted through links to a, in Father McSorley's words, "club of assassins, saboteurs and coup-directors", but, all the same, should one refuse to open our gates to a few, without doubt able, private individuals who happened to be covert operators or intelligence analysts and want now to escape their former anonymity by uttering their views on a free academic forum?

The question is whether or not the trench between both positions can be bridged. For his part, Father McSorley calls for a "disassociating from values" like those that were signified in the "Phoenix-Program" and the overthrow of Allende. But is it really an implicit set of "values" that relentlessly drives the CIA in ever new covert adventures? Notwithstanding a deeply rooted professional loyalty to the agency on part of most CIA-officers, it was mostly the "crusader-spirit" of other people, namely those on the policy-making level, that gave birth to all the well-publicised "atrocities" which the CIA then was left with to plan and carry out. Moreover, many of these covert actions reportedly met with basic disagreements among CIA-officers themselves, as in the case of "operation Mongoose", the Kennedy-brothers' program "to get rid of Castro" (an outspoken order to kill Castro was apparently never issued).

The National Security Act of 1947 clearly spells out the respective areas of responsibility: "It shall be the duty of the CIA to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." "Prof. Stearman, the widely respected head of the "Russian area studies program" at the SFS, was a permanent member of the NSC-staff in charge of Vietnam. He describes the CIA-people he came to know as "not necessarily conservative". According to him, "most of them displayed more liberal attitudes than a good deal of officials from other parts of the government". This is by no means astonishing. People whose very job it is to provide the President with that undistorted and comprehensive information which all the other, naturally biased agencies cannot be expected to provide, are likely to disregard the own official propaganda in their judgments. They are rather cynics than hot-blooded cold warriors, but, according to Cline, the type of the "sophisticated analyst" is the most wide-spread. "Within the CIA the emphasis always rested upon analysis. The attention paid by the media and the public to the more conspicuous actions always obscured this fact. CIA-people are analysts by nature.

"These words by Cline do square with the impression which the *Voice* grasped during my conversations with GU's "agent-turned-academicians". These few individuals probably still do not represent the CIA at large, which has not got into the twilight because of incorrect analyses. But, after all, there are yet a lot of former CIA-officers going about in this country who are not employed by GU, and it surely is more appropriate to assess the integrity of those few, who are, from their individual backgrounds rather than to include them in a wholesale condemnation of an institution which they have quit meanwhile.