

SECRET 1981 SOUTH AFRICA DOCUMENTS

COUNTERSpy


The Magazine For People Who Need To Know

Volume 5 Number 4

\$2

Aug.-Oct. 1981

U.S. and NATO Intervention in Africa



First MNC Intelligence Convention

Honduras: Staging Area for Counter-Revolution

FBI Cops in Puerto Rico

Moonies: CARP

British Columbia: Bourne Again RCMP

South Korea: AAFLI Taken Hostage by its Own

El Salvador White Paper

**instead
of an
editorial**

*june in d.c.
the women
being women
came out
(asking what is 9 x 8?)
after the rain
for flower heads
are offed
by june rains
and the children
silently saw
their grassroots transfiguration
while the men kept
driving capitalist cabs
(redlining SE)
of colby's, helms'
and menamara's
listening (while denying)
to: "Be ready, teddy"
lest you miss IT
when It comes or
take the devil
for It.*

by John Kelly

Contents

British Propaganda.....4
 U.S.S. Nimitz.....5
 FBI Cops in Puerto Rico.....8
 Moonies: CARP.....9
 El Salvador
 White Paper (Cont.).....11
 Honduras: Staging Area
 for Counter-Revolution.....13
 First MNC Intelligence
 Convention.....16
 Korea: AAFLI Taken
 Hostage by its Own.....21
 No Budget Cuts for RFE/RL.....22
 Warmongering: Council on
 Foreign Relations25
 Afghanistan-Pakistan Update...27
 NATO Intervention in Africa...30
 U.S. and NATO Facilities
 in Africa.....40
 Secret 1981 South Africa
 Documents.....48
 British Columbia:
 Bourne Again RCMP.....57

From the Editors

CounterSpy wants to thank our subscribers and readers for their support in publishing this issue. A number of articles were inspired by letters from readers.

You have also helped to expand our circulation by contacting bookstores and news stands in your area. This has been essential for *CounterSpy*, and with your help we have been able to keep production and distribution costs to an absolute minimum.

Special thanks go to the writers who have contributed articles for the first time, and to those who assisted in the production of the magazine, and, of course, to all of you who have given us financial support.

It was especially nice to meet some of our subscribers at the *CounterSpy* literature table during the May 3rd demonstration against U.S. intervention in El Salvador at the Pentagon.

We continue to need your support on a number of issues. It is getting more and more expensive to print and mail the magazine. The best way to contribute dollars to *CounterSpy* is to encourage your public library or your college library to subscribe to *CounterSpy*. That provides us with \$20, and gives many more people access to *CounterSpy*. Or you could take *CounterSpy* to local news stands and ask them to carry the magazine. If you are willing to do that, we'd be happy to mail you sample copies. Also, if you have access to any publication that might be willing to run a *CounterSpy* ad for free (or at reduced rates), please let us know.

The number of our paying subscribers and of copies printed increased again with the last issue. Hundreds of magazines, however, are sent free of charge to prisoners and to other countries where the exchange rates make it all but impossible for working people to pay for a subscription to *CounterSpy*. Please be mindful of that when you renew your sub, and add a few extra dollars.

THIS IS YOUR LAST ISSUE IF YOUR MAILING LABEL READS "R54" OR "L54".

PLEASE RENEW RIGHT AWAY, SO YOU WON'T MISS A SINGLE ISSUE.

Finally, please send us your comments on this issue of *CounterSpy*. We look forward to hearing from you.

News NOT in the News

Correction

In the midst of the barrage of undocumented charges by the Reagan administration against publications like CounterSpy, we feel the following note in the Washington Post, printed as a correction of a preceding article, bears repeating.

"An article in yesterday's Washington Post said that some U.S. intelligence agents have been killed as a result of the publication of their names. While such allegations have been made, they have not been confirmed."

Washington Post, 2/27/81, p.A-2.

Graham's CIA Petition

Official Petition

to the
United States Senate

WHEREAS, revealing the names of America's secret agents has resulted in murder, and

WHEREAS, allowing people without background checks to handle secret documents has resulted in security leaks, and

WHEREAS, weakening our ability to launch secret missions against our enemies has resulted in the needless deaths of American servicemen.

THEREFORE I, the undersigned, respectfully petition the United States Senate to safeguard America by:

Punishing those who endanger the lives of America's secret agents by revealing their names;

Checking the backgrounds of people handling secret documents to keep out spies;

Strengthening our ability to launch secret missions so we can better defend America against our enemies.

Respectfully submitted,

Sign here : _____

A project of The Hale Foundation, named after Nathan Hale, our first secret agent to give his life for America.

"I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country."

Nathan Hale, Sept. 22, 1776

1522 K Street, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20005

RCMP Death Squad

"You realize that if at any stage the RCMP find out that you have been a traitor that a special squad is to be set up to take care of that? And I have been approached in that regard." This is what Leslie James Bennett, former head of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's Security Service was told by a former RCMP colleague. Bennett was forced to resign in 1972 after intensive interrogation, and has been living in Australia since then. (See CounterSpy vol.5 no.3) He told the Australian Broadcasting Commission in June 1981 that he believed the fairly direct warning that he would be assassinated if the RCMP were able to prove that he was in fact a double agent. Bennett maintains he never was a double agent but cautions that: "I don't think [the RCMP officer] was romanticizing in any way, shape or form" (when he told Bennett of the assassination threat). Bennett should know what he is talking about. After all, he was running the RCMP Security Service for years.

Daniel Graham, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for six years, has close ties to the Reagan administration (he served as defense policy advisor in the transition team), and is co-chair of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. Graham circulated this petition accompanied by a letter written in the style of a third grader, full of over-simplifications and wild distortions.

Dear Friend,

Please sign the Petition I've enclosed for you. ...

Your Petition is part of a new campaign

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 3

of The Hale Foundation to make sure America never has another disaster like our failed rescue of the hostages in Iran. ...

Believe me, I'm not exaggerating when I say that your survival, your children's survival and your grandchildren's survival may very well depend on the success of our campaign. ...

Frankly, America is facing the very real threat of another Pearl Harbor sneak attack. Only this time the attack will be with nuclear weapons.

Stop. Think what that means to you and each member of your family.

It would mean the end of America.

That's why I'm urgently asking you to help my campaign to stop the liberal attacks on our CIA...

You can help my campaign by signing the enclosed Petition in support of criminal penalties against anyone disclosing our secret agents identity. ... And my Petition calls for an American ability to launch secret missions. ...

Now let me tell you what we're up against.

You know, powerful anti-intelligence groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for Democratic Action won't like my Petition.

But, we've got to beat them. ...

...liberal Senators like Ted Kennedy want all of our national security secrets laid out in full view. They want America's secrets spread out before Congressional committees.

They don't seem worried about Communist spies roaming the halls of Congress. ...

And here's the worst.

The liberals in Congress want advance notice of any secret operation. ...

And you can do something else to help after you sign your Petition. You can send The Hale Foundation your contribution for \$15, \$25, \$50 or more. ...

Your check may make the one thing that stands between peace and a Russian nuclear attack. Please help.

Sincerely

/signed/

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham
U.S. Army, Retired

British Propaganda

During the last hungerstrike of Irish Republican prisoners at the end of 1981, an MI6 (British equivalent of the CIA) psychological operations group was set up to bolster Britain's image abroad, and to promote anti-Republican propaganda.

The Dublin Sunday Tribune recently revealed that the team was set up at the beginning of November 1980 by MI6 chief Arthur Franks, General Jim Glover, who is security and intelligence coordinator for Northern Ireland and Francis Brooks-Richards, former intelligence coordinator in Thatcher's cabinet.

The Foreign Office (FO) immediately assigned fifteen PSYOPS (Psychological Operations Group) specialists to the British Information Service in Washington to convince the Irish community in the U.S. that the prisons in Northern Ireland were among the best in Europe. Fifty thousand copies of a report entitled "H-Block: The Facts" were distributed to press media the world



over. Their version of the "facts" made H-Blocks sound like a holiday camp.

At the same time, MI6 agents were sent to British embassies in other countries to take charge of anti-Republican propaganda. There has been a particularly persistent campaign against Arthur McCaig's film "The Patriot Game," which has been shown in France and Belgium. Attempts to discredit it were mounted by the Overseas Information Department (OID) of the FO. Apparently the FO is at the moment making its own film about Northern Ireland for foreign consumption.

An OID officer was sent to Paris to try to damp down criticism of the British Government's attitude on the hunger strike. French trade unions and other political organizations condemned the British government's treatment of the prisoners, and even the leading daily Le Monde published detailed articles which infuriated the British ambassador in Paris.

Up to the end of 1980, the OID was run by a high-ranking MI6 officer, James Allen, who was part of the British delegation that arranged the truce with the IRA in 1975. At the beginning of this year, Allen became British High Commissioner in Mauritius where the British are playing an important role in secret operations against the Militant Mauritius Movement.

The OID was set up during the Cold War in 1947 with the aim of fighting communism by propaganda. It was known at the time as the Information Research Department (IRD). Eighty percent of its employees were working for MI6, and it has been subsidized by the CIA from the beginning. One of its chiefs, Sir John Rennie, became director of MI6 in 1969. In 1976 the Guardian revealed that, although it was officially a Foreign Office department, the OID was financed from a secret fund for MI6.

(Peoples News Service, Oxford House, Derbyshire St., Bethnal Green, London E2, England.)

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FBI Trains British Cops

The following British police officers been trained by the FBI at its National Academy in Quantico, Virginia:

David Joseph O'Dowd, superintendent, West-Midlands Police, Birmingham.

Charles R. Ormerod, assistant chief constable, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, Exeter.

Raymond White, superintendent, Hampshire Constabulary, Hampshire.

Richard Adams, chief inspector, Merseyside Police, Liverpool.

Henry Arthur Leslie, superintendent, Metropolitan Police Department, New Scotland Yard, London.

Michael D. Richards, detective chief superintendent, Metropolitan Police Department, London.

Ronald C. Steventon, deputy assistant commissioner, Criminal Investigations Department, New Scotland Yard, London.

Roy W. McClean, detective superintendent, Nottinghamshire Constabulary, Nottingham.

Terence Watson, chief superintendent, South Yorkshire Police, Sheffield.

Master Sergeant Frank M. Harrell of the U.S. Air Force Security Police who was/is stationed at the Royal Air Force base in Bentwaters, also took part in an FBI training course.

U.S.S. Nimitz

On May 26, 1981, during a midnight training exercise 60 miles off the coast of Jacksonville, Florida, a Marine EA-6B aircraft crash-landed on the deck of the super-carrier U.S.S. Nimitz. When the fire resulting from the crash was finally under control, 14 men lay dead and 48 had been injured in what is being called the "worst peacetime accident in naval history."

"This was not a peacetime accident," charged Gavrielle Gemma of the People's Anti-War Mobilization (PAM) in a press release issued in New York the day after the crash. "It took place during a highly provocative combat-type mission in which one of the most powerful warships ever constructed was headed into a politically

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 5

sensitive area where no country is threatening the security of the people of the United States." Gemma also raised the possibility of a much larger disaster that could have happened the night of the crash. "We have information," explained Gemma, "that besides its load of conventional weapons, the Nimitz may well have been carrying a complement of nuclear warheads. Depending on the location of these warheads, an accident of the type experienced by the Nimitz could well have led to a detonation of the conventional explosives carried in these bombs."

To answer the questions raised by the accident a national PAM representative spoke with several Nimitz crew personnel, including members of the fire-fighting Crash Crew, in Norfolk where the ship was docked for a two-day rest stop before resuming its Caribbean cruise. These interviews revealed the following:

1) There were nuclear weapons on board the carrier at the time of the crash. They were stored below deck, below the water line.

2) While the nuclear weapons themselves were apparently in no immediate danger, on deck were two missiles of the powerful Phoenix class which were in danger of exploding and had to be kept hosed down to protect them from the flames. According to Crash Crew member Andy Perkins, "If those Phoenixes would have gone up, most of the two or three hundred men fighting the fire would have been killed and we'd probably have lost the bow of the ship." A convulsion of that magnitude may have resulted in some damage to the metal casings of the nuclear weapons raising the danger of radiation leakage.

3) Although the Navy brass, including Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. had flatly denied any major problems in the fire-fighting system, Perkins and other crewmen charged half the deaths were directly related to serious malfunctions in that system. Those malfunctions included loss of pressure in the hand-held foam hoses, failure in sections of the deck foam sprinkling grid, and the mechanical failure of one of two P-16 fire-fighting vehicles. The second P-16 was buried under the fire.

In addition, the sailors reported that the deck crew had been working 16 hours a day while the pilots had been working 12 hour shifts prior to the crash. Initially,

6 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

top Navy officers admitted the possibility of pilot fatigue as a major factor in the crash, but now the cause of the accident is described solely as "pilot error."

In a press release on June 17, the Veterans and Active-Duty Focus of PAM charged that the Navy was trying to cover-up other factors in the accident by "blaming the victims [the pilots] for the crime." The defective ship safety system, the grossly overworked crew and the possibility of a much larger explosion due to the on-deck presence of the Phoenix missiles and the nuclear warheads carried below, were never publicly discussed, and public attention was deliberately diverted away from the politically-provocative nature of the Nimitz "training mission" in the Caribbean.

For more information, contact the Veterans and Active-Duty Focus of PAM, 234 7th Street, New York, NY 10010; tel. 212-741-0633.

- by Phil Wilayto -

Quiet Kill

On May 6, 1981 the Air Force Armaments Laboratory at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, sent out contract notices asking companies with experience in producing small arms and silencers for 9mm automatic pistols to contact the laboratory. Major John Toner, a spokesperson for the laboratory stated that the silencers are designed mainly for units specializing in "counterinsurgency and special operations." The Atlanta Constitution (5/20/81) interprets this as "another indication that U.S. covert military operations are back in favor."

B-52s in Australia

Amidst numerous counter-demonstrations, the Australian government of Malcolm Fraser decided to allow U.S. B-52's to use the Australian Air Force base at Darwin, and U.S. personnel will be stationed at the base. Fraser's foreign minister Tony Street and U.S. Secretary of State

Alexander Haig worked out an agreement that the B-52's will only be used for sea surveillance and training. However, the agreement also allows the B-52's to engage in "other categories of operations" with the specific approval of the Australian government.

The biggest issue in the B-52 debate is whether they will be armed with nuclear weapons, and the U.S.-Australian agreement does not rule out this possibility. Clause 7 of the agreement only assures the Australians that "arrangements shall be made for consultation that the Government of Australia has full and timely information about strategic and operational developments relevant to B-52 staging operations through Australia." But even that isn't assured given the history of U.S.-Australian relations. During the 1973 Middle East "crisis," several U.S. facilities in Australia were placed on "Red Alert" without the knowledge of the Australian government, let alone "consultations."



replanning / Ant-Air / UNS Graphics

Nothing to Say

On June 15, 1981, the following item appeared in the Washington Post buried on page A-25:

A senior Soviet official indicated the Kremlin is prepared to show "unilateral

restraint" in stationing nuclear missiles in Europe if the United States resumes negotiations on the weapons. Former U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, here [Moscow] for an international forum on disarmament, said the proposal appeared to indicate a shift in the conditions under which the Kremlin would negotiate on European missiles. Georgy Arbatov, a leading Communist Party member participating in the independent forum, suggested the Kremlin would not deploy additional medium-ranged nuclear missiles in Europe until 1983 if talks resumed. He also said at a news conference that the Soviet Union would not insist that the United States stop producing similar weapons on its own, for possible deployment later.

The Reagan administration apparently has not responded to this virtually unprecedented offer by the Soviet Union. Indeed, Eugene Rostow, Reagan's nominee to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 22 that it will take the U.S. government nine months to know "what we are trying to achieve." He continued, "as of this moment I don't know anybody in this government with whom I've talked, who knows what it is we want to negotiate about."

"Aid" to Africa

In spite of cuts in U.S. foreign aid programs, the Reagan administration is planning to institute military aid programs to a number of African countries for the first time in fiscal year 1982. It won't cost much, according to the State Department's Congressional Presentation, and the results should be "great."

The island nation of Cape Verde is supposed to get a "small grant" for an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program since it "has moved toward an increasingly non-aligned position in world affairs [after having been]... closely tied... to the 'progressive' wing of the Non-Aligned Movement."

An IMET program for the Congo, also a first, is "designed to further U.S. interests by reinforcing the Congolese Govern-

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 7

ment's non-aligned posture... The proposed training will expose Congolese officers to American institutions and ideals."

Equatorial Guinea's IMET grant "is designed to further U.S. interests by reinforcing the new... Government's pro-western stance... The investment climate is ripe for U.S. firms..."

The granting of an IMET program to Guinea Bissau is seen as an "opportunity to... strengthen Guinea Bissau's resistance to Soviet influence... The recent coup... which brought to power Joao Vieira... may increase the influence of the military in the Government, thus broadening our U.S. contacts with the military which could take on greater significance."

An IMET program to the government of the Seychelles "which styles itself as socialist... would... improve the atmosphere in which the [U.S. satellite] tracking station operates."

Other justifications for assistance programs to countries who have received U.S. military aid before, are equally revealing in their bluntness. Botswana, for example, is supposed to get \$10.6 million in military assistance (\$10 million of that comes from the Economic Support Fund) to "contribute to our encouragement of Botswana's moderate stance on southern Africa issues. Botswana will need a capability to control infiltration of armed guerrillas... as long as Namibia remains an active front of guerrilla warfare and various liberation groups seek to gain access to South Africa."

A main reason for security assistance to Malawi is "its consistent support for key U.S. foreign policy objectives... Particularly in southern Africa, Malawi shares with the U.S. a desire for... non-violent resolution of conflicts... The IMET program... provides a means of strengthening pro-American sentiment within the Malawi Army and officer corps... which could become a decisive force for stability in the future." The assistance program to Ghana has given "key members of the Ghanaian military... an understanding of and respect for American values and institutions. This reinforces their western orientation..."

FBI Cops in Puerto Rico

Given the fact that the FBI unleashed widespread COINTELPRO operations in Puerto Rico against countless citizens engaging in legitimate political activities, it is in the vital interest of all Puerto Ricans to know that this same FBI has trained the following Puerto Rican police officers at its National Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

Mato Rey: Braulio Donato Morales; Carlos Garcia Ortiz;

Munacao: Francisco Aoado Torres;

Mayaguez: Juan B. Gonzalez, Luis Arturo Rivera;

San Juan: Israel Alameda-Ballester, Celestino Alejandro Cruz, Rafael Alvarez Jimenez, Jose D. Burgos, Astol Calero Toledo, Luis D. Camacho Rusas, Jorge Camacho Torres, Cesiderio Cartagena Ortiz, Arnaldo Castro Marrero, Gilberto Claudio Vazquez, Jorge L. Collazo Torres, Emanuel Cortes Davila, Reyes David Cruz Gonzalez, Roberto Cruz Itizarry, William Davidson, Angel U. Davila, Ruben Diaz Rivera, Israel Freytes Alvarez, Alfredo Fuentes Sosa, Jesus M. Garcia Aviles, Manuel A. Garcia Graulau, Juan Gonzalez Delgado, Raul Gonzalez Fernandez, Francisco T. Gonzalez, Jose W. Hernandez Aquino, Jose E. Hernandez Rodriguez, Antonio Hernandez Navas, Jacinto Hidalgo, Rafael Irizarry Velez, Octavio Jimenez Rosa, Samuel Lopez Torres, Andres Logo Cay, Ernesto Lugo Mendez, Tomas Maldonado Cruz, Luis Maldonado Trinidad, Fernando Marrero Colon, Manuel de J. Marrero;

Jesus Martino Martinez, Salvador Mass, Miguel Matos Colon, Manuel Mauras Poventud, Jose Melendez Santiago, Ismael Mercado, Jose R. Morales Ortiz, Luis M. Murphy, Jose Nazario, Angel J. Negron, Marcial Osurio Rosario, Quirpa Perez Collazo, Luis M. Perez, Emilio Quinones Guardiola, Jose A. Rivera Hernandez, Luis Rivera Rodriguea, Juan E. Rivera Santiago, Miguel A. Riveria, Mario Robles Cruz, Hector Rodriguez Cruzado, Victor M. Rodriguez Sambolin, Salvador T. Roig, Valentin Roque Colon, Jorge Juan Ruttell Medina, Leanora Sanabria Cortes, William Santana Maiz, Benigno Soto Rodriguez, Armando Tapla Suarez, Nestor Torres Rodriguez, Luis R. Torres Santiago, Luis E. Torres Colon, Angel L. Torres Lopez, Antonio Vazquez Rodriguez, Jose A. Vazquez Sanchez, Felix Vega Valazquez, Luis Velez Feliciano, Julio Vigoreaux Garcia, Jose Ramon Zapata Rivera;

Santurce: Julio Bolivieri Munoz.

Guatemala

Business International (BI), a corporate mouthpiece and long-term cover for CIA officers (see New York Times, 2/27/77) recently indicated that U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) and banks are extremely unhappy with the progress of the Guatemalan revolution. According to BI's Business Latin America (4/22/81, p.126), "Guatemala's once-robust economy is reflecting the effects of domestic and regional troubles. Indicators point to depressed

growth, rising unemployment and a deteriorating balance-of-payments position." Worse yet in the eyes of BI: "No new investments of any significance have taken place in the past 12 months... Income from tourism totaled \$130 million in 1979 but fell to half that last year." (1980) Occupancy in hotels (largely U.S.-owned) was "only at 55% capacity in 1980, compared with 85% in 1979, and so far in 1981 is off about 45%."

Aggravating U.S. business even more is that Guatemala's investment difficulties peaked just when Texaco and Amoco discovered oil in northeastern Guatemala in the same geological formation as Mexico's Reforma fields in Campeche; and not only have investment difficulties peaked but also, according to BI, there are "no prospects for a significant improvement..." The reason for the declining investment and profiteering in Guatemala is "the poor political climate" and the "political violence" which "continues at a frightening level" - business code words for the Guatemalan people's struggle against the military dictatorship of General Lucas.

The Reagan administration is naturally concerned with business losing trust in the Guatemalan regime's ability to cope with a successful guerrilla struggle. In May 1981, Gen. Vernon Walters (ret.) went to Guatemala as the personal representative of Alexander Haig, and on June 5, 1981 the administration quietly approved a \$3.2 million sale of 50 2½ ton military trucks and 100 jeeps to the Guatemalan military. In order to make the sale legal vis-a-vis laws restricting the sale of such equipment to governments that are gross violators of human rights, the State Department simply re-classified the vehicles and put them on a list of equipment to be used for "control of regional security." State Department officials said this re-classification was made not to circumvent the human rights issue, but "to stimulate export sales of American-made vehicles."

The administration is also considering selling \$2.5 million worth of spare parts for Guatemala's UH-1H Huey helicopters; and Guatemala is a likely recipient of money from Reagan's multi-million dollar contingency economic support fund which he can use at his own discretion.

Moonies: CARP by Elizabeth Zanger

On Sunday, May 3, 1981 tens of thousands marched on the Pentagon against U.S. military aid to El Salvador. Many demonstrators were confronted for the first time by an organization supporting military aid to El Salvador's ruling junta. The counter-demonstrators were members of CARP (Collegiate Association for the Research of Principles, Inc.) which identifies itself as "the campus arm of the Unification movement founded by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon."¹ CARP claims to have members on forty-five campuses - mostly large public universities across the United States. Its paper, World Student Times, acknowledges Sun Myung Moon as "the inspiration of CARP."²

Most CARP members would deny that it is a front or recruiting arm for Moon's Unification Church. But the dividing line between the Church and CARP is very thin: A 1978 Congressional report concluded that the many "religious and secular organizations headed by Sun Myung Moon constitute essentially one international organization."³ That report was a response to the "Koreagate" scandal in which agents of the South Korean government (including agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) were caught trying to buy influence in order to bend U.S. government policy to their own interests. The Moon organization was a part of the Korean government's effort. The Congressional study also found Moon to be a major weapons manufacturer and dealer: "A Moon Organization business is an important defense contractor in Korea. It is involved in the production of M-16 rifles, anti-aircraft guns, and other weapons."⁴

Unlike genuine religious groups, the Moon organization engages in deceptive, illegal tactics, and although "many of the goals and activities of the Moon Organization were legitimate and lawful, there was evidence that it had systematically violated U.S. tax, immigration, banking, currency, and Foreign Agents Registration Act laws, as well as State and local laws... and that these violations were related to the organization's overall goals of gaining temporal power..."⁵ Minnesota Con-

(Elizabeth Zanger is the pseudonym of a New England political activist.)

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 9

gressman Donald Fraser's House subcommittee produced that 1978 report ("Investigation of Korean-American Relations") and in apparent retaliation, the Moon organization spent millions of dollars to defeat Fraser's re-election bid in 1978. A young man named Michael Smith, then part of a Moon front called the Freedom Leadership Foundation, went to Minnesota to organize other Moonies to help Fraser's opponents.⁶

Michael Smith is now head of national CARP, headquartered at Moon's Unification Church Building in New York City. On April 14, 1981 national CARP claimed that students "on more than 100 campuses recently joined together to form the CARP Committee to Save El Salvador - a national campus group which supports U.S. aid to the moderate centrist government of that embattled nation."⁷ Michael Smith was named chairperson of the CARP Committee to Save El Salvador.

The CARP line closely follows the official position of the U.S. State Department and the Reagan administration. According to the April 14 press release, "Michael Smith, the chairman of the CARP committee, emphasized that the group condemns extremism of both the left and the right in El Salvador and elsewhere. Smith explained that, 'Until now only the left has had a voice on the campuses on this issue. It is time someone spoke up for the real interests of the Salvadoran people' which he said are best represented by the reformist government of President Jose Napoleon Duarte."⁸

This spring CARP launched a leaflet distribution campaign on many campuses. Their titles read, "The Castro Connection: U.S.S.R. and Cuba out of El Salvador," and "Duarte: man of the people." The latter portrayed Duarte as a moderate Christian Democrat who is "sincerely and successfully implementing policies of both rural and urban economic reform, including land reform..." According to the leaflet, it is Duarte's very success in implementing reforms which "has spurred terrorist activity from guerrillas of both reactionary and Marxist persuasions, anxious to see these [reform] policies fail."

The front page of the weekly CARP newspaper World Student Times on April 10, 1981 pictures a besieged Duarte wearing a button with the single word "Reform." On the right side of the cartoon a cigar-smoking general keeps company with an

armed guerrilla labelled "extreme right." On the left side of the drawing is someone resembling Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev with an armed guerrilla bearing the hammer and sickle insignia. The caption reads "Caught in the Middle! Duarte needs our support."⁹

CARP claims that the United States itself is the "final target" for leftist terrorism in this hemisphere. It also insists that "Salvador is not 'another Vietnam'" as an article in the April 3, 1981 issue of World Student Times proclaimed: "El Salvador is, in fact, 'in our own backyard.' Texas and California are closer to El Salvador than to New York... It would be foolish indeed for the United States to let 'another Vietnam' happen so close to its own borders."¹⁰

There are many unanswered questions about CARP.¹¹ Where does its money come from? What role does it play in the international strategy of Moon's Unification Church? And, given CARP's echoing of the State Department line on El Salvador - are there any tangible links between CARP and the Reagan administration?

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Press release of April 14, 1981; issued by CARP National Headquarters, 4 West 43rd Street, New York, NY 10036; phone 212-354-6531.
- 2) World Student Times (WST), 4/10/81, p.12.
- 3) Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 10/31/78, p.387.
- 4) *ibid.*, pp.387,388.
- 5) *ibid.*, p.388.
- 6) Robert Boettcher with Gordon L. Freedman, Gifts of Deceit: Sun Myung Moon, Tongsun Park and the Korean Scandal, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1980, pp.323,324.
- 7) *cf supra*, #1.
- 8) *ibid.*
- 9) WST, 4/10/81, p.1.
- 10) WST, 4/3/81, p.3.
- 11) There are at least two non-profit organizations that actively oppose Moon. One, Ex-Moon, Inc. is headed by a former member of CARP. It publishes a monthly newsletter (1712 Eye St. NW, Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20006). The other is the American Family Foundation. It publishes a bi-monthly newspaper called The Advisor and can provide transcripts of public hearings, reports and court cases concerning the Moon organization and other cults (P.O. Box 343, Lexington, MA 02173).

El Salvador White Paper (Cont.)



On June 8, 1981, three and a half months after the State Department released its infamous "White Paper" entitled "Communist Interference in El Salvador," and long after a number of progressive journalists and publications (including CounterSpy in our last issue) had published detailed articles questioning the validity of the paper, the Wall Street Journal finally published its analysis. One day later, the Washington Post, originally one of the chief promoters of the White Paper, followed suit. Both articles are devastating for the State Department. The Wall Street Journal article is based largely on an interview with State Department officer Jon D. Glassman who allegedly did most of the work on the paper. In the interview, Glassman himself describes part of the document as possibly "misleading" and "overembellished." He acknowledges mistakes and "guessing" by intelligence analysts who translated and explained the "guerrilla" documents.

Glassman admits that he does not know who actually wrote some of the documents including one which the State Department attributed to Shafik Handal, the head of the Salvadoran Communist Party. Glassman also concedes that the actual figures for "Communist arms shipments" to the guerrillas were not based on the documents but extrapolated.

Glassman told the Journal that he wanted to be absolutely sure that the captured

documents were genuine, since they could have been fabricated by the Salvadoran military or the CIA. Says Glassman: "I submitted all of the documents to them [the CIA] and I asked, 'Did you fabricate any of these documents, or is there any indication they were fabricated by anyone else?'" The answer was no to both, and Glassman was satisfied.

On June 17, in a very unusual move, the State Department published a response to the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post articles. It acknowledges that the original document contained a "few points of misstated detail or ambiguous formulations," but nevertheless maintains that "the analysis and conclusions of the Special Report are soundly based and fully valid."

The State Department's reply, by any standard, is unsatisfactory. It does not answer a number of questions raised in the Post and Journal articles, and does not even address criticisms of the White Paper raised by other magazines and newspapers. Some explanations offered to counter the Post and the Journal articles are as weak as the White Paper itself. For example: in replying to the Wall Street Journal statement, "Much information in the white paper (Special Report) can't be found in the documents at all. This information now is attributed by the State Department to other, still-secret sources," the State Department comments: "The Special Report is

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 11

not based on captured documents alone, and was never claimed to be. The captured documents go far toward confirming the Report's conclusions. But the Special Report also contains photographs of weapons captured from the guerrillas, and specifically points out that it is based on information going beyond the documents." First of all, this reply misses the point that back in February the "captured guerrilla documents" alone were offered as proof for Communist subversion in El Salvador. Second, to refer to the photographs of captured arms contained in the White Paper is problematic, to say the least, since these very photographs are of highly questionable validity. (For details, see CounterSpy, vol.5 no.3, p.6.)

In another rebuttal, the State Department attempts to disprove a Washington Post finding that only one document in the White Paper (the one allegedly written by Handal) "linked the Soviets directly to the Salvadoran civil war." Counters the State Department: "This is simply not true. In addition to the document referred to, published Document B refers to a guerrilla meeting with Soviets in Mexico City in April 1980..." Document B, fully reproduced in the last issue of CounterSpy, has its faults, however. Even the Salvadoran Deputy Foreign Minister Alejandro Gomez doubts its "truthfulness."

All in all, the State Department's replies are weak. In many cases, the validity of a document in question is asserted by quoting another - equally questionable - document. In other cases, statements under question are simply "proven" by the assurance that there is other secret "intelligence information" for a given argument.


All of that doesn't seem to bother the Post. A June 23, 1981 editorial concedes that the White Paper's evidence of communist support for the guerrillas "that was proclaimed to be 'definite' in February turns out... to be arguable and, in some cases, plain wrong." The Post continues: "We had found the documentation substantial in the first go-around. Upon reflection, we're not surprised to see questions being raised 100 days later." Wrong. Questions were raised immediately after the White Paper came out, but since these questions came from the left, the Post didn't listen. Obviously, the Post and other papers, most notably the New York

12 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

Times, were taken for a ride by the State Department. Or maybe they wanted to be taken for a ride but were forced to re-examine after progressive journalists had taken apart the White Paper lie.

The Washington Post continues to propagandize for the Reagan administration's military policy in El Salvador. The Post doesn't see "deception" in the original publication of the White Paper - but "simply error, and not necessarily grievous error." The Post suggests that the "errors" of the White Paper have not undermined the official policy on El Salvador; on the contrary, the Post unquestioningly accepts the State Department's response to its own and the Journal's articles as containing "some interesting and vigorous rejoinders."

For the State Department, the February 23 White Paper isn't enough. As we go to press, another one is reportedly in the works - on relief funds being raised in the U.S. which are allegedly being diverted "to the Communist war effort in El Salvador." This paper will be based on the same documents allegedly captured in El Salvador, as well as on others that were not used the first time around. The Post will love it.



Honduras: Staging Area for Counter-Revolution by Robert Holden

The U.S. secretary of state, enraged by the establishment of a progressive government in a Central American country long regarded as a U.S. fiefdom, blames "international communism" and the "evil purpose of the Kremlin" for its presence. The CIA helps organize a band of counter-revolutionary exiles operating from a base in neighboring Honduras. With arms supplied by the United States, they topple the progressive government and a rightwing colonel takes over.

The secretary of state was John Foster Dulles, not Alexander Haig, and the source of his anger in 1954 was the reformist government of Guatemala headed by Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Seventeen years later, the U.S. government again claims to perceive the tentacles of international communism, manipulated from Moscow, penetrating Central America, this time in Nicaragua and El Salvador. And once again, the United States seems to be relying on strategically located Honduras to serve its interests--the defeat of the struggle in El Salvador, early termination of the resistance in Guatemala and Honduras itself, and possibly an invasion of liberated Nicaragua by Somocistas exiled in Honduras.

In fiscal year 1982, the Reagan administration proposes giving the Honduran government \$10 million in loans and credits to buy U.S. military equipment--about as much as the United States sold or gave to Honduras during the entire decade of the 1970s. The principal effect of this sudden surge of aid will be to further bolster the presidency of General Policarpo Paz Garcia, whose palsied grip on the reins of state must be giving the State Department the jitters. "The government is blind, lame and halt," an individual described as a "foreign diplomat" told a New York Times reporter in Honduras last year. "It is no secret that the president has a slight drinking problem and rarely appears in public. Half the ministers do not talk to the other half. Senior army officers are making as much money as possible while they can. It is a disaster."¹ Graft and corruption are widely and openly prac-

ticed.² The election last year of an assembly to write a new constitution and organize a presidential election was a largely irrelevant exercise; the assembly promptly named Paz Garcia the provisional president. The assembly is said to be planning elections this year.

Having been a guest in Jimmy Carter's White House in February 1980, Paz Garcia has become one of Washington's favored procurers in Central America, in spite of the threat that his own people pose to his continued rule. Two months after his White House visit, a worried U.S. official acknowledged that "trouble could be just around the corner" for the general.³ Paz Garcia presides over a country that is the second poorest in the western hemisphere (after Haiti) and where more than half the people are illiterate. Unlike El Salvador, where U.S. economic investment is minimal, the Honduran economy is dominated by two U.S. banana growers and exporters: United Brands and Castle & Cooke, which also happen to be the biggest landowners in Honduras. Although it is among the most thinly populated of the Central American countries, it is the second largest in area (after Nicaragua) and uniquely situated: it borders Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.

Honduran armed forces have already assisted the Salvadoran army in anti-guerrilla offensives.⁴ Exiled Somocista National Guardsmen and other Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries are active in Honduras and have repeatedly raided the newly liberated territory of Nicaragua from sanctuaries in Honduras, reportedly with the assistance of Honduran troops who are now being so generously armed by the United States.⁵ The regime has approved new laws that allow foreigners (mercenaries?) to join the army, and authorize the army to undertake missions outside the country.⁶

Clearly, this is a country ripe for imperialist protection. The \$10 million in foreign military sales credits and loan guarantees requested by Reagan--and already approved by the House Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee--is twice the amount granted Honduras for fiscal year 1981. The money will buy unspecified engineering

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 13

(Robert Holden is a Cleveland-based journalist.)

equipment, A-37B and T-37B aircraft, a 107-ft. patrol boat, an unstated number of 105 mm howitzers, plus unspecified "support equipment and vehicles;" it may also finance the leasing of U.S. helicopters. A further request proposes \$700,000 in grant aid for military education and training of 288 Honduran military personnel, a 60 percent increase over 1980 and 1981. In addition, the Reagan administration expects to approve the export of \$2 million worth of military equipment to be purchased directly by the Honduran government from U.S. weapons makers--the same amount licensed for export in 1981, but three times the value of 1980 exports. So-called "economic assistance" (mostly Agency for International Development aid) has been set at \$39 million for 1982, a \$6 million increase over this year's allocation.⁷

Analysis of State Department-supplied figures of U.S. security assistance indi-

cate that as the national liberation struggle in Central America gathered strength in the late 1970s, Honduras led all six Central American republics in U.S. government-financed arms sales and in U.S. military training aid. From fiscal year 1978 to 1980 inclusive, Honduras received \$5.9 million worth of foreign military sales (FMS) credits and loans--40 percent of all FMS credits and loans granted it in the previous 30 years. This form of assistance took a huge leap in 1980 with the provision of \$5 million in FMS financing following six years in which such aid averaged just \$550,000 a year.

In the same period (1978-1980), the United States spent \$1.4 million to train 613 Honduran military personnel--nearly one-fifth of all the Hondurans trained in the previous 30 years. In the purchase of U.S. arms directly from commercial suppliers, Honduras ranked second in this pe-

CIA Cops in Honduras

The Honduran police and intelligence officers listed below have attended CIA-connected training programs in the U.S. which were conducted under the Office of Public Safety program. OPS programs focused on the creation of nationally coordinated police forces which would be able to deal with "problems" more effectively than scattered local police forces. Officers were trained in various skills, including intelligence gathering, riot control, handling of explosives, infiltration, etc. Another key element in these programs was training in psychological warfare. There are strong indications that the Honduran police and intelligence surveillance system might be the most "advanced" in Central America. In addition, the OPS served as an excellent field for CIA recruitment and for extending the CIA infrastructure in any given country.

Hector Aparicio Nunez; Juan Angel Barahona Galindo (in the U.S. from 2/72-6/72); Daniel Benitez Portillo (11/73-3/74); Jose Maria Betancourt Zelaya (10/69-2/70); Jose Maria Bonilla Bonilla (8-12/72); Federico Bonilla Garcia (1-5/71); Ramon Bueso Torres (8-12/67); Angel Arnoldo Cabrera Padilla (5-8/73); Alejandro Cacho Martinez (4-7/63); Rigoberto Cardenas Midence (6-9/72).

Agustin Cardona Macias (8-12/73); Abelardo Carias Hernandez (1-4/71); Guillermo Castellanos Irias (6-10/70); Fidel Cerrato Flores (1-4/63); Julio Cesar Chavez Aguilar (6-10/69 and 8-10/71); Luis Chirinos Antunez (1-4/63); Aben Carlos Mendez (2-6/73); Mario Coello Amador (6-10/69); Carlos Humberto Coello Hernandez (8-12/73).

Jose Eduardo Coello Hernandez (8-12/71); Gunther Debbe

Planas (11-12/62); Carlos Humberto del Cid Carranza (5-9/74); Rodolfo del Cid Ramos (8-12/71); Tulio Eraso Baradales (12/68-4/69); Raul Alejandro Espinal Flores (4-8/72); Felipe Fuentes Alvarado (9-12/74); Freddy Funen Ucles (5-9/74); Julio Cesar Funes Alvarez (1-5/73); Oscar Enrique Galeano (8-12/67).

Celeo Gomez Gonzales (3-7/68); Antonio Gutierrez (4-7/63); Alexander Hernandez Santos (8-12/69); Julio Alberteo Hernandez Young (1-5/70); Miguel Angel Irias Flores (10/71-2/72); Valentin Incoa Chavez (2-6/74); Plutarco Lagos Sandoval (1-5/71); Oscar Abraham Lanza Rosales (3-6/71); Francisco Santiago Lopez Gutierrez (5-9/71); Alvido Lopez Mass (8-12/71).

Julio Cesar Lopez (8-12/68); Juan Agustin Lopez Marroquin (1-5/72); Alfonso Luque Jimenez (3-7/71); Marco Antonio Matute Lagos (8-12/69); Moises Mazariegos Pineda; Felipe Mejia Cruz (8-10/71); Oscar Armando Mejia Peralta (5-9/67); Gonzalo Manjivar Alvarenga (3-7/68); Luis Alonso Moran Morel (2-6/74); Cesar Oliva Barrientos (5-8/69).

Marco Enrique Ortiz Gallo (8-10/70); Ven Ortiz Alvarado (1-5/70); Carlos Arturo Paiz Fernandez (8-10/70 and 2-6/73); Rene Adalberto Paz Alaaro (10/69-3/70); Policarpo Paz Garcia; Moises Portillo Bulnes (8-12/69); Isidre Prince Ramfrez (12/70-4/71); Oscar Ramirez Funes (12/70-4/71); Jose Conca Ramirez Walcher (11/73-3/74).

Mario Hernan Ramirez y Ramirez (1-4/63); Julio Joaquin Raudales Soto (1-5/72); Danilo Riera Cabus (10/71-2/72); Marco Antonio Rivera Perdomo (12/67-3/68); Manuel Osmundo Rodriguez Romero (10/69-2/70); Hugo Francisco Rodriguez Trochez (8-12/72); Pavon Francisco Rodriguez (3-7/71); Teofilo Heriberto Ruiz Salinas (6-10/70); Carlos Rene Sagastume Gomez (6-10/70).

Juan Blas Salazar Meza (11/72-3/73); Wilfredo Sanchez Valladares (7-11/67); Juan Segovia Bucardo (4-8/69); Juan Rafael Sibaja Lopez (2-6/74); Cristobal Simon Romero (10/69-2/70); Waldo Claofes Soriano Ortiz (5-9/71); Juan Rafael Soto Salgado (1-5/72); Guillermo Soza Perez (1-5/69); Roman Tabora Borgran (4-8/69).

Guillermo Thumann Cordon (4-8/67); Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa (12/70-4/71); Manuel Antonio Urbina Perez (1-5/73); Roger Vallecillo Arguello (8-12/72); Arturo Velasquez Cordova (8-12/68); Rolando Ventura Gonzalez (2-6/74); Jorge Alberto Villalobos Matamoros (4-8/72); Jose Heliodoro Zamora Bados (5-9/71); Mario Ramon Zapata Santos (10/68-3/69); Jose Lempira Zuniga Fiallos (9-12/74).

riod only to Panama (again, among the Central American republics), buying \$3.6 million worth of equipment--more than three-fourth of its total commercial sales purchases since 1950.

The Reagan administration's justification for the massive increase in 1982 military aid (as provided to Congress with its request for funding authority) is worth quoting at length:

"U.S. security assistance is an important means to promote the good relations we enjoy with Honduras. The program is designed to foster contact with the armed forces which have historically been friendly to the U.S. and have also played a significant role in the country's economic, social, and political development. A return to constitutional rule through an electoral process is underway. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in April 1980, and general elections are expected to be held in 1981. This process is expected to further peaceful, orderly development, in which the Honduran military will continue to have an important role.

"The security assistance program provides a medium of access through professional contacts and service-to-service communication which allows the pursuit of common interests with the Honduran military establishment. It also enhances stability in the increasingly volatile and uncertain Central American region through improvement of the Honduran armed forces' ability to perform their legitimate defense role. In addition to improved Honduran military professionalism, the program demonstrates the U.S. interest in Honduras' progress, and contributes to its self-confidence to respond to potential challenges."

The "potential challenges," of course, refer to what Secretary of State Haig has identified as the four-phase strategy for the conquest of Central America by international communism. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 18, Haig revealed his fantastic belief in what he called a "hit list... for the ultimate takeover of Central America."

The U.S. response is to shower the areas's remaining dictatorships with weapons; Haig's undersecretary, James L. Buckley, has promised to increase the flow of U.S. arms to any point on the globe threatened by "Soviet aggrandizement."⁸ This policy recently received the imprimatur of the

bi-partisan Council on Foreign Relations, which recommended an "improved capacity" for covert action, and for military aid and training for friendly regimes to preserve their internal security.⁹ It is a policy enunciated quite clearly with reference to Central America by Harold Brown, Jimmy Carter's defense secretary, in his final report to Congress. Brown warned that the "modest" levels of military aid to Latin America would have to rise, particularly in Central America and in the Caribbean "in response to growing pressures and tensions. The era of minimal-cost security on the southern flank of the United States is over."¹⁰

Once again, as in the Dulles years, the U.S. government resorts to the despicable lies of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism to justify massive intervention on behalf of pimps like Paz García. Dulles' shrill anti-communism is now being duplicated by Reagan and Haig in outbursts as ridiculously comical as they are frighteningly dangerous. The news media avidly promote this drivel--the editor in chief of Time, Inc., Henry A. Grunwald, is the chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations panel that produced the above-cited recommendations. Congress, either believing it or afraid to challenge it, gamely succumbs.

After using Honduras to overthrow the government of Guatemala in 1954, Dulles announced that "the United States will continue to support the just aspirations of the Guatemalan people." The fruit of that support--a dictatorship that has been slaughtering its own people for more than a decade--suggests the kind of stability that Washington would like to restore in El Salvador, with a little help from its old friends in Honduras.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) New York Times (NYT), 12/23/80, p.2.
- 2) ibid.
- 3) NYT, 4/20/80, p.12.
- 4) The Nation, 3/14/81, p.294. Also see NACLA Report on the Americas, July-August 1980, p.28.
- 5) The Nation, 3/14/81, p.294.
- 6) Granma Resumen Semanal, 4/26/81, p.15.
- 7) All figures are from the documents supplied to Congress by the Reagan administration in support of its requests for security assistance funding for fiscal year 1982.
- 8) NYT, 5/22/81, p.5.
- 9) NYT, 5/14/81.
- 10) Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request and the FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs, January 19, 1981, p.228.

First MNC Intelligence Convention

by C. L. Villas and John Kelly

"The once favored strategems to shape or even topple a foreign regime -- in the brash tradition of United Fruit in Central America -- are no longer acceptable corporate practices... As one executive remarks, "The time has passed when we could buy or rent governments."

Fortune, March 24, 1980

Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have been very fond of those "brash traditions" - traditions which established the "second frontier... of foreign trade and foreign investments"¹ which *Fortune* magazine had called for even before the end of World War II. In the fifties, the CIA proceeded to make the world safe for the MNC's from Guatemala to Iran, and the State Department worked hand-in-glove with the oil companies to establish the "lifeline" of the "West" in the Persian-Arabian Gulf. In those days, corporate executives agreed with poet Robert Browning who wrote of Victorian rule that "God's in his heaven - all's right with the world." But now the executive's requiem - "The time has passed..." - is apt.

In the last fifteen years, the oppressed of the world have been somewhat more successful in their struggles on the second frontier than the American Indians and Mexicans had been on the first. From Vietnam to OPEC to Iran the world seems a grimmer place to the corporate eye. And the same "firm political principles"² of expansion which *Fortune* had recommended gave rise to West Germany and Japan and an intensified competition for markets and profits in every area from infant formula to armaments.

In this world the CIA, the military, and the State Department can no longer wheel-and-deal as effectively as before (though the Reagan administration is trying to restore them to their former glory). MNC ex-

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16 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

ecutives have therefore a need for complementing CIA support by fending for themselves on the established but increasingly wobbly frontier. To help them do that *Fortune* recently advised them to "get smarter about political risks;"³ and the Wharton School of Business (University of Pennsylvania) organized (for a \$700 fee) the "First International Political Risk Management Seminar." This was held May 6 and 7, 1981 at the Hyatt Regency in Washington, D.C. About a hundred corporate executives and their academics assembled to discuss (in the privacy of that hotel) how to deal with governments which are prone to all manner of "interference" with multinational business from the "crude exercise of sovereignty" to regulations about exchange rates.

The purpose of "managing political risk" is the same as ever - to control the labor, land and resources of the Third World so as to enable expansion and profit. But this must now be done in a world which, as William L. Barkas,⁴ senior economic analyst for Shell Oil and a former director of government operations and expenditures with the National Association of Manufacturers, sees it, has changed:

In addition to increased economic strength, these countries [OPEC] were also given a perception of growing political power vis-a-vis other states and multinational corporations. Foreign business, specifically American, now faces a different and more hostile climate... In short, the "political" risk comes not only from OPEC countries, but increasingly from Third World countries encouraged by the success of these stronger oil producing states.

In this new "hostile climate" in which MNCs can no longer "buy or rent" governments, conference speakers advised the obvious: gaining maximum control of the host government is easiest before the investment has been made. At this stage, the corporation should also get insurance such as that offered by the U.S. government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC, Gerald West of OPIC was a conference seminar leader). Once the investment is made, the government can confront the corporation with many kinds of risks. In-

deed, according to Professor Franklin Root,⁵ of the Wharton School: "When a company enters a foreign host country it becomes exposed to a wide variety of political risks stemming from general instability and from actions by the host government that change the 'rules of the game.'"

Therefore, he advises the MNCs: "Corporate and country managers need to design and carry out strategies and policies in each host country that will sustain the political viability of their foreign ventures at acceptable levels of profitability."

Root delineated specific ways to manage "post-entry political risks." Besides the well known devices such as increasing local liabilities and decreasing local credits, siphoning off capital, etc. in times of uncertainty, he urged the executives to make their companies "indispensable" to the government and to remain so. This indispensability allows a corporation to maintain its "bargaining leverage" on the host government through its "capacity to impose net social costs on the host country in the event of adverse government actions to the venture." In plain English, the corporation should try to hold the government and the country hostage to its "bottom line." Besides offering "net social benefits as seen by the host government" (always easier with pliant governments such as those of Ferdinand Marcos and Mobutu Sese Seko) corporations were advised to maintain and create indispensability by doing one or more of the following:

- 1) Continue to create net social benefits as seen by host government.
- 2) Keep local venture dependent on inflows from parent company: Technology, technical/management skills, corporate staff support, capital equipment, materials, components, and other production inputs.
- 3) Keep control over local venture's access to world markets.
- 4) Establish multiple national production/sourcing points.
- 5) Develop transnational alliances: consortia, banks, customers under long-term supply, contractors, international institutions.
- 6) Develop local allies: suppliers, customers, labor unions, distributors, banks, joint venture partners, etc.
- 7) Divest local production assets while continuing control over technology and

marketing.

8) Lobby the local government through local business organizations, the foreign investment community, and your own government contacts.

9) Undertake public relations efforts that emphasize social contribution of local venture and identify it with national objectives and aspirations.

Professor Root, who worked in Chile in 1970, and has been on the faculty of the Naval War College, cited the example of the Kennecott Copper Company in maintaining "bargaining leverage" over the Allende government as a successful application of the strategy of indispensability.

"Exxon goes a step further than most corporations by integrating its political assessment into financial plans. In considering a possible \$1.2 billion expansion of its copper-mining project in Chile, for instance, Exxon is comparing its vast intelligence with views from a panel of outside experts on the country."

Fortune, 3/24/80

Root also pointed out that among the most important national aspirations in Third World countries is the achievement and maintenance of independence. Most Third World governments have this aim in some degree. Therefore, while the purpose of the corporation should be to make the country and the government as dependent as possible, the public relations posture should be just the opposite -- that the company is promoting national aspirations. "Such a strategy, therefore," Root goes on, "must be flexible and diplomatic in sustaining bargaining leverage." He warns the unsophisticated that "a clumsy strategy can provoke a government to take punitive action" precisely because it would be publicly evident that the aims of the corporation are diametrically opposed to those of the country in the matter of national independence. Sophistication in political risk analysis requires that frontiersmen be well informed. For this they must learn to ask the correct questions of the correct people.

"The future is to an extent knowable, so you don't have to be fatalistic."
Gerald T. West (OPIC)

William Barkas informed the executives that Shell looks at the following "vari-

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 17

ables" to do its pseudo-scientific crystal ball gazing: ideological shift to the left; anti-business climate; population growth decline; emphasis on agricultural production; widespread social disorder; violent government overthrow; private sector nationalization; rapid modernization; widespread unemployment; strategic resource discovery; large rise in food costs; land reform institution; military-civilian antagonism; and significant ethnic groups.

Speaking for bankers, Lawrence W. Brainard⁶ explained how Bankers Trust Co., of which he is Vice President, understands and manages political risk so as to have the fattest possible "bottom-line." His bank does "political risk analysis" for each of 100 countries at least once in two years and often three or four times a year for countries such as Brazil, which are heavily in debt. Bank executives ask questions such as: "Is the president of the country a patriot or is he out merely to line his own pockets?"; "Does he understand economics?"; does the country have an institutional system "in which technocrats come to the top?"; "Where were they trained?"; what is the character of the opposition groups?; and how is the "political system itself" evolving?

Brainard used South Korea as case study of political risk assessment by the banks. The main concern, he said, was the question of leadership. With President Park, the banks had been happy since he "was a patriot, he was honest, and he was a skilled politician." Following his assassination, the bank felt that "a leadership void was created," so risk analysts rushed to South Korea and "looked specifically at General Chun."

Around the same time, the World Bank's risk analysts went to look at Chun. They conceded that he was "appointed as President by a handpicked Electoral College,"⁷ and predicted the continuing of "the persecution of politicians, journalists, students, and others who are opposed to military rule."⁸ As the Bank analyzed the situation: "General Chon (sic) is a disciple of the late President Park and his recent actions suggest that he will be as authoritarian as his predecessor, adopting practices even more repressive than the ones sanctioned by the Yushin Constitution. In common with military rulers elsewhere, General Chon believes that concil-

iatory gestures are a sign of weakness, which the opposition is bound to exploit and so he has made none; instead, some 16,000 individuals including a large number of political activists have been arrested on various charges. Newspaper offices have been raided and 172 magazines have had their licenses revoked."⁹

Bankers Trust and the other commercial banks apparently agreed with the World Bank's risk analysis: "In the near future, at least, General Chon is unlikely to encounter organized political opposition and is well placed to press ahead with any policies, he and the coterie of generals around him, see fit to introduce."¹⁰

While Brainard did not mention his conclusions about Chun at the conference, his bank was obviously pleased with Chun. In December 1980, Bankers Trust's Hong Kong arm, BT Asia Ltd., led a syndicate of 60 banks which lent \$600 million to the Korea Development Bank. That loan was hailed by the Chun government as an international endorsement of his government.¹¹

Crucial to political risk analysis is so-called "intelligence." All this "managing" and crystal ball gazing requires that corporations collect reliable and diverse information. That means that corporations must now do themselves what the CIA does. It is not surprising, then, to find that they have developed internal structures and methods similar to those of that venerable agency of the second frontier, the CIA. Indeed, some corporations have, says Fortune in a burst of frankness, "set up private intelligence systems."¹² This explains why many political risk analysts/managers come from the CIA and the State Department. Heading the list of government officials-become-political risk analysts is Henry Kissinger who, as recently revealed, opened the mail of some of his foreign students which he passed on to the FBI.¹³ He then volunteered to serve as a secret FBI informant.¹⁴ Besides his advice to the Chase Manhattan Bank, where he sits on the risk committee for foreign loans, this stalwart of the destruction of Chile and Cambodia, also advises Merck as well as Goldman, Sachs.¹⁵

William Colby (former director of the CIA and head of the Operation Phoenix in Vietnam in which, according to Colby, 20,487 Vietnamese were killed in a three-and a half year period¹⁶) advises and does "intelligence gathering" for Japanese

The Reagan administration's complete disregard for human rights violations as a factor in granting loans is evidenced by the following letter. It was issued after the State Department's annual human rights report listed the South Korean government among the major human rights violators and said that "the observance of civil and political rights in 1980 was marked by deterioration."

Department of the Treasury
Washington, D.C. 20220

April 17, 1981

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with the provisions of Title V (Human Rights Reporting) of Public Law 96-259 enacted on June 3, 1980, I would like to inform you of a prospective change in our voting policy on multilateral development bank (MDB) loans to the Republic of Korea. The United States has been opposing by abstention non-basic human needs MDB loans to Korea on the basis of human rights considerations.

A \$30 million "Agriculture Credit" loan to Korea is now scheduled for consideration by the IBRD Board of Executive Directors on April 21. ... There is an interagency consensus that the loan does not meet basic human needs.

The Department of State has reviewed

the current human rights situation in Korea and has determined that the human rights legislation enacted in 1977 (P.L. 95-118) does not require U.S. opposition to MDB loans to that country. Since there are no other reasons to oppose the loan, it is the Treasury Department's intention to instruct our representative at the World Bank to support the loan when it is considered by the Board. ...

The Administration will soon begin an inter-agency study of the subject of U.S. human rights policies as they are applied to the MDBs. We will consult with you on the results of this study, and will be glad to provide you with any additional information you may require on the upcoming loan to Korea.

Sincerely,

/signed/
W. Dennis Thomas
Assistant Secretary
(Legislative Affairs)

The Honorable
Fernand St. Germain, Chairman
Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

business interests. Colby told Fortune that he was encouraged by the "development of a private industry of political analysis."¹⁷ Richard Helms, also a former CIA director, who created and ran Operation MHCHAOS which illegally surveilled and disrupted the political activities of hundreds of Americans, now counsels the CIA - involved Bechtel Corporation and half a dozen others. (Regarding the purview of MHCHAOS, Helms had secretly told Kissinger that it "is an area not within the charter of the Agency."¹⁸)

Some corporations vary this "formula for sophisticated counsel" by forming "advisory councils of prominent foreign businessmen and retired government officials."¹⁹ Interestingly, two prominent country-risk consultant firms, Business Environment Risk Index and the World Political Risk Forecast of Frost and Sullivan, refuse to identify members of their risk analysis councils.²⁰

Among the lesser known CIA analysts

turned corporate analysts are Eaton's Richard Lethander and Thomas Reckford (a seminar leader at the conference); and from the State Department, ITT's Samuel De Palma, Exxon's Richard Barham, Gulf's Hoyt Price, and Benjamin Weiner who founded the appropriately-titled Probe International.²¹

The modus operandi of the analysts/managers is the CIA method described in 1968 by then-United Aircraft executive and secret CIA consultant Richard Bissell: "... the technique is essentially that of 'penetration'... Many of the 'penetrations' don't take the form of 'hiring' but of establishing a close or friendly relationship (which may or may not be furthered by the provision of money from time to time)."²²

Completing this analogy to the CIA, the analysts/managers create agents of influence and manipulation as well as penetration. Exxon's Richard Barham told Fortune that he analyzes each Asian society

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 19

in terms of its "principal influence groups" based on data from his agents in the field who maintain regular contact with local intellectuals, labor leaders, and politicians. ²³ Xerox's director of international relations, Daniel Sharp, summarized to Fortune that "our best sources" are the local managers. "They are better educated and informed about their environments than anyone here at staff headquarters. Often they went to school with those who run the government and other important institutions."²⁴ Because of these penetrations, Xerox has "access" to everyone from government cabinet officers to working-level technocrats and politicians who create and shape legislation. "Encouraged by results in Latin America, Xerox is extending the new system to its other international operations."²⁵

Similarly, Chemical Bank, having adopted an approach of analyst/manager Lawrence Bloom has "started viewing each country in terms of political issues and its political actors, hoping to determine which actors exert the most influence over key decisions."²⁶ Presumably, this determination is not simply an academic exercise. As an OPIC official said: "A lot of people feel that they have essentially erased political risk by the associations they take on in a host country."²⁷ In this way, the local management of MNCs becomes not only a tool for implementing anti-national corporate policy, it also becomes the witting or unwitting local spy agency which supplies corporate headquarters with the raw data with which to formulate those anti-national strategies.

"The United States should make increasing use of non (U.S.)-nationals, who, with effort at indoctrination and training, should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff."

Richard Bissell to Council on Foreign Relations, 1/8/68

At the conference, executives were cautioned, however, that while local employees were the best source for routine information, they are often reluctant to supply information that would lead to the operation being closed down or reduced. Thus, warnings of unusual, but highly important events, such as revolutions, are likely to be missed. It was clear from the tenor of the discussion and the frequent

20 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

references that the revolution in Iran was the one most on the minds of the executives. William Ascher, who has recently done a confidential country risk evaluation of the Philippines for the World Bank, suggested that corporations would find it "quite useful to get some schizophrenic-paranoics... to make radical forecasts." Samuel De Palma of ITT put the same message more delicately in his Fortune interview. He introduces executives to persons with a wide range of views even "if they're not from the sort of people we would normally invite to dinner."²⁸

Such was the discourse of executives talking plainly to each other, briefly shedding some of the piety of public posture. So confident were they that they spoke only to their own kind that one (at least) did not hesitate to make racist observations over lunch. The governments of Third World countries were spoken of only as entities to be manipulated. The peoples of the Third World, who constitute the vast majority of people in the capitalist economy, were not mentioned except when their resistance was seen as an "obstacle" to the "bottom-line" goals of corporations. Both explicitly and implicitly, the desires of the people of the Third World for independence were seen as the main source of political risk against which corporations were advised to guard themselves.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Fortune, 2/40, p.91.
- 2) *ibid.*
- 3) Fortune, 3/24/80, p.86.
- 4) Barkas, W.L.; Ober, D.A.; Silak, "Country Risk Analysis: A Cross Impact Futures Model," May 7-8, 1981, pp.1-20. Unless stated otherwise, all references to Barkas are from this paper that he presented at the conference.
- 5) Root, Franklin R., "Managing Post-Entry Political Risks," May 1981, pp.1-14. Unless stated otherwise, all references to Root are from this paper that he presented at the conference.
- 6) Brainard, Lawrence W. "Bankers Trust Approach to International Risk Assessment," February 1981, pp.1-16. Unless stated otherwise, all references to Brainard are from this paper that he presented at the conference.
- 7) "Regional Briefing For Annual Meetings," C45915/J66284/D2692/07, p.1.
- 8) "Korea: Economic Brief" C62521/J66195/D316203, p.1. This brief and that referenced in #7 are unsigned in-house confidential World Bank documents which are available from CounterSpy.
- 9) *ibid.*
- 10) *cf supra*, #7.
- 11) Asia Monitor, vol.4, no.4, 1981, K-4-407.
- 12) *cf supra*, #3, p.87.
- 13) Nation, 11/10/79, pp.466-468.

- 14) *ibid.*
 15) *cf supra*, #3, p.87.
 16) U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam, Hearings before the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 92nd Congress, 1st session, July 15,16,19,21 and August 2, 1971, U.S. GPO, p. 183. (John A. Graham, a conference seminar leader also served in counterinsurgency programs, formerly under Colby, in South Vietnam.)
 17) *cf supra*, #3, p.100.
 18) Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Report), GPO, 041-015-00074-8, June 1975,
- p.134.
 19) *cf supra*, #3, p.87.
 20) *ibid.*, p.95.
 21) *ibid.*, pp.86-100.
 22) Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John D., The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Knopf, New York, 1974, p.386.
 23) *cf supra*, #3, p.88
 24) *ibid.*, p.92.
 25) *ibid.*
 26) *ibid.*, p.98.
 27) *ibid.*
 28) *ibid.*, p.87.

Korea: AAFLI Taken Hostage by its Own

In his presentation at the First International Conference on Political Risk Management, Lawrence W. Brainard of Bankers Trust Company was clear about the importance of labor unions for "stability" in South Korea. "The point here was whether the new executive leadership [President Chun] could forge a social coalition and the key was support by labor."¹

Illustrative of the attraction of South Korea's cheap labor was a one-day seminar in New York on October 16, 1979 for 148 U.S. corporate and government officials. Nam Duck-Woo, now Prime Minister under Chun, got a standing ovation when he pledged that his government would maintain stability and not be unduly influenced by "Western democratic ideas." At the same time, other South Korean panelists stressed the availability of long working hours (averaging 51.3 hours a week) and cheap women workers.

Under President Park, Korean unions were compromised and coopted. They were penetrated and manipulated by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) as well as the CIA and U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) through the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) whose executive director is well-known CIA agent Morris Paladino.² The sell-out of Korean labor by AAFLI was demonstrated by its 1978-79 listing of ten "Problems Affecting the Free Trade Union Movement in Korea." This list did not even mention that workers were prohibited to strike by law.

The main mechanism used by Park, the KCIA and AAFLI to maintain their exploitation was the leadership of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) to which all South Korean trade unions had to belong by law. The KCIA had their paid informants in

the FKTU and repeatedly manipulated FKTU elections particularly at the top levels. Even now, AAFLI continues to file labor reports to the CIA-connected labor attaches and Agency for International Development (AID) representatives in the U.S. embassy in Seoul, South Korea. AAFLI also finances trips to and training programs in the U.S. for select FKTU members. AAFLI has paid all or part of the salaries of a number of FKTU staff members, and partially financed the construction of the Anyong FKTU Education Center where two-thirds of the courses have been government Saemaul courses. These are anti-Communist lectures exhorting allegiance to the government while dishonestly accusing progressive and church-sponsored labor organizers of pro-North sympathies to discourage workers' solidarity and independent union organizing.

Chun has gone further than Park by effectively dismantling the FKTU at the national and regional level. He made it illegal for one union to cover more than one company which makes it all but impossible for labor to build a solid front. In early 1981, Chun's "Legislative Assembly" proclaimed the lifting of martial law but simultaneously passed a new series of labor laws which institutionalized the workers' exploitation that had existed under martial law. As a recent visitor to South Korea observed: "Maintaining Korea's appeal to foreign corporations has meant destroying all labor unions directly organized and run by the workers, and replacing them with government controlled unions."

New labor laws also provide a three-year prison sentence for so-called "outsiders" who encourage the formation of unions and a five-year prison sentence for "manipu-

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 21

lating" a strike. Furthermore, all workers with a criminal record - which could have been for union activism - or "previous misdeeds" were removed from office and banned from ever running again.

AAFLI is fully aware of the new labor laws and has issued no protest but has offered seminars to help the government-installed labor leaders to adjust to the new laws. As the AAFLI News explained it,

"The program [AAFLI seminars] is the FKTU's first effort to help local union leaders adjust to the new organizational structure imposed since government policies forced the dissolution of regional union branches. During these actions, thousands of local and regional labor leaders were purged for alleged abuse of power and corruption, and other unionists, many with little or no experience, appointed to replace them."³

In short, AAFLI immediately and consciously realigned itself with the new labor laws without raising a finger for persecuted workers, not even its fellow FKTU unionists. This fact was poignantly illustrated in January 1981 when Paladino himself visited South Korea. In Seoul, Paladino was scheduled to meet with Hwang Im-Sool and Lee Pil-Won, leaders of the FKTU. Before the visit, former leaders of the Chongkye Garment Workers Union, which had been dissolved under the new laws - with no protest from AAFLI even though they had previously worked together - decided they wanted to meet with Paladino.

Either because he was sick or simply would not meet with them, the twenty-one union members were denied a meeting with Paladino. In protest, they occupied AAFLI headquarters on January 30 and held AAFLI Seoul director George Curtin hostage from approximately 6PM to midnight. At midnight, Korean police stormed the building, and two union members tried to escape by

jumping out the window. All twenty-one were arrested, and when Lee Pil-Won claimed responsibility for the take-over, both she and Hwang Im-Sool were arrested. An eyewitness reporter found following the hostage-taking that "AAFLI in Seoul has since not been available - they don't answer their phone."

Again, AAFLI published no protest. Indeed, AAFLI's description of Paladino's visit made no mention of the event:

"During his stay in Korea, Paladino met with leaders from the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) to assess the impact of the revised Korean Labor Code on the ability of Korean unions to represent their members effectively, both at the bargaining table and at the job site. In addition, he met with representatives from the [Chun-created] Administration for Labor Affairs (ALA) concerning the dissolution of the Chonkye Garment Workers Union and other recent developments on the Korean labor scene."⁴

South Korean workers are faced with a simultaneous struggle on four fronts: against Chun, the MNCs, the banks, and AAFLI itself. U.S. workers can assist this struggle by demanding that AAFLI, which is part of the AFL-CIO and funded by U.S. taxes, withdraw from South Korea. U.S. citizens can also assist by insisting that the tax-financed World Bank stop lending money to Chun. The Korean people will take care of the rest.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Brainard, Lawrence J., "Bankers Trust Approach to International Risk Assessment," February 1981, p.15.
- 2) Agee, Philip, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1975, p.617.
- 3) AAFLI News, January 1981, p.3.
- 4) AAFLI News, February 1981, p.2; Unreferenced sources and quotes in this article are from an eye witness reporter who cannot be identified for security reasons.

No Budget Cuts for RFE/RL by Martha Wenger

"When a Russian, a Pole or a Czech says, often in a whisper and with a smile, 'I heard it on the radio,' the chances are good he means American radio stations, not his own: the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. These, along with the radio services of Great Britain and West Germany, represent an extraordinary

22 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

nary Western invasion of the Eastern bloc." (Peter Osnos, National Editor of the Washington Post, on National Public Radio's "Communique," March 27, 1981.)

Two programs notably spared by the Reaganomics scythe are the Voice of America (VOA) - the official U.S. radio abroad - and its more hardline cousin, Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). In fact, Reagan's budget restores \$4 million that former President Jimmy Carter had proposed to cut from RFE/RL's grants and boosts VOA's allocation from \$101.6 million to \$188 million, sparing all of its 3,000 employees from any pink slips. RFE/RL has also received a supplemental \$4 million grant for the current fiscal year including \$1 million to beef up its Polish language service. The push for these increases comes primarily from National Security Council (NSC) members Richard Pipes and Carnes Lord, with backup support from national security advisor Richard Allen.¹

RFE/RL's style has always been what even *Time* magazine calls "direct, blunt propaganda."² Not an official radio of the U.S. - although government funded - RFE/RL likes to call itself the "surrogate free press" of the "captive nations." It broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-

ropean nations with a total of 147 hours per day in 21 languages. Its staff of about 1,700 includes citizens of the U.S., West Europeans, and emigrés from the countries to which it broadcasts.

RFE/RL must communicate "in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States..."³ Its programming is news-heavy and repetitive, specializing in extensive coverage of news events and political developments within the target country. This news is based solely on Western press reports, samizdat ("dissident" writings), and monitoring of Soviet and East European press.

Poland in the last year provides an instructive example of the uses of the radio propaganda tool for U.S. foreign policy objectives. RFE/RL broadcasts more than 18 hours a day to Poland to an audience estimated (by RFE/RL) to be larger than in any

Reagan's Propaganda Team

The Reagan team of appointees in the propaganda field is being recruited as we go to press. Transition work for the International Communication Agency (ICA) was done by Frank Shakespeare, director of the U.S. Information Agency (ICA's predecessor) under Nixon, and a member of the Board of Trustees of the ultra-right Heritage Foundation.

The ICA, parent organization of the Voice of America radio, will be headed by long-time Reagan friend and California millionaire, Charles Z. Wick. Wick, a motion picture, TV and show business entrepreneur (President of Wick Financial Corp. and Mapleton Enterprises) was a Reagan campaign advisor, especially valued for his knack for fundraising (to the tune of \$6 million). Wick and his wife Mary Jane headed up the Reagan Inaugural Committee and Wick played a role in the appointments of a number of men now on Reagan's cabinet - who will undoubtedly have open ears for his concerns as ICA chief.

Second in command at ICA will be Gilbert A. Robinson, head of his own public relations firm and of International Management of Capital & Assets, Corp. Among the less illustrious credits in his career are a stint as an analyst with the National Security Agency in 1950-52, a

year (1970) as vice president and head of corporate communications for Gulf & Western Industries (notorious for its sugar operations which exploit workers in the Dominican Republic), and a number of years as political advisor to then-Governor Nelson Rockefeller.

Reagan's choice for Voice of America director - not yet confirmed - is James B. Conkling, another California business executive (of Bonneville International Co. - a commercial shortwave company) and a close friend of Wick.

Although RFE/RL staff are not political appointees, Reagan will be able to appoint three out of five seats on its oversight body, the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB). These appointees will bear close watching. In May 1980, fears were raised that the CIA was attempting to reassert more direct control over RFE/RL, which it funded covertly until 1971. Paul B. Henze, a National Security Council (NSC) specialist and a former CIA station chief in Turkey, had actively recruited two "suitable" candidates for jobs on the BIB, one of whom had at least indirect ties to the CIA. (New York Times, 5/15/80). While those candidates were not appointed, there is a good chance that the pro-CIA lobby might try again. Once the full Reagan propaganda team is in place, the face of U.S. propaganda will have turned full circle back to the days of the first cold war.

other country. When the Solidarity strikes developed, RFE/RL moved into high gear. Zygmunt Michalowski, director of the Polish service:

From the very beginning of the present crisis, we mobilized all our forces to inform our listeners about what is going on in the country and about the response abroad... We believe it is easier to make decisions when one is fully aware of one's position, rather than in a haphazard manner, uncertain of how the situation is developing.⁴

Remember that RFE/RL had no on-the-scene reporters. Its news was a rehashing of Western press accounts and samizdat which according to William Buell, Vice President for U.S. Operations of RFE/RL, "seems to come out in quite a stream from Poland... And of course, also we monitor very carefully Polish press and radio so that we know what the distortions are and where the gaps are and what needs to be filled."

The Soviet Union has charged that RFE/RL broadcasts to Poland have been "provocative and instigatory," amounting to "an open interference in Polish internal affairs."⁵ Polish union activist Waldemar Sobora acknowledged the influence of foreign radio broadcasts during the Gdansk strikes, "I learned what was happening on the coast from RFE and other Western stations."⁶ Likewise, Kenneth L. Adelman, head of Reagan's NSC transition team, noted, "Leaders of the Solidarity union have attributed a measure of their success to RFE's Polish service..."⁷

If RFE/RL was actually reporting "the truth" in such situations, there would be no argument. But when its mandate is to promote U.S. foreign policy interests, naturally truth sometimes gets lost. Even Malcolm Toon, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, admitted, "occasionally Radio Liberty would get things wrong. And this was also true of Radio Free Europe, in attacking of the wrong personalities for the wrong reasons, and so forth."⁸

A March 2, 1981 General Accounting Office report revealed that RFE/RL's own Broadcast Analysis experts were covering up violations of RFE/RL broadcast guidelines. Broadcast Analysis files contained the following comments about programs that had been aired:

There is a pervasive overtone of incitement about this program. It should never have been allowed to go on the

air....

The litany [Mission Statement/Program Policy Guidelines] reads "Avoidance of any programming that could be construed as encouraging defections." In my estimation the attached program * * * could be so construed.⁹


Disregarding their own assessment, Broadcast Analysis officials reported that there "were no ascertained instances which could be reasonably construed as violations of the MS/PPG [Mission Statement/Program Policy Guidelines]."¹⁰

In a major article in Foreign Affairs magazine, Kenneth Adelman is more honest in his assessment of RFE/RL's role, which he characterizes as "public diplomacy." "RFE's and RL's criticisms of the communist systems and commendations of their citizens invariably arouse destabilizing sentiments."¹¹ Clearly, for the Reagan administration, creating such "destabilizing sentiments" is the real goal of radio propaganda.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Washington Post, 3/12/81, p.A-5.
- 2) Time, 3/9/81, p.16.
- 3) "The Mission of RFE/RL" (1976), Board for International Broadcasting 7th Annual Report, 1981, p.31.
- 4) ibid., p.3.
- 5) cf supra, #2.
- 6) ibid.
- 7) Foreign Affairs, Spring 1981, p.922.
- 8) National Public Radio, "Communique", 3/27/81.
- 9) Improvements Made, Some Still Needed in Management of RFE/RL, U.S. General Accounting Office; 3/2/81, pp.10,11.
- 10) ibid.
- 11) cf supra, #7, p.930.

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Warmongering: Council on Foreign Relations

The Soviet Challenge: A Policy Framework for the 1980s, published by the Commission on U.S.-Soviet Relations of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is at once a ridiculous and frightening document. Its analyses of world problems are simplistically reduced to U.S.-Soviet conflicts and are limited to empty phrases such as, we live in "an increasingly complex and disordered world," and the power of "a dangerously strengthened Soviet Union... hangs like a shadow over a crisis-prone Middle East, Southeast Asia, and other distant places." The study, however, does not explain or document how the Soviet Union has become more dangerous. What is dangerous is the Council study itself, which is a call to war and unrestrained intervention wherever U.S. private economic or strategic interests are threatened.

The CFR study, paid for by the Ford Foundation, was undertaken as "an attempt to establish some common ground for a steadier approach toward Moscow." The premises of the study were that "the Soviet Union is and will remain the central concern of U.S. foreign policy;" that "above all we must convey to the Soviet Union a clear definition of U.S. interests and of the lengths to which we will go to protect them," and that "any policy toward the Soviet Union must be underpinned by a sound, vital base at home, starting with a revitalized economy."

The Commission further holds that the Soviet Union is an expansionist power, often working through proxies, e.g. Vietnam, Cuba, and "other friends." Postulating that "Marxist ideology has lost much of its force and reputation" and that the Soviet Union has "not overcome a long-standing sense of insecurity, including a lingering fear of encirclement by the world's major powers," the CFR study "deduces" that "the Soviet leadership instinctively responds to... basic impulses - the claim to a world role and the sense of insecurity - by amassing power, meaning pre-eminently military power."

To counter this Soviet threat, U.S. military ambitions must have a "global sweep," defense expenditures in the U.S. must be boosted to, and maintained at six percent of the GNP - more than requested in present Reagan administration propos-

als. Finally, the Commission suggests that the U.S. and its allies "must together shape a concept of jointly coping with a widening range of security threats. If this should involve a role for the West Germans outside Europe and for the Japanese outside the Japanese homeland, delicate planning... should be faced sooner rather than later."

The Council study especially emphasizes the need for Japan to "play a greater role in protecting... the sealanes between Japan and its sources of vital raw materials [through] ...additional... military exertions" and to increase its actions "on problems bearing on overall allied security, e.g. [through] economic and military assistance in Thailand." This would of course not only violate the Japanese peace constitution but also betray the will of the majority of the Japanese people (evident in the April-May 1981 anti-militarist demonstrations in Japan following disclosures of U.S. disregard for Japan's strict policy against nuclear weapons in Japanese territory), but that doesn't seem to bother the CFR.

Pushing its policy of rapidly increased military spending in the U.S. over and above giving "high priority" to the Rapid Deployment Force, the Commission calls for the availability of military units "on a less urgent basis. In effect this means suitably equipped reserve forces in the continental United States, Hawaii, West Germany, and elsewhere." The heart of the problem, though, is "the failure of the all-volunteer force." Therefore, the Commission urges "our national leadership" to give "serious consideration" to reinstitute now "some form of compulsory military service."

On nuclear strategy - while graciously granting that "catastrophic war" must be avoided - the Commission advocates rapid enlargement of the nuclear arsenal. The importance of arms control should not be underrated, but the Commission believes that it is "wrong" to have arms control as the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, and, *à la* General Haig, wants to make progress on arms control negotiations contingent on Soviet actions abroad. While the study calls for adherence to the existing SALT I treaty and states that no

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 25

"irreversible steps" should be taken to conflict with SALT II, it is lobbying for a policy that questions the value of both the SALT treaties and says the U.S. should "adjust" SALT criteria, "if necessary."

A key part of the Council study is entitled "Conflict in Third Areas." "Third areas," it says, are the "most likely source of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union," thus reducing every potential conflict to a struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for influence in a given area. The Commission concedes that "much of the turmoil is... indigenous and unrelated to Soviet actions," but feels the Soviet Union might stand a chance to gain influence through a local conflict. In any case, since the U.S. "has some degree of interest almost everywhere," it must "care about the growth of Soviet influence in any quarter of the globe."

Concretely that means that the U.S. should impede "either the emergence of a dominant regional power or the control of any major regional country by a Soviet client regime;" it should "fashion de facto security relationships with friendly states" against external aggression; and be "sensitive to the need for their maintaining domestic support;" a regional "infrastructure of military facilities should be built up and the U.S. must "commit itself to keep open the sealanes to and from the Persian Gulf." The commission further recommends that the U.S. maintain the option to provide (in addition to arms sale sales) "other kinds of military and police support (e.g., training)" to contribute to internal security. In addition, the U.S. capacity for "selective use of covert action" should be increased. Finally, in order to "raise the cost of Soviet intervention" in Afghanistan, the U.S. should "respond positively to requests for military and other supplies from the Afghan resistance."

In another section, "Economic and Energy Policy," it becomes very obvious that the CFR, representing the interests of multinational corporations, is in a bind. It states that "concern about losing Eastern business may... constrain Western courses of action," and therefore argues that "broad guidelines for economic relations with the U.S.S.R." need to be established. The CFR panel wants to tie U.S. trade with the Soviet Union to U.S.-Soviet re-

26 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981



lations in general, but at the same time urges that in the drafting of such a trade policy, "commercial advantage must of course be a central element." Given their dilemma - whether to emphasize a hard-line, anti-Soviet stance which would decrease U.S. business opportunities in Eastern Europe, or to put commercial interests above ideology - the Commission's admission that it is not "able to resolve this issue" does not come as a surprise.

Echoing Reagan's rejected human rights "specialist," Ernest Lefever, the Commission says that the U.S. "should not hesitate to point up the repugnant human rights practices in the U.S.S.R." The U.S. should "whenever possible extend support to... governments which observe... human rights standards." But, "it will often be necessary... for us to work with some which do not, especially on security matters... This should not mean that we support their repressive practices..."

The Commission on U.S.-Soviet Relations, which compiled the study included Henry Grunwald (chair), the editor in chief of Time, Inc.; Michael Blumenthal, former U.S. Treasury Secretary and Chief Executive Officer of Burroughs Corporation; William Hyland, a former CIA officer and now Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; syndicated journalist Joseph Kraft; Walter Laqueur of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies; Paul Nitze of the Committee on the Present Dan-

ger; Walt Rostow and Robert Tucker.

During and after World War II, the Council on Foreign Relations played a crucial role in developing the U.S. into a world power. Presently, the Council is concluding its "1980s Project" whose aim is according to Laurence Shoup and William Minter (The Imperial Brain Trust, Monthly Review Press, 1977)

"nothing less than the creation of a new global political and economic system to replace the existing one. The present, American-dominated, international capitalist system has been slowly disintegrating since the late 1960s under the impact of competition within

the advanced capitalist world, the war in Vietnam, poverty and revolution in the Third World, inflation, monetary problems [and] the success of the oil cartels."

The "1980s Project" is an attempt to "duplicate the success the Council had during World War II" when it played a "key part in constructing a new world order."

Two members of the "1980s Project" - Blumenthal and Harvard University Professor Stanley Hoffman - are also part of the Commission on U.S.-Soviet Relations which put together the Soviet Challenge study. It will be read closely by the Reagan administration and should be examined carefully by the American people.

Afghanistan - Pakistan Update

Francis Fukuyama

Secretary of State Alexander Haig recently appointed Francis Fukuyama, a military analyst for the Rand Corporation as a member of the State Department's policy planning staff. In September 1980, Fukuyama authored two Rand publications on Southwest Asia; The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report and The Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan: A Trip Report. The two reports were written with substantial assistance from Pakistani intelligence and military officers. Fukuyama acknowledges in the reports that his May 25 to June 5, 1980 visit to Pakistan, where he gathered most of his information, was organized "by the Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier (now Major General) Mohammed Afzal Khan, and the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Pakistani Army. ... The program... included... briefings with an extraordinarily large number of Pakistani Army and Air Force officers, intelligence officials, and civil servants in the foreign ministry," as well as "formal briefings on Afghanistan from the Military Intelligence Directorate and from Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)..."

The two studies are especially interesting in light of Fukuyama's participation in the formulation of the new Reagan policy toward Pakistan as a policy planning

staffer. On June 15, 1981 Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, James Buckley, announced a five year military and economic aid program to Pakistan totalling over \$3 billion. It includes the sale of F-16 fighter-bombers and is preceded by cash military sales to Pakistan which will be paid for mainly by Saudi Arabia; these sales might almost double the current \$3 billion aid program.

The State Department claims these sales are necessary to provide adequate defense against a Soviet and Afghan threat. However, Fukuyama knows better. In his 1980 study, he outlines four reasons for U.S. military aid to Pakistan; 1) "denial of Pakistani territory to the Soviet Union," 2) the possibility of "aiding the Afghan rebels militarily," 3) the use of Pakistani military bases for the Rapid Deployment Force, and 4) "the demonstration of American reliability, especially with respect to the People's Republic of China." However, Fukuyama writes, too, that "the central point made by the officers in charge of planning at the Joint Staff Headquarters and by numerous other Pakistanis was that regardless of what happened on the western border, Pakistan's major preoccupation was and would remain India." He continues: "The Pakistanis regard India as a Soviet proxy" - which is a very dangerous statement since, given U.S. promises to defend Pakistan against Soviet aggression, such an assumption might draw

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 27

the U.S. into a possible Pakistani war against India.

One of the main reasons for helping Pakistan, though, is that "the Pakistanis might be encouraged to allow outsiders to aid the Afghans from Pakistani territory if they felt reasonably secure." Fukuyama goes on: "The advantages of helping the Mujahedeen are considerable. The success with which the rebellion has been carried out thus far... suggests that rather small amounts of sophisticated weapons could have a potentially large effect on the war..." With the supply of such weapons, the Soviet Union would "face the choice of either stepping up their involvement in Afghanistan or withdrawing. Even if the United States does not have enough leverage to produce the latter result, it can at least raise the costs of subjugating Afghanistan substantially."

As Fukuyama sees it, U.S. aid to the rebels will not lead them to victory. On the contrary, in his Afghanistan report he paints a very negative picture of the rebel groups based in Peshawar who "tend to be more interested in their power position than in contributing to the success of the insurgency as a whole... All of the groups compete in trying to register the Afghan refugees into their own factions, often coercively." The prominence that the Peshawar groups have achieved, Fukuyama writes, "appears to be more the product of journalistic overemphasis than a reflection of their real importance in Afghanistan." The figures for Soviet and Afghan army casualties being given out by the Peshawar rebels "on which a number of journalists have based their estimates are wildly exaggerated; ... most of the photographs displayed of burnt-out or damaged Soviet equipment comes in fact from the Afghan army, and the losses were incurred for the most part before the Soviet intervention."

While Fukuyama does not mention CIA aid to the rebels, he admits that the Pakistani government "has made no effort to restrict their activities and actually pays for the house in which one of these groups is headquartered." Pakistan's North West Frontier Province has become "a haven for Afghan guerrillas... as well as a source of weapons."

Clearly, U.S. military aid to Pakistan ("An acceptable American aid package would have to be... perhaps on the level of what

28 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

has been offered to Egypt or Turkey in recent years.") is not directed toward protecting Pakistan against Soviet aggression. Even Fukuyama has problems constructing a plausible scenario for a Soviet threat to Pakistan. That leaves three other reasons for U.S. aid to Pakistan: 1) escalation of the undeclared war against Afghanistan; 2) using Pakistan in the overall interventionist strategy in the Middle East and possibly against India; and, 3) shoring up dictator Zia ul-Haq's military regime against internal opposition.

Keeping it Quiet

Even after Reagan's statement advocating U.S. aid to the Afghan "freedom fighters," the major media in the U.S. did not examine CIA aid to the rebels. Although the New York Times described the aid as the first operation of this magnitude "since the Angola civil war ended," in subsequent articles it unquestioningly accepted replies such as "people donate it" when rebel leaders were asked where they get their money for weapons.

In an excellent critique of U.S. reporting on Afghanistan, Jay Peterzell of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington, D.C. concluded in the Columbia Journalism Review that the press fails "to connect mounting evidence of a significant weapons supply in Afghanistan with previous reports of American involvement." He cites Newsweek writer Fred Coleman's reason why this is not happening: "Obviously, people on this side [in the U.S.] don't want to give credence" to Soviet reports about CIA aid to the Afghan rebels.

More Covert Aid

In its May 1981 pamphlet, The Soviet Challenge: A Policy Framework for the 1980s, the Commission on U.S.-Soviet Relations of the powerful Council on Foreign Relations called for improvement in U.S. "capacity for selective use of covert action." With outrageous arrogance, the CFR study says that having Babrak Karmal as Afghan president is "not acceptable." The Commission recommends that the Reagan administration should "concentrate on deterring Soviet military actions that use Af-

ghanistan as a base [and] future Soviet actions similar to those in Afghanistan. ... To do so, the United States must raise the costs of Soviet intervention. This... requires that the United States respond positively to requests for military and other supplies from the Afghan resistance. By this action we will also be signalling our willingness to aid resistance in similar cases elsewhere."

Heroin

In Washington, D.C. fourteen people died of heroin overdoses in the first three weeks of May 1981. This pushed the number of heroin deaths even higher, after drug deaths in Washington climbed from seven in 1978 to forty-one in 1979 and to sixty-two in 1980. Other East Coast cities face similar problems. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials speak of a "heroin epidemic" similar to the one that swept the U.S. some ten years ago.

At that time, the heroin came from the Golden Triangle, mainly Laos and Thailand, where the U.S. was conducting its war against the peoples of Indochina. When U.S. troops, and especially the CIA left that area, heroin shipments from the Golden Triangle dropped significantly. The connection between these two events is obvious. (See Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, Harper and Row, New York, 1972; and CounterSpy, vo.5 no.1)

Today, much of the heroin in the U.S. and Western Europe comes from the Golden Crescent, an area stretching along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border into Iran. When government officials talk about the Golden Crescent heroin, they usually mention just one supplier country: Iran. However, it appears to be mainly the heroin from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border that is making the big difference in the quantity of heroin supply in the U.S. and Western Europe which has been equally hard hit.

In his recent book, Weltmacht Droge (Worldpowerful Drug, Econ Verlag, Duesseldorf) and in an article in the monthly Transatlantik (Feb.81), Austrian journalist Hans Georg Behr shows that (as in the early 1970s in Southeast Asia) there is a connection between the aid provided by Western intelligence agencies to rightwing forces and increased heroin shipments into the West. In researching his story, Behr

spent two weeks with Afghan rebels smuggling opium to Pakistan. The opium was taken to Darra and exchanged for money and weapons. The leader of Behr's rebel band told Behr that the Afghan poppy growers hadn't given him all of the opium voluntarily but "they had to give it as some sort of tax for the freedom fight."

In an interview with an official of the DEA in Pakistan, Behr was told that the chief of the Pakistani drug enforcement office, Reza Hussein is participating in heroin smuggling. The U.S. official said that Hussein took several pounds of heroin with him on an official trip to Europe. (The DEA is presently training officers from its Pakistani counterpart agency.)

As far as heroin smuggling into the U.S. is concerned, the DEA, with its 2,000 agents, is certainly not part of the solution to the problem. According to the DEA's own estimates, only two to five percent of the heroin coming into the U.S. "is being kept from distribution channels." Lee Dogoloff, who was associate director for drug policy under Jimmy Carter, doesn't trust this figure since "we have no idea how much is entering the country. I think they are only guessing."

Even if the DEA were serious about stopping the heroin inflow from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, it would be in a bind because opium and heroin smuggling is a major source of revenue for the Afghan rebels. In an April 1981 article headlined "Afghan Rebels Bristle with New Arms," the New York Times wrote that in Nangarhar province, "a bountiful opium crop is being harvested and the feudal headmen who in large part control separate insurgent forces also control much of this trade." With CIA support for the rebels and President Reagan declaring these rebels "freedom fighters," it is somewhat problematic for the DEA in Pakistan to seriously go after these freedom fighters and their compatriots in Pakistan, stopping U.S.-headed heroin at its source.

West German intelligence has not been able to stem the heroin flow to their country either. Out of approximately 20 tons of heroin brought into West Germany in 1980, police and intelligence managed to confiscate a stunning 400 pounds. An increasing number of West German weapons are being bought by the rebels. According to Behr, the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, federal intelligence ser-

vice) owns shares in all major West German arms exporting companies... and that means that the BND is at least indirectly making money from the opium trade since the rebels' opium profits are often used to buy arms.

In the U.S., the situation is similar. CIA aid to the Afghan rebels undoubtedly prolongs what the Afghan government calls

their "undeclared war." As long as this war continues, the rebels depend on opium sales. And even if the CIA were not involved in the heroin smuggling itself, Western arms dealers are ready to sell to the rebels with no inhibitions about the source of the money they are being paid with.

NATO Intervention in Africa by Konrad Ege

NATO countries have militarily intervened in Third World nations outside NATO's purview numerous times. However, the agreement of NATO defense ministers in May 1981 to assist U.S. troops militarily in any intervention in the Middle East represents a basic change in NATO policy. For the first time, future military interventions in the Third World will be coordinated openly and in advance by NATO countries. This decision was made under heavy pressure from hawkish NATO officers and after intense lobbying by influential conservative institutions in the U.S. and Western Europe. For example, four right-wing research and propaganda institutes, the Council on Foreign Relations (U.S.), the Royal Institute of International Affairs (England), the Institute for International Relations (France), and the Research Institute of the Foreign Policy Association (Federal Republic of Germany) released a joint report advocating a new NATO strategy. "The days of the old 'Atlantic' system, based on U.S. predominance ... are over. Given today's international relations, neither the U.S. nor Europe can be expected to face the challenge of the 1980s on its own."¹

The U.S. Atlantic Council, whose directors include CIA Director William Casey (he did not resign from that post after joining the Reagan administration), promoted the same idea: "The threat [to the interests of NATO countries] is now global and deterrence must be global."² Similarly, Rolf Friedemann Pauls, West German Permanent Representative to NATO's North Atlantic Council until September 1980,

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30 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

wrote: "We [NATO countries] must be completely clear that we must also protect our interests outside the NATO area... We should... do so on the basis of a coordinated policy among the allies... It is not only the safeguarding of the supplies of oil and other raw materials vital for the survival and security of Europe which is at stake. It is also necessary to provide unstable regions with more stability..."³

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger let it be known after only two weeks in office that he would look "sympathetically" at a request by "any... friendly country" to have U.S. troops stationed within its borders.⁴ While Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Alexander Haig stated that dealing with challenges in Africa and the Middle East "is probably the core challenge for the alliance in the period ahead... Now, how we deal with this challenge collectively in the context of the Atlantic Community is a political question. Whether we work through a modified NATO or some other multilateral forum is less important than the reality that we collectively face up to these challenges outside NATO's traditional area of geographic concern and concert together more effectively to meet them."⁵

INTERVENTION IN AFRICA

With full military support from NATO countries for a U.S. intervention in the Middle East, complemented by U.S. bases in the region and alliances with Israel, Egypt, Oman and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. is quite ready to intervene in the oil producing Arab countries. NATO's interventionist policy, however, goes further. It is also directed against Africa, especially Southern Africa. The well-being of the

white racist governments of South Africa, and earlier those of Angola, Mozambique, and "Rhodesia" has been a high priority of NATO officials and conservative Republicans for a long time. Many of these Republicans now run the U.S. government.

Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, has advocated for years that the U.S. should "increase the resources it directs toward Africa commensurate with the importance of the continent and its increasing global significance." Crocker, like most NATO planners, sees policy toward Africa in a cold war framework: for him, Africa is a battle ground on which the U.S. and the Soviet Union compete for raw materials and military facilities. In a 1979 study for the Department of Defense, Crocker wrote that "it is legitimate and necessary to focus on the Soviet-Cuban dimension of African problems because of the importance of the relationship of the United States with Moscow and Moscow's often important role in African trouble spots."⁶

Peter Duignan, a close Reagan associate from the Hoover Institution in Stanford (he served on the State Department transition team) points out that "Africa is important to the U.S. for its strategic regions, for its markets, for its supply of raw materials."⁷ At the same time, Duignan is one of the academic apologists for South Africa which he labels "a great deal more free than... a score of African countries." According to him, "South Africa's problems basically stem from the fact that the four million whites are surrounded by nineteen million blacks, perhaps half of whom remain poor and technologically backward and do not share the values, morals, and technical knowledge of Western man. About half the blacks have left the tribal world, and not all of these have become Westernized."⁸

Academics like Duignan are important because they provide the "moral" justification for strengthening U.S. links with the apartheid regime. Others, especially military officers, are usually more blunt. An article in NATO's Fifteen Nations, a conservative publication with close ties to the military hierarchy of NATO, had this to say about South Africa: "Standing, as she does, a massive sentinel over the main trade route between the East and the West, her importance as the guardian for the supply of oil to the NATO countries

needs no stressing. Fortunately for us, South Africa is strongly anti-communist."⁹ Joseph Churba, a former U.S. Air Force intelligence officer and a member of Reagan's Defense Policy Advisory Panel, argued during a visit in South Africa that "Southern Africa [is] second only to the Persian Gulf in its strategic importance to the U.S."¹⁰

Advocates for closer military ties to South Africa, like Churba, always seek to justify such ties with the argument that South Africa is strategically located. In some cases demands are even made for a formal alliance with South Africa or the establishment of a NATO counterpart, a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO).

WHY SOUTH AFRICA ?

In essence, South Africa already has (more covertly than overtly) been integrated into NATO, as will be discussed. First, however, arguments for closer NATO ties with South Africa should be scrutinized for they are fallacious. Upon closer examination, one of them - that the West needs access to South Africa's minerals, and would lose them if the "Communists" took over - doesn't hold even though South Africa is a supplier of several raw materials which the U.S. needs to import in large quantities (more than 25 percent of U.S. consumption): manganese, platinum, chromium, asbestos, antimony, and vanadium.¹¹ Other countries in Western Europe and Japan are more dependent on South African raw materials.

Statistics like these, even if they are quoted numerous times and exaggerated, tell only one part of the story and ignore important aspects of mineral trade. For example, the U.S. has been exporting vanadium to West Germany for years; about half of the platinum produced in South Africa is used for jewelry in Japan; and the world's largest chromium resources are in Zimbabwe.¹² (At times, statistics on chromium export indicate the point from which the chromium was shipped to the U.S. rather than the initial source of the raw material: in the case of Zimbabwe, chromium exports have often been erroneously credited to South Africa.)

Before the liberation of Zimbabwe, Western "strategists" also argued that if the Rhodesian regime fell "we" would lose access to "our" vital resources. It didn't happen. The same is true for Angola which

SATO?

Rumors and reports about the possibility of establishing a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) have been circulating for over a decade. Earlier this year, the influential Brazilian weekly Veja reported that "highly placed sources" stated that President Reagan is pursuing the creation of a naval pact between Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and South Africa.

While it is not clear that a formal South Atlantic alliance will ever come into being, the Reagan administration undoubtedly is moving ahead with strengthening military ties not only with South Africa but also with the Southern Cone countries. Numerous high-ranking military and government officials from these countries have visited the U.S. this year, and U.S. officials went to South America. In March and April, Gen. Edward C. Meyer, U.S. Army Chief of Staff; Gen. Richard Ingram, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff; and Rear Admiral Peter K. Cullins, commander of the U.S. South Atlantic forces spent several days in Argentina for talks with military officers.

Argentina's General Roberto Viola - now president - met with Reagan in mid-March. His visit "coincided" with that of five high-ranking South African military officers. Other officials from Southern Cone countries who came to the U.S. in the first few months of the Reagan administration include the head of the Chilean Air Force, the Chilean foreign minister, and the Chairman of the Brazilian Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

Congress has lifted a ban on military aid to Argentina, and the Pentagon has compiled a list of \$1 billion worth of military equipment to be sold to Argentina. Uruguayan Vice Admiral Hugo Marquez also stated in March that after four years the U.S. has once again begun selling arms to his country. This summer, the Southern Cone and the U.S. navies will hold joint maneuvers in the South Atlantic.

Relations between Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay on one side of the Atlantic and South Africa on the other side have been close for years. (The Brazilian government has been forced by internal pressure to take a less friendly position toward the apartheid regime.) In February of this year, South Africa appointed Lt. Gen. John Dutton, one of its "most senior generals" (Rand Daily Mail, 2/18/81) to be ambassador to Chile; several senior Argentine Navy officers are assigned to the Argentine embassy in Pretoria; and in May the Chilean Navy training ship Esmeralda visited ports in Cape Town, Durban, and East London.

Support for SATO comes from other quarters as well: Egypt's minister for foreign affairs, Butros Ghali traveled to South America in January 1981 and stated that Egypt was interested in a South Atlantic defense treaty similar to NATO.

Plans for a formal SATO have been discussed numerous times and then dropped. An informal alliance, however, has undoubtedly been established. Transforming this informal alliance into a formal one could create more problems than benefits.

continues to supply oil to U.S. corporations. No government in South Africa would be able to halt the export of minerals for whatever reason since it is a fundamental component of South Africa's economic system. Even a recent two-year study on South Africa, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation argued that "if stoppages of key minerals from South Africa do occur, they are likely to be... of relatively short duration, whatever the political character of the government."¹³

Thus, at issue in the minerals debate is not that a revolutionary government in South Africa might cut off mineral exports. The issue is that the U.S. wants to exploit South African minerals on their

own terms while a revolutionary government would put restrictions on corporate exploitation. Another "mineral myth" - that the Soviet Union might want to take over South Africa because of its resources - was dispelled by the South African Institute of International Affairs itself in 1976. It stated that the Soviet Union has no need for South African minerals being a country with tremendous resources of its own.¹⁴

The second argument for stronger ties with South Africa - that it somehow protects the free flow of oil and other trade from the Middle East and Asia against Soviet "aggression" - is equally untenable. In a detailed study, Robert Price of the

Institute of International Studies at the University of California (Berkeley) demonstrates how much this theory of a Soviet threat to the sealanes around South Africa's Cape of Good Hope is based on cold war-type perceptions of Soviet policy which don't match reality. If there were a Soviet disruption of the flow of oil, there are two possible consequences. "Either the ensuing military conflict would be rapidly settled through negotiations," in which case oil shipments would be disrupted for only a very short time, or it would escalate into a World War - in which case oil shipments would have lost their significance.¹⁵ In case of a nuclear war, the destination of the oil shipments most likely would have ceased to exist anyway.

Chester Crocker himself wrote in a 1981 article that for these reasons, "the Soviet Union is unlikely to start a war by disrupting Western shipping in the southern oceans - because [war] is what such action would lead to."¹⁶ Even assuming for a moment the militarist "logic" that the Soviet Union wants to destroy the "West" by cutting off the oil, "there are far more effective means for them to do so than to mount a naval blockade from ports in... southern Africa," e.g. by bombing the oil fields in the Persian-Arabian-Gulf area. Price concludes that "the conditions of global war which would almost certainly result" from the act of Soviet blocking of the Cape route would turn its implementation "into an act of strategic suicide."¹⁷

The main objective of the Soviet navy with its great geographical disadvantages remains the protection of the "Soviet heartland," that is to provide a strategic nuclear defense. Stationing the submarine fleet at the Cape to block the Western oil shipments from the Persian-Arabian Gulf - which in effect means the patrolling of thousands of miles of high seas between the Cape and Antarctica - would seriously weaken primary Soviet strategic objectives. Thus, Price concludes, "the argument that pro-Western governments in southern Africa... are vital to the security of the West because of the proximity of these areas to the oil shipping lanes cannot be sustained."¹⁸

In order to promote their theory of the extremely crucial strategic importance of South Africa for international shipping, a number of military periodicals¹⁹ greatly exaggerate (double or triple) the number

of ships passing the Cape. Edmund Palmer, a South African naval intelligence officer put their number at only "about 2,300 during the first six months" of 1980 - which brings the number of ships rounding the Cape to about 4,600 in 1980.²⁰ But even this figure is misleading. Over ten percent of these ships fly the Soviet flag, and, according to Wehrpolitische Informationen (Military-Political Information, West Germany) only 50 percent of the total are owned by NATO countries.²¹

If neither the alleged Soviet threat against South Africa and the Cape sealane, nor the "dependence" on South African minerals is the real reason for NATO plans to move closer to South Africa, what are the real reasons? As noted, one is economic. U.S. investments in and trade with South Africa are expanding greatly. U.S. exports to South Africa rose by 74 percent from 1979 to 1980 to some \$2.5 billion. U.S. investments in South Africa (\$2.5 billion and rising) constitute about half of total U.S. private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. When Reagan implements plans to remove some existing restrictions in U.S.-South African trade, investment and trade are bound to expand even faster. Other NATO countries, primarily West Germany, have similarly lucrative business exchanges with the apartheid regime.

At the same time, the reason for the increasingly close collaboration of NATO countries with South Africa is more than simply the protection and expansion of investment in and trade with South Africa. Its military aspect is primarily directed at crushing the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. Their victories would "speed up the defeat of the North American and European exploitation not only in South Africa but in almost all of Africa. And the NATO governments are ready to make sacrifices in order to preserve their power,"²² i.e. unrestricted exploitation of African peoples and resources.

By taking care of their own interests in Africa, the South African regime is already doing some of the U.S.'s dirty work in the region: attacks into Mozambique and Angola, and aid to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA as well as further north, to Morocco. Indeed, in a secret document left behind by South African foreign minister Pik Botha when he visited the U.S. in May 1981, the South African government says that "they would be prepared to secure U.S. access to

critical minerals and naval facilities, and generally promote U.S. financial and trade interests in the region, if Washington recognized that there are 'no shortcut solutions to the question of the exercise of political power in South Africa.'"23 Washington, of course, fully recognizes that and Reagan wants to be "helpful as long as South Africa makes a sincere and honest effort to alter its apartheid policies."24 As Africa magazine (London) pointed out, Reagan's comments on South Africa (such as "Soviet objectives in Af-

rica are clear domination of the ocean oil routes... and control of Southern Africa's mineral riches") sound as though they were "written by Pretoria's Department of Defence" and reflect a "common geopolitical world view between Reagan and South Africa."25

INTEGRATING SOUTH AFRICA INTO NATO

Since the late 1960s, "the South African regime has waged a nonstop campaign to form military alliances with other states, in particular NATO and the countries of

a CIA cover for this operation, according to Mozambican authorities.

Concurrently, there are indications that the South African regime is prepared to vastly expand its campaign of subversion and terrorism through its National Intelligence Service (NIS, the successor of the infamous BOSS). Headed by Lukas Daniel Barnard, NIS has some 5,000 agents and is located in the Concilium Building in Skinner Street, Pretoria. According to Africa Now (London), South African intelligence agents are trained by West Germany and the U.S., and U.S. spy planes, based near Pretoria, supply NIS with strategic photographs of other African states.

NIS itself raids neighboring countries with soldiers without insignia and mercenaries. South African troops have also joined with Savimbi's UNITA in an undeclared war against the people of Angola. Raids into Angola against SWAPO camps (or allegedly against SWAPO camps) have become routine for the South Africans. According to Angolan President Eduardo Jose de Santos, more than 3,000 Angolans have been killed by South African troops over the last four years. With the Reagan administration pushing for the complete repeal of the Clark Amendment, U.S. aid to Savimbi is expected to be resumed even though State Department spokesperson William Dyess assured the press that it would be a mistake to draw the conclusion that the repeal of the amendment would mean automatic resumption of U.S. aid to Savimbi.

Moreover, it is questionable whether CIA aid to Savimbi ever really stopped since under CIA Director George Bush, the CIA gave more than \$500,000 to UNITA "for continuing activities" after they were mandated by Congress to stop all aid.

Intelligence Links

With Reagan's further expansion of the CIA's covert and paramilitary operations overseas (see Washington Post, 6/15/81), which reportedly began in the last years of the Carter administration, it is expected that the CIA will play a greater role in destabilizing progressive governments in Southern Africa. During his campaign, Reagan himself stated that "I don't see why we shouldn't provide them [UNITA] weapons." Since Reagan took power, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Lannon Walker, has met with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in Morocco (in March 1981), and U.S. military advisors are reported to have visited UNITA camps in Angola.

Undoubtedly, Reagan's destabilization and subversion campaign in Southern Africa is coordinated closely with the South African regime. There are strong indications (to say the least) that CIA officers in Mozambique supplied the South African regime with intelligence used in the January 20, 1981 raid into Mozambique. Mozambican authorities also say that the CIA used to collect information on Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique and passed it on to the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia. In addition, the CIA continues to subvert Mozambique's economy and spies on refugees and militants from liberation movements of South Africa, Namibia, Western Sahara, East Timor and Palestine in Mozambique. For such activities, four U.S. embassy officials in Maputo, Frederick Lundahl, Louis Ollivier, Arthur Russell, Patricia Russell, and the wives of Ollivier and Lundahl were expelled from Mozambique as part of a CIA spy ring on March 4, 1981. A U.S. General Tire and Rubber Co. subsidiary, Mabor, was used as

South America."²⁶ It has found open ears in the "defense" departments of most NATO countries, and, with a few setbacks, integration of South Africa into NATO has been moving ahead. With Reagan now in power in the U.S. the process could be sped up dramatically - if the South African apartheid regime manages to institute "changes" that give its racist system a facade of liberalization.

As early as 1972, South Africa benefited from a "largely British pressure group that had been working on behalf of the white regimes in Southern Africa since the 1960s" when the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly "appointed a subcommittee to examine the 'Soviet maritime threat.'" A report written by professors Sean Gervasi, Lawrence Bowman, and Ellen Frey-Wouters for the U.N. General Assembly's Decolonization Committee further states that the subcommittee urged NATO's North Atlantic Council to give the NATO Supreme Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) the authority to plan for the "protection" of the Cape route. After the subcommittee report was toned down for "political reasons", SACLANT was given the "authority to plan for contingencies 'outside the NATO area.'" The U.N. report concluded: "The 1972 deliberations... were the prelude to an official decision to move towards defence planning with the white regimes."²⁷

In May 1974, a NATO press spokesperson acknowledged to The Observer (London) that SACLANT Admiral Ralph Cousins had in fact "received secret authorization to study possible operations in the Southern African area."²⁸ One year later, the Pentagon and the West German Defense Department proposed to install NATO intelligence facilities in South Africa. This proposal was not carried out because of strong protests from the governments of the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. In 1977, the annual Allied Commander Europe conference, directed by Gen. Alexander Haig, again discussed "plans for the protection of the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope;"²⁹ and on June 20, 1978 NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns disclosed that "the alliance had completed plans for the defense of the sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope." Luns said that it would be "unrealistic" to extend NATO formally beyond the Tropic of Cancer but acknowledged that U.S., French and British squadrons were operating south of

the Tropic of Cancer.³⁰

In spring 1978, NATO officials from three countries also participated as observers in South African military maneuvers.³¹ South African foreign minister Pik Botha also met with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns in New York and Brussels in 1980.

NATO countries have contributed substantially to the build-up of South Africa's military and intelligence installations. The construction of "Project Advocaat" began in 1968. It consists of "short wave transmitters, relay stations, telephone and telex stations and computerized data processing capability. Its major locations are the Cape Town central headquarters, with regional headquarters at Port Elizabeth, Durban, and Walvis Bay in Namibia... It aids the South African government in its internal security by monitoring the identity and movement of the black population. Second, it has the capability to monitor naval traffic."³²

Advocaat was later integrated within Silvermine, "South Africa's combined services underground surveillance and communications headquarters in the hills near Simonstown." Part of Silvermine's equipment "was installed before 1973, at North Atlantic Treaty Organization request, to link South Africa with a projected South Atlantic-Indian Ocean defense system."³³ The West German corporation AEG Telefunken created Silvermine. The three leading AEG Telefunken officials who directed the installation of Silvermine, Helmut Bodenbender, Aloys Stuck and Friedrich Ziss wrote proudly about their work: Silvermine uses the NATO code ACP-127 for all communications and has ties to "international military and commercial intelligence centers." (They are said to include Diego Garcia, Mauritius, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the U.S. naval base in San Juan, Puerto Rico.) The AEG technicians make clear that Silvermine is principally a military project,³⁴ which provides intelligence for NATO. The West German defense ministry admitted in 1977 that South Africa received permission from NATO to use NATO code numbers on all elements of Silvermine. NATO codes are also used for British and West German shipments for the project "Drumpel," an electronic battlefield being constructed in the north of Namibia to prevent infiltration of SWAPO guerrillas.

In spite of a mandatory U.N. arms embargo against South Africa, the amount of military equipment, arms and ammunition NATO countries have channeled to South Africa is huge: submarines from France, an ammunition plant from the U.S., mines produced in Portugal under a West German license... The U.S., West Germany and France have gone so far as to provide direct support, together with Israel, in South Africa's production of atomic weapons.

South Africa has several major naval bases,³⁵ notably Simonstown and Durban, and, in South Africa's thinking, also Walvis Bay in Namibia. Since June 1975, when the British government, under massive international pressure, was forced to give up its agreement on using Simonstown, NATO ships and submarines have not been using South African facilities. Military officials in NATO countries, however, have been lobbying heavily for the re-opening of South African ports to NATO navies. South Africa has offered its bases to all countries that are willing to collaborate in the spirit of "peace, friendship, and freedom."³⁶

A number of events in the first few months of the Reagan administration have indicated that U.S. Navy ships may be calling on South African ports quite soon. Before the visit of Foreign Minister Pik Botha, several delegations of South African military officers came to Washington.³⁷ Only one of them so far, has been revealed publicly - the visit of a group headed by the chief of military intelligence, General P.W. Van der Westerhuizen and Admiral Willem du Plessis who was Defense Attache at the South African embassy in Washington until 1979. The five South African officers met with officials of the National Security Council, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick on March 15. Kirkpatrick later claimed not to have known with whom she was meeting. Apparently, Kirkpatrick and her staff don't read the New York Times which reported on March 15 that five "top military men from South Africa" who had received visas from the U.S. embassy in Pretoria "without identifying themselves as military men" were in the U.S. Further undermining Kirkpatrick's claim is the statement of American Security Council president John Fisher who said that he wrote a letter to the State Department on February 27 about

36 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

the upcoming visit.

Only two months after the visit by the five military officers, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha himself came to Washington for talks with Reagan and Haig. In Botha's terms, the visit was a great success, especially regarding Namibia. Promises Haig made to Botha have been interpreted to include a "U.S. pledge not to pressure South Africa to accept solutions it believes are counter to its interests."³⁸ In other words, the Reagan administration has no fundamental objections to South Africa's designs for Namibia. High level U.S.-South African talks are continuing. In early June, Deputy Secretary of State William Clark and Chester Crocker went to South Africa where they met with Prime Minister Pieter Botha. Crocker told the House Foreign Relations Committee in a subsequent hearing that they discussed a variety of issues with Botha, including the training of South African Coast Guard officers by U.S. "specialists" and an increase in the number of military attaches each country would maintain at embassies in Washington and Pretoria.

Being racists themselves,³⁹ Reagan officials don't have much difficulty accepting "reforms" by the South African apartheid regime as "progress" which justifies closer collaboration. Chester Crocker, for one, thinks that South Africa "is by its nature part of the West. It is an integral and important element of the Western global economic system. Historically, South Africa is by its nature part of us."⁴⁰ (Emphasis added.)

Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu, contributing editor of Africa Now, predicts that the Reagan administration, "for purely pragmatic reasons... will sooner or later be forced by its more seasoned European allies to retract from making loud statements about its support for South Africa." Babu argues that the change to a quieter approach won't mean a shift in policy. "South Africa is an integral part of the Western economic and military global strategy and the West will do everything in its power not to upset the status quo. Of course there will be some cosmetic reforms of one kind or another to appease Africa and to provide a face-saving device for the pro-American African states... But despite the tactics of moderation the overall strategy in American policy toward

Africa which reflects Western economic and military strategic interests will not change."⁴¹

FRANCE: TAKING CARE OF NATO INTERESTS

There can be little question that South Africa is already a de facto military ally of NATO. It has intervened time and time again, as in Angola, Mozambique and Biafra, side by side with other NATO countries. However, most of NATO's military intervention in Africa is taking place through France.

Ken Adelman, head of Reagan's National Security Council transition team and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from 1975 to 1976, praised French Africa policy as having "clear objectives: greater glory and riches throughout the continent."⁴² France continues to dominate its former African empire. The relationship is "administratively and politically formalized and institutionalized. Paris' overall

hold, from politics to culture, is... persuasive, guaranteed and insured by military, 'technical' and other pacts. It is also obediently supervised by neocolonial governments... French troops are positioned around the continent ready to pounce on any semblance of rebellion and prepared to bail out other imperialist forces who encounter trouble in neocolonial Africa."⁴³

France's Africa Strike Force includes a paratrooper division with 15,000 members based at Caylus in southern France, a marine infantry division with 7,600 members in Brittany as well as over 11,000 troops stationed in Africa.⁴⁴ In its support for South Africa, as even Chester Crocker wrote, France "working quietly through business and intelligence channels... provided Pretoria an entree through which to break out of its diplomatic-political isolation in such French-influenced places as the Ivory Coast [and] Gabon, and it dis-

Mitterrand and Africa

Progressive African governments are hoping that Francois Mitterrand's victory over Valery Giscard d'Estaing will mean a shift toward a non-interventionist

French policy in Africa, and French support on at least one crucial issue: Namibian independence. Indicating a possible non-interventionist policy, Socialist Party Secretary General Lionel Jospin stated to the U.N. Anti-Apartheid Committee in May 1981 that "Namibia is occupied illegally, it has the right to independence and Namibians the right to freedom." The Socialist Party's African Study group also endorsed the right of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. On overall French military policy and bases in Africa, the study group urges a thorough review and wants to replace military treaties that emphasize the defense of regimes with agreements on the defense of states. On South Africa, the study group asks for "immediate measures to stop strengthening the Pretoria regime by financial and technical contributions." All public and semi-public investments, and all aid to private investments in South Africa are to be halted. Further, "a leftist government... will participate in the economic sanctions agreed upon by the United Nations."

Comments Africa News, "in principle at

least, the Socialist government seems committed to new priorities in Africa. The first acid test at the level of implementation will likely be French actions in southern Africa." It appears that Mitterrand will not make drastic changes over-night, and his financial minister, Jacques Delors stated on May 25, 1981 that France plans to honor all of its current contracts, including those for the sale of arms to South Africa. (Washington Post, 5/26/81, p.A-1)

How much will Mitterrand actually change in France's African policy? The odds are against change. France's private economic interests in Africa are tremendous, and much of France's wealth is still based on the exploitation of African peoples and resources. The French military and intelligence agencies - the instruments of the exploitative status quo - are well entrenched in numerous African countries. Many heads of state of Francophone African nations have been put in place and are kept in place by French support and consequently represent predominantly French interests.

To stay in power, Mitterrand will have to produce results with his economic program in France. Since he is determined to do this within the capitalist system, he can do so only by continuing to exploit a major source of France's wealth: Africa.

cretely supported the South African 'dialogue' policy with the African proteges."⁴⁵ France has launched dozens of military interventions in Africa over the last twenty years, in many cases directed or at least supported by the SDECE, the French equivalent of the CIA. At various times, these interventions have been carried out in coordination with other NATO countries as in Zaire in 1978. France has also been instrumental in supporting Jonas Savimbi's UNITA.

Under President Giscard d'Estaing, there had been a shift in France's strategic perspective as expressed in military intervention. France's established supremacy in Africa "has made it the natural instrument for the safeguard of Western interests in large areas of Africa... Military policies have come much more in line with those of NATO."⁴⁶ During the mid-1970s, France emerged as the United States' "strongest ally in Africa," according to State Department officials.

French policy "has converged with U.S. interests to such an extent that Paris at times seems to have assumed the role of an American surrogate. France, commented Le Monde, is rapidly becoming 'the West's policeman in Africa.'"⁴⁷

With the possibility of a changing French role in international politics after the election of Francois Mitterrand, and with a pro-interventionist attitude in the Reagan administration, the U.S. may take over some of France's openly interventionist role in Africa. Haig doesn't seem to mind. In a recent interview he stated that France "has been somewhat more foresighted in the African Continent ..., and I would hope that we would learn some lessons and attempt to emulate that French concern."⁴⁸ The infrastructure for increased NATO intervention in Africa is in place, ranging from Capetown to Cairo. Mohamed Babu predicts that "in Reagan's fight against Communism, progressive African countries will be the first casualty.

What is to be Done? by Abena Kwabena

An eagle reared in a chicken coop will tend to exhibit behavior patterns of a chicken. The late Dr. J.W.K. Aggrey, one of Africa's eminent scholars and educators (who taught and influenced the late President of Ghana, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah) once told a parable about an eagle who had been reared among chickens. The eagle ate and acted like a chicken. But one day a seasoned hunter saw the young eagle, told it who it was and revealed to the eagle that the coop was not its proper place of habitat. The young eagle did not understand the old hunter; the young eagle, of course, had no knowledge of who it was. The hunter repeated to the eagle that its place was not among chickens for the eagle is the King of all birds - the King who soars high above all with the exception of the Almighty Sun. The old hunter decided to prove to the young eagle that it could fly and soar in the heavens like its kind but the young eagle lacked confidence in itself.

The old hunter picked it up and carefully flung it into the air. The young eagle

(Abena Kwabena is an activist living in Washington, D.C.)

fluttered down to eat with the chickens. The hunter returned the following day and after several attempts without success left to come back the following day. This he did. But this time just before dawn and on top of a hill. As the Sun appeared, he told the young eagle to look straight at the rising Sun and fly. He beckoned the young eagle, "you are the mighty eagle, whose place is in the heavens. The King of all birds. Stretch forth your wings to the rays of the Almighty Sun and look straight where it shines and fly, and fly and fly high to take your place where you belong." The eagle looked straight ahead into the heavens, with wings outstretched and waking up to the challenge, labored and hovered but gained strength with each effort. Then, even to the surprise of the seasoned hunter, the young eagle propelled itself like its kind into the heavens with a halo of the Almighty Sun's rays crowning it for finding itself.

This parable still speaks to the Africans (Blacks) scattered all over the world who are subjected to living conditions and controls which systematically sever them from their cultural matrix and make them

... They will be permanently threatened by a proliferation of 'Savimbis' whom the now strengthened CIA is getting ready to unleash... Rightwing military coups will be engineered whenever there is any attempt to adopt policies of independent national development."

Babu warns that U.S. National Security Advisor Richard Allen's stance toward the U.S.'s European allies is that they should "not persist in their archaic philosophy of 'better red than dead;' that is to say, all must be dead before they are red. This will be the guiding philosophy of the Reagan administration."⁴⁹

Reagan's war against liberation movements in Africa as well as in other continents is closely tied to his overall policy: a policy that is likely to create a society in the U.S. increasingly similar to the one in South Africa with power concentrated in the hands of a small white and male elite. The success of the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and

Zimbabwe, and the heroic example of the liberation movement in South Africa and Namibia should be an inspiration for people in the United States.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) as quoted in The Guardian (New York), 3/11/81, p.24.
- 2) Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1980, p.41.
- 3) NATO's Fifteen Nations, Oct.-Nov. 1980, p.24.
- 4) Washington Post (WP), 2/4/81, p.A-1.
- 5) U.S. News and World Report, 6/5/78, pp.21,22.
- 6) Africa Report, Jan.Feb. 1980, p.51.
- 7) as quoted in Africa (London), Nov. 1980, p.52.
- 8) Lewis H. Gann, Peter Duignan, South Africa: War, Revolution, or Peace?, Hoover University Press, Stanford University, CA, 1978, p.6.
- 9) NATO's Fifteen Nations, June-July 1976, p.59.
- 10) South African Digest, 10/17/80, p.4.
- 11) Department of State Bulletin, April 1981, p.24.
- 12) see Rolf Hofmeier, Abhaengigkeit von Suedafrika?, Die Neue Gesellschaft, Bonn, 1980; Informationsdienst Suedliches Afrika (ISSA), March 1981, p.10.
- 13) WP, 5/23/81, p.A-29.
- 14) ISSA, March 1981, p.10.
- 15) Robert M. Price, U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy, Policy Paper in International Affairs, No.8, Institute of International Studies, University of California

(Cont. on page 59)

servants to an unnatural domineering system. Africans for over 400 years have been the victims of this constant, massive and concentrated indoctrination into Western norms and behavior - convincing the eagles that they are chickens. Such damage to Africans cannot be eliminated by the attainment of independence or rather "self-government." This historical damage to a whole race and its descendants is what the famous African scholar and nationalist, Dr. Yosef ben-Jochanan calls "Mentricide" or "Cultural Genocide." Neo-colonialism, as was its parent colonialism, is a peculiar form of cultural genocide which continues to serve the imperialists and capitalists as an instrument for paralyzing the activity of the African masses in their struggle against the imperial order even after formal independence.

Because of this dominance of capitalist European values over African elites - or what Frantz Fanon called "Black Skin White Mask" - imperialism and neo-colonialism will continue to have a field day in Africa for the next two decades or so. The bourgeoisie in Africa, the Caribbean, Central and South America, Asia and the Pacific Islands keep tagging at the coat-tails of the Reagans and Thatchers trembling over the question of "how do we deflect the rising anger of our population"

and call on the Reagan administration to hurry up with security arrangements that would preserve their rule and not put them in the same boat as the Bokassas.

Africa is rising up to its socialist duty, but that process can be sped up tremendously by people struggling in the bellies of the monsters for the freedom of Africa. Important gains have been made. In the Caribbean, trade union workers in Antigua toppled a government because it collaborated with South Africa via the U.S. Space Research Company. In the U.S., when the poor blacks (Africans) in Orlando, Florida erupted, they were quite expressive about the kind of treatment meted out to the Haitian "boat people." And the African blood running through the veins of Cubans and their internationalist responsibility propelled them to go to the aid of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Ethiopia.


The ruling class is naturally concerned. They meet to escalate the "cold war," and to manufacture wars far away from their own borders to test their strength and might. But what happens? They are beaten even in their combined maneuvers in Zimbabwe and Nicaragua.

With increasing solidarity of Africans and oppressed peoples everywhere, the eagle will fly.

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 39

U.S. and NATO Facilities in Africa

U.S. and NATO military forces have access to and/or maintain the following military and intelligence facilities in Africa.



1-3: In a mid-May, 1981 meeting in Belgium, NATO defense ministers agreed that they would provide "facilities for the U.S. defense of Middle Eastern oil fields."¹ While concrete plans for NATO "defense" of the oil fields have yet to be articulated, it is obvious that Egypt, with its U.S. facilities, will become an integral component of the NATO plan.

At present, the U.S. has free access to

40 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

Cairo West airbase (1) and Qena airbase (2) from where the April 1980 raid into Iran was launched. The U.S. is also financing the completion of the Ras Banas naval facility (3) at the Red Sea which is reportedly "perfectly located for American regional military purposes."² The Pentagon has budgeted "funds to improve the Ras Banas base to accommodate warplanes and a division (18,000) troops."³ In addition,

AWACS spy planes have been stationed in Egypt, and Egypt is the recipient of one of the largest military and economic aid programs in the world - over \$1 billion a year since 1974.

In addition to the several hundred U.S. military and civilian advisors presently in Egypt, it is expected that by April 1982 at least another 1,000 U.S. troops will be stationed on Egypt's Sinai Peninsula after completion of the Israeli withdrawal. A total force of 2,500 troops will be stationed in a "buffer zone" between Egypt and Israel. Since the United Nations is not willing to provide the troops because of the nature of the Camp David Treaty, and other U.S. allies are somewhat hesitant, the U.S. will probably supply most of them. At least publicly, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is expressing displeasure with the prospect of the Israeli occupation of the Sinai being replaced by U.S. troops. Sadat, who has publicly offered the use of Egyptian facilities to the U.S. a number of times, sees a need to save face by stating that he is opposed to having foreign troops permanently on Egyptian soil. He has been especially "concerned" about statements that a U.S. "peacekeeping force" in the Sinai "would be the first step in the formation of a permanent United States contingent in the Middle East."⁴

Obviously, military bases in Egypt, perhaps the most important U.S. military ally in the Arab world, are primarily directed toward oil producing countries in the region. However, in a number of instances the Egyptian government, which is almost completely dependent on U.S. military and economic aid, has served as U.S. policeman in Africa. On May 3, 1977 Sadat sent pilots to help out Zaire's President Mobutu who was faced with "unrest" in the Shaba province; in summer, 1977, Egypt transported arms to Somali forces fighting in the Ogaden in U.S.-supplied C-130 transport planes; on March 2, 1979, the Egyptian defense ministry announced that Zairian pilots would be trained in Cairo; in April the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that Egypt, now heavily supplied by the U.S., is shipping its Soviet weapons to Zaire, Somalia, Zambia and the Eritrean Liberation Front.⁵ More recently, Sadat began supplying weapons and ammunition to the rebel forces of Chad's former defense minister, Hissene Habre. (Habre,

who is reportedly supported by France, has also asked the U.S. for military aid.⁶) More than 50 Egyptian military advisors are in Somalia training the Somali troops for their battles against Ethiopia. Sadat also maintains contact with some Libyan opposition groups based in Cairo⁷ and has joined Sudanese president Jaafar Nimeri in a call for the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya.

⁴: There are no U.S. facilities in Sudan. However, with the election of Ronald Reagan, the Sudanese government has moved far up on the U.S. list of friendly countries. Almost immediately the administration decided to increase U.S. military aid from \$30 million to \$100 million in the fiscal year beginning September 1, 1981 (the largest aid package in Africa after Egypt), and Sudanese president Nimeri also "expressed interest in U.S. financing for improving rudimentary Sudanese air and naval facilities that... could be made available to American and other friendly forces, presumably Egypt's."⁸ According to the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Sitassah, Nimeri was discussing the possibility of building a U.S. military base at Suakin on the Red Sea already with the Carter administration in summer 1980. Nimeri also wants a U.S. training mission, and is especially interested in improving Sudan's military intelligence capacity.⁹

Egypt and Sudan signed a joint defense pact in July 1976, and Sudan, a member of the Arab League, restored full diplomatic relations with Egypt in March 1981. Egyptian weapons to Habre went through Sudan. Nimeri further stated that he has opened Sudan "for any Chadian citizen to use the Sudan for fighting the Libyans and driving them out of Chad."¹⁰

France has also stepped up its military aid to Sudan. After the visit of a high-level French military mission, former French foreign minister Robert Galley signed a technical military assistance pact between the two countries which includes the training of Sudanese officers and the sending of French military advisors to Sudan.

There have been no clear indications from either France or the U.S. as to how far they are willing to go in their support of the Nimeri government, or whether the Reagan administration wants to take

Nimeri up on his base offer. While the U.S. government is certainly interested in having Sudan as a close ally capable of taking care of U.S. interests, especially in its activities against Libya, the Reagan administration might be hesitant to construct facilities in Sudan given the lack of any military and economic infrastructure for a U.S. base and the accessibility of facilities in Sudan's neighboring countries, Egypt and Kenya.

5: Djibouti is the largest French naval and air base in Africa. 4,000 French troops are permanently stationed in this small country, including air force troops maintaining and flying 10 Mirage fighters, 30 tanks in two squadrons, two batteries of field artillery and of anti-aircraft artillery, as well as about 800 troops of the 13th Demibrigade of the French Foreign Legion.¹¹ Djibouti's naval facilities are the main base for France's large fleet in the Indian Ocean, and before the U.S. naval buildup over the last three years, Djibouti was the largest naval base in the region.

U.S. ships use Djibouti to take on fuel and provisions. Beyond these arrangements, Djibouti is officially "off limits" to the U.S., but "in private conversations, French officials say the United States probably could count on using French facilities in Djibouti in a major crisis," but the U.S. should be careful not to "compromise" the continued French presence there by "publicly or formally seeking anything in advance."¹²

6-7: The Somali government offered the U.S. use of the Berbera naval facility (6) - constructed with Soviet aid - almost immediately after the Soviet-Somali rift in 1977. At the time, the U.S. government refused because officially it hesitated to get involved in the Somali-Ethiopian fighting in the Ogaden. At the same time, however, there have been no protests from U.S. officials about U.S. client Anwar Sadat's supplying of Somalia - something he was able to do thanks to generous U.S. military aid.

Today, the U.S. has a base at Berbera with U.S. troops permanently stationed there. Berbera is a major military facility including a 15,000 foot runway capable of servicing B-52 bombers, ample storage sites, pipeline facilities and barracks.

Some issues regarding the U.S. base in Berbera remain unsolved. Somali president Mohamed Siad Barré wants more U.S. military and economic aid (Somalia also receives large amounts of aid from Saudi Arabia and West Germany), and in spite of its interventionist policy, the Reagan administration is not too eager to get involved openly in the fighting between Somalia and Ethiopia. Siad Barré has pledged to abide by restrictions placed on U.S. arms sales to Somalia (that they are not to be used in the Ogaden). But even if Barré keeps his promise, U.S. weapons play a major role in the Ogaden war since the U.S. shipments allow the Somali army to use more of their old equipment in the Ogaden.

The Reagan administration has also been unwilling to increase aid to Somalia by as much as Barré wanted. However, in spite of these problems, the U.S. is developing Berbera into one of the most important U.S. facilities in Africa and the Indian Ocean region. U.S. ships also are using Mogadishu port (7).

8-9: In exchange for economic and military aid, the U.S. Air Force has access to Embakasi and Nanyuki airports (8), and the U.S. Navy has been using Mombasa (9) for years. In 1980 alone, the U.S. Navy made 40 visits.¹³ Presently, a number of projects are underway to improve U.S. military facilities in Kenya, including construction of buildings for communications and navigational aids with an antenna structure and electronic equipment, storage sites for ammunition, and an additional runway.¹⁴

The British military also has been advising the Kenyan military, and Britain and Kenya have a defense pact.

10: French intelligence facility on Desrouches island.¹⁵

11: Under a June 29, 1976 agreement, the U.S. maintains a "tracking and telemetry facility on Mahe Island, the largest island of the Seychelles. (The Seychelles became independent on that very day, and the terms of the agreement had been finalized on March 18, 1976 when the Seychelles were still a British colony. In fact, the station had been operating on Mahe already since 1967.) Under the 1976 agreement, which expires in 1986, U.S. Air Force officials have access to the tracking station without having to go through

"immigration inspection and any registration or control as aliens."

12: Diego Garcia island is the "linchpin of the U.S. security ring" in the Indian Ocean, and the Pentagon will have spent "a total of \$1 billion on the atoll upon completion. It is already capable of servicing U.S. aircraft carriers, nuclear-tipped Polaris/Poseidon submarines" and is able to handle B-52 bombers.¹⁶ Diego Garcia also has "fuel storage capacities sufficient to sustain air and naval operations in the area for 30 days. The U.S. is also constructing an electronic station for rapid radio communication with ships and planes that operate in the Indian Ocean."¹⁷ After the declaration of the "Carter Doctrine" in January 1980, the Pentagon pre-positioned seven cargo ships "with weapons and supplies to support a 12,000 man Marine brigade" on Diego Garcia.¹⁸ Presently, the U.S. base on the island also contains sophisticated communication equipment and is used for intelligence purposes.

At the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Freetown, Sierra Leone in July 1980, a resolution was passed which said that military activity on Diego Garcia "presents a threat to the whole of Africa." The same resolution also backed Mauritius' claim to Diego Garcia and declared that the island "has always been an integral part of Mauritius" and that it was "not ceded to Britain for military purposes."

Formerly part of the British colony Mauritius, Diego Garcia was ceded to Britain in 1965 - before Mauritius became independent (1968). The Johnson administration secretly gave Britain a \$14 million credit to buy Diego Garcia. Part of the agreement between Britain and Mauritius was that the island would be used only as a communication facility and not as a military base. In 1967, Britain and the U.S. signed an accord which leased Diego Garcia to the U.S. for 50 years. The agreement provided that all of Diego Garcia's inhabitants - approximately 1,200 - were to be evacuated from the island. Britain's purchase of Diego Garcia, its leasing to the U.S. for military purposes and the expulsion of the inhabitants constitute a clear violation of international law and of a U.N. resolution of December 14, 1960 concerning the integrity of a colonial territory.¹⁹

Mauritius' Prime Minister Seewoosagar

Ramgoolam "who has taken a strong pro-Western position, has been forced by political reality to... demand the return of Diego Garcia... But he has also supported the presence of the United States at the base." Ramgoolam simply wants Mauritius to collect the rent from the U.S., instead of Britain.

However, there is strong sentiment on Mauritius against the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia, and former residents of Diego Garcia have staged numerous protest actions including a hunger strike in March 1981. Mauritian opposition parties, which have steadily increased their votes over the last years, are determined to intensify the campaign to force the U.S. to vacate Diego Garcia. They would also bar U.S. warships from visiting other ports in Mauritius.²⁰

13: France has a number of intelligence facilities on the island of Tromelin. Indeed, some countries in the Indian Ocean charge that France transformed Tromelin into a relay station for its paramilitary units. France claims sovereignty over Tromelin, but Mauritius officially includes the island among its dependencies.

14-15: France has a naval base, intelligence facilities, and a contingent of more than 2,000 troops equipped with nuclear weapons (14) on Reunion Island.²¹ Other accounts put the number of troops somewhat lower.

Bases on Reunion are open to the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. runs an Omega Very Low Frequency navigation station on Reunion (15). Omega stations are of special importance for submarines, and U.S. nuclear submarines are equipped with Omega receivers. Since there are only a total of eight Omega stations necessary to send signals to all oceans, any country hosting an Omega station is in the immediate danger of being attacked in war time. (For more on Omega, see CounterSpy, vol.4 no.1 and vol.5 no.2.)

16: France maintains a naval facility on Mauritius, and Port Louis is frequently called on by U.S. ships. In addition, the government of Mauritius "has been uniformly responsive to U.S. requests to provide access to its facilities by units of the Indian Ocean Task Force."²² Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British counterpart of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), also maintains a

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 43

listening station on Mauritius.²³

17: France is illegally occupying the island of Mayotte and maintains a base there for ships and aircraft. The facility is run by several hundred French Foreign Legion troops. Mayotte is part of the Comoro islands, whose government was installed by French mercenaries in May 1978.

18: Juan de Nova harbors a French naval base. An OAU resolution in July 1980 affirmed the sovereignty of Malagasy over the island, but the French government has not made any serious effort since then to return the island to Malagasy. The OAU resolution also stated that, contrary to French claims, Bassas de India and Europe islands are part of Malagasy.

19: French naval base on Bassas de India island.

20: French naval base on Europe island.

21: Crozet, French intelligence facility.

22: French intelligence facility on Kerguelen.

23-25: The U.S. has overflight, landing and naval fueling rights in Zaire (23), and the U.S. (NASA) and Zaire run a joint satellite ground station near Kinshasa (24) under a January 31, 1975 agreement. Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko, who, according to Stephen Talbot, came to power in 1965 "with the active support of the CIA,"²⁴ is being kept in power only by outside military assistance and the presence of French, Egyptian, and Belgian troops and advisors in his country. There are presently some 110 Belgian military advisors in Zaire under a 1979 cooperation agreement, and, during his Zaire visit in March 1981 Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens promised to increase their number. Belgian Defense Minister Charles Poswick had promised earlier to "help solve the technological and training problems" of a Zairian division.²⁵ In addition, in September 1980, the People's Republic of China agreed to train Zairian anti-guerrilla commandos in Kisangani; maintain armored vehicles in Mbanza-Ngungu; and install and maintain radar equipment for the Zairian Navy in Banana.²⁶

The West Germany company OTRAG (Orbital Transport and Missiles, Ltd.) which works closely with the West German military, maintains a 30,000 square mile territory

44 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

in Zaire (25). Under a contract with Mobutu's government, OTRAG will lease the territory until the year 2000. OTRAG is working on the development of cheap missiles, and has attempted three launches - two of which were successful. In mid-1979, under international pressure, Mobutu asked OTRAG not to launch any more missiles in the area. An OTRAG spokesperson commented that OTRAG had a number of offers from other countries, and might launch its missiles from ships in the future.²⁷

26: GCHQ maintains a signals intelligence facility in Malawi.

27: A NASA station in Gaborone, Botswana provided a crucial link in the 15 groundstations used to monitor the April 1981 space shuttle flight. Africa Now said that even Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham (ret.) confirmed that the main purpose of the shuttle is military when he stated that "the shuttle gives us a strategic edge over the Soviet Union."²⁸

28-30: Durban naval base (28), although presently not used by NATO ships, is open to NATO vessels. Monitoring stations at Durban provide intelligence to NATO.

Simonstown naval base (29), at the present time, is not used by NATO navies. Due to heavy internal and external pressure, the British Navy had to withdraw from Simonstown in 1976. South African officials, however, have expressed a number of times their willingness to have NATO navies use Simonstown.²⁹ Project Silvermine, a sophisticated intelligence gathering project, is located close to the Simonstown base.

The U.S. also runs a satellite tracking station at Pretoria (30).³⁰

31: Walvis Bay in Namibia is linked to Silvermine and provides intelligence to NATO.

32: British naval facility on St. Helena.

33: The U.S. maintains a satellite tracking station on Ascension, and the GCHQ has a listening station there.

34: There are 600 elite French troops at Libreville and at Port Gentil, Gabon. Gabon's relations with France are extremely close, so close that some critics call Gabon "a virtual French colony." France and Gabon hold regular joint maneuvers in Gabon, and usually additional French

troops are brought in for the occasion. France has strong influence on all aspects of the Gabonese security system; during the 1977 OAU conference in Gabon, for example, President Omar Bongo called in French police to take care of security.

U.S. Navy ships "regularly make port calls at Libreville, and overflight and landing rights are routinely granted U.S. military aircraft." U.S. Air Force planes have "used Gabonese airports to support peacekeeping operations in Zaire."³¹

35: During 1979 and 1980, "U.S. Navy ships have made highly successful port calls" in Equatorial Guinea.³² There are a number of Spanish military advisors in Equatorial Guinea, and after the 1979 coup, 100 Moroccan troops went there to "maintain security."³³

36: Cameroon, whose military is fully dependent on French arms, training, and advisors, routinely grants overflight and landing rights to the U.S. Air Force, and since fall 1980, the U.S. Navy has been allowed to call on Cameroon's ports. (France, of course, has been enjoying these privileges all along.) In 1980, the U.S. also reopened a Defense Attache Office in Yaounde.³⁴

37: After French troops flew into the Central African Empire - now Central African Republic (CAR) - in September 1979 to overthrow Emperor Bokassa, they installed David Dacko, who had been Bokassa's advisor during three years of his reign. Some 2,000 French troops are presently in CAR, including 1,000 at Bouar. They assisted Dacko in winning the March 1981 presidential elections. Comments Jeune Afrique: "Nothing has ended with the fall of Bokassa. French troops have staged a coup d'etat, and may remain to impede the real revolution. The Emperor has fled, long live the Empire!"³⁵

The French government claimed that the dictator Bokassa had to be overthrown because of his extremely repressive and cruel rule - however, they forgot to mention that it was only through French military, intelligence, and economic aid that Bokassa took power in the first place.

38: France has 450 troops in Port Bouet and Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Under a 1961 bilateral technical military assistance agreement with France, the Ivory Coast agrees to "make available the installa-

tions and facilities required by French forces in its territory," while France furnishes military equipment, training and an advisory mission. France has free access to Abidjan international airport and Abidjan port. France and the Ivory Coast regularly hold joint military maneuvers. This year, exercises took place from March 7 to 12.³⁷ For several years, "the Ivory Coast has extended overflight rights to U.S. Air Force aircraft and port facilities to the U.S. Navy."³⁸

39: Since World War II, Liberia has been a very reliable U.S. military ally. A defense agreement, signed in 1959, and a variety of other military agreements, in effect puts the U.S. in charge of the Liberian military. The U.S. has base rights in Monrovia and complete access to Robertsfield airport, which is run by Pan American World Airways. Liberia is entirely dependent on U.S. military training and aid. The U.S. also runs an Omega navigation station in Paynesward and two Voice of America stations in Careysburg and Brewerville. (For more on U.S. installations in Liberia, see CounterSpy vol.5 no.2)

Military relations with Liberia have been strengthened since the ouster of William Tolbert in April 1980. Head of State, Samuel Doe has expressed his desire for a close U.S. military alliance, and the Reagan administration has dramatically increased aid to Doe for 1982 by ten-fold. Doe also left intact a regulation "whereby U.S.-owned, Liberian-registered ships are available to the U.S. Defence Department in time of emergency."³⁹

At the first anniversary of Doe's coup, the U.S. sent some 100 Green Berets from Fort Bragg and the 7,800 ton, missile firing U.S.S. Thorn. The Green Berets held a parachute show and stayed in the country for one month to conduct infantry training courses. Five other teams of U.S. military training personnel are conducting courses in Liberia throughout 1981.⁴⁰

Immediately after the coup, the U.S. expressed its outrage about Doe's takeover and subsequent executions of former government officials. However, U.S. officials quickly changed their rhetoric and today, as Africa magazine said, "the U.S. has a vested interest in keeping Doe in power, not so much out of any admiration for the military regime's ability as for the lack of a better alternative."⁴¹

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 45

40: Some 1,200 French infantry marine troops are permanently stationed in Oakem and Dakar, Senegal. France and Senegal have a number of military cooperation agreements, many of them stemming from the colonial years. In 1966, the two countries signed agreements allowing the French military virtually unrestricted use of naval and air bases in Senegal. French Navy ships regularly visit Senegalese ports. According to a U.S. governmental document, arrangements were "probably included" in the French-Senegalese agreements "whereby France could assist, upon request of the Senegalese government, in case of serious civil disorder."⁴² Senegal also has "assisted the U.S. by granting ready access to its excellent communications and transportation facilities,⁴³ and hosts a ground-station to monitor U.S. space shuttle flights.⁴⁴

41: According to Informationsdienst Suedliches Afrika (issa, Information Service Southern Africa, West Germany), the U.S. Navy operates underwater sensors out of Mindelo, Cape Verde.⁴⁵

42: Niger has a mutual defense treaty with France. Presently, there are a number of French military advisors training Niger's armed forces. On March 8, 1981 then-French Defense Minister Robert Galley went to Niger to talk about stationing French troops there to "help counter the Libyan presence in Chad."⁴⁶ After Niger broke relations with Libya over what Niger's military head of state, Seyni Kountche, a former intelligence officer, perceives as a Libyan invasion of Chad, the French government reportedly guaranteed Kountche direct military assistance should his rule come in danger - a danger that could always be interpreted as "Libyan inspired." The French government is especially worried about the "stability" of Niger since it has one of the world's largest uranium resources, a large part of which is sold to France.

43: The U.S. maintains a radar station on the Canary Islands.

44: NATO maintains crucial bases on the Azores, an island group controlled by Portugal, including ports on Faial, San Jorge, Terceira and San Miguel islands, and three air bases, Lajes air base on Terceira, the most important facility; Ponta Delgada on San Miguel and Vila do

Porto on Santa Maria. The air bases are "a convenient way station for air traffic en route from the United States" to Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Lajes air base, for example, was essential for U.S. military shipments to Israel during the 1973 war.

Some 1,000 troops are permanently stationed on the Azores, and a number of Portuguese military facilities were built on the Azores with "NATO common infrastructure funds." Such facilities "are those fixed military facilities which are constructed at the request of international commanders of NATO for the training of international forces in peacetime and for their wartime operational use... They include... radio navigational aids, signals and telecommunication facilities, training areas, radar warning installations, petroleum storage tanks... and missile installations."

Beside their role as through-way and staging facilities, the bases on the Azores are essential for anti-submarine warfare. They contain the "most sophisticated monitoring equipment and antisubmarine weapons in the U.S. arsenal." Lajes also hosts a Defense Satellite Communications System earth terminal which transmits messages to the naval air station at Lakehurst, N.J.⁴⁷

45-46: Since its independence in 1956, Morocco has been an important U.S. military ally. The U.S. 6th Fleet, including its nuclear-powered ships, has unrestricted access to Morocco's ports, most notably Kenitra (45) and Tangier (46). According to a 1979 New Statesman article, the NSA has also "made arrangements for setting up three stations in Morocco."⁴⁸

Through weapons sales and U.S. military personnel in Morocco, the U.S. maintains a strong hold over Morocco's armed forces. Morocco hosts one of the largest U.S. assistance programs in Africa, the U.S. has a Military Assistance Advisory Group, the Morocco-U.S. Liaison Office (MUSLO) as well as occasional training teams in the country. MUSLO's duties include the provision of "'on the spot' advice and assistance to Morocco's field units to solve equipment and maintenance problems."⁴⁹ Thus, MUSLO directly supports Morocco's war against the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic (RASD). (The Polisario people of the Western Sahara declared the establishment of their republic on February 27,

1976. Since then, the RASD has been recognized by the majority of the member countries of the OAU. The territory of the RASD is very rich in minerals, especially phosphates, and possibly oil.)

The U.S. has supplied crucial military support to Morocco's King Hassan in his unsuccessful war to conquer the RASD. Equipment supplied by the U.S. includes C-130 transport planes, F-5 fighter planes, Cobra gunship helicopters equipped with TOW anti-tank missiles, and armed Bronco reconnaissance planes has been used in the RASD in spite of a 1960 agreement restricting its use to Morocco proper. Even though former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotos testified that "since Moroccan representatives made clear to us they planned to use in the Sahara a number of military items they proposed to buy from us," arms sales went ahead under the Carter administration. After a meeting in Washington in late 1978, Carter and Hassan acknowledged "their identity of view concerning the international problems they examined" including the "situation in Africa."⁵⁰

In late January 1981, the CIA sponsored a visit to the U.S. by a special emissary of King Hassan. The emissary met for over an hour with Secretary of State Haig; one day after the meeting Haig notified Congress of his intention to sell 108 M-60 tanks to Morocco as well as six sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft.⁵¹

Morocco also receives arms from France (200 French military advisors are reported to be in Morocco, and French pilots have flown "reconnaissance missions" over the RASD), Italy and South Africa. On the fifth anniversary of the RASD, journalists were shown large quantities of captured Moroccan vehicles and other military equipment including South African-built light armored cars.⁵²

Wilfred Burchett wrote several years ago that Morocco's fight against the Polisario people "must always be seen in the context of Hassan's representing American neo-colonialism in the region."⁵³ Indeed, Morocco has twice sent troops to Zaire and

(CounterSpy thanks Informationsdienst Suedliches Afrika, a monthly magazine on Southern Africa, for their assistance in compiling this information. Their address: ISSA, Bluecherstr.14, 5300 Bonn, West Germany.)

kept them there for months to prop up President Mobutu's regime. Hassan has also been instrumental in getting the "peace talks" between the Israeli and Egyptian governments underway, and at the same time, Morocco is attempting to undermine the government of Mauritania.⁵⁴ A coup attempt in Mauritania on March 16, 1981 was staged by former Mauritanian officers who had been living in Morocco. Likewise, with U.S. backing, Hassan continues his hostile attitude toward neighboring Algeria which seems to have been placed on the list of enemy countries by the Reagan administration.

Morocco also hosts a Voice of America station with eight transmitters near Tangier. They broadcast to Europe, the Soviet Union, North Africa and South Asia. Total daily broadcast time is over 50 hours.

⁴⁷: According to the State Department, Tunisia "welcomes Sixth Fleet vessels, including nuclear warships, in its ports." After referring to a guerrilla attack against the town of Gafsa and "other border incursions from Libya," the State Department claims that a "significantly increased U.S. security assistance program is required to assist the Tunisian Government to meet its urgent military needs."⁵⁵

France provided direct military assistance during the Gafsa incident in early 1980 (which should rather be described as an internal revolt), and hundreds of Tunisian officers and "specialists" are being trained in France.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Washington Star (WS), 5/13/81, p.A-10.
- 2) Washington Post (WP), 1/19/81, p.A-21.
- 3) Africa (London), 10/80, p.104.
- 4) New York Times (NYT), 5/4/81, p.A-8.
- 5) MERIP Report, 9/80, pp.29,30.
- 6) Christian Science Monitor (CSM), 3/31/81.
- 7) see Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 2/9/81, p.A-1.
- 8) WP, 4/1/81.
- 9) see African Economic Digest (AED), 9/5/80, p.10.
- 10) WP, 4/1/81.
- 11) WP, 6/10/80; NYT, 5/7/81, p.A-5.
- 12) WP, 7/6/80, p.A-14.
- 13) WP, 2/3/81, p.A-22.
- 14) AED, 1/30/80, p.6.
- 15) Informationsdienst Suedliches Afrika, 3/81, p.12.
- 16) cf supra, #3, pp.103, 104.
- 17) Newsfront International, 4/16-30/81, p.4.
- 18) cf supra, #3, p.102.
- 19) see Africa, 9/80, p.28.
- 20) see NYT, 4/21/81, p.A-8.
- 21) cf supra, #17.
- 22) Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1982, p.323.
- 23) New Statesman, 2/2/79.
- 24) Inquiry, 3/20/78, p.19.
- 25) AED, 9/12/80, p.19

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 47

- 26) Internationales Afrikaforum (West Germany), vol.4, 1980, p.341.
 27) African Business, 6/79, p.9.
 28) Africa Now (London), 5/81, p.10.
 29) South African Digest, 10/24/80, p.2.
 30) Dr. Frank Barnaby (ed.), World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook, Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1980, p.293.
 31) cf supra, #22, p.291.
 32) *ibid.*, p.287.
 33) Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (London), 1/80 p.102.
 34) cf supra, #22, p.271.
 35) AFP, 5/7/81, as quoted in FBIS, 5/8/81, p.S-1.
 36) as quoted in USA Today, 9/80, p.24.
 37) see FBIS, 3/30/81, p.K-1.
 38) cf supra, #22, p.303.
 39) AED, 10/10/80, p.13.
 40) see NYT, 4/12/81, p.A-8; Africa, 5/81, pp.28-30.
 41) Africa, 5/81, p.30.

- 42) Harold Nelson, et.al., U.S. Area Handbook for Senegal, U.S. G.P.O., 1974, p.337.
 43) cf supra, #22, p.339.
 44) cf supra, #28.
 45) cf supra, #15.
 46) AFP, 3/7/81, as quoted in FBIS, 3/9/81, p.T-3.
 47) Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 1979, pp.50-53.
 48) cf supra, #23, p.144.
 49) Study by the Staff of the U.S. General Accounting Office, Profiles of Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Fifteen Countries, 9/1/78, p.66.
 50) Africa Report, Jan.-Feb.1979, p.53.
 51) Defense Week, 2/2/81, pp.1,9.
 52) Africa, 4/81, p.61.
 53) The Guardian (New York), 2/11/76, p.20.
 54) Strategy Week, 7/7-13/80, p.10.
 55) cf supra, #22, p.163.

Secret 1981 South Africa Documents

Document 1

The following is a "Secret" South African document. It outlines the history of U.S.-South African collaboration on nuclear issues since World War II from the South African point of view.

SECRET

14 May 1981

SOUTH AFRICAN - UNITED STATES NUCLEAR RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. South African - United States nuclear relations date back to just after the second World War when the Western Allies, and in particular the United States, were in dire need of uranium for their military programmes.

In collaboration with the Combined Development Agency (CDA), South Africa developed its uranium industry to supply uranium under contract to the CDA free of safeguards. These contracts expired in the late sixties when our production reached a level of over 3,000 tons per annum. At that time the United States also placed an embargo on foreign imports of uranium to the States.

2. An Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy with a duration of 10 years was concluded with the
 48 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

U.S. in 1957. Under this Agreement the U.S. undertook to sanction the supply of the SAFARI research reactor to South Africa and to meet the fuel requirements for this reactor under a bilateral U.S.-S.A. safeguards agreement. The 1957 Agreement for Co-operation was subsequently reviewed, amended and renewed in 1962, 1967 and again in 1974. (The 1962 amendment permitted the rental of H.E.U. [Highly Enriched Uranium] for SAFARI in addition to the purchase thereof by South Africa. The agreement was renewed in 1967 for a further 10 years after South Africa had on the insistence of the USA given assurances on its policy with regard to uranium sales. The trilateral safeguards agreement between the USA, South Africa and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] was also amended to ensure the continued application of safeguards after expiry of the U.S.-S.A. agreement.)

In 1974 the agreement was extended from 20 to 30 years, that is until 2007, and also to provide for the supply of separating (sic) working units by the United States for the life of the proposed Koeberg reactors (that is for 25 years after 1982).

In terms of this arrangement a contract for enriched uranium for the Koeberg reactors was concluded with ERDA, which was later transferred to DOE [Department of Energy].

It must be emphasized that the 1974 agreement as well as the DOE supply contracts only provided for IAEA safeguards on such facilities and on the fuel to be transferred to South Africa by the USA.

These agreements and safeguards arrangements were and are still diligently honoured by South Africa.

3. During the latter half of 1976 it became clear to South Africa that it would become increasingly difficult to obtain fuel for its research reactor (SAFARI) from the U.S. Although the U.S. never refused the required export permit for a batch of fuel, at that time on order and paid for by South Africa, unacceptable delays were experienced resulting in the cancellation of the order by South Africa when it became evident in 1977 that the delivery of the fuel would not be allowed by the previous U.S. Administration.

4. In June of 1978 discussions took place in Pretoria on nuclear relations between the U.S. and South Africa. During these discussions it became abundantly clear that the U.S. would not supply the fuel in question unless South Africa acceded to NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and subjected all its nuclear facilities and activities to international safeguards. More restrictive conditions were thus imposed unilaterally by the U.S. after conclusion of the contract.

5. South Africa has repeatedly stated that it will observe the principles of the NPT and also indicated that it was in principle not opposed to accession to the NPT if its basic requirements could be met.

6. Subsequent discussions to those in June 1978 revealed that even if South Africa should accede to the NPT, the U.S. would find it difficult to provide South Africa timeously with the enriched uranium for Koeberg. South Africa was also prevented, through U.S. intervention, from obtaining fuel from any other source unless it accepted the conditions unilaterally imposed on South Africa by the U.S.

THE PRESENT POSITION

7. Koeberg is scheduled for initial fuel loading in March 1982, and as no firm undertaking for the supply of enriched uranium could as yet be obtained, the chances are that the scheduled start-up of

Koeberg would be seriously delayed at great cost to South Africa.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION

8. (i) As has been indicated in the past, South Africa is not in principle opposed to the NPT, provided that its basic requirements can be met.

(ii) As in the past, South Africa will continue to conduct and administer its nuclear affairs in a manner which is in line with the spirit, principles and goals of the NPT.

(iii) South Africa's nuclear programmes are geared to the peaceful application of nuclear energy and at no time has she tested a nuclear device.

9. It must be realized that South Africa is threatened by the USSR and its associates and by certain African countries with Soviet support and encouragement. South Africa has no hope of any assistance from the U.N. in case of attack. On the contrary, it is continually being threatened with action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. While this state of affairs continues South Africa cannot in the interest of its own security sign the NPT and thus set the minds of its would-be attackers to rest, allowing them to proceed freely with their plans against us.

WHAT SOUTH AFRICA REQUESTS

10. (a) That the United States Government give an undertaking that export permits will be issued for delivery of enriched uranium to France;

(b) if the U.S. feels it cannot supply the enriched uranium through France timeously for the Koeberg reactor in present circumstances, the U.S. makes it known to France that it would not insist on the conditions that it imposed unilaterally on South Africa after the signature of the original supply contracts if France were to supply the fuel, and

(c) DOE agrees either to cancel the present contract for the supply of enriched uranium to ESCOM at no cost, or DOE agrees to postpone execution of the contract at no cost until such time as an agreement can be reached between the United States and South African authorities which would permit the United States to resume deliveries of fuel to South Africa.

Document 2

The following "Memorandum of Conversation" gives a concise account of Assistant Secretary of State-designate Chester Crocker's meeting with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha and Defense Minister Magnus Malan in Pretoria on April 15 and 16. The document was leaked from the State Department and has been widely quoted in the U.S. media. CounterSpy is reprinting it in full length.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

South Africa:

Foreign Minister Pik Botha
Defense Minister Magnus Malan

U.S.:

Assistant Secretary-designate Crocker
Alan Keyes, S/P

DATE & PLACE:

April 15/16, 1981, Pretoria

SUBJECT:

Discussions, with SAG

COPIES TO:

AF, IO-McElhane, S/P-Keyes, AF/S

U.S.-Africa Relations:

Botha opened first day's discussion by expressing unhappiness over what SAG perceives as backsliding by Administration from view of South Africa taken during U.S. presidential campaign. Reagan campaign statements produced high expectations in South Africa. But, administration, in response to views of allies, such as U.K. and Germany, and to influence of State Department professionals, has disappointed SAG expectations. USG handling of visit by military officers example of this. Botha raised issue of trust, referring to earlier "McHenry" duplicity on issue of SWAPO bases.

However, he affirmed that it means a great deal to SAG to have good relations with U.S. and that SAG understands U.S. problems in maintaining friendly relations with black African states. To begin second day's discussion, Crocker noted that, though he hadn't come to discuss South Africa's internal affairs, it was clear that positive movement domestically would make

50 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

it easier for the U.S. to work with SAG. U.S. ability to develop full relations with SAG depends on success of Prime Minister Botha's program and extent to which it is seen as broadening SAG's domestic support. "Pik" Botha cautioned against making success of P. W. Botha's program a condition of U.S./South African relations. Crocker responded with view that this is not a condition but reflects U.S. desire to support positive trends. In response Pik Botha went more fully into reasons for deep SAG distrust of U.S. Botha reiterated view that, as result of pressure from African states in U.N., and influence of State Department, USG has backed away from initial recognition of importance of its interests in southern Africa (read South Africa). He doubted whether, given domestic pressure and views of such African states as Nigeria, U.S. could continue any policy favorable to South Africa, which would not provoke constant criticism.

In response, Crocker replied that present Administration would have more backbone in face of pressure than previous one. U.S. has many diverse interests and responsibilities, but will stand up for what we think right. Our objective is to increase SAG confidence.

Toward end of discussion, in context of Angola issue, Botha again came back to question of trust. He said he is suspicious of U.S. because of way U.S. dropped SAG in Angola in 1975. He argued that SAG went into Angola with USG support, then U.S. voted to condemn in U.N. Cited many examples of past USG decisions that didn't inspire confidence -- Vietnam, Iran, USG failure to support moderate governments in Africa, while aiding those with leftist rhetoric. Alluding to Chad, Botha asserted that African leaders became so desperate for help against Qaddafi that one even approached SAG privately, as last resort, to ask for help. Botha admitted that SAG can't yet pass judgement on present Administration. He pleaded for consistency, "When we say something, let's stick to it."

Crocker addressed trust issue, saying that new Administration is tired of double think and double talk. Despite rocky start in U.S./SAG relations, improvement is possible. Reagan election victory represents enormous change in U.S. public opinion on foreign policy reversing trend of post-

Vietnam years.

SAG View of Regional Situation:

During first day's session botha (sic) discussed at length situation in southern Africa and Africa at large. He cited economic, food and population problems to support view that Africa is a dying continent because Africans have made a mess of their independence. Botha asserted belief that cause isn't race, but fact that new nations lack experience, cultural background, technical training.

Referring to South African past experience in helping and training blacks in neighboring states, Botha discussed the need for peaceful co-existence between South Africa and its neighbors. Until they recognize they're making a mess of their independence, South Africa can't help them. South Africa is willing to help those who admit they need its help.

On this basis Botha presented vision of southern Africa's future, in context of "Constellation of States" concept. He appealed for USG support for South Africa's view of region's future, involving a confederation of states, each independent, but linked by a centralizing secretariat. SAG doesn't expect U.S. support for apartheid, but it hopes there will be no repeat of Mondale's "One man, One Vote" statement. SAG goal is survival of white values, not white privileges.

Botha argued that central issue in southern Africa is subversion. Noting that what ANC does, South Africa can do better. Botha stressed need for agreement on non-use of force. If region starts to collapse, fire will spread, there will be no winners. This is not meant as threat, but simply stating facts. Botha emphasized view that if you kill the part of Africa containing people who can do things, you kill whole of Africa.

Asked about U.S. view of the importance of southern Africa, Crocker summarized U.S. regional interests in context of its global responsibilities. He emphasized U.S. desire to deal with destabilization threats worldwide by going to their sources, using means tailored to each source and region involved. Crocker made clear that in Africa we distinguish between countries where Soviets and Cubans have a combat presence, and those whose

governments espousing Marxism for their own practical purposes. He stressed that top U.S. priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa. U.S. wants to work with SAG, but ability to deal with Soviet presence severely impeded by Namibia. Crocker alluded to black African view that South Africa contributes to instability in region. Said he agrees with this view to the extent SAG goes beyond reprisal. Putting fear in minds of inferior powers makes them irrational.

Namibia/Angola Issue

Malan raised topic of Angola during first session. He asked about a supposed plan for an all-African force to replace the Cubans in Angola. Crocker responded that he was aware of no such plan, except perhaps as a symbolic gesture. Views were exchanged on the character of the MPLA Government, with the South Africans firmly asserting its domination by Moscow, while Crocker suggested a more nuanced view, allowing for several factions within the MPLA varying in ideological commitment and character. Discussion touched briefly on the nature of SWAPO. Botha alluded to the view that Nujoma is a "Bloody Thug."

Malan flatly declared that the SAG can't accept prospects of a SWAPO victory which brings Soviet/Cuban forces to Walvis Bay. This would result from (sic) any election which left SWAPO in a dominant position. Therefore a SWAPO victory would be unacceptable in the context of a Westminster-type political system. Namibia needs a federal system. SAG does not rule out an internationally acceptable settlement, but could not live with a SWAPO victory that left SWAPO unchecked power. Botha asserted that Ovambo dominance after the election would lead to civil war.

Crocker addressed these concerns saying USG recognized need to build South African confidence and security. Malan interposed with the view that it is the local people in Namibia who need security, and SAG could accept SWAPO victory only if their security is provided for. SAG can't dictate to local parties. Crocker remarked upon need to negotiate with governments (sic), which ultimately means that parties can't have veto power. In response Botha gave eloquent rendition of SAG's problem in dealing with internal parties. These parties fear secret plot to install SWAPO

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 51

government. SAG doesn't wish to entrench white privileges but some confidence-building measures needed. Discussion briefly explored constitutional issues. South Africans asked who would write a constitution. Crocker alluded to idea of expert panel.

SAG sees Savimbi in Angola as buffer for Namibia. SAG believes Savimbi wants southern Angola. Having supported him this far, it would damage SAG honor if Savimbi is harmed.

Second round of discussions went into greater detail on Namibia/Angola question. Malan declared SAG view that Angola/Namibia situation is number one problem in southern Africa. Angola is one place where U.S. can roll back Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa. Need to get rid of Cubans, and support Unita. Unita is going from strength to strength, while SWAPO grows militarily weaker.

In his response Crocker agreed on relation of Angola to Namibia. USG believes it would be possible to improve U.S./South African relations if Namibia were no longer an issue. We seek a settlement, but one in our interest, based on democratic principles. Our view is that South Africa is under no early military pressure to leave Namibia. The decision belongs to SAG, and ways must be found to address its concerns. USG assumes Soviet/Cuban presence is one of those concerns, and we are exploring ways to remove it in context of Namibia settlement. We agree that UNITA is an important factor in the Angolan situation. We believe there can be no peace in Angola without reconciliation between UNITA and MPLA. We see no prospect of military victory for UNITA. Must achieve (sic) movement toward reconciliation by playing on divisions in MPLA. With regard to Namibia, USG assumes that constitution is an important issue, which must be resolved before elections. The constitution would include guarantees for minority rights and democratic processes. We have said we believe SCR 435 is a basis for transition to independence for Namibia, but not for a full settlement. We wish to meet SAG concerns, while taking account of views on other side. We cannot scrap 435 without great difficulty. We wish to supplement rather than discard it.

Malan took up Namibian question, observ-

ing that internationalization of the issue posed greatest difficulty. He alluded to tremendous distrust of U.N. in South Africa. He questioned inclusion of South Africa and Front Line states in the quest for a settlement, asserting that SWAPO and the internal parties should conclude it. He agreed on the need for a constitution. But 435 can't work. The longer it takes to solve the Namibia question, the less South African presence will be required there. We will reach a stage where internal forces in Namibia can militarily defeat SWAPO.

Malan's remarks set stage for Botha to discuss SAG view of SWAPO. Botha noted that SAG thought it was important to U.S. to stop Soviet gains. But of you say SWAPO not Marxist, you move in same direction as previous administration. SWAPO's people are indoctrinated in Marxism every day. Savimbi considers SWAPO universally Marxist. SAG's bottom line is no Moscow flag in Windhoek. If U.S. disagrees, let sanctions go on, and get out of the situation. South Africa can survive sanctions. Eventually South Africa can get support of moderate black African states. Better to start U.S./SAG relations with lower expectations, than to disagree angrily later. At moment, U.S. doesn't believe SAG view of SWAPO; you're soft on SWAPO. SAG appreciates U.S. firmness against Soviets, Botha continued. Even Africans now see you assuming leadership. But SAG worried that USG is moving toward Namibia plan SAG cannot understand. As with Kissinger attempt on Rhodesia, it will be difficult to get consensus, especially with so many parties involved. SAG tried one-on-one approach with Angolans, but Geneva meetings side-tracked effort. SAG has tried Angolans several times. Each time, there is progress, but then something intervenes. We're convinced Moscow controls present government in Angola. We're convinced SWAPO is Marxist. Nujoma will nationalize the whole place, and cause upheaval and civil war, involving South Africa. We will have to invade Namibia, and other countries as well. We are pleading for you to see the dangers of a wrong solution in Namibia. It would be better to have a low-level conflict there indefinitely, than to have a civil war escalating to a general conflagration. If Nujoma governs as an Ovambo, the Hereros will fight. Also, Nujoma made promises to the Soviets. De-

factors from SWAPO have revealed their plan to SAG -- first Namibia, then Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, followed by the final attack on South Africa. SAG can't ignore this reality. We wouldn't justify that to our people. South Africa is a democracy as far as white voters are concerned. Even black leaders can criticize the government. South Africa has freedom, and can have more, but survival is the prerequisite. The BLS leaders agree with us. Even some Front Line leaders see the danger. We have twice saved Kaunda's life.

The situation is not what you think. You think in global terms; we're not a global power. We must safeguard our interests here. Not just white interests. We see the necessity of avoiding black-white polarization. But we see it as an ideological struggle. Developed moderate blacks are not communists. They will engage with us in common effort against communism. When whites see blacks as allies, whites will move away from discrimination. With more distribution of economic goods, more blacks will join us. But if we all come under Moscow's domination, that's the end.

Crocker addressed Botha's expressed fears and concerns by first accepting the premise that Soviet domination is the danger. But U.S. believes best way to avoid that danger is to get Namibia issue behind us. As long as issue subsists, we cannot reach a situation where U.S. can engage with South Africa in security, and include South Africa in our general security framework. If Namibia continues, it will open South/Central Africa to the Soviets. Simmering conflict in Namibia is not acceptable. The ideas U.S. has in mind don't include Soviets in Windhoek. We believe we can get the Soviets out of Angola, and provide a guarantee of security whether Nujmoma (sic) wins or not.

Botha said this is the nitty-gritty. Without Soviet support, others won't accept Nujoma's rule. To satisfy others we need a political solution. Crocker agreed that a political solution is needed. Botha stressed the need to consult with leaders in Namibia. If U.S. can gain their confidence, and SWAPO's, and talk about minority rights, progress is possible. People in Namibia are concerned about property, an independent judiciary, freedom of religion, the preservation of their language

and the quality of education under the present system, discrimination has been abolished by law, though it continues in practice. There is also the problem of the white ethnic Legislature vs. the black majority Council of Ministers.

Crocker said that U.S. understands concern with constitutional rights. U.S. has inherited a situation with many parties but we must build a consensus in Africa that we are serious and not just delaying. We believe a Lancaster type conference won't work: We see a panel of experts, consulting all parties, writing a constitution, and then selling it through the Contact Group. With SAG's help, we could sell it to the internal parties. Botha referred to reports of a French constitutional plan. He said that he's against multiple plans. Botha stressed need for U.S. leadership, and emphasized need for U.S. to consult with internal parties in Namibia. He discussed SAG relations with internal leaders, and need to avoid leaving them in lurch in order not to be discredited with other moderate leaders in Africa. He tied this to possibility of SAG cooperating with moderate African states to deal with economic development problems. Botha concluded by saying that SAG doesn't want to let Namibia go the wrong way; that's why South Africa is willing to pay the price of the war. We pray and hope for a government favorably disposed to us. The internal parties don't want us to let go until they have sufficient power to control the situation. We want an anti-Soviet black government.

Following the substantive discussion, Botha conveyed to Crocker written communications from the heads of Bophuthatswana and Venda. He explained that their ambassadors wanted to deliver the messages in person, but Botha decided to convey them to avoid appearance of trying to force U.S. hand. Then question of invitation to Botha to visit U.S. in May was discussed. Crocker stressed need for SAG to decide cooperation with U.S. was worth it before accepting invitation. Botha resisted setting any conditions for visit, and said he would prefer not to come if conditions are set. Crocker said there were no conditions, just a question of clarifying the spirit in which the visit would take place. Botha ended the discussion by noting that he would inform internal parties

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 53

about discussion immediately. He said he would tell Prime Minister Botha that SAG should explore question of constitution before an election in Namibia. He noted that a referendum on the constitution rather than constituent assembly elections, would make matters easier.

Document 3

The following document was leaked to the media in late May, 1981. This "Scope Paper" was drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, for Secretary of State Alexander Haig to be used in his meeting with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha on May 14, 1981. It provides unusual insight into the thinking of State Department planners and the real U.S. attitude toward the South African regime. Gen. Haig, naturally, found the leak "atrocious" and "appalling." CounterSpy is reprinting the document in full.

TO: The Secretary
 FROM: AF - Chester A. Crocker
 SUBJECT: Your Meeting With South African Foreign Minister Botha, 11:00 a.m., May 14, at the Department - Scope Paper

SUMMARY:

The political relationship between the United States and South Africa has now arrived at a crossroads of perhaps historic significance. After twenty years of generally increasing official U.S. Government coolness toward South Africa and concomitant South African intransigence, the possibility may exist for a more positive and reciprocal relationship between the two countries based upon shared strategic concerns in southern Africa, our recognition that the government of P. W. Botha represents a unique opportunity for domestic change, and willingness of the Reagan Administration to deal realistically with South Africa. The problem of Namibia, however, which complicates our relations with our European allies and with black Africa, is a primary obstacle to the development of a new relationship with South Africa. It also represents an opportunity to counter the Soviet threat in Africa. We

54 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

thus need Pretoria's cooperation in working toward an internationally acceptable solution to Namibia which would, however, safeguard U.S. and South African essential interests and concerns.

I. OBJECTIVES:

-- To tell the South Africans that we are willing with them to open a new chapter in our relationship based upon strategic reality and South Africa's position in that reality and the continued explicit commitment of P. W. Botha's government to domestic change.

-- To make clear to the South Africans that we see the continuation of the Namibia problem as a primary obstacle to the development of that new relationship and that we are willing to work with them toward an internationally acceptable settlement which will not harm their interests.

II. PARTICIPANTS:

U.S. The Secretary
 Under Secretary Stoessel
 Assistant Secretary-Designate Crocker
 Assistant Secretary Abrams

SOUTH AFRICA: Foreign Minister Botha
 Brand Fourie
 Ambassador Sole
 Ambassador Ecksteen

III. SETTING

The discussion with the South Africans will cover three discrete areas: Namibia, U.S.-South Africa nuclear cooperation and general bilateral issues. Pik Botha may touch on each of these during his 15 minutes in private with you. Botha will probably weave these questions into an overview of southern Africa regional issues delivered in terms of his familiar "Africa is dying"/Soviet-onslaught-against South Africa" (sic) speech. The expanded meeting with you and the working luncheon will focus specifically on Namibia. OES Assistant Secretary Jim Malone will conduct separate discussions with Brand Fourie on the nuclear issue. I will also conduct a separate discussion with Fourie on our bilateral relations with reference to the several specific issues now pending between us. This format will permit you to focus

on the Namibia issue.

Our dialogue with South Africa over the possibility of a new and more balanced relationship began with my visit to Pretoria last month. As I reported to you from my meetings with Pik Botha and Defense Minister Magnus Malan, I found the South Africans to be in a testy mood. The substantial amounts of misinformation and disinformation which had appeared in the press since the November election had, I suspect, acted to bring to the surface ingrained distrust. The South Africans are deeply suspicious of us, of our will, from the 1975-76 experience and the Carter period. They claim that they can go it alone in the region--an attitude which is partly bluster, partly an opening bargaining position with us.

South African truculence (which can be coated with great charm) is compounded by the fact that, as an international pariah, the country has "had no meaningful, balanced bilateral relations in recent memory". Thus, the South Africans deeply resent being treated as an embarrassment and are not used to the give-and-take of pragmatic relations. If the South Africans still want to vent their frustrations, I fear you will be subjected to Pik's rhetoric. Thus, it is in your interest to take control of the meeting from the beginning.

IV. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES:

1. To tell the South Africans that we are willing with them to open a new chapter in our relationship based upon strategic reality and South Africa's position in that reality and the continued explicit commitment of P. W. Botha's government to domestic change.

You will need to make it clear to Pik that we share the South African hope that, despite political differences among the states of southern Africa, the economic interdependence of the area and constructive internal change within South Africa can be the foundations for a new era of cooperation, stability, and security in the region. We also share their view that the chief threat to the realization of this hope is the presence and influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its allies.

You will also need to make it clear to Pik that we are not willing to be manipu-

lated by them or to act as a smokescreen for their actions and misadventures with their neighbors. We must make it clear to the South Africans that we have a role in rebuilding stability in southern Africa, that is a shared goal they cannot reach without us, and they cannot go it alone. Our shared objectives require that our diplomacy have a chance to operate and our interests be observed as well as theirs. We cannot afford to give them a blank check regionally. Moreover, SAG intransigence and violent adventures will expand Soviet opportunities and reduce Western leverage in Africa. In turn, they may complain about our performance in the past and voice doubts about our constancy and reliability in the future.

TALKING POINTS

-- WE WANT TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

-- WE FEEL THE NEW RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE BASED UPON OUR SHARED HOPES FOR THE FUTURE PROSPERITY, SECURITY AND STABILITY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, CONSTRUCTIVE INTERNAL CHANGE WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA AND OUR SHARED PERCEPTION OF THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SURROGATES IN THWARTING THOSE GOALS.

-- WE CAN FORESEE COOPERATING WITH YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS IN OUR EFFORTS TO RE-ESTABLISH REGIONAL STABILITY.

-- U.S./SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION IS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THOSE EFFORTS. FAILURE TO COOPERATE WILL ENCOURAGE FURTHER SOVIET GAINS, AND JEOPARDIZE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

-- WE WILL NOT ALLOW OTHERS TO DICTATE WHAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE AS EVIDENCED BY OUR RECENT VETO OF SANCTIONS. BUT JUST AS WE RECOGNIZE YOUR PERMANENT STAKE IN THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, SO YOU MUST RECOGNIZE OUR PERMANENT INTEREST IN AFRICA AS A WHOLE.

-- WE MUST CONSIDER THESE INTERESTS IN OUR SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY AND EXPECT YOU WILL TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH US. THIS WILL REQUIRE RESTRAINT AND GOOD WILL BY ALL PARTIES. WE CANNOT CONSENT TO ACT AS A SMOKE SCREEN FOR ACTIONS WHICH EXCITE THE FEARS OF OTHER STATES IN THE REGION, AND ENCOURAGE IMPRACTICAL, EMOTIONAL RESPONSES (sic) TO REGIONAL PROBLEMS.

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 55

-- ALTHOUGH WE MAY CONTINUE TO DIFFER ON APARTHEID, AND CANNOT CONDONE A SYSTEM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED RACIAL DIFFERENTIATION, WE CAN COOPERATE WITH A SOCIETY UNDERGOING CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE. YOUR GOVERNMENT'S EXPLICIT COMMITMENT IN THIS DIRECTION WILL ENABLE US TO WORK WITH YOU. YOU MUST HELP TO MAKE THIS APPROACH CREDIBLE. YOU ALSO SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THIS PERIOD REPRESENTS YOUR BEST SHOT, A RARE OPPORTUNITY, BECAUSE OF OUR MANDATE AND OUR DESIRE TO TURN A NEW LEAF IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.

-- THE NEW SITUATION WE ENVISION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WOULD ENTAIL MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN THE STATES OF THE REGION.

-- OUR COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE THE KEY ECONOMIC ROLE PLAYED BY SOUTH AFRICA IN THE REGION AND THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH COULD BE MADE BY SOUTH AFRICA TO COORDINATE REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

-- I UNDERSTAND THAT IN A SEPARATE MEETING HERE YOU WILL BE DISCUSSING PRACTICAL STEPS WE CAN UNDERTAKE TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF IMPROVING OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

2. To make clear to the South Africans that we see U.S./SAG cooperation in resolving the Namibian problem as the crucial first phase of our new relationship and that we are willing to work with them toward an internationally acceptable settlement which will safeguard their interests and reflect our mutual desire to foreclose Soviet gains in southern Africa.

Namibia complicates our relations with our European allies and with black Africa, and the interests of South Africa with those states as well. We cannot allow the South Africans to be disingenuous with us over Namibia. If they have no intention of pulling out of the territory under circumstances reasonably acceptable to the international community at large, we will want to opt out of the negotiation process rather than be subjected to an endless, meaningless charade. Contrary to what Botha will argue, UN involvement will be necessary to gain international acceptance for a Namibia settlement. As he told

56 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

Crocker in Pretoria, there is no point in fooling around, dissimulation or miscommunication.

Conversely, if the South Africans cooperate: to achieve an internationally acceptable settlement, this will greatly facilitate efforts to deal effectively with the Soviet threat. We need to convey our seriousness about this strategic choice. A relationship initiated on a cooperative basis could move forward toward a future in which South Africa returns to a place within the regional framework of Western security interests. The South Africans will be anxious to explore the details of such future relationship. We cannot be excessive in what we suggest to them, e.g. any implication that we can return to 1945 is unrealistic given firm international commitments such as the arms embargo. We can, however, work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important regional actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically. You will also need to respond with an artful combination of gestures and hints. The gestures would include, as described in the attached paper, small but concrete steps such as the normalization of our military attache relationship.

TALKING POINTS

-- THE CONTINUATION OF NAMIBIA AS A FESTERING PROBLEM COMPLICATES OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND BEDEVILS OUR RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICA. IT COMPLICATES YOUR RELATIONS WITH THOSE COUNTRIES AS WELL AND PREVENT (sic) SOUTH AFRICA FROM IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

-- AS YOU TOLD CROCKER IN PRETORIA, THERE IS NO POINT IN DISSIMULATION AND MISCOMMUNICATION BETWEEN US.

-- WE SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT NAMIBIA NOT BE TURNED OVER TO THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES. A RUSSIAN FLAG IN WINDHOEK IS AS UNACCEPTABLE TO US AS IT IS TO YOU.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT A CAREFULLY CONCEIVED AND IMPLEMENTED NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT WILL HELP TO FORECLOSE OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND CAN, IN THE COURSE OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT, CONTRIBUTE TO THE LEVERAGE WE NEED TO PRODUCE A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET/CU-

BAN MILITARY FORCES FROM ANGOLA.

-- WE SEEK YOUR SINCERE COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING CONCLUSIVE CRITERIA FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH LEADS TO A TRULY INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA, WHILE ENHANCING OUR EFFORTS AGAINST SOVIET ENCROACHMENT AND SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS OF U.S., SOUTH AFRICA AND ALL THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA.

-- THIS APPROACH CAN FACILITATE A DEEPENING OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL WAYS. IT CAN ALSO BEGIN A PROCESS LEADING TO THE END OF INTERNATIONAL REJECTION OF YOUR COUNTRY AND GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA WITHIN THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK OF WESTERN SECURITY.

-- WE DID NOT INVITE YOU HERE TO SELL YOU SPECIFICS OF A NAMIBIA PLAN. RATHER WE

WANT TO EXPLORE THE DEPTH AND SERIOUSNESS OF YOUR INTEREST IN A SETTLEMENT.

-- WE ARE INEVITABLY BROKERS IN THIS EXERCISE. YOU MUST TELL US TWO THINGS. (A) WHETHER YOU ARE IN FACT PREPARED TO MOVE TO A SETTLEMENT NOW, TO COMMIT YOURSELVES TO IMPLEMENT A REVISED PLAN ONCE WE PIN DOWN SPECIFICS; (B) WHAT YOUR CONCLUSIVE LIST OF CONCERNS INCLUDES. WE WILL MAKE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO MEET YOUR CONCERNS BUT YOU MUST RESPECT OUR ROLE AS BROKER AND THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE.

-- MY PEOPLE NEED TO BEGIN SHAPING REVISED PROPOSALS. OUR CREDIBILITY IS ON THE LINE. WE NEED TO KNOW SAG'S AUTHORITATIVE POSITION.

British Columbia: Bourne Again RCMP

"WANTED TO LEAVE BRITISH COLUMBIA: ROBIN BOURNE, Newly Appointed Assistant Deputy Minister for Police Service, B.C. Attorney General's Department," says a poster opposing the appointment of British Columbia's new police minister. Over night, hundreds of these bright yellow 17x11 posters with a nice photo of Bourne appeared in several cities in B.C. The poster was produced by the Civil Liberties Action Security Project (CLASP) in Vancouver. According to the information compiled by CLASP and printed below, there are numerous reasons for getting Robin Bourne out of British Columbia.

An old enemy of trade unions and the left has surfaced in Victoria. His name is Robin Bourne and he is the newly appointed Assistant Deputy Minister for Police Services in the Attorney General's department. He is now B.C.'s top police bureaucrat and his past history is something all of us should know.

Robin Bourne is best known for his role as head of the Security Planning and Analysis Group (later the Police & Security Planning & Analysis Branch) established in 1971, after the 1970 FLQ Crisis, to monitor and collect data on "subversives" and organize countermeasures against them.*

From 1971 to 1979 when he left that job Bourne and his group spied on unionists and political activists, blacklisted civil servants, and planned covert actions with the RCMP Security Service aimed at dis-

rupting radical activity across the country. A chronology of these actions follows.

Bourne was born in England in 1930, lived in Shanghai where his father was Police Commissioner until 1941 and was then educated in Ontario. He attended the Royal Military College in Kingston and served one year in Korea with the artillery. By 1968 he was a Colonel with service in defense intelligence.

1968 - He joined the Cabinet Secretariat for Foreign Policy and Defense.

1970 - In the summer of 1970 Bourne joined the newly formed Strategic Operations Centre (SOC), an intelligence body

** On October 5, 1970 the FLQ (Front de Libération du Québec), according to Jean Paul Brodeur, "abducted a British diplomat - James Richard Cross - from his home in Montreal. Five days later, another FLQ proceeded to kidnap ... Pierre Laporte, a minister of the provincial Liberal government of Quebec. In the days following those kidnappings, the federal government of Canada proclaimed that a state of "expected insurgency" was existing in Quebec. The Canadian Army was sent into Quebec and the powers of the police were greatly enlarged under the Canadian War Measures Act. Massive waves of arrests followed and for several months Quebec lived under a form of martial law." (Jean Paul Brodeur, "Police Abuses in Canada," CILIP, West Berlin, Aug.-Oct. 1980)*

CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 57

for crisis management working directly under the federal cabinet committee for crisis management. Its staff consisted of Trudeau aide, Jean-Pierre Goyer (named Solicitor General a few weeks later), and armed forces and RCMP representatives.

CBC TV research for an October 1975 documentary on the FLQ Crisis and Pierre Vallieres in his book The Assassination of Pierre Laporte reveal that during the summer of 1970 war games were conducted at the National Defence College in Kingston to teach high-ranking officers how to respond effectively to political kidnappings. It now seems clear that the Liberal government, acting through SOC and the RCMP Security Service (S.S.), set up the FLQ Crisis in order to attack the Parti Quebecois and defuse the growing separatist movement in Quebec. SOC had all sources of intelligence covered during the crisis and information that investigating police did not have. According to the Last Post, in its September 1973 issue, a police official by the name of R.B., knew the location where Laporte was being held.

1971 - In September the Security Planning & Analysis Group was established. Bourne had been offered the job of heading it the previous December but did not officially take up his duties until June. Among his staff were RCMP Security Service officers and Lt.-Col. Walter Dabros, later in charge of the armed forces intelligence and security directorate. The Group gathered information from the RCMP S.S., Dept. of External Affairs, and Canadian Forces intelligence. Its function as announced by Solicitor-General Goyer on September 21 was:

"1. To study the nature, origin, and causes of subversive and revolutionary action, its objectives and techniques, as well as the measures necessary to protect Canadians from internal threats.

2. To compile and analyze information collected on subversive and revolutionary groups and their activities, to estimate the nature and scope of internal threats to Canadians and to plan for measures to counter these threats.

3. To advise the Solicitor-General on these matters."

Goyer described it as "a civilian anti-subversive information service" to fight groups "that are genuinely revolutionary and prepared to use violence in achieving their ends." The Group's first action was

58 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981

to have Paul Rose transferred to a special security prison.

Sometime in late 1971 Bourne passed on to the Solicitor-General a list of 21 civil servants suspected by the RCMP of wanting to overthrow the government, the so-called Extra Parliamentary Opposition. Some of these people later sued and won judgements against the government for this blacklist.

1972 - Canadian Forces intelligence spied on union leaders in the Confederation of National Trade Unions and Quebec Federation of Labor during the period of the Common Front General Strike in Quebec in April. Information was processed and passed on to the cabinet by Bourne's group. They produced estimates on how long the three union federations of the Common Front could hold out after analyzing financial information provided by the military.

1975 - On February 25 in the House of Commons, Mitchell Sharp admitted that Bourne had taken part in confidential "information sessions" for corporate managers in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver to give background on labor "subversives" and "national security."

In Last Post (Feb.-March 1975) Ian Adams claimed that Bourne had a liaison with CIA station chief Cleveland Cram, letting him pore "over files of Canadian unionists, politicians, academics, journalists, and so on."

1976 - It was discovered that Bourne's group in cooperation with the S.S. were screening civil servants for separatist tendencies.

1977 - Bourne was put on a committee of high-ranking B.C. and federal civil servants to find ways of solving B.C.'s heroin problem.

Blacklists compiled by Bourne's group of members of the Canadian Union of Public Employees, National Farmers Union, and Alberta Indian Association were discovered. It was also revealed that a file on Ed Broadbent, leader of the NDP (New Democratic Party), was kept in Bourne's office and that files were kept on members of the Canadian Peace Research Institute, senior civil servants and urban affairs employees.

1979 - It was revealed that Bourne had been circulating a secret weekly bulletin on subversion. Bourne said that groups were mentioned "if we felt their inten-

tions were contrary to our interests."

In May he left his job with the Police and Security Planning and Analysis Branch and in November testified before the McDonald Royal Commission investigating RCMP activities where he said "there might be occasions where the security service, in order to do what it is expected to do, may have to break the law."

1980-81 - He served as Secretary to the Marin Commission of Inquiry Relating to the Security and Investigations Branch in the Post Office headed by Rene Marin, the author of the Security and Investigations manual, and a personal friend of Bourne. The resulting report is a whitewash of the Security and Investigations Branch that recommends that police be empowered to open personal mail legally after forty

years of illegal openings.

1981 - In March, Bourne is appointed to the job of Assistant Deputy Minister for Police Services in B.C.'s Attorney-General's Department for a two-year period. He remains a part-time advisor to the federal government on security matters.

The question is, what is Bourne now doing in B.C.? Officially all that has been announced so far is that he will coordinate the activities of the RCMP, municipal police forces and the Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit, CLEU, which he will command. This is a newly created job. With his past history in police security work what emphasis will he put on it here?

Produced by CLASP, P.O. Box 790, Station A Vancouver, B.C.

Cont. from page 39

- nia, Berkeley, 1978, p.10.
 16) Africa Report, Jan.-Feb. 1981, p.12.
 17) cf supra, #15, pp.13,15.
 18) *ibid.*, p.13.
 19) e.g. Navy International, June 1976, p.5; Wehrkunde, May 1975
 20) Los Angeles Times, 9/13/80, p.I-A.
 21) Wehrpolitische Informationen, 5/8/76, as quoted in ISSA, March 1981, p.11.
 22) cf supra, #14, p.13.
 23) WP, 5/29/81, p.A-21.
 24) Africa, May 1981, p.15
 25) Africa, Dec. 1980, p.43.
 26) John Prados, "Sealanes, Western Strategy and South Africa," in U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, ed. by Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salaam, 1978, p.79.
 27) as quoted in The Observer (London), 5/19/74, p.7.
 28) The Observer, 5/19/74, p.7.
 29) New York Times (NYT), 5/16/77, p.8.
 30) NYT, 6/21/78, p.18.
 31) Statement by U.N. Special Committee Against Apartheid by Abdul S. Minty, 5/30/78.
 32) Ronald A. Walters, "U.S. Policy and Nuclear Proliferation," in U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, op. cit., p.183.
 33) cf supra, #20.
 34) Wehrtechnik, April 1975, p.153; May 1975, p.210; see Der Spiegel, 6/28/76, pp.90,91.
 35) See The Apartheid War Machine, the Strength and Deployment of the South African Armed Forces, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, London, April 1980.
 36) Europaeische Wehrkunde, June 1977, p.275.
 37) Africa Now (London), May 1981, p.45.
 38) WP, 5/16/81, p.A-5.
 39) Alexander Haig, during NSC meetings under Nixon "would quietly pretend to beat drums on the table as African affairs were brought up." (Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness, Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, Harper & Row, New York, 1977, p.131.)
 40) cf supra, #16, p.11.
 41) cf supra, #37, p.81.
 42) Harper's, Sept. 1978, p.22.
 43) The Guardian, 1/21/81, p.15.
 44) see Newsfront International, 5/1-15/81, p.6.

- 45) Orbis, Fall 1976, p.648.
 46) Africa Report, Sept.-Oct. 1979, p.6.
 47) Inquiry, 3/20/78, p.19.
 48) cf supra, #11, p.16.
 49) cf supra, #37, p.81.

این قسمت را جدا کرده همراه ما وجه اشتراک ارسال فرمائید.

ما یلیم نشریه
 علم و جامعه
 را مشترک شوم

NAME: _____
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PERSIAN JOURNAL FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
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