


COUNTERSpy

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CIA-IMF-WORLD BANK-AID: COUNTER- INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

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EDITORIAL

Before the U.S. entered World War II, a wealthy, liberal President, Franklin D. Roosevelt and a millionaire Wall Street attorney, William J. Donovan created the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) without the knowledge or consent of the American people or Congress. While the COI had covert political and paramilitary capabilities, the public and Congress were told it was solely an intelligence agency. Of course, FDR in creating a military organization during peacetime usurped one of the Constitutional powers of Congress.

In the minds of FDR and Donovan, the COI was allowed covert operations by its directive "to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security and not now available to the Government".

According to FDR's own cousin, Kermit Roosevelt, this directive was intentionally deceiving. Kermit has written that: "The order, however, was not to be specific as to the functions proposed for the new agency: both the President and Donovan agreed that, in the delicate situation then existing, it would be preferable to have no precise definition appear."

In effect, two wealthy, pro-corporate men, one of whom was sworn to uphold the Constitution, secretly established an agency, financed by U.S. taxes, which was to affect the lives of millions. And, it has been all downhill for the Constitution since FDR and Donovan.

1947 saw the creation of the CIA by the likes of international financiers Ferdinand Eberstadt and Bernhard Baruch as well as the wealthy, Wall Street attorneys, James Forrestal and Clark Clifford who recently testified that a prohibition against CIA assassinations would be "demeaning" and "make us look silly". Forrestal forged ahead with the CIA despite the warnings of two fellow militarists, General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King. Marshall had stated that: "The powers of the proposed agency (CIA) seem almost unlimited and need clarification." King, according to Forrestal's diary,

felt that the proposed CIA "had elements of danger" and "questioned whether such an agency could be considered consistent with our ideas of government".

Forrestal, by the way, while swearing before Congress that the CIA would only gather foreign intelligence, had initiated Operation Shamrock which secretly surveilled telecommunications of the American people.

With token input from Congress, the CIA was created in 1947 and like the COI, was authorized, in the minds of a few, wealthy men, by an intentionally deceiving directive to carry out covert political and paramilitary operations. Also like the COI, the CIA, as recommended by Wall Street attorney, Allen W. Dulles, was "directed by a relatively small, but elite corps of men".

In 1941, we had FDR and Donovan. Today, we have Jimmy Carter and Stansfield Turner and matters are as bad and worse. Two pro-corporate men are running a secret, powerful agency with U.S. taxes but without the knowledge or "consent of the governed". As if things were not bad enough, Carter is now expanding the already extensive powers of the CIA.

King's fears have become a reality.

This all boils down to an either/or situation. We either have a democracy or a CIA. CIA careerist, James J. Angleton attested to this fact when he said: "It's inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government."

Fair enough. The American people have been told by the CIA itself that the choice is between democracy and the CIA.

We end with the words of the late Senator Wayne Morse speaking of the CIA in 1956: "What is happening now in the United States is similar to what has happened in the history of other free nations. They flowered in freedom for a long time, and then gradually a small clique of government officials in the executive branch started taking over their rights, freedoms, and liberties. The people woke up too late to discover that they had lost their freedoms, rights, and liberties. It can happen in America, if we do not stand on guard in relation to the principle of checks and balances under the Constitution."

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CIA COPS IN SOUTH KOREA

by John Kelly

(Ed. note: John Kelly is the author of the forthcoming book "The CIA in America".)

The recent uprisings in Iran and South Korea share two exacerbating causes: a CIA-created, euphemistically-entitled intelligence agency and an exploiting Gulf Oil Corporation. In Iran, the secret intelligence agency was the illegal, brutal SAVAK. In South Korea, it is the equally brutal Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

Gulf, of course, was one of the U.S. oil corporations which, along with the CIA, installed the shah and his 26 years of repression that meant untold profits for Gulf. Appropriately enough, Gulf later hired as a vice-president, Kermit Roosevelt who engineered the CIA's coup and installation of oppression in Iran in 1953. Roosevelt's vice-presidential function was to bribe governmental officials around the world who facilitated Gulf's profiteering.

Gulf is also in South Korea where it owns: 100% of Korea Gulf Oil; 50% of Korea Oil Company; 49% of South Korea's refining capacity; and parts of Hanguk Sangsa Co.Ltd., the Chin Hae Chemical Co., and the Ssangtung Cement Industrial Co.¹ By the end of 1977, Gulf had remitted to the U.S. \$33,538,000 in profits from Korea Oil Co. alone,² and expected to up that figure to \$36 million in 1978.³

During Roosevelt's vice-presidency, Gulf made illegal payments to the Democratic Republican Party of Park Chung Hee for National Assembly elections.⁴ Gulf later channeled \$3 million to Park's 1971 presidential campaign which payment along with other corporate payoffs may have created Park's margin of victory.⁵

These three powers: the Korean government, the KCIA, and Gulf Oil dove-tail in the Korea Oil Co. which is 50% government-owned. Despite the national - if not international - reputation of the KCIA for brutality, Gulf stooped to its level by choosing a former KCIA Deputy Director, General Park Won Suk in 1966 to become President of Korea Oil.⁶

In 1972, Gulf went to the new Prime

Minister, Kim Jay Pil, and asked him to suggest a purchaser for a boat named the Chun Woo. Kim Jay Pil was the founder of the KCIA and had worked with the CIA in a coup that put Park Chung Hee in power in 1961.⁷ Regarding the boat deal, Gulf's own special committee found that: "Gulf's decision to offer the new Prime Minister an opportunity to select the purchaser of the Chung Woo had obvious political overtones and was designed to gain some favor with that high official".⁸ Even the South Korean Martial Law Command has now charged Kim Jay Pil with accumulating \$36 million through embezzlement and bribe-taking.⁹

Not to be outdone by Gulf in cynical insensitivity to the Korean people, the State Department appointed John LaMazza (House 4976 B, South Post, Tel.Y-4123) a well-known CIA collaborator, as Embassy liaison officer with Korean church, human rights, and labor organizations in July 1976. Not surprisingly, a member of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) reported that LaMazza "may in fact be meeting with human rights representatives primarily to gain intelligence for the U.S. CIA". The same person felt that LaMazza actually "holds in contempt the very people for whom on the surface he has expressed concern". When asked by a second AFSC member about U.S. silence on martial law and political prisoners, LaMazza scoffed: "We can't be protesting every point in the country's legal code."

Completing its contempt for the Korean people is the CIA's training of the South Korean police - yet another commonality with Iran. In the interests of potential victims, we are publishing the names of the following Koreans who have had CIA police training in the U.S. In doing so, we hope to give a concrete expression of our support to the struggle of the Korean people to free themselves from their governmental/corporate prison.

Bark, Yang Bae (was trained in the U.S. from 7/67-11/67), Cho, Ki Soo (7/67-11/67), Cho, Yong Hak (8/73-11/73), Choe, Sang Yung (6/73-9/73), Chon, Sok Bong (3/73-5/73), Chun, Byung-Suk (4/70-7/70), Chun, Hae Ryong (2/72-5/72), Han, Jung Hee (8/73-11/73), Huh, June (no date given), Huh, Shik (10/69-2/70);

Hwang, In Chul (12/70-4/71), Kim, Jung Law (3/72-10/72); Kim, Ku Il (7/69-

10/69), Kim, Yong Baik (12/70-4/71), Kim, Yun-Chol (6/70-10/70), Kim, Yung Shik (1/69-5/69), Kim, Yung Hui (9/71-2/72), Koo, Chul-Hae (8/71-12/71), Kyu-Bok, Hwang (3/74-5/74), Lee, Seon Yong (11/74-2/75);

Lee, Jong Kuck (1/69-5/69), Lee, Jong Kuck (2/71-6/71), Lee, Kuk Jong (7/67-11/67), Lee, Kwang Ui (7/67-11/67), Lee, Sang Yang (3/74), Mohk, Zin Soo (9/74-12/74), Nam, Sang-Yong (10/69-2/70), Paik, Hyung Cho (7/69-10/69), Pak, Pyong Hyo (3/68-6/68), Pang, Jai-San (no date given);

Park, Il Yong (9/74-12/74), Park, Sang Lae (3/73-6/73), Park, Sang-Lae (10/69-2/70), Song, Il Soon (7/67-11/67), Song, In Shik (4/69-7/69), Suh, Jae Myong (6/72-7/72), Tcha, Sung Kap (1/69-5/69), Yang, Bo Sang (3/73-5/73), Yoo, Bong-Ahn (3/74), Yoo, Jung-Khun (6/70-10/70), Yoon, Il-Shik (2/71-6/71);

The following South Koreans were trained in the FBI National Academy: Myong, Chung Sok (7/67-11/67), Park, Yang-Bae (3/72-6/72), Park, Yong Kyu (2/70-8/70), Yi, Sung Ho (7/71-11/71);

The following officials are assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul:

DRAGONE, Robert J. (third secretary)
born: 12/27/46
Embassy Apt. 4C
Dragone is a CIA officer. Seoul is his first overseas assignment.

HUDKINS, Hugh A. (Attache)
born: 4/1/33
House 491/B South Post
tel. 293-4149
Hudkins is an intelligence officer who has served in France, Iraq, Thailand, Japan, Liberia, the Dominican Republic and from 1/76 to 6/77 in the U.S. Sinai Support Mission.

LEE, Maurice E. (Director of ICA)
born: 8/20/25
Embassy House 7
Lee is an experienced propaganda officer. He has been instrumental in psychological warfare operations in Vietnam, where he was the deputy director of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon from 4/70 to 5/71. He attended the National War College from 8/68 to 7/69.

Footnotes:

- 1) "Gulf Oil in South Korea: The Influence of a Global Corporation", Korea Report, American Friends Service Committee, April 1979; Asia Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1978
- 2) Korea Times, 2/4/78
- 3) Korea Times, 6/23/78
- 4) AFSC, ef supra # 1
- 5) *ibid.*
- 6) *ibid.*
- 7) Washington Post, 6/19/80, p.A-27
- 8) "Report of the Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors of Gulf Oil Corporation", December 1975
- 9) cf supra # 7



MOSSAD IN WEST GERMANY

by Konrad Ege

On August 9, 1979, the Washington Post reported on the activities of foreign intelligence agencies operating in the U.S. in violation of U.S. sovereignty. Now West Germany has a similar scandal, and many questions are still unanswered.

On October 29, 1979, the West German weekly Der Spiegel reported that, despite governmental denials, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, West Germany's CIA) had allowed MOSSAD (Israeli intelligence) officers to secretly interrogate several Palestinians charged with "terrorist activities" in jails and prisons in Munich, Amberg, Straubing, and Landsberg. A number of the summaries of the interrogations - written by MOSSAD officers - were then to be used in the court proceedings against the Palestinians, who were not informed about the identities of their interrogators.

According to the Palestinian news

agency Wafa, the MOSSAD officers did more than "just" ask questions. Wafa reported that one PLO fighter had been tortured and administered drugs by Israeli intelligence officers in Straubing, and had been pressured to assassinate the PLO's intelligence chief, Abu Ijad. However, Wafa said, he chose instead to take his own life.

The West German authorities knew well the man to whom Wafa was referring. His name is Abdel Wali Abdel Hafes Aabed. He and others were arrested on the West German border when they allegedly tried to smuggle explosives into West Germany. While his co-defendants got prison sentences of several years, Aabed was sentenced to only four months imprisonment.

After being released, he went back to Beirut, Lebanon, where he shortly thereafter entered a mental hospital. As Wafa reports, it was then that he told Abu Ijad how he had been administered drugs in Straubing, and how Israeli officials had shown him pictures of his family, who lives on the occupied West Bank, and told him that he had better collaborate for their sake.

A few days later, Aabed was found

dead in his apartment. In a letter he left to explain his suicide he wrote that he felt he was in a "no-way-out" situation; his resistance had been broken with drugs in Straubing, and he saw no other way to protect his family than to kill himself.

While discounting Wafa's version of Aabed's death, the West German government was forced to admit two facts: that Abdel Wali Abdel Hafes Aabed was interrogated by Israelis in Straubing, and that he was administered drugs in prison because, so the official version goes, "he was depressed" (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 11/9/79, p.3).

Having had to admit interrogations of Aabed and other Palestinians by Israeli intelligence officers in four prisons, West German governmental officials were quick to assert that these cases were "isolated incidents". New evidence uncovered in the meantime, however, leads one to the conclusion that these cases might rather be part of common practice.

Die Tageszeitung, a left Berlin daily, wrote on November 1, 1979 that at least two imprisoned Palestinians were questioned by a West German plain-cloth police officer accompanied by an Arabic speaking "translator" who actually carried out the interrogation. Courts in Berlin repeatedly refused to examine these and other charges of "translators" who were allowed to interrogate Palestinian prisoners.

Reports about these interrogations have raised several questions about the role of foreign intelligence agencies in West German prisons in general. One of the questions is whether the shah of Iran's secret police, SAVAK, were ever allowed into West German prisons. While collaboration between West German intelligence agencies and SAVAK has been documented, this contention is strongly denied by West German authorities.

Still another serious and for the West German government very uncomfortable question was raised after the publication of MOSSAD interrogations and the claims of a West German intelligence officer in the Swedish social democratic Aftonbladet. This question is: How did Gudrun Ensslin, Jan Carl Raspe, and Andreas Baader die on the night of October 18, 1977? The three were members of the Red Army Fraction (an organization advocating armed struggle)

and at the time imprisoned in Stammheim, West Germany's most "advanced" maximum security prison. The West German government claims they committed suicide.

Aftonbladet and others have pointed out that a good part of the governmental version of events is simply incoherent. Important details are missing or remain unexplained. On October 21 last year Aftonbladet wrote: "It is not just the so called West German left that is very sceptical about the official version of events in Stammheim. There are people within the West German intelligence agencies who refuse to believe it was suicide! One intelligence officer .. said: 'I believe they (Raspe, Baader, and Ensslin) were assassinated, but I don't believe it was our people who killed them'".

Some people now wonder aloud whether the publication of Israeli activities in West German prisons might have brought us one step closer to the answer of "Who did it?".

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MOSSAD'S LONG ARM

by Robin Rubin

On September 12, 1979, two West German citizens, Brigitte Schulz and Thomas Reuter were convicted of "anti-Israeli activities" by a secret Israeli military tribunal and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The same secret trial is continuing for three Palestinian defendants, Husain Hadi al-Attar, Mahmoud Musa Hasan al-Makussi and Ibrahim Twafiq Ibrahim Yusuf.

The three Palestinians had been arrested by Kenyan authorities in Nairobi on January 18, 1976, and were interrogated -- before being charged -- at military headquarters in Nairobi by MOSSAD (Israeli intelligence) officers. Nine days later, Reuter and Schulz were arrested in their Nairobi apartment; and on February 3, the five of them were taken to a secret military camp in Israel. They were transferred in a disguised Israeli El Al airplane in blatant violation of international law since there were no extradition hearings and Kenya does not have a bilateral extradition treaty with Israel.

The five were held incommunicado and interrogated for four months by the Shin Beth (Israel's internal intelligence organization) during which they claim they were severely tortured to extract confessions of guilt. It was well over a year after their arrest that they were charged with conspiring to shoot down an El Al plane, and before their lawyer Lea Tsemel, who had been retained by the Schulz family, received confirmation from the Israeli Defense Ministry that Schulz was in custody in Israel. Likewise, it took the West German Foreign Ministry until March 19, 1977 to notify the families that their relatives had been detained in Israel for over one year.

According to Brigitte Schulz, it is very likely that West German police and/or intelligence assisted the Israelis. For example, after Schulz had arrived in the Israeli camp, Shin Beth officers showed her an extensive dossier describing her political activities inside West Germany. Much of the

file dealt with her activities and her concern with the denial of human rights to political prisoners in West Germany. Presumably, the Israelis were given this dossier by West German authorities.

In April 1977, an official from the West German embassy in Israel was allowed into the trial as the only outside observer. The families in West Germany learned about the trial date from the press. Professor Pierre Mertens, a member of the Belgian League of Human Rights, who was retained by the parents to observe the trial, was prevented by the Israeli government from attending any court sessions.

The secret military tribunal was composed of military and intelligence officers. One of the judges, in fact, was a member of the military intelligence unit that had extracted "confessions" in the secret military camp. The secretiveness and the lack of independence between the judiciary and the police departments violated international standards for a fair trial.

Two "cover papers" issued by consecutive Israeli Defense Ministers, Shimon Peres and Ezer Weizman, forbade the defendants from testifying on their behalf about the circumstances surrounding their arrests, extradition from Kenya, and interrogation in Israel. The army further denied Reuter and Schulz their choice of attorneys and instituted a variety of other measures eliminating any possibility of justice.

At the same time, the Israeli government realized that it was in a delicate situation particularly since it was not able to provide convincing evidence against the five defendants. Pressed by growing international awareness of the incident, the Israeli government attempted to strike a deal with the two Germans: they should plead guilty to charges of conspiring to shoot down an El Al plane, and then they would be released after five years imprisonment. Both refused to accept this offer, termed "blackmail" by Amnesty International, since they saw it as an attempt to coerce them into participating in a cover-up of the true nature of the case.

On September 12, 1979, Brigitte Schulz and Thomas Reuter were sentenced to ten years imprisonment. This was

the public side of another secret agreement, which, unlike the previous one, was proposed by Schulz and Reuter, who saw it as the only possibility to regain freedom in the foreseeable future. They agreed to plead guilt to non-specific "anti-Israeli activities" in return for the government's dropping of all other charges. Furthermore, Israel was to agree, in writing, to their release in February 1981. The Israeli government was compelled by the increasing public pressure to accept this proposal.

The fate of the three Palestinians is still unresolved. Since the Israeli authorities separated the German from the Palestinian cases, no information has been available. Their case has continued on its original basis, and it is generally presumed that their sentences will be much harsher than that of Brigitte Schulz and Thomas Reuter.

This case illustrates the Israeli method for dealing with political oppo-

sition from abroad by citizens of other countries. In the past few years there have been an increasing number of political charges against foreigners. For example, a Dutch man, Gerd Dessen, a member of the Dutch Palestine Solidarity Committee, was kidnapped on the high seas between Lebanon and Cyprus, by Israeli authorities and held for a week in an Israeli prison. The Cypriot journalist, Panayiotis Paschalis, was arrested as a foreign agent for interviewing Palestinians and Israelis. Terre Fleener and Sami Esmail, both U.S. citizens and now free, were arrested and sent to prison on charges of aiding various alleged terrorist organizations.

It appears likely that this systematic, cross-border repression of any political opposition will continue for Palestinians and foreigners alike until the wider aspects of the regional and international political situation of Israel and the Arab world have been resolved.

CIA-IMF-WORLD BANK-AID: COUNTER- INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

By Robin Broad

(Ed. note: Robin Broad is working on her Ph.D. in Princeton University. She has lived in Thailand, and written extensively on Southeast Asia.

This article was completed before General Kriangsak stepped down as prime minister in the spring of 1980. In his place the Monarchy put General Prem Tinsulanond. While cosmetic, this change is not without significance. Strongly backed by the royalists, Prem has made initial gestures indicating that his administration will strive further to accommodate foreign investment. Moreover, Prem is shrewdly attempting to incorporate within his administration

those nationalist factors among the Bangkok elite who could potentially form an important component of the Thai left.)

Anyone acquainted with the policies of Thailand smiles in anticipation as October rolls around, for October is the month of coups in that Southeast Asian country. Destabilizations of Thai governments have played no small part in that nation's history. Indeed, since 1932 when the absolute monarchy gave way to a constitutional monarchy, Thailand has weathered the coming and going of eleven constitutions, twelve elections, forty-two cabinets and fifteen prime ministers. The last group has been split between six military officers, ruling for a total of thirty-five years, and nine civilians, whose rule summed up a mere eleven years in comparison. Several of the civilian governments were, in actuality, puppets of the military.

This article will concentrate on how the United States, through the CIA and its domination of both bilateral and mul-

tilateral assistance institutions, has profoundly influenced Thai domestic development. Exposes in recent years of American foreign policy in countries like Iran and Chile have provided one model of U.S. orchestrated destabilization -- the CIA led coup.

Thailand, however, provides a case study of a more subtle and predominant method of control and influence by U.S.-led forces which cultivate domestic forces to work in concert with U.S. interests. Through this conditioning and support, the United States has exercised a major role in instilling an authoritarian military tradition in Thailand and in negating the possibility of a constitutional, democratic tradition.

CHRONOLOGY -- THAILAND, 1932-1980

1932 - Constitutional monarchy established by coup led by civilian/military coalition. Civilian reformer, Dr. Pridi Phanomyong heads government.

1933 - Military faction of coalition, led by Phibun Songkram, takes over.

1940-1944 - Japanese forces occupy Thailand.

1945 - Civilian rule, with Pridi as prime minister, returns.

1947 - Military coup returns Phibun as prime minister. Police General Phao Siyanon amasses power under Phibun.

1957 - Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat overthrows Phibun and Phao regime in a military coup, ushering in reign of despotic paternalism.

1963 - General Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapas Churasatiara, power holders under Sarit, take over after his death.

1973 - Massive demonstrations cause fall of Thanom-Prapas regime. Three year period of various civilian coalition governments introducing some reforms.

1976 - Bloody massacre at Bangkok's Thammasat University. Military coup ends "democratic period". Arch-conservative Thanin Kraivixien becomes prime minister.

1977 - General Kriangsak Chamanand removes Thanin in military coup.

1980 - Kriangsak resigns. Army Commander-in-Chief Prem Tinsulanond chosen new prime minister.

On one hand, this process in Thailand will be shown to involve the grooming of a reactionary military elite. Beginning with the 1954 Geneva accords, the National Security Council (NSC) conceived of a strategy for Southeast Asia that placed Thailand "as the focal point of U.S. covert and psychological operations".¹ The United States has provided "generous" assistance programs to Thailand which have centered around counterinsurgency against trumped up Communism. A police force groomed by the CIA, and a military spurred by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) have attempted to liquidate any and all critical factions within Thai society. The civilian bureaucracy has been groomed to be technocratic, apolitical and corrupt -- all characteristics facilitating the U.S.-linked military's domination of politics.

On the other hand, although rumblings of popular discontent were a far cry from an organized revolutionary movement when counterinsurgency efforts began, as the repressive forces consolidated, the outrage grew until the prophesy of insurgency itself was fulfilled. While the Maoist liberation movement (whose armed struggle was declared in 1965) was only a part of the popular discontent, the reactionary forces, by refusing to differentiate between this and the student, labor, and farmer movements, pushed all the "insurgents" into one category, potentially providing them with a sense of unity and strength. Likewise, the lumping of liberal elements within the society together with radical segments as the "enemy" created the possibility of an insurgent backfire.

Behind the scenes, as will be shown, a crucial component of the expanding repression has been programs of U.S. economic, military and CIA assistance as well as those of U.S.-dominated multilateral aid institutions. Thirty years ago, after Mao rose victoriously in China to the great consternation of the West, Thailand's geopolitical importance led the U.S. to promote a strategy that distorted Thai development for U.S. interests. Unlike Burma, Cambodia or Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), Thailand was to become a "modernized" state, serving as a strong buffer to Communist Asia. The modernization pro-

cess was to be of a very specific nature one that would bring capitalism to the rural areas and also lead those in political power to exploit their positions through influence in the most important businesses.²

In this way, national independence and self-determination could be undercut from two sides -- first, from reliance on American-led assistance institutions, and second, from the expanding presence of transnational corporations. American interests in Thailand quickly grew to be economic as well as political. In the 1960's, U.S. exports to Thailand tripled, totaling \$210 million in 1969, 17 per cent of total U.S. exports. One third to one fourth of all foreign investment in Thailand was American at that point in time.³ Geopolitically, Thailand and Indochina together were seen as the pivotal link to the riches of the rest of Southeast Asia which included not only tin, rubber, and coconut, but also promises of oil. By 1975, with Indochina "lost", Thailand had to be held at all costs.

This article will trace the effects of this U.S. interest and intervention in Thailand on Thai domestic development. First, the popular movements that were set into motion by oppressive military rule will be examined with special emphasis on their flourishing during the 1973 to 1976 "democratic period". The next section will focus on how the domestic elite were conditioned, through U.S. programs, to react and rule in the U.S.'s interests and in ways that led to the polarization of Thai society. The four international actors whose Thailand involvement will be analyzed include U.S. economic and military bilateral assistance, both crucial in the first decades of this pattern; and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both of increasing importance later in Thailand's history. The last section will return to the people's movements, analyzing the possibility of a resurgence of popular strength capable of breaking the tradition of reactionary military rule.

The period between 1973 and 1976 did, however, give the movements a chance to flare, and to test their powers. The labor movement, previously weakened by foreign assistance programs that sought

to divert labor's attention from political demands and keep it focused on apolitical, technical problems, untangled its arms from the hold of the counterinsurgent Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC),⁶ and discovered its voice. Unionism, outlawed during the 1960's was legalized through the new Constitution. Militant trade union activity succeeded, in that three year period, in raising the minimum daily wage from 12 baht (U.S. \$.60) to 25 baht (\$.1.25). In 1973 alone more than 126,000 workers participated in 322 strikes.⁷

THE PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT HISTORICALLY

Prior to the 1960's, the anti-government rebellion in Thailand was rather limited and quiet. Rumblings among the dispossessed of the poorest northeast region ("Isan"), the hilltribe and Lao population, were sporadic and unthreatening enough to be virtually ignored during the 1950's. During the 1960's, however, counterinsurgency cloaked in "modernization" programs wreaked havoc on Thai society, stoking the fires of the popular discontent and leading to violent outbursts in the north and northeast.

The construction of U.S. airbases in this area made the quieting of any mass criticism even more crucial, and repressive mechanisms were accelerated. The process of repression and mass reactions has been cyclical. By 1965, with the proclamation of armed liberation struggle by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), the Communist spectre was, for the first time, a real threat. By the early 1970's, half of Thailand's provinces were designated "sensitive" areas.⁴

The purpose of this section is to illustrate how, by 1973, various elements within Thai society were pushed to the point of explosion, triggering the transition to three years of non-military rule. Symbolically, it was the central police station in Bangkok that was set aflame by students during the 1973 demonstration leading to the fall of the Thanom-Prasapas military regime.⁵ At that point, attacks on the institution of the Thai police served as a link, unifying various liberal and radical elements in their outrage.

Likewise, during rallies that followed October 1973, students, farmers, and workers continued to decry the surveillance and subversion carried out by the Special Branch police, the U.S. trained political police. Joining the students in 1973 were movements of farmers and laborers which together formed the key components of mass movements that would be crushed by the bloody October 1976 coup (but would maintain their inner sense of strength enough to resurface in 1979).

The Farmers Federation of Thailand (FFT) founded by five or six farm leaders in 1974 began organizing the peasantry which formed about 80 per cent of the Thai populace. The organization spread to 41 provinces, tying one and a half million farmers together into a movement of great potential strength. For the first time ever, farmers marched en masse to Bangkok protesting unfair landlord practices. Students set up seminars in rural areas for government officials and foreign development experts to explain their development programs to the rural inhabitants who vocalized their grievances and complaints. Development was no longer forced upon silent victims.

The student movement clearly provided the crucial catalyst. The National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), which had been formed in 1970 to oppose the deteriorating economic and social conditions foisted upon Thai society through military rule, spread into rural and labor groups, and also backed candidates for political office.

Nationalist Puey Ungphakorn (former governor of the Bank of Thailand, with close ties to the IMF-World Bank group) served as rector of Thammasat University and encouraged nationalistic teachings in the classrooms.⁸ Students, proudly wearing the blue work shirt of the farmers, were charged both with a sense of the need to set things right for Thailand and with an understanding of how ties to labor and farmer movements provided the unified strength to do so.

A fourth component of these movements was the CPT. According to a 1973 student leader, the three pre-eminent characteristics of the Thai student movement over the years -- independence, involvement with social justice and fairness, and a sense of how their society

should progress autonomously -- made it difficult for any legal party to dominate the student organizations.

The CPT, however, possessed these three characteristics. It is not surprising, therefore, that, according to this student leader, the CPT maintained close contacts with the students after 1973 and found fertile ground for CPT's "anti-establishment, pro-change" ideas. The trust was both political and personal, the latter enhanced by the CPT method of organizing which relied on the personality of an organizer, who gave and received both friendship and loyalty.

These combined popular movements had profoundly cooling effects on foreign investors. During the first half of 1974 alone, foreign investment dropped 50 per cent. Guerilla attacks forced the shutdown of some foreign enterprises,⁹ and exposes of corruptly obtained concessions scared other potential investors away.¹⁰

As the movements became more focused towards fundamental change, the bourgeoisie, which had previously allied with them, retreated. "To hold foreign employers hostage, to demand the ouster of foreign executives, to go on strike ... all of this is enough to scare away all investors," bemoaned the Secretary General of the Board of Investment.¹¹ "Investors (are) frightened by some groups which uncompromisingly oppose foreign investment", added civilian political leader Kukrit Pramoj, Prime Minister in 1976.¹²

All this changed, when the movements were silenced by what Business Week termed a "pro-business junta to calm... to stabilize the country's economy".¹³ The horrifying cruelty with which the movements were crushed in the October 1976 coup was largely ignored by the U.S. media. Massacres of those involved in the popular movements -- labor and farmer representatives, student leaders and progressive politicians (including Dr. Boonsanong Poonyodyana, Secretary General of the Socialist Party) had, in actuality, started as early as 1974.¹⁴ But the hundreds of young students who were shot, hung and burnt alive when U.S.-trained Thai forces stormed Bangkok's Thammasat University on that day in October 1976 brought a shattering end

to the period of flourishing above-ground movements. The FFT was outlawed; the NSCT banned. The reactionary forces had, for the time being, gained the upper hand. Still, in some university departments, "40 to 60 per cent (of the students) and a larger per cent of the faculty" fled to the hills to join the CPT.¹⁵ Thousands of others lived with nightmarish memories of that brutal day.

U.S. MILITARY/CIA ASSISTANCE

The repression and authoritarian rule that seems part and parcel of recent Thai history are not merely a function of the "Oriental despot". Throughout these thirty years, U.S. military and CIA assistance has engendered these characteristics within the Thai military clique.

Right after World War II, the United States' intentions of maintaining a close alliance with Thailand and turning her away from either Britain or Japan became clear. It was Truman's Ambassador Stanton who whispered to Thai Prime Minister Phibun -- at that point, totally illusory -- tales of encroaching Communist subversion, purported to be especially strong among intellectuals, students, priests, and writers.¹⁶

Phibun's Police General Phao Siyanon emerged as a power figure, and the CIA, quickly forging close connections with him, channeled funds and advice for construction of a repressive police apparatus, including the Border Patrol Police.

All this was done quietly through the Sea Supply Corporation (formally called the Overseas Southeast Asia Supply Company), a private company based in Miami, Florida which was used as a CIA front. The Sea Supply Corporation served as a conduit for the \$35 million of CIA money as well as for retired U.S. military personnel with close CIA links which together transformed the Thai military police force into paramilitary, counterinsurgency units.¹⁷ The operation was undoubtedly strengthened by the fact that in 1952 William Donovan, founder of the Office of Strategic Services, assumed the post of U.S. Ambassador to Thailand.

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While a U.S. Congressional restriction of aid to foreign police forces stood on the books, by 1954, through CIA assistance, the Thai police force had grown to a shocking ratio of one for every 407 people (totalling 42,835 policemen).¹⁸

Although the Joint Military Assistant Advisory Group (JUSMAG) was officially set up in 1953, during Phibun's time it was the CIA that had the closest Thai connections, and the Pentagon strived for more direct influence, especially after "the 1953 Viet Minh invasion of Laos pointed at the throat to Thailand".¹⁹ There was some popular discontent expressed in Thailand during Phibun's last few years of rule.

Subsequently, the U.S./DoD gained equal influence with the CIA in Thailand after Field Marshall Sarit, with close DoD connections, staged a 1957 coup. Ten years later, Ambassador Leonard Unger would look back and summarize the official U.S. perception of Thailand as a crucial strategic location for large numbers of U.S. military personnel:

"There is nowhere we have anything like the kind of relationship we have with Thailand. There is nowhere where we have the possibility of establishing these various facilities that are of considerable interest to us..."²⁰

The statement hints at the strengthening of political links between the U.S. and Thai military that occurred during the rule of Sarit and that of his followers, Thanom and Prapas.

With the establishment of the Military Assistance Command to Thailand officially under the domain of the Military Advisory Command - Vietnam, it was no secret that U.S. interests in Indochina were dictating U.S. strategic objectives and policy in Thailand.²¹ U.S. training of Thai officers widened in scope as the latter were sent to U.S. bases to study both conventional and guerilla warfare.

A fervent disciple of Joe McCarthy and believer in the domino theory, Graham Martin, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand in the mid-sixties, promoted the institutionalization of counterinsurgency (citing the expanding Communist movement in South Vietnam) through joint U.S.-Thai military maneuvers in the northeast frontier in 1964. Negoti-

ations between CIA Director William Colby and Martin prompted the expansion of the role CIA advisors played with the Thai Border Patrol Police.²²

Martin's initiative was followed up by Praspas in the 1965 establishment of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC, the predecessor of ISOC).

Instead of CIA-funding of the police force, it was now the United States Operations Mission (USOM, the predecessor of AID in Thailand) that financed the police's rural security operations -- to the tune of almost \$1100 million between 1967 and 1972.²³ U.S. economic and military assistance merged to create a repressive police and military apparatus, focused on an insurgency that was still at this point of small magnitude.

Between 1967 and 1972, approximately 30,000 Thais in military, police and paramilitary units were given training by the U.S. Green Berets. Within "enemy" lines, however, as a Thai National Security Council White Paper on the insurgency indicated, from 1966 to 1967 only 687 Thai communists received paramilitary training in Vietnam, while in the earlier period from 1952 to 1957, merely 65 CPT members attended China's Marx-Lenin Institute for theoretical training.²⁴

The extensive training of such a counterinsurgency-oriented Thai military was useful to the U.S. in Korea and Vietnam as well as in Laos and Cambodia. Moreover, as the Vietnam era spawned a massive U.S. presence in Thailand -- at its height accounting for 40 per cent of the Thai GNP²⁵ -- polarization and discontent within Thai society increased, vastly strengthening the insurgency for which the U.S. had prepared the Thai military.

Thai Foreign Minister during the years of this multiplying U.S. presence, Thanat Khoman, later wrote that the bases construction agreement was conducted without any input from the civilian part of the government. It was simply a matter of consent between the U.S. and Thai military elite.²⁶ The U.S. had set a pattern for future rule in Thailand -- encouraging the military elite while weakening any civilian legislative structure and initiative.

The reversal of Thai domestic politics in 1973 sparked shifts in U.S. bi-

lateral assistance to Thailand. In a show of keen loyalty, the U.S. military assistance soared after 1973, totalling around \$150 million for the three year period. On the other hand, although the civilian governments spoke of priorities for development that appeared to coincide with the official U.S. economic assistance rhetoric, there was no word of encouragement for the Thai democratic experiment. Indeed, economic assistance plummeted from \$39 million in 1973 to \$17 million in 1975.²⁷

While the civilian government under Kukrit pledged the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Thailand after the Vietnam fiasco, an irritated U.S., intent on maintaining at least its 18 electronic listening sites, sought out the Thai military for assistance. This time it was General Kriangsak Chamanand (proving himself to be an American friend) and Air Marshall Thawee who bypassed the civilian government in signing the agreement which kept American troops on Thai soil.²⁸

The U.S., however astounded by the chain of Thai political events in 1973, was not without continuing allies in the police and military forces it had helped to build in the earlier decades. Through U.S. help, the police force alone had swelled to 82,000 in 1975. As U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) Director Daniel Parker confided in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on June 11, 1974:

"Upward of 9,000 police are stationed in about 1,000 village police stations. Fifty-four fifty-five man provincial action force units were specially trained and equipped to augment police presence at village and district posts. The Border Patrol Police has been increased from about 7,000 men in 1965 to present strength of 14,000 in view of the growing importance of its counterinsurgency mission. The mobility of police elements has been improved with public safety advisor assistance in the creation of the Police Aviation Division of 75 fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft."²⁹

On top of this, the increasing military assistance during the 1973 to 1976 peri-

od was justified by and in turn reinforced the rabid anti-Communist view of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson explained to the Senate Armed Forces Committee in 1974:

"Priority is given to the advisory effort and the Military Assistance Program to support of Thai counterinsurgency plans and programs. Approximately 300 U.S. advisers are participating in training and advising of Thai forces."³⁰

The liberalization of Thai society during this period was thus watched by this broadly focused counterinsurgency effort led by the Thai military elite. General Kaiyut Koedphon, deputy head of CSOC and a close ally of the CIA, admitted that the CIA was collaborating with a variety of Thai security agencies, including CSOC, during this period. Similarly, Deputy Director of Police, Withun Yasawat, said he was receiving CIA advice and reports as late as 1974.³¹

During this period, the U.S. also turned increasingly to a subtler conduit for funds to the Thai National Police Department - the International Narcotics Control (INC) program. Established by President Nixon in 1971, the INC program channeled 12.1 million to Thailand between 1973 and 1976, supplying help similar to that of the old controversial AID Office of Public Safety, which, with the CIA had previously directed U.S. police training programs for foreign nationals.³²

A General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress in 1976 made the links between the INC, money and Thai repressive mechanism quite clear, quoting a U.S. Embassy official in Bangkok who admitted: "It will be almost impossible to insure that commodities furnished will be used exclusively for controlling narcotics."³³

American indoctrination of the CSOC and the Border Patrol Police during the 1960's produced U.S.-desired objectives. "Nawaophon", created by ISOC officers who in turn had close contacts with the CIA, employed covert tactics to search out "subversive" elements within the Thai population. "Krathing Daer" (Red Gaur), also an ISOC creation, was led by Col. Sudsai Hatsadinthon whose mercenary history included working with the CIA to organize the Meo tribesmen in Laos.

The "Village Scouts", created by the Border Patrol Police, provided a paramilitary rural security force.³⁴ Thus, the U.S.-groomed Thai military spawned its own institutions of terror, whose vicious activities against the liberal and progressive elements in Thai society increased polarization and brought tensions towards a breaking point. The three paramilitary vigilante groups, along with 4,000 units of the Border Patrol Police and the Metropolitan Police, seemed delighted at the opportunity to storm Bangkok's Thammasat University in 1976.³⁵

Under Thaninand Kriangsak, instruments of repression were expanded. In 1977, 40 per cent of the Thai budget was geared towards counterinsurgency. U.S. military assistance followed its same old pattern, simply at an accelerated rate. Indeed, the current military build-up in Thailand, purported to be in response to Vietnamese expansionism, began in 1976. Today, the U.S. is quietly re-assigning military personnel to Thailand -- including U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy personnel in civilian clothing, and CIA specialists³⁷-- while verbally reiterating past pledges of support and increasing military aid.³⁸ As in the late 1960s a heightened U.S. presence in Thailand, with its concomitant polarization of that society, is only serving to exacerbate the tensions and the repression, bringing "insurgency" to a head.

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

While U.S. military assistance has more blatantly encouraged the pattern of authoritarian military rule in Thailand, U.S. economic assistance has served to buttress and accentuate this trend in Thai domestic politics. Throughout modern Thai history, the latter has perhaps been as dangerous, in that its humanitarian rhetoric offers a useful, deceptive cloak. As already discussed, large chunks of the post-World War II economic assistance directly financed the training and equipping of a police force for counterinsurgency. Other parts of the economic aid package served complementary functions.

The 1950 Economic and Technical Cooper-

ation Agreement between Thailand and the U.S. served as an indication of things to come. Allen Griffen, former deputy director of the U.S. aid mission to China, traveled to Thailand to establish the program. His words conveyed the influence that Mao's recent triumph would have on Washington's Thailand policy: "There is hardly any important economic urgency. There is political urgency... A country that has come out solidly for the West, Thailand needs prompt evidence that its partnership is valued." 39

With Sarit in power, the strategy became focused and project assistance began. "Nation building" was the name of the game. The Council on Foreign Relations rationalized that this very specific sort of aid program would effect the changes necessary to insure "stability and permit internal development, and ... security to prevent a take-over by international communism". 40

A top U.S. economic aid official's earlier warning that "a quick gesture calculated to impress Government leaders and the people -- particularly the educated elite ...-- may produce more desirable political results than a long range economic project" 41 was borne in mind as foreign advisers and technicians trained Thai technocrats. Thai nationals sent abroad through U.S. aid to gain training returned to assume the role of "Western" advisers in government economic agencies.

One month after Vice President Lyndon Johnson's visit to Thailand in May 1961, AID Director, Henry L. Labuisse announced that, in accordance with the Kennedy administration's "new look" in economic aid programs, all supporting assistance to Thailand would be drawn to a close by mid-1961. Such official optimism about Thailand's economic future was not long lived, however. U.S. aid experts in Thailand launched a series of politically-motivated protests, including a number of telegrams from staunchly anti-Communist Ambassador Young, filled with warnings of a communist insurgency that was sure to sprout in the northeast in the near future.

One such classified telegram from the U.S. Embassy to the U.S. Secretary of State included the following appeal:

"Thailand could become another Viet-

nam. We hope public pressures at home will not force penny-wise and pound-foolish reductions in our aid effort here while communists make continuing headway in spreading their influence in the countryside. In candidness, all this in Thailand in 1962/63 is beginning remind me uncomfortably of U.S. cutbacks and delays in Vietnam in 1959/60 just before Viet Cong sprang terror and insurgency on peaceful recovering countryside." 42

Not surprisingly, an official economic rationalization for continued economic assistance to Thailand was voiced anew, with a fresh Congressional twist directing programs to the northeast region. 43

Out of this grew a variety of rural development programs, the foremost of which was termed Accelerated Rural Development (ARD). The American who conceived the program explained:

"Economic development is, after all, one of the best counterinsurgency weapons we have. If we develop among the rural people a friendship and loyalty towards their government, we shall have gone a long way toward making it possible for them to resist communist subversive attempts from the outside." 44

The complementarity of such a program with militaristic counterinsurgency programs was not lost on the Thai government who viewed the program as providing a means "to win over and sometimes win back our villagers". 45 The program, as implemented did little more than provide basic material infrastructure. With 90 per cent of its budget financing highway building, 46 the theory seemed to be that by expanding the reach of capitalism's clutches and lures while increasing the mobility of the military, anti-Communist forces would be able to prevail.

By 1969 the acting Director of USOM could boast to the U.S. Congress that two-thirds of the Fiscal Year 1969 program was "directly oriented to counterinsurgency". 47 What that meant was that programs could have been of some help in alleviating daily problems of small northeastern farmers, such as the proposed Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, could be and

were vetoed on the grounds that they were potentially incompatible with the counterinsurgency objectives.⁴⁸

The 1968 U.S. AID Program in Thailand booklet made no bones about the purpose of economic assistance to that country: "The U.S. AID program in Thailand is concentrated upon a single objective: supporting the Royal Thai Government in its efforts to contain, control and eliminate the Communist insurgency in rural areas." ⁴⁹

Alongside rural development, the other crucial component of this goal involved creating a civilian bureaucracy which would view development problems in a similar vein. This necessitated a spreading of technocratic capabilities -- but only among certain factions of the elite. A program to work with the new Parliament in 1970 and 1971, for instance, was vetoed. Parliaments, AID decided, did not fit in with counterinsurgency.

Other segments of the bureaucracy and the military did. USOM and AID reports seldom failed to mention how receptive Thais were to Western influence, a favorable comparison to former colonial nations experimenting with the voicing of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist aspirations. Neocolonialism, it appeared, had emerged in Thailand without formal colonial rule, making the whole process of continuing and increasing Western influence much easier.

1973 shook this view for a time. In an environment hostile to the aims of its practitioners, economic assistance dropped sharply, with only the security component gaining importance. Ironically, the democratic period included the most genuine attempt to institute decentralization through Kukrit's Tampon Development Funds, a program that was halted immediately after the civilian parliament procedure was destabilized.

With authoritarian rule back in place in 1976, AID plunged ahead, increasing its commitment to nine times the 1975 level in 1977 (\$98.4 million). ⁵⁰ The U.S. "seal of approval" was widely publicized by the Thai regime.

The CIA's direct links with AID in Thailand during the Vietnam War period appear to have stopped, but this did not change AID's objectives of providing counterinsurgency support for re-

actionary military regimes. The 1979 AID Country Development Strategy Statement noted that an important problem for Thailand to overcome, if it was to attract foreign investment, was "the frequent turnover of governments". U.S. Ambassador Abramowitz's introductory remark to the report put the request for the aid program in its geopolitical context:

"The Thai place high value on that (U.S.) support for their development program... Recent events (in Indochina) have further enhanced the potential value of any early demonstration of that sustained U.S. effort."⁵¹

AID's projects continue to be built upon the intertwining of economic development and counterinsurgency. The government followed AID advice in regrouping rural cooperatives on the ampor (district) level rather than at the village level as in the early 1970s. Any potential grassroots strength in the coops was therefore squashed. Similarly, AID has sought to encourage the growth of conservative, pro-government "non-government organizations" (NGOs) that concentrated on apolitical, technical problems, while ignoring those more progressive NGOs trying to solve basic problems through people's participation.

Two representatives from Thai NGOs to the 1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, whose trips were financed by AID, were chosen on the Thai government's recommendation. Needless to say, it was the government-corrupted groups who received the honor. Other programs have brought community development teachers from the north and northeast regions to Bangkok for two-months courses in counterinsurgency.

The Mae Chaem "opium replacement" project, still in planning stages as of August 1979, provides an illustration of AID's development goals for the 1980s. Officially, the project was to promote the desire of both Thai and U.S. governments to turn hilltribes from opium growers into commercial crop marketers.⁵² However, reliable statistics reveal that the actual magnitude of opium growing in the Mae Chaem watershed was far below the preliminary AID report's estimates.

When questioned on these statistics,

the AID rationale for the project was switched to one of "good watershed management" with opium replacement as a small subgoal. The more likely objective was counterinsurgency, for as the Bangkok Post reported:

"Over half the fifty-man militia force in Mae Chaem District have quit and the rest are in poor spirits because of the threats against their lives by Communist insurgents."

The Governor, the story continued, announced plans to launch "civic action under the Mae Chaem River Basin Programme to win back the loyalty of Communist sympathizers".⁵³ It therefore should not have come as a surprise to find that the one American consultant pushing for an expansion of people's participation in this "opium-replacement project" was quickly dropped from the team.

The pattern of support provided by U.S. economic assistance in Thailand, although gaining in rhetorical sophistication, remains the same as in the decades past. As one Western diplomat told the New York Times, "The Thais are the best friends money can buy".⁵⁴

THE WORLD BANK

Since its founding after World War II, the World Bank, with an array of projects paralleling AID's, has buttressed American interests in Thailand. A World Bank funding request to the U.S. Congress made clear in whose camp the Bank lay:

"From U.S. national point of view, these banks encourage development along lines compatible with our own economy. They stress the role of market forces in the effective allocation of resources and the development of outward-looking trading economies... Our participation in the international banks will also provide more assured access to essential raw materials, and a better climate for U.S. investment in the developing world.... Most of the total lending... is to countries... where we have strong interests..."⁵⁵

A strong relationship between the Bank and Thailand's military regimes began with a 1957-1958 World Bank mission that led Sarit to form the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB),

the central planning organization whose technocrats were molded into the World Bank view of efficiency and development. With Sarit's attack on Thai inefficiency and his ushering in the era of private enterprises in Thailand, the World Bank sought to pave the way for the penetration of international capitalism. The new Industrial Act promulgated in 1960 followed the advice, offering guarantees, privileges, and benefits to foreign investors.⁵⁶

World Bank projects during the 1960s maintained a strong emphasis on counterinsurgency through rural development, in keeping with Washington's priorities. The World Bank took over the funding of infrastructure projects in 1965, providing the government with better access to remote areas of the country where resistance was strong.

In the early 1970s, however, the World Bank voiced grave doubts about the growing instability in Thailand. During those years, the Bank expressed disapproval of such liberalizing policies as the raising of the minimum wage level.⁵⁷

The 1977-1980 Kriangsak reign witnessed a surge of World Bank projects that strived to restore an imposed stability both to sensitive rural areas and to Thailand's capitalist economy. The World Bank-funded Village Development Program, with its goal of providing heightened penetration of villages in the Thai-Malay and Thai-Kampuchean border areas where the Communist Party was strong, echoed the AID thrust. Funds were channeled to credit institutions providing loans to already well-off peasants (rather than small farmers) in the hopes of creating a kulak class serving as a bulwark against Communism. These programs, in actuality, aggravated rural tensions by quickening the formation of a class of landless peasants, a phenomenon unknown to Thailand historically, yet now comprising almost 30 per cent of all households, almost two times the urban population.⁵⁸

In February of 1979, when Kriangsak journeyed to Washington to receive the blessing of President Carter, he secured just as decisive backing from World Bank President Robert McNamara who assured him that loans to Thailand would double in the next year. Furthermore, World Bank analysts told

Kriangsak that his country had the capacity to absorb five times the level of loans at that point. That the World Bank anticipated variations on AID's counterinsurgency rural development strategies was obvious in the World Bank 1978 Country Report entitled "Towards a Development Strategy of Full Participation":

"The government's efforts to improve national security through its ARD program is a reflection of the fact that insurgent activities in the country are most frequent in those areas where the bulk of the population have been left behind by the growth process. Further efforts to bring those...into the mainstream of economic growth would establish a healthier economy and a more stable political situation." 59

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Unlike many former colonies, Thailand seldom experienced balance of payment deficits in the first two decades after World War II. There was, therefore, little opportunity for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to lay down the ground rules of Thai development by providing the stringent discipline that has helped set the stage for enhanced neocolonial grasps in neighboring countries like the Philippines.

This is not to imply that during the 1950s and 1960s the U.S. dominated IMF did not assume an important consultative role in advising highly receptive technocrats as to what sort of policies would please the West. Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s after IMF consultation, Thailand undertook major changes in its exchange rate policy.⁶⁰ Annual IMF mission visits and special technical missions (on such topics as fiscal tariff and financial structure) reinforced the ideologically conservative economic skills of the economic planners, while encouraging Governor of the Bank of Thailand, Puey to fit the Bank of Thailand more securely into the international capitalist structure.

By 1976, however, with the long chain of foreign loans and the turmoil of the 1973 to 1976 period, Thailand's balance of payments situation had deteriorated

badly. The Thanin-Kriangsak governments were not simply borrowing more from capital markets and public sources, they were seeking to draw extensively of the IMF facilities for the first time in Thai history. The series of IMF loans -- \$68 million for the 1976 Compensatory Finance Facility, the same again in 1977, \$32 million for the Reserve Trench in 1978 and \$45 million for the first Credit Trench in 1979 -- came easily, but so did enforcement of borrowing stipulations, including targets for growth, price-levels and credit, and policies to liberalize import bans, tax laws affecting foreign banks and concessions to foreign capital.

With the most recent two-year Standby Credit Agreement for up to \$600 million, Thailand has surrendered even more of its economic management.⁶¹ There is talk of the establishment of a resident IMF mission in Bangkok to oversee the policies more closely, as well as rumors of a decision to opt for the IMF's stringent Extended Fund Facility in 1982. Thailand's changing philosophy towards more direct international control and assistance is revealing of the secure domestic foundation that the Thai military rule lacks. Cooperation with international actors has been the elite approach to maintaining security and building up prosperity. Such patterns have been followed before in Thailand's past, with little but adverse ramifications for the Thai people.

THE MOVEMENT'S GROWTH

While the mass movements of 1973 and the brutal repression that the reactionary forces launched against them have been well documented, there has been little international recognition of renewed popular discontent surfacing in Thailand today. Although after October 1976, no more than five people could legally congregate without special government permission, the re-birth of worker militancy is evident in the recent wave of strikes at large and medium-scale businesses in Bangkok. Employers fire the striking laborers at the flick of a wrist, and labor organizers are arrested almost as rapidly by the regime's police force, but

the labor militants appear not to be dissuaded.

In summer 1979, as oil prices soared to the point of putting a subsistence diet out of the reach of common laborers, 10,000 people gathered to decry the oil price increases in spite of a government warning that they were violating Martial Law.⁶² The site was Sanam Luang, the huge field directly across from Thammasat University campus where the last demonstrations in Thai history had ended in tragedy. Although it was officially organized by the Labor Congress of Thailand, reliable sources indicate that the alliance behind the rally included student groups. The speeches by labor leaders were fiery and quickly strayed from the narrow subject of oil to a broadened analysis of the roots of Thai problems, focusing not only on the current government, but also on foreign capitalists.

Kriangsak reacted to the rally with moderation rather than risk a growing radicalization of the movements. The minimum wage was increased to 45 baht per day for the Bangkok area (still far below what the workers were asking), and, later in the year, the government backed down from a proposed electricity price hike of 55 per cent as protest spread.⁶³

The July 1979 assassination of Chamras Muangyarm, an ex-president of the FFT and one of the few farmer leaders who had neither been killed nor fled to the jungles after October 1976, indicates that something was stirring in the mobilization of the peasantry once again. Chamras was said to have been in the process of revitalizing the FFT by attempting to provide a crucial link between the 50 farmer leaders alive (and not in the hills) today.

At this point, the conditions of the rural areas have deteriorated to the point where movements are beginning almost spontaneously. With annual per capita income in Bangkok approximately \$600 as against the northeast where the figure is \$90,⁶⁴ the large rural-urban disparities focus the farmers' complaints. The repression that greets the protests only serves to intensify and enlarge the scope of the rural outrage.

The resurging student movement in

1979 is one that has grown in caution and sophistication as well as determination as a result of its bloody history. Through an ad hoc alliance, the students have moved on to political conscientizing events. Their leaflets and lectures on the international forces behind the oil price hikes spread out onto the Bangkok streets. They joined workers to protest a proposed bus fare increase.

Thammasat once again has become the hub where critical students from Bangkok's universities congregate. Radical bands mix the old, now outlawed lyrics with the new in daring defiance since the new musicians know well that the leaders of the old bands were among the first to be killed by repressive forces during the democratic period. It is not as easy to get official permission to use Thammasat auditorium as it was in those days, but every official assembly is used to make a political statement.

One of the skits in the Law Day program, for instance, revealed the depth of anger and agony that Chamras' assassination provoked among the students with whom he had been very popular. The play, depicting an unmistakable re-enactment of Chamras' assassination to anyone familiar with the details of his death, extended into the imaginary realm by ending with Chamras' children joining the CPT.

While the resurgence of progressive activity has been occurring on all fronts in 1979/80, the only well publicized event internationally, has been the split within the Communist Party of Thailand. Some of the intellectuals who fled to the hills in 1976 -- the potentially powerful leaders, according to most views -- have broken away to form a pro-Vietnam faction that may evolve into a new Communist Party. The split is less over Indochina loyalties than over the question of revolutionary tactics suitable for the Thai reality. The new group, arguing what has been dubbed the "Soviet line" (as opposed to the CPT's "China line"), believe that Thai society has advanced to the stage of possessing a national bourgeoisie large enough to be used as the vanguard of the revolution.

The government would like to view the split as an indication that problems with the guerilla insurgency are drawing to a close. The view, needless

to say, is far from accurate. First of all, most of those leaving the CPT are not returning to the government's outstretched arms, but to other growing movements

More importantly, however, the CPT will undoubtedly remain a force that has to be reckoned with since it has mass support from rural areas as well as from the majority of progressive students. The split is not a major one for the CPT whose seven person Politburo remains intact, and there are indications that the Party maintains enough flexibility to learn from past mistakes.

One would like to be able to view these mounting movements with optimism. Yet, the outpouring of repression against popular movements has been too well indoctrinated into reactionary forces in Thailand through these decades of counterinsurgency programs for that sort of confidence to exist.

Government control is being tightened these days. "Communist" books are now being seized at the Bangkok airport. News of popular demonstrations in Iran and Nicaragua is the main target of the newly-formed censorship committee for international news reports, a committee which includes members of the U.S.-trained Special Branch Police. The CIA appears to be aiding this increased surveillance. According to a reliable source, CIA-affiliated U.S. academicians are receiving appointments in the departments of Bangkok universities where some of the government's more vocal critics teach and study.

As social and economic conditions deteriorate, the military regime is experiencing increasing political instability. Should a popular movement replay the events of 1973, it seems probable that the pattern of ensuing repression through a reactionary backlash will also be followed.

U.S. interests in Thailand have expanded even further today. Not only has the U.S. recently edged out Japan in applications for new foreign investment but also the U.S. needs the reassurance of knowing that Thai power rests in the hands of friendly generals who allow America to accelerate its covert and overt Southeast Asian activities from Thailand's strategic location.⁶⁵ The favor is likely

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to continue to be granted in exchange for further increases in military and economic assistance programs to Thailand, often geared to counterinsurgency -- which will, in turn, only renew tensions within the population.

It seems likely that, at some point in the near future, a truly successful popular movement, with a stronghold among the farmers, will break this pattern of force and counterforce. If from nothing else, such optimism arises from the awareness of the enduring, and ever-expanding strength and commitment within those Thais leading the fight for true self-determination.

Footnotes

- 1) Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, South End Press, Boston, 1979, p.229, quoting National Security Council, 5429/2, 8/20/1954
- 2) Sarit was on the board of directors of 22 different companies.
- 3) "Thailand in a Changing Asia", Indochina Chronicle, May-June 1975, p.3
- 4) Southeast Asia Chronicle, Nov.-Dec. 1978, p.23 The Communist Party itself was established in the 1940s; the armed struggle launched in 1965.
- 5) Thomas Lobe, United States Security Policy and Aid to the Thai Police, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Volume 14, University of Denver, Colorado Seminary, Denver, 1977, p.115
- 6) For more about ISOC, formerly called CSOC, see military assistance section of this article.
- 7) Far Eastern Economic Review, 10/18/74; Indochina Chronicle, May-June 1975, p.4
- 8) Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, Best Wishes for Asia, Klett Thai Publications/Interpart Thailand Limited, Bangkok, 1975
- 9) Time (European edition), 5/26/75
- 10) David Elliott, Thailand: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, Unpublished Thesis for MA of Social Sciences, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, July 1975, p.62
- 11) Indochina Chronicle, May-June 1975, p.6
- 12) A. Turton, J. Fast and M. Caldwell, Thailand: Roots of Conflict, Russell Press Ltd, Nottingham, England, 1978, p.86
- 13) Business Week, 11/8/76
- 14) Thirty-seven leaders of FFT were assassinated between April 1975 and March 1976. Dr. Boonsanong's death remains shrouded with indications of a CIA-aided plot, complete with a young woman, fluent in Thai, supposedly doing research in northern Thailand.
- 15) cf supra, # 5, p.122
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- 17) Thadeus Flood, The United States and the Military Coup in Thailand: A Background Study, Indochina Resource Center, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 1; cf supra # 5, p.23
- 18) cf supra # 1, p.22
- 19) cf supra # 11, p.11
- 20) U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearings before the Subcommittee, 1969

- 21) cf supra # 17, p.2
 22) cf supra # 5, p.48
 23) J. Alexander Caldwell, American Economic Aid to Thailand, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, MA, 1974, pp.19,46
 24) cf supra # 17, p.2
 25) Southeast Asia Chronicle, Dec. 1978, p.22
 26) cf supra # 17, p.2
 27) cf supra # 12, p.29; WIN Magazine; 10/21/76 See next section on economic assistance.
 28) cf supra # 12, p.88
 29) cf supra # 3, p.13
 30) Michael T. Klare, Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., 1977 quoting U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization for Military Procurement Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973, Part I, p.163
 31) cf supra # 17, quoting reports from the Thai press
 32) cf supra # 30, pp.26,29
 33) Controller of the U.S., Stopping U.S. Assistance to Foreign Police and Prisons, Report to Congress, U.S. GPO, Washington D.C., 1976
 34) see cf supra # 8, p.10; and cf supra # 1, pp.224-225
 35) Chaianan Samudavanija and David Morell, Reforms, Reaction and Revolution: Political Conflict in Thailand (unpublished manuscript), chapter 12
 36) cf supra # 12, p.95
 37) Manchester Guardian Weekly, 12/2/79, p.7, quoting one Asian embassy's analyst and a military analyst from Western Europe; Business Week 11/26/79, p.63
 38) U.S. agreed in early 1979 to increase military aid to Thailand by \$6 million during that fiscal year. Thailand Information Center, 2/15/79, p.4
 39) cf supra # 23, p.4
 40) As quoted in Southeast Asia Chronicle, Nov.-Dec. 1978, p.23. The statement was made in 1960.
 41) cf supra # 23, p.39
 42) U.S. Embassy/Bangkok, Telegram to Secretary of State, 3/30/63 (now declassified)
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 44) cf supra # 23, p.135
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 47) cf supra # 23, p.50
 48) see cf supra # 23
 49) Ralph Thaxton, "Modernization and Counter-revolution in Thailand"; Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Dec. 1973, p.32
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 52) Far Eastern Economic Review, 9/14/79, p.42
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 54) As quoted in Indochina Chronicle, May-June 1975, p.17
 55) U.S. Department of Treasury, Statement of John A. Bushnell, Deputy Director for Developing Nations Before Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, 3/16/76, pp.2-5
 56) cf supra # 43, p.68
 57) Far Eastern Economic Review, 10/18/74
 58) Far Eastern Economic Review, 7/13/79, p.48
 59) World Bank, Thailand: Toward a Development Strategy of Full Participation, A Basic Economic Report No. 2059-TH (confidential), East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, World Bank, Bangkok, Sept. 1978, pp.V,131
 60) see Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, Finance and Commerce -- Text of Address to American Chamber of Commerce, The Commerce and Accounting Journal, Nov.1963
 61) Far Eastern Economic Review, 12/14/79, pp.94-96
 62) The crowd estimates are from Bangkok Nation (7/20/79). A huge rainstorm in the middle of the rally dispersed the crowds while their numbers were still growing making estimations difficult.
 63) Far Eastern Economic Review, 12/21/79, p.38
 64) Business Week, 10/22/79, p.107
 65) Thailand Update, Feb.79, p.4; Business America, 8/13/79, p.12; The general need not be Kriangsak, whose control is shaky. Indeed, in the near future it will likely be General Serm or General Prem who leads the next reactionary military coup. Prem seems the likeliest candidate since he possesses the "youth", and the royal backing Serm lacks.



Source: LNS

U.S. AND NATO BASES IN TURKEY

by Konrad Ege

(Ed. note: Konrad Ege is an independent journalist. He has worked with CounterSpy magazine for two years.

This article is the second in an ongoing series of the U.S. role in Turkey. An article in the last issue detailed the influence the CIA has over some Turkish labor unions through the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI). An upcoming article will explore the role that the CIA and the U.S. military have in suppressing progressive movements in Turkey and in keeping Turkey open for U.S. corporations.)

"U.S. policy on military aid to Turkey... should be based on the necessity of... strengthening Turkish efforts to oppose communist pressure, and to possible utilization of Turkey for U.S. strategic purposes." This is what the CIA's Review of the World Situation stated as early as February 1949. At that time, military collaboration between the U.S. and Turkey was already running in high gear.

Three months after President Truman had announced in his doctrine that Turkey and Greece needed to be protected against internal communist subversion and Soviet aggression, the U.S. and Turkey signed an agreement on military assistance. In 1950, the Turkish government sent 5,000 troops to fight on the side of the U.S. in Korea. Two years later, Turkey joined NATO, and in 1955, the Baghdad Pact, which was to become CENTO after Iraq left the pact.

In October 1959, the Turkish and the U.S. governments concluded negotiations about the stationing of nuclear weapons there. The U.S. argued that this was necessary from a military standpoint, and the Turkish government allowed the stationing of one squadron of Jupiter missiles with nuclear warheads.

Even though it was stated in the agreement that a decision about the launching of nuclear missiles would have to be agreed on by Turkey and the U.S., a recently declassified State Department telegram claimed that as of 1962, "the

Turks really have no say over Jupiter now because of custodial arrangements" - that is, the U.S. had retained control over the use of the missiles.

U.S. "rights" in Turkey go much further. A 1959 treaty grants that "in case of an aggression against Turkey, the U.S. government, upon request, will take necessary steps ... including the use of military force, for helping the Turkish government". This phrasing is intentionally vague. What it means in practice is that if the pro-U.S. government in Turkey is threatened by internal opposition - which, of course, can be interpreted as "Soviet backed" aggression - and asks for U.S. troops, the U.S. military could aid the Turkish rulers by breaking strikes and demonstrations, and would probably even occupy the country to prevent a change in government.

Despite several disagreements and conflicts between the U.S. and Turkey since 1962, the military collaboration between the two countries was never seriously endangered. The U.S. has built more than 100 military and intelligence facilities on Turkish soil. The Turkish government, controlled by a small ruling oligarchy, and by sectors of the army, maintained a deepening connection with and dependency on the U.S. government.

Opposition by large sectors of the Turkish society to the U.S. presence in Turkey and Turkey's NATO membership, as well as to the increasing economic domination of the U.S., has become more and more substantial over the years. The Turkish government, with logistical support from the U.S., has responded with brutal repression and continues its campaigns against progressive movements.

February 1975 saw the most serious crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations, when the U.S. Congress banned all arms sales to Turkey in retaliation for the Turkish military action in Cyprus. The Turkish government responded by closing most of the U.S. military and intelligence bases. In spite of the advanced development of spy satellites which could perform many of the functions of the intelligence bases, this closing dealt a serious blow to U.S. strategic interests. (For details on the importance and nature of U.S. bases in Turkey, see map below.) However, the arms embargo was lifted

again in September, 1978, the U.S. bases were re-opened, and the Turkish and U.S. governments began to negotiate about a new, long-term base agreement.

On March 29, 1980, this new Turkish - U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed, and later presented to the Turkish parliament. While the new agreement limits the use of the bases for NATO purposes and prohibits their use by the U.S. in a war in the Middle East it can be assumed that there are loopholes favorable to the U.S. since the annexes to the agreement have not been published. Also, as we saw the agreement on the Jupiter missiles had no binding on the U.S.

Already, a Turkish member of Parliament, Ismail Hakki Ozturun charged in a speech on January 8, 1980, that U.S. paratroopers stationed in the Incirlik air base were put on alert after Iranians had taken over the U.S. Embassy in Teheran.


Recently, U.S. officials have re-emphasized that the "importance of a stable, democratic pro-Western Turkey has never been clearer. Turkey is the southeastern anchor of NATO. It occupies a unique geopolitical position (and) provides a highly useful location for U.S. military installations..". After the forced closure of U.S. intelligence facilities in Iran, the spy

bases in Turkey, aimed at the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and some Middle Eastern countries, have indeed become more important for the U.S. government.

In the past, the U.S. bases in Turkey have played a decisive role in U.S. objectives in the Middle East. The U.S. air base in Incirlik, for example, was a focal point in the U.S. invasion of Lebanon in 1958; and U.S. planes flew supplies from Adana to Amman, Jordan to assist King Hussein in his massacre of thousands of Palestinians in the "Black September" of 1970. Israel has also been receiving valuable logistical support via U.S. bases in Turkey.

There can be little doubt that the Turkish bases will play an important role in the use of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). In this way, Turkey would almost certainly be drawn into any military conflict between the U.S. and a Middle Eastern country.

The following map details U.S. and NATO military and intelligence facilities in Turkey. Their number and nature explained below makes clear once more the importance Turkey has for U.S. strategic interests. Needless to say, these U.S. and NATO bases make Turkey a prime target in case of a military confrontation in which the U.S. is involved.



● **NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) station.** The NADGE system consists of 84 radar sites in nine countries. It is able to detect bomber-size aircraft at a 500km. distance and to differentiate between hostile and friendly aircraft.

The NADGE system was finished in 1973 - by which time, ground-based radar systems, like NADGE were already, in a certain sense, obsolete, since the stations themselves cannot be sufficiently protected against attack and are unable to detect low-flying objects. In the early 1970's, this task had been taken over by sophisticated satellite surveillance.

This suggests another purpose for NADGE. NADGE could be used for attacks. Peacetime surveillance (that is, continued determination of their location) by NADGE station in Turkey of Soviet, Bulgarian, and presumably Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian forces makes it possible for U.S. and NATO Air Forces to "neutralize" them in a preemptive attack. NADGE could also control and monitor a U.S. attack on these countries, e.g. by monitoring U.S. bomber planes sent into the other country and detecting and intercepting defense responses by the attacked country.

● **U.S. Defense Communication System (DCS) facility.** The Yamanlar station connects the DCS in Turkey with the DCS stations in Greece through the Mt. Pateras terminal there. It is also linked to the Karamursel and Yaluva terminals, and to sites in European Turkey. Elmadag is linked to the Samsun communication facility and the Karatas terminal. Karatas, in turn, is connected to the Malatya terminal, which has a link to Diyarbakir.

Diyarbakir contains an earth terminal for the Defense Satellite Communications System; it is linked directly to the Lakehurst Naval Air Station in New Jersey. Diyarbakir has been termed "irreplaceable" by U.S. officials.

In addition, there are some other 40 minor U.S. and NATO communication stations not marked on this map in the Ankara, Izmir, Izmit, Diyarbakir, and Incirlik area as well as in European Turkey.

● **U.S. Intelligence Base.** The Belbasi

station contains seismographic detection equipment which registers underground nuclear tests. It is linked to a world-wide network of similar stations, whose data is evaluated in the National Security Agency's (NSA) Seismic Data Analysis Center in Alexandria, Virginia.

Sinop is run by the NSA. It spies on Soviet naval and air activity in the Black Sea and on missile testing.

Samsun, with functions similar to Sinop, is run by Turkish personnel and the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS). It is part of the NSA's intelligence network.

Karamursel is run by Turkish personnel and the USAFSS. It spies on naval traffic in the Sea of Marmara.

Diyarbakir spies on Soviet missile testing. It is a part of NSA's global intelligence system and is closely associated with Pirinclik Air Base.

④ **U.S. Air Base.** Incirlik Air Base is the most forward deployed land base of the U.S. Air Force. Planes there are capable of carrying out nuclear strikes. It is also used as a training facility for U.S. pilots in Europe, and as a refueling point for transports to and from the Middle East. Cigli Air Base is mainly utilized in NATO exercises.

○ **U.S. Naval Base.** The Iskenderun and Yumurtalik facilities also harbor the most important storage centers for petroleum, oil and lubricants for U.S. and NATO forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Kargaburun naval base also contains a Loran C communication facility. Loran C is a long range navigation system for ships, submarines, and aircraft. It is under the auspices of the U.S. Coast Guard. Its main purpose is military.

● **NATO Land Southeast Command and 6th Allied Tactical Air Force Command in Izmir and TUSLOG (Turkish-U.S. Logistical Group) in Ankara.** TUSLOG is the central logistical and support command for all U.S. forces in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

④ **U.S. nuclear storage site.**

④ **NATO nuclear storage site.**

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GHANA'S INDEPENDENCE OR VALCO?

by Kojo Arthur

(Ed. note: This article was researched at the Center for Development Policy, a Washington, D.C. non-profit research facility. It is excerpted from a forthcoming publication on the entire Volta River Project to be published by the Africa Research and Publications Project (P.O. Box 1892, Trenton, N.J. 08608).

While examining Kwame Nkrumah's economic development plans carefully and critically, the author does in no way want to diminish the progress made under Nkrumah in other areas, e.g. education and agriculture, and the important role Nkrumah played in Pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist struggles.) /

The ten months old civilian government in Ghana headed by Hilla Limann has come under intense pressure in re-

cent weeks to move against some multinational corporations - particularly three U.S. subsidiaries in Ghana, Star Kist, Firestone and Valco. In launching his administration's two-year "New Deal" agricultural program in May 1980, President Limann condemned the fact that the country's "resources (are) unused or exploited cheaply by others and taken away from us á lá Valco, á lá Firestone type of naked and conscienceless exploitation of poor undeveloped countries by rich developed countries".

On February 8, 1962 Valco (Volta Aluminum Company) and the Ghana government signed a 30-year agreement for the sale of hydroelectric power to Valco. Behind this agreement lay the concentrated use of bargaining power by the U.S. government, the British government, the international lending institutions (spearheaded by the World Bank), and the "six sister" companies in the aluminum industry itself. This article will attempt to look into the intrigues that occurred (and are continuing) as this concentrated bargaining power was exercised to further develop Ghana's underdevelopment.

The Valco case has extraordinary implications, and any move by Ghana against the company will be followed closely by U.S. corporations who have more than \$40 billion invested in developing countries. International lending institutions - notably the World Bank - will be following Limann's plans with more than keen interest. But more importantly, U.S. reaction to Limann's moves will be watched closely by third world governments. U.S. reaction will give an indication of the true stand of the advanced western countries on the New International Economic Order (NIEO).

Valco is an aluminum smelting facility owned by the California-based Kaiser Aluminum and Chemicals Corporation (90 %) and the Virginia-based Reynolds Aluminum and Metals Company (10 %). The smelter uses low-cost electricity from a World Bank-funded hydroelectric plant on the Volta River in Ghana. The U.S. and Britain also provided loans to Ghana for the construction of the hydroelectric project. Ghana met half of the cost of the scheme, which was to be one aspect of the Volta River Project.

Other components were to be an integrated aluminum industry, irrigation for a large agricultural program, cheap water transportation over the lake to be created by damming the Volta River, and fishing industry on the human-made lake. The integrated aluminum industry was to mine, refine, smelter and process aluminum using Ghana's vast bauxite deposits. The aluminum industry was to be the catalyst for transforming Ghana's mono-crop (cocoa) economy to a modern industrial base.

The desire to tap Ghana's rich bauxite deposits and hydroelectrical potency dates as far back as the 1920s when Ghana (then called Gold Coast) was a British colony. Following the gold rush in the colony at the time, and with the increased demand for the strategic metal - aluminum - after World War I, the Gold Coast Geological Survey Department drew the colonial government's attention to this industrial potential in Ghana.

However, right from its inception to the present, the Volta River Project has been manipulated. The multinational corporations are determined to keep Ghana

in a neo-colonial economic development structure by maintaining their monopoly over capital and technology in order to maximize their profits. At one point or the other, the multinational companies have had the tacit, subtle or open support of their home governments who found the project an important tool for international power plays.

The initial attempts in the 1920s to exploit Ghana's resources remained "on paper". Aluminum production, using advanced technology, was protected by patents and other devices of a few firms. The aluminum industry was characterized both by the international division of markets and by domestic monopoly. The monopoly companies were vertically integrated: that is, they controlled the whole process of production from bauxite, through initial chemical reduction to alumina to further electrolytic reduction to aluminum and finally to fabricated aluminum products. Until World War II, the U.S. and France were the world's major producers. Added to that, the small-scale level of the industry at that time meant that the bauxite deposits of the U.S. and France were sufficient to meet domestic and external demands.

However, World War II catapulted aluminum to the foreground as a most strategic metal. Britain was unique in being a major power of those times without an aluminum industry or reserves. Britain renewed its interest in the Volta River Project for this and other reasons. In the course of the war, France's bauxite deposits and aluminum industry were being lost to Germany. At the same time, the rapid growth of the aluminum industry in the U.S., funded by massive government aid, marked the beginning of the period of intense worldwide expansion of the aluminum industry.

The U.S. government's decision that all national deposits of strategic minerals - including bauxite - should be kept in reserve for wartime needs led the intense scramble for overseas bauxite sources by U.S. corporations. As mentioned, Britain renewed its interests in Ghana's bauxite as a measure to protect its claim to Ghana's resources. In addition, to help stabilize the tottering British currency, the Volta River Project was regarded an important sterling area (Ghana, as a

colony of Britain, used the same currency) source of aluminum. Together with the newly created Cocoa Marketing Board, the aluminum project would be used to defray Britain's war debts, and to stabilize the British currency and devastated economy.

Renewed British interest resulted in the issue of a Government White Paper of November 1952, entitled "The Volta River Aluminum Scheme". The White Paper made it clear that Britain's only interest was in acquiring supplies of aluminum from a sterling area source. The White Paper also admitted that Britain's interest in the Volta River Project was not so much because of Ghana's bauxite, but the hydroelectric power potential available for smelting. No concern was expressed for Ghana's development as such.¹

By the mid-1950s Britain's interest in the Volta River Project was on the wane again, this time for both economic and political reasons. Economically, it was unfeasible for the British to carry out the project since by the time they had finished the preparatory studies, a surplus had developed in the world aluminum market. Also, thanks to the surplus capital accumulated and transferred from the colonies to Britain through the Agricultural Marketing Boards, Britain's economy had recovered sufficiently from its war losses. Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Board and Malaysia's rubber money contributed largely to this rapid recovery.

Politically, the upsurge of nationalism in 1948-51 in Ghana added a new dimension to the project. "Responding to nationalist agitation (for independence), the Watson (Commission) Report of 1948 had suggested that the Volta scheme, as the colony's largest project, should now be considered a national scheme, with substantial local equity investment and ultimate local ownership."² Earlier proposals were that the project should be a private enterprise to be owned by Duncan Rose's (a South African speculator and adventurer) company, WAFAL, or by the government-subsidized British Aluminum Company (BAC).

The Watson Commission's suggestion appealed more to the new nationalist party, led by Kwame Nkrumah; the Convention People's Party (CPP). The CPP included the immediate realization of the Volta

scheme in its election manifesto, and also in the party's first five-year development plan when the party came to power in 1951. A major feasibility study was undertaken during the years 1953-55. The result of this study - the Preparatory Commission Report published in 1956 - highlighted the technical and economic aspects of the project. "It did not consider such important questions as whether so much electricity out of the total available ought to be allocated to aluminum production, not whether the aluminum companies should be allowed permission to import alumina rather than process Ghana's bauxite."³

The Preparatory Commission Report priced the project at about \$900 million. The high price tag and other economic and political factors clearly indicated that negotiations would not lead to a satisfactory agreement for the immediate realization of the project as Nkrumah and his CPP wanted. "The aluminum companies (Alcan, BAC), whose participation was necessary, had indicated that they did not favor the idea of mixing private and public funds."⁴

Local critics - inside and outside the Legislative Assembly - feared the envisaged arrangements suggested by the Preparatory Commission might mean economic enslavement of Ghana. One Bediako Poku (a CPP back-bencher) in proposing an amendment to a motion in the Legislative Assembly on the project said: "...Since this scheme might be the basis of our expanding economy, the government should endeavor to avoid a second Abadan, that is, a possible Anglo-Gold Coast (Ghana)-Canadian dispute. The country should own the scheme, but if that proves difficult, at least more than half of each section of the entire scheme. Since, if the whole capital should come from foreigners, it might mean economic enslavement."⁵

In spite of all criticism of "sell-out to imperialists" both the critics and supporters of the project believed that the project together with other development schemes would help revolutionize the economy of Ghana. The differences were over how the project was to be financed, and over ownership. Foreign investors, particularly British and Canadian, would control 90 per

cent of the equity shares and assume responsibility for the operation of an aluminum smelter. The British government, through loans to the Ghana government, would build the required dam and the hydroelectrical plant. Ghana would be responsible for the new port and railroad, resettlement and other infrastructure services.

Nkrumah compromised in order to have the project consummated at that time for he feared that to do otherwise would have jeopardized the scheme and also cost Ghana its political independence. Nkrumah was well aware of events in another British colony, Guyana in South America where during this period in 1953, the radical nationalist party of Dr. Cheddi Jagan, following an electoral victory, had assumed power in an internal self-government arrangement. The British colonial government revoked Guyana's constitution and delayed granting independence to the "extremist".

Nkrumah did not want Ghana to suffer the same fate by taking so-called extremist positions on the Volta River Project. He had taken a similar compromising position on the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB). As has been pointed out above, the British had formed the CMB and other agricultural marketing boards to transfer much needed finance capital from the colonies to stabilize Britain's war shattered economy. Ghana was able to make available substantial dollar reserves to the sterling area because it sold large amounts of cocoa to the United States.

The British had a clear vested interest in the continuation of these CMB policies following the rise of the CPP to political power in Ghana in 1951. Had Nkrumah broken the CMB's marketing monopoly or used the CMB reserves within Ghana as articulate sections of Ghanaian farmers wanted, the British economy's recovery program would have been seriously affected. This would have led to a confrontation with British colonial power and Ghana's political independence would have been in doubt.

By 1957 when Ghana won its political independence from Britain, Nkrumah had secretly resumed talking to other (especially U.S.) aluminum companies. This was to put pressure on Alcan and BAC and the British government with whom Ghana was having open negotiations for the

"immediate realization" of the project. Nkrumah's mediator in the secret talks was Dr. Horace Mann Bond (father of Georgia Senator Julian Bond), formerly President of Lincoln University in Pennsylvania where Nkrumah was a student in the forties.

The U.S. companies that showed interest in the secret talks included Anaconda, Reynolds, Alcoa, and later, Kaiser. With Alcoa controlling most of the U.S. bauxite deposits, Reynolds and Kaiser (earlier known as Permanente Metals) had looked overseas for their material supplies. The Ghana scheme involving cheap hydroelectricity and a smelter was very appealing to these rising major competitors to Alcoa's monopoly.

When Vice President Richard Nixon represented the U.S. government at Ghana's independence celebration in March 1957, he assured the Ghanaian leaders of the U.S. government's willingness to encourage U.S. private investment in Ghana. A host of speculators and investors from the U.S. descended on Accra to try and pick up the contract for the Volta River Project.

Reynolds was represented by Adlai Stevenson and Sir Robert Jackson, an Australian. Kaiser was represented in the initial stages by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles - Kaiser's legal and political advisor. President Eisenhower showed personal interest by introducing Henry J. Kaiser to Kwame Nkrumah. "As a result of this approach, the U.S. explored the situation with American aluminum companies and after it was determined there was sufficient interest on their part, (the U.S.) offered to pay half the cost of a reassessment of the Preparatory Commission's 1956 Report." ⁶

Kaiser Engineers and Constructors were awarded the contract to reassess the Preparatory Commission's feasibility study. Kaiser Engineers supposedly trimmed the costs of the project and made it a financial possibility. "In fact the Kaiser cost estimates were not essentially different from those of the Preparatory Commission. All that was done was to omit most of the expenditure on public works such as roads, railways, land acquisition and resettlement." ⁷

By such omissions, Kaiser was able

to trim the costs to about \$300 million, about one-third of the price tag the Preparatory Commission had proposed. The Kaiser Report also stated that there were ample reserves of acceptable quality bauxite in Ghana to support a substantial aluminum. But later on Kaiser was to abandon any plans to use Ghana's bauxite, thus putting aside more than one-half of the original Volta River Project proposals.

Following the Kaiser Report, what was purported to be a consortium was formed to bid for the contract for the smelter. The so-called consortium comprised Alcoa, Alcan, Kaiser, Reynolds, and Olin Mathieson. Four of the "six sisters" were in the consortium specifically formed to give one-sided leverage to the giants in the aluminum industry to preempt competitive bidding. When it became obvious that the consortium would win the contract, all but Kaiser and Reynolds dropped out.

Alcoa and Alcan had no real need for additional smelter capacity, but this was exactly what Kaiser and Reynolds, with newly acquired ample bauxite deposits in Jamaica, required. The integrated aluminum industry was scaled down by the omission of the alumina plant that would have used Ghana's bauxite. Other ancillary facilities that could have stimulated Ghana's industrial development were also omitted. Ghana's original intention of acquiring 40 per cent of the smelter's equity shares was sacrificed at the high altar of monopoly corporate interests. Ghana accepted these trimmings though not without a fight.

By the 1960s Nkrumah was the "golden voice of solidarity" not only in the Pan-African movement but also in the non-aligned movement. He openly supported Patrice Lumumba, and vigorously condemned U.S. involvement in the Congo (now Zaire) crisis in 1960. But the biggest U.S. worry was what the intelligence agencies had assessed to be a growing Soviet influence in Africa, notably in Nasser's Egypt and Nkrumah's Ghana. Following the Suez Canal crisis, the U.S. had lost out on Egypt's Aswan High Dam project to the Soviets. Then Western intelligence sources discovered that the People's Republic of China and East Germany had sent "experts" to Ghana.

In the Cold War atmosphere of the

1960s and the alleged growing Soviet influence in the newly independent African countries, the Volta River Project was to be used by the U.S. with the help of British "Prime Minister Macmillan in attempting to turn Nkrumah on a reasonable course".⁸ Irving L. Markovitz writes that: "Since his pro-Algerian independence speech as a senator, President Kennedy has been considered as a friend of nationalist regimes. He pursued a foreign policy that was disguised by its sophistication from the crude anti-communism of the Dulles-Eisenhower era. Yet he sent several missions to Ghana headed by men such as Henry McLoy, head of the Chase Manhattan National Bank, to find out whether Nkrumah was or wasn't a communist."⁹ Following the Cuban missile crisis, Nkrumah was considered "a Castro" rather than "a Nasser", and it was felt that if the U.S. "should go ahead (to fund the project) we ought to get something in return".¹⁰

Some African leaders like Liberia's William Tubman, Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Buigny, Nigeria's Tafewa Balewa and Ghana's K.A. Gbedemah and K.A. Busia lobbied against U.S. funding of the Volta scheme. (Busia was the leader of opposition in the Ghana Parliament at the time Ghana was negotiating with the U.S. for funding. He testified before the U.S. Internal Security Sub-Committee against U.S. support for the project. His testimony was released with other documents under the title "Is U.S. Money Aiding Another Communist State?" with a three page introduction by Senator Dodd on July 15, 1963. Busia became Prime Minister of Ghana (Oct. 1969 -Jan. 1972) after the CIA-backed military coup overthrew Nkrumah's government in February 1966.

These African leaders were not opposed to the imperial design of the Volta scheme, they wanted Nkrumah chastized by U.S. withdrawal; otherwise, they "would feel indignant that Ghana had been accorded the priority in assistance which they believed they had earned".¹¹ But the U.S. reasoned that these African leaders who opposed Nkrumah "would have to realize that U.S. backing for the Volta project would be needed to counter-balance Ghana's increasingly close relations with the

(Soviet) Bloc". 12

It is evident from the above that from the very inception of the Volta River Project the industrialization of Ghana was not the concern of the British and U.S. governments and the aluminum companies involved. Britain was more interested in harnessing Ghana's water and mineral resources to meet Britain's aluminum needs. The U.S. government wanted a vehicle to carry out its Cold War against the Soviet Bloc. Ghana became a pawn in the hands of external forces.

Faced with an apparent coincidence of interest between U.S. foreign policy and Kaiser's own corporate investment logic, the company "asked the U.S. government for special guaranties of their proposed investment against political risks. The guaranties requested are more extensive than those normally extended by the U.S. government..."¹³ Howbeit, to get Kaiser to go along, the U.S. government did not only guarantee bargain-rate loans from the U.S. taxpayer-funded Export-Import Bank (Eximbank). The U.S. government also awarded Kaiser with extremely generous insurance terms from the U.S. taxpayer-funded Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).

Kaiser had some difficulties wrangling similar concessions from the Ghana government. In 1963 the Kaiser Aluminum Company had still not committed itself to the constructing of the huge aluminum smelter that was to use the dam's electricity. The U.S. government pressured Ghana into signing "a satisfactory arrangement with the Volta Aluminum Company or Valco" or else the U.S. would not release funds totalling \$30 million for the dam.

Dean Rusk, in testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made it clear that the United States would not provide additional capital for the all-important Volta scheme if Nkrumah were to "steer Ghana down a road that is hostile to the United States .. interests there".¹⁴ Beside the U.S. pressure, "a \$40 million loan from the IBRD (World Bank) and \$14 million from the U.K. (Britain)" were "also contingent on Ghana reaching a 'satisfactory agreement' with Valco".¹⁵

The forces mounted against Ghana were overwhelming. Why did Ghana go

along in the face of such unfavorable odds? Why was Nkrumah, the author of Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, in favor of a project which was repeatedly described in Ghana as imperialist and colonialist? What did the parties involved (Ghana, Kaiser and the U.S. and its allies) gain in the Volta River Project?

The author of this article does not profess to have answers to all of these questions. Before we offer our answers let us see what others have to say. Kaiser, for its part wondered, "Where else could we get a 120,000 ton smelter costing \$150 million of which 85 per cent was supported by debt and 90 per cent of that covered by the American Government?"

A study by the CIA's Office of National Estimates offers the following answers: "The Ghanaian President would use the Volta Project to reassure moderate elements within the ruling Convention People's Party (CPP) that he is able to get aid from the West and to demonstrate that playing-off East and West can prove rewarding... This would probably hearten the moderate elements in the CPP and Armed Services who oppose closer ties with the (Soviet) Bloc."¹⁶

In a statement before the U.S. Committee on Foreign Affairs, then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams explained: "...it is our estimate that in the long run there are favorable factors that will prevail. This is an area where the British developed a very soundly based civil service, a well-trained military... I think when you put the thing in balance that over the long run we could hope for a government which would at least be non-aligned."¹⁷

Eugene Black, President, Executive Director and Chairperson of the World Bank between 1947 and December 1962 (the period when most of the Volta River Project's negotiations were underway) had this to say: "... our foreign aid programs constitute a distinct benefit to American business. The three major benefits are: 1.) foreign aid provides a substantial and immediate market for U.S. goods and services. 2.) foreign aid stimulates the development of new overseas markets for U.S. companies. 3.) foreign aid orients national economics towards a free enterprise system in which U.S. firms can prosper..."¹⁸

David Hart, author of The Political Economy of a Development Scheme: The Volta River Project identified at least three reasons why Nkrumah was in favor of the way the project was carried out. 1.) Nkrumah "believed, naively, that the conflicting Ghanaian and non-Ghanaian interests could be brought to a satisfactory compromise". 2.) He was convinced that "an indigenous energy source was absolutely necessary for the industrialization of his country and that the only way he could get this was through foreign capital investment... He failed to properly consider smaller hydroelectric schemes which Ghana could have built largely by herself". 3.) Nkrumah "was misled by his Western advisors and by his own Western education into believing that Ghana's development would have to be led by foreign capital".¹⁹

The Western advisors that Hart alludes to include banker George D. Woods who was then with Boston First National and served as Kaiser's "banker and finance minister". He later succeeded Eugene Black as the President of the World Bank from 1963 to 1968. Another Western advisor to Nkrumah was the Harvard economist Sir W. Arthur Lewis whose "pioneering work in economic development in developing countries" won him a Nobel Prize. None other than Edgar Kaiser and his associate Chad Calhoun also advised Nkrumah.

The Volta River Project had been at the top of the Nkrumah's government industrial plan for Ghana since 1951. By compromising, Nkrumah wrote, "One of my greatest dreams was coming true".²⁰ He also envisaged using the Volta River Project to further his African Unity ambition - "we would be more than willing to share its benefits with our immediate neighbours within a common economic framework".²⁰

From the point of view of Kaiser and the U.S. government, the Volta scheme as carried out has been a success. Valco's Managing Director Ward B. Saunders in a reply to a critic wrote, "We take great pride in the Valco organization and the Ghanaian people who, through their efforts, make it the excellent enterprise it has become".²² Valco alone represents about 20 per cent of Kaiser's world wide operations and the low-cost hydroelectricity from

the Volta dam has saved Kaiser over \$100 million in operation cost alone since 1973 when OPEC took control over oil pricing.

The Volta scheme has not helped Ghana to industrialize either through the electric project or the aluminum project. In 1966 when Nkrumah was overthrown in what has been alleged to be a CIA-backed military coup, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sent the Harvard Development Advisory Service (DAS) Team headed by Dr. Gustoph Papanek to Ghana. (Interestingly enough, Papanek led another IMF team to Indonesia after the 1965 coup there. The IMF and the World Bank had also a close working relationship with the DAS in Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, Argentina, and Tanzania - all major clients of these two lending institutions.) The team advised the military government of Ghana to cancel Nkrumah's industrial projects that would have benefited from the cheap hydroelectric power. As a result, electric power surplus was created and Valco quickly expanded its smelter capacity to the point that the smelter alone consumes about 70 per cent of the hydroelectricity from the Volta dam. Ghana has to import electric power from neighboring Ivory Coast.

The Volta dam has created an extensive, under-utilized lake which has caused severe social, environmental and ecological disruptions. The still waters of the lake have created conditions favorable to the spread of a serious and virtually uncontrollable disease called schistosomiasis (bilharzia) which the World Bank calls "one of the worst scourges of mankind".

The Volta River Project, as carried out, clearly illustrates that post-colonial imperialism involved subtler forces than direct or even indirect intervention. The same forces will confront President Limann's government if Limann moves against some of the multinational corporations whose activities in Ghana he condemns. Does he have the courage and his people's support to steer off the "proper" course?

If he is able to rewrite the Valco agreement to the benefit of Ghana, such a success will be considered an important victory in the struggles of developing countries for economic independence.

Footnotes

- 1) David Hart, "The Political Economy of a Development Scheme: The Volta River Project", International Relations, Vol.VI, No.1, May 1978, p.246
- 2) "Imperialism and the Volta Dam", West Africa, 3/31/80, p.520
- 3) cf supra # 1, p.246
- 4) cf supra # 2, p.521
- 5) Legislative Assembly Debates, Issue 1, Vol. 1, Accra, 1953, pp.471-472
- 6) Declassified State Department Documents, "Background and Status of Volta River Project", 3/6/61, p.1
- 7) cf supra # 1, p.247
- 8) Notes for Record: National Security Council Meeting on Volta Dam, The White House, 12/5/61, p.1
- 9) Irving L. Markovitz, Power and Class in Africa, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977, p.80
- 10) cf supra # 8, p.2

- 11) Memorandum for the Director, "Likely Consequences of Various U.S. Courses of Action on the Volta Dam", CIA Office of National Estimates, 11/16/61, p.4
- 12) *ibid.*, p.3
- 13) cf supra # 6, p.2
- 14) W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-66, p.272, as quoted in Markovitz, *op.cit.*
- 15) cf supra # 6, p.2
- 16) cf supra # 11, p.3
- 17) as cited in C. Allen and R.W. Johnson, African Perspectives, C.U.P., 1970, p.263
- 18) H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969, p.176
- 19) cf supra # 1, pp.255-256
- 20) Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, International Publishers, New York, 1963, p.117
- 21) *ibid.*, p.169
- 22) Daily Graphic (Accra), 3/7/80, p.3

CIA'S CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN ARGENTINA

(Ed. note: We have agreed to publish this article anonymously since the author travels frequently to Latin America.)

"Latin America has about 80 per cent of the total U.S. private investment in the development world",¹ said Henry R. Geyelin, the President of the Council of the Americas in a Senate hearing in October, 1978. The Council of the Americas is the traditional voice and research institution for multinational corporations in the area.

With headquarters in New York (684 Park Avenue, New York City 10021), the Council had offices in most countries in Latin America until 1973, when a growing awareness of the new style of U.S. multinational imperialism (especially after Nelson Rockefeller's trip to Latin America in the late 1960's) forced the Council to close all of its field offices.

It became a think tank for issues concerning multinational operations such as foreign investment analysis, legal environment in different countries, etc., and remained a powerful tool for corpo-

rations in influencing U.S. governmental decisions. Today, the Council has a decisive role in the strategizing process of the Trilateral Commission which underpins Jimmy Carter's foreign and domestic policy as it had in the writing of the Rockefeller Report of 1969 which gave direction to Henry Kissinger's and Richard Nixon's policy toward Latin America.

Henry Geyelin outlined in the above mentioned Senate hearing why Latin America is of such high importance. "U.S. exports to Latin America in 1977 alone amounted to \$19 billion - two and a half times higher than just five short years ago. We now sell more machinery, consumer goods, and chemical products to this area than to the rest of the world combined. ... Nearly 20 per cent of our petroleum imports come from the region, and even larger proportions of copper, bauxite, tin manganese, lead, zinc, and other commodities including food stuffs. Our relationship promises to become even more important in the future since this hemisphere is estimated to have the world's largest potential for energy development both in hydrocarbons and non-traditional energy sources. Mexico alone is estimated by some to become a second Saudi Arabia... Brazil has the single largest totally renewable, non-polluting energy source in the world today. It is the Amazon River out of which flows over 20 per cent of all the fresh water of the world..."²

In the same hearing, former Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Viron P. Vaky emphasized the role the Council is playing in the State Department's decision-making process and said that State had a "quasi-formalized relationship" with the Council as an organization which "does embody the business community".³

However, since the Council had to close down its field offices in Latin America, another organization has stepped in to take over this function. This organization is the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA). President Carter consults with them on a regular basis⁴, and wrote in a letter on the occasion of AACCLA's sixth year meeting in Brazil in November, 1979: "I would sincerely appreciate if you would devote a portion of your meeting to a discussion of the export policy and I would be grateful to receive a summary of your deliberations."⁵

Since 1969 AACCLA is housed in the central Washington, D.C. building of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It counts as members Chambers of Commerce in 16 Latin American countries and boasts 17,000 individual members from the U.S., Europe, and Latin America. AACCLA openly acknowledges the increase of U.S. investment in Latin America from \$10.3 billion in 1967 to \$24.3 billion in 1978 with exports from the U.S. quadrupling in the same period.

AACCLA describes itself as a lobby group which articulates policy positions on "critical issues", representing the interests of multinational corporations. It has lobbied even against the so called "human rights policy" of the Carter administration and maintained that business is business, and "should be carried out solely on the basis of sound social and economic considerations".⁶

AACCLA's "business is business" rule doesn't always apply since it gets directly involved and works closely with U.S. governmental officials - including the CIA - in order to maintain power structures in Latin America. A personification of this strategy is AACCLA's Vice President, Alexander Perry, Jr. He was described by former CIA officer, Philip Agee as the one who arranged non-official covers for CIA officers in Uruguay in

1966 where they were to carry out operations against revolutionary groups. Perry was a golfing companion of the local CIA Chief of Station, Edward P. Holman and worked as General Manager of Uruguayan Portland Cement Co., a subsidiary of the U.S. based Lone Star Cement Co. which gave explicit approval to place a CIA officer in the Uruguayan Portland Cement Co.⁷

In 1973 the post of CIA Chief of Station in Montevideo was taken over by Gardner Hathaway, who had served in Brazil during the U.S.-backed overthrow of President Goulart in 1964. In July 1974, Hathaway was transferred again, this time to Argentina, where he had served as CIA officer during the military dictatorships ruling that country from 1967-72.

In March 1977 famed Argentine journalist Rodolfo Walsh denounced Hathaway as one of those responsible for what has become known as the "genocide": the mass disappearances of thousands of Argentinians and their assumed assassinations at the hands of the Argentine military who took power in March, 1976.

"The certain participation in these crimes of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Police, directed by officers trained by the CIA through AID such as Police Commissioners Juan Gattei and Antonio Getter, who themselves take orders from Mr. Gardner Hathaway ... is the seedbed of future revelations similar to those which today shock the international community. These revelations will not be exhausted when they expose the role of the CIA along with senior officers of the army headed by Benjamin Menendez in the creation of the 'Libertadores de America' lodge which replaced the 'Triple A' (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, a paramilitary rightwing organization) until its... functions were assumed by the junta..",⁹ wrote Walsh in an open letter to General Videla in March 1977 only to be kidnapped himself the next day. Recent testimonies indicate that he was assassinated shortly afterwards.

Interestingly enough, Alexander Perry of AACCLA moved to Argentina at about the same time as Hathaway. He now lives in Buenos Aires as managing director of the Argentine Portland Cement Co. (which has 1,258 employees and is located at Defensa 113, Buenos Aires). Like the

Uruguayan Portland Cement Co., it is a subsidiary of the CIA-connected Lone Star Cement Co.

Perry has come to Washington several times to lobby for business interests in Latin America and testified at the same hearing as Vaky and Geyelin. Perry praised the Videla regime for putting an end to the "human rights violations" that existed in the early 1970's by eliminating "terrorist groups". What Alexander Perry does not say is that Videla unleashed an almost unprecedented system of terror - kidnappings, torture, imprisonment, assassinations - on the Argentine people in order to do away with the "human rights violations" of leftist groups waging an armed struggle against the repressive governments.

What Perry likewise doesn't mention is the substantial involvement of the CIA in the build-up of the fascist forces in Argentina. From 1972 onwards there was a major CIA offensive in Argentina in face of the mounting popular movement, particularly with the arrival of Robert Hill as Ambassador in 1974. Hill had worked with the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services and has always worked closely with the CIA. He was a personal friend of Spain's fascist dictator Francisco Franco and was involved in the 1954 CIA coup in Guatemala.¹⁰

In Argentina, Ambassador Hill's good friend Lopez Rega organized the Triple A, which was responsible for some 2,000 assassinations up to 1976 when Videla incorporated it into his counter-insurgency taskforce.¹¹ Special forces of the U.S. Army were also training Argentine troops in counterinsurgency warfare¹², and the CIA penetrated the powerful Argentine labor movement through the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).

Alexander Perry, undoubtedly, knows of these facts. One has to wonder, what form - other than lobbying in the U.S. - his active participation in the suppression of the popular movement in Argentina takes today, given his close collaboration with the CIA in a similar situation in Uruguay.

While AACCLA and the Council of the Americas are the most important business organizations influencing the decision-making process in the U.S. gov-

ernment, there are other rightwing groups that work hard to promote U.S. corporate interests in Latin America and to preserve repressive regimes. One of them is the American Security Council (ASC), based in Culpepper, Virginia with a branch office on 499 South Capitol Street in Washington, D.C.

The ASC was founded in 1955 by an initiative coming from the extreme right. It proclaims to uphold American security and dedicates itself to lobbying against and intelligence gathering on, allegedly "dangerous" situations and people. Its members and advisors include: Dr. Ley Dobriansky of Georgetown University, one of the founders of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL); Marvin Liebman, a Madison Avenue public relations expert and another founder of WACL; former Navy Secretary Charles Edison, and former Ambassador to Argentina, Spruille Braden - both members of the John Birch Society. ASC has also links to the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), a group instrumental in Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign.

Recently, ASC sponsored a visit to the U.S. by Roberto D'Abuisson, the former intelligence chief of El Salvador. He is an acknowledged leader of the terrorist rightwing Union Guerrera Blanca, and was implicated in the recent assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero. He came to the U.S. only one week after that crime, and met with Robert Pastor of the National Security Council.¹³

In December, 1979, ASC also sponsored a visit of retired Generals John K. Singlaub and Daniel Graham to Guatemala, at which time they called on President Carter to support the military and the oligarchies in Latin America more directly and openly. ASC was also involved in the formation of the American Chilean Council in 1975 to back the Pinochet regime, and the American Nicaraguan Council to support and lobby for Anastasio Somoza.

Other, better known institutions lobbying for U.S. corporate interests and the preservation of dictatorial regimes include the CIA-connected Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at Georgetown University, and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) for Public Policy Research, which recently started a new project,

the Center for a Definition of Hemispheric Priorities, headed by Otto J. Reich and Pedro Sanjuan, who formerly served in the Departments of Defense and State as well as in the White House. The AEI project is conducted through AEI's Foreign and Defense Studies program with such advisors as former CIA Director, William Colby, Senator Barry Goldwater, Senator Sam Nunn, and corporate officials.

The Council of the Americas, CSIS, AACCLA and a few other far right wing, pro-business organizations are called upon fairly often to testify in Congress. Comprised mainly of former governmental officials and corporate executives, their influence reaches far for the benefit of a few.

Footnotes:

1) U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Major Trends and Issues in the United States Relations with the Nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, October 4, 5, and 6, 1978, pp. 49, 50

- 2) *ibid.*
- 3) *ibid.*, p. 175
- 4) see AACCLA Report, Vol.9, No.1, pp. 1,2
- 5) AACCLA Report, Vol.9, No.1, pp. 1,2
- 6) *cf supra* # 1, p. 56
- 7) Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, England, 1975, p. 493
- 8) North American Congress on Latin America, Argentina in the Hour of the Furnaces, Berkeley, CA, 1975, p. 52
- 9) A copy of this letter is available from CounterSpy.
- 10) *cf supra* #8, p. 53
- 11) Charles Goldman (ed.), "World Anti-Communist League", The Public Eye, Vol.II, Issues 1 and 2, p. 26
- 12) T.E. Weil, Area Handbook on Argentina, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 337
- 13) see Washington Post, April 20, 1980, p.C-1

AID AND IDEOLOGY IN COLOMBIA

(Ed. note: We have agreed to publish this article anonymously since the author travels regularly to Latin America.)

The Agency for International Development (AID) and other U.S. governmental agencies play an important role in the maintenance of U.S. corporate interests and the pacification of the exploited sector in Colombia. This is done overtly through U.S. training and supplying of the Colombian police and military, and simultaneously in a more disguised, but perhaps more effective way, through ideological manipulation and control. If the exploited people can be led to

Colombia is the fourth most populated country (estimated population of 25 million) in Latin America. With 440,000 square miles, it is about as large as Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico combined. Colombia borders on Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama. Its main exports are coffee, bananas and other food stuffs as well as chemical and metal products.

In many ways, Colombia is a typical Latin American country, except in one respect: until recently, it has maintained a facade of democracy. Colombians, of course, have known that this image of democracy was just a facade. Now, however, the facade has crumbled in the eyes of the world in light of widespread arrests, torture, and political assassinations by the government recently confirmed by Amnesty International after an extensive investigation.

believe that they have no power to change the system into one which would meet their needs, then they will be quiet and become subservient consumers.

In Colombia, where the facade of democracy can no longer hide the reality of exploitation and repression, AID has provided substantial funding to Accion Cultural Popular (ACPO) - or Popular Cultural Action - and its powerful radio network, Radio Sutatenza. Through a series of transmitters, Radio Sutatenza is beamed to all regions of Colombia, and ACPO provides radio receivers to the rural population.

Through extensive radio broadcasting and through courses and seminars, ACPO seeks to train Colombian peasants in practical techniques of agriculture, nutrition, health etc., but also "educates" them about "proper" values and attitudes. Without denying the value of the former, the latter will be examined in this article. A thorough review of ACPO textbooks and other material of ACPO reveals an ideological content which clearly serves the interests of the U.S. government.

ACPO, so far, has received a total of over \$4 million from AID including a \$2 million loan to make it "financially self-sufficient", and a special grant of \$970,000 to help spread the ACPO ideology and system of values to Central America. ACPO got its first U.S. governmental grant in 1965 (\$65,000); it was administered by the Catholic Relief Service (CRS, which at that time was working closely with the CIA in other parts of the world). In addition to giving grants to ACPO, AID has also had a \$786,000, three year contract (1976-79) with Florida State University which was to evaluate ACPO's operations and examine its effectiveness.

ACPO was founded by Joaquin Salcedo, a Catholic priest. He was supported by the Jesuit, Vicente Andrade, a well-known anti-communist who was instrumental in founding the Union de Trabajadores de Colombia (UTC, Union of Colombian Workers) and who has remained a special advisor to the UTC. The UTC originated as an effort to combat the more progressive elements in the Colombian labor movement and is currently favored with AID largesse through the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), which promotes

"bread and butter" unionism and is controlled by U.S. corporations, the CIA, and the AFL-CIO hierarchy.

The nature of Andrade's UTC work was seen in a letter of August 8, 1975, of Robert A. Hurwitch, then U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, describing his previous work as a labor attache in the U.S. Embassy in Colombia: "I worked to strengthen the non-Marxist Colombian trade union movement. I worked particularly closely with the UTC... and was especially associated with ... Father Vicente Andrade, the UTC spiritual advisor."

One direct way in which ACPO's Radio Sutatenza spreads U.S. propaganda is by using material from the International Communication Agency (ICA, formerly USIA). ACPO also willingly promotes "responsible parenthood", a prerequisite for U.S. aid, even though it is tied to the Catholic church. Reasoning that "overpopulation" is a cause for poverty in Colombia, AID and other U.S. institutions insist on population control. While not opposed to birth control as such, a growing number of Latin Americans oppose U.S. promoted birth control, particularly since it is often applied without much care for health; has taken the form of forced sterilization of women in many cases; and reaps untold profits for U.S. medical supply companies.

The application of birth control is also seen as a reformist attempt by the ruling elite to keep the lid on an explosive status quo, e.g. living conditions in overcrowded slum areas, while only a systematic change will truly transform the lives of the people. Revealingly, the hierarchy of the Catholic church in Colombia, which is notoriously conservative on social issues, has been quiet about the population control programs promoted by ACPO and the Colombian and U.S. governments.

A look at the basic textbooks used by ACPO in its courses for peasants reveals more of the reformist ideology paid for in part by U.S. AID. In the preface to a series of booklets, we find mention of those who dominate the peasants and who prevent their true development. But then the question is posed: "What is the cause of your bad situation?" The answer: "The real cause is your ignorance." The solution:

"Education, skill training, and solidarity."

The individual peasant is told: "It is up to you to improve yourself." And ACPO states its goal: "The integral Christian education of the people - in order to awaken in them the spirit of initiative." Critics of ACPO point out that ignorance and lack of initiative are indeed part of the problem but that they have their roots in a system of exploitation and oppression which must be addressed and changed rather than ignored.

The U.S. Army's Area Handbook for Colombia (1970) aptly describes the role ACPO and the conservative sector of the clergy play in a country where the Catholic church is extremely powerful: "Generally the reforms and social programs advocated by the Church and other major institutions have been paternalistic, presenting no threat to the established order. The upper class has retained its control of these institutions and is therefore responsible for the development of the reformists' ideology and the administering of the programs... Members of the clergy have worked through their own organizations, such as... ACPO, to aid socio-economic development" (p.124). The acceptance of ACPO by the U.S. Army speaks for itself.

While "blowing with the wind", ACPO still has a definite religious dimension to its work. That this is more akin to the traditional religion of domination ("opiate of the people") rather than to the theology of liberation (which sees religion as a force for freedom and justice for the poor, and is taken up by an increasing number of Christians in Latin America) is evident in the textbook entitled Christian Community. The peasant is advised: "When entering the church, let us make sure that our shoes are clean, and let us try not to cough." Coming to the seventh commandment, "Thou shalt not steal", ACPO gives this explanation: "No one is entitled to take what belongs to another, neither money nor land nor anything else in his possession. You must return loans and repay your debts, even when there are no receipts or other official documents. What belongs to another will always be another's, even though the owner cannot prove it before the authorities." So much for land takeovers by landless and

hungry peasants in search of survival, which are becoming more and more frequent in Latin America and which are supported by the more progressive sector of the church.

Another textbook used in ACPO's courses states that "...we should maintain good relations with the authorities...", and, "when we go to see an official, let us take off our hats. Whenever we have to make a complaint to the authorities, let us do it with respect".

This booklet also promotes a certain attitude towards structures of authority. "The priest, the civil authorities, the teacher, those who have received a higher level of education and who have experience in certain things can be the ones to give us direction." Clearly, ACPO promotes subservience, and there is no mention of the right to question illegitimate authority; if the priest belongs to the kept clergy of the upper class; if the civil leaders are on the payroll of the landowners; or if the teachers are the ideologues of the oligarchy.

Patriotism, which, according to one well-known critic of the American system, is often the last refuge of scoundrels, is pushed in the peasant sector without question: "Our flag should fly, as a sign of happiness, on all Colombian homes on the national holidays." There is no recognition that such holidays commemorate historical events which made little improvement in the life of the majority and which merely substituted the native oligarchy for the foreign conquistadores.

ACPO textbooks also teach the citizen's prayer: "Help me, Lord, to stand tall, but without hatred or arrogance. Keep me away from the bullet and from weapons in general. Accompany me on election day to vote for honorable men, without fanaticism or violence, and to put out the bonfires which are set in the village squares by the bad sons of Colombia." The prayer ends on a note of business ethics: "Help me, Lord, to pay my debts."

The prayer to avoid hatred and weapons, though in itself acceptable to all Christians, is easily used as an ideological tool to turn public attention away from the institutionalized violence which already exists and to mislead the victims into believing that social change is conflict-free. And, the prayer clearly supports the electoral process, which in Colombia, as in other parts of Latin

America, is boycotted by about half the potential voters because elections are frauds manipulated by the upper classes. Finally, the "bad sons of Colombia" and their incendiary actions undoubtedly refer to revolutionaries and their approach to social change; the convenient label of evil is smeared on them.

The ACPO textbook entitled Wake Up, Peasant is equally heavy with this ideology. The students are told that "there are those who delight in tossing off subversive and insulting discourses full of complaints about misery and injustice. This book (by contrast) is to communicate a teaching and to give an optimistic message of progress and improvement." Those who criticize are subversives who take a perverted pleasure in complaining; people should listen rather to an optimistic message since, by implication, the present system - in spite of some "individualistic, selfish and atheistic" aberrations acknowledged by ACPO - is good and can be made to work for the benefit of all.

In a booklet on productivity, capitalistic values are again promoted with enthusiasm, by means of such slogans as: "Wealth is the mother of wealth", or "Dead capital is that which is put under the mattress; not producing interest, is an injury to society." Furthermore, "there is an obligation to make capital produce ... according to the principles of social justice."

Another slogan, "productivity is beneficial for all" attempts to disguise the discrepancies between owners and workers and who actually benefits. For instance, the skyrocketing productivity of some Latin American countries has done nothing to improve the conditions of the vast majority.

Production and Profit, another ACPO textbook, regurgitates such stale bits of capitalist ideology as: "Those who have more goods have received them from God for their own perfection and for the benefit of others"; and "Profits compensate for the efforts and risks which the businessmen run in trying to meet the needs of the market". Thus, it is the will of God that a small percentage constitute the wealthy elite, and this arrangement is for everyone's good. And, businessmen are devoted to meeting the needs of the market, incidentally receiving some profit for

their effort and risk. Nothing is said about the manipulative advertising which creates the market, nor about the military force which protects the investment.

Basic Education and Integral Development, a working paper produced in 1967 by ACPO's Department of Sociology, discusses an individual characterized by lack of knowledge of his/her own value and dignity, lack of knowledge of his/her rights and duties, and lack of job training. Such a person "can fall for demagogic promises and false illusions about easy, violent solutions and can be taken in by the suggestion that all his misfortune is due to 'others' who possess more than he does". Here again, revolutionary violence is discredited as illusory.

On the cover of an ACPO booklet entitled The Rights of the Citizen we find the slogan: "Colombians: weapons have given you independence, the laws will give you freedom." The booklet goes on: "No one can excuse himself from fulfilling the laws for any reason other than those which are foreseen by the same law. That is, the law is obligatory." Such blind obedience to the letter of the law has a paralyzing effect on social change, especially in a situation where labor strikes are declared illegal and "squatting" on desperately needed land is a crime.

ACPO seeks to provide an ideological underpinning for its subservience to the law by presenting the tired old rationale that the law protects everyone: "The law is for all and protects equally all the citizens of a country, no matter what their race, religion, level of culture, economic condition, or profession or office." This illustrates ACPO's ideology: rationalization in the service of those in power. ACPO does not ask: Who devised these laws? Whose interests do they protect? And who directs the enforcers?

Basic Education and Integral Development also explains why there is a division between the desperate masses and the comfortable oligarchy, and describes it as "margination" of those who "do not participate in the advantages of society". It should be noted that the word itself, margination is based on the image of unexplained juxtaposition at

the edge of society rather than on the reality of large sectors of society being pushed into a marginated status through exploitation by the ruling class.

Not surprisingly, the author refers the reader to the work of Roger Vekemans for a more complete definition of margination. Vekemans is the Belgian Jesuit who received millions of dollars from AID and the CIA to promote the Christian Democrats as a "safe" alternative to Salvador Allende in Chile. Vekemans is now based in Colombia where he is an adviser to the official hierarchy of the Latin American Bishops Conference. Archbishop Lopez-Trujillo of Medellin (the current president of the Conference) and Vekemans are perhaps the chief opponents of the theology of liberation. For them margination is the cause of social ills to be remedied by re-integration; whereas theology of liberation sees violent exploitation as the cause of social problems and thus recommends a more revolutionary, conflictual approach as the only possible solution. Obviously, the concept of margination is no threat to the U.S. or the native elite.

The author of Basic Education and Integral Development talks about the lack of progressive organizations and attributes this to the people's lack of ability to organize, which in turn, is due to their individual inadequacies. "This lack of ability shows itself in lack of interest, laziness, inactivity, and in promising but not fulfilling the promises. This has forced us to think of the urgency of motivating people, and such motivation must come from an outside agency which will get the marginal groups to feel the need of integrating themselves into the national community." This is once again a case of blaming the victims and seeing external motivation as the solution to their "laziness". The goal is not systemic change or radical redistribution of resources, but rather one of "jacking up" the individual into playing the game.

Integrating the individual into the system, or at least promoting the illusion that it is possible for all to "make it", stems from a desire to prevent revolution: "To the extent that dissatisfaction grows, the extremists begin to operate, in order to accentuate the existing disparities between the poor and the rich, between the

haves and the have nots, between those who are and those who are not. They turn the masses to hatred and put forth as their goal the destruction of the society."

Margination is further described as the simultaneous existence of an economy of abundance and an economy of subsistence, with no causal links being analyzed. Latin American countries are said to depend on the more developed countries for all kinds of goods and services. Solution: "to break the circle of poverty, these countries need heavy investment of foreign capital."

This kind of propagandizing is one important service performed by U.S. foreign aid for U.S. business, and in Colombia ACPO is the instrument at hand. (The author does give a brief word of caution about development based "entirely" on aid from abroad, noting that this is against human dignity in that it makes people beggars.)

ACPO explains poverty and lack of education as follows: "In Latin America the political and administrative structures are not adequate to take effective measures to achieve the minimum goals which are indispensable to the common welfare." ACPO radio schools "supply what the peasant masses cannot obtain, due to the scarcity of resources and the lack of adequate funds. Due to topographical difficulties, a large percentage of the school-age rural population does not attend primary school." While all this is true, it is only a symptom of the real problems in Colombian society, i.e. resources are scarce for a large sector of society because they are not distributed equally. But such a comment is not to be found in ACPO's literature.

Clearly, ACPO's fear of revolutionary change is at least part of the motivation for development-style education: "An ignorant people is easy prey for political demagogery, for exploitation, for hatred, and for false ideas which propose easy solutions based on violent revolution. In this environment violence, misery, robbery, assaults, and social and moral insecurity flourish; and these are the ingredients for the establishment of totalitarian regimes." (The obvious implication is that the regime in Colombia in 1967, when this was written, was not totalitarian, which

is merely to take a superficial glance at the facade of democracy.

The same author, in a 1970 paper published by ACPO entitled How Opinion Leaders Operate in Community Development, gives another accolade to the system and to its possibilities and blames its deficiencies on the individual's ignorance of how to use the mechanisms which are waiting to serve people. "For development it is necessary that the citizens learn how to use the various services which outside agencies offer, such as ... (there follows a list of governmental and other agencies). Experience shows that a great obstacle to development is not a lack of services, but ignorance on the part of many that such services exist."

A working paper published by ACPO in 1972 entitled Informal Education for Rural Development gives an indication of ACPO's attitude toward those in power: "A large-scale educational program must earn the support and approval of the local power structure, if it is to be effective within certain communities. In Colombia the pastor is the prominent figure in this power structure; in other countries a similar position of power could be held by a local chief or mayor."

In addition to its radio schools, radio programs and textbooks, ACPO has "peasant institutes" where groups of people from various parts of Colombia live and study for several months at a time. A recent visitor to one of these institutes asked a class of about thirty, in the presence of their instructor, whether they had ever talked about land takeovers or "squatting". The question was met with a tense silence. When the visitor asked whether the students could justify "squatting" on a small plot of land by a desperate peasant family: again there was a nervous silence. Finally, a few students commented that this could be justified.

The reticence might well have been due to the presence of a foreigner who was asking the questions and perhaps to the presence of the ACPO instructor. But, it seemed clear that such controversial issues were generally sidestepped in the institute. The visitor went on to explain the heavy dependence of ACPO upon U.S. aid, a fact which was obviously unknown to the students.

In a 1971 ACPO paper entitled Communi-

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Media for Rural Development we find a reiteration of ACPO philosophy: "The purpose of the basic education is the evolution of the person as an agent of development; the changing of external structures must be the result of conscious efforts of qualified and motivated individuals for the attainment of said purpose."

The author finds the ACPO approach deficient in some ways: "It would be illusory to suppose that in some regions, where cultivation of only one product is predominant and where the techniques of production have only reached the first phase of modernization, the enlargement of certain basic knowledge and the adoption of some new practices have exerted a significant influence on the economic and income structures. The correlation coefficients and the weak connections which they imply could better be interpreted as a confirmation of the fact that the improvements produced on the individual level (family) are not sufficient in themselves to cause outstanding multiplication effects on the macro-social or macro-economic level." Thus, we can see that ACPO itself admits that focusing on individual "capacitation" does not lead to large-scale social change.

The author concludes that "the success of ACPO's activities pre-supposes a certain minimum welfare or progressiveness among the peasant families which the institution presumes to influence. In general the poorer class from the isolated population is not the most receptive to the influence of ACPO, but those who due to their more favorable socio-economic conditions expect to improve their situation through their own effort. No doubt these socio-economic conditions are related to the conditions of land tenure." Like other AID-funded programs, ACPO is oriented to the propertied class while keeping the exploited in line.

Some years ago ACPO published a statement entitled Our Ideological Position. It began by noting that "peasants, students, many priests, especially the young ones, and in general the needy people of the developing countries are hoping for miraculous formulas and solutions". The statement then cautioned against hopes for rapid change and repeats the familiar saying: "Underdevelopment is in the human mind."

Not surprisingly, ACPO's ideological position includes a rather favorable view of the history of the "developed" countries: "The people of the developed countries received training and education, and they got organized; their communities were and continue to be the basis of their social organization; they worked and saved; thus they were able to produce and consume their wealth and the fruits of their industry; they solved their own problems and now we are even asking them to help solve ours."

This historical view of the developed countries says nothing about their promotion of colonialism which was one source of wealth for their industrial development (in the case of the European nations); and, it conveniently ignores the historical facts of slavery, persistent racism, the displacement and genocide of indigenous populations, the exploitation of immigrants, and other aspects of the U.S. experience. Success is attributed to education, hard work, and thrift rather than to exploitation and domination within and outside the borders.

Seven years ago an interesting exchange took place between a noted Colombian economist-attorney and Monsignor Salcedo of ACPO. The attorney grants the validity of ACPO's position that any kind of development requires the people's participation and that this is not possible when people are ignorant, but "on the other hand ACPO condemns conscientization (consciousness-raising) concerning the causes which maintain a state of 'domination-dependency'". ACPO discusses the problem "as if the people themselves were the ones responsible for their ignorance and marginality and as if overcoming those inhuman conditions depended entirely on their own will." Rather, those who dominate the poor "will not be convinced by good advice but through the pressure of the people aware of their rights. Marginality or lack of participation in society is the other side of the coin of the concentration of political, economic, and social power".

In response, Salcedo insists that ACPO does not condemn conscientization and does not deny the importance of the concept of domination-dependency "but only tries to clarify these as a problem of lack of capacity". This fundamental fo-

cus on individualism is repeated several times, and Salcedo argues that an educational institution should not be expected to intervene in political questions. (Our examination of ACPO material has shown that it is indeed deeply involved in promoting certain political and economic values.) While granting that the people themselves do not bear the entire responsibility for their ignorance, Salcedo sees fit to insist that "their share of responsibility cannot be denied".

The attorney emphasizes the structural realities of Colombian society which oppress the majority and keep them ignorant: "Half of the agricultural land is owned by 2% of the families; 2% of the population gets one third of the national income; and in industry 2% of the shareholders own more than 60% of the shares.

He also addresses another crucial issue: "It seems that you operate under the fear of class struggle and of inevitable revolution. We Christians are not inventing class struggle; neither was it invented by Marx. Marx only discovered it and formulated it clearly. It does not need to be touched off by consciousness-raising on the part of Christians, but it finds sufficient kindling in the growing misery and injustice suffered by the masses and in their growing awareness." In reply, Salcedo says that he is not afraid of class struggle "nor of class hatred, but I affirm that it is a Marxist invention expressly condemned by Christian and Catholic principles".

Summing up, the attorney writes that ACPO's position is not entirely incorrect but rather insufficient: "It is possible to train people in such a way that the system is sustained, and in fact this is what is done when consumerism and the economic values which support capitalism are encouraged. Education must be consciousness-raising, that is, committed to social change."

In a later letter, the attorney states that education can be opposed to social change "if it limits itself to 'inoculating' students with the values of the traditional society or if it omits all questioning, merely providing students with training for good conduct as pillars of the established system... The survival of un-

just structures is due in large part to their being supported by certain talented people of the lower classes who are absorbed by such structures and who uncritically assimilate their thought patterns and habits".

He situates the basic cause of Latin American problems in the internal and external dependency, "and ignorance is an accompanying cause and at the same time an effect of dependency". In this view, "education should provide the intellectual tools for the planning of political action, especially if it is education through the mass media. And here is our essential difference: I

hold that education, especially through the mass media, is prophetic". He argues that politicians, economists, sociologists, communicators, and others should work to transform the society of consumerism and the political system which supports it into a more rational society and system.

But an educational program directed toward fundamental systemic change rather than merely cosmetic reform would quickly be cut off from U.S. government and foundation support, for it would no longer provide the ideological service which is one of the products purchased by "foreign aid".

CIA IN SWEDEN

The following officials are assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden:

BREISKY, Arthur E.
born: 2/3/32

Breisky, head of the political section, was a political officer in the Dominican Republic at the time of the U.S. invasion in 1965; he has worked in the Department of Defense, and was an advisor to the U.S. Naval Academy in 1974.

DUBERMAN, David
Duberman is a CIA officer who has served in France.

HANDLIN, James M.
born: 10/10/41
Handlin has served in the Department of Air Force as "administrative assistant" from 1968-1969 and following that with AID in Laos. At the time, AID programs were an important part of and cover for the U.S. counterinsurgency programs.

HARPOLE, Mark A.
born: 10/2/36
Harpole's official biography (State Department Biographic Register, 1972) lists the following positions: high school principal American Community School, Saigon 1962-64; University of

Saigon 1965-66; legal officer airline in Laos 1968-70; AID in Laos as public administration advisor from 10/70 on.

HILLER, LeMoine E., Jr.
Hiller is a CIA officer. He has also served in Mexico.

KUNIYUKI, Yukio A.
born: 11/1/34
Kuniyuki, listed as U.S. Information Agency employee in his official biography, has participated in psychological warfare operations in the Department of Defense from 1973-75.

MCBRIDE, Michael G.
McBride is a CIA officer. He has also worked in France.

MCLAIN, George H.
born: 5/8/32
McLain is a CIA officer. He has served in Indonesia during the 1965 coup, and in India.

MELTON, Marilyn E.
Melton was the secretary of the CIA Chief of Station in London before she was transferred to Stockholm.

PETERSON, Jeffrey G.
born: 7/13/41
Peterson is a CIA officer. He has served previously in Bolivia and Ecuador.

NOTES ON AFGHANISTAN

After publishing the last issue, CounterSpy learned some new details regarding the CIA's involvement in Afghanistan:

1) After Mohammed Daoud took power in 1973, the U.S. government was afraid that he actually would carry out the reforms he had announced, and would follow a "leftist" course in his politics. The U.S. response to this "threat" was to have Afghan "rebels" trained by the CIA. The training took place in a camp in Attock, Pakistan; the men who received the training belonged to the following of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is today one of the most reactionary "rebel" leaders. After the U.S. government realized that Daoud's policies hadn't turned out to be "left", the training was stopped, and, it appears, the "rebels" were never used - until after the People's Democratic Party took power in April 1978.

2) A number of newspapers, including the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Tallahassee Democrat have reported about direct CIA aid to the Afghan "rebels". The Democrat stated that "CIA agents have been buying rifles, pistols, and ammunition on the world's open arms market for secret shipments to Afghanistan. Most of the purchases have been of Soviet, German, Belgian and Israeli manufacture." (6/9/80, p.1)

3) Over the last few months the Carter administration and the U.S. media have continued to misinform the public about events in Afghanistan. While CounterSpy does not claim to know exactly what is happening there, we know very well that most reports reaching the U.S. are based on such sources as correspondents who are outside Afghanistan, who in many cases use information supplied by the "rebels". The majority of these reports have been grossly exaggerated or even completely false.

U.S. officials have suggested that poison gas is being used by the Soviet military in Afghanistan in their fight against the counter-revolutionaries. The evidence, however, is remarkably thin, and based on scattered accounts from

(cont. on pg.44)

FROM THE EDITORS:

Again, we would like to express our thanks for the support of our readers during the last three months, particularly to people who have helped CounterSpy to widen its circulation, who have written with their suggestions and comments, and who have supported us financially.

Of course, we continue to need your support, especially in the area of circulation. Please be sure to let us know about bookstores and newsstands in your area which might be interested in CounterSpy.

Our financial situation has remained "unchanged", that is, we have received enough money through subscriptions, sales, and donations to keep going. However, in order to make some necessary improvements, we ask you to support CounterSpy financially; e.g. by taking out gift subscriptions for other people or sending donations.

You can already look forward to the next issue. Articles will include topics like: CIA in Turkey, analysis of the International Communication Agency, an update on Chile's Colonia Dignidad (see vol.3 no.3), and possibly an expose of U.S. activities in the New Hebrides. Unfortunately, due to lack of space we were unable to include all the articles we had planned for this issue. We hope to publish some of them in the upcoming issue. (We did not publish a response from TransAfrica because as of press time, they had failed to submit a letter as promised in March 1980.)

Cont. from pg.43

refugees and the "freedom fighters".

Soldier of Fortune, a mercenary magazine that is also involved in recruiting for Afghanistan, has repeated that claim.

The following is a report by Tim Frasca, acting bureau chief of the Pacifica National News Service. CounterSpy thanks him and Pacifica for permission to reprint this transcript of the report, which was broadcast on June 11, 1980.

Tim Frasca: "Daniel Gearhart picked up a copy of Soldier of Fortune back in 1975. In it, he saw an ad for out-of-work ex-soldiers, part of a campaign to recruit white mercenaries to fight in Angola. Gearhart signed up. His side lost, however, and he was executed after the famous mercenary trials in Luanda.

"After that, Soldier of Fortune printed more romantic articles about war opportunities in Africa, one featuring color photos of white mercenaries in Zimbabwe equipped with weapons to fight in the bush.

"Soldier of Fortune publisher Robert K. Brown, also of Omega Press Service, calls his publication a 'true-life adventure magazine', and the next issue's true life adventure will be featuring Afghanistan, where Galen Geer, a former P.R. (public relations) man for the armed forces in Korea, spent 11 days on assignment. Brown, himself a former Green Beret in Vietnam, described some of the thrills Soldier of Fortune readers can look forward to reading about in the August issue."

Robert Brown: "The interesting thing about it was that Mr. Geer brought this out, it was an 80 pound unit, brought it out on a camel. Once again, something that the CIA has not been able to obtain."

Tim Frasca: "Brown was referring to a chemical filter that is standard equipment on some Soviet military vehicles. Geer's findings on Soviet use of nerve gas added little to official statements on the matter - based entirely on unconfirmed refugee accounts, often describing tear gas-like agents.

"But Geer brought back home some Soviet equipment that he said was extraordinary. For example, Brown displayed a bullet - or a 'round' as he called it - known as a hollow-point, especially built to cause more severe wounds."

Robert Brown: "After having sectioned a round, which means simply cutting it in two, and analyzing it, the basic analysis indicates that it appears because of the design of this round, which is a round they would be using in their assault rifles, that the Russians are attempting to circumvent the Geneva Convention."

Tim Frasca: "However, Gary Hankins of the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, had this to say about hollow point."

Gary Hankins: "We have been using the hollow point for two years now."

Tim Frasca: "Reporter Geer said he turned over some of the equipment he found in Afghanistan to 'an agency of government' though he wouldn't say which 'agency' it was. Geer's reports were quoted on the floor of the Senate... by Robert Dole of Kansas. Dole labeled the Soviet hollow point 'incredibly more lethal than any bullet in our arsenal'."

Senator Dole's speech is a good example of the way unreliable or just plain incorrect reports about Soviet military actions in Afghanistan are used in the U.S. to push up the defense budget and call for increasing the chemical and biological weapons arsenal of the U.S. (Recently, a similar push for chemical weapons has also been launched by members of the ruling conservative party in Great Britain.) Here is more from Dole's speech on June 6, 1980:

"During a recent briefing by Mr. Galan Geer (who) ... observed the (Soviet) invasion firsthand for Soldier of Fortune magazine, convincing evidence was presented that the Soviets had developed a chemical capability that extends far beyond our greatest fears... X-gas, as Mr. Geer choses to call it, is unaffected by ... our gas masks and leaves our military defenseless. ... The gas renders its victims unconscious... providing the perfect opportunity for the aggressor to move in for the kill."

Mr. Geer's "observations" are about all Dole offers as "convincing evidence", but it becomes clear what he is really aiming at. "To even suggest a leveling off of defense spending for our Nation ... at such a critical time in our history is unfathomable." Dole also calls for "an immediate and intense examination of our chemical and biological defense capabil-

ities". (Congressional Record, 6/6/80, pp. S6375, S6376)

As CounterSpy goes to press, the Military Construction Appropriations Bill is being debated in the Senate. It was passed on from the House on June 27, where it was approved by a 308 to 19 vote. The bill includes an appropriation of \$3.1 million for the construction of a so-called binary chemical munitions production facility at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, which is nothing less than a plant to produce nerve gas. A report that accompanied the bill to the Senate stated that the project was necessary "in response to Soviet chemical warfare activities". (Washington Post, 6/28/80, p.A-6)

With promoters such as Senator Robert Dole and his reliable reporter Galan Geer, there is a very good chance that the bill will also be passed in the Senate, again, of course, not for aggressive reasons, but just "in response to Soviet chemical warfare".

It is always good to have someone like Geer on hand, but even some conservative Senators and Representatives will have to admit that it is pretty low, to say the least, to rely on reports from a man who works for a magazine that promotes mercenary atrocities all around the world.

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Particular Reference to CIA's Use of
U.S. Police Departments"**

**Kathie Sarachild (editor of Feminist
Revolution, an Abridged Edition with Ad-
ditional Writings)**

**Paper Title: "Censorship of Women's
Writings"**

**Dr. Jason W. Smith (author of Founda-
tions of Archaeology)**

Paper Title: "CIA in Academia"

Jonathan Friedman (freelance journalist)

Paper Title: "CIA in Media"

**Place: Washington Hilton Hotel
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Time: August 30, 1980, 10:30 A.M.

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