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U.S. Sponsorship of Terrorism
Chomsky on the Libya Attack



Editorial

The Reagan administration has raised perversion of the language to new heights with its campaign against "terrorism." It has managed to convince much of the public, and a large part of the media, that terrorism is simply the actions of our enemies. Moreover, as Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky explain in this issue, the administration has focused the discussion on retail terrorism, to the exclusion of wholesale terrorism; rarely does anyone call the government to account for supporting, and in large part operating, the most extensive terror network in history. It is difficult to define terrorism, so the "experts" define it however they want. The report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism is a case in point; it says terrorism is "the *unlawful* use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives." [Emphasis added.] The problem is who decides what is "lawful" and what is not.

"International terrorism" is not the struggle of the Blacks of South Africa and Namibia for national liberation; it is not the fight of the Palestinians for their ancestral lands; it is not the battle of the Nicaraguans to bring democracy to their country after 50 years of dictatorship. International terrorism is the U.S. bombing of Libya; it is the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; it is the South African invasion of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique; it is the *contra* war in Nicaragua; and it is the death squads in Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

More Secrecy and Intimidation

While we continue our struggle to bring you information you cannot find in the mainstream media, the administration is expanding its campaign to restrict the flow of information and to intimidate the media. We warned years ago that the Intelligence Identities Protection Act was just the tip of the iceberg, and that it was not just aimed at stopping this magazine, but at chilling the establishment media. Recent CIA pronouncements indicate that such intimidation remains a priority. In May the Agency announced that it thought the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Washington Times*, *Time*, *and Newsweek* should be prosecuted for revealing details of the Ronald Pelton case. While the idea that the administration would ever prosecute Arnaud de Borchgrave's sleazy Moonie rag is preposterous, the other publications were, despite their public indignation, scared. The *Post* actually censored a lead story. Then in June the CIA attempted to obtain prior review of forthcoming publications *not* written by former employees. And in July, Casey began to push for the "You Spy, You Die" bill, not only preventing convicted spies from keeping the proceeds of their activities or selling the rights to their stories, but also authorizing the government to seize the assets of newspapers or other organizations that might be found guilty of violating the law they threatened to use against coverage of the Pollard case.

The CIA is making a push for more power than it has had in decades. As a State Department official told the *New York Times* (July 12, 1986), "Casey is dying for it [operational responsibility for the *contra* war—which he was given]. If we can win, he can walk away with an agency that is rehabilitated to the best days of the cold war, able to conduct wars and throw governments out."

Rightwing fanatics set up organizations like the "RAMBO Coalition," whose members include Alpha 66, Tradition, Family and Property, and a host of other extremist organizations. Retired General John Singlaub, head of the U.S. Council for World Freedom, announces that the way to deal with terrorists is to "rubblize" the camps where they live.

The times are definitely perilous ●

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Cover photo: Vernon Walters at the United Nations; © 1985, Brian Alpert, Keystone Press Agency, Inc.

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The Modern Mithridates:

Vernon Walters: Crypto-diplomat and Terrorist

By Ellen Ray and William Schaap

In 120 B.C., Mithridates VI of Pontus inherited the throne at the age of 11, and was immediately targeted for assassination by most of his relatives. He fled to the mountains and spent some years training himself to be his own master spy, combining "the cunning of the spy with the anxieties of the brutal despot whose intelligence he collected," and while in exile, he "mastered twenty-two languages and dialects, traveling over Asia Minor—at the age of fourteen—disguised as a caravan boy. He visited many tribes, learned about their customs and spied upon their military strength."[1]

Mithridates returned to Pontus, and, after murdering his mother, his sister (whom he had married), and his sons, spent eighteen years terrorizing the likes of Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey. He was, even for his times, singularly brutal, responsible for the massacres of hundreds of thousands of people in the far corners of the known world, "one of the most formidable opponents Rome ever had."[2]

Except for the family problems,[3] there are interesting parallels between the affairs of Mithridates the Great and Vernon Anthony ("Dick") Walters, the current United States Ambassador to the United Nations. For one thing, Walters is a well known linguist who speaks eight languages and many dialects and "likes to slip into a country unannounced before a meeting with a head of state so he can ride the buses around and pick up the local slang and intonation."[4] More to the point, Walters, like Mithridates, is linked to countless coups, wars, and massacres around the world. But while his role as linguist is widely publicized, his high stature as Grand Master of state terrorism, his decades of ties to wholesale butchery in Iran, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, and most recently, Nicaragua, do not appear in the State Department press releases or the raft of puff pieces about him in the mainstream media.[5]

The Military Background

Vernon Walters enlisted as a private in the U.S. Army shortly before Pearl Harbor.[6] After the U.S. entered the War, he attended infantry school and graduated as a Second Lieutenant in 1942, and attended the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Richie, Maryland. In October 1942 he "took part in the assault landing at Safi, Morocco." (This appears to be the extent of Walters's combat experience.) He then taught "Prisoner of War Interrogation" at Camp Richie. Although not mentioned in his official biography, Walters later trained Brazilian troops at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he became close friends with a young officer, Humberto Castelo Branco, who, more than 20 years later, was to take power in the coup which overthrew President João Goulart and installed a long-lasting regime infamous for its brutality and torture of leftists, especially students and unionists.[7] Walters was aide de camp to General Mark W. Clark in Italy and then, until the end of the War, combat liaison officer with the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division in Italy (living on the same floor with his friend Castelo Branco).[8] All the abovementioned countries are ones with which Walters was later to have significant ties.

Walters spent more than 25 years in a succession of military assignments, usually as military attaché or interpreter, and generally under the aegis of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was in Brazil in 1945 with Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman, and attended the 1947 Pan American Conference in Bogota, Colombia. This was his first brush with revolution and counterrevolution; the massive protests against the

1. Richard Wilmer Rowan, *The Story of Secret Service* (New York: Literary Guild, 1937), pp. 9, 10.

2. *Webster's Biographical Dictionary*, 1st ed. (Springfield, MA: Merriam, 1971), p. 1031. According to *Webster's*, Mithridates committed suicide in 63 B.C., at the age of 69, although Rowan says that "one of his sons whom he had unaccountably neglected to murder brushed him from his throne with a powerful draught of poison." *Op. cit.* n. 1, p. 12.

3. Walters, 69, a lifelong bachelor and a devout Catholic, lived with his mother until her death a few years ago and currently lives with his sister, who held the Bible when Vice President George Bush (his former boss at the CIA and a predecessor at the U.N.) swore him in as U.N. Ambassador. Jeff Stein, "Mystery Man of American Diplomacy," *Boston Globe Magazine*, August 29, 1982, p. 12. A shorter version of this article appeared as "Vernon Walters: Secret Agent," *City Paper* (Washington, DC), December 3, 1982. Michael Massing, "America's Top Messenger Boy," *New Republic*, September 16, 1985, p. 22; *U.S. News & World Report*, June 3, 1985, p. 13. His friends call him "asexual." He says he "married the U.S. government a long time ago." *Washington Post*, December 16, 1985.

4. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 12. Walters "has developed near-perfect imitations of Pope John Paul II, Franco, and Castro. He is said to do a mean Augusto Pinochet." *Washington Post*, December 16, 1985.

5. The major media are extraordinarily kind to Dick Walters. See, for example, "An Envoy Who Specializes in Sensitive Missions," a profile in the *New York Times*, June 3, 1982, in which he is quoted as responding to his critics, "If I was a bad man, I couldn't keep doing this." And, "Reagan Nominates Walters To Be Ambassador to U.N.," in the *Washington Post*, February 9, 1985, which highlights the "stern warning" he gave Roberto D'Aubuisson not to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador. Yet the *Times* piece notes that "his de emphasis of the human rights issue" has won praise from conservatives, and the *Post* points out that "his strong anticommunist views . . . have made him a favorite of conservative Republican administrations." Walters refers to the 1953 coup in Iran, the 1954 coup in Guatemala, the 1964 coup in Brazil, and the 1973 coup in Chile as "revolutions." His perspicacity is tempered by his knee-jerk rightwing sentiments. In March 1986 he was quoted: "I mean, how do we really know that Marcos is this unpopular? Marcos does have the support of the two largest parties in the Philippines." *M* Magazine, March 1986, p. 82. In another departure from reality, Walters is one of the few people left in the world who still denies that the United States ever tried to kill Cuban President Fidel Castro. *Washington Post*, December 16, 1985.

6. The underlying data are from the State Department biography of August 1981.

7. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 28; Michael Massing, "America's Top Messenger Boy," *New Republic*, September 16, 1985, p. 22.

8. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 22.



Credit: Manchete

Humberto Castelo Branco.

Conference were met with bloody retaliation which left more than 2,000 dead. Curiously, Walters received a medal for his service during this incident, leading to speculation about his role in the events.[9]

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Walters was all over the globe, most significantly, as we will see below, in Iran, Italy, Brazil, France, and Vietnam (only one month, in 1967, from which, presumably, he derived the experience to write his "Sunset at Saigon"). He spent three years in secret negotiations with the Chinese, and, in the words of his official biography, "smuggled Henry Kissinger into Paris on 15 different occasions to conduct such negotiations."

His military promotions were unprecedented, considering his beginnings as a private. His Brazilian escapades in 1964 earned the Colonel a promotion to Brigadier General; his one month in Vietnam three years later got him his second star, as Major General; and when, in April 1972, he was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, he became a Lieutenant General. He retired in July 1976 and spent the Carter years in an action-packed civilian career. Then, shortly after President Reagan entered office, Walters returned through the revolving door and began four years' State Department service as Ambassador-at-Large, before becoming U.N. Ambassador.

Prior to examining his post-military career, it is enlightening to review Walters's far-flung operations in the coup-filled years from 1953 to 1973.

Early Dirty Work

Walters admits, and associates confirm, that he was involved in the 1953 putsch which overthrew the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and reinstalled the young Shah.[10] In the early 1960s he was military attaché in Rome, actively blocking the Kennedy administration's "opening" towards the Italian left.[11] Presumably Walters was involved in the massive CIA campaign to fund lavishly the Christian Democratic Party in its otherwise risky electoral battles against the Communist Party of Italy. While it is not known whether Walters knew CIA veteran Hugh Montgomery[12] in the 1960s, at present he and Walters *do* work together; Montgomery is Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs in the United States delegation to the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador, according to the current U.N. diplomatic list.

Brazil

In 1962 Walters was posted to Brazil as military attaché. Although Walters insists he was nothing more than a "well-informed observer" of the events that followed,[13] it is obvious that he was up to his neck in the plotting which culminated in the bloody coup of 1964. He was, according to Jan Knippers Black, the "linchpin, the one person all the officers would talk to while they were still afraid to talk with one another."[14] Indeed, he was such a good "observer" that he told Washington one week in advance the exact day the coup was to take place.[15] Moreover, he breakfasted with Castelo Branco the morning after the coup began, urging him to assume the presidency, and he lunched with him the day after the inauguration.[16] Walters never acknowledged Castelo Branco's consummate viciousness nor conceded the enormity of his regime's acts. In his autobiography he wrote: "I never saw Castelo Branco do a mean thing or heard him say a shameful word. The moral integrity of the man was beyond challenge."[17] And as to the installation of the brutal Brazilian military dictatorship, he wrote: "A regime basically unfriendly to the United States had been replaced by another one much more friendly. Some may regard this as bad. I do not. I am convinced that if the revolution [*sic*] had not occurred, Brazil would have gone the way of Cuba."[18]

In fact, various government documents suggest that Walters played an extremely crucial role both in fomenting and in accomplishing the coup. In the year preceding the March 31, 1964 start of the coup, a series of CIA documents—some still classified, some partially released, and some fully declassified—describe a meticulous investigation into the attitude of the Brazilian military regarding the Goulart government. One, written in May 1963, notes that "Military becoming more anti-Goulart."[19] Another, in July, worries about "Military's hesitance to overthrow constitutional regime."[20] Shortly thereafter, another document describes the "possibility of a rightist coup."[21] During this period, the person best situated to sway the hesitant rightist military leaders was Colonel Vernon Wal-

9. Ramón Jimeno and Marcela Caldas, "*Vernon Anthony Walters: El Agente Secreto de la Diplomacia Silenciosa*," in *Zona* (Bogotá, Colombia), April 23, 1986, p. 46.

10. Claudia Wright, "Brass Knuckles for America," in *New Statesman*, February 8, 1985, p. 20.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Montgomery was with the CIA in Italy from 1965 to 1969 and returned there in 1975 as CIA Chief of Station until 1980. Steve Weissman, "*Ecco La Cia in Italia*," in *La Repubblica*, January 15, 1976, reprinted as "Hello Hugh Montgomery," in Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, eds., *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe* (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1978), p. 165; *CAIB*, Number 12 (April 1981), p. 41.

13. Massing, *op. cit.*, n. 7, p. 22.

14. Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

15. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 22.

16. *Ibid.*; Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 29.

17. Quoted in *The Progressive*, April 1985, p. 10.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Central Intelligence Agency, Summary of Declassified Documents, reference to: Office of Current Intelligence, Special Report, OCI No. 0278/63B, May 3, 1963.

20. *Ibid.*, reference to: Draft National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 93-2-63, July 2, 1963.

21. *Ibid.*, Information Report, TDCS-3/553, 860, July 19, 1963.

ters, who, as it happens, was promoted to Brigadier General within a year of the coup.[22]

Another set of declassified documents are equally damning. They detail a U.S. plan called "Brother Sam," which not only describes foreknowledge of the coup, but also notes the probability of Castelo Branco's assuming its leadership, and indicates that if the coup appeared to be failing, the U.S. Navy was to intervene. These are the same documents which describe Walters's breakfast with his old friend, Castelo Branco.[23]

Officially With the CIA

Walter's friendship with Nixon, solidified in 1958 when he protected the then Vice President from the spitting, rock-throwing crowds in Venezuela, led to his appointment, in April 1972, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a post he filled under four Directors, Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, William Colby, and George Bush. John Dean testified during the Watergate trials that he had been told Walters "was a good friend of the White House and the White House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have some influence over the Agency."[24] He served from 1972 to 1976, a seminal period in CIA history, which ran from Watergate through the overthrow of Allende in Chile to the Church Committee hearings, the intervention in Angola, and the planning of the assassination of Orlando Letelier. Vernon Walters played important roles throughout this period.

The Great Watergate Myth

Part of the Walters mythology is his allegedly firm, moral, and indignant refusal to be a part of any cover-up of what came to be known as the Watergate scandal. Indeed, his autobiography paints a picture of incorruptible valor: "I looked [John Dean] right in the eye and said, 'Fire everyone connected with this.' "[25] The fact is that when Walters was first asked, by Nixon aide Bob Haldeman, to warn the FBI (falsely) that a strenuous investigation of Watergate would jeopardize ongoing CIA operations, he did just that. Within minutes of receiving those orders, he was on his way to FBI Director Patrick Gray.[26] Several days later Walters was still stonewalling, advising John Dean that the then Director, Richard Helms, wanted to distance himself and the Agency from the growing scandal. They did not want to expose the administration's deep involvement; they just wanted to keep the Agency out of any further involvement. In fact, for all his posturing, Walters *never* retracted the phony warning he had delivered to Gray.[27] He connived with Dean on possible scenarios to use.

Two weeks after his first, eager involvement, Walters realized he could not stall the investigation much further. When Gray, also anxious to protect himself, asked Walters if he could put the CIA's request in writing, Walters said he could not write such a "spurious" letter. The relieved Gray then understood that he could let the investigation, already with a momentum of its own, go on; Walters did not want to be in the position of wittingly covering up crimes, especially as so many people would know about it. Still, it was almost a *year* later that he first informed the Department of Justice of his knowledge of the White House's efforts to have the CIA stop the FBI, and during that year he received the Agency's Distinguished Intelligence Medal, for doing such a good job of keeping the CIA out of the Watergate morass.[28]

Yet, as Jeff Stein has pointed out, "Walters's recounting of the affair leads one to believe he was naive and misled. 'I had been in Washington for six weeks at this point and it simply did not occur to me that the Chief of Staff to the President might be asking me to do something that was illegal or wrong.' But at this point in his career, Walters had been engaged in various intelligence operations for more than thirty years."[29] Indeed, his year of silence speaks more eloquently than his diffident autobiography.

Chile, Allende, and Letelier

One of the most controversial series of charges against Walters involve his connections with the fascist opposition to the administration of Chilean President Salvador Allende, to the overthrow of Allende, and to the assassination of former Chilean Defense Minister Orlando Letelier.

While DDCI, Walters was in charge of the close liaison between the CIA and the Chilean intelligence services, which cooperated closely in the efforts to overthrow the Allende government. They also reportedly received considerable help from Walters's friends in the Brazilian service.[30]

But the most controversial allegation against Walters is that he was complicit in the assassination of Letelier.[31] In July 1976 the police in Paraguay had in jail an alleged CIA informant, a possible cause of considerable embarrassment to the U.S. At the same time, Conrado Pappalardo, the assistant to Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner, was pressuring the U.S. Ambassador, George Landau, to comply with a request made by Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to Stroessner. Pinochet wanted two Chilean agents to travel to the U.S. on false Paraguayan passports, which Stroessner had approved, but they now needed U.S. entry visas, and the two agents were in Paraguay waiting for the visas. When Ambassador Landau expressed concern and remarked that the request was rather unusual, he was told by Pappalardo not to worry, that DDCI Vernon Walters knew all about it and that the two men were to report to Walters when they arrived in the U.S.

Landau was unable to reach Walters, who was on leave in Florida at the time, and after considerable soul-searching, he issued the visas. But he took some precautions, photocopying the passports before returning them, and sending a detailed

22. Massing, *op. cit.*, n. 7, p. 22. Walters insists that none of the declassified material "shows any participation by me," which may be true as far as it goes, but hardly justifies John Goshko's assertion that "no evidence has been offered to support [the charge that Walters encouraged the coup]." *Washington Post*, February 9, 1985, p. A6.

23. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 29; *Washington Post*, December 29, 1976. The *Post* article says that the part of the plan which called for the airlifting of small arms from a carrier off the coast was codenamed "Quick Kick."

24. David Wise, *The American Police State* (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 245.

25. Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (New York: Doubleday, 1978).

26. David Wise, *op. cit.* n. 24, pp. 243-44.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 245.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-46; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 529.

29. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 35.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 36. It is interesting that one of Walters's old chiefs, Averell Harriman, was, according to Thomas Powers, "lobbying for the hardest line against Allende." Thomas F. Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 231.

31. For the details of the account which follows, see Jeff Stein, "Vernon Walters and the Death of Orlando Letelier," *Boston Globe*, August 29, 1982, p. 50; Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper, *Labyrinth* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 1-14; John Dinges and Saul Landau, *Assassination on Embassy Row* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 382-89; Donald Freed with Fred Landis, *Death in Washington* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1980), pp. 184-86.

memorandum to the State Department and the CIA. Landau assumed that the issuance of the visas related to some CIA-Paraguay deal to free the imprisoned agent. However, on August 4, Landau received a cable from Walters indicating that he knew nothing of the matter, that he had no plans to meet with the Chileans, and suggesting that Landau confer further with the State Department. Landau notified the Paraguayans that the visas were to be considered revoked and demanded the passports back. Shortly thereafter, Walters did travel to Paraguay, ostensibly on a mission involved solely with the captured agent.

Despite repeated requests Landau did not get the passports back until October 29, and they were returned with the photographs of the bearers removed. But Landau had photocopied the passports; later he was to learn that one of the two "Chileans" was Michael Vernon Townley, one of the men who planted the bomb which, on September 21, 1976—when he was awaiting the return of the passports—killed Letelier.

It is almost impossible to believe, from all of the studies which have been published, and from the testimony of several trials and congressional hearings, that Vernon Walters did not have advance knowledge of a major Chilean secret police operation in the U.S. being planned in July and August of 1976, but no directly incriminating evidence has been found. Walters vigorously denies any connection with, or foreknowledge of, the Letelier assassination, although he has admitted to many meetings with Colonel Contreras in his years as DDCI.[32]

Walters's "Private Life," 1976-1981

Whatever his reasons for leaving the Ford administration well before the elections, Walters spent the Carter years close to the friends he had made over the past three decades. And playing upon those friendships proved no fiscal hardship. In 1980, for example, Walters made nearly half a million dollars, $300,000 of which was a fee from what may be one of the most misleadingly named companies in the United States, Environmental Energy Systems, Inc., of Alexandria, Virginia, which is, curiously, a major arms merchant. The money was a consultant's fee for assisting them in their efforts (apparently unsuccessful) to sell tanks to the King of Morocco. As the company president told the *New York Times*, "We went to him because he had the connections, he knew the King of Morocco."[33] In fact Walters has used his relationship with King Hassan through the years, ever since 1942, when he gave the then 13-year-old Crown Prince a ride in his Army tank.

Walters's work with Morocco during this time period has even more ominous overtones. He was (and possibly still is) a general partner in a Vienna, Virginia organization called Morocco Travel Advisers. In a letter to the Senate submitted with his April 1, 1981 Disclosure Statement he said the company "provides tours of Morocco for and at the expense of U.S. travel agents." But he also noted that it was involved in "the development of tourism in the far south of Morocco and in the contested area." Of course, "the far south of Morocco" is that portion of Western Sahara "given" by Spain to Morocco when it abandoned its colony known as Spanish Morocco, and "the contested area" is that portion given by Spain to Mauritania, abandoned by it, and claimed by Morocco. Both portions, however, comprise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, whose people, led by Polisario, have been struggling for their independence for many years. Moreover, it was Walters, as DDCI, who convinced the Spanish to relinquish its colony to Morocco and Mauritania in the first place.[34]

If "Environmental Energy" means military equipment, we can only surmise what "Travel Advisers" means. It would appear to be aimed directly at Polisario and the Sahrawi people.

Walters's Ties to Guatemala

Vernon Walters was perhaps President Reagan's most prominent apologist for the brutal military dictatorship of General Romeo Lucas García of Guatemala. He visited Lucas García three times; in a May 1981 press conference in Guatemala City, Walters said the U.S. wanted to help Lucas García defend "peace and liberty."[35] When asked about Guatemalan human rights violations, Walters said, "There will be human rights problems in the year 3000 with the governments of Mars and the moon. There are some problems that are never resolved."[36] A month later, U.S. aid for Guatemala resumed at a significant level.

Walters had ties to Guatemala and its murderous leaders from his "civilian" interlude in the late 1970s. One of the clients he listed in his Senate disclosure statement was Basic Research International, S.A., "an international oil cartel scouting the fields of Guatemala." They paid him $1000 a day as a "consultant," to try to influence the Guatemalan government to lift oil production quotas. It has been charged that in this project, Basic Research issued exaggerated estimates of Guatemalan oil reserves which the State Department then used to justify continued U.S. support for the brutal regime. In fact, it has been reported that he continued to represent this company unofficially even while in Guatemala officially, during the May 1981 trip noted above.[37]

Walters continues to flack for Guatemala. In 1985 he told an interviewer that the administration's "quiet diplomacy" really worked; the Guatemalan military is "not killing as many people as they did before."[38] This faint praise was not even true; virtually all reports indicated that the Guatemalan government at the time continued to have the worst human rights record in the area.

Joining the Reagan Administration

Walters was appointed a senior adviser to then Secretary of

32. Letter, Vernon A. Walters to Al Larkin, Editor, *Boston Globe Magazine*, September 14, 1982, p. 2, responding to the Jeff Stein article cited *supra*, n. 3. Michael Massing (*op. cit.* n. 7, p. 23) says that Walters acknowledged two meetings with Contreras, but his letter denies discussing Letelier "in any of the meetings with Colonel Contreras," language which suggests rather a greater number of encounters.

33. Jeff Gerth, "Former Intelligence Aides Profiting From Old Ties," *New York Times*, December 6, 1981. This, incidentally, is one of the most informative articles available on the subject. The income figures come from Walters's own disclosure statement filed with the Senate on April 1, 1981.

34. According to Jeff Gerth's congressional sources, "One of Mr. Walters's last missions in the CIA was a trip in late 1975 to Spain, where in meetings with King Hassan II of Morocco and Spanish officials he convinced Spain to give up control of Western Sahara, a Spanish colony in Africa long sought by Morocco." *New York Times*, December 6, 1981.

35. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 24.

36. *Ibid.* Walters was accompanied on his May 1981 trip to Guatemala by Frank Ortiz, who had been removed by President Carter from his post as Ambassador to that country because he was considered "too conciliatory" to the regime. *Washington Post*, May 13, 1981.

37. *New York Times*, June 3, 1982; *CAIB*, Number 13 (July-August 1981), pp. 45, 48; *New Statesman*, February 5, 1982. *Washington Post*, July 14, 1981; December 16, 1985.

38. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 25.

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State Alexander Haig on April 1, 1981, just two months after Reagan took office. On July 22, 1981, after Senate confirmation, he was sworn in as Ambassador-at-Large. Among his earliest duties was a deep involvement in the administration's war against Nicaragua. In 1981 and 1982 he made numerous trips to Argentina to arrange for that government's training of *contras* and for their handling of various secret payments to *contra* leaders, particularly prior to the final approval of the CIA's original plans.

Ironically, the Argentine regime was not well repaid for its clandestine help to Walters in supporting Reagan's Nicaragua policies. The *New York Times* was unusually frank: "In dozens of recent world missions, Mr. Walters has hurried six times to Argentina alone, most recently taking on the thankless task of telling his friends in the junta that, with war beginning in the Falklands, Washington had to side with Britain."[39]

Walters had a special role in the building up of the *contra* forces waging their brutal war against Nicaragua. According to the testimony of former *contra* leader Edgar Chamorro,[40] Walters was instrumental in consolidating the forces of the former members of Somoza's National Guard:

> "At that time, the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small bands operating along the Nicaragua-Honduras border. The largest of the bands, headed by Enrique Bermudez, a former Colonel, was called the 15th of September Legion. They were not an effective military force and represented no more than a minor irritant to the Nicaraguan government. Prior to the UDN's merger with these people, General Walters himself arranged for all the bands to be incorporated within the 15th of September Legion, and for the military government of Argentina to send several army officers to serve as advisers and trainers . . . the new organization was called the Fuerza Democratica Nicaragüense (National Democratic Force), or by its Spanish acronym, FDN."

Colombia and San Andrés Island

One of Walters's most significant achievements in his personal war against Nicaragua was a secret agreement he negotiated with the then President of Colombia, Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala aimed at setting up a top secret U.S. military base on the Colombian island of San Andrés, only 125 miles off the east coast of Nicaragua. Some $50 million worth of sophisticated tracking radar and anti-aircraft batteries have reportedly been installed on the island and nearby keys.[41]

Forever Morocco

Walters has remained intimately involved with Morocco for more than 40 years. Most recently he seems to have played a considerable role in the rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco, which led to a cooling of Algerian support for Polisario. Walters is said to be close to the number two man in Algeria, Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi, who lived in the U.S. in 1976, and through whom Walters arranged for the first official visit of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to President Reagan.

Another likely Walters operation in Morocco was the use of that country, in 1981, for meetings between high U.S. officials and Angolan traitor Jonas Savimbi. Walters had been DDCI during the CIA's operations in Angola in 1975 and 1976, and had tried to get the Brazilians (unsuccessfully) and then the French (successfully) involved in the operations.[42] Walters's presence in Africa is ubiquitous; nearly every year as Ambassador-at-Large he made whirlwind tours of numerous African countries. In one instance, Angola was bombed by South Africa just after he departed.

Walters in for Kirkpatrick

In February 1985, Walters was nominated by President Reagan to succeed Jeane Kirkpatrick as United Nations Ambassador. Although most reportage continued to praise Walters, reiterating all the old war stories, some of the journals were less than flattering. As Claudia Wright noted in the *New Statesman*, "Walters's candidacy for the U.N. post carries an unusual cachet: Directly or indirectly, he has been involved in overthrowing more governments than any other official still serving in the U.S. government."[43] And even *U.S. News & World Report* pointed out that Secretary of State George Shultz wanted Walters in the job, but without cabinet rank, "to signal a lowered U.S. appraisal of the worth of the world body."[44]

Indeed, the downplaying of the role of the United Nations is a pillar of Reagan's foreign policy. And Walters is a staunch adherent of the Reagan Doctrine which, in its haughty disdain for international law, would just as soon see the world body destroyed. He has called the U.N. a "measured disappointment," because it has "drifted away from resolution of conflicts." Walters has promised to be "very tough," to "work very hard to change these voting patterns [unfavorable to the U.S.]."[45] His professed love for conflict resolution belies the administration's—and Walters's—contempt for the World Court, as evidenced by their refusal to participate in the case brought, successfully, by Nicaragua to challenge the *contra* war.

The Blackmailer

Recent press reports note that Walters has been absent from his U.N. post nearly continually the past few months,traveling around the world on more secret missions. As usual, his trips go undocumented while incidents of U.S.-sponsored terrorism continue unabated.

If all else fails, Walters is not above simple blackmail. *U.S. News & World Report* has described how he fended off a potentially hostile Senator during the Watergate hearings by discreetly threatening to bring up at the hearings the time the Senator had asked Walters, then military attaché in Paris, to ship some luxury items illegally through military channels for a group of junketing Senators.[46] These are the kinds of moves Mithridates would have approved. ●

39. *New York Times*, June 3, 1982.

40. Transcript, sworn testimony of Edgar Chamorro before the International Court of Justice, at The Hague, in *Nicaragua v. United States of America: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.*

41. Jimeno and Caldas, *op. cit.* n. 9, p. 47.

42. See *CAIB*, Number 13 (July-August 1981), p. 20; John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 184, 192.

43. *New Statesman*, February 8, 1985, p. 20.

44. *U.S. News & World Report*, February 18, 1985, p. 10. In fact, the dispute over cabinet status, in being leaked to the press, led to the agreement that Walters would have cabinet rank, but was followed by another dispute, whether Walters would automatically serve on the National Security Council. According to the *New York Times* (March 26, 1985, p. 1), Walters was "so distressed at not being asked to serve on the council that he submitted his resignation this afternoon." His petulance was short-lived; the next day it was announced that Walters would accept the U.N. post even though it did not include an automatic seat on the NSC. The President's press secretary did announce, though, that the President had the "highest regard" for Walters and valued his counsel. (*New York Times*, March 27, 1985, p. A3.)

45. *U.S. News & World Report*, September 3, 1985, p. 29.

46. *U.S. News & World Report*, June 3, 1985, p. 13.

Power and the Semantics of Terrorism

By Edward S. Herman*

For the average citizen of the West, the idea of the United States as a sponsor of international terrorism–let alone the *dominant* sponsor[1]—would appear utterly incomprehensible. After all, one reads daily that the United States is leading the charge against something it calls "terrorism," and it regularly assails its allies for dragging their feet in responding to terrorism. On the other hand, the U.S. government has organized a mercenary army to attack Nicaragua, and even provided it with a printed manual of recommended acts of sabotage and murder, which has been implemented by the proxy army, at the cost of well over a thousand Nicaraguan civilian lives. The U.S. government has given unstinting support to the apartheid government of South Africa, which has invaded, and organized its own mercenary armies, to subvert a string of frontline states, again at the cost of many thousands of civilian lives.[2] The western media, however, never refer to the United States or South Africa as "terrorist states," even though both of them have killed vastly greater numbers than Qaddafi or the Red Brigades.[3]

The reason for the western misperception is that *the powerful define terrorism*, and the western media loyally follow the agenda of their own leaders. The powerful naturally define terrorism to exclude their own acts and those of their friends and clients.

"If I don't like it, call it terrorism."

The current administration in Washington has found it possible arbitrarily to designate *any* group or country which it opposes as "terrorist," and this will be transmitted to the public by the mass media without serious criticism or laughter. In his speech before the American Bar Association on July 8, 1985, President Reagan named five states as engaging in serious state terrorism—North Korea, Libya, Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The Soviet Union was presumably omitted because of the upcoming Summit meeting. The media reported that Syria had been spared as "a gesture of gratitude" to President Assad for his role in negotiating the release of 39 U.S. hostages in Lebanon![4] The press failed to discuss the fact that South Africa and Guatemala (among others) were omitted, that Nicaragua does not murder its own citizens as South Africa and Guatemala have done on a large scale, and that Nicaragua has not invaded other countries or organized subversive forces to destabilize other countries, as South Africa has done in many places and as the United States does quite openly to Nicaragua itself. The ludicrousness and hypocrisy of the United States calling Nicaragua a terrorist state was entirely unnoticed and without effect on the objective reporting by the U.S. press. With a compliant mass media, especially in the United States but also among its clients, terror is what the powerful U.S. government declares to be terror. As it is now using the concept with audacious and arbitrary abandon, it is employing the "If I don't like it, call it terrorism" definition of terrorism.

Exclusion of State Terrorism: Retail Versus Wholesale Terror

In its semantic manipulation of terrorism and related words, a number of devices are used by the United States and its intellectual spokespersons to differentiate friends and self from "terrorists." Perhaps the most important is to confine the use of the word to non-state actors and actions; i.e., to define terrorism as the use of violence to *oppose* governments.[5] This departs from standard and traditional usage, according to which terrorism is a *mode of governing* as well as of opposing governments by means of intimidation.[6]

By excluding governments, South Africa, Guatemala, and Israel are removed from the category of terrorist, while the African National Congress (ANC), rebel groups in Guatemala, and the PLO are automatically eligible. This is grotesque in terms of both numbers of victims and forms of violence employed by state and non-state intimidators,[7] but it is extremely convenient in terms of western priorities and interests. The governments protected by this word usage are allies, clients, and self; the groups automatically made "terrorists" oppose

1. As I argue in "U.S. Sponsorship of International Terrorism: An Overview," in this issue.

2. See Richard Leonard, *South Africa at War* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1983).

3. Qaddafi talks big, but carries a small terrorist stick. The U. S. leadership, by contrast, talks "anti-terrorism" and "counter-terrorism," but carries a gigantic terrorist stick. See Table 1 and the text below.

4. Bernard Weinraub, "President Accuses 5 'Outlaw States' of World Terror," *New York Times*, July 9, 1985, p. 1.

5. How President Reagan nevertheless refers to Nicaragua and other enemy states as "terrorist" will be discussed below under "'International terrorism' and its supporters."

6. The fifth edition of *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, for example, defines terrorism as "a mode of governing, or of opposing government, by intimidation." The *American Heritage Dictionary* defines it as "The use of terror, violence and intimidation to achieve an end." This does not exclude governments, and the third accepted usage given is explicitly "A system of government that uses terror to rule."

In the past, terrorism was assumed to refer *primarily* to acts of government. According to a U.N. study of terrorism, "While at first it applied mainly to those acts and policies of Government which were designed to spread terror among a population for the purpose of ensuring its submission to and conformity with the will of those Governments, it now seems to be mainly applied to actions by individuals, or groups of individuals." "The Origins and Fundamental Causes of International Terrorism," in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1975), p. 5. The identification of terrorism with government receded with the rise of organized western state terror and modern public relations.

7. State terrorists use torture on a large scale; dissident groups rarely engage in this form of terror. See "U.S. Sponsorship of International Terrorism," in this issue.

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these clients and western defense of the status quo.[8]

To focus more sharply on the absurdity of this definitional system, I use the concepts of "retail" and "wholesale" terror: Dissident individuals and groups kill on a retail basis (that is, on a small scale, with limited technological resources to kill, and with small numbers of victims); states kill wholesale. This fairly obvious but neglected point is displayed dramatically on Table 1, which compares the numbers killed by state and non-state terrorists in recent decades. It can be quickly observed that *single incidents* of state terrorism frequently involve many more killings than multi-year totals for non-state terrorists (not to speak of the vastly greater numbers allocable to state terrorists on a multi-year basis). In fact, one can see from this table that the multi-year aggregates for the Baader-Meinhof gang (a part of row 1), the Red Brigades (only a part of the relatively small Italian total on row 2),[9] and the PLO (row 3)—the bogeymen of the western media—even when taken together fall short of the totals for single episodes of violence by South Africa, El Salvador, and Israel. The table suggests that if we were to allow state (wholesale) terror to be included in our definition of terror and give it attention remotely proportional to numbers, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel and the United States itself would be pushed to center stage,[10] the Red Brigades and PLO would recede to the background. But this would not conform to the demands of western power.

Terrorism Versus "Retaliation"

A second important device allowing "terrorist" to be applied only to the enemy is distinguishing between terrorism and "retaliation," and simply asserting that we and our friends only "retaliate" to somebody else's "terrorism." In a sequence of violence, it is often very difficult to determine where the process began, and thus the distinction between terror and retaliation is often arbitrary and depends on the ability of one side to establish its claim by sheer power. Thus, when Israel bombed Tunis, killing 20 Tunisian bystanders as well as many more Palestinians, the Reagan administration and the West accepted this as "retaliation," even though the action at Larnaca that allegedly elicited the Tunis attack was explicitly stated by its perpetrators to have been a retaliatory act against Mossad agents involved in Israeli hijackings of ships. A note found on the body of one of the Rome terrorists speaks of vengeance for the Israeli-sponsored massacres of Palestinians at Shatila and Shaba, but this was not taken seriously in the West as making the Rome attacks merely "retaliation" for a prior terrorism.[11] As Israel is a client state of the United States, the West allows Israel to kill always in "retaliation," never as terrorism, whereas the PLO and other Palestinian groups are never allowed to be retaliating; they only engage in terrorism.[12]

Terrorists as Indiscriminate Killers

Terrorists are also sometimes distinguished from non-terrorist perpetrators of violence by an alleged *randomness* or *indiscriminateness* in their attacks. This is presumably less moral than non-random killing, and the claim is used to lend an aura of evil to terrorists and benignness to the other (frequently state) killers. Well-targeted killing, however, is not evidently more decent than random killing, unless the targeted victims are thought to be deserving of their fate. If redheads, or school teachers were targeted, would this be morally superior to random killing? If, however, the targeted victims are alleged to be Communists or PLO officials, in the West this may give the requisite moral aura. Frequently, of course, the targeted victims are not the only casualties, as in Tunis, but the claim of having gone after a "legitimate" target helps justify the casualties that are allegedly unintended.

As a question of fact, however, non-state terrorists such as the Baader-Meinhof gang and PLO, or SWAPO in Namibia, or the NLF in Vietnam, have *not* been more prone to indiscriminate killing than state terrorists. Most non-state dissident acts of violence are carefully targeted at some symbol of abuse, and in the case of the NLF in South Vietnam, non-selective violence was punishable as alienating the popular base sought by NLF strategy. Where dissidents take hostages, of course, the victims are often random, but neither the number of such cases nor the ensuing casualties have been large (the deaths have been a small part of the small retail totals on Table 1).[13]

On the other hand, state terror also presents a mixed picture of targeted and indiscriminate killing. State terrorists in Latin America have deliberately sought out political activists and leaders and cadres of organized groups, but where the targeted groups are large and diverse, and the term "cadres" is defined broadly (*e.g.*, active union members), the policies are reasonably described as indiscriminate. Furthermore, state terror is often very "generous" in attacking civilians at large where these are seen as a virtual enemy population. McClintock points out that "in the case of a mass-based insurgency, seconded by the vast majority of the population, the perception of the 'innocent civilian' becomes obscured." He contends that in Guatemala and El Salvador in the mid-1980s, and in the last years of Somoza, the tactics of state terror "have taken on an almost random, mass-oriented form."[14] The point applies to the U.S. assault on Indochina. The essence of U.S. policy in Indochina was the massive use of firepower in the countryside, based on minimal targeting information. Civilian deaths were seen as having the merits of reducing an enemy population, forcing an exodus into the cities, arousing intense fear, and occasionally even killing an enemy soldier. In the U.S. mass

8. This usage is completely institutionalized in western discussions of terrorism. This is reflected, for example, in so-called "risk-assessment" analyses by professionals in that new field. Thus the U.S. consulting firm Risks International, Inc., confines terrorism entirely to dissident violence and excludes state murders by, say, Pinochet's government in Chile, by definition. In fact, in a recent assessment, it finds that the leading *victim* of terrorism in 1984 was the state of Chile! *Executive Risk Assessment*, December 1985, p. 30.

9. The total number killed by the Red Brigades between 1969 and 1982 has been estimated by D. Della Porta at 90, which is about the same number as were killed in the single rightwing massacre at the Bologna railway station. *Cifre Crudeli* (Bologna: Il Mulino [Istituto Cattaneo], 1984), Table 14, p. 61.

10. As Pol Pot was in his heyday of power, and as the Soviets have been in their attacks on Afghanistan since 1979.

11. The Tunis attack was of course directed at a PLO official residence. We may ask, however, whether if, immediately following the Beirut massacres of Palestinians, the PLO had successfully attacked the building of the Israeli Parliament, killing dozens of Israeli officials, this would have been considered legitimate targeting and "retaliation." And if not, why not?

12. What makes this system of words especially inappropriate is that Israel has gone to great pains to designate the PLO as "terrorist" in order not to have to deal with the Palestinians, except as a group to marginalize and exterminate. For a discussion of the fact that the Israeli government invaded Lebanon in 1982 to avoid the threat of political negotiations, claiming, of course, that they were cleaning out nests of "terrorists," see Noam Chomsky, "Libya in U.S. Demonology" in this issue. The U.S. media swallowed entirely the Israeli claim to be "retaliating" to "terrorism."

13. A significant proportion of hostages who have been killed have been victims of state efforts to recover the hostages by force. Those so killed are usually attributed to the dissident terrorists.

14. Michael McClintock, *The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador*, Vol. I (London: Zed Press, 1985), p. 52.

Table 1
Killings by State and Non-State Terrorists: Numbers and Orders of Magnitude[1]

		Numbers	As Multiples of German Non-State Total ($\frac{\text{Number}}{31}$)
Non-State			
1.	*German*: Red Army Faction, Revolutionary Cells, and all other non-state, January 1970 to April 1979	31	1
2.	*Italian*: Red Brigades and all other non-state, 1968-82	334	11
3.	*PLO*: Israelis killed in all acts of terror from 1968-81	282	9
4.	*World*: All "international terrorists," CIA global aggregate, 1968-80	3,368	109
Single Incidents of State Terror			
5.	*El Salvador*: Rio Sumpul River, May 14, 1980	600 +	19 +
6.	*South Africa*: Kassinga (Angola) refugee camp, May 4, 1978	600 +	19 +
7.	*Guatemala*: Panzos, May 29, 1978	114	4
8.	*Israel*: Sabra and Shatila, (Lebanon), September 1982	1,900–3,500	61–113
Larger Dimensions of State Terror			
9.	*Argentina*: 1976-82 "disappeared"	11,000	355
10.	*Chile*: 1973-85	20,000 +	645 +
11.	*Dominican Republic*: 1965-72	2,000	64
12.	*El Salvador*: Matanza I, 1932	30,000	968
13.	*El Salvador*: Matanza II, 1980-85	50,000 +	1,613 +
14.	*Guatemala*: Rios Montt pacification campaign, March-June 1982	2,186	70
15.	*Guatemala*: 1966-85	100,000 +	3,226 +
16.	*Indonesia*: 1965-66	800,000 +	25,806 +
17.	*Indonesia*: Invasion and pacification of East Timor, 1980-85	200,000 +	6,452 +
18.	*Soviet Union*: Afghanistan, 1979-85	200,000 +	6,452 +
19.	*Libya*: External assassinations of Libyans, 1980-83	10 +	0.32
20.	*Cambodia*: Pol Pot era, 1975-80	300,000 +	9,677 +
21.	*U.S.-Sponsored Contras*: in Nicaragua, 1981-85	2800 +	90 +
22.	*United States*: Assault on Indochina, 1955-75	4,000,000 +	129,032 +

[1] Citations for each entry are at the end of the table by number of row.

Footnotes:

1. Data from Hans-Joseph Horchem, "Political Terrorism: The German Perspective," in Ariel Merari, ed., *On Terrorism and Combatting Terrorism*, Proceedings of an International Seminar, Tel Aviv, 1979 (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1985), p.63.
2. Data by Dr. Vittofranco S. Pisano, *Terrorism and Security. The Italian Experience*, Report of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Senate Judiciary Committee, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, November 1984, p.63.
3. B. Michael, *Ha'aretz*, July 16, 1982, citing official police statistics. Some of the 282 were killed by Israeli forces in attempts to free hostages by force.
4. CIA, *Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980*, June 1981, p. vi.
5. Michael McClintock, *The American Connection*, Vol. 1, State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador (London: Zed, 1985), p. 306.
6. Richard Leonard, *South Africa at War* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1983), p. 67.
7. Marlise Simons, "Massacre Shakes Guatemala," *Washington Post*, July 7, 1977.
8. The Lebanese government claims to have recovered 762 bodies and that 1,200 were privately buried by relatives: Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), p. 370. In a careful study, Amnon Kapeliouk estimates between 3000–3500 murdered: Amnon Kapeliouk, *Sabra & Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre* (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1984), pp. 62-63.
9. John Simpson and Jana Bennett, *The Disappeared and the Mothers of the Plaza* (New York: St. Martins, 1985), p. 7
10. Amnesty International, *Report on Torture* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975), p. 252.
11. Carlos Maria Gutierrez, *The Dominican Republic: Rebellion and Repression* (New York: Monthly Review, 1972), p.11
12. Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, *El Salvador: The Face of Revolution* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p.30
13. Central America Historical Institute.
14. Amnesty International, Special Briefing, "Guatemala: Massive Extrajudicial Executions in Rural Areas under the Government of General Efrain Rios Montt," July 1982, p. x.
15. "Bitter and Cruel . . .," Report of a mission to Guatemala by the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, October 1984; C. Krueger and K. Enge, *Without Security or Development: Guatemala Militarized*, a report submitted to the Washington Office on Latin America, June 6, 1985.
16. T. B. Millar, *Australia in Peace and War* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), p. 539.
17. Noam Chomsky, *Towards a New Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), pp. 341 and 470 (citing Father Leoneto Vierra do Rego and Father Francisco Maria Fernandez.
18. Numbers highly uncertain. A UN Commission report estimated 35,000 civilians killed in 1985, considered a year of heavy casualties: Elaine Sciolino, "U.N. Aide Seeks to End Impasse in Afghan Talks," *New York Times*, February 27, 1986.
19. Amnesty International, *Political Killings by Governments*, (London: AI, 1983), pp. 69-77.
20. *Ibid.*, p.24
21. Center for International Communications, *Nicaragua: Development, the Counterrevolution, and Consequences* (London: CIC, 1986). The cumulative official figure for civilian deaths, 1981 through 1985, is 2817.
22. Paul Quinn-Judge, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 11, 1984; Noam Chomsky, *Turning the Tide* (Boston: South End Press, 1985), pp. 216-17.

media, B-52 raids were generally reported to be directed at "enemy base camps," parroting the language of Pentagon press releases. This was partly true, in that the villages attacked did house a population supportive of the indigenous rebels. Clearly, however, bombing addressed to an entire rural population is reasonably described as indiscriminate. This is reflected in the staggering casualty rates that were imposed on the defenseless peasant populations (see Table 1, row 22).

These policies have been brought to El Salvador where the United States is now carrying out, mainly but not entirely by a proxy army and airforce, a Vietnam-style anti-peoples war in the countryside.[15] Casualty levels are huge, but the western media have turned their attention to "terrorism." The same

Credit: Salvador Human Rights Commission.

Salvadoran victim of U.S. napalm and white phosphorus bombs.

points apply to Israeli bombing raids during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and those currently being carried out against Shi'ite villages in Southern Lebanon, with heavy firepower directed at heavily populated civilian areas and therefore involving essentially random killing. Again, the West is not aroused and does not talk about going to the "source" of these killings; they are not "terrorism."

Terrorists as Manipulators of the Media

Another basis on which western terrorism experts attempt to confine attention to individual and small group actions rather than the more massive state violence is by focusing on the alleged manipulation of the media by terrorists. Terrorism may even be *defined* by the use of violence in conjunction with a search for media publicity.[16] Some retail terrorist activities are designed to attract attention to grievances, and the terrorists count on the media giving publicity to their hijackings and taking of hostages. State terrorists, by contrast, do not rely on the media in their own processes of intimidation, because their capacity for violence is sufficiently great to have the desired effects without deliberate enlistment of publicity. In fact, the problem for state terrorists is *keeping the media quiet*, so that violence can be carried out without undue public reaction.

As dissident terrorists seek publicity, while state terrorists shun it as interfering with their freedom to kill, it is obvious that a focus on the "theatre of terror" automatically serves an apologetic function. It also allows conservatives to berate the media for "encouraging terrorism" by giving the terrorists a great deal of publicity. This involves a double deception. One is the implication that the media treat dissident terrorists sympathetically. While the media occasionally do convey some of the grievances of the terrorists and allow them to appear in a human light, media coverage of terrorist events is still heavily dominated by official views and by a focus on the fate of the victims. In the aftermath of the actions these emphases and recrimination against the terrorists are overwhelming.

The second deception is more serious. The analysts of "terror theatre" fail to see the important role that publicity about dissident terror plays in sanctioning state terrorism. It was not a coincidence that the great increase in western attention to "terrorism" has accompanied the Reagan arms buildup, placement of missiles in Western Europe, and more aggressive attacks by the United States and its surrogates against Nicaraguans, Lebanese, Angolans, and Salvadoran rebels. Reagan's explict shift in emphasis from "human rights" to "terrorism" was virtual acknowledgement of support for state terrorists and simultaneous diversion of attention to lesser terrorists.[17] The great attention now given to the theatre of terror doesn't help the retail terrorists;[18] it strengthens the claims of those who only "retaliate" to the terror of others. The Reagan administration's manipulation of the Libyan threat, from the mythical "hit squads" of 1981 to the deliberately provoked encounters off the Libyan coast and recent direct attacks, have been designed to shift attention from the assault on Central America, the Palestinians and assorted other Arab groups, and the frontline

Credit: Prensa Latina

Israeli tanks abandon ruins after destroying Shi'ite village of Ma'arakeh.

15. Alexander Cockburn, "Remember El Salvador?," *The Nation*, June 1, 1985; Eva Gold, "The New Face of War in El Salvador: A View of Counterinsurgency Warfare," NARMIC, American Friends Service Committee, February 1986.

16. Brian Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict* (California: Crescent Publications, 1975); Gabriel Weimann, "The Theatre of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage," *Journal of Communications*, Winter 1983, pp. 38-45. See also, Gabriel Weimann, "Mass Mediated Theatre of Terror: Must the Show Go On," and Edward S. Herman, "The Use and Abuse of Terrorism: A Comment," (a reply to Weimann), in *Media and Terrorism*, Discussion Document, Carleton Center for Communications, Culture and Society (Carleton University, Canada), forthcoming.

17. Another Orwellism may be noted here: State terrorists don't engage in terrorism, they violate "human rights"; only retail terrorists "terrorize."

18. For example, the PLO's status has been greatly reduced in the 1980s, because while massive Israeli attacks on its infrastructure has aroused no serious western recriminations at Israeli terrorism, as each PLO attack is "terrorism" it suffers a steady accumulation of moral deficits.

states of South Africa and to mobilize western populations for aggressive adventures abroad. The "theatre of terror" is managed from Washington to serve its perceived interests.

My Terror as "Counter-terror"

Another frequently encountered concept in western terrorism semantics is "counter-terrorism." As the United States and its clients, like South Africa, El Salvador, and Guatemala, do not (by definition) engage in terrorism, their attacks on their enemies require alternative words. One, as we have seen, is retaliation. But retaliation implies a response to an immediately preceding act. We need a word that allows a more continuous assault on the bases and populations of "terrorists." The gap has been filled by the concept of "counter-terror." For us and our allies, immediate violent responses are retaliation; longer term attacks are counter-terror. Thus, South Africa's systematic assaults on its neighbors to induce them to refuse sanctuary to the ANC and SWAPO—"terrorists" in western semantics and political language[19]—are counter-terrorism. Similarly, the massacres of peasants carried out by the Guatemalan state to root out any opposition (i.e., "terrorists") is counter-terror.[20] In short, what in western terrorism semantics is called "counter-terror" is in reality a dressed up form of state (wholesale) terror.

"International Terrorism" and its Supporters

A final semantic adjustment is needed so that the western establishment can tar certain disfavored states with the terrorist brush. This is done with the aid of the concept of an "international terrorist," who either kills across national borders or kills with the support of a foreign power. In western terrorism semantics, a *state* whose agents cross a border to kill is not engaging in "international terrorism," nor is aiding a state that employs systematic violence supporting international terrorism. Thus, if the United States aids Pinochet and Botha, this is not supporting international terrorism. On the other hand, aid to the ANC, or any other group *opposing* government is automatically aid to international terrorists. This is enormously helpful to Botha, Pinochet, and Reagan. On this system of definitions, also, aid by Nicaragua to the rebels of El Salvador makes the rebels international terrorists and the Nicaraguan government a "terrorist state." Attacks on both are "counter-terrorism." On the other hand, U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government is exempt from any such labeling, even though it was massive killing by the U.S.-sponsored regimes in El Salvador that literally forced a guerrilla movement into existence in the early 1980s.[21] As the West is generally trying to bolster up existing regimes against threats from below, a definitional system that renders all rebels and liberation movements terrorists by virtue of receiving aid, while not doing the same for aid to a government they are trying to unseat, is extremely convenient.

A problem arises, of course, where the West itself supports rebel movements and alleged "freedom fighters," as in the case of the Nicaraguan *contras* and Savimbi in Angola. If the United States organizes and supports the *contras*, and South Africa (and the United States) do the same for Savimbi in Angola, strict adherence to the West's own skewed definitions makes the United States and South Africa "terrorist states." How is this handled? The answer is, once again, power defines terrorism: what we and our allies do cannot be terrorism, so that any incompatible definitions—even our own—must be temporarily abandoned and special exceptions made."

The system of terrorism semantics

To summarize the western definitional system and its consequences: If the Soviet Union gives aid to the PLO, it is supporting terrorism and is a terrorist state, because the PLO uses force to oppose Israel. *That* intimidation is terrorism. If the United States gives aid to Israel, which invades Lebanon, imposes collective punishment on West Bank Arabs, and bombs Tunis and assorted other PLO "havens," this is not supporting terrorism because Israel only "retaliates" or engages in "counter-terrorism," as does the United States. If the United States aids the Salvadoran government as it slaughters several thousand civilians a year, this is not support of terrorism because a state killing and torturing its own citizens is excluded from the western definition. Also, if some of the people being slaughtered are rebelling, they are "terrorists" and the allied government is slaughtering as "counter-terrorism" (as in Guatemala). If the United States organizes and aids the *contras*, and supports South Africa as the latter invades its neighbors and organizes subversive armies across its borders, this is not terrorism either because the victims are aiding "terrorists" (and we and our allies are again "countering" terror), or by a special exemption to the especially virtuous—who also happens to own the most guns and the biggest cash balance. ●

Credit: William Schaap

Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman at the Symposium on State Terrorism in the Third World, Frankfurt, April 1986. Portions of this article were presented at that symposium.

19. In an interview with the Johannesburg *Financial Mail*, November 18, 1983, Charles Lichenstein, the Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., stated that "destabilization will remain in force until Angola and Mozambique do not permit their territory to be used by terrorists [sic] to attack South Africa."

20. In 1985 the Reagan administration requested $5 million for the Guatemalan police and security assistance as part of what it called a "counter-terrorism" package.

21. See Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, *El Salvador: The Face of Revolution* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), Chapters 4-6; Raymond Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador* (New York: Times Books, 1984), Part I; Richard Alan White, *The Morass: United States Intervention in Central America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 132-34.

22. There are, of course, rationalizations for the special exceptions. As Chester Crocker explained in regard to Angola, its government is illegitimate because it was put in place by a foreign (Soviet) power. (See *Namibia and Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 15, 1983, p. 43.) Only if a government is put in place by us, or meets our approval, are attacks on it by rebels terrorism.

Who Is a Terrorist?

By Philip Paull*

Whether the media identify the same individual as a "soldier of fortune," "international killer," "'dangerous' murder suspect," or "terrorist" often depends on what government directed or paid for the killing. A recent aborted attempt by Berkeley police to arrest a man wanted for murder, for example, was depicted by two Bay Area journalists, Michael Taylor of the *San Francisco Chronicle* and Vince Bielski of the *Daily Californian* as a straight local news story rather than one with far-reaching political dimensions, mainly, I assert, because the wanted killer had worked for the State of Israel, a Cold War ally of the United States. Had the wanted man been an agent of the Libyan government, the story would have made front page news in the *New York Times*. Bielski's June 6 *Californian* article was headlined "Cop bungles arrest of international killer;



David Lee Williams, Israeli-American terrorist.

Man escapes after shown own photo," and describes the alleged murderer matter-of-factly as "an assassin who has operated in the Middle East."

Michael Taylor's June 5 *Chronicle* story, "'Dangerous' Murder Suspect Evades Manhunt in Berkeley," provides more details about the suspect: To wit, David Lee Williams, also known by his Israeli *nom de guerre* David Abrams, wanted by the FBI for a brutal double murder, has numerous handguns and automatic weapons and worked as house manager of Chabad House, a residence hall for Jewish students near the University of California. He has been the target of an FBI manhunt since last February. Williams is a Vietnam veteran, a former U.S. Army paratrooper, explosives expert, and counterinsurgency warfare instructor. The suspect "popped up" in Israel in the early 1970s, and served in the Israeli Defense Force for one year. "In 1973, he became an officer in the national police force and served on the border patrol in occupied territories." He worked in the Jerusalem police force, and in 1983, presumably in reward for a decade of unspecified services rendered to the State of Israel, was granted Israeli citizenship (which also required conversion to Judaism).

During this same period, according to unnamed FBI, U.S. Navy, and Israeli intelligence sources cited by Taylor, and from statements made by Williams to friends, he was also an "assassin in the Middle East," a "mercenary" (for the Israelis, presumably), and a "gunrunner" with "volatile" moods.

The real story involves more than just a "bungled arrest," obviously. For a decade or more Williams served the Israeli defense and security services. Yet none of the news reporters sought to uncover what role, if any, the U.S. government played in this arrangement. Were U.S. intelligence agencies—always in close contact with Israeli intelligence—aware of this use of a U.S. national?

Neither story uncovered or even questioned the possible duties Williams/Abrams performed as a member of the Israeli armed forces and the Israeli national police, particularly duties performed in the Israeli-occupied territories. What were the duties that required the use of an American mercenary when Israel possesses the most highly trained military/intelligence personnel in the world? Is it possible the Israeli government is engaged in activities they wish to keep secret from its own citizenry? Is this an isolated case or part of a pattern? Whom did Williams actually assassinate "in the Middle East," and who directed and financed the assassinations? How and where was Williams involved in gunrunning?

The local media coverage also missed the indirect but nevertheless significant connection between the Williams/Abrams case and the ongoing Pollard spy case. The Israelis have been saying that the Pollard case represents an isolated rogue espionage caper and that no other Americans have been employed by the Israeli security and intelligence services as spies for Israel. But what about employing Americans for Israeli-sponsored covert action "dirty tricks" operations involving assassinations and gunrunning?

In the Pollard spy case, the Israelis created a new identity for Pollard which he would assume, together with a Swiss bank account and pension after a planned decade of service to the State of Israel. This scheme included the granting of an Israeli passport and Israeli citizenship. In the Williams case the same employment pattern is followed, casting doubt on Israeli denials that the Pollard case is unique.

I would have headlined the original story, "Former U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Expert and Israeli Terrorist, Wanted for Double Murder, Escapes Police/FBI Dragnet. State Department and CIA Queried on Israel's Employment of U.S. Nationals as 'Middle East Assassins.'" ●

* Philip Paull is a contributing editor of *Propaganda Analysis Review*, a publication of the Media Alliance, an organization of 300 Bay Area media persons. This article is to appear in the third issue of *PAR*, to be published in August 1986. For back issues ($1.00 each) and further information, write to Media Alliance, Bldg. D - Fort Mason, San Francisco CA 94123.

Libya in U.S. Demonology

By Noam Chomsky*

St. Augustine tells the story of a pirate captured by Alexander the Great, who asked him "how he dares molest the sea." "How dare you molest the whole world?" the pirate replied. "Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an Emperor."

The pirate's answer was "elegant and excellent," St. Augustine relates. It captures with some accuracy the current relations between the United States and Libya, a minor actor on the stage of international terrorism.

More generally, St. Augustine's tale reaches to the heart of the cynical frenzy over "international terrorism" currently being orchestrated as a cover for western violence, and illuminates the meaning of the concept in contemporary western usage. The term "terrorism" came into use at the end of the 18th century, primarily to designate violent acts of governments intended to ensure popular submission. That concept, plainly, is of little benefit to the practitioners of state terrorism, who, holding power, are in a position to control the system of thought and expression. The original sense has therefore been abandoned, and the term "terrorism" has come to be applied mainly to "retail terrorism" by individuals or groups.[1] Whereas the term was once applied to Emperors who molest their own subjects and the world, now it is restricted to thieves who molest the powerful.

Extricating ourselves from the system of indoctrination, we will use the term "terrorism" to refer to the threat or use of violence to intimidate or coerce (generally for political ends), whether it is the wholesale terrorism of the Emperor or the retail terrorism of the thief.

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1. "Origins and Fundamental Causes of International Terrorism," U.N. Secretariat, reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1975).

Credit: Associated Press

An American missile lights up the sky over Tripoli as the U.S. commences its predawn bombing raid, Tuesday, April 15, 1986.

In the true sense of the term, Libya is a terrorist state: the latest Amnesty International Report lists the killings, through 1985, of 14 Libyan citizens by this terrorist state, four abroad, the major acts of terrorism plausibly attributed to Libya. In the course of the hysteria orchestrated to serve other ends, all sorts of charges have been made, but the record confirms the April 1986 statement of a senior U.S. intelligence official that "what happened a few weeks ago is that Khadafy, who previously had used his people primarily to assassinate Libyan dissidents, made a clear decision to target Americans."[2] Qaddafi's alleged decision followed the Gulf of Sidra incident, when a U.S. air and naval armada sank Libyan vessels with many killed, and is entirely legitimate, indeed much belated, under the cynical doctrines professed by the United States executive, as we shall see directly.

Amnesty International reports that Libya's terrorist killings began in early 1980, at the time when Jimmy Carter launched the terrorist war in El Salvador with José Napoleón Duarte serving as a cover to ensure that arms would flow to the killers. While Libya was killing 14 of its own citizens, along with a handful of others, the U.S. client regime of El Salvador killed some 50,000 of its citizens in the course of what Bishop Rivera y Damas, who succeeded the assassinated Archbishop Romero, described in October 1980 as "a war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population." The security forces who perform these necessary chores were hailed by Duarte, a few weeks later, for their "valiant service alongside the people against subversion" while he conceded that "the masses were with the guerrillas" when this exercise began under the Carter-Duarte alliance. Duarte expressed this praise for the mass murderers as he was sworn in as President of the Junta in an effort to lend it legitimacy and ensure the flow of arms after the murder of four American churchwomen, generally regarded here as improper, though such partisans of terror and torture as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Alexander Haig, offered justifications even for this act.

The slaughter in El Salvador is not mere state terrorism on a massive scale, but international terrorism, given the organization, supply, training, and direct participation by the ruler of the hemisphere. The same is true of the massacre of some 70,000 Guatemalans in the same years, when U.S. arms to the murderers flowed at close to the normal level contrary to what is commonly alleged, though it was necessary to call in U.S. proxies, the neo-Nazi Argentine generals and Israel, to implement the slaughter more efficiently, and to construct an arms pipeline involving Belgium and other collaborators, under the illegal direction of the Pentagon and the CIA. Meanwhile Reagan and his associates extolled the killers and torturers for their human rights improvements and "total dedication to democracy." "The striking feature of Libyan atrocities," two observers note in reviewing the Amnesty International study of state terror, "is that they are the only ones whose numbers are sufficiently limited that the individual cases can be enumerated," in striking contrast to Argentina, Indonesia, or the Central American states where the Emperor molests the world.[3]

2. William Beecher, *Boston Globe*, April 15, 1986.

3. *Amnesty International Report—1985* (London, 1985); *Political Killings by Governments* (AI Report, London, 1983); Chris Krueger and Kjell Enge, *Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands* (Washington Office on Latin America, 1985); John Haiman and Anna Meigs, "Khaddafy: Man and Myth," *Africa Events*, February 1986; Allan Nairn, "The Guatemala Connection," *Progressive*, May 1986. References not given here and below can be found in my *Turning the Tide* (Boston: South End Press, 1985).

U.S. international terrorism in El Salvador is hailed as a magnificent achievement across the mainstream political spectrum in the United States because it laid the basis for what is called "democracy" in western parlance: namely, the rule of elite groups serving the needs of the Global Enforcer with the public occasionally mobilized to ratify elite decisions. In El Salvador, the United States organized what Herman and Brodhead call "demonstration elections" to pacify the home front, carried out in an atmosphere of "terror and despair, macabre rumor and grisly reality," in the words of the observers of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group.[4] The U.S. press lauded this demonstration of our passionate commitment to democracy, as *Pravda* does under similar circumstances. Guatemala is also considered a success, for similar reasons. When half the population is marched to the polls after it has been properly traumatized by U.S.-backed violence, enlightened American humanists are overjoyed at this renewed demonstration of our love for democracy, untroubled by the rise in death squad killings after the elections (including at least 94 deaths and 35 disappearances in the weeks following President Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo's January inauguration), the open recognition by the newly-elected president that he can do nothing given the roots of actual power in the military and the oligarchy and that the civilian government are merely "the managers of bankruptcy and misery,"[5] and the fact that the reaction in the United States helps convert the elections into a means for the U.S. to participate more fully in state terror and repression, as in El Salvador. In fact, elections in U.S. terror states are often a disaster for the domestic population, for this essential reason. These two examples, of course, represent only a small part of the U.S. role in international terrorism during the 1980s, and the grisly record goes back many years.

In short, Libya is indeed a terrorist state, but in the world of international terrorism, it is hardly even a bit player.

"Their Side" Is Terrorist

The pirate's maxim explains the useful concept of "international terrorism" only in part. It is necessary to add a second feature: An act of terrorism enters the canon only if it is committed by "their side," not ours. Consider, for example, the public relations campaign about "international terrorism" launched in early 1981 by the Reagan administration. The

4. Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections* (Boston: South End Press, 1984). They define this concept to refer to a device of foreign intervention in which elections are "organized and staged by a foreign power primarily to pacify a restive home population," discussing several other examples as well and showing in detail that they are no less farcical than elections held under Soviet authority. Their term "demonstration elections" was borrowed and radically misused with reference to the election in Nicaragua by Robert Leiken (*New York Review of Books*, December 5, 1985), as part of his campaign in support of the terrorist proxy army established by the U.S. to attack Nicaragua from its Honduran and Costa Rican bases. See Brodhead and Herman's letter, published after half a year's delay along with others by British Parliamentary observers (June 26, 1986), and Leiken's response, tacitly conceding the accuracy of their critique (by evasion) while claiming that they designed their concept "as a way of focusing attention on Western imperialism while diverting it from Soviet imperialism . . . in line with their apparent belief that there is only one superpower villain." This is the standard reflex of propagandists whose deceit is exposed, in this case, requiring the suppression of Brodhead and Herman's harsh critique of elections in Poland along with much else. The remainder of Leiken's response and his articles themselves maintain a comparable level of integrity and merit careful reading for those interested in the workings of the U.S. ideological system.

5. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, *Washington Report on the Hemisphere*, April 16, 1986.

major text was Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network*, which offered an ingenious proof that international terrorism is a "Soviet-inspired" instrument "aimed at the destabilization of western democratic society." The proof is that the major terrorist actions are confined to the western democratic states, and are not "directed against the Soviet Union or any of its satellites or client states." This profound insight much impressed other terrorologists, notably, Walter Laqueur, who wrote that Sterling had provided "ample evidence" that terrorism occurs "almost exclusively in democratic or relatively democratic countries."[6]

The Sterling thesis is true, in fact true by definition, given the way the term "terrorism" is employed by the Emperor and his loyal coterie. Since only acts committed by "their side" count as terrorism, it follows that Sterling is necessarily correct, whatever the facts. In the real world, the story is quite different. The major victims of international terrorism[7] in the several decades prior to the Sterling-Laqueur pronouncements were Cuba and the Palestinians, but none of this counts, by definition. When Israel bombs Palestinian refugee camps killing many civilians—often without even a pretense of "reprisal"—or sends its troops into Lebanese villages in "counterterror" operations where they murder and destroy, or hijacks ships and places thousands of hostages in prison camps under horrifying conditions, this is not "terrorism"; in fact, the rare voices of protest are thunderously condemned by loyal Party Liners for their "anti-Semitism" and "double standard," demonstrated by their failure to join the chorus of praise for "a country that cares for human life" (*Washington Post*), whose "high moral purpose" (*Time*) is the object of never-ending awe and acclaim, a country which, according to its American claque, "is held to a higher law, as interpreted for it by journalists" (Walter Goodman).[8]

Similarly, it is not terrorism when paramilitary forces operating from U.S. bases and trained by the CIA bombard Cuban hotels, sink fishing boats and attack Russian ships in Cuban harbors, poison crops and livestock, attempt to assassinate Castro, and so on, in missions that were running almost weekly at their peak.[9] These and innumerable similar actions on the part of the Emperor and his clients are not the subject of conferences and learned tomes, or of anguished commentary and diatribes in the media and journals of opinion.

Not only is "terrorism" defined for ideological serviceability, but standards of evidence are also conveniently set so as to achieve the Emperor's goals. To demonstrate Libya's role as a state terrorist, the flimsiest evidence, or none at all, will suffice. The headline of a *New York Times* editorial justifying the terrorist attack that killed some 100 people in Libya reads "To Save the Next Natasha Simpson," referring to the 11-year-old American girl who was one of the victims of the terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna air terminals on December 27, 1985; these victims entitle us to bomb Libyan cities "to discourage state-supported terrorism," the editors solemnly inform us. It is only a minor defect that no evidence has been presented to implicate Libya in these actions. The Italian and Austrian governments stated that the terrorists were trained in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and had come via Damascus, a conclusion reiterated by Israeli Defense Minister Rabin. Four months later, in response to U.S. claims about Libyan involvement in the Vienna attack, the Austrian Minister of Interior stated that "there is not the slightest evidence to implicate Libya," again citing Syria as the connection and adding that Washington had never presented the evidence of Libyan complicity it had promised to provide to the Austrian authorities. He also added the correct but—in the U.S.—inexpressible comment that the problem of Lebanese-based terrorism lies largely in the failure to solve the Palestine problem, which has led desperate people to turn to violence, exactly the result intended by U.S.-Israeli terrorism, a matter to which we return.[10]

If an individual implicated in a terrorist act once paid a visit to Libya, or is alleged to have received training or funds from Libya in the past, that suffices for condemnation of Qaddafi as a "mad dog" who must be eradicated. The same standards would implicate the CIA in the murderous exploits of Cuban exiles, among numerous others. Keeping just to 1985, one of the suspects in the bombing of the Air India jumbo jet near Ireland that was the year's worst terrorist act, killing 329 people, was trained in an anti-communist school for mercenaries in Alabama. The terrorist action that cost the most lives in the Middle East was a car-bombing in Beirut in March that killed 80 people and wounded 200, carried out by a Lebanese intelligence unit trained and supported by the CIA, in an effort to kill a Shi'ite leader who was believed to have been involved in "terrorist attacks against U.S. installations" in Beirut; the term "terrorism" is commonly used by foreign armies in reference to actions against them by the local population which, as in this case, plausibly see them as an occupying force attempting to impose a detested political settlement.[11] By the standards of evidence used in the case of Libya, the U.S. is the world's leading terrorist power, even if we exclude the wholesale terrorism ruled ineligible by the propaganda system by the means already described.

What the President calls "the evil scourge of terrorism" (in the specific western sense) was placed in the central focus of attention by the Reagan administration as it came into office in 1981. The reasons were transparent, though inexpressible within the doctrinal system. The administration was committed to three related policies, all achieved with some success: (1) transfer of resources from the poor to the rich; (2) a massive increase in the state sector of the economy in the traditional American way, through the Pentagon system—a device to force the public to invest in high technology industry by means of the state-guaranteed market for the production of high tech-

6. See my *Towards a New Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), for references and discussion, and for more on the topic, Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network* (Boston: South End Press, 1982).

7. I exclude here outright aggression, as in the case of the U.S. attack against South Vietnam, then all of Indochina, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S.-backed invasions of East Timor and Lebanon by its Indonesian and Israeli clients, etc.

8. *Washington Post*, June 30, 1985; *Time*, October 11, 1982; Goodman, *New York Times*, February 7, 1984. For recent discussion of the astonishing record of Israeli terrorism and the western response, or lack of it, see my papers "International Terrorism: Image and Reality," delivered at the Frankfurt conference on International Terrorism, April 1986, and "Middle East Terrorism," forthcoming in *Race & Class*.

9. See references in note 6. And see Warren Hinckle and William Turner, *The Fish is Red* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981). And see Edward S. Herman, "U.S. Sponsorship of International Terrorism: An Overview," in this issue of *CAIB*.

10. Editorial, *New York Times*, April 20, 1985; *Washington Post*, January 11, 1986; Rabin, *Boston Globe*, January 25, 1986; *El Pais* (Madrid), April 25, 1986.

11. *New York Times*, June 27; Bob Woodward and Charles R. Babcock, *Washington Post*, May 12; Philip Shenon, *New York Times*, May 14, 1985, for CIA denial of involvement "disputed by some Administration and Congressional officials who said that the agency was working with the group at the time of the bombing."

nology waste (armaments), and thus to contribute to the general program of public subsidy, private profit, called "free enterprise"; and (3) a substantial increase in the U.S. role in intervention, subversion, and international terrorism (in the true sense of the expression). Such policies cannot be presented to the public in the terms in which they are intended. They can be implemented only if the general population is properly frightened by monsters against whom we must defend ourselves.

The standard device is an appeal to the threat of Reagan's "Evil Empire," what President Kennedy called "the monolithic and ruthless conspiracy" bent on world conquest, as he launched a rather similar program.[12] But confrontation with the Evil Empire can be a dangerous affair, so it is preferable to do battle with safer enemies designated as the Evil Empire's proxies, a choice that conforms well to the third plank in the Reagan agenda, pursued for quite independent reasons: to ensure "stability" and "order" in our global domains. The "international terrorism" of properly chosen pirates, or of enemies such as Nicaragua or Salvadoran peasants who dare to defend themselves from our terrorist attack, is a far preferable target, and with an efficiently functioning propaganda system, it can be exploited to induce a proper sense of fear and mobilization among the domestic population.

Qaddafi as Scapegoat

Libya fit the need perfectly. Qaddafi is easy to hate and Libya is weak and defenseless, so that martial flourishes and, when needed, murder of Libyans can be conducted with impunity. The glorious military victory in Grenada, a culmination of the extreme hostility and aggressiveness of the Carter-Reagan administrations after the Bishop government threatened to consider the needs of the poor population, served similar ends. The point is readily perceived abroad. American journalist Donald Neff, writing in a British publication about the March 1986 Gulf of Sidra incident, comments that "this was less of a Rambo-style operation than a demonstration of the bully on the block picking a fight. It was typical of Reagan. In his five years in office, he has repeatedly got away with lording it over little guys. He did this time too."[13] It is an interesting fact about American culture that this regular show of cowardice and two-bit thuggery seems to strike a responsive chord.



Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi with his adopted daughter, who was killed in the bombing of his home.

The public relations specialists of the Reagan administration understood the utility of the Libyan enemy and wasted little time in confronting this dangerous foe. Libya was at once designated as a prime agent of the Soviet-inspired "terror network," and in July 1981, a CIA plan to overthrow and possibly kill Qaddafi with a paramilitary campaign of terror within Libya was leaked to the press.[14]

We might note parenthetically that by U.S. standards, this plan authorized Qaddafi to carry out acts of terror against American targets in "self-defense against future attack," the words of White House spokesman Larry Speakes presenting the official justification for the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. The same justification was reiterated at the United Nations by Vernon Walters and Herbert Okun. The administration even had the gall to argue that this right, which not even Hitler claimed and which, if proclaimed by other violent states, would tear to shreds what little remains of global order and international law, is in accord with the United Nations Charter; no form of legal sophistry can bridge that gap, but Reagan's pronouncement was duly acclaimed by Anthony Lewis for its reliance "on a legal argument that violence against the perpetrators of repeated violence is justified as an act of self-defense." The reason why the U.S. justified the attack "on the basis of pre-empting an attack, which could be seen as a form of self-defense, [rather] than as a retaliatory action" was explained by a State Department official, who noted that the U.N. Charter expressly forbids the use of force except in self-defense—in fact, self-defense against armed attack, until the U.N. acts after a formal request by the country that regards itself as the victim of a sudden and overwhelming armed attack.[15]

In August 1981, the anti-Qaddafi message "was reinforced by the trap laid for Libya in the Gulf of Sidra," a trap "elaborately planned on the U.S. side" with the intent of a confrontation in which Libyan jets could be shot down, as they were, Edward Haley observes in his bitterly anti-Qaddafi study of U.S. relations with Libya. One specific purpose, Haley plausibly argues, was to "exploit the 'Libyan menace' in order to win support for steps [the administration] wished to take in pursuit of Secretary Haig's 'strategic consensus' against the Soviet Union, and as an element in the arrangements necessary for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force," targeted primarily at the Middle East. In November, the administration concocted a ludicrous tale about Libyan hit-men roaming the streets of Washington to assassinate Our Leader, eliciting feverish media commentary along with some limited skepticism. When questioned about the plot, Reagan stated: "We have the evidence, and [Qaddafi] knows it."[16] The story faded away when its purpose was served, and the press was suffi-

12. Kennedy's program was limited to the second and third plank of the Reagan agenda; the first, which was enthusiastically supported by congressional Democrats under Reagan and indeed had already been proposed by Carter, in direct violation of the will of the public, reflects the decline in relative U.S. power in the intervening years. It is no longer feasible to pursue "great societies at home and grand designs abroad," in the words of Kennedy adviser Walter Heller, so the former must be abandoned. On public attitudes, see *Turning the Tide*, chapter 5, and Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1986.

13. *Middle East International*, April 4, 1986.

14. See P. Edward Haley, *Qaddafi and the U.S. Since 1969* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 271 f.

15. Larry Speakes, national TV, 7:30 PM, April 14; *New York Times*, April 16; Associated Press, April 14; *New York Times*, April 15; Lewis, *New York Times*, April 17; Bernard Weinraub, *New York Times*, April 15, 1986.

16. Haley, *op. cit.*, n. 14, pp. 8, 264.

Credit: Associated Press

Composite sketches of alleged Libyan "hit team" which Jack Anderson distributed to press and TV networks. Later Anderson wrote that he had been set up by an unnamed intelligence agency.

ciently disciplined so as not to report the exposure in the British press that the "assassins" on the official U.S. list, leaked in England, were prominent members of the (passionately anti-Libyan) Lebanese Amal, including Nabih Berri and the elderly religious leader of the Shi'ite community.[17]

Other tales included a Libyan threat to invade the Sudan across 600 miles of desert (with the Egyptian and U.S. air forces helpless to impede this outrage) and a plot to overthrow the government of the Sudan in February 1983—conveniently discovered at a moment when the administration's reactionary constituency was charging it with insufficient militancy—a plot so subtle that Sudanese and Egyptian intelligence knew nothing about it, as U.S. reporters who took the trouble to go to Khartoum to investigate quickly discovered. The U.S. responded to the fabricated plot with an elaborate show of force, enabling Secretary of State Shultz, who had been denounced as too faint-hearted, to strike heroic poses on television while announcing that Qaddafi "is back in his box where he belongs" because Reagan acted "quickly and decisively" against this threat to world order. Again, the episode was forgotten when its purposes had been served. There have been a series of similar examples. The media have generally played their appointed role, with only occasional demurrers.[18]

The events of March-April 1986 fit the familiar pattern to perfection. The Gulf of Sidra operation in March was plainly timed to stir up jingoist hysteria just prior to the crucial Senate vote on contra aid, coinciding with a fabricated Nicaraguan "invasion" of Honduras as Nicaragua exercised its legal right of hot pursuit to expel from its territory U.S. proxy forces dispatched by their master from their Honduras bases to sow terror in Nicaragua prior to the Senate vote. The public relations campaign succeeded brilliantly as demonstrated by the enraged reaction of congressional doves and the media fairly generally, and the Senate vote. The charade also permitted the administration to provide $20 million of military aid to Honduras, which Honduras officially maintains that it did not request, and which has no doubt been conveniently "lost" in the *contra* camps, yet another method by which the lawless band in Washington evades the weak congressional restrictions on their thuggery.[19] The Libyan provocation too was a success, enabling U.S. forces to sink several Libyan boats, killing more than 50 Libyans, and, it was hoped, to incite Qaddafi to acts of terror against Americans, as was subsequently claimed.

While the U.S. forces were successful in killing many Libyans, they were singularly unable to rescue survivors. The task was apparently not impossible, since 16 survivors of the U.S. attack were rescued from a lifeboat by a Spanish oil tanker.[20]

Credit: U.S. Navy

Libyan ship burns in the Gulf of Sidra after being bombed by naval aircraft from the Sixth Fleet. The Americans refused to rescue Libyan sailors from several sinking ships, and more than 50 died.

The official purpose of the U.S. military operation was to establish the right of passage in the Gulf of Sidra, perfect nonsense, since dispatch of a naval flotilla was hardly the necessary or appropriate means to achieve this end; in fact, under international law, a public declaration or the commencement of court proceedings would have sufficed. Since there was plainly no urgency, it was possible to resort to legal means to establish the right of innocent passage. But a violent terrorist state will naturally observe different priorities.

The U.S. position is dubious on narrower grounds. The press continually speaks of "the law of the sea," but Libya shot at U.S. planes, not U.S. ships, and "the law of the air"

17. *New Statesman*, August 16, 1985.

18. See my *Fateful Triangle* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), p. 210); Haley, *op. cit.*, n. 14, makes a praiseworthy effort to take the comedy seriously.

19. "The Central Intelligence Agency, barred from providing military aid to Nicaragua rebels, secretly funneled several million dollars to the rebels for political projects over the past year, U.S. government officials say," also allowing "the CIA to maintain a strong influence over the rebel movement, even though a Congressional ban existed from October 1984 through September 1985, prohibiting the agency from spending money 'which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua,' the officials said." One purpose of what U.S. officials described as "a major program" was to "create the aura that [the *contras*] are an actual political entity among our allies in Europe." Congressman Sam Gejdenson stated that "We suspected that the CIA had never really withdrawn from the scene, but the extent of the agency's direct involvement in the Contra war may astound even the most jaded observer." UNO documents obtained by the Associated Press "show much of UNO's political money going to military organizations allied with the umbrella group" established by the U.S., while some of the funds were used to pay off Honduran and Costa Rican officials "to enable the rebels to operate in those countries." Much of the money was funnelled through a Bahamas branch of a London bank. Associated Press, April 14; *Boston Globe*, April 14, 1986. The disclosures passed without comment. Subsequently, the *Miami Herald* reported that over $2 million of the $27 million provided by Congress for "humanitarian assistance" was used to pay Honduran officers "to turn a blind eye to illegal contra activities on Honduran soil" (editorial, *Boston Globe*, May 13, 1986).

20. Associated Press, March 27, citing *El Pais*.

barely exists. States make various claims in this regard. The U.S., for example, claims a 200-mile Air Defense Identification Zone within which it has the right to exercise "self-defense" against intruding aircraft judged to be hostile. There is no doubt that U.S. aircraft were well within 200 miles of Libyan territory—40 miles, the Pentagon claims—and that they were hostile, so that by U.S. standards, Libya was within its rights to intercept them. The point was noted by the conservative legal scholar Alfred Rubin of the Fletcher School at Tufts University, who commented that "by sending in aircraft we went beyond what we were clearly authorized to do under the Law of the Sea" in "an unnecessary provocation."[21] But for a gangster state, such matters are irrelevant, and the exercise was a success, domestically at least.

The extent of the provocation in the Gulf of Sidra was made clear by Pentagon spokesman Robert Sims, who "said that U.S. policy is to shoot at any Libyan boat that enters international waters in the Gulf of Sidra for as long as the U.S. naval exercise in that region continues—no matter how far away the boat might be from U.S. ships." "Given the 'hostile intent' displayed by Libya when it tried to shoot down U.S. warplanes," Sims stated, any Libyan military vessel is "a threat to our forces."[22] In short, the U.S. maintains the right of "self-defense" against any Libyan vessel that approaches its naval armada off the Libyan coast, but Libya does not have a right of self-defense in airspace comparable to that claimed by the U.S.

There is more to the story. David Blundy interviewed British engineers in Tripoli who were repairing the Soviet-installed radar system. One, who says he was monitoring the incident throughout on the radar screens (which, contrary to Pentagon claims, were not rendered inoperative), reports that "he saw American warplanes cross not only into the 12 miles of Libyan territorial waters, but over Libyan land as well." "'I watched the planes fly approximately eight miles into Libyan air space,' he said. 'I don't think the Libyans had any choice but to hit back. In my opinion they were reluctant to do so.' " The engineer added that "American warplanes made their approach using a normal civil airline traffic route and followed in the wake of a Libyan airliner, so that its radar blip would mask them on the Libyan radar screen."[23]

21. Richard Higgins, *Boston Globe*, March 25, 1986.

22. Fred Kaplan, *Boston Globe*, March 26, 1986.

23. London *Sunday Times*, April 6, 1986.

The Photos You Didn't See In the U.S. Media



U.S. bombing of residential districts of Tripoli resulted in many civilian casualties and much property damage.

The French Embassy after U.S. bombing raid of Tripoli.

Libyan peasants surveying damage to what was their barn.

Fragment of a body after the bombing.

No hint of this information appeared in the national press, to my knowledge, apart from a typically excellent report by Alexander Cockburn, playing his usual role of personal antidote to media subservience and distortion. Blundy's article was not mysteriously missed by the U.S. press. It was cited by Joseph Lelyveld of the *New York Times*, but with its crucial content entirely omitted.[24]

One likely consequence of the Gulf of Sidra operation was to elicit acts of Libyan terrorism in retaliation. These would then have the effect of inducing a state of terror in the United States and, with some luck, in Europe as well, setting the stage for the next escalation. The bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on April 5, with one American and one Turk killed, was immediately blamed on Libya, and was then used as the pretext for the April 14 bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi, with about 100 Libyans killed, neatly timed the day before the expected House vote on *contra* aid. In case the audience missed the point, Reagan's speech writers made it explicit. Addressing the American Business Conference on April 15, he said: "And I would remind the House voting this week that this arch-terrorist has sent $400 million and an arsenal of weapons and advisers into Nicaragua to bring his war home to the United States. He has bragged that he is helping the Nicaraguans because they fight America on its own ground."[25] The idea that the "mad dog" is bringing his war home to the U.S. by providing arms to people the U.S. is attacking with its terrorist proxy army was a nice touch, which passed without notable comment, but the public relations operation did not, for once, succeed in steamrollering Congress, though the bombing of Libya did enflame chauvinist passions. This consequence was largely attributable, perhaps, to the rampant anti-Arab racism in the United States and the absence of any sane reaction to earlier episodes of manufactured hysteria over Qaddafi's real and alleged crimes.

The April 14 attack was the first bombing in history staged for prime time television. As the subsequently published record shows, the bombing raids were carefully timed so that they would begin precisely at 7PM Eastern Standard Time—as they did; that is, precisely at the moment when all three national television channels broadcast their national news, which was of course pre-empted as agitated anchor men switched to Tripoli for direct eyewitness reports of the exciting events. As soon as the raids ended, the White House had Larry Speakes address a press conference, followed by other dignitaries, ensuring total domination of the propaganda system during the crucial early hours.

Difficult Questions

One might argue that the administration took a gamble in this transparent public relations operation, since journalists might have asked some difficult questions, but the White House was justly confident that nothing untoward would occur and its faith in the servility of the media proved to be warranted.

Questions could have been raised, surely. To mention only the most obvious one, Speakes stated that the U.S. knew on April 4 that the East Berlin Libyan "People's Bureau" had informed Tripoli that an attack would take place in Berlin the following day, and that it then informed Tripoli that the La Belle discotheque bombing had taken place, as planned. Thus the U.S. knew on April 4-5—with certainty, the White House alleged—that Libya was directly responsible for the disco bombing. One might have asked, then, why the reports of U.S. and West German investigations from April 5 to the moment of the attack consistently stated that there were at most suspicions of Libyan involvement. In fact, every journalist listening to the administration story had in his or her hands—unless we assume the most astonishing incompetence on the part of the news rooms—a report from Berlin which came across the wires at 6:28 PM EST, a half-hour before the bombing, stating that "the Allied military command [in West Berlin] reported no developments in the investigation of the disco bombing" and that "U.S. and West German officials have said Libya—*possibly* through its embassy in Communist-ruled East Berlin—is *suspected* of involvement in the bombing of the La Belle nightclub" (my emphasis).[26] Some journalist might have asked, then, how it is that just prior to the attack, the U.S. and West Germany still had at most suspicions of Libyan involvement—as throughout the preceding period—while on April 4-5, ten days earlier, they had certain knowledge of it. But no embarrassing questions were asked then, nor have they been since, and the relevant facts have been largely suppressed.

Credit: Jan Stappenbeld

The hour of the attack: A grandfather clock in a Tripoli home near the French Embassy, stopped at 2 a.m., just when the home was destroyed.

Reagan stated on the evening of April 14 that "our evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable"—just as "We have the evidence, and [Qaddafi] knows it" in the case of the Libyan hit-men, not to speak of the Sandinista involvement in drug-peddling, their announcement of a "revolution without frontiers," the support of Helmut Kohl and Bettino Craxi for the Libyan attack (angrily denied by "shocked" officials in Germany and Italy),[27] and numerous other fabrications of an administration that has broken the usual records for deceit, but continues "to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat"—in the words of the titular leadership, referring to his Stalinist models—to achieve its ends, confident that the occasional exposure in the small print, well after the fact, will not prevent the constant stream of lies from setting the terms of debate and leaving the appropriate impressions firmly implanted, exactly as it does.

Beyond the borders, discipline does not reign. In Germany, a week after Washington had stated its certain knowledge ten days earlier of Libyan responsibility for the disco bombing, *Der Spiegel* reported that the famed telephone intercepts apparently do not exist and that West Berlin intelligence has only suspicions about Libyan involvement, also suspecting "rival groups of drug dealers" among other possibilities, including

24. Cockburn, *Wall Street Journal*, April 17; also *The Nation*, April 26, 1986. Lelyveld, *New York Times*, April 18, 1986.
25. *New York Times*, April 16, 1986.
26. Associated Press, April 14, 1986.
27. James M. Markham, *New York Times*, April 25, 1986.

neo-Nazi groups. Washington's war is "a means of politics," "insofar as the enemy is as small as Grenada and Libya—and the adversary is as ideal a scoundrel as Qaddafi," and no European leader should have any illusions that Europe's concerns or interests will be considered if the U.S. decides to escalate international violence, even to the level of a final World War, editor Rudolf Augstein adds.[28] In an interview on April 28 with a reporter for the U.S. Army journal *Stars and Stripes*, Manfred Ganschow, chief of the Berlin Staatschutz and head of the 100-man team investigating the disco bombing, stated that "I have no more evidence that Libya was connected to the bombing than I had when you first called me two days after the act. Which is none." He agreed that it was "a highly political case" and hinted at considerable skepticism about what "the politicians" were saying and would say about it.[29] The U.S. press has concealed the doubts expressed by the Berlin investigators, but the careful reader will discern them in the reports of the continuing investigation, as suspects alleged to have Syrian and other connections are investigated.

For much of the world, the U.S. has become an object of considerable fear, as its "bizarre cowboy leader" engages in acts of "madness" in organizing a "band of cutthroats" to attack Nicaragua and playing mad bomber elsewhere, in the words of Canada's leading journal, generally restrained and quite pro-U.S. in tendency.[30] The Reagan administration is playing on these fears. At the Tokyo Summit of the advanced industrial democracies in May, the Reagan administration circulated a position paper in which it stated that one reason why Europe would be wise to line up in the U.S. crusade is "the need to do something so that the crazy Americans won't take matters into their own hands again." The threat succeeded in eliciting a statement against terrorism mentioning only Libya by name.[31]

The reaction to the bombing of Libya at home and abroad was sharply different. Expecting the worst, the 12-member European Economic Community called upon the U.S. to avoid "further escalation of military tension in the region with all the inherent dangers." A few hours later, U.S. warplanes struck, as West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was on his way to Washington to explain the EEC position. His spokesman stated that "We want to do everything we can to avoid a military escalation." The bombing aroused extensive protest throughout most of Europe, including large-scale demonstrations, and evoked editorial condemnation in most of the world. Spain's major journal, the independent *El Pais*, condemned the raid, writing that "The military action of the United States is not only an offense against international law and a grave threat to peace in the Mediterranean, but a mockery of its European allies, who did not find motives for economic sanctions against Libya in a meeting Monday, despite being previously and without success pressured to adopt sanctions." The conservative *South China Morning Post* in Hong Kong wrote that "President Reagan's cure for the 'mad dog of the Middle East' may prove more lethal than the disease," and his action "may also have lit the fuse to a wider conflagration" in the Middle East. In Mexico City, *El Universal* wrote that the U.S. "has no right to set itself up as the defender of world freedom," urging recourse to legal means through the United Nations. There were many similar reactions.

The U.S. press, in contrast, was overwhelmingly favorable. The *New York Times* wrote that "even the most scrupulous citizen can only approve and applaud the American attacks on Libya," describing this as a just sentence: "the United States has prosecuted [Qaddafi] carefully, proportionately—and justly." The evidence for Libyan responsibility for the disco bombing has been "now laid out clearly to the public"; "Then came the jury, the European governments to which the United States went out of its way to send emissaries to share evidence and urge concerted action against the Libyan leader." It is irrelevant, apparently, that the jury was hardly convinced by the evidence, and issued a "judgment" calling on the executioner to refrain from any action.

Most governments also condemned the action, though not all. The government-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation said the attack "underlines the commitment the leader of the western world has made to taking positive action against terrorism"; the U.S. was justified in attacking Qaddafi, "whose name is virtually synonymous with international terrorism." In Israel, Prime Minister Shimon Peres stated that the U.S. action was clearly justified "in self-defense": "If the Libyan Government issues orders to murder American soldiers in Beirut in cold blood, in the middle of the night, what do you expect the United States to do? Sing Hallelujah? Or take action in her defense?" The idea that the U.S. was acting in "self-defense" against an attack on her forces in Beirut two and a half years earlier is an intriguing innovation, even putting aside the circumstances of that earlier act of "terrorism" against the military forces that much of the population saw as imposing the "New Order" that Israel had sought to establish: the rule of right-wing Christians and selected Muslim elites.[32]

In the U.S., Senator Mark Hatfield denounced the U.S. bombing raid "on a nearly deserted Senate floor," and in a letter to the *Times*. Leaders of several major Christian denominations condemned the bombing, but Jewish leaders generally praised it, among them, Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, who "said the U.S. government 'properly and vigorously responded' to the 'mindless terrorism' " of Qaddafi. Harvard international affairs professor Joseph Nye said Reagan had to respond "to the smoking gun of that Berlin thing. What else do you do about state-supported terrorism?"—such as U.S.-supported terrorism in Central America, for example, where the "smoking gun" is considerably more in evidence. Eugene Rostow supported the bombing as part of a "more active defense against the process of Soviet expansion," a step that was "inevitable and overdue." The "forcible removal of the Qaddafi regime," he explained, "would be fully justified under the existing rules of international law," since he "has flagrantly and continually violated these rules." "That being the case,

28. *Der Spiegel*, April 21, 1986; the front cover features the phrase "Terror against Terror," a well-known Gestapo slogan, presumably not selected by accident. See also Norman Birnbaum's article, same issue.

29. Text of interview provided by a journalist for *Stars and Stripes* in Germany. The bombing may, in fact, have been the result of gang warfare involving nightclub ownership; other sources in Berlin raise the possibility that a neo-Nazi group or the Ku Klux Klan (which had verbally attacked the club) may have been involved.

30. *Toronto Globe & Mail*, editorials, March 28, 18, 5, 1986, referring specifically to Nicaragua.

31. See Associated Press, *International Herald Tribune*, May 6, for extensive discussion; *New York Times*, May 6, 1986,a briefer mention, and the text of the statement.

32. Associated Press, April 14; survey of world press reaction, Associated Press, April 15; survey of U.S. editorial reaction, April 16; editorial, *New York Times*, April 15, 1986; Peres, *New York Times*, April 16.

every state injured by Libya's actions has the right, alone or with others, to use whatever force is reasonably necessary to put an end to Libya's illegal behavior. Libya is in the legal position of the Barbary pirates." He urged NATO to "issue a declaration on the responsibility of states for illegal acts committed from their territory." *A fortiori*, then, NATO should condemn the Emperor, not just the pirate, and states from Indochina to Central America to the Middle East, among others, should organize to use whatever force is necessary to attack the United States, Israel and other terrorist states.[33]

The U.S. bombing of Libya had nothing to do with "terrorism," even in the hypocritical western sense of the word. In fact, it was clear enough that the Gulf of Sidra operation and the bombing of Libyan cities would if anything incite such retail terrorism, one major reason why the likely targets in Europe pleaded with the U.S. to refrain from such action.

This is hardly the first time that violent actions have been executed with the expectation that they would incite retail terrorism. Consider the U.S.-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, undertaken against the background of persistent U.S.-Israeli refusal to permit a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[34] After the Israeli-initiated exchange across the Israel-Lebanon border in June 1981 with some 450 Arabs and six Jews killed, the border was "quiet" in the racist terms of American discourse, meaning that there was no PLO response to the many Israeli provocations (including bombing of civilian areas with many killed) undertaken in an effort to elicit a "terrorist act" that could be exploited to justify the planned invasion. Finally, Israel invaded on a pretext in June 1982, proceeding to destroy the civilian base of the PLO in Lebanon and demolish much of what remained of Lebanese society. The goal was to establish a "New Order" under Israeli domination at least in Lebanon and to secure Israel's integration of the occupied territories. It was clear at once that these acts could only have the effect of inspiring what the West calls "terrorism," and indeed, most terrorism, in the western sense, has since originated in the ruins of Lebanon.

The real reason for the 1982 invasion was not the threat to the northern Galilee, as the sanitized history regularly offered to American audiences pretends, but rather the opposite, as was plausibly explained by Israel's leading specialist on the Palestinians, Yehoshua Porath, shortly after the invasion was launched. The decision to invade, he suggests, "flowed from the very fact that the cease-fire had been observed." This was a "veritable catastrophe" for the Israeli government, because it threatened the policy of evading a political settlement. "The government's hope," he continued, "is that the stricken PLO, lacking a logistic and territorial base, will return to its earlier terrorism; it will carry out bombings throughout the world, hijack airplanes, and murder many Israelis," and thus "will lose part of the political legitimacy it has gained" and "undercut the danger" of negotiations with representative Palestinians, which would threaten the policy—shared by both major political groupings—of keeping effective control over the occupied territories.[35] The plausible assumption of the Israeli leadership was that those who shape public opinion in the United States—the only country that counts, now that Israel has chosen to become a mercenary state serving the interests of its provider—could be counted on to obliterate the actual history and portray the terrorist acts resulting from Israeli aggression and atrocities as random acts of violence ascribable to defects in Arab character and culture, if not racial deficiencies.

Credit: Prensa Latina

Victims of Israeli bombing of Beirut, 1982.

Recent U.S. commentary on terrorism fulfills these natural expectations with some precision.

The basic points are understood well enough in Israel. Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir stated over Israeli television that Israel went to war because there was "a terrible danger. . . . Not so much a military one as a political one," prompting the fine Israeli satirist B. Michael to write that "the lame excuse of a military danger or a danger to the Galilee is dead." We "have removed the political danger" by striking first, in time; now, "Thank God, there is no one to talk to." Other Israeli commentators have made essentially the same point.

In short, the goals of the war were political, the occupied territories being a prime target. The tale about protecting the border from terrorism is agitprop, eagerly swallowed by the docile western media. If Palestinian terrorism can be revived, so much the better. And if we can't pin the blame on Arafat, he can at least be stigmatized as "the founding father of contemporary Palestinian violence,"[36] so that his efforts at political settlement can be evaded. The attack on Libya may also inspire retail terrorism, which will serve to mobilize domestic and foreign opinion in support of U.S. plans at home and abroad. If Americans react, as they have, by general hysteria, including fear of traveling to Europe where visitors will be at least 100 times as safe as in any American city, this too is a net benefit, for the same reasons.

U.S. Escalation Strategy

The real reasons for the U.S. attack on Libya have nothing to do with self-defense against "terrorist attacks" on U.S. forces in Beirut in October 1983, as Shimon Peres would have it, or any of the other actions attributed rightly or wrongly to Libya, or "self-defense against future attack" in accord with

33. Associated Press, April 21; *New York Times*, April 20; survey of religious reactions, Associated Press, April 17; also April 19, reporting a news conference of 14 religious and community groups in Seattle condemning the bombing in contrast to support for it by the Western Washington Rabbinic Board; Nye, *Boston Globe*, April 16; Rostow, *New York Times*, April 27.

34. On the actual record, very different from the fabrications that dominate U.S. discussion, see *Fateful Triangle*, chapter 3. For a detailed account of Israel's rejectionism under the Labor Party in the crucial 1967-73 period, based on the internal record, see Yossi Beilin, *Mechiro shel Ichud* (Tel Aviv, 1985); as this and other sources demonstrate, the story goes back to the early days of the founding of the state.

35. *Ha'aretz*, June 25, 1982; see *Fateful Triangle*, pp. 200 f., for further quotes and similar analyses by other Israeli commentators, and for a review of the events leading up to the invasion.

36. *New Republic*, January 20, 1986.

the astonishing doctrine proclaimed by the Reagan administration to much domestic acclaim. Libya's terrorism is a minor irritant, but Qaddafi has stood in the way of U.S. plans in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere: supporting Polisario and anti-U.S. groups in the Sudan, forging a union with Morocco, intervening in Chad,[37] and in general interfering with U.S. efforts to forge a "strategic consensus" in the region, and to impose its will elsewhere. These are real crimes, which must be punished.

Furthermore, the Libyan attack had the purpose, and the effect, of preparing opinion at home and abroad for further acts of U.S. violence. The immediate response might be negative, but once absorbed, the level of expectation is heightened and the U.S. can proceed to further escalation.

There are two major areas where such escalation is likely. The first is Central America. While the U.S. proxy army has succeeded in its major task of "forcing [the Sandinistas] to divert scarce resources to the war and away from social programs," as explained in a rare moment of candor by administration officials,[38] it is unlikely that it can "cut out the cancer"; hence the threat of successful independent development in terms that might be meaningful to the suffering population of U.S. client states will remain. Domestic and international pressures prevent the U.S. from attacking directly, as the U.S. attacked South Vietnam in 1962 and later all of Indochina; and the more indirect means of terror, while largely successful in El Salvador, may be inadequate for Nicaragua. It would be natural, then, for the U.S. to move to an arena where it is more likely to prevail: international confrontation. The U.S. has succeeded in cowing most of its allies into refraining from offering any meaningful assistance to Nicaragua, thus largely achieving the intended goal of forcing them to rely on the Soviet bloc for survival. The recent congressional battle over $100 million of aid is basically a sideshow; a lawless administration will find ways of funding its terrorist army somehow, whatever Congress legislates. What is important is a more symbolic victory: congressional authorization for direct CIA involvement and escalation by other means. The obvious means are threats to Soviet and Cuban shipping. Nicaragua would not be able to respond, but the U.S.S.R. and Cuba might. If they do, the U.S. propaganda system can be counted on to react with outrage over this new proof of Communist aggression, allowing the administration to construct an international crisis in which, it may be assumed, the U.S.S.R. will back down, so that Nicaragua will be effectively blockaded. If they do not respond, the same result will be achieved. Of course, the world may go up in smoke, but that is a minor consideration in comparison with the need to excise the cancer. U.S. and European opinion must be prepared for these eventualities. The bombing of Libya turns the ratchet another notch.

The second area where world opinion must be prepared for eventual escalation is the Middle East. The U.S. has blocked political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict at least since 1971, when President Sadat of Egypt made his first proposal for a full peace treaty (offering nothing to the Palestinians, and in almost precise accord with official U.S. policy as well as the international consensus). In the situation of military confrontation that results from U.S.-Israeli rejectionism, Israel cannot permit any combination of Arab states to approach its military power, since it will face the threat of destruction. The Camp David agreements succeeded in excluding the major Arab state, Egypt, from the conflict, thus allowing Israel to expand its steps towards integrating the occupied territories and to attack its northern neighbor. But Syria remains a growing threat, and sooner or later, Israel will have to act to eliminate it. There is substantial war talk in Israel today, generally alleging Syrian belligerency and threat, but concealing the Israeli intention—indeed, need, as long as a political settlement is averted—to strike to eliminate a possible military rival. The U.S. media follow along, as usual.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government surely wants to leave its options open. It would make sense for an Israeli strike against Syria to be accompanied by U.S. bombing, the former presented as a "pre-emptive strike" in "self-defense against future attack," the latter packaged for western consumption as "self-defense" against Syrian-inspired terrorism. The purpose of direct U.S. participation would be to warn the Soviet Union that a global war will result from any attempt on their part to support their Syrian ally. European and U.S. opinion must be prepared for such possible moves. The attack on Libya, and the subsequent propaganda campaigns, help set the stage, leaving the U.S. more free to consider these options if they are later deemed necessary. Again, the likelihood of a nuclear war is not small, but the U.S. has shown repeatedly that it is prepared to face this danger to achieve its ends in the Middle East, as elsewhere. ●

Credit: Associated Press

Angry Libyans at funeral procession in Tripoli, April 18, 1986, for sixteen adults and four children, some of the victims of the U.S. bombing.

37. The first Libyan intervention followed the dispatch of French Foreign Legion forces, advisers and aircraft (Haley, *op. cit.*, n. 14, p. 98), but French intervention in Africa is legitimate, indeed laudatory; as *Business Week* exulted, French forces help "keep West Africa safe for French, American, and other foreign oilmen" (August 10, 1981), and perform similar services elsewhere.

38. Julia Preston, *Boston Globe*, Feb. 9, 1986.

Half a Billion Allocated:
The CIA Chooses a New *Contra* Leader

By Ellen Ray, William Schaap, and Louis Wolf

There were two fantasies pervading Congress last month; one was the notion that the CIA was *not* directing the *contra* forces battling the Sandinista government of Nicaragua; the other was the belief that *only* $100 million was being approved for that vile and illegal war. *CAIB* has confirmed that both ideas are specious.

Controlling the *Contras*

The suggestion that the CIA has been cooling its heels for the past year or two would be fatuous, were it not for the excessive naiveté on the part of so many legislators. Less than three weeks after the June 25 vote, the Reagan administration announced that, although the State Department "would have overall policy direction of the operations," the CIA was being given "day-to-day responsibility for managing rebels' military operations against the Nicaraguan government."[1] One would imagine this was a new assignment for the CIA.

But the CIA has a history of avoiding congressional restrictions, often quite deviously, and the *contra* war has been no exception. It is interesting, though, that in the case of CIA control of the *contras*, developments that were reported on the wire services, and in some newspapers, did not get mentioned in the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*, and most readers, and members of Congress, even if they saw the stories, did not understand the implications of what they read.

At the outset, there were numerous reports in the press that the CIA had a major role in urging upon the various feuding *contra* personalities the formation of an umbrella organization, the Unidad Nicaragüense Opositora (UNO). Moreover, in March of this year, amidst allegations of rampant corruption in UNO, the CIA stepped in to control the feuding and the funds. According to an investigation by Robert Parry and Brian Barger of the Associated Press, first reported on April 5, 1986, the UNO appointed a "Secretary General" to coordinate political and financial operations, to "improve UNO's efficiency and increase the cooperation among the three directors," Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo—whose bickering, cronyism, and graft were becoming major embarrassments. Indeed, the UNO was being accused not only of a failure to achieve unity among the anti-Sandinista forces, but also of representing not the Nicaraguan people, but the U.S. government. The latter charge was, and is, particularly true. The news of the creation of the new position was kept quiet, according to the AP's sources, because "admission of existing problems could undercut President Reagan's request for $100 million in military and other aid." As it turned out, of course, neither these problems, nor very credible reports of massive drug dealing, graft, and illegal weapons trading by *contra* leaders,[2] had any effect on the Congress.

Leonardo Somarriba, Agent

The Secretary General is Leonardo Somarriba, an expatriate Nicaraguan businessman who runs a photocopy store, Sir Speedy, on Brickell Avenue in Miami. The U.S.-educated Somarriba had been a spokesman for the Nicaraguan Business Council, "a group of conservative exiled business leaders" in Miami. In January the council had privately circulated a paper criticizing in particular the sloppy accounting and record keeping of the UNO, defects which led to the February report of the General Accounting Office noting that more than $7 million of the $27 million voted by Congress for "humanitarian aid" was missing. The next month, Somarriba took over as chief executive officer, and a month later, the AP broke the story.

Very few newspapers—and no influential major papers—carried the wire service report. Thus very few people learned that: "Several Nicaraguan exiles said Somarriba had a close working relationship with the CIA. Former FDN [Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the dominant member of UNO] leader Edgar Chamorro said when he was recruited by the CIA into the FDN's directorate in late 1982, Somarriba accompanied a senior CIA official to an initial recruitment meeting in Miami."

CAIB interviewed Chamorro at his home in Key Biscayne. He confirmed the AP report. "Somarriba was with the CIA in Nicaragua," he told us; "he is with the CIA in Miami now," he continued; "and he has been appointed Secretary General of UNO. That means the CIA is controlling that organization. . . . It means the CIA wants to control the organization politically, because they already control it militarily, with Bermudez and Calero. . . . This appointment means that the executive decision making is in the hands of Americans, . . . the executive control of the group comes from Washington, from the CIA—not just Washington, but from the CIA where this man Somarriba has been working very closely with them, that is what I see."

During the first year of the Sandinista government, Somarriba was close to Jorge Salazar, the leader of a business group opposed to the new government. Salazar was killed in November 1980 in a shootout with Sandinista police, who said he was caught with a cache of weapons. Somarriba was then jailed for several weeks and left for Miami when he was freed. According to Chamorro, Somarriba was not only working for

1. *New York Times*, July 12, 1986, p. 1.

2. See the *New York Times*, July 10, 1986, p. B5.



Credit: *Miami Herald*

CIA mystery man Leonardo Somarriba.

the CIA while still in Nicaragua, he was also working for Fidel Angel Chávez Mena, the Foreign Minister of El Salvador. Later, according to Chamorro, Somarriba worked for Chávez Mena in El Salvador as well, helping him to channel CIA funds to the 1984 election campaign of José Napoleón Duarte. Chávez Mena is still a member of Duarte's cabinet.

The Chief Executive Officer

In May Somarriba attended the week-long UNO strategy session in Miami. On Wednesday, May 14, Presidential envoy Philip Habib sat in, and appeared for the press with Calero, Robelo, Cruz, and Somarriba. Somarriba's presence was duly reported by AP, and duly ignored by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. The point of all this, of course, is that the CIA, which supposedly does *not* control the funding of the *contras*, has installed its agent as the Secretary General in control of the very funds in question.

Somarriba's reformist zeal is limited. As he told the AP a few days later (April 13, 1986), "money was used as 'payoffs,' to encourage support among exiles. Some of that is necessary," he said, "but we hope to be minimizing it in the future." From the beginning, Somarriba played down his role. He told the AP reporters that he accepted the characterization of his role as "chief executive officer," and that "better management was needed if UNO was effectively to handle the large amounts of aid that Reagan is requesting." He wanted to create a structure within which the three UNO leaders could work together, but, he said, "I personally have no political ambitions." *CAIB* has learned that there are reports of serious disputes between Somarriba and Calero, who has been angry about both the criticism of FDN and the appointment of Somarriba since the beginning. He, for one, saw Somarriba's appointment as a power shift, because Somarriba, as Chamorro told *CAIB*, has been identified with the more moderate opposition, "a classic CIA technique." While Cruz and Robelo seem willing to put up with Somarriba, Calero's attitude has been described as "petulant, cocky, rude." Whether Calero's powerful position will force some changes remains to be seen.

Slippery Language

Putting aside the wrath of Calero, Somarriba's role and duties are only enhanced by the new law. While the administration has announced, as expected, that the CIA will oversee day-to-day operations, the law bars U.S. citizens employed by the government from working with the *contras* while inside Nicaraguan territory, but explicitly allows the liaison use of non-citizens working for the CIA—known in Agency jargon as Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets, or UCLAs. (Such chauvinist hypocrisy is not unusual in Congress.) The July 7 issue of *Newsweek* magazine reported that the CIA has been unusually active recruiting Spanish-speaking agents, and *CAIB* has learned of such activity in Los Angeles and San Francisco, and in New York and New Jersey.

More surprisingly, *Newsweek* reported that despite the bill's $100 million figure, the CIA "is preparing to provide the rebel forces with covert logistical support, training, communications, and intelligence worth the equivalent of $400 million." The White House spokesperson, Larry Speakes, had "no comment." The State Department's representative, Charles Redman, said, after a day of stonewalling, "The story is wrong."

But if anything, the $400 million figure is somewhat modest. The CIA has had millions of dollars in special "contingency" funds in its *contra* pipeline ever since it organized the FDN in 1981. These funds have continued to flow throughout the operative periods of the Boland Amendment and other attempts to ban the overthrow of the government of Nicaragua.

Congressional Ineptitude

The House did not know what hit them this time. Rep. Chalmers Wylie (Rep.-Ohio), who changed his vote after a lengthy call from the President, admitted he could not name the countries of Central America. After some heavy arm-twisting, the White House won the key vote by the slim margin of 12 votes, 221-209, but there are lingering doubts that many of the members on the winning side grasped the implications of their votes. Virtually all national opinion polls indicate that a substantial majority of the citizenry is opposed to the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, and that they strenuously oppose the introduction of U.S. military personnel into the conflict, something Congress refused to prohibit in the bill which passed.

Shortly before the final vote, Rep. David Obey (Dem.-Wisc.) tried to warn his colleagues: "If anybody really believes this little war that will be conducted under the administration policy will be a minor, little pop-gun affair, I urge you, I beg you, to read the classified annex to this legislation which will describe in detail what kind of equipment and what kinds of activities will be carried out if the administration program prevails."

Terrorism Wins

Obey's warnings ran up against a stone wall. Soon the voting was over. At a CIA-choreographed press conference, the victorious *contra* leaders brushed aside reporters' questions about allegations of continuing wholesale torture, murder, corruption, and drug dealing. Cruz, Robelo, and Calero posed in "I'm a *Contra* Too" tee-shirts and vowed, "Now that America is behind us, we will win." A few days later, on July 5, President Reagan outdid himself. Of the vote to give $100 million to a band of brutal terrorists, he said, "I'm sure it put a smile on the face of the Statue of Liberty." ●

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Compiled by Daniel Brandt.

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An Overview:
U.S. Sponsorship of State Terrorism

By Edward S. Herman

A hegemonic power with enormous technological and financial resources has wide options in the use of both peaceable and violent means to accomplish its ends. The violent means include all of the various forms of terrorism, and the United States as hegemonic power has used—or sponsored the use of—all of them. In most of these modalities the United States is not unique, it is merely quantitatively important, sometimes even supreme, as terrorist and sponsor of terrorism. The United States approaches uniqueness, however, in the use of the nuclear threat as a form of intimidation. The United States is the only country that has actually used nuclear weapons on enemy populations; not just one bomb, but two, destroying two substantial Japanese cities and exterminating several hundred thousand people in the process. It seems clear that this murderous destruction was unnecessary, that Japan was on the very edge of surrender (as was known to U.S. officials), and that no American lives were saved by destroying the two cities.[1] But the dropping of the bombs had the important function of intimidating the Russians, toward which end several hundred thousand Japanese deaths were seen as a small price.

Since Hiroshima, the United States has been alone in regularly brandishing atomic weapons, and on quite a few occasions it has come very near to using them again.[2] The United States continues to refuse to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in warfare. It has innovated continuously to make nuclear weapons tactically usable, and it has spawned a large intellectual and political constituency that has been striving for years to make nuclear war thinkable and a part of working military strategy.[3] With the Reagan administration, we have in power a group in which the nuclear crazies are an integral part of the policy planning apparatus. It is clear that this administration, in talking up and planning to make nuclear war winnable, in its enormous nuclear arms buildup, its placement of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe, and in its aggressive technological forward push, is attempting to achieve the nuclear superiority of the early postwar years. This would allow it to brandish the nuclear threat more credibly, thus permitting the freer use of the more standard modes of domination on a global basis. This is in and of itself a major form of "terrorism."

Another very important form of terrorism used by the United States on a worldwide basis since 1945 has been the organization, sponsorship, and support of rightwing terrorist regimes. The breakup of the colonial empires and the revolutionary and democratic impulses accelerated by World War II posed a major threat to western domination of the Third World. The United States stepped in to fill the gap. Under the guise of "containing" Soviet imperialism,[4] the U.S. took on the role of propping up old regimes or replacing them with the neo-imperialist rule of compradors, military dictators, the free market, and the American Embassy. The policies formerly applicable to the "banana republics" of Central America were extended to the entire world, as the United States took on global "responsibilities."

The primary function of the new comprador and military leaderships was to preserve the main features of the old order, to maintain an open door and friendly climate for foreign investment, and to keep the country as a subordinate within the Free World alliance. Given the income and social inequalities of the old regimes, and the newly unleashed ideas of democracy and opportunity, the "new-old-order" installed by the U.S. required a massive dose of terror to keep the masses in the proper state of apathy. It also demanded tolerance of thievery on a gigantic scale, as the people (compradors and military officers) who were willing to serve as surrogates for a foreign power have been almost uniformly venal. In Guatemala, the Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, pre-Sandinista Nicaragua, Chile, Indonesia, and Zaire (among others), the elites put in power and supported by the West have been not merely brutal terrorists, but rapacious as well. Noam Chomsky and I have referred to the countries they rule as "shakedown states."[5]

The United States has also used the more conventional forms of terrorism such as assassinations, sabotage, and the organization of armed bands and terrorist armies. The attacks on Cuba by the United States provide a remarkable case study in multidimensional state terror combined with the process of "transference"—that is, accusing Cuba of doing precisely what the U.S. is doing *to* Cuba. The record shows: eight *acknowledged* assassination attempts against Fidel Castro;[6] extensive sabotage of shipping, crops and animals, warehouse stores, terminals, oil facilities, and power stations; raids to disrupt activities

1. See Robert L. Messer, "New evidence on Truman's decision," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August 1985, pp. 50-56 for a good review and citations. Characteristically, President Truman lied in stating on the occasion of the Hiroshima bombing that the attack had been made on a military site.

2. As Dan Ellsberg has said: "The notion common to nearly all Americans that 'no nuclear weapons have been used since Nagasaki' is mistaken. . . . Again and again, generally in secret from the American public, U.S. nuclear weapons *have* been used, for quite different purposes: in the precise way that a gun is used when you point it at someone's head in a direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled." "Introduction" to E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, eds., *Protest and Survive* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), p. 1. Ellsberg goes on to describe a substantial number of cases in which the U.S. threatened to use nuclear weapons.

3. Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush & Nuclear War* (New York: Random House, 1982).

4. In 1968 I gave the following definition of Containment: "The exclusion of lesser powers from areas in which we intend to establish hegemony. Syn. Expansion." *The Great Society Dictionary* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Resistance, 1968), p. 8.

5. *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Boston: South End Press, 1979), pp. 61-66.

6. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Rep. No. 94-465, Select Committee to Study Government Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 1975, pp. 75 ff.

and kill; and at one point the organization of an abortive proxy invasion.[7] The campaign of subversion "began virtually at the moment of revolutionary victory in 1959, stretched through the 1960s into the 1970s and endures, vestigially at least, to this day. . . ."[8] After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, the Kennedy administration organized a massive subversive effort under the code name "Operation Mongoose," which involved "continuous sabotage raids" and a major campaign of disinformation,[9] which regularly charged Cuban subversion at the very moment that the United States was engaged in a *real* and massive subversion operation against Cuba (and many other Latin American states).[10] The rightwing Cuban refugee terror network, which came into existence in large measure as a result of CIA training for anti-Cuba operations, continued long after 1961 as an apparatus of terror employed not only against Cuba but other enemies of "freedom."[11]

This U.S. secret war against Cuba was not unique. There is a long record of U.S.-sponsored armed bands and attacks on the countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and the Indochinese states, among others.[12] The U.S. sponsorship of the *contras* follows a long tradition in Central America as well. Also in a long tradition has been the U.S. outcry about somebody else's "terrorism" coincident with a massive application of terrorism by the United States or one of its proxies.

The sponsorship of terrorist armies to invade Guatemala in 1954 (successful), Cuba in 1961 (unsuccessful), and Nicaragua 1981-86 (unsuccessful) has had two other notable features. First, all three were cases of revolutions from below, with governments coming into power that addressed the basic needs of a formerly depressed and repressed majority.[13] This process of social democratization has been consistently horrifying and intolerable to the U.S. elite. That elite is happy only with elite rule and amenable clients. The threat of a "demonstration effect" of successful performance in the majority interest is also frightening. What if the masses in the other countries of the empire were to get the idea that they were not necessarily born to serve their masters? A second notable feature of at least two major cases of U.S.-sponsored invasions—Guatemala and Nicaragua—is that they displayed a level of political freedom and bourgeois democracy that have been rare in Central America. With the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, pluralism and bourgeois democracy disappeared. The well-established pattern demonstrates that U.S. "counter-terrorism" is antithetical to *political* as well as social democracy.

Mechanisms of Support of State Terrorism

The United States has built up and aided the forces of state terrorism in four ways: by the protection and rehabilitation of the fascist cadres defeated in World War II, by outright or proxy invasions to install or protect terrorist clients, by subversion aiming at the overthrow of disfavored (often democratic) governments, and by "supplying repression" via financial aid, training, and arms supply to security forces and military dictators. Of these, invasions have been important but they are relatively familiar and obvious in character.

(1) *Rehabilitating fascists.* During and immediately after World War II the United States was busily and aggressively organizing forces for the struggle against the Left. A central feature of this process was the protection and rehabilitation of fascists. There were show trials at Nuremberg and elsewhere, and some top leaders were executed, but at the very same time large numbers of fascists were being protected and positioned for Cold War service. Most of these were not scientists with scarce skills—they were mainly bureaucrats and army and intelligence personnel, many of them mass murderers. This was worldwide in scope: in Thailand, under U.S. influence, a military dictatorship was allowed to take power headed by Phibum Songkram, who was (in the words of a former CIA analyst) "the first pro-Axis dictator to regain power after the war."[14] In Greece, the pre-war pro-Nazi forces were gradually pushed to the fore and installed in power by the British and the United States, who eventually consolidated that power by means of a savage counter-insurgency war.[15] The large-scale protection of Nazi and fascist activists and killers is now well established,[16] although the western public has been spared the details. This protection included the extensive fabrication of documents and the hiding and spiriting away of fascist cadres. Many fascist killers were relocated in Latin America and played an important role in the development of the National Security States. Others were allowed to escape to Spain and Portugal, both countries befriended and protected by the United States and other members of the Free World.

The nominal denazification and general protection and rehabilitation of fascists provided a structural base for state terrorism in a variety of ways. In cases like Thailand and Greece, terror was an immediate instrument of the reinstalled fascists. Elsewhere in Western Europe the fascist cadres were positioned within the NATO framework to resume their traditional role in case the Left proved strong enough to really threaten to attain power. Greece in 1967 and Chile in 1973 were models of how terror states could be quickly brought into service under U.S. auspices in the face of liberal or radical challenges.

The rehabilitated fascist cadres have also served as a pool or reserve army of counterrevolutionary operatives for use both in

7. For many details on all of these efforts, see Warren Hinckle and William Turner, *The Fish Is Red: The Story of The Secret War Against Castro* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981).

8. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

9. "All major CIA stations abroad assigned at least one case officer full time to gathering intelligence, trying to turn the host country against Cuba, and encouraging the defection of Cuban officials. Reports from this far-flung network were funneled to the Miami station for correlation and action." *Ibid.*, p. 113.

10. For many examples, see Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (New York: Bantam, 1976).

11. Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), pp. 65-69.

12. John Loftus, *The Belarus Secret* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1983), *passim*; Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell, 1980), Chapter 4 ("Special Operations").

13. One group of Central American experts speaks of the Sandinista aims as follows: "The FSLN sought to fill the political and institutional vacuum by creating new political structures that responded to its agenda of social transformation. That agenda defined national priorities according to 'the logic of the majority,' which meant that Nicaragua's poor majority would have access to, and be the primary beneficiaries of, public programs." *Report of the Latin American Studies Association Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General Election of November 4, 1984*, pp. 4-5.

14. Frank Darling, *Thailand and the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 65.

15. Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), Chapter 8 ("The Military Solution").

16. See "Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA," special issue of *CAIB*, Number 25, Winter 1986, esp. Peter Dale Scott, "How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other"; also, Magnus Linklater, Isabel Hinton and Neal Ascherson, *The Fourth Reich: Klaus Barbie and the Neo-Fascist Connection* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984).

Europe and the Third World. They have served as leaders and soldiers in colonial wars (Angola, Algeria, Rhodesia, Vietnam), in building up fascist terrorist networks in Latin America, and as organizers of terror in Europe itself. Much of the terrorism in Italy has come out of neofascist elements drawing inspiration and support from P-2 and the intelligence services most closely linked to the CIA and NATO.[17]

(2) *Subversion.* Another major mechanism of U.S. support of state terror has been by means of subversion. This term is used to describe actions taken to discredit and destabilize opposed governments, including the use of disinformation, economic pressure and harassment, manipulating the institutional environment of the victim by bribery and the discriminatory use of aid, and encouraging and supporting conspiracies and coups. The United States is so powerful that these devices are used, and hardly even remarked upon, against its larger allies, many virtually occupied countries—economically and militarily—with large numbers of locals serving the interests of the great foreign power. At the time of the overthrow of the elected government of Brazil in 1964, for example, the United States was doing the following:[18] (1) it had bribed hundreds of local politicians in a scandal so great that a Parliamentary Commission was forced to investigate the matter;[19] (2) it had numerous journalists on its payroll, subsidized newspapers and magazines, and for 90 days before the election even rented the editorial page of Rio de Janeiro's evening newspaper; (3) it funded Brazilian thinktanks that poured forth a flood of books and pamphlets dispensing conservative ideology and disinformation; (4) a U.S. corporation, Time, Inc., illegally controlled the largest Brazilian TV station, and dispensed strong pro-coup propaganda; (5) the U.S. government-funded American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) worked to depoliticize and weaken the union movement, and actively supported the 1964 coup; (6) U.S. officials encouraged the military establishment to oust the legal government, and the United States even had ships offshore as moral support for the leaders of the coup.

U.S. dissemination of propaganda and disinformation intended to destabilize, and plotting with conspirators to displace legal governments, is even more extensive in lesser client states.[20] Brazil is a good illustration because it is the most powerful state in Latin America; despite which the United States manipulated and subverted its institutions, politicians and military leaders virtually without restraint.

U.S. subversion frequently involves the use of money to buy people off. The money is often in the form of loans or gifts that reward "friends" and allow them to pay off *their* friends and buy support at home.[21] The most remarkable form of subversion by buy-off is undoubtedly the employment of the AFL-CIO, through the AIFLD, as an instrument for bribing labor leaders in client states. Dispensing large sums, the AIFLD has coopted hundreds of Third World union leaders, inducing them to stick to "bread-and-butter" unionism and eschew politics (especially left politics) and split away from the politicized unions. AIFLD has regularly helped put in place anticommunist and repressive regimes that have served well the needs of multinational corporations and U.S. foreign policy, but which have been rabidly antiunion. AIFLD, in short, is a literally "subversive" intruder into any state in which it is allowed to function.[22]

(3) *Supplying repression.* A further major mechanism for U.S. support of state terrorism has been the buildup, financing, arming, and training of Third World police, intelligence, and military personnel. This is in fact a primary form of subversion, in which a deliberate attempt is made to bribe and brainwash the principal armed groups within dependent societies and make them *de facto* servants of a foreign power. This has been done with a quite clearly subversive purpose: to increase the power of the armed forces, to manipulate them ideologically into serving as an anticommunist and antipopulist force, and to train them in counterinsurgency (CI) techniques that would also serve U.S. objectives. While the policy had important antecedents, it went into a rapid growth phase after the triumph of Fidel Castro in 1959. It flourished in the 1960s with the development of CI doctrine and the notion of *preventive* CI.[23] We would prevent Castros and Ho Chi Minhs by putting in place anti-radical political and armed forces who would nip insurgencies in the bud.[24]

CI strategy was initially tied in with a reformist "hearts and minds" complement (such as the Alliance for Progress), but the reformist component has invariably been submerged by CI, for a number of reasons. One is that CI is inherently reactionary, as it rests on an attempt to take advantage of superior state force without regard to underlying issues or justice. It employs power and advanced technology in areas such as tools of interrogation, and applies them to poor people in revolt. With the "superior" races seeking submission of the inferior on the basis of force alone, this is a system in which escalating barbarity is "built-in." A second reason for the submergence of "reform" is that reformers are potential radicals, or are willing to tolerate the continued existence of radicals,[25] so that they are immediately suspect and have often been murdered in preventive CI practice. Third, CI doctrine with an antireformist bias

17. Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection* (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), Chapter 4 ("The Rome-Washington Connection"); Gianni Flamini, *Il partito del golpe: Le strategie della tensione e del terrore dal primo centrosinistra organico al sequestro Moro*, Vol. I (Ferrara: Italo Bovolenta, 1981), Chapter 1.

18. See Jan K. Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), esp. Part II.

19. The Commission's work was, of course, ended following the coup. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

20. Several dramatic illustrations are given, with extensive details, in Philip Agee, *op. cit.*, n. 10.

21. Just prior to the Italian elections of April 1948, the U.S. Congress voted a special Marshall Plan subsidy of $227 million for Italy, much of it transmitted secretly to the Christian Democratic Party and split-off trade unions organized under U.S. sponsorship. See Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, *Gli americani in Italia* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), p. 298. Vast sums in U.S. gifts and loans, and loans from organizations like the World Bank, have gone to U.S. friends like Suharto and Marcos, despite clear evidence of a huge corruption drain. The services rendered by these friends have been substantial, however. See text below on the implicit trade-offs.

22. Jonathan Kwitny, *Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World* (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), pp. 341-54; Tim Shorrock and Kathy Selvaggio, "Which Side Are You On, AAFLI?," *The Nation*, February 15, 1986.

23. See Michael McClintock, *The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador*, Vol. 1 (London: Zed Press, 1985), Part I ("The US and the Doctrine of Counter-Insurgency").

24. This was the language used in a speech on "The U.S. Role in Stability Operations," included as a standard speech in a "Speechmaker Kit" used by the army in the late 1960s. Upheavals from below "can be controlled if we are successful in nipping every Communist insurgency in the bud. This is what we hope to do." Quoted by J. W. Fulbright, *The Pentagon Propaganda Machine* (New York: Liveright, 1970), p. 82.

25. One of Juan Bosch's critical failings from the standpoint of the Kennedy liberals was his unwillingness to deport or otherwise persecute Communists, which was viewed as a sign of his lack of fealty to higher Free World principles. See Piero Gliejeses, *The Dominican Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978), pp. 87-89.

follows from the primacy of anticommunism in U.S. ideology. Political risks in the United States are incurred by supporting reformers who seek independence, who do business with radical states, or who take radical action like land reform at the expense of U.S. interests. "Losing a country to Communism" or even to a radical and/or independent regime is politically costly. No penalties are associated with support of a murderous rightwing regime that remains within the Free World. A fourth factor is that the groups who are the natural allies of anti-radical strategies in the client states are reactionary and anti-reformist. Doing business with them may require tolerance of the liquidation of reform and reformers.

Finally, the U.S. military, economic, and political elites who are close to and implement Third World policies are also often reactionary, and they invariably put serviceability to U.S. interests ahead of all other considerations. Thus as a practical matter fascists are preferred either on principle or for "pragmatic" reasons as a lesser evil. The United States has the great advantage of having numerous liberals who can expound on the virtues of liberty and reformism with great eloquence, and pretend that these are operative values in U.S. policy toward the Third World, while their superiors and the armed services train and put into place people like Pinochet, Castelo Branco, Massera and Viola, Castillo Armas and Rios Montt, and numerous others.[26]

The U.S. training and buildup of client police and armed forces has been historically unique in scope and scale. Between 1950 and 1979 U.S. military aid programs transferred a huge $107.3 billion in arms and ammunition to various U.S. clients, in addition to some $121 billion in arms sales. Between 1973 and 1980 the United States sold $66.8 billion in arms to Third World countries, including vast quantities of firearms, chemical munitions, helicopters, and other police gear useful in CI and repression.[27] Since 1950 the United States has trained over 500,000 military personnel from 85 countries in the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama and in several hundred other military schools and bases within the United States and abroad. Under police training programs that began in 1954 and terminated in 1975, over 7,500 police officers received regularly training in U.S. schools, and over a million regular policeman have been given training abroad. Large quantities of arms and equipment were also transferred to foreign police departments. A large investment was made in improving police and military communications systems in client states, oriented to CI efficiency and control of protests and other disorders. Training was provided in the design and manufacture of home-made bombs and assassination devices, which was put to practical use by regular and irregular forces in the National Security States.[28] Training in advanced "methods of interrogation" were also offered in U.S. programs, with dire consequences (as discussed below).

U.S. training has had a very substantial political content, one expert noting that it was "aimed less at military expertise than . . . at cultivation of internal political attitudes favorable to the United States."[29] It has focused heavily on the menace of Castro, the evils and omnipresence of communism, methods of CI, and the merits of foreign investment as the route to development. Political scientist Frederick Nunn has stated that "subject to United States military influence on anticommunism the [Third World] professional army officer became hostile to any form of populism."[30] There is a large body of evidence that U.S. training has given not the slightest nod to democracy and human rights; instead, *it provided all the essential ingredients of National Security State ideology*. The rise of the National Security State (NSS) in the U.S. sphere of influence was not fortuitous.

Terror Outcomes

As already suggested, the massive U.S. military aid and training programs, and other forms of support to states such as South Africa, had important consequences.

(1) *Military takeovers and the rise of the National Security State*. There were 18 military takeovers in Latin America between 1960 and 1968. These coups and displacements of freely elected governments by military regimes were a predictable result of the buildup and "education" of the Latin armed forces. Many were led by U.S. trainees, and most of them were supported by the United States. The key Brazilian coup, for example, was led by the so-called "Sorbonne group," closest to the United States in personal affiliation and training background.[31] The Brazilian coup plans were known in advance by U.S. officials (who, of course, never warned the legally elected government), and the coup itself was greeted enthusiastically by the Kennedy liberals in Washington. (A classic remark by U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon, was that the Brazilian coup was "the single most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century."[32]) These attitudes were not exceptional, as evidenced by the fact that U.S. aid has moved fairly consistently in an inverse relationship to democratic and human rights conditions. In Table 1 we can see that as democratic conditions deteriorate (column 2, minus sign) there is a distinct tendency for total U.S. aid and multinational credits to increase markedly. In a more elaborate quantitative analysis of this relationship, Lars Schoultz found that the correlations between U.S. aid and human rights violations "are uniformly positive."[33] That is, the worse the human rights conditions, the greater the aid.

One can also see on Table 1 that as human rights conditions deteriorate, factors affecting the "climate of investment," like tax laws and labor repression, improve from the viewpoint of the multinational corporation. This suggests an important line

26. Given the political costs of a Communist assumption of power in a client state, and the fact that most liberals have also internalized the primacy of anticommunism, the policies of liberals who achieve power are often indistinguishable from those of the reactionaries. Johnson and his crew fought desperately to keep the social democrat Juan Bosch out of power in the Dominican Republic. The Kennedy liberals were enthusiastic at the military coup in Brazil and displacement of a social democratic government. A major spurt in the growth of National Security States in Latin America took place under Kennedy and Johnson.

27. Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson, *Supplying Repression* (Washington, Institute for Policy Studies, 1981), pp. 44-45; Michael Klare, *American Arms Supermarket* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), p. 9. Based on export licenses issued for sales to Third World police alone—excluding the larger volumes sold to armies and paramilitary groups—Michael Klare found that between September 1976 and May 1979, U.S. firms supplied the following: 615,612 gas grenades, 126,622 revolvers, 51,906 rifles and machine guns, 12,605 canisters of chemical Mace, and 56 million rounds of ammunition. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

28. See Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, *op. cit.*, n. 11, pp. 128-31; Klare and Arnson, *Supplying Repression*, *op. cit.*, n. 27, p. 6.

29. Dr. R. K. Baker, quoted in Miles Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counter-revolution in the Third World* (Boston: Lexington, 1972), p. 31.

30. Quoted in Jan Black, *op. cit.*, n. 18, p. 194.

31. See *ibid.*, pp. 176-78.

32. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 55.

33. "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions," *Comparative Politics*, January 1981, p. 162.

Table 1
U.S. Aid, Investment Climate, and Human Rights in Ten Countries *

Country	Strategic Political Dates[1] (1)	Positive (+) or Negative (−) Effects on Democracy (2)	(−) means an increased use of torture or death squads (3)	(−) means an increase in No. of political prisoners (4)	Improvement in Investment Climate: tax laws eased (+) (5a)	Improvement in Investment Climate: labor repressed (+) (5b)	Economic Aid (% change) (6)	Military Aid (% change) (7)	(6) + (7) (% change) (8)	U.S. and Multinational Credits (% change) (9)	Total Aid (8) + (9) (% change) (10)
Brazil	1964	−	−	−	+	+	+ 14	− 40	− 7	+ 180	+ 112
Chile	1973	−	−	−	+	+	+ 558	− 8	+ 259	+ 1,079	+ 770
Dominican Rep.	1965	−	−	NA	+	+	+ 57	+ 10	+ 52	+ 305	+ 133
Guatemala	1954	−	−	NA	+	+	NA	NA	NA	NA	+ 5,300
Indonesia	1965	−	−	−	+	NA	− 81	− 79	− 81	+ 653	+ 62
Iran	1953	−	−	−	+	+	NA	NA	NA	NA	+ 900
Philippines	1972	−	−	−	+	+	+ 204	+ 67	+ 143	+ 171	+ 161
South Korea	1972	−	−	−	+	+	− 52	− 56	− 55	+ 183	9
Thailand	1973	+	+	NA	−	−	− 63	− 64	− 64	+ 218	+ 5
Uruguay	1973	−	−	−	+	+	− 11	+ 9	− 2	+ 32	+ 21

Sources:

1. Information on torture and political prisoners mostly from the *Amnesty International Report on Torture*, 1975 and *The Amnesty International Report, 1975-76*, 1976. Supplemented with data from newspaper articles, journals, and books on the specific countries. Data on investment climate largely from articles, journals, and books on the specific countries.

2. Data on aid taken from *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants* and *Assistance from International Organizations*, A.I.D., 1972 and 1976 editions, for years 1962-1975. Data previous to 1962 taken from *Historical Statistics of the United States*, Bicentennial Edition, Dept. of Commerce, 1975.

* Reproduced from Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, p.43.

of causation. Military dictatorships tend to improve the investment climate, and the multinational corporate community, and the U.S. government, are very sensitive to this factor. Military dictators enter into a tacit joint venture arrangement with Free World leaders: They will keep the masses quiet, maintain an open door to multinational investment, and provide bases and otherwise serve as loyal clients. In exchange, they will be aided and protected against their own people, and allowed to loot public property. Marcos was loyally supported by the United States for more than a decade on this reciprocal basis. The U.S. distancing in 1986 clearly had nothing to do with Marcos' longstanding fundamental behavior patterns. It is just that he had ceased to be able to keep the population quiet any longer, which was an important part of the bargain. Thus, suddenly, the U.S. media discovered that he steals and is not a good democrat.

(2) *U.S. aid and the growth of torture*. Torture has had what Amnesty International calls "a cancerous growth" in recent decades. Since the death of Stalin in 1953 it has declined markedly in the East. It has been a growth industry in the West. What is more, this terrible and dehumanizing form of violence is almost exclusively an instrument of *state* terror.[34] That it should have grown dramatically as an instrument of state terror while the new concern over something called "terror" has been restricted to non-state terror, reinforces the point that the powerful define terrorism to their own advantage and independently of the substance of terror.

Table 2 shows the relationship between U.S. aid and training for 15 countries using torture on an administrative basis in the 1970s. A more comprehensive overview shows that of 35 countries using systematic torture in the 1970s, 26 (or 74%) were clients of the United States.[35] While these results have not been updated in detail, despite the ebbs and flows of the past decade there have not been any major changes in pattern.[36]

The linkage between U.S. aid and parent-client relationship and the use of torture is not coincidental. We have seen that the installation and support of repressive regimes has been functional. The United States is also wealthy, and can provide its clients with the best and latest in methods and tools of interrogation. There is a great deal of evidence of U.S. training in methods of torture and provision of torture technology, which have been diffused throughout the system of U.S. client states. Electronic methods of torture, used extensively in Vietnam, have been adapted throughout the U.S. sphere of influence. A. J. Langguth claims that the CIA advised the Brazilian military on the limits that would prevent premature death in the use of field telephones for interrogation.[37] A recently published interview with a Salvadoran death squad officer shows that officials from the Salvadoran police and intelligence services have received intensive training in interrogation methods from the

34. "Torture today is essentially a state activity." Amnesty International, *Report on Torture*, p. 22.

35. See Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection*, Frontispiece and notes. Parent-client relationship was based primarily on receipt of military training and significant flows of direct economic and military aid. For more details, and the criteria used in determining countries using torture on an administrative basis, see p. 361.

36. See Amnesty International, *Torture in the 1980s* (New York: AI, 1984).

37. *Hidden Terrors* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), p. 139. This book gives substantial evidence of U.S. training in and support of torture in a number of Latin American states.

Table 2

U.S. Military, Police and Economic Aid to Countries Using Torture on an Administrative Basis in the 1970s[1] *

(Figures in Millions of Dollars)

	Military Assistance[2] (1946-1979)	Commercial Arms Exports[3] (1950-1980)	No. of Military Personnel Trained by U.S.[4] (1950-1980)	Police Aid[5] (1973-1981)	Bilateral U.S. Economic Aid[6] (1946-1979)	International Aid[7] (1946-1980)
Argentina[8]	263.6	90.4	4,017	.45	199.1	2,946.7
Bolivia	80.7	4.28	4,896	15.78	801.8	1,027.2
Brazil	640.0	83.31	8,659	.77	2,424.1	9,080.6
Chile	217.0	8.76	6,883	.14	1,163.1	1,046.6
Colombia	240.9	19.40	8,349	34.17	1,340.7	4,095.6
Dominican Republic	43.0	2.59	4,269	—	589.4	733.9
Guatemala	41.5	5.09	3,334	—	417.4	703.5
Haiti	5.9	1.87	643	—	251.8	305.0
Mexico	.1	12.97	1,003	95.1	2,691.9	5,807.3
Nicaragua	32.4	4.24	1,003	—	298.9	537.1
Peru	239.7	25.63	8,160	8.4	609.3	1,434.1
Paraguay	30.3	2.45	2,018	.09	177.8	629.1
Uruguay	89.2	1.67	2,806	—	159.5	632.3
Venezuela[8]	152.3	60.33	5,540	—	201.1	657.0

[1] For the concept and criteria of torture on an administrative basis, see Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, frontispiece and explanatory footnotes.

[2] Agency for International Development, *Congressional Presentation, Fiscal Year 1982*, Annex III (3), Latin America and the Caribbean.

[3] U.S. Department of Defense, *Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1982*.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson, *Supplying Repression*, IPS, 1981, p.3. This column refers to police aid provided for a brief period under the International Narcotics Control Program. The much larger Public Safety Program supplied $324 million of arms and training to Third World police between 1961 and 1973.

[6] See footnote 2.

[7] Ibid.

[8] The data source for both Argentina and Venezuela, for military assistance, bilateral, and international economic aid categories was: US A.I.D., *US Overseas Loans and Grants*, July 1, 1945-Sept. 30, 1979.

* Reproduced from Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, p.129.

United States, including advice on the use of torture.[38] The U.S. official position has always been that U.S. police training stresses "humane" methods of interrogation, as well as greater police efficiency, but there has been a remarkable correlation between the coming of such training and the emergence of death squads and the rise of systematic torture. U.S. Congressman George Miller recently released a May 19, 1970 Airgram from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala to the State Department, reporting on the torture and assassination activities of a Guatemalan death squad made up of security personnel. Scrawled on the top of the first page of this document from an unnamed Foreign Service officer was the statement: "Jack—This is what we were afraid of with increased public safety support."[39]

In its *Report on Torture*, Amnesty International noted that torture came to Greece with the 1967 coup of the Colonels, whose leaders were trained and supported by the CIA and U.S. Army. AI points out that the United States regularly apologized for the torture regime, because it liked what it was doing in general.[40] AI noted a "seeming paradox"—that "never has there been a stronger or more universal consensus on the total inadmissibility of the practice of torture: at the same time the practice of torture has reached epidemic proportions."[41] The solution to the paradox is simple: terrorism, as we have seen, is defined in accordance with the requirements of power. Just as power permits the exclusion of South Africa and Guatemala from the category of "terrorist states," so that same power may exclude countries using institutionalized torture from the list of terrorist states and their practices from the manipulated consciousness of western publics. The premier terrorist as portrayed in the U.S. media during the period of the worst excesses of the Argentinean regime of organized torture (1976-81)[42] was *Libya*. Argentina was a slightly troublesome friend, not a terrorist state.[43]

(3) *U.S. aid and training and the spread of the death squad and "disappearances"*. Latin America has been unique in modern world politics in recent decades in developing an institution called the "death squad" and in the recrudescence of the phenomenon of "disappearances." The death squad is a sub rosa group of killers, who abduct enemies of the state and frequently torture and kill them and cause them to "disappear." Their function is to kill and intimidate without attribution to the official forces of the state. U.S. officials generally

38. Allan Nairn, "Confessions of a Death Squad Officer," *The Progressive*, March 1986, p. 28.

39. Quoted in Kai Bird and Max Holland, "Capitol Letter," *The Nation*, December 14, 1985.

40. *Report on Torture* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975), p. 81.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

42. At its peak, Argentina had at least 60 separate detention centers in which torture was regularly employed. See Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, *op. cit.* n. 11, pp. 112-13.

43. On the modes of apologetics and evasions on Argentina in the U.S. press, see Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection*, *op. cit.*, n. 5, pp. 263-70.

accept the claims of the client states that the "death squads" are unconnected with the state, as this allows them to rationalize support for the state committing the organized murders. The claim is ludicrous—the evidence is clear that the death squads are usually made up of off-duty and irregular official forces and are under the control of the state[44]— but the acceptance of these claims by U.S. officials shows the essentially collective and supportive relations between the United States and clients employing this mode of terror.

The death squad spread throughout Latin America in the 1960s and 70s. It terminated in Nicaragua with the Sandinista triumph, and was ended or greatly reduced in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay as a result of the recession in military rule in those states. It is still important to recognize that it became very widespread in the U.S. sphere of influence, and that its rapid growth was closely correlated with U.S. aid and training (see Table 3). The death squad emerged in the Dominican Republic immediately after the U.S. invasion and intensified training of 1965-66. It emerged in Brazil immediately after the U.S.-sponsored 1964 coup. It came to Guatemala after the reestablishment of close U.S hegemony in 1954, and especially after the influx of Green Berets and CI training in 1966-67.

"Disappearances" have been a continent-wide phenomenon in Latin America. This horrendous development has brought forth groups of relatives of the victims in over a dozen Latin American states, who have held a series of Conferences of Relatives of the Disappeared each year since 1981. (These conferences have been essentially ignored in the Free World press.) It is estimated that the number of disappeared persons in Latin America since 1960 now exceeds 100,000, including over 35,000 in Guatemala alone. There is a close correlation between death squad activity and disappearances, and thus between U.S. aid and training and disappearances as well. It should be noted that the decline in death squad activity and disappearances in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay was in no way attributable to U.S. policy or pressures—it came, in fact, from the catastrophic failures of the U.S.-supported military regimes and their inability to retain open power.[45] In an area of intense U.S. interest and activity like Central America, the death squad, disappearances, and torture have taken on new life. In El Salvador, for example, the enlarged U.S. interest beginning in 1979 led to a huge surge in death squad and regular army killing of civilians. This has been transformed in the last two years to only "moderate" death squad activity, but even more civilian deaths via an aggressive CI and aerial war on the countryside. Honduras, increasingly occupied by the United States in the 1980s, has joined the list of countries now subjected to disappearances.[46]

(4) *Escalated "surrogate" terrorism.* One of the purposes of U.S. sponsorship of conservative and counterrevolutionary states, and training of security forces within states, has been to establish surrogates, who could function as regional gendarmes. The Shah of Iran and Israel in the Middle East, South Africa and France in Africa, Brazil in Latin America, have been notable instruments of the surrogate strategy. Some have fallen by the wayside, but the strategy is very much alive and new candidates will be mobilized in the future, even though the United States is positioning itself more and more for "open" covert action and direct attack under the guise of "counter-terrorism." Since the coming into power of Reagan, the violence of the surrogates has escalated markedly. The suffering produced by surrogate state terror vastly exceeds that inflicted by the retail terrorists, who kill on a smaller scale and do not regularly torture their victims.

Conclusion

The western view is that if Libya or the Soviet Union train and give (or sell) guns to somebody, they are accountable for the behavior of their trainees or buyers of their weapons. As usual, this reasoning is not applied symmetrically. The United States is the greatest trainer and supplier of arms in world history, and the acceleration of its activity as trainer-supplier in the 1960s and 1970s was associated with the emergence of an extensive network of military dictatorships and National Security States. The growth of torture and disappearances was largely attributable to the workings of this *real* terror network, and in recent years the mass slaughters by major U.S. surrogates—Israel and South Africa—have been major contributors to quantitatively substantial world terrorism. The escalation of U.S. intervention in Central America, notably in aiding the *contras* and the "death squad democracy" of El Salvador, have also been major contributions to terrorist violence.

The coming into power of the Reagan administration was also associated with a huge arms buildup and attempt to make the nuclear threat more credible and nuclear war winnable. This is an important form of terrorism in itself; but its main function is to make it easier for the United States and its surrogates to employ conventional forces and to support "freedom fighters" like Savimbi and the Nicaraguan *contras* on a worldwide basis. This is a new and dangerous phase of U.S. imperial expansion. What is most frightening is that the Big Lies that cover over the Reagan policies of unconstrained arms escalation and counterrevolution—in the names of "counter-terrorism" and "freedom"—have been effective, and western publics have been made confused, fearful, and thus manageable. The rightward drift of European politics, partly a response to U.S. power and pressures, has reduced the constraints on the United States. The West is being mobilized for a new crusade against progressive change in the Third World.

In *The Real Terror Network*, written in 1981, I pointed out that Reagan's policies would not only greatly enlarge state terrorism, his parochial and repressive policies at home and abroad and refusal to address real problems would generate more terrorism from below (retail terrorism). "This natural result of greed, shortsightedness and stupidity will then be used to justify greater state violence, which will be wrapped up in an 'antiterrorist' flag. Rightwing ideologues create retail terrorists and are then quite prepared to kill them."[47] This is the ultimate Orwellism: Those who terrorize the most are able to take the puny responses of their victims and use these to justify their own further excesses. It is a feedback system that can only be fought by a determined effort to understand the reality, to call it by its right names, and to organize to contest the hegemony of the dominant terrorists. ●

44. See esp. Amnesty International, *"Disappearances": A Workbook* (New York: AI, 1981), chapter 8.

45. See Edward S. Herman and James Petras, "'Resurgent Democracy' In Latin America: Myth and Reality," *New Left Review*, Number 154, Nov.-Dec. 1985.

46. Estimates of disappearances in Honduras ranging from 147-200 are given in "Human Rights Watch," *Latinamerica Press*, March 17, 1986, and James LeMoyne, "CIA Accused of Tolerating Killings in Honduras," *New York Times*, February 14, 1986.

47. Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, *op. cit.*, n. 11, p. 213.

Israeli-South African Collaboration

By Jack Colhoun*

Over the last decade the world community has increasingly ostracized South Africa's white minority regime. Arms embargoes, economic sanctions, bans on the transfer of nuclear and other high technology have been applied to compel South Africa to dismantle its racist system of apartheid. But at the same time a triangular strategic partnership of Israel, South Africa, and the U.S. has developed to cushion the apartheid state from the full force of these sanctions.

To understand the Israeli relationship with South Africa, it is useful to put it in the context of Israel's growing involvement in the Third World. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, a former professor at the Univeristy of Haifa who now teaches at Columbia University, writes "Consider any Third World area that has been a trouble spot in the past ten years and you will discover Israeli officers and weapons implicated in the conflict—supporting American interests and helping what they call 'the defense of the West.' " Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua under the Somoza dictatorship are examples.

"In South Africa," Beit-Hallahmi observes, "Israel is actively involved in defending what Washington sees as 'a strategic outpost'—with the complicity and encouragement of the U.S. In this case, although the U.S. is committed to the survival of the South African regime, Washington feels that the overt support it can give to South Africa is severely limited by world opinion."[1]

But, Beit-Hallahmi notes, "Israel's role in South Africa is qualitatively different from its role elsewhere."[2] Israel's investments in South Africa, the burgeoning volume of trade between the two countries and their extensive sharing of high technology and military experience has resulted in a unique network of mutual support.

Extensive Trade

In *The Unnatural Alliance: Israel and South Africa*, James Adams points out, "While it is impossible to place an accurate figure on the true total volume [of trade between the two countries], it is probable that when all trade is taken into account, Israel may be South Africa's biggest trading partner."[3] Economic relations between the two countries are shrouded in secrecy, says Adams, an executive of the London *Sunday Times*.

According to International Monetary Fund statistics for 1983, South African exports to Israel totaled $142 million, while Israeli exports to South Africa amounted to $69 million.[4] But these numbers don't include Israel's secret arms trade with South Africa, or South Africa's export of raw diamonds to Israel.

"South Africa stands out as the single largest customer [of Israeli weapons]," Aaron Klieman, a political scientist at Tel Aviv University, concludes in his book *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*. "It is thought to have been the purchaser of 35% of all sold in the years 1970-79."[5] The Tel Aviv regime doesn't allow much information to reach the public about its weapons sales, especially those to South Africa, which are in defiance of the U.N.'s 1963 and 1977 arms boycotts of the apartheid state.

"It is believed that Israel currently gets 50% of its diamonds from South Africa," Adams reveals. "South Africa currently exports in excess of $100 million of uncut gems to Israel each year, and it has been a steady and lucrative market for both parties." The diamond polishing industry is a mainstay of the Israeli economy. Israel's foreign sales of polished diamonds in 1983 totaled $1 billion.[6]

Many Israeli companies have invested extensively in South Africa. Afitra and Koors, corporations owned by Israel's Histadrut labor federation, are big investors in South African commercial agriculture, high technology, and power generation industries. Israeli investments are also concentrated in other critical sectors of the apartheid state's economy such as communications, computers, advanced computer software, and electronics.[7]

As writer Jane Hunter explains, "One of Israel's chief attractions, as far as South African industrialists are concerned, is its preferred status with the European Economic Community and the U.S."[8] Under the 1984 U.S. Free Trade Agreement, all Israeli exports to the U.S. will eventually be duty free. "To take advantage of Israel's privileged trade status, South African companies have systematically established manufacturing facilities in Israel, most often joint ventures with Israeli firms. Raw or semifinished materials are shipped from South Africa to Israel where sufficient 'local content' . . . is added, a 'made in Israel' label is attached, and the finished merchandise is shipped off to unsuspecting consumers abroad."[9] This practice of "springboarding" is made profitable by the slave wages paid to Black South African workers.

The Military Alliance

A military alliance between the two countries evolved gradually in the 1960s as the U.N. adopted its first arms embargo against South Africa in 1963 and European suppliers of weapons to Israel stopped selling their wares to Israel after Israel's aggressive land grabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. But the Israeli-South African military partnership intensified after

1. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "Israel's Global Ambitions," *New York Times*, January 6, 1983.
2. Quoted in Jack Colhoun, "South Africa buoyed by Israeli support," *Guardian Supplement*, Spring 1986.
3. James Adams, *The Unnatural Alliance: Israel and South Africa* (London, Quartet Books, 1984), p. 19.
4. Jane Hunter, *Undercutting Sanctions: Israel, the U.S. and South Africa* (Washington: Washington Middle East Associates, 1986), p. 32.
5. Aaron Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), p. 139.
6. Adams, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 20.
7. John Mahoney in "The Link," March 1986, newsletter of Americans for Middle East Understanding.
8. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 34. See also *New York Times*, March 5, 1985.
9. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, pp. 34-35.

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South African Prime Minister Johannes Vorster visited Israel in 1976 and signed an agreement with the Tel Aviv regime setting up a Ministerial Joint Committee of the two nations' defense ministers. According to the agreement, "the exchange of Israeli arms and advice has three major areas: conventional arms trade, nuclear collaboration and counterinsurgency."[10]

Israel has exported sophisticated Kfir aircraft and rebuilt Mirage jet warplanes to South Africa. Israel has also supplied the apartheid state with Dabur coastal patrol boats, Reshef-class gunboats armed with Gabriel missiles, self-propelled 105 mm howitzers, antitank missiles, air-to-air missiles, assault rifles, radar bases and surveillance equipment.[11]

"Beyond outright sales, Israel has enabled South Africa to become almost completely self-sufficient in several types of weaponry and weapons systems," Hunter notes. "The two countries have set up a joint helicopter manufacturing project—Rotoflight of Capetown and Chemavir-Masok in Israel—which supplies the armed forces of both countries with Scorpion helicopters."[12] Without the Israeli-South African alliance, she concludes, Pretoria could not have broken the U.N. arms embargo.

Adams points out Pretoria's debt to Israel in its counterinsurgency wars against the Black African Frontline States surrounding it and its repression of South Africa's Black majority. "Much of the efficiency of the South African security services must be placed at the door of Israel," Adams writes, "for both army experts and specialists in counterintelligence operations and interrogation from Mossad [the Israeli central intelligence agency] have been based in South Africa in a permanent advisory capacity since 1976."[13]

Israel Aircraft Industries constructed an electrified fence between Angola and Namibia, which South Africa illegally occupies, to block the infiltration into Namibia of SWAPO guerrillas fighting to liberate their homeland. Antipersonnel mines made in Israel are planted by South Africa along the Angolan and Mozambican borders. An Israeli spy drone was shot down in 1983 flying over Mozambique.[14]

Israeli military officers helped South Africa plan its 1975 invasion of Angola. In 1981 Gen. Ariel Sharon, then Israeli Defense Minister, spent 10 days with South African troops in Namibia near the Angolan border.[15] The London *Financial Times* and the London *Observer* published reports of Israeli involvement in 1983-84 with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas, the South African backed *contras* fighting against the MPLA government of Angola.[16]

Nuclear Cooperation

Israel and South Africa have also collaborated with regard to nuclear weapons technology since the mid-1960s. Adams states, "For South Africa, Israel had one primary advantage: a relatively advanced nuclear industry that had been working on uranium-enrichment techniques and on the design of a nuclear bomb. For the Israelis, South Africa possessed almost unlimited supplies of uranium that it might be persuaded to part with as part of a uranium-for-technology swap."[17]

Despite a curtain of secrecy, it appears that both Israel and South Africa have developed nuclear weapons and could not have done so without each other's help. Israeli nuclear scientists were frequently reported to have been in South Africa in 1977, the same year the apartheid state abruptly canceled what the CIA thought were preparations for an atomic weapons test in the Kalahari desert.[18]

Two years later, the CIA concluded, Israel and South Africa carried out a nuclear bomb test in the South Atlantic Ocean, although the Carter administration and the regimes in Pretoria and Tel Aviv denied it. CBS News correspondent Dan Raviv reported in 1980 that Israel "had detonated an atomic bomb in a joint nuclear project in the South Atlantic," referring to the 1979 double flash in the South Atlantic, which is characteristic of an atomic explosion.[19]

Sophisticated weapons technology purchased by Israel from the U.S. also has been diverted to South Africa. Adams reveals how the Israelis helped the racist white-minority regime obtain the 155 mm howitzer, then the world's most advanced artillery piece. Israel bought the weapon from the U.S.-based Space Research Corp. (SRC), and used the big gun with great effectiveness in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.[20]

After South African troops were repelled in their 1975 invasion of Angola by MPLA forces with superior artillery, Pretoria turned to Israel. Although the Israelis were willing to sell the 155 mm howitzer technology to South Africa, Tel Aviv didn't own the rights to the weapon. So the Israelis teamed up with some former CIA agents to fashion a clandestine deal. SRC in the end not only sold Pretoria the advanced weaponry but also trained South African technicians, who later reconstructed the howitzer.

"It is possible that another major weapons system—Israel's Lavi aircraft, which incorporates highly advanced U.S. technology and is largely dependent on U.S. financing—is now making its way to Pretoria," Hunter warns.[21] There have been numerous reports in the Israeli and international press that South Africa is covertly financing part of the Lavi project in return for a deal that would eventually allow the South Africans to build the Lavi under license in the apartheid state.

Hunter notes that the U.S. corporations may, under pressure from antiapartheid campaigns, stop their operations in South Africa, but use their corporate subsidiaries in Israel to continue doing business with South Africa. "Motorola has recently won praise for its announcement that it will stop selling two-way radios to the South African police. However, its subsidiary, Motorola Israel, which produces military communications systems and distributes them in South Africa through Afitra, can offer Pretoria continued access to those radios," she writes.[22]

U.S. Encouragement

The Israeli-South African partnership evolved in part as a relationship between two nations faced increasingly with international isolation because of their destabilizing and oppressive policies in the Middle East and Southern Africa. But this re-

10. Steve Goldfield, *Garrison State: Israel's Role in U.S. Global Strategy* (San Francisco: Palestine Focus Publications, 1985), p. 26.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
12. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 27.
13. Adams, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 85.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 93; Goldfield, *op. cit.* n. 10, pp. 28,30.
15. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 28.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Adams, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 170.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 182; Hunter *op. cit.* n. 4, pp. 15-16.
19. Quoted in Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 17. See also Jack Colhoun, "Little doubt U.S. helped build an 'apartheid bomb'," *Guardian*, February 16, 1983. And see, Barbara Rogers, "South Africa Gets Nuclear Weapons—Thanks to the West," in Ray, *et al.*, eds., *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa* (Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart, 1979), p. 276.
20. Adams, *op. cit.* n. 3, pp. 38-71. And see, Michael Klare, "Arms for Apartheid," in Ray, *op. cit.* n. 19, p. 258.
21. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 24.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

lationship was also encouraged by the U.S.

"[Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger in early 1975 secretly asked the Israeli government to send troops to Angola in order to cooperate with the South African army in fighting the Cuban-backed MPLA," the British magazine *The Economist* wrote. "They sent South Africa some military instructors specializing in antiguerrilla warfare plus equipment designed for the same purpose. In return, the Israelis took Kissinger's request as the green light for an Israeli-South African partnership."[23]

23. Quoted in Israel Shahak, *Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression* (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1982), p. 29.

Israeli Spy Target of MOSSAD Hit?

By Louis Wolf

Ever since Jonathan Jay Pollard was arrested in November 1985 and charged with a long history of spying for Israel, there has been substantial doubt that he will ever receive a full, public trial. Now, *CAIB* has learned, there is a question whether he will remain alive.

The key is the relationship between the CIA and Israel's MOSSAD. The Department of Justice fears an assassination attempt by MOSSAD against Pollard, and at press time he was being kept under extremely tight security at the Petersburg, Virginia Federal Correctional Institution. He is under 24-hour guard in an isolation compound, has been given a "John Doe" identity, and wears a disguise, including a false beard and hairpiece. He is moved only after dark, for his frequent meetings with intelligence officials.

The CIA and MOSSAD

Given the long history of especially close relations between the CIA and MOSSAD, both intelligence services—and both governments—would seem to have far more to lose than to gain by allowing Pollard's case to reach the courts. The two sister services share highly secret intelligence information and work side by side around the world. Cooperation ranges from covert paramilitary operations to media disinformation campaigns. It could prove extremely embarrassing to Tel Aviv and Washington if the full scope of such activities were to become apparent from a public airing of Pollard's activities on behalf of Israel while employed as a U.S. Navy counterintelligence officer. And, from the Israeli side, it is not just a question of intelligence information. The $4.5 billion in annual aid—which makes Israel by far the leading recipient of U.S.foreign aid—is doubtless a major incentive for downplaying the Pollard case.

Pollard's Career

Pollard was for years fascinated with the workings of Israeli, U.S., and South African intelligence agencies. In 1984 he asked the Israelis to let him spy for them, and he received training from MOSSAD handlers including the legendary Rafael Eitan. In Washington and on two visits to Tel Aviv he was taught highly specialized espionage techniques, including the writing and sending of secret messages and the use of Hebrew alphabet codes. He was given a false Israeli passport, a phony name, and $85,000. And he was promised $300,000 more, to be placed over time in a Swiss bank account.

U.S. prosecutors said he had provided the Israelis with "reams" and "suitcases full" of classified documents during his busy two years, including U.S. technical intelligence on the military capabilities of Arab nations. A special Israeli cabinet inquiry suggests he was supplying MOSSAD with data on CIA spying against Israel.

White House Worries

The case is a major headache for the White House. Pollard's arrest came only after what an insider has described as "a pitched bureaucratic battle" between the CIA and State Department on the one hand, and the FBI and Pentagon on the other. Both the CIA and the State Department wanted to look the other way, and let Pollard continue—subject to some scrutiny and damage limitation. But the FBI saw an arrest as a great public relations booster, and the Pentagon was evidently seriously worried about the intelligence resources and advantages accruing to Israel at the expense of other allies.

The FBI won out, and within three days arrested Pollard and two other spies who were being watched in unrelated cases—former CIA China analyst Larry Wu-tai Chin and former NSA officer Ronald Pelton. As the Pollard case unfolded, the official U.S. position was almost comical. The Munich daily,*Süddeutsche Zeitung* commented (December 3, 1985), "The U.S. State Department trumpeted its 'horror,'...and the CIA wailed shrilly like an old courtesan pretending to be a violated virgin. Jerusalem behaved even less circumspectly."

The Spreading Scandal

The Justice Department is finally of the opinion that the Pollard operation is just part of a larger Israeli espionage apparatus in the United States—something any intelligent observer of the scene would have assumed for years. The office of Rep. John Conyers (Dem.-Mich.) has announced that the House Judiciary Committee subcommittee on criminal justice, which Conyers chairs, will commence an investigation of Israeli spying in the U.S. shortly. The conservative *New York Times* columnist William Safire reported (June 30, 1986), "I'm told a New Yorker, prominent in Jewish affairs, is likely to be implicated in the [Pollard] spy scandal."

CAIB has learned that, for many years, the leadership of the American Jewish Committee in New York has, on a regular basis, supplied reports on U.S. strategic affairs, including intelligence matters, to the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations. Israel's U.N. mission has long been a key MOSSAD post. Only time will tell what Safire was told.●

The next year the U.S. turned again to its covert partner in Tel Aviv. "British television (and subsequently the press as well) aired a report referring to the sale of American helicopters to South Africa, in the middle of their notorious invasion of newly liberated Angola. It turns out Kissinger, with reason, expected the U.S. Congress would not confirm the sale of such equipment . . . so . . . an 'Israeli solution' was found for this problem by means of a fictitious sale effected by 'unknown Israeli companies,' and the 'copters were transfered to South Africa' "Hebrew University professor Israel Shahak writes.[24]

Jane Hunter sums up: "Israel has become an indispensable covert partner for the U.S. because this partnership isn't subject to congressional scrutiny or even public debate because of Israel's 'special relationship' with Washington." But, she concludes, "The question for progressive Americans should be simply whether we are doing all that we can to end apartheid. If we find, therefore, that the 'special relationship' between the U.S. and Israel spills over into South Africa, then issues like the level of American aid to Israel, the role of U.S. firms in three-way trade and U.S. diplomatic attempts to cover up this involvement cannot be ignored."[25] ●

24. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
25. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 51.

Cluster Bomb Hypocrisy

Credit: Associated Press

One facet of the expanding U.S.-Israel spy scandal is the allegation that Israel has been smuggling cluster bomb technology out of the United States. Cluster bombs are pods which open in midair, on the way to their targets, releasing up to 500 potentially lethal exploding projectiles. The charge, made July 8 by the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, has been denied by that nation, which insists that their development of such weapons was "totally independent." (*New York Times*, July 10, 1986, p. A18.)

The U.S. reportedly "halted shipment of cluster weapons to Israel in 1982 after they were used against civilian areas in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon." (*Ibid.*) But the blatant hypocrisy in such a policy—if in fact it is followed at all—is that the U.S. used cluster bombs against civilians in its invasion of Libya in 1986, to say nothing of their extensive use in Indochina during the 1960s and early 1970s.

The photo above shows hundreds of such devices displayed for news reporters on a Benghazi beach. Clearly the United States does not practice what it preaches. ●

News Note

Cover Photo Explained

The cover of our last issue showed some Greek women who were hanged by Nazi collaborators during the German occupation. The photo was taken by Spyros Meletzis in Volos in 1944 and given to us by him. While we used the photo to illustrate the brutality of the Nazis and their collaborators, we had no idea precisely who the women were.

The cover of CAIB *Number 25 was reproduced in the Athens weekly,* Pontiki, *on January 10, 1986, to illustrate an article about our magazine. It led to some extremely interesting correspondence, and a poignant article (January 24, 1986), translated excerpts of which follow:*

An emotionally crushing photograph from the martyrdom of the Greek people during the German occupation went round the world via *CovertAction* magazine. On one half of the magazine's cover (reproduced in *Pontiki*) the execution of two Greek women is depicted, while on the other half, Reagan and Kohl are paying tribute to the SS cemetery at Bitburg. Beneath the photo of the two hanged Greek women are only two words, "Greece 1940s." Nothing else.

Shortly after our issue came out a letter from a resistance fighter, Aris Psiaris, a lawyer in Volos, gave us the first pieces of information about those women. On the right is Filitsa Kalavrou; on the left, Lukia Topali. In the original photograph, the body of Sofia Topali, the daughter of Lukia, can also be seen. All three were hanged by members of the traitorous EASAD [National Agricultural Association of Anti-communist Action]. But why?

For Kalavrou the reason may have been the participation of her husband in ELAS [National People's Liberation Army], but for the other two, the reason was simply looting. No matter how much their executioners claimed they were part of ELAS, they were hanged because they were wealthy. The collaborators targeted them so that they could loot their mansion, and they did not even stop to consider that they were *Swiss subjects*.

The unfortunate victims could have saved themselves had they escaped to Switzerland, but they chose to stay in Greece, helping people who were hungry by organizing soup kitchens and schooling for the children in the region. Detailed data, photographs, and reports of eyewitnesses can be found in the book, "Unknown Facets of the Occupation and the Resistance, 1941-44," by the journalist Nitsa Koliou.

The women were hanged in the Volos village square on June 7, 1944. They had been arrested eight days before by EASADites, taken to the Alexandra prison, and from there tied with cables and taken to be hanged.

According to Fotis Hatzopoulos, who was 12 years old at the time, but remembers the three tragic women very well, when the EASADites came to arrest Sofia Topali, they found her mother Lukia alone in the house. The man in charge pretended he was an *andartes* [guerrilla fighter] and asked why they had not sent supplies to ELAS. The unsuspecting woman replied that she had sent supplies the day before, and was immediately arrested. A short time later her daughter arrived and was also arrested.

About Filitsa Kalavrou there is the testimony of her own daughter, Vasiliki Agrafiotis:

"My mother tended the mill of my father when he left to join the *andartes*. She lived in the mill. One night men of EASAD appeared at the mill disguised as *andartes*, wearing caps with the word ELAS! 'We are in the mountains with Antonin,' they said. 'Why don't you send anything to your husband?' She said she had already sent bread and woolen undershirts and socks. She said she did the knitting herself. 'You yourself are a fighter?' the EASADites asked her. 'Of course,' was my mother's reply. They arrested her. That was the same evening they arrested the Topali women, and took them all to the Alexandra prison. One day I passed by the prison and I heard my mother call to me from the window. She had been severely tortured, but she denied nothing. She told her tormenters that she had been knitting for the *andartes*. Later she was tied with cables, taken from the prison, and hanged. The mill and our home were completely looted."

In front of the gallows all three women behaved courageously. Fotis Hatzopoulos remembers the Topali mother cheering for the freedom fighters and crossing herself before they put the noose over her head. As they made her daughter step up on the table to be hanged, she shouted to Fotis, "Take care of the children." She meant the soup kitchen children.

Today nothing remains of the terrible crime. The bodies were buried nearby, but were later exhumed and have disappeared. Even the tree from which they were hanged was uprooted some years later by officials charged with the beautification of the area. These women were not the only victims of the Germans and their collaborators. Twenty-two other villagers were executed, including a 10-year-old boy.

Little is known of the fate of the group of EASADites who arrested and executed the women. The leader of EASAD, the notorious Takis Macedonas, fled Volos for Athens and then Salonika. When the Germans left, in October 1944, he went with a band of followers to hide in the countryside, but they were captured by *andartes*. Macedonas had hidden a small pistol under his armpit and, a few days after his arrest, told a fellow prisoner that he was terrified he would not simply be executed, but might be tortured. "What will happen if they decide to skin me alive?" he told a fellow prisoner. Before the other could answer, Macedonas pulled out the pistol and killed himself.

How much one photograph tells. •

The Continuing War:
Media Manipulation in Costa Rica

By Howard Friel and Michelle Joffroy*

In his affidavit to the International Court of Justice the former head of the *contra* communications office in Tegucigalpa, Edgar Chamorro, testified that, through him, the CIA had bribed journalists in Honduras to influence public opinion to oppose the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Chamorro testified that he "received money to bribe Honduran journalists and broadcasters to write and speak favorably about the FDN (the main *contra* group) and to attack the Government of Nicaragua and call for its overthrow." According to Chamorro, "approximately 15 Honduran journalists and broadcasters were on the CIA payroll and our influence was thereby extended to every major Honduran newspaper and television station." Chamorro also testified that "I learned from my CIA colleagues that the same tactic was employed in Costa Rica in an effort to turn the newspapers and television stations of that country against the Nicaraguan Government." Although details of the CIA's media campaign in Honduras are scarce (even Chamorro won't discuss them), details of similar operations in Costa Rica are even more scarce. However, recent media events in Costa Rica may give observers some insight into the nature and methods of U.S. media operations in Central America.

Background

U.S. efforts to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua involve the destabilization of important sectors of its neighboring countries—Honduras and Costa Rica. In Honduras, the militarization of the budget, the expanded influence of the military, and increased military surveillance and repression of Honduran citizens are policies designed by the Reagan administration to undermine the popular movements and Honduran democracy. More visible is the construction of several U.S. military bases in Honduras and the ongoing military exercises off the Nicaraguan and Honduran coasts and along the border—demonstrating to Nicaragua that the regional infrastructure for a U.S. military invasion is already in place. Finally, Honduran acquiescence to the presence of the U.S. mercenary forces inside Honduran borders is perhaps the clearest indication of U.S. domination there. The purpose of the CIA's media campaign in Honduras is to condition the Honduran public to accept or support the Reagan administration's policies there.

In Costa Rica the manifestations of U.S. power are more subtle, primarily because there is no military establishment there to exploit or dominate. Instead, the primary focus of American interventionists is the Costa Rican mass media. Because the mass media were the only major sector of society untouched by the social reformation of the past half-century, the Costa Rican press is still owned and operated exclusively by the upper classes of the private sector, which, as Andrew Reding comments, maintains a "desire to insulate itself from the possible influence of revolutionary ideas on labor and landless peasantry." The vested interests of the mass media and its upper class owners represent "a natural convergence" with "the Reagan administration's desire to remove the Sandinistas from power."[1] The outcome, as Reding writes, has been "a concerted propaganda and disinformation campaign. Now entering its seventh year, this campaign is designed to scare Costa Ricans into a hostile attitude toward Nicaragua, thereby increasing their receptivity to U.S. intervention, Costa Rican rearmament, and persecution of real and imagined domestic leftists."[2] According to Reding, who spent several years in the country with intellectuals, professionals, students, and workers, many Costa Ricans believe that the relationship between the media and the Reagan administration goes beyond a "natural convergence." Reding states that in Costa Rica, "it is taken for granted" that the CIA is active within the media and that its influence is "comprehensive."[3]

One can examine the recent record of deception and falsification in the Costa Rican mass media, and especially in Costa Rica's leading newspaper, *La Nación*, to get an idea where CIA media assets might be located.

La Nación and the Falsified Photo

On May 30, 1985, two Costa Rican border guards were killed at Las Crucitas during a Costa Rican-based *contra* attack across the Nicaraguan border. Although an Organization of American States commission was unable to determine how the border guards were killed, the incident was reported in the Costa Rican press as an indication of Sandinista aggression and as revealing the supposed intentions of the Sandinistas to invade Costa Rica. The media's coverage of the border incident provoked an anti-Sandinista demonstration at the Nicaraguan Embassy in San José, including a mob attack on the embassy by several rock-throwing demonstrators. *La Nación*'s coverage of the demonstration involved deceptive information and the falsification of a photograph.

On June 11, 1985, *La Nación* published three photographs of the demonstration. The photographs are reproduced here and numbered for reference. According to Carlos Morales, the

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1. Andrew Reding, "Costa Rica: Democratic Model in Jeopardy," *World Policy Journal*, Spring, 1986, p. 303.
2. *Ibid.*
3. These quotes are from a telephone interview with Andrew Reding.

editor of *La Universidad*, the newspaper of the University of Costa Rica School of Journalism, the anti-Sandinista rock-throwing mob was organized by the Free Costa Rica Movement, a John Birch-type organization affiliated with General John Singlaub's World Anti-Communist League.[4] The trident-like logo of the Free Costa Rica Movement (MCRL) is clearly visible in photographs 1 and 2. In both photographs, those wearing the MCRL insignias are the peaceful demonstrators, thus creating the impression that MCRL involvement in the

Photographs 1 and 2. Note visible trident MCRL insignia.

demonstration was peaceful and free of provocations. In photograph 3 the man in the foreground holding a brick is also a member of the MCRL, although this could not be discerned by *La Nación*'s readers since the MCRL logo on the brick thrower's shirt had been rubbed out by the editors of *La Nación*. In the original, unaltered photograph the logo is clearly visible. The falsified photograph was discovered during an investigation of the demonstration by *La Universidad*, which also determined that the rock-throwing incident was, in fact, a MCRL provocation.[5] Given that one of *La Nación*'s editors, Juan Antônio Sanchez Alonso, is also Vice President of the Free Costa Rica Movement, it is clear that the erasure of the insignia and the coverage of the demonstration was meant to mislead and manipulate the Costa Rican public.

La Nación and the Manipulation of Public Opinion

On March 2, 1986, the period immediately preceding the debate in the United States regarding *contra* aid, *La Nación* published the results of a poll taken by Consultoria Interdisciplinario en Desarollo (CID), a San José subsidiary of Gallup. The poll showed that 69 percent of Costa Ricans supported military aid to the *contras*, while only 24 percent opposed aid. The poll results were distributed in the United States that month by the United States Information Agency, publicized by *The Washington Times*, broadcast by National Public Radio, and cited by Congressman Bob Livingston (Rep.-La.) during the congressional debate. Upon publication of the CID poll by *La Nación*, *La Universidad* conducted another investigation of the background and methods of the survey.[6]

Photograph 3, as it appeared in the newspaper. Note black mark on chest.

The original of photograph 3, showing trident MCRL insignia before it was obliterated.

4. *La Universidad*, University of Costa Rica, San José, June 21, 1985, p. 3.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *La Universidad*, March 14, 1986, p. 14.

La Universidad discovered that the survey, published for the first time in March 1986, was actually conducted 9 months earlier in June 1985. In addition, the poll was conducted only days after the border incident at Las Crucitas, when, according to Carlos Morales, the Costa Rican public was "under the influence of the press campaign which had been focusing on Las Crucitas." Furthermore, *La Nación* published the results of this poll without mentioning the results of a more recent CID poll conducted in November 1985. That poll found that 42 percent of Costa Ricans opposed aid to the *contras* while 39 percent support it—a dramatic reversal from the June poll. These results were never published by *La Nación*.

The game played by *La Nación* is apparent—to ensure that Costa Ricans support the Reagan administration's policy in Nicaragua and the rest of Central America. According to Daniel Obuder Quiros, former president of Costa Rica (1974-1978:

> All the Costa Rican media owners are conservative. They follow what they feel is the U.S. line, though most of the time much more aggressively than the actual U.S. line. They're ultras in the sense that they go beyond what may be the wishes or recommendations of U.S. officials in the area in order to ingratiate themselves and secure U.S. support.[7]

"U.S. support" involves primarily cheap loans from the U.S. to private Costa Rican banks—an economic assistance program designed to undermine state banks and social programs. In essence, as long as U.S. economic assistance to Costa Rica is contingent upon support for the *contras* and designed to enhance the power of the Costa Rican oligarchy while undermining the social democracy, the mass media in Costa Rica will continue to operate and publish on strings pulled by the U.S. government.

La Nación and the Fake Letter

As a response to increased terrorist targeting of Americans overseas, the United States Embassy in San José constructed a wall to surround the compound for additional security. However, the embassy wall juts out onto the sidewalk, forcing pedestrians to walk into the busy street in order to walk by the embassy. Residents of San José soon began complaining about the inconvenience, the safety hazard, and the fortress-like appearance of the new wall. For these reasons, few good things could be said by Costa Ricans about the embassy wall—that is, until the following letter appeared in the May 31, 1985, issue of *La Nación*:

> Praise for the Wall
> I love the wall constructed in front of the embassy of the United States in the capital. It is a brilliant ornament which attracts the attention of all pedestrians. It would be very pleasant for diplomatic buildings to become such works of art, given that they now look like stockades to detain the criminals who want to damage them. It's a shame that they are so low as now they are used for people to sit on and even the dogs dirty them. What disrespect, My God! It also occurs to me that in residential neighborhoods, the residents could build similar walls to better protect themselves.—Amalia Zamora V., Ced. 4-033-180.

Elogian pretil

Me encanta el pretil que construyeron en la acera de la Embajada de Estados Unidos en esta capital. Luce como singular ornato que llama la atencion de todos los transeúntes. Seria muy agradable que las representaciones diplomáticas realizaran obras semejantes, ya que parecen pequeñas trincheras para detener a los maleantes que intenten dañar los edificios. Lástima si que sean tan bajitos, pues ya los están cogiendo para sentarse y hasta los perros los han ensuciado. ¡Qué irrespeto Dio mio! Se me ocurre que también en los barrios residenciales los vecinos podríamos levantar pretiles similares para protegernos mas. Amalia Zamora V., Céd. 4-033-180.

The phony letter, as it appeared in *La Nación*.

The letter is signed with an accompanying *cedula* number (routinely used in Costa Rica for identification and geographical purposes).

Once again, *La Universidad* investigated. Carlos Morales petitioned the Civil Registry in Costa Rica to check the authenticity of the *cedula* number.[8] He received the following reply:

> There appears to be no person carrying the *cedula* number 4-033-180 and it cannot be established how long the number has been non-existent. Page 33 of the jurisdiction *Heredia* numbers from No. 35724 to 36715.

Thus, it seems that the letter, absurd as it is, was contrived to give the impression of at least marginal support among Costa Ricans for the embassy wall. Of course, like other *La Nación* attempts to demonstrate Costa Rican support for the U.S. presence in the region, the evidence presented for this alleged support was shown to be fraudulent.

Ideology and Myths

These three examples of misleading and falsified information in *La Nación* are typical of the kind of lies and mythologies being built up today in Costa Rica to vilify Nicaragua and justify U.S. policy in Central America. It is always the case that when an ideology lacks an ideational and moral legitimacy it must rely upon an extensive network of lies and myths to sustain itself. Perhaps the best way to summarize the most likely outcome of such an ideological campaign is to quote from a recent interview with José Figueres Ferrer, former president of Costa Rica and current president of the Costa Rican National Liberation Party:[9]

> A few months ago, there was a moment of crisis in Nicaragua following a border incident at Las Crucitas near the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border. People were saying that the Nicaraguans wanted to invade us, and that if Costa Ricans went beyond the border, they would be killed. So the democratic labor leaders decided to cross the border to see what would happen, and I joined them. We went to the Rio San Juan, and the Sandinistas shouted, "Viva Costa Rica!" Nothing happened at all. On the contrary, we were really well received. When we went to Muelle San Carlos against the wishes of the Costa Rican Government, we were received like friends. Many times war is created by myths—people are turned into your enemies by myths. ●

7. Andrew Reding, "Voices from Costa Rica," *World Policy Journal*, p. 326-27.

8. *La Universidad*, June 21, 1985, p. 2.

9. Reding, "Voices from Costa Rica," p. 322.

Duarte: The Man and the Myth

By Dennis Hans*

The case of José Napoleón Duarte, president of El Salvador, confounds. The very qualities his legion of admirers in the U.S. government and media profess to see in him are precisely those he lacks. Although he has been caught in lie upon lie, Duarte is praised for his honesty. Duarte, the pitchman for murderers and torturers, is hailed for his morality and decency.

This describes the Duarte of the 1980s, the years covered in this review. There was a time when Duarte deserved—but did not receive—the support of Washington. A founding member in 1961 of the Salvadoran Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Duarte was an effective and popular mayor of San Salvador from 1964 to 1970. In 1972, he ran as the presidential candidate of a center-left civilian coalition that was attempting to bring to an end four decades of military rule. Duarte won the election, only to have it stolen by the army, which arrested and tortured Duarte and shipped him off to exile.

Nothing here disturbed the U.S. It had supported a string of anticommunist military dictatorships in El Salvador and promptly recognized the stealers of the 1972 election. As long as the Salvadoran army provided "stability" and a favorable investment climate, and remained loyal to the U.S., the U.S. was content to let it rule.

Ironically, the electoral fraud welcomed in Washington in the interests of stability sowed the seeds of instability. Seeing that the peaceful, democratic road to economic and social reform led to a dead end, many Salvadoreans took to the hills and prepared for a guerrilla war.

Some seven years later (October 1979), with El Salvador on the brink of civil war, a group of moderate and progressive officers committed to democracy and reform staged a coup and formed a government with a broad array of respected citizens—educators, lawyers, politicians, enlightened businessmen. Unfortunately, the democratic contingent of the military never consolidated its power. The reactionaries retained a significant power base and gradually expanded on it.

It is at this point that we begin our detailed review of Citizen Duarte. He returned from exile in late 1979, and in a matter of weeks assumed a critical role not only in the politics of El Salvador, but in U.S. foreign policy as well.

1980 was a tumultuous year in El Salvador. In January, the government collapsed. Distressed at their inability to restrain the armed forces which were terrorizing political and labor activists, the three civilians on the five-man junta and every cabinet minister except one resigned.

The PDC, after much soul-searching, agreed to fill the breach. Mindful of the cause of the collapse of the preceding junta, the PDC conditioned its participation in the government on the armed forces' submission to civilian control and the dismissal of three notorious hard-liners, Defense Minister José Guillermo García, Vice-Minister of Defense Nicolas Carranza and Treasury Police Chief Francisco Morán.

None of these promises were kept, and that provoked a mass exodus of Christian Democrats from the government in March. The officials stated that the PDC "should not participate in a regime which has unleashed the bloodiest repression ever experienced by the Salvadoran people." One faction of the party, however—the old guard, led by Duarte—stayed on, with Duarte himself occupying the junta seat vacated by the PDC's Hector Dada. Archbishop Oscar Romero's appeal to the Duarte faction not to lend a moderate, civilian presence to a government clearly dominated by the most ruthless sectors of the army was rejected.

In May, troops loyal to the moderate Colonel Adolfo Majano arrested Roberto D'Aubuisson (a retired army officer who was directing death squads with the connivance of the military high command) and confiscated documents implicating him in coup plotting and the March 24 assassination of Romero. Now it was Duarte's turn to confront the army: The PDC would resign en masse if D'Aubuisson were not prosecuted. D'Aubuisson was released, Majano was demoted, and Duarte backed down. In the next 50 days, more than 2,500 Salvadoreans were tortured, assassinated, or massacred.

In October, the top U.S. labor official in El Salvador, Richard Oulahan, analyzed recent developments in an internal memorandum. "Government here operates with no real popular support," he began. "In the past several months, Duarte and company have sided with the conservative military (perhaps because this group holds the key to power now), which has hurt their image among the population." After noting that "military inspired violence is much worse now than before," Oulahan described the *modus operandi* of the charmers Duarte had sided with: "The armed forces have been operating with the list system here: If your name happens to be on the list and you are taken prisoner your future life expectancy is about one hour."[1] The *Washington Post* reported December 8, 1980, the latest Duarte ultimatum to the army: "If 'democratic interests' are not given complete control of the military the Christian Democrats will withdraw." Five days later, Duarte was appointed president of the junta—but not commander-in-chief. The government restructuring actually strengthened the position of the military hard-liners. As in May, Duarte's demands had not been met. As in May, Duarte backed down.

Explaining Away State Terrorism

The Carter and Reagan administrations have pretended that the thousands of civilian killings since the civil war began in 1980 have been perpetrated primarily by "extremists of the left and right" out to topple the "centrist" government and, to a lesser extent, by government soldiers "out of control." Because U.S. military aid flows directly to the armed forces, the executive branch has gone to great lengths to hide the fact that

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1. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador* (New York: Times Books, 1984), pp. 203-205.

the vast majority of civilian deaths are the responsibility of government troops following to the letter the orders of their commanding officers. The White House has feared Congress would balk at bankrolling known butchers. And Duarte has served as point man in the campaign to protect the image of the Salvadoran armed forces.

In May 1980, for example, the army massacred hundreds of refugees at the Sumpul River. At first, Duarte claimed no incident had occurred there, but later conceded that "an action did take place" and that 300 people were killed, all "communist guerrillas."[2] In July 1981, soldiers slaughtered 40 residents of Armenia, including all the members of a soccer team. "Duarte flatly denied that there had been any killings."[3] He even denied that there were rotting corpses at the El Playon lava fields, despite the fact that even U.S. Embassy officials admitted that the fields were a favorite dumping ground of the local army cavalry unit. Stories to this effect were "fabricated," Duarte said. Still, Duarte and the army high command promised to investigate. "Several months later the embassy acknowledged that there had been no investigation."[4]

Colonel Majano (forced out of the government by army hard-liners in December 1980) undoubtedly had these and other instances in mind when, according to the *Christian Science Monitor* (March 15, 1982), he "asserted that despite the widely held view in the United States that President Duarte is a moderate who is trying to end abuses, Duarte was fully aware of what was happening and had helped to cover up the government's complicity."

On those rare occasions where Duarte acknowledged the complicity of government forces in attacks on civilians, he passed them off as "abuses of authority," certain the army *as an institution* was not to blame. In this connection, we note that Ray Bonner's widely praised book, which documents countless mass killings by government forces, details only one involving an "abuse of authority."

The U.S.-trained Atlacatl Battalion arrived in the northern village of Mozote on a December day in 1981. After assembling the villagers in front of the church, the troops proceeded to blindfold the men and take them away in groups of four and five to be shot. "Women were raped. Of the 482 Mozote victims, 280 were children under fourteen years old." Among the victims were the four children and blind husband of Rufina Amaya. She had managed to hide in safety in a nearby wooded area, from where she overheard the following conversation.

"Lieutenant, somebody here says he won't kill children," said one soldier. "Who's the son of a bitch who said that?" the lieutenant answered. "I am going to kill him."[5] A fitting punishment for a soldier who "abused the authority" of the commanding officer by refusing to kill children.

When the military and police of a nation murder 25,000 civilians in two years—34 per day—as El Salvador's did during the period Duarte served as a member or president of the junta (March 1980 to March 1982), a sullied reputation would seem sure to follow. But, according to Duarte's letter published in the November 9, 1981, *Miami Herald*, the armed forces' sordid image stemmed from an "astonishing, clever, and effective campaign of hearsay and false information channeled by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries." In truth, "The armed forces are waging a heroic battle against a cruel and pitiless enemy supported by great resources of ideological aggression."

The "Democratic Process"

Duarte was out of the government from April 1982 to May 1984. In the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections the PDC lost to a coalition of right-wing and extreme right-wing parties. Participation was limited to pro-army political parties in this U.S.-conceived, -financed, and -staged affair; anti-army politicians of the center and left were on a hit list of "traitors" circulated by the army.

A unique aspect of this "democratic process" was that the provisional president was selected by the U.S. Embassy and the army. In El Salvador, the president serves the army and the U.S. executive; the U.S. Congress is his constituency; soliciting the constituency for military aid is his function. The U.S. Embassy and the army concluded that mild-mannered banker Alvaro Magaña could better perform this function than the Constituent Assembly's choice for president, Roberto D'Aubuisson.

Duarte remained in El Salvador, attending to PDC affairs and planning his presidential campaign for 1984. Throughout 1982 and 1983, the army killed noncombatants at the declining yet impressive rate of 15 per day. This appears not to have disturbed Duarte any more than it did when, as president of the junta, the blood was on his hands. Commenting on a late-1983 conversation with Duarte, *Le Monde*'s Charles Vanhecke, writing in the *Manchester Weekly Guardian* (December 25, 1983), noted that Duarte could not "find words kind enough for the army, in spite of its 'pacification' methods. Aligning himself with the military when he was president, he lent his name to the most cruel period of repression."

Duarte's praise notwithstanding, the army was in fact in disarray in late 1983, having suffered heavy casualties in the course of a disastrous U.S.-promoted and -designed counterinsurgency campaign. Seeing that the army was no match for the rebels on the ground, U.S. strategists convinced their Salvadoran clients to counter with a massive escalation of the air war, the objectives being "to disrupt the rebels' ability to mass for attack and to drive civilians out of the areas in the countryside that the rebels controlled or contested, thereby denying the rebels a base of logistical support."[6] A seven-fold increase in U.S. funding for aircraft in fiscal year 1984 provided the Salvadoreans with the firepower, while stepped-up reconnaissance flights by U.S. pilots based in Honduras and Panama helped select the targets.

The civilian population bore the brunt of the bombing, strafing and rocket fire, a fact amply documented by human rights groups—and cynically denied by U.S. and Salvadoran officials. By mid-1984, eight months into the escalated air war, many hundreds of civilians had been killed and more than 100,000 driven from their homes. The air force even "used the Red Cross's humanitarian activities to locate and attack groups of displaced people in areas of conflict." One tactic was to cancel Red Cross visits at the last minute and greet the gatherings of unsuspecting sick and homeless peasants with a parcel of bombs and bullets.[7] Meanwhile, civilians in Guazapa were being burned to death by incendiary weapons—napalm and white phosphorous, according to medical experts. Government troops acknowledged that villages in the area had been

2. Americas Watch report, 1982; the actual number was over 600.
3. Bonner, *op cit.* n. 1, p. 324.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 325-26.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 338-39.
6. In the words of a report by the congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, entitled "U.S. Aid to El Salvador," February 1985.
7. *Christian Science Monitor*, March 26, 1984.

"burned to the ground . . . by incendiary bombs."[8]

While these atrocities were taking place, candidate Duarte was singing the praises of the military on the presidential campaign trail. The election of 1984 resembled the 1982 affair in that it was sponsored and staged by the Reagan administration and restricted to pro-army candidates. It differed from the 1982 contest in that the White House invested heavily ($2 million, disbursed by the CIA) in a particular outcome: the defeat of D'Aubuisson. Though he, like the administration, favored a military solution to the civil war, a D'Aubuisson victory would deprive the armed forces of the means to pursue it. His well-deserved reputation as an ultra-rightist gangster would lead Congress to block all but a trickle of military aid. On the other hand, a victory for Duarte—ostensibly the "peace" candidate—would loosen congressional purse strings. Gullible liberals could be counted on to vote for aid so that Duarte could "seek peace" from a position of strength. The $2 million did the trick: Duarte defeated D'Aubuisson in a runoff election in May.

Within days of his triumph, Duarte was in Washington performing the function of the Salvadoran head of state. He insisted that no "degrading" human-rights strings be attached to military aid and pledged—with a straight face—to abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among its principles are the right to live, freedom of expression and assembly, and a prohibition on torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention. No one pointed out that Duarte had made no effort to uphold these principles as junta president, and that even if he had undergone a change of heart in the intervening years, it was beyond his power to enforce military compliance with the Declaration. He got the guns, without strings.

More "Abuses of Authority"

On July 23, 1984, Americas Watch charged[9] that "indiscriminate attacks on civilians by El Salvador's armed forces are continuing at a high level. . . . 1,331 noncombatants had

8. *Ibid.*, April 27, 1984.

9. As paraphrased by the Associated Press.

Duarte and the U.S. Churchwomen

On December 2, 1980, Sisters Ita Ford, Maura Clarke, and Dorothy Kazel and lay worker Jean Donovan were raped and murdered by five low-ranking soldiers of the Salvadoran National Guard (henceforth, the "Lowly Five"). In May 1984, some three and a half years later, the Lowly Five were tried and convicted of murder.

In an interview conducted in July 1984 and published in the November 1984 *Playboy*, Duarte described the trial as "an expression of the moral conviction of the government that arrested and indicted the guardsmen. And that was my doing, because *I* was president of the junta at that time and the entire junta, together with the military high command, turned the prisoners over to the judge. . . . " He denied that the current defense minister, Gen. Eugénio Vides Casanova, had initially covered up the crime and blocked the investigation in 1980-81 in his capacity as director of the National Guard. As Duarte explained on *Meet the Press*, May 20, 1984, "The investigation was made by me personally. So if there was any cover-up, I did it, but I investigated the whole thing. . . . I don't believe there was any cover-up on that."

While Duarte has *publicly* maintained throughout that the Lowly Five acted on their own—they "are the only and the true guilty ones"—in private he has indicated otherwise, at least on one occasion. According to the June 1, 1984, *Los Angeles Times*, at a private meeting with a group of congresspersons and congressional staffers in Washington on May 22, 1984, Duarte said that "evidence suggests that Col. Oscar Edgardo Casanova," the defense minister's cousin, "may have ordered the slayings." (The quote is Rep. Mary Rose Oakar's (Dem.-Ohio) recollection of Duarte's remark. Two others at the meeting confirmed her account.)

The same article notes that Col. Sigifredo Ochoa, the Warlord of Chalatenango, "is reported to have told Senate aides that he believes Vides Casanova's cousin ordered the murders and Vides Casanova attempted to cover up the guard's involvement in the crime to protect his cousin." (Both Casanovas categorically deny the allegations.)

The private remarks of Duarte and Ochoa contradict Duarte's public remarks and substantiate the elements of the account of the crime and cover-up offered by Roberto Santivañez, the former intelligence chief in El Salvador who defected in 1984. At the time of the crime, Santivañez was serving as an adviser on intelligence matters to the high command.

On December 3, 1980, the night after the crime, Santivañez insists that the entire military hierarchy knew that Lt. Col. Casanova had ordered the murder of the churchwomen. Santivañez himself learned of Casanova's responsibility that evening from a high-ranking army officer. Fearful that this vicious act would result in a cutoff of U.S. aid, Santivañez met with the army chief of staff the next day and urged that Casanova be charged "for the good of the country." As the days passed, Santivañez realized that the "highest echelons of the junta and the high command were involved in the decision to protect the guilty man and cover up all traces of the murderers' activities on Dec. 2." He implicated by name Duarte and Vides Casanova in the cover-up (see Ana Carrigan, *Salvador Witness* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 310-317).

Duarte's claim that there was no cover-up is definitively disproved by Judge Harold Tyler. In the spring of 1983, President Reagan, under pressure from the Senate, appointed Tyler to conduct "an independent and high-level review of all evidence available pertaining to the churchwomen's case." Tyler's report of December 2, 1983, while shedding little light on Edgardo Casanova's guilt or innocence, nevertheless demonstrates that:

(1) The Lowly Five confessed their guilt to fellow

been killed in the first six months of 1984, mainly from air attacks." Duarte denied it. The next day he boldly declared that he would not "accept a single case of *abuse of authority* wherever it comes. If I find anybody guilty of this, he'll go to prison or I'll go away from the presidency."[10]

But the crimes Americas Watch described were committed by the army and air force, ordered by officers in good standing, and condoned by the high command. No one was "abusing authority" in these operations. "Abuses of authority" were not the cause of the army massacre of 68 civilians in Los Llanitos, Cabañas, carried out only days before Duarte's bold declaration (and carefully documented by Tutela Legal, the human rights office of the San Salvador archdiocese, and several U.S. journalists). Nor does it seem the August 1984 army massacre of dozens of peasants at the Gualsinga River in Chalatenango should be attributed to "abuses of authority." Unable to explain away the massacres with his favorite excuse, Duarte did the next best thing. He denied they ever took place.

In September 1984, Duarte finally admitted that aerial bombing had resulted in civilian deaths and issued guidelines to the air force for the stated purpose of minimizing noncombatant casualties. Predictably, he absolved the air force of responsibility for the deaths. "The terrorists are using the masses as shields and they are using the masses to provoke, exposing the people to be killed," Duarte said. "This is horrible. This is inhuman. But this is not my problem. It's the problem of the subversives' terrorist actions and they have to be held responsible."[11] No respectable observer was describing the 1984 air war in such terms. As for Duarte's guidelines, the air force has continued to violate them and Duarte has pretended that it has not.

The Peacemaker

Duarte the peacemaker was on display at La Palma in October 1984. His out-of-the-blue offer to talk peace with the guerrillas (who had been waiting patiently at the negotiating

10. *New York Times*, July 25, 1984; emphasis added.

11. *New York Times*, September 13, 1984.

Guardsmen repeatedly in the days following the murder.

(2) The Salvadoran authorities' response was to commission "two investigations, one public and one private, both with apparently the same objective: to create a written record absolving the Salvadoran security forces of responsibility for the murders."

(3) Vides Casanova appointed Major Lizandro Zepeda to conduct the private "investigation," and Zepeda reported directly to him. Yet when Tyler and his associates interviewed Vides Casanova, he was "evasive" and "professed a disturbing lack of knowledge of Zepeda's investigation."

At this early stage, December 1980 to May 1981, the Salvadoran government refused to admit the guilt even of the Lowly Five, let alone the officer who allegedly gave the orders. On December 27, 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, in a secret cable to the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, assessed Duarte's performance to date: "We do not see him active in pressuring investigation." Ambassador Robert White told Congress in April 1981 that, in the month of December, "there was no serious investigation into the death of the nuns, and as far as I am concerned there never has been and I know of no evidence to say that the situation has changed" (Carrigan, p. 286).

This phase of the cover-up collapsed in May 1981, after the U.S. Embassy confronted Duarte and Defense Minister García with evidence of the guilt of the triggermen and demanded their arrest. They were promptly arrested. (At this point they were the Lowly Six. The sixth Guardsman was subsequently found to have participated only in the abduction of the women, and was released.)

In September 1981, Congress conditioned further military aid on a good-faith effort by the Salvadoreans to prosecute the case, to be certified by President Reagan every six months. On January 26, 1982, two days before Reagan was required to certify, García announced that the Lowly Six would stand trial "within a few days."

The Salvadoreans stonewalled for the next 20 months, forcing Reagan to lie to Congress at certification time in order to keep the arms flowing to the state terrorists (always the primary concern of the White House). Then, in November 1983, Congress made the Salvadoran army an offer it couldn't refuse: $19 million for a resolution of the case. The Lowly Five were tried on May 23, 1984, and the jury handed in a verdict of guilty of murder the very next day.

For $19 million, senior army officers were willing to sacrifice the freedom of five enlisted men. The question of how huge a sum would have been required for them to permit the prosecution of a fellow officer—something unheard of in El Salvador—did not come up. They made sure of that.

According to former Ambassador White, two Guardsmen who *were* in a position to link a commanding officer to the crime had been executed by military death squads prior to the congressional offer of November 1983. And the *New York Times* (May 6, 1985) reported the allegations of a Salvadoran lawyer on the steps the military took to secure an obedient legal defense team for the Lowly Five.

In December 1982, during the stonewalling phase, three attorneys were assigned to the Lowly Five. Salvador António Ibarra was joined by two lawyers who made little effort to hide their links to the high command. They pressed Ibarra not to contradict a statement that "the possibility of a cover-up had been thoroughly investigated" and rejected a statement he regarded as "an outright lie." The common-law wife of one of the Lowly Five told Ibarra that her husband and the other defendants had told her that they were merely "carrying out orders from above" on that fateful night.

Ibarra refused to cooperate in a cover-up, and for this he was abducted on October 30, 1983, and tortured at National Guard headquarters. Only the intercession of the International Red Cross and the U.S. Embassy secured his release. (He fled to the U.S. and currently resides in Texas. He has applied for political asylum.) At the trial of the Lowly Five, the legal defense chose not to argue that their clients had merely been "carrying out orders from above."

Considering all the information recorded above, including Duarte's private remarks, one must take with a grain of salt his public denial of a cover-up and insistence that the Lowly Five are "the only and the true guilty ones." ●

Credit: Associated Press

Duarte shakes hands with Roberto D'Aubuisson during a reception in the presidential palace. Looking on is Assemblyman Hugo Barrera.

table for three years) was quickly endorsed by the army and the Reagan administration, neither of which was (or is) known to favor a political resolution of the conflict. Why would advocates of outright military victory support a peace process? Because Duarte's negotiating position, from which he never budged, called on the guerrillas to lay down their arms and compete for power through the "democratic process," under the watchful eye of the armed forces—that is, to surrender.

La Palma was a smashing success. Duarte's fraudulent gesture was interpreted in the U.S. as a good-faith attempt to settle the civil war. Congress was so impressed that there hasn't been any serious opposition to military aid since La Palma. Hawks naturally have continued to vote for aid, while a flock of dimwitted doves have switched their vote to "yes" on the assumption that "peace" is just around the corner and therefore it is not the time to weaken the bargaining position of El Salvador's saviour. The doves' reward? For 19 months the army of El Salvador would not allow its "commander-in-chief" to return to the negotiating table. Not until June 1986 did the army relent, granting Duarte permission again to seek the unconditional surrender of the guerrillas in talks set for late July or August. Meaningful negotiations, however, will remain a dead letter so long as Congress provides the army with what it considers the means to pursue total victory.

The *Contras'* Friend

Duarte has served well the Reagan agenda for Nicaragua, heaping scorn on the Sandinistas and endorsing aid to the *contras*, whose depravity rivals the Salvadoran army's.

Duarte has supported *contra* aid on the theory that it helps interdict the infamous "massive" flow of arms, via land, air, and sea, from Nicaragua—a theory that coincides with two early Reaganite disinformation themes: Nicaragua is flooding El Salvador with arms; the purpose of *contra* aid is to interdict these arms. In an interview published in the November 1984 *Playboy*, Duarte was asked if he had proof of Nicaraguan gunrunning. His reply:

> Look, it doesn't matter what I say or what proof I give you, you are always going to say it's not sufficient evidence. . . . The entire world does not want to accept any evidence that is offered by El Salvador and the U.S. In contrast, it accepts any evidence, even verbal evidence, that the Sandinista government offers as proof of U.S. interference. Let the Sandinistas make any declaration about U.S. intervention and they have instant credibility. . . . Here in *Playboy*, you are not going to publish "Duarte makes important declaration about Nicaraguan intervention." No, instead, you will say, "Duarte alleges some possibility without proof of any kind." That's how the image of our country is distorted.

Though Duarte knows that the goal of Reagan and his *contras* is to oust the Sandinistas, and though he's repeatedly endorsed aid to the *contras*, he refuses to state publicly that he supports the violent overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. Setting aside the evident hypocrisy and duplicity, Duarte's reasoning, as reported in the *New York Times* (March 23, 1986), is that such a public posture would deprive him of the moral high ground when denouncing Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran FMLN.

Duarte's position ascribes a symmetry to the two conflicts that is not apparent. In Nicaragua, a popular government is under assault from a terrorist force totally dependent on foreign aid and bases and led by the remnants of a despised, 46-year dictatorship. In El Salvador, an indigenous resistance movement faces a U.S.-sponsored killing machine—the armed forces—that is wholly responsible for the civil war, having for 50 years blocked every attempt by the people to bring about change through peaceful, democratic means. Given this background, Nicaragua need not be ashamed of the moral support it provides the Salvadoran rebels.

Duarte's position is doubly duplicitous, for his government is in fact actively engaged in the U.S. effort to overthrow the Sandinistas. In June 1985, for example, a "DC-3 cargo plane . . . filled with guns and ammunition" flew from Miami to the Ilopango military airport in El Salvador, from where a smaller plane "ferried the weapons to rebel camps in Costa Rica." And since October 1985, U.S. aid to the *contras* has been channeled through El Salvador, with the approval of its air forces, "in an effort to make up for a recent cutoff of supplies by Honduras."[12]

Duarte has been a good soldier in Reagan's propaganda war against Nicaragua. On June 1, 1985, he described Nicaragua as "the cancer from which Central America is suffering." In an address to the National Press Club in Washington, October 31, 1985, he said the "terrorist dictatorship" in Nicaragua is "the Central American source for totalitarianism and violence, and is the sanctuary for terrorists."

Duarte picked up on the favorite theme of the propaganda war—censorship of the press—in a May 16, 1985, appearance at the White House to drum up support for "humanitarian" aid to the *contras*. Contrasting El Salvador's successful revolution with the "betrayed" revolution of Nicaragua, Duarte declared: "Our press is free to say and publish what it wants. *La Prensa* in Nicaragua is censored every day down to a few lines."

Duarte exaggerated the degree to which the pro-*contra* scandal sheet is censored. Worse, he failed to note that the Salvadoran military is "free" to destroy any newspaper that criticizes it. The army did just that to the last of the opposition papers, *El Independiente*, in 1981, eliciting not a peep of protest from Duarte. The press that remains either supports the government or criticizes it from the right. These papers do not print stories "critical of the government from a human rights standpoint," reports Americas Watch (September 1985). "Freedom of the press" is hardly the issue around which a Salvadoran president should try to rally support for the killer *contras*.

12. *New York Times*, February 13, 1986.

Further Statistics

Last year saw a statistical improvement in the human rights record of the Salvadoran armed forces, though the statistics probably would not be much consolation to the families of the year's civilian victims. In 1983, government killings of civilians outpaced guerrilla killings of civilians by 85 to one. In 1985, the ratio stood at about 14 to one, with government forces killing "only" four or five noncombatants per day. The army and security forces continued to practice torture in this period, but not on the mass scale of earlier years.

Duarte rewarded the groups that documented these reduced human rights abuses by challenging their competence and integrity. For daring to report on the persisting air war on the civilian population in conflictive and guerrilla-controlled zones, the staff of Tutela Legal was called "unreliable" and accused of "permanently working under the direction of (those) trying to help the subversive groups."[13] When Amnesty International and Americas Watch documented army and air force attacks on defenseless civilians, Duarte shot back that they had been duped by guerrilla propaganda.[14]

Conclusion

Duarte: the man and the myth. A look at the record reveals that the myth is a dedicated defender of human rights, the man an apologist for human rights abusers and an abuser of human rights defenders. The myth is said to have taken control of the armed forces, but the man apparently can't say boo without the permission of the high command. The myth seeks peace and reconciliation, while the man seeks substantial unconditional aid for those committed to a military solution.

Genuine congressional critics of the Reagan administration's militaristic aims in Central America, who have nevertheless voted for aid in response to an emotional appeal from Duarte the myth, would be well advised to take a closer look at Duarte the man. ●

13. *Dallas Morning News*, March 30, 1985.

14. Pacifica News, May 22, 1985.

Film Review

Oliver Stone's "Salvador"

Reviewed by Allan Frankovich*

***Salvador**, Hemdale Film Corp.; produced by Gerald Green and Oliver Stone; directed by Oliver Stone; written by Oliver Stone and Richard Boyle; color, 122 minutes.*

Oliver Stone's "Salvador" is the finest dramatic film to have come out of the Central American conflict. It has the hard edges of historic truth and does not skitter away—as a Costa Gavras film might have—from the simple important fact: The death squads in El Salvador have been the necessary policy instruments of our freedom-loving, duly-elected government.

Today El Salvador is a "free" country because of the death squads, and our President is popular because he has lost nothing to Communism—and only part of his gut to cancer. If the Duarte government could neutralize the guerrillas who have armed themselves rather than accept particularly brutal deaths, we might expect to see "Shoah" at a local San Salvador art house. "Shoah" is about history, we are told; but "Salvador" is about refuse disposal, how live humans go from the local army barracks to the garbage dump as the American Embassy has the American press over for cocktails.

Oliver Stone and writer Richard Boyle have telescoped the terrible events of 1980 and 1981 into their script: the death squads, the 2,000 bodies a month, the murders of Archbishop Oscar Romero and four American innocents abroad—missionaries serving their savior. The story is framed in the adrenaline rushes of two palookas—James Woods as an autobiographical Richard Boyle, a down-and-out freelancer giving himself a last chance charge at the big S, doing it his way, without the brie; and a pal he shanghais, Doctor Rock, played by Jim Belushi, a disc jockey weaned on Janis Joplin, cheap thrills, sex, hooch, and uppers and downers.

The film has the feel of Central America – the drunks weaving across the roads, the pot holes, puddles, open sewers, cantinas, bargain whore houses, open air eateries, and burned-out car hulks. Boyle has some leftovers in Salvador, a local woman he loved during a past trip and a photographer friend. When he meets the woman again, he loves her without the patronizing condescension for the "poor, beautiful, how-they-enrich-us" Latins so characteristic of gringo corporate, religious, or political do-gooders. He wants this woman and he gets her, with her kids, mom, brothers, and first and second cousins.

Floating over the local dust, the cheap liquor and sweaty carnality, there is the official American presence—the Embassy, press, and military advisory group crowd gathering around a swank hotel swimming pool to hear the 1980 Reagan-Carter election results. The CIA's man Tom comes across as a nice guy. They usually are. This nice guy is Robert Redford handsome, smooth talking, and reasonable.

Except for a few false inflections and some dramatic hyperbole, especially in the casting and direction of the latino bad guys, there is a proliferation of fine characterizations, thinly disguised versions of the real figures of Roberto D'Aubuisson, Archbishop Romero, and U.S. Ambassador Robert White. The pace is quick.

Boyle sees himself as a weasel. He has the quick turn of the head, but not the successful furtiveness of a real weasel. He does get into the chicken coop, but usually to find the door slammed shut behind him. He cuts deals, the kind of small betrayals freelancers must often make to survive. He'll give the CIA and the military attaché a first look at photographs he takes of guerrillas, their arms and camps, in return for an identity card for his lover. A *cedula* means life or death in El Salvador. When the Embassy refuses to accept the photographic evidence that the guerrillas' arms are captured American weapons, not Soviet-bloc imports, Boyle delivers in response the one speech in the film, and it is in character.

As Boyle boils over, we accept his claim to be as American

* Allan Frankovich is a documentary filmmaker, whose "On Company Business," a three-hour film about the CIA, has been shown around the world. His most recent work is "Short Circuit," about the death squads in El Salvador. For details, write to Isla-Negra Films, 2735 Fulton Street, Berkeley CA 94705.

as the Embassy flacks because he is making his speech from the gutter, not a soap box. And there is some real love in that gutter. What he says about the origin of the death squads, United States complicity, and the American training received by the Roberto D'Aubuisson look-alike, Major Max, as the movie's head of death squads is absolutely accurate. D'Aubuisson was trained by the CIA at Georgetown, and in American bases in Panama. This simple and key fact is something the big media will never tell us unequivocally.

Boyle's betrayal of the guerrillas who trusted him is an insignificant breach of journalistic ethics compared to the sleazy deals regular television correspondents make. In 1980-81, you could have seen them in the Camino Real or Sheraton hotels, bored out of their minds, making the nightly run to the brothel, snorting coke, going off in rat packs to feed off the bodies or shoot the bang-bang, then returning to do gutless stand-ups with Salvador behind them, as if a country were just a billboard. Boyle doesn't like a perfectly cast network Barbie Doll reporter. He believes she really sucked her way up the corporate ladder. We watch her on assignment, lying and talking around the truth.

Boyle's other friend, a photographer modeled after John Hoagland, killed under fire, is an avatar out of another myth: two eyes on the prowl for the perfect shot. John Savage plays the character with proper perspiring obsession. He pays for his big picture with a rattle in the throat as he dies while covering a guerrilla offensive. Boyle sucks the blood out after giving his friend an emergency tracheotomy. As he holds his dying buddy in his arms, taking the blood- and dust-soaked rolls of film, you know Stone and Boyle have seen combat deaths.

"Salvador" also preserves small details and ambiguities—as in the American Ambassador, modeled on real envoy Robert White. Our emissary cuts off military aid after the four American missionaries are raped and murdered, only to restore it after a pouty little speech when the guerrillas strike in force. More death is preferable to losing Salvador. American arrogance comes in two doses, liberal and conservative. Both are lethal.

Boyle and his woman friend do finally get through the countries between El Salvador and the U.S. At the border he comes home. She and the kids are hauled out of the land of the free and the home of the brave by the Border Patrol, wearing uniforms most Americans only see on their suburban garbage men. The film has already told us enough. We don't have to be told now how they treat Central Americans in detention centers along our glorious frontiers. Boyle reacts to the Border Patrol as if they were death squads, and the response is authentic, for both are instruments of the same policy. It appears that our shores now welcome only worn-out dictators and idle murderers. ●

(Continued from page 52.)

were the various opposition parties in Nicaragua, as we shall see.

Access to the Ballot

A variety of parties may compete in an election but if they are denied roughly equal conditions of competition or access to the ballot or shoved to the edge of the political arena, it cannot be said that democratic competition exists. In the U.S. all fifty states have laws, written and enforced by Republican and Democratic officials, regulating party access to the ballot—often in ways restrictive enough to keep smaller parties from participating, thus depriving the electorate of the freedom to choose someone other than a Democrat or a Republican. Minor parties are often required to gather a large number of signatures on nominating petitions in a limited time. Thus in Pennsylvania third-party state-wide candidates must collect 36,000 signatures in a three-week period; in Maryland candidates are required to collect over 55,000 signatures in a short time. Sometimes a 5 percent requirement for signatures has been interpreted to mean 5 percent of voters from every district within the state—an impossible task for a third party whose base might be confined to a few urban areas.

In some states voters who are registered with the major parties are not allowed to sign or circulate minor-party nominating petitions. Petitions are sometimes thrown out by hostile officials on trivial and sometimes unlawful technicalities (as happened to the Communist Party in Illinois and Connecticut in recent elections) compelling minor parties to pursue expensive court battles that further strain their financial resources.

In some states minor parties must pay exorbitant filing fees: $5,000 in Louisiana for an independent candidate. To get on the ballot in all 50 states, a third party would have to expend an estimated $750,000 in filing fees and other expenses and collect 1.2 million signatures, a feat accomplished in 1984 by no third party. And the trend is toward less and less ballot access: in the last 12 years, sixteen states have tightened the restrictions. Between 1980 and 1984, for example, the states of Indiana and North Dakota quadrupled the number of signatures required to get on the ballot.

In Nicaragua, in striking contrast, the electoral law favors the smaller political parties. In 1984 any party could register to field candidates by merely presenting a national directorate and two representatives from each of the country's nine regions. One of the parties that so registered, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) asked to withdraw from the contest four days before election day. The Electoral Council ruled that it was too late for a party to pull out but that individual candidates could withdraw their names if they chose. None did so.

Accessibility to the Electorate

Being on the ballot does little good if the bulk of the voters have never heard of you or never hear *from* you. Third parties in the United States are given almost no national media coverage during campaigns. News media focus exclusively on the two major parties, failing even to report the votes that third parties get on election day (usually between one and two million all together), thus treating the minor parties as if they do not exist. Lacking the huge sums available to the major parties, especially the Republicans, the smaller parties are unable to buy major media time and space of their own. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 finances the major parties, giving each tens of millions of dollars for their presidential campaigns, but the smaller parties can obtain federal funds only after they glean 5 percent of the national vote (about 4 million votes for any one party) In sum, they cannot get the money until they get the 5 percent, but they cannot get the 5 percent until they get the money.

In contrast, the Nicaraguan electoral law provided public financing of 9 million cordobas ($321,000) for each participating party *regardless of size* and guaranteed an equal amount of time each day on the state-run radio stations and television channels. Each party was also permitted to receive unlimited

funds from private donors, including people and organizations outside Nicaragua, a provision that worked to the advantage of the centrist and rightist parties. As the campaign got under way, complaints from the participating parties led to changes in the electoral law, including an increase in radio and television time, an additional 3 million cordobas in government campaign funds for each party, and a lengthening of the campaign period. Parties were also guaranteed access to products in short supply in Nicaragua: paper, printing facilities, transportation and gasoline. The various parties also produced their own party newspapers, together with leaflets and billboards.

Absence of Coercion

Instances of coercion and harassment of candidates have not been an unusual occurrence in U.S. elections. In the United States third-party candidates especially those of a pronouncedly leftist hue have run into difficulties of this sort. Harassment may not be confined to the candidates themselves but may include their supporters and canvassers. In 1972 in Vermont, persons who merely signed Communist Party ballot petitions found their names publicized by town clerks in an effort to embarrass them into withdrawing their signatures. Generally though, in modern times American elections have not been marked by violence nor by any serious degree of threat against candidates. The coercions are largely of the legal kind noted earlier which work well enough against third parties. In regard to individual voters, however, it should be noted that not every American citizen has the right to an uncoerced vote, as testified by the continuing need for a Civil Rights Voting Act, the renewal of which President Reagan opposed.

Turning to Nicaragua, we find there were serious acts of violence and murder in the 1984 election—all committed by the forces supported by the Reagan administration. The *contras* killed the presidents of two polling stations and two volunteer workers involved in registration. In the Jinotega mountains, one polling station worker's throat was cut by the *contras* in front of his wife and family. On election day a member of the electoral police was shot to death by *contras* in La Tronca. In all, twelve election workers lost their lives in assaults by counterrevolutionaries.

The election was less than flawless in its procedures, but the overall performance was one that the Nicaraguan democracy can be proud of. There was free and open campaigning in every area of the country except in some war zones. According to estimates by the Supreme Electoral Council, there were some 250 public rallies. In general the election was characterized by untrammeled and vigorous political debate. If the FSLN was instituting a totalitarian regime, it was going about it in the wrong way.

About five of the public rallies were marred by incidents of violence, but no serious injuries were reported. During the first months of the campaign a number of parties also reported that their campaign workers had been harassed by members of the FSLN, or that their posters had been destroyed. The Sandinista leadership denounced these incidents and they seemed to diminish thereafter. In addition, several rallies held by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Committee (CDN), a coalition of conservative business-oriented parties that abstained from the election, were disrupted by fights between CDN supporters and Sandinista counterdemonstrators. These rallies were technically illegal since the CDN had refused to participate in the election and indeed spent its time during the campaign attacking the electoral system itself. Once the CDN decided to conduct what seemed like a sabotage of the electoral effort (in the eyes of FSLN supporters), clashes with counterdemonstrators were difficult to avoid.

Because of these incidents, Arturo Cruz claimed that he was attacked by "mobs" and that free electoral competition did not exist. It should be recalled that the country is at war and that Cruz openly identified with the enemy and was not at any time functioning as a legal or serious candidate. When Cruz, a banker in Washington, arrived in Managua five months before the election, the CDN suddenly announced he would be their unified presidential candidate. Without officially registering as a candidate, Cruz toured the country for several days, drawing small crowds. As suddenly as he arrived, he left, announcing he would not run under the prevailing electoral conditions. Throughout this period the U.S. media and the U.S. government described him as the "major opposition candidate" and treated his nonparticipation as evidence that the election was an unfair and meaningless exercise. In conflict with this view is the one expressed in the report, cited herein, by U.S. citizens in Nicaragua:

> In general, our perception of the electoral campaign period is that the harassment and fistfights were scattered incidents that did not affect the generally free atmosphere of the electoral process. We found our neighbors and co-workers unafraid to voice their opinions, and heard and read virulent criticism of the FSLN. We know of no pressure on Nicaraguans to vote for the Sandinista Front. In particular, we found no truth in the charge made by *La Prensa* that the cards which entitle families to receive subsidized food allotments were controlled in a concerted effort to influence Nicaraguans' votes. We conclude that the electoral campaign provided Nicaraguans with abundant information on which to base a free decision about their vote.

A similar conclusion was reached by the 460 official observers from all over the world who were free to check out all aspects of the voting process and ballot counting. None of the seven participating parties filed any charges of fraud.

System of Representation

The FSLN won 64.9% of the vote, a victory that was only a few percentage points higher than the one enjoyed by Ronald Reagan in 1984. The two runner-up parties, both center-rightist, won 13% and 9% respectively. The National Assembly seats were allocated according to proportional representation so that minority parties were assured of 35 of the 96 seats (including six seats that under the electoral law are allotted to the losing presidential candidates of each party). All this was dismissed by Reagan as "an electoral farce without any meaningful political opposition."

In contrast, the single-member-district electoral system used in the United States is much less representative and therefore less democratic. The party that polls a plurality of the vote, be it 40, 50 or 60 percent, wins 100 percent of a district's representation, while smaller parties, regardless of their vote, receive zero representation. Proportional representation provides a party with legislative seats roughly in accordance with the percentage of votes it wins, thus assuring minor parties of some parliamentary presence. But the single-member, winner-take-all system magnifies the strength of the major parties and leaves the minor parties with a percentage of seats (if any) that is far lower than its percentage of votes. The winner-take-all system deprives third parties not only of representation but eventually of voters too, since not many citizens wish to

"waste" their ballots on a party that seems incapable of establishing a legislative presence.

Minorities

There are other criteria by which the American and Nicaraguan democracies might be compared. For instance, there is the treatment of minorities. Much is made of the Sandinistas' forced relocation of Miskito Indians during a time of serious border attack, a policy that quickly proved not only wrong but in some instances wrongful. Today Managua is now trying to undo its previous policy and resettle the Miskito on their lands, an approach that compares favorably with the U.S. treatment of Native American Indians, to say the least, and with the forced relocation of the Japanese into concentration camps during World War II, uprooting them from California communities that—unlike Nicaragua—were never threatened by enemy invasion. Nor did the U.S. government ever compensate the Japanese for the losses they sustained in the way of homes, businesses and farms.

Political Dissent

There is the more general question of freedom of communication for dissenting ideas. *La Prensa* is not the only opposition voice in Nicaragua. About half of the radio and television stations in the country are privately owned and most of these give the government a daily ideological pounding that makes National Public Radio look like the tepid establishment mouthpiece it is. The various political parties also produced their own newspapers during the campaign. There is a war going on in Nicaragua. The country is encircled by hostile forces, has endured invasions on both of its borders and has suffered much loss of life and destruction of property, yet the censorship imposed is no worse and probably less restrictive than what the U.S. government imposed during World War II, and Managua's treatment of dissenters and collaborators has been far more tolerant and liberal than the treatment accorded Tory sympathizers during and immediately after the American revolution or dissenters who received long prison terms during World War I.

In the United States, dissenting views that go beyond the mainstream, or even much left of center, are rarely allowed time or space in the major media, but are consigned to small-circulation magazines that teeter on the edge of insolvency. In short, there is a greater plurality of ideas, ideologies, and debate in Nicaragua than in the United States. On this score Nicaragua is a more open, more pluralistic society. It may not always remain so however. Subject to enough threat and siege, assault and murder, the Nicaraguans will start tightening up, choosing security over dissent, survival over pluralism. Indeed, it is miraculous that they haven't already done so. The signs are there; President Daniel Ortega has said: "In the hardest moments we have to convert the defeats into more ideological unity, more political unity ... [and] more organization." (*Miami Herald*, August 4, 1985).

If the U.S. government were really interested in encouraging pluralistic dissent in Nicaragua, it would pursue a policy quite the opposite of the one now in the saddle, offering Managua friendship and support and the hope for peaceful independence and security. Democracy is a delicate flower that does not do well when repeatedly stomped upon.

Religious Freedom

The Reagan administration has charged that there is religious persecution in Nicaragua. But the Catholic church is alive and well. Elements of its clergy and laity can be found playing prominent roles on both sides within Nicaragua, struggling hard to build—or destroy—the revolution. Religious practice is not interfered with. The Rev. Miguel Gray, a Nicaraguan Baptist minister, hailed the religious freedom enjoyed in that country and pointed to the building of 19 additional churches since 1979—in a desperately poor country where not too many buildings of any kind are going up.

The level of religious tolerance in the United States today is as good as might be found anywhere. But in recent years the disturbing intolerance manifested by such groups as the Moral Majority, and the President's open association with the religious Right, including his announcement that "ours is a Christian nation," might cause us to give more attention to the question of religious tolerance here at home.

Human Needs

If democracy means more than a set of procedures but implies something about the substantive conditions of life, then here too poor Nicaragua looks better than rich America in the era of Ronald Reagan. Decades of colonialism, Somocista pillaging, earthquake, revolution and counterrevolution, have left Nicaragua with a legacy of extreme poverty, yet the very worst is not happening to the poor citizens of that country as it is to the poor on the streets in Washington D.C.; no one is starving and no one has been tossed aside like so much human refuse.

International Behavior

Finally, in comparing Nicaragua with the United States, we might consider the degree to which each country is interfering with the political development and security of the other. As Reagan himself aptly put it: "Democracies do not spend a lot of money on arms, build large armies or invade or destabilize their neighbors." With typical Orwellian inversion he was aiming this remark at Nicaragua but it applies most perfectly to his own administration, which spends more money on arms and more time destabilizing and invading neighbors than we could ever imagine Nicaragua doing. The truth is also inverted when Reagan calls the Sandinistas "terrorists." To be sure, there is plenty of terrorism going on in Nicaragua and plenty being exported to other countries in Central America, but it is conducted by *contra* mercenaries and Hondurean, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran death squads and military, all financed and advised by the U.S.

Those "democratic socialist" critics on the left, who give qualified and skittish support to Nicaragua, who are quick to point out how they have "problems" with some of the things the Sandinistas are doing, who impose flawless democratic standards upon a tiny country that is under mortal siege from the Yankee Colossus, those critics might want to consider the realities of the situation. It is the United States which should be the object of their professedly democratic concerns; it is the U.S. which falls so dismally short of practicing the democratic pluralism it preaches to others, exporting violence and terrorism, and pummeling a smaller neighbor that is trying to develop a democratic society of its own.

If one criterion of democracy is that a country not act like a thug and aggressor in its dealings with another country—even to the point of refusing to show up in (world) court to defend itself when so charged—then the United States under Reagan comes off looking far less fair, less open, and less democratic than Nicaragua. ●

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

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Is Nicaragua More Democratic Than the United States?

By Michael Parenti*

To justify the policies of attack, encirclement, embargo, and destabilization directed against Nicaragua, the Reagan administration has charged that the Sandinista government is on the road to totalitarianism, that it denies religious and political freedom and is a threat to the security of its neighbors. The goal of U.S. policy, claims President Reagan, is to bring about a pluralistic open society in Nicaragua, a goal that never loomed very large during the fifty years of the Somoza dictatorship. More recently in a book on the Nicaraguan revolution, journalist Shirley Christian echoed this line, arguing that the *contra* war was a justifiable attempt "to force the Sandinista Front into accepting major structural changes toward an open political society."

In response to this position, supporters of the Sandinista revolution have argued that Nicaragua does have a pluralistic society, is attempting to make a better life for its people, has no aggressive designs upon its neighbors, and instead is itself being invaded along two of its borders. Others have shown that by every standard, Nicaragua's elections have been more open and democratic than El Salvador's and its society more humane than most others in Latin America.

Indeed it can be further argued that by every standard Nicaragua is a more democratic society than the one waging aggression against it—and I do not mean Honduras. By every major democratic criterion, Nicaragua comes off looking better than the United States. Let us begin with a comparison of the national elections held in November 1984 in both the United States and Nicaragua.[1]

Popular Participation

One crucial measure of an open political system is the degree of popular participation. Most voting studies in the United States and elsewhere find that nonvoters show a high degree of alienation from the political process; they believe voting is not a means of effecting changes, and they often fail to see a meaningful choice in the candidates presented to them. (This is the view also of a surprisingly large number of persons who *do* vote in the United States.) Therefore a comparison of the respective rates of turnouts in the Nicaraguan and U.S. elections might be worth pondering for a moment.

The turnout in the United States in the 1984 election was a little less than 53 percent of the eligible voters, one of the lowest of any western nation. Yet the press took little note of this and instead treated Reagan's reelection as a landslide victory and a democratic mandate. In contrast, voter turnout was nearly 82 percent in Managua and 75.4 percent in Nicaragua as a whole. Yet this turnout was described in the U.S. press as "disappointing" because the Sandinistas had hoped for an 80 percent national turnout. (Left unmentioned was the fact that in Nicaragua the voting was voluntary, unlike most Latin American countries.)

Range of Political Choice

Elections that offer little choice are said to be wanting in democratic standards. The choice in Nicaragua was noticeably wider and more democratic than in the United States. Seven parties ran for seats in the national assembly and for the presidency, representing a broad ideological range: from those on the far left (who damned the FSLN for its moderate policies and for allegedly betraying the workers and peasants) to those on the center and right (who accused the FSLN of exercising a rigid control over the country, wrecking the economy and leading Nicaragua to war). All these charges and countercharges were reported and debated extensively in the public and private press in Nicaragua.

In the United States the choice was limited largely to Democrats and Republicans, who in many races are often hard to tell apart. True, there were a variety of minor parties but these were not accorded the same opportunity for participation as

(Continued on page 48.)

1. Much of the information regarding the 1984 Nicaraguan national election is from "Their Vote Decided" a report by the Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua (CUSCLIN, Managua, Nicaragua).

* Michael Parenti writes and lectures frequently on U.S. domestic and foreign politics. His most recent book is *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

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