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New Evidence Backs Ex-Envoy on

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

For six years Edward M. Korry, United States Ambassador to Chile from 1967 to 1971, has insisted that he was not involved in and indeed tried to stop White House efforts to induce a military coup in Chile in 1970 to prevent Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, a Marxist, from assuming the presidency.

Evidence has come to light suggesting that Mr. Korry, despite his strong opposition to the Allende candidacy, was frozen out of the planning for a proposed military coup and warned the White House that it would be risking another "Bay of Pigs" if it got involved in military plots to stop Dr. Allende's election.

Mr. Korry has not worked in his professions, journalism or public affairs, since 1974, two years after the columnist Jack Anderson published International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation documents that seemingly linked Mr. Korry to joint I.T.T.-Central Intelligence Agency operations to block Dr. Allende's election.

Mr. Korry expressed particular bitterness toward The New York Times for what he said was unfair reporting about his role in articles in 1974 that revealed the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile and in refusing in later years, despite his entreaties, to investigate his actions accurately.

Mr. Korry, who lives with his wife in Stonington, Conn., insists that his sullied reputation and his early inability to get appropriate work stem from publication of the I.T.T. documents and from two subsequent widely publicized investigations by Senate committees. He is now a visiting professor of international relations at Connecticut College in New London.

Much of the new evidence, including highly classified internal C.I.A. documents, was provided by a former intelligence official who had direct knowledge of the agency's activities against Dr. Allende, who died in the course of a military uprising against him in 1973. Corroborating information was obtained in interviews with other C.I.A. and White House officials. Internal documents provided by the C.I.A. to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence — and not published by the committee in its reports in 1975 on Chile — have also been obtained. Finally, Mr. Korry made available some of his private communications with Washington during the 1970 election period.

These materials raise new questions about the extent of C.I.A. operations in Chile in 1970 and the efficacy of the Senate committee's investigation. For exam-

ple, an "eyes-only" internal C.I.A. report, filed in early 1971 and not provided to the Intelligence Committee, shows that senior agency officials were aware that an operative had entered Chile under a false passport and posed as a member of the Mafia in making contact with anti-Allende forces.

In another internal 1971 report, William V. Broe, then chief of the agency's clandestine service in Latin America, was formally advised that an operative had posed as a representative of the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation while on special assignment to Chile in October 1970 — a tactic in violation of a Presidential prohibition against the use of American educational and philanthropic foundations as covers. The operative, in later meetings with Chilean businessmen, made it clear, according to the C.I.A. documents, that "as a representative of American business interests," he was eager "to activate a military takeover of the Chilean Government."

None of this, it is now evident, was known to Ambassador Korry.

Not Considered Trustworthy

In interviews, a number of C.I.A. officials directly involved in the anti-Allende operations emphasized that Mr. Korry was not considered trustworthy by the White House or by C.I.A. headquarters. "Korry never did know anything," said an intelligence operative who worked in the embassy under Mr. Korry in 1970.

While he was in Chile, Mr. Korry was known in the Nixon Administration for his outspoken hostility to Dr. Allende and his harsh anti-Communist stance. Mr. Korry, who acknowledges the severity of his views on Dr. Allende, was active in lobbying for a \$400,000 C.I.A. propaganda effort against him and his Marxist views that was authorized by the Nixon Administration in the spring and summer of 1970.

Nonetheless, Mr. Korry insists that he repeatedly advised Washington not to take any steps toward a military solution of the Allende problem. On Oct. 9, 1970, for example, he told the White House in a direct message made available to The New York Times that he was appalled to learn that unauthorized contact had been made by the C.I.A. station in Santiago with Patria y Libertad, a right-wing extremist group advocating the violent overthrow of the Government. "I think any attempt on our part actively to encourage a coup could lead us to a Bay of Pigs failure," he added in the "eyes only" cablegram.

In the interviews Mr. Korry constantly focused on his inability to get newspapers to publish his view of events after he left Chile. But he says that he perhaps waited too long, until 1976, to begin to tell all he knew of the role of the Nixon Administration and its predecessors in Chile.

g tional security interests.

Mr. Korry, who is 59 years old, was a foreign correspondent for United Press and went on to Look magazine, where he served as European editor. In 1962 he was designated Ambassador to Ethiopia by President John F. Kennedy, serving there with distinction, by all accounts, until his assignment to Chile.

His moment in the greatest glare of publicity came in September 1974, soon after The New York Times disclosed that the C.I.A. had spent at least \$8 million in Chile in an effort to prevent Dr. Allende's election and, failing in that, sought to make it impossible for him to govern. Mr. Korry, with Richard M. Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, and two senior State Department officials, was accused by members of the Senate staff of having provided misleading testimony to the Senate multinational subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, which held hearings in March and April 1973 into I.T.T.'s involvement with the Chilean election.

During the hearings Mr. Korry testified that the United States maintained a "total hands off" policy toward the military during the campaign for the election, which Dr. Allende won in a three-way race by only 30,000 votes of three million cast. Mr. Korry denied knowledge of the I.T.T. cablegram that became a focal point of much of the hearings — a report from two I.T.T. officials in Santiago that the Ambassador had finally received "the green light to move in the name of Richard Nixon" against the new President.

Repeatedly refusing to answer many queries in full from the senators and the subcommittee staff director, Jerome I. Levinson, Mr. Korry insisted that to describe confidential communications and official orders would be "contrary to the

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