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Subproject 68: The Case Continues

Secretary of State George Shultz is scheduled to meet tomorrow with his Canadian counterpart, Joe Clark, for their regular quarterly get-together. Along with acid rain, East-West relations and trade, the two will be discussing a matter that has become a sore point with the Canadians but has received little attention on this side of the border: CIA misbehavior in Canada 28 years ago.

Using the code name "Subproject 68," the CIA funded gruesome psychological experiments on Canadian citizens as part of its infamous MK-ULTRA program of brainwashing and mind-bending. According to a lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court here by veteran civil rights attorney Joseph Rauh, at least nine, and possibly more than 50, Canadians were unwitting CIA guinea pigs.

The suit has dragged on for five years, with the CIA refusing to negotiate a reasonable settlement with the victims. In a private letter this month to the chief of Canada's Labor Party, Clark wrote: "I am not satisfied with the slow pace of discussions in District Court, but this, of course, is beyond our control."

Sean Brady, Clark's press secretary, told our

associate Tony Capaccio: "We expect to be discussing this issue in some detail" with Shultz at the Calgary, Alberta, meeting.

Subproject 68 started in January 1957, when the CIA approved a \$60,000 grant to Dr. Ewen Cameron, a world-renowned psychiatrist at the Allan Memorial Institute in Montreal. The CIA has insisted, in its defending against Rauh's lawsuit, that it had not solicited Cameron's application for the grant.

But that's not the way the agency's "project monitor" remembered it. In a sworn deposition two years ago, John W. Gittinger said he had asked a CIA undercover man to approach Cameron and encourage him to apply for a grant. (There is no evidence that Cameron was aware he was asking for or taking money from the CIA, which used a front group.)

Gittinger testified that he was interested in Cameron's work on voice-stress analysis, which he figured would help the CIA in its studies of the stress an individual undergoes during interrogation. He admitted, however, that Cameron's application for the grant contained no plans for such work.

"I went along with the idea of giving him the \$60,000," Gittinger explained, "because that's

what he asked for. We wanted contact with him and to know what he was doing, primarily in the audio area."

What, in fact, was in Cameron's application was a proposal to conduct the kind of experiments that even a CIA general counsel characterized years later as "repugnant." Cameron's proposal called, among other things, for "the breaking down of ongoing patterns of the patient's behavior by means of particularly intensive electro-shocks (depatterning)."

His proposal also called for "the intensive repetition (16 hours a day for six to seven days) of prearranged verbal signals" while the patient was "kept in partial sensory isolation."

Even more ominously, Cameron's application stated: "We propose to use LSD-25 and other similar agents as a means of breaking down the ongoing patterns of behavior."

This mention of the unpredictable hallucinogenic drug should have been a red flag to the CIA officials. Three years earlier, then CIA director Allen Dulles had chastised Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, head of the Technical Services Division, for its role in the suicide of Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army. Olson was surreptitiously given a dose of LSD in a

glass of liqueur. He leaped through a 10th-floor hotel room window a few days later.

Gittinger testified in his 1983 deposition that he hadn't noticed the LSD proposal in Cameron's application. In any case, the CIA project monitor said it was not his job to raise questions about Cameron's testing methods. If the CIA officials were unconcerned about LSD experiments three years after being admonished for using them, what exactly were they concerned with in the Canadian venture?

One reason for exporting MK-ULTRA, Gittinger testified, was that association with a psychiatrist of Cameron's renown would be "good cover" for the CIA front group that gave him the \$60,000 grant.

In retrospect, Gittinger acknowledged 26 years later, in his deposition: "That was a foolish mistake. We shouldn't have done it. . . . I'm sorry we did it because it turned out to be a terrible mistake."

The program, Gittinger explained, "turned out to be something of no interest" to the CIA. Cameron, however, wrote a thank-you note to the CIA-front society in early 1960, saying the grant had been "invaluable."

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