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Interview with Turner and Kline

KATHLEEN SULLIVA: Bob Woodward's book about William Casey and the CIA has brought denials from the White House and from Casey's immediate family, and it has also touched off some very spirited debates about journalistic methods and the nature of intelligence itself.

Joining us now from Washington are two senior veterans of the CIA. Stansfield Turner was Director of the CIA from 1977 to '81 under President Carter. Ray Kline was the Deputy Director from 1962 to '66, and he was later the Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department from '69 to '73.

Gentlemen, good morning.

STANSFIELD TURNER: Good morning.

RAY KLINE: Good morning to you.

SULLIVAN: Stansfield, what's your reaction? Apparently you've read about half of the book?

TURNER: Yes. Two reactions. One, is I think Bob Woodward did the country a lot of harm in this book by disclosing techniques of collecting intelligence and by hurting relations between the United States and other countries through the exposures of things we did to those countries.

On the other hand, I think he did some good in the book. He tells us very clearly that an unprincipled director of the CIA can get this country into activities that it doesn't want to get into. And that's a frightening thing.

SULLIVAN: Well, let me ask you a couple of the specifics in which you were thwarted (?). Do you feel that our agents abroad are in danger this morning because of the book?

TURNER: Well, I hope that Bob Woodward had enough sense not to put specifics in the book where an agent's life would be in danger. That is, perhaps the agent is no longer alive, even, for other reasons. But, yes, there are stories in there that if the agents were still around, they could be endangered.

But more than that, I think it's basically his disclosing some of the over-all techniques of collecting information, because that lets any country we might possibly spy on, put up its guard.

SULLIVAN: Ray, were you surprised at the amount of illegal covert operations that apparently went on under Bill Casey's tenure?

KLINE: No. I wasn't surprised. But my theory is that the CIA was set up to conduct clandestine and covert operations abroad and that Bill Casey was doing exactly that under the directions of the President. I wish he -- I wish he were -- had been more successful.

SULLIVAN: Well, what was your reaction to Bob Wood-ward's book?

KLINE: I thought it was disgusting. I feel that he did reveal, as Stan Turner said, a number of sensitive operational details that are going to do damage to the CIA's work abroad.

SULLIVAN: Ray, can you be specific about what operational details?

KLINE: Well, the allegations, which I cannot confirm, about the operations in Morocco and in Saudi Arabia and other countries which he generalizes about suggest that we work against our friends abroad. This kind of allegation is heard often and, if he gives credibility to it, we will have fewer friends, fewer sources, fewer cooperative agents abroad, and it will hurt the whole intelligence effort and the whole decision-making apparatus here in Washington. That's what I resent about the book.

But more than that, it seems to me a perfect example of the investigative reporting technique that's become so popular these last ten years in which you interview a lot of people then you decide you will cite anonymous sources who cannot be brought to account, so you have a complete unaccountability of the writer. I'm a historian and I disapprove of that as a matter of scholarship.

SULLIVAN: Well, you know, Stansfield, a lot has been made about this death-bed interview. And do you think it is possible that he could have penetrated CIA security around Bill Casey at Georgetown?

TURNER: Yes, I think it's possible. I happen to have talked to Bob Woodward about this several months ago. He claims the morning he arrived there, there just was nobody on the corridor of the hospital and he walked down, got to Casey's room, Casey waved him to come on in.

I don't know for a fact that the CIA was guarding Mr. Casey around-the-clock. I don't think that ordinarily would be necessary under those circumstances. If they were, it certainly was a bad show.

SULLIVAN: Stansfield, are you one of the anonymous sources quoted in the book?

TURNER: Well, I've talked with Bob Woodward but I don't think I gave him anything that he shouldn't know or that isn't public information, that is.

SULLIVAN: Well, what is?

KLINE: That's famous last words. And, as you know...

TURNER: Well, everybody...

KLINE: ...everybody thinks that.

I'm happy to say I was never interviewed by Bob Wood-ward, I suspect because he thought I wouldn't tell him anything useful to his book.

SULLIVAN: Well, what do you feel about -- you know, here the two of you are on different sides. One of you talks to the press, one doesn't. I mean, there are two completely different methods of operation, intelligence versus covert activities. Well, what do you think the direction of the CIA should be?

KLINE: I want to say, very simply, something that is part of the history of the agency. Clandestine operations to collect information abroad, which are absolutely essential to our security, are part of the process of getting involved with foreigners which sometimes, under presidential direction, leads to a special political covert relationship, and that's perfectly correct.

SULLIVAN: Well gentlemen, thank you for joining us this morning. I have a feeling this debate is only beginning.