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THE NEW REPUBLIC
7 FEBRUARY 1983

THE ANDROPOV FILE

BY EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

WHEN Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was merely head of the K.G.B., his image was that of the stereotypic hard-line "police boss." His major accomplishment, according to C. L. Sulzberger, writing in *The New York Times* in 1974, was "a fairly successful campaign to throttle the recent wave of liberal dissidence." Nor was he viewed as much of an admirer of foreign culture. In 1980 Harrison E. Salisbury wrote in the *Times* that Andropov "has been working for three years on schemes to minimize the mingling of foreigners and natives. . . . Now Andropov's hands have been freed to embark on all kinds of repressive measures designed to enhance the 'purity' of Soviet society." Completing this picture of a tough, xenophobic, wave-throttling cop, Andropov was physically described, in another *Times* story, as a "shock-haired, burly man."

Andropov's accession to power last November was accompanied by a corresponding ennoblement of his image. Suddenly he became, in *The Wall Street Journal*, "silver-haired and dapper." His stature, previously reported in *The Washington Post* as an unimpressive "five feet, eight inches," was abruptly elevated to "tall and urbane." The *Times* noted that Andropov "stood conspicuously taller than most" Soviet leaders and that "his spectacles, intense gaze and donnish demeanor gave him the air of a scholar." *U.S. News & World Report*, on the other hand, reported that "he has notoriously bad eyesight and wears thick spectacles."

His linguistic abilities also came in for scrutiny. Harrison Salisbury wrote, "The first thing to know about Mr. Andropov is that he speaks and reads English." Another *Times* story took note of his "fluent English." *Newsweek* reported that even though he had never met a "senior" American official, "he spoke English and relaxed with American novels." Confirmation of his command of English appeared in *Time*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, and *The Washington Post*. *The Economist* credited him with "a working knowledge of German," and *U.S. News & World Report* added Hungarian to the growing list. And this quadralingual prodigy was skilled in the use of language, too: *Time* described him as reportedly "a witty conversationalist," and "a bibliophile" and "connoisseur of modern art" to boot. *The Washington Post* passed along a rumor that he was partly Jewish. (Andropov was rapidly becoming That Cosmopolitan Man.)

Soon there were reports that Andropov was a man of extraordinary accomplishment, with some interests and proclivities that are unusual in a former head of the K.G.B. According to an article in *The Washington Post*, Andropov "is fond of cynical political jokes with an anti-regime twist. . . . collects abstract art, likes jazz and Gypsy music," and "has a record of stepping out of his high party official's cocoon to contact dissidents." Also, he swims, "plays tennis," and wears clothes that are "sharply tailored in a West European style." Besides the Viennese waltz and the Hungarian czarda, he "dances the tango gracefully." (At a press conference within hours of Andropov's accession, President Reagan, asked about the prospects for agreement with him, used the unfortunate metaphor, "It takes two to tango.") *The Wall Street Journal* added that Andropov "likes Glenn Miller records, good scotch whisky, Oriental rugs, and American books." To the list of his musical favorites, *Time* added "Chubby Checker, Frank Sinatra, Peggy Lee, and Bob Eberly," and, asserting that he had once worked as a Volga boatman, said that he enjoyed singing "hearty renditions of Russian songs" at after-theater parties. *The Christian Science Monitor* suggested that he has "tried his hand at writing verse—in Russian, as it happens, and of a comic variety."

The press was less successful in ferreting out more mundane details of his life. Where, for example, was he born? *The Washington Post* initially reported that he was "a native of Karelia," a Soviet province on the Finnish border. *The New York Times* gave his birthplace as the "southern Ukraine," which is hundreds of miles to the south. And *Time* said he had been born in "the village of Nagutskoye in the northern Caucasus." His birthplace was thus narrowed down to an area stretching from Finland to Iran. There was also some vagueness with respect to his education. *The Wall Street Journal* reported that he had "graduated" from an unnamed "technical college," but *U.S. News & World Report* had him "drop out" of Petrozavodsk University, while *Newsweek* awarded him a diploma from the Rybinsk Water Transportation Technicum, a vocational school

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Edward Jay Epstein is the author of *The Rise and Fall of Diamonds: The Shattering of a Brilliant Illusion* (Simon and Schuster), and is currently completing a book on international decep

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PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (ME)
1 September 1984

Central America briefing planned

The World Affairs Council of Maine will open its season Sept. 6 with an off-the-record briefing on Central America by a former CIA officer.

The speaker, John R. Horton, resigned from a CIA post in May in the belief that "ideological prejudices were overriding intelligence judgments in some key areas."

Horton will speak on intelligence operations and policy in Mexico and Central America, and will answer questions.

During his 27-year career with the CIA, Horton devoted 10 years to Latin America. He was the CIA's chief of station in Mexico and Uruguay and later served as deputy chief of the agency's Latin American Division.

He was recalled from retirement last year to serve on the National Intelligence Council as officer for Latin America. The coming briefing will be Horton's first public appearance since his resignation.

The talk will be held at 5:30 p.m. on Sept. 6 in the Pavillion of the Atlantic House resort in Scarborough. The Atlantic House is on Route 207 at Prouts Neck.

The tax-deductible admission fee is $25 for Council members, $35 for the general public. The council stresses that Horton's remarks must be treated as private and not for general publication. For reservations or information, call the WAC office at Westbrook College, 797-7261.

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FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PROGRAM NEWS

STATION CNN-TV AND THE CABLE NEWS NETWORK

DATE OCTOBER 8, 1983 8 PM

CITY NEW YORK

-BROADCAST EXCERPT

NEWSCASTER: The C.I.A. deals in secrecy. That's its business. Reporters, it follows, have a tough time finding out what's going on inside C.I.A. headquarters. But intelligence expert David Wise has learned of some personnel moves not widely publicized elsewhere. In his commentary tonight, Wise suggests what implications those moves could have.

DAVID WISE: Covering a secret intelligence agency is a little like covering the Kremlin. They don't talk much about what happens inside the walls. So, reporters have to draw conclusions from little things, like who shows up at public appearnces, or what shifts in personnel really mean.

In the same spirit, it's valuable to explore some quiet shakeups that have occurred inside the C.I.A. Little or nothing has been said publicly about these changes, but word has a way of seeping out to those who watch the walls.

In the first change, C.I.A. Director William Casey has tapped two former clandestine operatives to handle the agency's dealings with Congress and the press. J. William Doswell, a former Richmond public relations man who headed Casey's Congressional and press relations, has left C.I.A. Casey split the job in two. He named Clair George, until now the second-highest clandestine operator in the agency, to handle Congress. He put George Lauder, another former spook, in charge of public affairs.

C.I.A. hands deny that the agency's desire to shore up Congressional and public support for its covert operation in Nicaragua was behind these moves.

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THE ATLANTIC
November 1982

CHOOSING A STRATEGY FOR WORLD WAR III

BY THOMAS POWERS

IN THE YEARS SINCE 1945, DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC nuclear policy in the upper reaches of the American government has centered on a single overriding question—what to do "if deterrence fails." The phrase is characteristic of the rigid etiquette that governs official talk about nuclear weapons. It means war, and especially a big general war between the United States and the Soviet Union—war of the old-fashioned, all-out sort, in which even fear of The Bomb would take second place to the struggle. Officials have learned to be wary of talking in public about nuclear war. It just gets them in trouble. But in private they talk about war all the time. None of them wants such a war. In truth, none of them expects it—now or ever. But deterrence *could* fail. What do we do then?

For the general public, nuclear war means something like the end of the world—a single burst of destruction in which cities would be flicked off the face of the globe in a whirlwind of fire. That is not the way military men look at things. They may vaguely threaten to scrape Russia flat down to the primeval gravel, but that's mainly for show, to put the other side in a serious frame of mind. "When the balloon goes up," as they sometimes say, the time for threats is past. Then you have got to fight, not just kiss the kids good-bye and push the button. The general public may be content with the awful either/or, but the military instinctively rebels against the idea that the end of deterrence is the end of everything else.

When war comes, armies fight with the weapons at hand. Nuclear weapons are a prominent feature of the arsenals of both sides. How are they to be used? What should we point them at? How many should we fire in the opening salvo?

In the early days of the nuclear era, the bombs were so cumbersome, so hard to deliver, and above all so few that they were reserved for only the most dramatic targets. As a practical matter, that meant cities. In 1945, it meant Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the late 1940s, it meant Moscow and Leningrad. In the fall of 1948, for example, the United States had about 100 bombs, but the early bombs took two days to assemble by a team of twenty-four. We didn't have teams enough to assemble them all at once. Such bombs as we had were under the control of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was reluctant to turn them over to the Air Force in advance. The generals sometimes didn't even know how many bombs we *had*. Until 1948, the only airplanes that could deliver the bombs were specially modified B-29s, slow craft, vulnerable to attack en route, so limited in range that they had to be based in Europe. Military targets tend to be small, numerous, protected, hard to find and hit. For purely technical reasons, then, the first nuclear weapons were pointed at "strategic" targets, that is, targets the loss of which might affect the morale or the war-making potential of the enemy. The wars of the late 1940s, if they had taken place, would have lasted a few weeks, and would have consisted of devastating blows on Russian cities, ports, and industrial sites.

By the early 1950s, these problems had been solved. The AEC agreed to let the Strategic Air Command (SAC) keep bombs on its airfields. We had a fleet of new intercontinental bombers to deliver them. The bombs themselves had a much longer "shelf life" and didn't have to be assembled from scratch immediately before use. Above all, they were more numerous. We had entered, in the phrase used by professional strategists, "the era of nuclear plenty"—in which we still find ourselves. It is also the era of choice. When you've got only three weapons, as we had in July of 1945, it's not hard to decide what to point them at. When you've got thousands, as we have now, and when you can hit anything in a known location on the surface of the earth, as we can now, and, above all, when the Soviets can retaliate in kind, then you have to think hard before deciding what to hit and when to hit it. The decisions imply the course of the war we are likely to see "if deterrence fails."

When Jimmy Carter entered the White House, in January of 1977, he probably would have done away with nuclear weapons altogether given the choice. This may sound like the inevitable preference of any sane man, but none of Carter's predecessors had shared it. Nuclear weapons solve certain kinds of problems; in particular, they are cheaper than men and tanks. Carter's predecessors had all chosen nuclear weapons rather than press Congress or NATO allies to come up with money for men and tanks enough to face the Russians on what is called the "central front" in Europe. Eisenhower's first secretary of defense, Charles Wilson, once said, "We can't afford to fight limited wars. We can only afford to fight a big war, and if there is one, that is the kind it will be." But Carter was a stranger to Washington in 1977; he had not been over and over this

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NOTRE DAME NEWS
February 1982

How to Retire at 45

In the CIA, says Ralph McGehee all you have to do is tell the truth.

Ralph McGehee '50 joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1952, shortly after he was cut from the Green Bay Packers. He's not sure why the CIA approached him, but during his intelligence training he met so many other pro football dropouts that he suspects the agency considered the National Football League a prime recruiting ground.

When the Korean War ended in 1953 McGehee joined the agency's clandestine operations section as a case officer. Over the next two decades he served in the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam. He did the routine work of an intelligence officer: recruiting agents, conducting investigations, and maintaining liaison with the local police and intelligence organizations.

During that era the CIA's main struggle was against Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia. That struggle was a losing one. Of all the countries in the region, today only Thailand remains allied to the West. McGehee thinks he knows why our side lost the rest.

In 1965 McGehee directed an intelligence gathering effort in a province in northeast Thailand where a Communist insurgency was beginning. After a detailed, yearlong study, McGehee reported that he had found a popular movement so broad, pervasive and deeply rooted that purely military measures were unlikely to defeat it.

McGehee submitted his findings to the agency but, after a brief period of praise for this work, he ran into an official wall in Washington.

His findings, he explains, ran counter to the official Washington view that Communist insurgency was a form of clandestine invasion, and that the natives involved were unwilling participants who were duped or forced into joining guerilla units who took their arms and orders from outside.

McGehee maintains that intelligence information often is politicized. In theory, the agency provides accurate and unbiased information to the President so he can make wise decisions regarding national security. In practice, when a President is firmly committed to a particular policy (such as military victory in Vietnam), the agency shapes its information to conform to that policy. Bad or even inconvenient news is unwelcome. That is an abiding theme in the history of intelligence, and it is the rock on which Ralph McGehee foundered.

After he submitted his dissenting report, McGehee's career took a nose-dive. He was shuttled from one low-level job to another. He was promised promotions but never received them.

He was frustrated as he watched his country wage the wrong kind of war in Southeast Asia, one he knew was doomed to failure. He did what he could

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THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
April 1982

Taylor Branch ON POLITICAL BOOKS

In August 1955, John Prados tells us,* the CIA's Richard Bissell went to the White House to show President Eisenhower some pictures that had been taken from an airplane more than ten miles above the earth. Greens, fairways, and sand traps were clearly visible in the aerial shots of the Augusta National Country Club in Augusta, Georgia, which was not only the home of the Masters but also Ike's favorite golf course. The photos clearly impressed the president, who recognized the topography of certain memorable holes. Then Bissell played his trump card. He pointed out that the pictures actually revealed the presence of golf balls on some of the greens, as well as the flags in the cups. This truly impressed Eisenhower, who must have reflected that sometimes he had trouble seeing the cup when standing over a ten-foot putt. Bissell, on the strength of the demonstration, asked for permission to develop a U-2 spy plane that could produce such pictures from even higher altitudes, and Eisenhower, who was normally skeptical of new military gadgets, heartily approved. Thus, through crafty persuasion and awesome technology, the CIA won its battle against the air force for control of a new spy system.

With technology that has long since made Bissell's U-2 obsolete, the secret services now stand on permanent watch against nuclear attack. Simultaneously, they grapple clandestinely with their adversaries in localized conflicts that policy-makers want to keep quiet, fearing Armageddon. These two functions have brought spy organizations to the forefront of modern politics since World War II, as intelligence activities have expanded on both the highest and lowest of roads. The same Richard Bissell who showed Eisenhower the golf course photographs planned the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The Soviet Estimate is a readable and even-tempered chronicle of the higher road—the effort of the CIA and military intelligence services to keep track of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Prados has assembled the first comprehensive record of American performance in this field, matching predictions of Russian strength against what ends up actually happening in the arms race. Working from National Intelligence Estimates that, ironically, are the most sensitive and yet the most publicly debated spy products we have, he labors to separate the contributions of hard fact from those of prejudice, and he makes convincing judgments about the bureaucratic wars within the intelligence community.

The human element of intelligence mistakes was more easily exposed during the early years, when the spy network was relatively unsophisticated. Shortly before a 1955 Soviet-American summit meeting, the Russians invited Colonel Charles E. Taylor, the air force attache in Moscow, to watch an aerial parade at Tushino Field. Sitting in the reviewing stand, Colonel Taylor was astounded to watch 28 Bison bombers fly over in 2 succession of formations. As Prados notes, this was twice the number of Bisons attributed to the Russians only a few months before and four times the number of B-52s then in existence. Taylor's alarming report quickly became the basis for another drastic upward revision of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic bombers.

What Colonel Taylor had no way of knowing at the time was that the Russians were so insecure about the American lead in nuclear weaponry that they had circled their few Bisons repeatedly over the airfield as a blustering show of strength. The Russians fooled the Americans—especially the air force, which was eager to be fooled so that it could build more B-52s—and thereby helped create the "bomber gap," which was the first major hoax in postwar strategic intelligence.

Several years later, about the time the CIA and the army and navy managed to push the air force back toward reality on Soviet bombers, the Russians launched their Sputnik. They also tested some ICBMs before they were expected to, causing a wave of apprehension in the United States. The 1958 National Intelligence Estimate predicted that the Russians would solve all their test problems almost instantaneously, and that Moscow would produce and deploy up to 1,000 ICBMs by 1961. By contrast, the United States had only ten ICBMs in 1960. This was the "missile gap." There was a great public scare, and the shape of the weaponry involved encouraged journalists to imply that national manhood was at stake, along with survival. The Alsop brothers reported that the Eisenhower administration was about to "flaccidly permit the Kremlin to gain an almost unchallenged superiority."

As is well known, John Kennedy was elected on his virile pledge to change that with a greatly accelerated ICBM program, but by the time he took office the missile gap was revealed to be a larger hoax than the bomber gap. The CIA, joined by navy and army intelligence, now realized that the Russians had produced no ICBMs at all. The air force, after a Strangelovian campaign of resistance during which Strategic Air Command generals went so far as to claim that Crimean War memorials were actually Soviet ICBMs in disguise, finally conceded.

The result of all this confusion was the Defense Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's well-intentioned but ultimately counter-productive effort to end public disputes between the military intelligence services. To McNamara, such squabbling was inefficient as well as politically embarrassing. He wanted a unified, accurate military position on intelligence matters. In the DIA, however, he got an agency that tended to produce brokered intelligence compromises that were

Taylor Branch is a contributing editor of The Washington Monthly.

**The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength.* John Prados. Dial, $17.95.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Reports

STATION WDVM TV CBS Network

DATE January 23, 1982 9:30 PM

CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception

MIKE WALLACE: The only war America has ever lost, the war in Vietnam, reached a dramatic turning point 14 years ago this month. The morning of January 30th, 1968, across the length and breadth of South Vietnam, the enemy we thought was losing the war suddenly launched a massive surprise attack. It was called the Tet offensive. And the size of the assault, the cacualties, the devastation caught the American public totally by surprise. But more than that, it caught the mighty American Army, half a million strong, unprepared for the enemy's bold strikes in all of South Vietnam's cities.

As the fighting continued, it became clear that the ragged enemy forces we thought were being ground down had greater numbers and greater military strength than we had been led to believe. Before they were finally pushed back, those Viet Cong forces had left behind a nagging question in the minds of millions of Americans: How was it possible for them to surface so brazenly and so successfully at a time when Americans at home were being told the enemy was running out of men?

The fact is that we Americans were misinformed about the nature and the size of the enemy we were facing. And tonight we're going to present evidence of what we have come to believe was a conscious effort, indeed a conspiracy, at the highest levels of American military intelligence to suppress and alter critical intelligence on the enemy in the year leading up to the Tet offensive.

A former CIA analyst, Sam Adams, introduced us to this evidence and he became our consultant. What you're about to see are the results of our efforts over the last 12 months to confirm his find[illegible] and I

THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN
Winter 1981

The Historian as Forei Policy Analyst: The Challenge of the CIA

SUMNER BENSON

PROFESSIONAL HISTORIANS and the institutions of Ameri policy have been engaged in increasingly fruitful relat years since World War II. Just as individuals like Geo and Herbert Feis have linked the worlds of diplomacy and historical research, so the profession has established "institutional beachheads"[1] in the historical offices of the Department of State, the military services, and in smaller numbers, the Departments of Defense and Energy. In these offices historians working as historians have applied rigorous scholarly standards in editing primary sources, most notably the *Foreign Relations of the United*

° This paper is a revised version of a talk presented at the annual meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, University of Southern California, August 1980.

This material has been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency to assist the author in eliminating classified information. However, that review constitutes neither CIA authentication of material presented as factual nor a CIA endorsement of the author's views or those ascribed by the author to others (including current or former officials of any nation).

1. The concept is taken from Otis L. Graham, Jr., "Historians and the World of (Off-Campus) Power," *The Public Historian*, Volume I, Number 2 (Winter 1979), 34.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 November 1981

Joseph C. Harsch

Colonel Qaddafi is difficult

The latest disclosures about Americans working for Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya seem to clear up one point. Libya was able to invade its southern neighbor, Chad, last November not because Libyans were aided in this undesirable (from the United States' point of view) operation by the Soviet Union but because some 20 American pilots, mostly recruited in or around Miami, were willing to take the colonel's money.

The money, incidentally, came from selling Libyan oil to American oil companies. Libya is the third largest exporter of oil to the US.

There is now a vigorous feud between the US and Libya.

On May 7 the US closed down the Libyan Embassy in Washington.

The feud reached its peak on Aug. 19 when planes from the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean shot down two Libyan jet fighters in airspace claimed by Libya but considered to be international in Washington.

The feud has been kept going since then by the dispatch of US reconnaissance planes to the Sudan after the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat. There was suspicion in Washington that Colonel Qaddafi might take advantage of political uncertainty in Egypt to invade the Sudan. Also, there has continued to be a lively propaganda duel between Washington and Tripoli.

The feud began before Ronald Reagan and the Republicans took over the White House in January. Previous to that Washington had withdrawn its diplomatic community from Libya. There was supposed to be some danger that the colonel might be tempted to do to them what the Iranians had done to Americans in Tehran.

The Carter administration had at one time tried to get along with Colonel Qaddafi. Brother Billy's notorious dealings with the Libyans were not originally opposed at the White House. In fact Qaddafi's help was invited over the Iranian hostage affair. There was almost a courtship of Libya into 1979.

But then things began to go sour. Libyans were suspected of having tried to carry out a political execution inside the US. Libya was believed to be a main source of weapons for PLO forces in Lebanon. The PLO is unpopular in Washington. The Libyans are also believed to be a main source of weapons to the IRA (Irish Republican Army) in Northern Ireland, but Washington has never tried seriously to stop the flow of funds from the US to Libya for the purchase of those guns.

So there was bad blood between Washington and Tripoli before Mr. Reagan took over. But Mr. Reagan picked up the theme eagerly. One of the first orders issued from the White House by Mr. Reagan was for preparation of a plan "to make life uncomfortable" for Colonel Qaddafi. It fitted in with his campaign theme of Moscow being the prime source of world terrorism.

Also in the first days of the Reagan administration the White House asked for documentation of that charge of Moscow being the prime source of world terrorism. Previous CIA reports had failed to produce solid evidence to support the assumption. The new CIA chief, William J. Casey, ordered his staff to try again. It is the first publicly exposed case of the CIA being instructed to support a White House thesis.

In theory the CIA produces expert, objective information. It is not supposed to start from a conclusion and then hunt around for possible evidence to back it up. That job belongs to the propaganda department of any government.

The CIA has still to come up with any hard evidence that Moscow did train Libyan terrorist agents, provided Libya with terrorist weapons, planned joint terrorist operations with Libya, or used Libya directly for its own purposes. These things may have happened. There is as yet no published hard evidence that they did.

But we do have hard evidence that two American ex-CIA agents, Edwin Wilson and Frank Terpil, have long been running a major service operation for Colonel Qaddafi. Their work has included shipping (illegally) US terrorist-type weapons to Libya, recruiting former Green Berets for training terrorists in Libya, setting up a little factory inside the palace in Tripoli to manufacture terrorist weapons, and recruiting American pilots to supply Libyan troops in Chad.

On the public record it now stands that the US, not the USSR, is the prime provider to Libya of terrorist weapons and techniques.

This is just one place where the real world fails to fit the world of Mr. Reagan's campaign rhetoric. It is one reason why his foreign policy is coming in now for widespread criticism. Too much of it is founded on ideological assumption rather than on known fact.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1981

SOVIET-TERROR TIES CALLED OUTDATED

U. S. Intelligence Officials Say Haig Based Accusation on Decade-Old Information

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 — Early Reagan Administration charges that the Soviet Union was directly helping terrorists were essentially based on information provided a decade ago by a Czechoslavak defector, according to senior intelligence officials.

"What we are hearing is this 10-year-old testimony coming back to us through West European intelligence and some of our own C.I.A. people," one official said. "There is no substantial new evidence."

The defector, Maj. Gen. Jan Sejna, was said to have been closely associated with Antonin Novotny, the Stalinist party leader of Czechoslovakia. The general fled to the United States in early 1968 after Mr. Novotny had been replaced by Alexander Dubcek, the leader of the short-lived liberalization period, which was ended by the Soviet-led military intervention in August 1968.

In 1972, the Central Intelligence Agency dispatched General Sejna to Western Europe to share his information on a number of subjects with intelligence agencies there, as is often done.

Sejna Reported Direct Link

General Sejna was said to have told Western intelligence agencies at the time that the Russians had trained terrorist groups like the Baader-Meinhof gang of West Germany and the Red Brigades of Italy.

American intelligence officials said there was little evidence to back up his assertion of direct Soviet involvement in international terrorism, though there is evidence of indirect links.

Last January, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. said that the Soviet Union, as part of a "conscious policy," was "training, funding and equipping" international terrorists.

President Reagan said at the time that the Administration would give the combating of international terrorism high priority in foreign affairs.

Officials said the State Department's own Bureau of Intelligence and Research later told Mr. Haig on several occasions that there was no hard evidence to back up his assertions, and that he was basically repeating the stories of the Czechoslavak defector.

The officials said it sometimes happened that information shared by the United States with other governments through the intelligence network and American military attachés abroad

General Under C.I.A. Protection

General Sejna, who remains under C.I.A. protection, could not be immediately reached for comment. In response to an inquiry, a C.I.A. press officer said any questions to him would have to be relayed by letter..

After Secretary Haig's initial remarks, the C.I.A. prepared a study that the Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey, rejected as inadequate. He ordered other studies that, officials said, also did not satisfy his conviction about direct Soviet responsibility.

As described by officials, the judgment of the intelligence agencies is this: In the early 1960's, the Kremlin established training and support centers in the Soviet Union and in other countries for Libyans, Iraqis, North Koreans, Angolans, members of the Palestine Liberation Organization and others.

The purpose was to help these groups with guerrilla techniques and weapons for the early stages of what the Soviet Union calls "wars of national liberation."

But later some of these centers were used by the Libyans, the P.L.O. and others to train terrorist groups like the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army.

No Direct Link to Soviet Seen

The Soviet Union almost certainly knew of these subsequent activities, and there is no evidence of Soviet efforts to block them. But there is also little evidence to show that the Soviet Union was in any way directing terrorist actions.

Some intelligence experts say "it should not be necessary to draw pictures," as one put it, to establish Soviet responsibility and Soviet benefit from the activities. Others say that the Soviet Union created the centers for one purpose — support of national liberation movements — and that the centers turned into Frankenstein monsters that could not be controlled.

There is also intelligence evidence that the Soviet leaders themselves have talked about the uncontrollability of these groups, and have referred to the terrorists as "adventurists."

In an interview, William E. Colby, the former Director of Central Intelligence, summed up what many other intelligence experts said: "Given the fact that the Soviets set these centers in motion, they are not without responsibility, and there is no evidence of their urging restraint on the terrorists."

Intelligence officials react with sensitivity to the subject of Soviet complicity in terrorist activities. Some feel that recent statements, including some by Administration officials, are really accusing the intelligence agencies of covering up links between Moscow and terrorists.

Officials said the feelings on the matter ran so high that the first and unsolicited C.I.A. report after Mr. Haig's statements was, in fact, written as a rebuttal.

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NEW YORK TIMES
4 OCTOBER 1981

ESSAY

The Reagan Corollary

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — In the acronym-ridden lingo of the national security types, a Special National Intelligence Estimate — SNIE — is pronounced "snee."

When a high Government official or intelligence officer believes that dangerous trends are showing up in a foreign country, he demands an analysis from Henry Rowen's shop at the C.I.A. This column draws on that 12-page "snee" on north Yemen, "parallel documents" and interviews.

Six weeks ago, it became apparent that new trouble was taking place in north Yemen, the official name of which is Yemen, but is referred to here as "north Yemen" to differentiate it from Southern Yemen, its Communist neighbor mainly to the west. (That's right, to the west; they call it "Southern" to confuse us.)

Trouble in north Yemen sets off alarms at C.I.A. because that impoverished nation of five or six million Arabs is on the border of Saudi Arabia. Under the Reagan Corollary to the Carter Doctrine, the U.S. has guaranteed both the territorial integrity and internal stability of Saudi Arabia. The most direct threats come from potential subversion by the million Yemeni who now work in the world's oil center, and from the strong Communist army now in Southern Yemen.

Three years ago, the Soviet clients in Southern Yemen attacked the Saudi client in north Yemen, which beat off the attack until the Arab League called a halt. The Communists learned a lesson: the smartest way to take control of uptown Yemen was not by direct attack, but by wooing dissident tribes and sponsoring civil war.

Accordingly, a "National Democratic Front" was set up in north Yemen and supplied with arms. The Saudi princes could not decide whether to support the Government of Ali Saleh in north Yemen strongly — they worried if he became too strong, he might merge with Southern Yemen and then go for the oil up north. So the Saudis helped a little; Ali Saleh, the Sihanouk of the Middle East, got aid from the Russians as well, but is now turning again to us.

This summer, after a visit to Aden, Southern Yemen's capital, by Soviet generals, downtown Yemen signed a treaty with Cuban-run Ethiopia and Libya. Col. Qadaffi appeared in Southern Yemen, and a Soviet naval task force called; now the combined Communists are building military facilities on nearby Perim Island, blocking the Red Sea.

At the same time, the Communist-sponsored National Democratic Front got busy in north Yemen. In the city of Ibb, a Government force was ambushed; Ali Saleh, pretending no challenge was under way, ran "training flights" of his American and Russian jets to bomb and strafe the insurgents. Dependents of U.S. aid officials in Ibb were told to get ready to withdraw.

That is when the "snee" was ordered. Our intelligence reported that the N.D.F. had significantly improved its position; that it was gaining considerable political support among the Yemenis; that there was reason for concern about Ali Saleh moving closer to the Russians; and that "a lack of internal cohesion ensures regular upheavals."

That means that a half-billion dollars worth of U.S. planes, tanks and other military hardware shipped to Yemen by President Carter — using an emergency arms-control loophole — is in jeopoardy of takeover by local Communists, or by Southern Yemen's possible seduction of Ali Saleh.

More important, the growing strength of the Communist force in north Yemen poses a direct threat to the Saudis. That was one of the reasons why White House aides prepared an answer to a news conference question that was soon to establish the Reagan Corollary: nobody is going to grab the oil from the Royal Family.

main threat to Saudi Arabia
Soviet jets striking across the Persian Gulf. To answer what he sees as an expensive-hardware threat, Mr. Reagan offers our expensive-hardware answer.

But the threat that is developing is from millions of hungry, angry Yemenis, now working in the Saudi oilfields or being urged on by agitators at home.

Russian military strategists must be smiling at the debate raging here over the Awacs. The troops that may ultimately move on the Saudis will be on trucks, horses and even camels, all moving at far less than 80 miles per hour. And the million-man force that will form the fifth column is already in place inside the Saudi kingdom.

Let's come down to earth. If the Reagan Corollary is to be carried out, we will have to come to grips with the attempted Communist subversion of north Yemen, or later to organize Jordanian and Egyptian foot soldiers to repel a seizure of the oilfields.

DETROIT NEWS
28 September 1981

Improving U.S. Intelligence

Congress is considering several measures to correct the damage done to the U.S. intelligence community during the past decade by former Sen. Frank Church and his cohorts.

The measures under consideration include: repeal of the Hughes-Ryan amendment that established extensive congressional oversight of secret intelligence activities, exempting the intelligence community from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, and adopting the intelligence identities protection act to safeguard the names of secret agents.

Although these measures are welcome, they will not solve a more fundamental problem affecting the U.S. intelligence Establishment. For the blunt truth is that some of the CIA's wounds have been self-inflicted.

The CIA assembles data from its own sources and from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the military intelligence services, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This material is then synthesized by the CIA into National Intelligence Estimates (NIE).

When a specific topic is selected, the CIA assigns someone to draft a paper reflecting the consensus of the intelligence agencies. Although the agencies may formally protest particular points, they rarely do so, preferring instead to be "team players." Consequently, the NIEs presented to the president and other top policy-makers, tend to reflect the lowest common denominator of opinion. And too frequently, the bad news is played down.

Until 1979 the NIEs insisted that the Soviet Union would not place offensive weapons in Cuba. To admit otherwise was to accuse the Russians of violating the terms of the 1962 agreement with President Kennedy ending the Cuban missile crisis. Thus the stationing of Soviet fighter-bombers, the construction of submarine pens, and frequent visits by major Russian naval units to the island were noted but not accorded any significance in intelligence estimates.

The NIEs contended that the Soviets would not invade Third World nations with their own troops. This estimate was hastily revised in 1979 when the Russians invaded Afghanistan.

U.S. intelligence forecasts were certain the Shah of Iran would weather the political storm to remain in power through the 1980s. By suggesting otherwise, the intelligence network would undercut the administration's reliance upon Iran as "the policeman of the Persian Gulf."

In 1977 the NIEs predicted that the Soviets would experience a major oil crisis within a decade. Though the forecast was incorrect, it did bolster Jimmy Carter's contention that Russian dependence upon Western drilling technology would strengthen detente.

When the Reagan administration scored the Soviet use of terrorism to destabilize pro-Western governments, the CIA had to go back and dig up more than 1,000 terrorist acts that had gone unreported during the last year of the Carter administration. The Carter people weren't interested, you see, in Soviet-inspired terrorism.

But the largest failure of the intelligence community was in consistently underestimating the Soviet military buildup during the past two decades. This miscalculation contributed to the disastrous SALT I agreement that left America at a strategic-arms disadvantage.

Nations that value the importance of intelligence seldom experience these kinds of failure. Yet, so long as the United States remains uncertain about the proper role of intelligence, there is little likelihood the situation will improve.

The proper role of intelligence is neither to bolster presidential decisions that have already been made nor to provide convenient "scorecards" for busy policy-makers. It is to provide the administration with the best and most up-to-date political, economic, and military information.

So, while it is fashionable to blame Congress and the Carter administration for all of the problems plaguing the intelligence community, this rationale ignores the institutional weakness of the CIA.

CONTINUED

ATLANTA JOURNAL
20 September 1981

The Paisley Affair

A CIA tale of bl
and intrigue

By Daniel Burstein
Constitution Special Correspondent

WASHINGTON — It was a sun-swept afternoon, September 24, 1978. A lone sailor — middle-aged, tanned, with a scraggly beard — allowed his 31-foot sloop, the Brillig, to drift across the shimmering waters of Chesapeake Bay. He studied some documents from his briefcase. He switched on and off his very special radio. He munched on a pickle loaf sandwich.

Then something extraordinary happened. Something violent. Something that shook American national security to its foundations and is still reverberating around the world in financial scandals, murders and the nuclear brinksmanship of the superpowers.

Exactly what happened to John Arthur Paisley three years ago is not known for certain by anyone who will talk about it. The Central Intelligence Agency, for which he worked much of his life as an expert on Soviet nuclear capabilities, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Senate Intelligence Committee may know. But their reports remain clamped under a tight lid of secrecy.

Paisley, 55, never finished his sandwich and never returned from that day at sea. A bloated, blood-drained corpse with a 9mm bullet lodged in the brain was dragged out of the bay a week after the empty Brillig ran aground.

Soon thereafter, the Maryland State Police identified the body as Paisley's and the cause of death as suicide. Official accounts from the police, FBI and CIA, pictured Paisley as a "low-level analyst" retired from the CIA, who committed suicide in despondency over his estrangement from his wife Maryann.

It took only a few weeks, however, for investigative reporters in cities that dot the Chesapeake area to tear through all three points in the official story with a mountain of evidence and a maze of unan-

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Paisley's disappearance and possible death rocked Washington in the fall of 1978. One CIA source remarked at the time that "this thing is so big it touches every vital nerve in Langley," the CIA's headquarters. A senator confided more than a year later that the Carter administration's failure to win Senate ratification of the SALT agreement had "a very great deal" to do with concerns that Paisley's disappearance had somehow compromised U.S. satellite verification abilities — the field in which Paisley was most expert.

Three years later, the demand for answers about Paisley has not abated. The mystery has grown only more knotted and troublesome as a continuing tale of blood and intrigue is associated with Paisley's name.

• In mid-1980, the Nugan-Hand Merchant's Bank in Australia collapsed with Francis J. Nugan having been found murdered earlier in the year and his American partner, Jon Michael Hand, having disappeared. Scandalous revelations poured out about the CIA's use of the bank to launder funds for international covert action. It was an important enough institution for former CIA director William Colby to have been Nugan's personal lawyer in America, and it has recently come to light that Paisley was particularly preoccupied with Nugan-Hand's operations in August and September 1978, only days before his disappearance. He had specifically asked a former consultant to the bank to join him at Coopers and Lybrand, an accounting firm intimately involved in the CIA's financial affairs where Paisley was employed after his formal retirement as deputy director of the Office of Strategic Research at the CIA in 1974.

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WASHINGTON STAR
2 AUGUST 1981

Casey Speech Lif
Off Some CIA O

CIA Director William Casey partially pulled aside the agency's veil of secrecy last week in an address to CIA employees that has become public.

In it, Casey discussed agency operations during his first six months and made disclosures that normally would never have seen the light of day, including the names of people running key departments.

Casey was provisionally cleared last week by a Senate Intelligence Committee Wednesday of known allegations regarding his past business dealings and his judgment at the CIA. He explained his actions in a "pep talk" to agency employees Monday at their heavily guarded headquarters in Langley, Va.

CIA spokesmen by telephone gave the media a severely trimmed version of the remarks made by the director shortly after he delivered them. But when it was learned Casey had distributed the complete 11-page text to senators he visited on Capitol Hill, the agency issued the full contents.

As part of the speech, Csey told the CIA workers that during his first six months as their chief, "I have traveled to Europe, Asia, Central America and the Middle East and met with over 20 Station Chiefs in those areas."

For security reasons, the movements abroad of the CIA chief and top intelligence officials are never disclosed.

Other comments included:

● "John Stein is charged with strengthening counter-intelligence covert action and paramilitary capabilities as well as overseeing Clair George's direction of the clandestine service."

George has never before been publically named and the reference to a build-up of pararamilitary capabilities is not the type of item generally disclosed.

Stein was appointed to succeed Max Hugel, the Casey appointee who resigned July 14 after published allegations – which Hugel denied – of past questionable securities transactions. Reporters following up on the appointment were told only that he was a veteran officer.

● "Last Wednesday, I returned from California where I visited contractors and Air Force program managers. I was filled with admiration for the ingenuity which Les Dirks and our Science & Technology Directorate have applied to create such powerful an
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they were loaded with conflicting views and qualifying footnotes from other agencies.

● "One of the charges I have given to John McMahon, Harry Rowen, and our new chief of domestic collection, Joe Shugrue, is to see that our intelligence collection, analysis and estimating is augmented, checked and evaluated in every possible way by knowledgeable people and institutions in the pivate sector."

The reference to "domestic collection" may not be as ominous as it sounds. The CIA is forbidden by charter to engage in domestic spy activity but has agents authorized to interview Americans who return from abroad who might have information of intelligence value.

● "Jim Glerum has been asked to review employment forms and polygraph procedures to see if more can be done to bring out past incidents which could embarrass the Agency. Stan Sporkin [CIA General Counsel] is reviewing our contracts to develop additional protections against the kind of moonlighting and use of our contractors and technology which occurred in the Wilson-Terpil situation."

CIA employees are required to submit to polygraph or "lie detector" tests when hired and periodically thereafter. Former CIA agents Frank Terpil and Edwin Wilson were reported to have moonlighted in Libya and engaged in illegal arms deals.

United Press International

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THE WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1981

CIA Is Lowering the I
Closing More Shutt

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA has decided to go underground again.

It is no longer necessary, CIA Director William J. Casey announced in a newsletter circulated in the agency last week, to spend much time justifying the agency's activities or defending the quality of its work. In his view, "the difficulties of the past decade are behind us."

As a result, contacts with the press and public, which have already been cut back, will be reduced still further. The CIA's office of public affairs will be closed and its work assigned to a new section that will also take over legislative liaison.

Both assignments have had high-level status since disclosures of CIA domestic spying and other misdeeds prompted a series of executive branch and congressional investigations in the mid-'70s. That was a time, Casey noted, when the agency "was still encountering considerable criticism in the media and the Congress and when it was important to expend considerable effort" explaining and defending the agency's work.

Apparently confident that a "trust us" atmosphere has returned, the CIA director said he feels "the time has come for CIA to return to its more traditional low public profile and a leaner, but no less effective, presence on Capitol Hill."

The head of the office of public affairs since 1977, former Navy captain Herbert E. Hetu, reportedly disagreed with the decision to downgrade the work and will be leaving the agency as a result of the shuffle.

The reorganization comes on the heels of Casey's March orders to halt the occasional background briefings that the CIA had been providing reporters since the days of Allen Dulles. Casey took that step on the grounds that the briefings took up a lot of time and were not a proper undertaking for an intelligence agency.

The CIA's office of legislative counsel, headed by Fred Hitz, also will be downgraded. Its legislative liaison duties, along with the public affairs work of Hetu's staff, will be taken over by branches of a new office of policy and planning under CIA veteran Robert M. Gates. The work of drafting legislative proposals and analyses will be turned over to the CIA general counsel's office.

Gates will report directly to Casey and CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman. He will also retain his present duties as their executive staff director for the intelligence community.

The change will take effect tomorrow and could result in a reduction in the issuance of public reports and studies under the CIA imprimatur. Inman, who formerly headed the supersecret National Security Agency, is known to feel strongly that some and inconsistent with providing the policymaker with a timely, crisp forecast that incorporates clearly defined alternative views."

For years there has been some bitterness in the intelligence community because the national intelligence estimates have been predominantly CIA products, with dissents from other agencies usually relegated to footnotes.

Casey said he had decided to organize the cadre of national intelligence officers, who are in charge of drawing up the estimates, into a formal National Intelligence Council. The council will report directly to Casey and Inman and the council's chairman, who has yet to be named, will serve as a chief of staff over the other officers.

Staff writer Michael Getler contributed to this report.

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R W
(CIA) 30 June 1981
(BY DANIEL GILMORE)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE CIA IS GOING DEEPER ABOLISHING ITS OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFECTI CONFIRMED TODAY.

HERB HETU, A FORMER NAVY CAPTAIN WHO HEADED WHEN STANSFIELD TURNER TOOK OVER AS DIRECTOR IN ADMINISTRATION, SAID THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION WITH REDUCED FUNCTIONS GIVEN TO A NEW DEPARTMEN HANDLE THE CIA'S LIAISON WITH CONGRESS.

IT WAS UNDERSTOOD HETU DISAGREED WITH THE DE THE AGENCY. THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE WORD ON WHAT TWO PRINCIPAL ASSISTANTS, DALE PETERSON AND KATHY PHEKSUN.

WITH SECRETARIES, THE CIA'S PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE HAD A STAFF OF ABOUT 12 AND PUT OUT A WEALTH OF NON-CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON SUBJECTS RANGING FROM SOVIET OIL AND GRAIN PRODUCTION TO FULL LISTS AND BACKGROUND OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND OTHER COMMUNIST-RULED NATIONS.

WILLIAM CASEY, 68, CHIEF OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE IN EUROPE FOR THE WORLD WAR II OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, HAS BEEN CUTTING DOWN ON THE AGENCY'S CONTACTS WITH THE MEDIA SINCE HE BECAME CIA DIRECTOR IN FEBRUARY AS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NOMINEE.

LAST MONTH, THE AGENCY ENDED ALL BRIEFINGS FOR REPORTERS ON GROUNDS THEY WERE AN IMPOSITION ON THE TIME OF THE BRIEFING ANALYSTS. THE BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS WERE USEFUL FOR CORRESPONDENTS BEING SENT ABROAD, PARTICULARLY TO SUCH AREAS AS THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, EASTERN EUROPE AND OTHER SENSITIVE POSTS.

CASEY MADE HIS DECISION ON THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE IN AN INTERNAL MEMO "FROM THE DIRECTOR."

REFERRING TO CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS AND NEWSPAPER EXPOSES OF THE EARLY 1970S ON THE CIA'S PAST MISDEEDS, CASEY SAID "THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE PAST DECADE ARE BEHIND US" AND THE AGENCY NO LONGER HAD TO WASTE TIME JUSTIFYING ITS ACTIVITIES.

IN HIS MEMO -- WHICH WAS NOT OFFICIALLY RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC -- CASEY SAID, "OUR EMPHASIS FROM NOW ON SHOULD BE TO MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE CIA'S REPUTATION NOT BY REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITIES BUT BY THE EXCELLENCE OF OUR WORK AND THE HIGH QUALITY OF OUR CONTRIBUTION."

THE NEW SECTION WHICH WILL ABSORB THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND LEGISLATIVE LIAISON OFFICES WILL BE HEADED BY ROBERT GATES, EXECUTIVE STAFF DIRECTOR TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, WHO WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO CASEY AND INMAN.

CASEY ALSO SAID HE WOULD ESTABLISH A SPECIAL CADRE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TO DRAW UP THE CIA'S NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

from the Director

Number 3

24 June 1981

This week I have made two organizational changes which will bear importantly on the improvement of national estimates, on the administration of CIA and on our relationships with the media, Congress and other elements of the government.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (NIC)

For intelligence to play its crucial role as policy is formulated, our work must be relevant to the issues at hand and it must be timely. There have been shortcomings for some time in this relating of intelligence efforts and activities to the policy process. Moreover, the process of preparing national intelligence estimates has become slow, cumbersome and inconsistent with providing the policymaker with a timely, crisp forecast that incorporates clearly defined alternative views.

To correct this situation, I am restructuring the role of the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) and the procedures for having the National Foreign Intelligence Board and its members make their inputs to national estimates. The NIOs, constituting jointly the National Intelligence Council, henceforth will report directly to the DCI and DDCI. The Chairman of the NIC will function as chief of staff in directing and coordinating the work of the NIOs. The NIOs will continue to be the DCI's principal representatives in policy forums, and will continue to support the DCI in his role as member of the the NSC and the DDCI as Intelligence Community representative to the Senior Interdepartmental Groups (SIGs)—working through the Director of NFAC for analytical support and assistance.

The National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) will continue to be the analytical arm of CIA and the DCI and carry primary responsibility for the production of finished foreign intelligence.

OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING

I have decided that organizational changes are needed to improve Agency-wide administration and to shift direction in certain areas now that the difficulties of the past decade are behind us. These changes will reduce staff positions and return a number of intelligence officers to the collection and production of intelligence.

I am establishing the Office of Policy and Planning to ensure that plans and policies submitted for DCI/DDCI consideration are consistent with Agency-wide objectives and priorities and that they are reviewed in the context of overall Agency needs. The Office will further develop and coordinate CIA's long-range planning effort, review materials submitted to the DCI/DDCI that concern Agency administration, personnel, analytical operations and external affairs policies, and coordinate preparation of briefing papers for the DCI and DDCI for NSC and SIG meetings as well as meetings with heads of other agencies. The Office of Policy and Planning also will centralize in the immediate office of the DCI/DDCI responsibility for all external affairs, including interdepartmental relations, liaison with the Congress and public affairs.

With respect to external affairs, the Office of Legislative Counsel and the Office of Public Affairs were created at a time when the Agency was still encountering considerable criticism in the media and in the Congress and when it was important to expend considerable effort to explain the Agency's mission, to justify our activities and to defend the quality of our work. The magnitude of effort devoted to these purposes has significantly decreased, and I believe the time has come for CIA to return to its more traditional low public profile and a leaner—but no less effective—presence on Capitol Hill. Our emphasis from now on should be to maintain and

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NEW YORK TIMES
23 JUNE 1981

Europeans Link Terror to Arabs but Disagree on Soviet

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 22 — Western European police, intelligence and political officials generally believe that Palestinian groups and radical Arab nations have given considerable direct assistance and encouragement to European terrorist organizations.

The officials, however, are more divided and equivocal on the much-argued question of the Soviet Union's possible role in terrorism. Some officials believe that the Soviet Union has given mostly indirect support to terrorism.

At the same time, these officials say they do not believe that Soviet or Palestinian officials create, lead or direct urban terrorist groups, which they describe as indigenous. The officials also say the evidence of Soviet involvement sometimes falls short of being "proof."

These were among the conclusions suggested in interviews conducted by New York Times correspondents in Europe and in Israel and supplemented in the United States by the opinions of nongovernmental and governmental analysts of international terrorism.

The responses varied among officials and analysts from different countries, and there were differences in emphasis and in assumptions within individual countries.

A debate about international links between terrorist groups and about the degree of Soviet complicity has recently become more heated, especially in the United States, and has increasingly assumed ideological implications that involve the desirability of détente with Moscow and the international status of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

This sometimes causes different individuals and groups to assign varying meaning and degrees of importance to direct and circumstantial evidence. But the interviews suggested several themes:

¶Palestinian groups that in the past have openly cooperated with and supported European terrorists in spectacular operations continue to give sanctuary to hunted European terrorists and to render some assistance to both left- and right-wing terrorist groups.

¶There is evidence that in the very recent past, as well as for more than a decade previously, diverse groups of terrorists have received training in camps in Southern Yemen, Libya, Lebanon and elsewhere in the Arab world. Some of these camps were created by radical Palestinian organizations such as Dr. George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Technical and political instructors from East Germany and other Soviet-bloc nations reportedly were involved.

¶The operations, associations and character of terrorism have not remained static and neither have the political implications and importance of terrorism. In Spain, for instance, officials suggested this spring that terrorism was being encouraged, apparently by the Soviet Union, in the hope of preventing Spain from joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Rightists have used the Government's inability to stamp out terrorism as an excuse to support demands for a return to authoritarian government. In West Germany and Italy, on the other hand, officials believed that the strength of terrorist organizations was waning.

Some journalists, policy analysts and conservative politicians in the United States and Britain have, in effect, accused government officials in Europe and in the Carter Admininstration of ignoring evidence of alleged Soviet complicity for diplomatic and political reasons.

To a considerable extent the debate is actually about how to interpret "evidence." Although some West German terrorists have said they used "safe houses" in East Berlin and received help from East Germans, officials in West Germany seem to give less weight to such evidence than American analysts committed to the hypotheses of indirect Soviet responsibility.

Those who wish to blame the Soviet Union for Italian terrorism stress statements made by a Czechoslovak defector about Soviet-directed training camps in Czechoslovakia. An Italian police official said the Czechoslovak camps were for ideological training and had been "important" at one time, but he said he did not believe they continued to operate.

One important feature of recent terrorism was the extremely violent and ruthless character of two incidents attributed to neo-Fascist groups. A bomb attack at the railroad station in Bologna, Italy, in August killed more than 80 people and injured at least 200. In West Germany, a neo-Nazi group called the Defense Sport Group Hoffman was blamed for a bomb incident during the Munich Oktoberfest. A 21-year-old member of the group was killed along with 11 other people, and about 200 people were injured.

A Higher Casualty Rate

Western officials say right-wing terrorists seem to attempt fewer attacks but cause more casualties per incident.

The Central Intelligence Agency said the two right-wing attacks "rank among the worst terrorist incidents ever recorded" and "produced more casualties than any previous terrorist attacks in Western Europe."

The New York Times reported this spring that senior West German security officials suspected that Palestinian groups associated with the Palestine Liberation Organization had given paramilitary and other training to neo-Nazi groups. The P.L.O. representatives in West Germany denied this.

The same German officials said they possessed "clear indications" that fugitive members of extreme left-wing terrorist groups were hiding in regions of Lebanon controlled by the P.L.O.

Israeli Reports Cited

Israeli intelligence files are overflowing with allegations of both old and fairly recent contacts between Palestinian groups and neo-Fascist terrorists as well as even more numerous associations with left-wing terrorist groups.

But this evidence does not necessarily mean that "active" support of international terrorism by the P.L.O. or by so-called "rejectionist" groups has actually increased.

For instance, the Central Intelligence Agency's annual report on terrorism published June 15, covering the year 1980 and reviewing events since 1968, said that "Palestinian terrorist actions in 1980 did not reach the level experienced during the 1970's."

It added that Al Fatah, the largest group in the P.L.O. and the one directly led by Yasir Arafat, "while presumably waiting for the results of Arafat's diplomatic initiatives" in seeking an interim Palestinian state, "restricted its international terrorist attacks to Middle East countries."

Habash Group Less Active

Other, "rejectionist" Palestinian groups "met with mixed success," the C.I.A. report said, adding that their operations were mostly confined to Lebanon. The once highly active Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has been "relatively inactive" since Dr. Habash underwent surgery in September.

The opinions of the European security officials about Soviet complicity in international terrorism were noticeably milder than those of some journalists, authors and American politicians who have stressed Soviet guilt in recent months.

CONTINUED

GARDEN CITY NEWSDAY (NY)
15 June 1981

A New View on Nuclear War

In 1976, a team of hard-liners rejected the Central Intelligence Agency's view of the Soviet nuclear buildup. Now, the views of 'Team B' dominate U.S. strategic policy. Second of two articles.

By Jim Klurfeld
Newsday Washington Bureau

Washington—From the very beginning the members of Team B had only one goal in mind. They were going to demonstrate that the Central Intelligence Agency was wrong in its most vital judgment, that the Soviet Union was not trying to achieve nuclear superiority.

For 10 years the CIA had concluded, in one form or another, that the Soviet Union accepted the idea that a nuclear war was unwinnable. The entire American strategic approach was based on that assumption. The SALT I accord and the still-to-be-completed SALT II treaty were negotiated on that basis.

But in the summer of 1976, President Gerald Ford, under pressure from the right wing of his own party and from his own Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, had decided to bring in an outside panel of experts to compete with the CIA. The idea was to give a group of outside experts, all hard-liners, access to the same data as the CIA and have them write their own national intelligence estimate of Soviet strategic capability and intentions. CIA Director George Bush had agreed with the idea.

Other CIA officials were bitterly, adamantly opposed.

The chairman of the group was Richard Pipes, a professor of Russian history at Harvard University. Included on the panel were Paul Nitze, a former Pentagon official; Paul Wolfowitz, an expert in strategic and tactical doctrine who worked for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Gen. Daniel Graham, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; William Van Cleave, a defense expert from

In 1976 this group represented a minority opinion. But it was a minority on the attack. A great debate on national defense was just beginning. The first target had been Henry Kissinger and his policy of detente with the Soviet Union. Now it was Team B vs. the CIA and its intelligence estimates. Later, attention would turn to President Jimmy Carter and his attempt to have SALT II ratified. Then the focus would shift to the 1980 national election.

The outside panel has come to be known as Team B, though its members never referred to it as Team B and usually called themselves the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board group (PFIAB, pronounced *Piff-e-yab*). They met in CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., and were paid on a per-diem basis with money that came from the CIA.

Team B's very first decision was that its members would not try to write their own intelligence estimate to offset the work of Team A, the regular CIA analysts. Instead Team B would prepare a detailed report demonstrating why the members believed the CIA had been so wrong for the previous 10 years.

All the resources of the CIA were made available to Team B: satellite photographs, intercepts of Soviet signals, secret Soviet military documents, public documents and reams of technical data. Each member took a particular area of interest and worked toward the November deadline. Experts in specific areas wrote chapters of the report and submitted them to Pipes, who acted as an overall editor. In some cases other outsiders with particular expertise were brought in to help the panel.

But all the work was done in the context of showing how past intelligence estimates had not adequately appreciated the Soviet strategic military threat.

The specific Team B conclusions are still highly classified, but aspects of the report were leaked to the media and Team B members have gained added prominence and written and spoken about their views in the past 4½ years.

Their conclusions can be divided into two areas.

The first concerns the intelligence process itself. Team B charged that the CIA had become too insulated and tended to perpetuate its own views. In addition, it had come to rely too much on purely technical data and not enough on Soviet military documents and statements of military philosophy and practices, Team B argued.

The report was particularly critical of the agency for "cultural mirror-imaging," as Graham put it.

"There was a tendency by the agency to project our assumptions on the Soviets," Graham said. "If we believed in mutual assured destruction, so must they. It was a major fault of their entire analytical process."

The second area had to do with Soviet intentions. They argued that the CIA had paid too little attention to Soviet military doctrine, the totality of the Soviet military effort and the relation of Soviet history and goals to its military program.

The members of Team B argued that the Soviets did not accept, and have never accepted, mutual assured destruction—the notion, called MAD, that there was a sufficient deterrent in the knowledge by both sides that a nuclear war would lead to the destruction of the attacker as well as the attacked. To make that case, Team B pointed to the new Soviet missile programs, the Soviet civil-defense program and the percentage of gross national product that the Soviets were spending on the military.

Pipes, who specialized in the area of Soviet military doctrine, argued that the CIA had ignored what the Soviets were saying they would do. It was essential to understand, he

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HUMAN EVENTS
13 June 1981

Does the USSR Really S
International Terrorism

By SEN. JOHN P. EAST (R.-N.C.)

Approximately one week after Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as President of the United States, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in his first press conference on January 28, affirmed that the Soviet Union is "involved in conscious policies which foster, support and expand international terrorism." National Security adviser Richard V. Allen has also stated that there is "ample evidence" of Soviet support for terrorism.

These statements by high-level government officials represent perhaps the first time that the United States government has officially accused the Soviet Union of supporting international terrorism. The evidence for this involvement is not new, however.

As long ago as 1975, Brian Crozier, director of the Institute for the Study of Conflict in London, testified before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee that the Soviets were deeply involved in the support for and training of terrorist cadres throughout the world.

Robert Moss, John Barron, and Miles Copeland, to name but a few, are among the many prominent and respected journalists who have developed compelling evidence in the last 10 years of Soviet involvement over a lengthy period of time. More recently, Samuel T. Francis has summarized and analyzed this evidence in a monograph entitled *The Soviet Strategy of Terror*, published early this year by the Heritage Foundation, Herbert Romerstein, in a monograph just published, *Soviet Support for International Terrorism*, also presents evidence for the allegation, based on both Soviet and terrorist primary sources.

Finally, Claire Sterling, an internationally respected journalist, has recently published *The Terror Network*, which shows in massive detail the role of the KGB and other Soviet or Soviet-satellite services in the

Yet, for some reason, the thesis that the Soviets support terrorism remains controversial. Although much of the evidence was available to the mass media throughout the 1970s, there was virtually no discussion of the Soviet role in major newspapers in this period. One reason for this black-out was purely ideological.

Both liberals as well as some government officials wished to promote detente with the Soviet Union. A basic assumption of detente was that the USSR is no longer a serious "revolutionary force," that it has matured into a "great power" which has responsible international commitments and goals and is no longer pursuing the goal of Marxist destabilization and revolution.

Of course, conservatives were all along skeptical of detente and of these claims for the Soviet Union. Long before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we were pointing out the discrepancies between the carefully cultivated image of the Soviet Union as a "responsible power" in the West and the brutal realities of Soviet behavior.

Soviet assistance to North Vietnamese aggression in Indochina, the escalation of Soviet espionage efforts against the United States, Soviet and Cuban military involvement in southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, the Soviet military and naval buildup, reported Soviet violations of SALT I, and even the repetition of aggressive themes and slogans by Soviet leaders—all these were ignored or covered up or explained away by the proponents of detente, but were continually exposed and emphasized by conservative foreign policy spokesmen.

Because liberals and the far left exhibit a strong tendency toward "peace at any price" and were enthusiastic about detente to the point that they often refused to look at the evidence or to consider its implications. Because

in previous administrations had a vested political interest in the policy of detente, the U.S. government itself refused to deal with what was becoming a serious threat to national security.

Instead of recognizing and responding to the growing Soviet threat, we entered into a decade of withdrawal and restrictions on our own intelligence services and foreign policymaking capacities.

The Church and Pike committees investigated our intelligence services and created a "black legend" of the CIA as "a rogue elephant out of control," in the words of former Sen. Frank Church. The Levi guidelines on domestic security investigations for the FBI, restrictive executive orders for the CIA and other parts of the intelligence community, the expanded Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, internal dissension and demoralization in the intelligence community itself, and the collapse of the internal security apparatus in the executive and legislative branches and at many local law enforcement levels as well—all these undermined our ability even to know about and analyze, let alone respond effectively to, the dangers of Soviet military escalation, covert action, espionage, terrorism and propaganda.

Of course, the proponents of detente cannot admit that the Soviets support terrorism. To admit this well-documented fact would imply that the Soviets are actively engaged in promoting violent revolutionary attacks on Western society—in other words, that the Soviet Union is not a "mature" or "responsible" power eager to become an established member of the international community.

Yet it is also true, on one level, that the Soviets do want to be accepted by the other responsible states of the West. The Kremlin desires respectability as well as the diplomatic and economic benefits

ELIZABETH DAILY JOURNAL (NJ)
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Moscow's terror r

a conservative

M. STANTON EVANS

WASHINGTON — An acrimonious flap developed early in the Reagan Administration concerning Soviet involvement, or lack of it, in global terrorism.

When top officials of the new regime fingered the Kremlin as a culprit in the terrorism business, they were hit with a quick bombardment from the CIA and other sources saying that it wasn't so.

The Soviets, we were informed, didn't get involved in international terror — or, if they did, we had somehow failed to come up with evidence of their complicity.

A useful study is now at hand suggesting that, if the CIA is not aware of Soviet involvement in global terror, the fault must be the CIA's.

For there is ample evidence in the record showing that Moscow and various of its clients are neck-deep in promoting terrorism, despite occasional pious statements to the contrary.

Data going to prove the point are pulled together by Herbert Romerstein, a professional staff member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in a monograph just published by the Foundation for Democratic Education.

And while the subject falls within the realm of Romerstein's professional expertise, he has carefully documented his case with materials from the public record.

Part of the problem in this debate, Romerstein notes, is that people confuse Marxist-Leninist objections to purely random terror with opposition to terrorism as such.

In point of fact the founding fathers of Communism, and the present rulers of the Kremlin, have made it plain that they approve of terrorism, and support it whenever it will serve their purposes. In recent years that has turned out to be quite frequently.

A foremost example of such support is Moscow's relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is openly terrorist in its operations and makes no bones about attacking purely civilian as opposed to military targets in the state of Israel and gives backing to terrorist groups and actions elsewhere.

Romerstein supplies evidence that the Soviets furnish arms, military training and financial support to the PLO, both directly and through intermediaries.

An equally prominent instance of Soviet-supported terrorism is the case of Cuba, which has been busily exporting terrorism and political violence all over Latin America since the 1960s.

Romerstein documents the crucial role of the Cubans in fomenting terrorism in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Uruguay, Bolivia and other states; their effort to coordinate the actions of terrorist and revolutionary groups, and the consistent support afforded their activities by the Soviets.

A third major example is Libya, which is a principal supporter of the PLO, and a supplier of training groups, and weapons for left-wing terrorists of every possible description.

Libya is in turn supported by Moscow and the East European states. A similar role as safe house and training ground is performed by South Yemen — a puppet of the U.S.S.R.

One point that emerges clearly from this discussion is the numerous interconnections among the terrorist groups: PLO support for the Sandinistas, Castro's involvement in Africa, Japanese extremists attacking the Israelis — all with leading strings that go back to the Kremlin.

Occasionally, Moscow even gets caught directly, as when Mexico discovered the KGB recruiting terrorists for training in North Korea.

The usual routine, however, is to act through faithful proxies — such as the PLO, or Cuba, or East Germany — connections which are a bit more difficult, but hardly impossible, to trace.

Romerstein lays it all out for us to see, and one wonders how the boys at CIA contrived to miss it.

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FOREIGN POLICY
Summer 1981

MISREADING INTELLIGENCE

by Les Aspin

It is not enough to cite Winston Churchill's epigram that the Soviet Union is a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." The truth is that the United States has not properly focused its intelligence and analysis efforts.

Intelligence analysts have an aversion to studying Soviet intentions and priorities—and understandably so. Most of the data on intentions—documents, speeches, and human intelligence reports—are necessarily soft. Technical collection, however, supplies hard data. The technical profile of a missile in test flight can be clearly inferred from telemetry.

But what does a speech by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev mean? Can it be trusted? Why was it delivered? What is the significance of an article in a Soviet military journal? What if its conclusions are contradicted by another article in another, or even the same, journal? Intelligence analysts like to have a high degree of confidence in their findings; they like to maintain credibility within the bureaucracy. They are, therefore, wary of advancing conclusions based on other than hard information.

For this reason, the intelligence community has focused on Soviet capabilities rather than intentions. The United States can answer detailed questions about Soviet technical capabilities, e.g., the range, accuracy, and payload of Soviet weapons systems. But next to nothing is known about what is going on inside Soviet heads.

If such a void of knowledge were ever acceptable, it certainly is not today. When Soviet forces posed no clear threat to U.S. forces, the United States could live with misestimates of Soviet intentions; in an era when they do pose such a threat, it cannot. Only a mixture of hard and soft intelligence can improve U.S. understanding of Soviet strategic intentions.

Three vital areas need attention. First, the United States must improve its forecasting of Soviet strategic plans. Misunderstood Soviet priorities have been at the heart of some of the worst misestimates of Soviet forces in the past. SALT II would have given the United States advance notice of the numerical size of Soviet strategic forces. If the United States is entering an era without SALT, with no treaty to make Soviet deployment priorities predictable, the gross misestimates of the past could reappear with even more perilous consequences.

Second, the United States needs a basis for devising negotiating strategies. Without a better understanding of the Soviet Union, the United States is very likely to miss opportunities and waste time in arms control. U.S. negotiating strategy will necessarily consist of offering proposals with little idea of their potential success.

Third, better intelligence is needed for developing U.S. strategic forces. More than ever, the United States must develop weapons with future Soviet capabilities in mind, and to do so, it must have a better understanding of Soviet plans. To determine what sorts of intelligence measures are needed, past intelligence errors must first be analyzed.

Mirror-Imaging

There is a widespread perception in the United States that throughout the post-war period the United States has consistently underestimated Soviet offensive capabilities. Alternatively, some contend that underestimations resulted from a naive belief in benign Soviet policy or from a misreading of the volume of resources Moscow was willing to devote to defense.

But a review of past estimates reveals that these were not the errors. Rather, the U.S. mistake was in the assumptions made about how the Soviet Union would allocate its defense spending. The problem repeatedly was "mirror-imaging," or the assumption that the Soviets would choose to expand their nuclear forces in the same way the United States had expanded its own. Thus:

- In the mid-1950s, Air Force intelligence predicted the Soviets would deploy 600-700 long-range bombers in order to reach the ultimate target, the United States. Instead, it later transpired that the Soviets were more concerned about targeting Western Europe and Turkey—and the U.S. B-47 bombers stationed there—not American population centers. The Soviets therefore devoted most of their production capacity to a medium-range force.
- In the late 1950s, some sections of U.S. intelligence predicted a massive Soviet effort to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States.

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THE VILLAGE VOICE
June 3-9 1981

How Thirsty Is the Russic

The Great C
Oil Blunde

Alexander Cockburn & James Ridgeway

WASHINGTON, D.C.—On May 17 of this year, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was asked on "Meet the Press" for the Reagan administration's rationale for selling the highly advanced AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia, over the passionate objections of the Israelis and their supporters in the United States.

Weinberger, himself deeply committed to the sale, replied: "[The AWACS's] principal use, and the principal reason the administration is supporting the sale to the Saudis, is that it would enable them to oversee and look much further into the invasion routes of Iran and Iraq and Afghanistan, where a possible Soviet thrust to the oilfields may come. With the Soviets going to be an energy importing nation in a few years, I think that is an essential capability to have."

But even as Weinberger once again invoked the specter of an oil-starved Soviet Union plunging towards the Gulf, he was well aware that not only had his own Defense Intelligence Agency long disputed this scenario, but that the Central Intelligence Agency was in the process of confessing to one of the most egregious failures of intelligence analysis of recent times, in its own estimate of Soviet energy needs in this decade.

Earlier that week CIA analyst James Noren had disclosed in a seminar at Harvard that the CIA had prepared a new report conceding that the Soviet Union would have no need to import oil by the mid-1980s. Two days after Weinberger's appearance on Meet the Press, Bernard Gwertzman reported Noren's remarks and the existence of the new CIA estimates in *The New York Times* for May 19.

Thus disappeared one of the major rhetorical planks of the Reagan-Haig foreign policy. For both the present administration and indeed its predecessor had proposed an impending Soviet energy crisis as the Rapid Deployment Force and a U.S. military buildup in the Gulf region and the Indian Ocean. This view went almost undisputed throughout the 1980 election campaign, even though it seems that by the fall of last year the CIA was well aware that the predictions on which this view was based were ludicrously wrong.

Birth of a Blunder

The CIA's blunders began to circulate in 1977. In that year the Agency's Office of Economic Research issued a series of reports that amounted to major modifications of intelligence estimates of Soviet economic trends. In a report called "Prospects for Soviet Oil Production," the Agency predicted that Soviet oil output would start to fall by the late 1970s or early 1980s and that this drop could slow the growth of total energy production. "More pessimistically," the CIA said, "the USSR will itself become an oil importer." The report added that during the 1980s the Soviet Union might find itself unable to sell oil abroad, notably to its Eastern European clients, and would therefore have to compete for OPEC oil for its own use.

In a broader assessment the Agency concluded that the rate of growth of Soviet GNP was likely to decline by the early and mid-1980s to between 3 and 3.5 per cent per annum and could even sink as low as 2 per cent. This view was partly based on predictions of worsening problems in the energy sector.

Not everyone agreed with this dire estimate, which was instantly seized upon by the arms lobby as further justification for a major U.S. defense buildup, battling a presumed Soviet grab for new sources of oil. The Defense Intelligence Agency flatly dissented. And a major rebuttal came from the Joint Economic Committee in Congress in March 1978.

This rebuttal took the form of a staff study by Richard F. Kaufman, the committee's general counsel. On the basis of

- Not only was the Soviet Union the world's largest producer of crude oil at the present time, but it had also the largest proven reserves of coal and natural gas. Its oil reserves were probably second only to those of Saudi Arabia, and it continued to make impressive gains in the development of its energy resources.
- In addition to supplying its own needs and those of Eastern Europe, Soviet energy exports to the West were on the increase, with oil exports worth $5 billion in 1976.
- The boom in oil and gas pipeline construction in the Soviet Union suggested that the country was giving high priority to the energy sector. The Soviets had built 5000 miles of pipeline in 1976 and 10,000 miles in 1977.
- The hard currency earned from oil sales to the West and the influence gained from sales to Eastern Europe were too important to Moscow to be lost by default: "Soviet leaders will probably take the policy initiatives necessary to preserve the USSR's status as a net oil importer. Possible new actions include major increased investment in the energy sector, substitution of natural gas and other energy sources for oil, and conservation."

The Blunder Reversed

Kaufman's assessment made little or no dent in the Washington consensus. The Soviet move into Afghanistan was seen, in the worsening cold war climate of late 1979 and early 1980 as but the prelude to more far-reaching incursions, all climaxing in an assault on the Middle Eastern oil jugular to the West.

In mid-1980 Senator William Proxmire held closed hearings in which he asked the DIA and the CIA for their latest views on Soviet oil production. A sanitized version of these hearings has now been released.

Frank Doe of the DIA put his agency's unchanged position straightforwardly: the

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 June 1981

OPINION AND COMMENTARY

Thoughts on terrorism

Joseph C. Harsch

The best way to get this business of terrorism in perspective is to figure out what recent acts of terrorism would not have happened if the Soviet Union did not exist.

The most recent acts of criminal and violent terrorism have been the attempted assassinations of Pope John Paul II in Rome and of President Reagan in Washington.

There is every indication that the man who fired at the Pope was a criminal psychopath. If he had accomplices or an organization background it was apparently of a right-wing variety. There is no serious suggestion that the deed was motivated from Moscow or the man trained by Moscow or by its agents.

The man who shot at President Reagan was presumably a psychopath. There is no evidence whatever of Soviet influence or training behind him.

Some of the worst acts of terrorism in recent times have been the killings of political reformers and dissidents in El Salvador by hit squads employed by members of the former oligarchy. The total number over recent years is in the thousands. The victims have included Roman Catholic nuns and experts on land redistribution from the United States.

Unless you can believe that the right-wing former landowners of El Salvador, most of whom are living in the Miami area, are agents of Moscow, you have to attribute these large-scale killings to the political right. Moscow probably has provided some of the funds and weapons which have kept a guerrilla army in the field in El Salvador. They have done their share of killing. But the number killed from the right exceeds heavily those killed by the left.

Previous to the political terrorism which has wracked El Salvador was the mass suicide on Nov. 18, 1978, of some 800 followers of Jim Jones, leader of a religious cult called the People's Temple, in Jonestown, Guyana. The deed was attributed to fanaticism. There was no known Soviet connection.

One of the world's worst killers since World War II was Idi Amin of Uganda. The number of his victims has never been officially tallied. It must have run into many thousands. He was motivated by power, greed, and enjoyment in cruelty. There is no evidence that he was motivated from Moscow or supported by Moscow, although Moscow did not shun him. He might have had some weapons from Moscow – for cash.

The staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran was held hostage by Iranian students for more than a year. The motive was anti-Americanism arising out of years of US support for the former Shah of Iran. There is no serious suggestion that Moscow had any hand in the motivation or training of the students.

The worst horror in modern times (some historians would say in all time) was of course the liquidation of the Jews of Central Europe by Adolf Hitler's Nazis.

The Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia are widely believed to have massacred as many as a million of their compatriots. But they have in turn been nearly wiped out by the Vietnamese who are armed and supported by Moscow. The Chinese give some support to the remainder of the Khmer Rouge.

What role then has Moscow played in international terrorism?

At the beginning of World War II the Soviets executed some 13,000 Polish officers who had surrendered to them when Soviets and Germans collusively invaded Poland.

In more recent times Moscow has provided encouragement, support, and probably guns to a number of "popular liberation movements." The best known and most publicized of such movements has been the Palestine Liberation Organization. PLO leaders reportedly have been trained in Moscow. But the movement grew out of the Arab-Israel wars. The PLO recruits from among Palestinian refugees whose condition stems from Israel's conquest of Arab lands. The Palestine resistance movement would exist without Moscow.

Other popular resistance movements spring from local conditions. Moscow moves in to support where there is a prospect of future advantage to the Kremlin. But it is difficult to document any long list of such movements which were initiated in Moscow or which would disappear without Moscow's support.

The CIA keeps a tally of incidents of violence and terrorism around the world. Its findings do not support the Reagan administration's assumptions that most world terrorism comes from Moscow. The CIA has been asked to restudy the matter. The administration hopes that the result the next time around will be more supportive of administration preferences. CIA officials say privately they are finding it difficult to find the evidence to support the administration's view.

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THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
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REAGAN'S DR. STRANGELOVE

by Jonathan Alter

Every so often a certain kind of person involved in public affairs arouses within those who disagree an emotional response so strong, so angry, that you get a little curious about what it is that causes all the snorts and sighs when his name comes up.

One of those people in Washington right now is Richard Pipes, a Polish-born Harvard professor of Russian history. Pipes became important in 1976 when a team of hardline analysts he headed totally revised CIA estimates of Soviet strength. Since January he has been on leave from Harvard, serving at the White House as senior advisor on Soviet and Eastern European affairs, a critical National Security Council post.

Paul Warnke, an otherwise discreet Washington lawyer and former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, says that some of Pipes's views on the Soviets are "just full of crap." Averell Harriman, irascible octogenarian that he is, went a little further than usual a couple of years ago when he advised a visitor that Pipes is "nothing but a damn fool." George Kistiakowsky, Eisenhower's science advisor and a well-known expert on arms control issues, told me something utterly libelous about Pipes, took it off the record, then added simply, "I can't rationalize the man for you—that's not possible."

Now, whenever something like this happens—and I've left out many similar examples—it's a good bet that either 1) the person in question has turned out to be at least partially right about a subject on which his critics were sure he was entirely wrong, or 2) he is in fact the arrogant ideologue his detractors claim, and he does in fact overstate his case to the point of being irresponsible if not dangerous.

It has to be admitted that Richard Pipes, superhawk, falls a little into the first category. Like other hardliners, he has at least some reason to feel a perverse sense of vindication over the course of U.S.-Soviet relations. For those more hopeful about detente, the invasion of Afghanistan was a double whammy—it was abhorrent in itself, but it also hurt a little to have to chalk one up for the Cassandras, whose dire warnings turned out to contain a grain of truth.

Jonathan Alter is an editor of The Washington Monthly.

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AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY
25 May 1981

Beam Weapons Technology Expanding

By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.

Washington—The U. S. is moving toward taking full advantage of its technological capability operating in the medium of space to provide a defense for the nation against ballistic missile attack by the Soviet Union.

The National Security Council is considering a major study on space defense by a task force.

White House policy decisions on programs, national objectives and the level of commitment are expected to result from the study, according to high-level White House staff officials.

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., also is delving into the possibility of space-based weapons for national defense and has asked his agency to conduct a study of the available technology and the political and military implications.

One of the reasons the National Security Council plans to move into policy and U. S. strategy in the area of space-based weapon systems designed for defense, Administration officials said, is because of departmental policy issues and bureaucratic lethargy.

Recent events have combined to focus attention on space defense:

- Addition of $50 million by the Senate to the Fiscal 1982 Defense Authorization Bill for space-based, high-energy laser weapons development, bringing the authorization total to $147.5 million. Language in the Senate bill directs the Air Force to establish an airborne and space-based laser weapons program office.
- Conceptual study designs under Defense Dept. contract by SRI International, and possible cooperation by Rockwell International on the development of a small, manned utility space cruiser. The vehicle would service other spacecraft from low earth orbit up to geostationary altitudes and could aid and maintain conventional infrared homing vehicles and directed-energy weapons placed in space for defense.
- Serious consideration within the Defense Dept. and Congress of establishment of a new branch of the armed services for space warfare, probably Space Command. The reasoning is that the Air Force and Navy are seeking to avoid developing space weaponry for defense and that any effort in this area takes away from total obligational authority for other planned strategic weapon systems. There also is some concern over roles and missions between the Army and Air Force as to where the Army's ballistic missile defense mission stops and USAF's traditional space defense mission begins.
- Expected development of SOFAS (survivable optical forward acquisition system), utilizing long-wavelength infrared optical probes launched into space if a ballistic missile attack is suspected. The probe would be used to scan corridors of attacking ballistic missiles and provide instantaneous information to the President and military commanders regarding the strategic situation, size and nature of the attack.
- Funding provided through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for feasibility demonstrations of beam propagation of both charged and neutral particle devices. The programs are structured to lead toward the eventual development of particle-beam weapons application both in space and within the atmosphere.
- Successful beam propagation by the Navy Sea Lite program TRW 2.2-megawatt mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL) in beam tests at San Juan Capistrano, Calif.
- Consideration by the Air Force Weapons Laboratory and Air Force Systems Command of lethality tests using the Boeing NKC-135 airborne laser laboratory aircraft equipped with a carbon dioxide gas dynamic laser against a Navy Polaris ballistic missile. The test would take place at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific with the laser laboratory flying at approximately 35,000 ft. at a standoff range of 20-40 naut. mi. The 400-kw. 10.6-micron laser should be able to destroy the Polaris missile soon after it broaches the ocean surface in the boost phase.
- Proposal by Boeing Aerospace Corp. to DARPA to build and test in orbit a 2.2-megawatt chemical hydrogen fluoride laser with a 2.5-meter (8.2-ft.)-dia. optical system for feasibility demonstration against airborne and space-based targets. Such a feasibility demonstration could be conducted by 1985, using the shuttle to place the laser weapon system in orbit, Pentagon officials said.
- Defense Dept. Scientific Advisory Board Laser Panel report to Congress calling for increased research and development funding for high-energy laser technology.
- Operational capability in the USSR of a ground-based, high-energy laser weapon capable of damaging the sensitive optical and electronic subsystems on U. S. spacecraft in low Earth orbit, and massive laser weapons and particle-beam weapons development effort in the USSR. This includes attempts to package a laser weapon for space basing and development at the Soviet installation at Golovinno of a mobile air defense laser weapon system for forward area use.
- Soviet testing of killer satellites with 18 tests and 11 successes. Both radar and infrared sensors have been used to home on target Soviet spacecraft. The USSR has an operational antisatellite capability, making U. S. spacecraft operating in low Earth orbit vulnerable to attack.

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Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed

RICHARD K. BETTS*

Most major wars since 1939 have begun with surprise attacks. Hindsight reveals that the element of surprise in most of these attacks was unwarranted; substantial evidence of an impending strike was available to the victims before the fact. The high incidence of surprise is itself surprising. The voluminous literature on strategic surprise, however, suffers from three fixations. One is a focus on the problem of warning, and how to improve intelligence collection, rather than on the more difficult problem of how to improve political response to ample warning indicators. Another is a common view of surprise as an absolute or dichotomous problem rather than as a matter of degree. Third is the prevalent derivation of theories from single cases rather than from comparative studies. This article puts these fixations in perspective.[1]

Intelligence and Warning: The Relativity of Surprise

Warning without response is useless. "Warning" is evidence filtered through perception; "response" is action designed to counter an attack (alert, mobilization, and redeployments to enhance readiness). The linkage between the two is accurate evaluation and sound judgment, the lack of which is the source of most victims' failures to avoid the avoidable. Just as analysts of arms-control agree-

[1] For eight case studies on which this article is based see, Richard K. Betts, *Surprise and Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, forthcoming), chaps. 2 and 3.

RICHARD K. BETTS, research associate at The Brookings Institution, has taught at Harvard, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins Universities, has served on the staffs of the National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and is author of *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*.

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WILMINGTON SUNDAY NEWS JOURN.
FAMILY WEEKLY
10 May 1981

Can the CIA W Spy War?

"We are in possibly the most menacing period since Wor who believes that the answer to the Soviet challenge lies how intelligent is our intelligence?

By Tad Szulc

—In Saudi Arabia, radical plotters are conspiring to overthrow the rulers of the oil kingdom in an ominous replay of the Iranian revolution.

—In strife-ridden Central America, Cuban operatives are secretively delivering weapons to leftist rebels.

—In Western European capitals, Soviet diplomats are subtly seeking to encourage the new wave of neutralism.

—At their proving grounds in Central Asia, the Russians are flight-testing a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with 10 nuclear warheads, a super-rocket designed to hit targets in the United States with deadly accuracy.

These are just a few of the crucial problems and dangers facing the United States at a time of rising tension with the Soviet Union and general international upheaval. We are in possibly the most menacing period since World War II.

For America to be able to deal effectively with threats of this kind, we need precise, detailed and timely knowledge of what is happening around the globe on a daily basis. In other words, the greatest self-defense requirement for the United States, as seen by the Reagan Administration, is a first-rate capability for gathering and interpreting intelligence — as well as for influencing events in foreign countries through secret means and resources.

But according to the most experienced experts in Washington, United States Intelligence — the Central Intelligence Agency and its military sister agencies — has been falling short of superb performance, to say the least, in recent years. This is believed to be true of both "human" and technical intelligence, from cloak-and-dagger espionage to the spy-in-the-sky (satellite) surveillance of Soviet nuclear advances.

The rebuilding, streamlining and modernizing of American intelligence operations looms, therefore, as one of the highest priorities for the Reagan Administration and the new leadership team it fielded earlier this year. The decision to revive and step up covert activities abroad — ranging from clandestine arms aid to anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan to efforts at gaining decisive political influence in the petroleum-rich Persian Gulf — is part of the current upgrading plan. Much more must be done, however, to restore primacy to the United States in the elusive world of intelligence.

The immediate responsibility for improving American intelligence lies with William J. Casey, the 68-year-old New York lawyer who was named by President Reagan as Director of Central Intelligence after managing his election campaign. Under the law, Casey is head of the entire intelligence community (comprising the CIA; the Pentagon-run National Security Agency (NSA), which specializes in technical intelligence; the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and

erence to the low morale pervading the Agency since the Congressional investigations of the mid-1970's and continuing through the tenure of Admiral Stansfield Turner as CIA Director during the Carter Administration.

How well Casey will succeed remains a serious question mark in Washington. Though he has been touted as an "old hand" at intelligence, there are many doubts among intelligence professionals concerning his leadership qualities, including his limited experience in this field. Casey served for three wartime years as a London-based senior officer in the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA's forerunner, but did not join the CIA afterward. His only other direct exposure to intelligence was his service in 1976 on the Murphy Commission, which surveyed the work of the intelligence community. Casey's exposure

Tad Szulc has written 14 books on foreign policy. His first novel, Diplomatic Immunity, will be published by Simon & Schuster later this month.

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FOREIGN POLICY

A Tempest Over Terrorism

Terrorism seems to have supplanted human rights as Washington's most emotional foreign-policy preoccupation. Alexander Haig regularly portrays the Soviet Union as a wet nurse to international terrorism. And Ronald Reagan hinted last week that the United States would not talk to the Soviet Union about limiting nuclear weapons until the Soviets stop providing more conventional weapons to terrorists. The difficulty all along has been that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Hard facts on terrorism are scarcer than honest men in a KGB safehouse. And the Administration's own anti-terrorism campaign has posed a disquieting question: is the crisis as bad as the President and Haig have presented it, or has the Administration's rhetoric outstripped sound intelligence—and good ideas for coping with the problem?

Few doubt that the Soviets have given aid and comfort to terrorists. The real question is whether they are actively recruiting, training and dispatching them around the world. "You'd be able to play a tougher game if you could really pinpoint the fact that this was being done by the Soviets," says one State Department officer. If the Soviet connection proves more nebulous, a more complex approach may be required: assisting friendly countries to stamp out individual terrorist groups and using whatever limited economic and diplomatic pressure can be brought to bear on countries such as Libya, South Yemen and Syria, which openly support terrorism.

In confronting the problem, the Administration has directed the CIA to draw up a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of Soviet involvement in terrorism. Haig asked for the report only after he had publicly voiced his own view that the Soviets were indeed "training, funding and equipping" international terrorism. The CIA's first draft of the study drew protests from the Defense Intelligence Agency and some political appointees at the State Department, who didn't think it was tough enough. So the next draft was prepared by the DIA. The DIA's version was rejected by career analysts at State and the CIA as being too "polemical" and "a visceral version of events." Now a third draft is being written by an interagency body called the National Intelligence Council.

It is not clear that, under the circumstances, any such study can be objective. "It's always a problem when the particular policy line is already known," admits a knowledgeable source. The CIA defines terrorism as an act of violence involving the [illegible] a political objective and says that las terrorist activities were worse than i of the twelve years it has kept record attacks, 642 deaths, 1,078 injuries) those figures can change. Citing a new puter formula, the agency added 2,500 cases to its twelve-year data The key issue is that the inferences from data have led to some "major substantive disagreements." "Ultimately one can argue that all of this has nothing to do with terrorism and has everything to do with the posture one wants to strike in the East-West relationship," says a source. "It's a classic case of 'What is it that I want to make out of the same set of facts?' "

Training: The basic facts about Soviet involvement have not changed much since the CIA's first public report on terrorism in 1976. As Claire Sterling, an expert on terrorists, says in her new book, "The Terror Network": "The case rests on evidence that everyone can see, long since exposed to the light of day." The 1976 CIA report said the Soviets had been aiding the Palestinians since 1969. It cited evidence linking the Soviets with terrorists in Western Europe and connecting other Warsaw Pact members to the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army (though it is also true that most of the IRA's funding comes from Irish Americans). It noted, too, the Kremlin's program of bringing Third World revolutionaries to the Soviet Union for training and indoctrination. Among them: Carlos, the world's most notorious terrorist, who masterminded a number of brutal attacks including the kidnapping of eleven OPEC oil ministers in Vienna in 1975.

The most obvious Soviet tie remains with the PLO. There is plenty of evidence that Palestinians have traveled to the Soviet Union for training in everything from ideology to making bombs. Captured Palestinians now in Israeli prisons have confessed to such schooling—and the Soviet Union scarcely bothers to make a secret of it. Previous administrations have stopped short of calling the PLO a terrorist organization on grounds that it represents a people trying to regain its homeland and that only some factions have resorted to terrorism. But Richard Allen, the President's national-security adviser, now says, "We must identify the PLO as a terrorist organization ... The Soviet involvement is organic and I don't want to just isolate it with respect to the PLO. You need to amplify the context here to talk about train- [illegible] ...ntage of a group of crazies, the net effect is the same." But the problem is more subtle than that. No one knows, for example, whether Carlos works on his own—or with a KGB case officer. If he is a freelancer, Washington would be hard-pressed to draw a moral distinction between him and some of the Cuban exiles whom the CIA once trained and controlled. (Cuban exiles were responsible for as many terrorist attacks as Palestinians in 1976, according to the CIA.)

Kaddafi: To what extent is the Soviet Union responsible for the terrorism supported by countries like Libya, Syria and South Yemen? Allen calls them Soviet "subcontracting stations." But Douglas Heck, who was head of the interagency Working Group on Terrorism during the Ford Administration, doubts that even the Soviets could persuade Libya's Muammar Kaddafi to abandon terrorism.

On occasion, the Russians have helped to thwart terrorism. Heck recalls that when he was ambassador to Nepal, the Russian ambassador warned him that four Arabs had entered the country to kidnap him. East Germany has provided safe houses for members of the Baader-Meinhof gang. But according to the CIA, the Bulgarians, clearly with Soviet approval, allowed a West German police team to arrest Till Meyer, a member of the Baader-Meinhof's Red Army Faction in 1978.

No change in Soviet behavior could remove the vast array of economic, social, religious and racial causes that prompt most terrorist groups to spring into existence. Most terrorists now have the expertise to survive without Soviet support. But if nothing else, Reagan's rhetoric promises to keep the Soviets on the defensive. "They really were completely unprepared for the charge they were connected and associated with international terrorism," says Anthony Quainton, head of the current Working Group On Terrorism. He hopes that the rhetorical lashing will mobilize public opinion and "over time have the effect of making the Soviet Union more circumspect in the kinds of support they give to political violence." If the strategy puts even a small damper on terrorism, the effort will have been worth it.

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ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES
3 MAY 1981

U.S. TRIES TO BACK UP HAIG ON TERRORISM

But Repeated Intelligence Studies Find No Direct Link to Soviet

By PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 2 — In late January, eight days after the inauguration of President Reagan and three days after the new Administration's first Cabinet-level meeting on terrorism, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. accused the Soviet Union of "training, funding and equipping" international terrorists.

His words caught the Government's intelligence agencies by surprise. Now, three months later, with resistance to terrorism firmly established as a main focus of foreign policy, the agencies are still scrambling to catch up with Mr. Haig's comments, intelligence officials said.

An intelligence report on terrorism, begun after Mr. Haig had spoken, is nearing completion after several false starts. Officials said that it supported some but not all of Mr. Haig's sweeping charges.

That gap is one of several problems that have dogged the policy on terrorism since it began evolving in January. The Administration's pronouncements about fighting terrorism, for example, exceed its ability to predict, prevent and respond to terrorist acts, a review of State Department, Defense Department and intelligence agency capabilities shows.

Administration spokesmen have also been imprecise in defining terrorism, scholars who study the subject said, leading to public confusion about exactly what the policy covers.

The policy on terrorism was enunciated before State Department officials had fully considered how it would mesh with other policies, including relations with the Soviet Union. Some officials question whether terrorism is an appropriate focus for the foreign policy of the United States.

As a result, Administration officials acknowledged, an effort to create a forceful and popular policy about a serious international problem has failed to crystallize.

Interviews with officials at the White House, State Department, Defense Department and intelligence agencies indicate that the underlying source of difficulty was a failure to coordinate preparatory work on the policy.

When President Reagan's National Security Council, the senior body formulating foreign policy, held its first meeting on Jan. 28, terrorism was the main subject on the agenda.

The American hostages held in Iran for more than a year had been freed the week before, and terrorism was on everyone's mind, officials recalled. The participants, including President Reagan, Vice President Bush and the Secretaries of State and Defense, were briefed in the Cabinet Room of the White House by Anthony C. E. Quainton, director of the State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism.

Need for Forceful Policy Seen

No specific decisions were made, officials said. The participants agreed that the Administration should develop a forceful policy, and a review of intelligence information and collection capabilities was proposed.

The next day, Mr. Reagan welcomed the former hostages at the White House and declared, "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."

On Jan. 23, Mr. Haig, appearing at his first news conference as Secretary of State, made the charges against the Soviet Union.

"International terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights," he said after having accused the Soviet Union with supporting terrorism.

Later, Mr. Haig added that the Russians "are involved in conscious policy, in programs, if you will, which foster, support and expand" terrorism.

The remarks, made in response to questions, seemed to be a major pronouncement by the new Administration and marked a significant shift from the Carter Administration's emphasis on human rights.

Two Key Questions Unresolved

They immediately raised two questions: What did Mr. Haig mean by terrorism? What evidence did he have to support the charges against the Soviet Union? Neither question has been resolved.

By not defining terrorism, experts said, Mr. Haig left unclear whether he meant traditional terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army in Japan, and classical forms of terrorism such as airplane hijackings and bombings, or whether he had a broader definition in mind that would include insurgent movements and wars of national liberation.

"Haig made a sweeping statement," said Walter Laqueur, professor of political science at Georgetown University. "He seemed to make terrorism synonymous with all forms of political violence. One should be a bit more careful."

Brian M. Jenkins, who directs research on political violence at the Rand Corporation, said Mr. Haig might have kept his remarks general because he hoped to use the label of terrorist as a political weapon against the Soviet Union.

Wrong Focus for Foreign Policy

The ambiguity left the impression that a major priority of American foreign policy might be to combat airplane hijackings, bombings and political kidnappings and assassinations, a goal that troubled many officials.

"Combatting terrorism is a police problem," said Mr. Laqueur. "It is not a problem for the foreign minister of a global power."

The questions about definitions spilled over into the intelligence community, where analysts were uncertain whether Mr. Haig was accusing the Soviet Union of directing individual terrorist groups or more generally supporting terrorism.

At the Central Intelligence Agency, senior officials, apparently surprised by the remarks, ordered a review of intelligence on terrorism. The first draft was rejected by William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, officials said.

Analysts complained that Mr. Casey had considered the draft faulty because it did not support Mr. Haig's assertions. Sources close to Mr. Casey said he felt the report had lacked substance and had been poorly prepared.

Second Report Found Inadequate

Mr. Casey then asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to prepare a report on terrorism. That was finished recently, but was also found by Mr. Casey and other officials to be incomplete.

Intelligence officials said a third and final report was now being prepared, incorporating new material as well as sections of the two previous papers, and would be sent to the President soon.

This final report, according to officials familiar with it, concludes that the Soviet Union has not played a direct role in training or equipping traditional terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades or the Red Army and has no master plan to create terrorism around the world.

It does find that the Soviet Union has provided aid to organizations and nations, including the Palestine Liberation Organization and Libya, that support terrorism and engage in it themselves.

Haig Is Said to Overstate Case

"Haig was generally correct, but he overstated the case," an intelligence official said, adding:

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GALLERY MAGAZINE
May 1981

For almost 20 years a quiet but ominous fear has haunted the corridors of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is the specter of a mole — an American official somewhere in the upper echelons of the CIA who is really a Soviet agent planted by its own spy network, the KGB.

In the words of a CIA insider, "If there is a mole inside the CIA hierarchy, this means that every particle of our intelligence is suspect and possibly contaminated. It means the Soviets have detailed knowledge of our verification capability and can circumvent it. It changes the world power balance."

Three years ago a widespread CIA search intensified for a mole who might conceivably be operating his own spy ring within the Agency. This followed a series of arrests of several former CIA employees who admitted having passed intelligence secrets to the Soviets. Many of these secrets concerned clandestine electronic and satellite surveillance systems the U.S. was using to monitor Russian strategic weapons developments. Loss of those secrets was termed by the CIA the most serious espionage disaster in 20 years.

Some say John Paisley was a top Russian spy planted in the CIA.
Some say he was both.
Some say John Paisley was a brilliant CIA operative looking for a master Russian spy planted in the CIA.
Was his "strange" suicide actually murder?

THE SPY AT THE BOTTOM OF THE BAY

Investigative report by Richard Russell

CONTINUED

FOREIGN REPORT
Published by The Economist
30 April 1981

Is Russia violating arms pact

An important battle that will directly affect the future of A
being fought out behind the scenes of the Reagan administra
the Central Intelligence Agency and the state department
Control and Disarmament Agency on the other – is about the unratified Salt-2 agreement, alleged Soviet violations of Salt-1 and other treaties, and the future of arms control in general.

The focal point of the clash is a long, highly-classified study being prepared by top officials at ACDA which claims that the Soviet Union has regularly violated treaties and is, therefore, not to be trusted. The issue is whether there is any point in signing any future agreements with the Russians if they are ("contemptible cheaters", as one ACDA source put it.

Traditionally, the CIA has taken the most benevolent view of Soviet actions which are "ambiguous" in relation to such treaties. The state department, under Alexander Haig, does not want to shut down any possibility of talking with the Russians in the future by trumpeting to the world treaty violations that may not actually be so – and may, in fact, be technically legal actions, or actions not covered by specific agreements between the two countries.

FOREIGN REPORT has been given the substance of an early draft of the ACDA report, which will include at least two dozen specific instances of what are called probable or clear Soviet violations.

Those concerning the Salt-1 agreement, signed in 1972, include:

- Large-scale camouflage and concealment of testing, production and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (see FOREIGN REPORT, March 5, 1981).
- Deployment of up to 150 launch control silos (III-X silos), which might be converted for use as missile silos, and an increase in their depth, which means that they might hold the Russian super-missile, the SS-18.
- Replacement of the SS-11 with a heavy missile.
- Deactivation of fewer than the agreed number of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) to make up for new replacements, and the concealing of the fact that the agreement had not been fully complied with.
- Use of 18 SS-9 ICBM training launchers, maybe as part of the active ICBM force.
- Encryption of telemetry – encoding, to make it unreadable, the stream of performance data coming from a test missile – for various missiles listed in the agreement.

Allegations about the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and protocol, signed in 1972, include:

(1) Tests of an air-defence missile, the Sam-5, and its accompanying radar, the "Square Pair", for ABM purposes – at least three times for both the interceptor and radar, but probably more often than that.

(2) Development of a rapidly deployable ABM system called the ABM-X-3, using sophisticated phased-array radar.

(3) Testing of Sam-10 radar in an ABM mode in 1979.

(4) Falsification of the number of ABM test launchers deactivated in 1973.

The complaints concerning the unratified Salt-2 treaty, signed in 1979, include:

- Misleading data on the range of the Backfire bomber, and statements which did not cover its known intercontinental and refuelling capability.
- Heavy encryption of SS-18 tests, and the testing of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile for the Typhoon class nuclear submarine.
- The simulated testing of a rapid reload capability for the SS-18 during last September's Warsaw pact exercises.

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Wash Post
27 April 1981

ABC's Bomb Watch In the Middle East

By George C. Wilson

The fuse on The Bomb is already lit in the Middle East.

This is the message ABC will transmit to television viewers tonight (Channel 7 at 10) in a grim documentary entitled "Near Armageddon: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East."

Through taped interviews with relevant officials, past and present, and commentary by ABC correspondents, the viewer is told Israel has the nuclear bomb for sure; that Iraq, Libya

TV Preview

and Pakistan are working on it with the help of countries that should know better — Belgium, France and Switzerland. Egypt is portrayed as a more distant candidate for joining the nuclear club.

Camera crews succeed in portraying the irony of underdeveloped countries spending billions on expensive and dangerous weapons — billions that could go for food, waterways, roads and housing. Each mini-chapter on the four countries opens with scenes projecting primitive conditions of barren landscape or crowded streets.

The reporting rings true as the commentators present evidence to contradict claims by government leaders and industry executives that they are not helping to develop nuclear weapons for Middle Eastern countries. The producers obviously went to considerable pains and expense to trace how Israel might have obtained uranium for making nuclear weapons, with a Pennsylvania firm and a mystery ship their leading suspects. The same kind of detective work is presented to show how Iraq is inexorably advancing toward The Bomb.

Missing from the enlightening narratives are man-in-the-street reactions, or even pictures of anti-nuclear protests, to underscore that some people are trying to throw themselves in front of the blind march toward a nuclear Armageddon. Perhaps because of that missing emotion, the program has a certain antiseptic quality as it warns that the Middle East may soon incinerate itself.

Also, the viewer is left with a feeling of helplessness. Some kind of summing up on what could be done to avoid Armageddon would have been welcome. However, the first step toward getting a problem solved is to force everyone to look at it. ABC must get high marks for doing that. The problem cannot be overexposed. "Near Armageddon" is a significant contribution.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
20 April 1981

Assault on Terrorism: Int
or Witch Hunt?

First of two articles

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Ever since it started issuing annual reports on the touchy topic of terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency had never counted more than 188 terrorist attacks in a year throughout the world.

This year it has hit upon a startling new math. The CIA has suddenly discovered there were 760 international terrorist incidents in 1980 alone — and thousands of others in years gone by that it never bothered listing. Until now.

The escalation of the terrorist threat is just one facet of a new politics of paranoia sweeping Washington. Congressional investigations are being cranked up. Protests in the name of civil liberties are planned. Conservatives warn of dangers to national security. Liberals envision a new wave of "witch hunts."

At the CIA, the statistical revisionism coincides with the advent of the Reagan administration and its determination — proclaimed by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. — to make international terrorism the chief concern of foreign policy.

On Capitol Hill, the first forum will be the newly created Senate subcommittee on security and terrorism. The chairman of the five-member panel is Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.), who plans to begin hearings soon on "Soviet and surrogate support for international terrorism," an issue that foreign policy hardliners feel has been shamefully neglected in recent years.

The CIA report should add fresh dimensions to the problem. Officials say the text has somehow become "stuck" somewhere at agency headquarters, but it should be made public shortly.

When it does come out, officials say, it will contain charts and graphs showing 5,954 terrorist attacks throughout the world between 1968 and 1979. Last year's report showed 3,336 attacks — for the same 12-year period. The new report also will show hundreds more deaths and injuries at the hand of terrorists than the CIA has ever before suggested.

"They've thrown in things they didn't use to throw in," a State Department expert said approvingly. "Instead of using a standard of 'significant' terrorist activity, they're using more universal criteria. We encouraged them to do it."

Some critics see the new Senate subcommittee as a reincarnation of the old internal security subcommittee that used to hold extensive hearings on "subversive activities" and "subversion in government."

Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), who served on the old subcommittee before it was eliminated in 1977, seems to share that view, and not with dismay.

"I have felt for some time that it should be reinstituted and when I became chairman, I did reinstitute it," he says. "It's not going to be a witch hunt. It's not going to assassinate people's characters. It's just going to get the facts."

Denton voices similar assurances, although terrorism is far from his only field of interest. A retired admiral who spent seven years and seven months as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam, Denton also intends to look at the performance of the American press on some sensitive subjects.

He says he can still remember how galling it was to be told by his captors that the U.S. press or politicians were taking up the same themes he'd heard days earlier from Radio Moscow or Radio Hanoi.

"I don't believe it's a matter of con-

[redacted] concerned [redacted]

propaganda campaign, employing the same placards and the same slogans around the world.

Back in the 1950s, Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) and his allies used to denounce such phenomena as evidence of a so-called "transmission belt" between Soviet Russia and sympathizers in the United States. Now it has an even more ominous set of labels. It is "disinformation," planted and nurtured by "agents of influence."

Among his first witnesses, Denton said in an interview, will be such people as Claire Sterling, author of *The Terror Network*, and Arnaud de Borchgrave, co-author of *The Spike*.

Both books are rave items in conservative circles, fueling the new alarums about the threat of terrorism and other insidious influences. Sterling's book lays out a pattern perhaps best summed up by the announced subject of Denton's first set of hearings: "Soviet and surrogate support for international terrorism." De Borchgrave's novel is about a Kremlin "blueprint" for taking over the West with the help of KGB dupes and agents of influence in academia, the press and even the White House.

"If we used the classic witnesses, from the intelligence agencies, I think they'd be looked on as representing vested interests, as not as objective as they should be," says the Senate subcommittee's chief counsel, Joel S. Lisker, a veteran of the FBI and the Justice Department's internal security section. He said journalists such as Sterling and de Borchgrave "will be taken more seriously" and "bring a

COMMENTARY
April 1981

THIS IS THE FIRST PART OF A FIVE-PART SERIES.

The Future Danger

Norman Podhoretz

EVERYONE--or nearly everyone at any rate--now recognizes that a change of major proportions came over the United States after the seizure of the hostages in Iran in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which followed hard upon its heels. Yet putting the case in such precise temporal terms is slightly misleading. It suggests that the change in question occurred overnight and all at once, whereas what actually happened was the dramatic crystallization of a process which had been developing and gathering momentum for five years and possibly even more. Having thus matured, this great change went on to demand--and achieve--full political expression and representation. Within a year after the hostages were seized, Ronald Reagan, who embodied the new mood more fully than any other candidate for the Presidency in 1980, had first swept away all his Republican rivals with relative ease, and had then gone on to inflict a humiliating defeat on the sitting Democratic President.

Reagan's victory was all the more significant in that Jimmy Carter had in response to Iran and Afghanistan made his own adjustment to the new mood, and was much more closely attuned to it than Edward Kennedy, his chief rival within the Democratic party. But Carter's adjustments were too hasty, too little, and too late to overcome his identification with the now discredited attitudes of the recent past and the policies generated by those attitudes.

In winning the Presidency by a landslide, then, Ronald Reagan confirmed, and in unmistakable terms, that a new consensus had indeed come into being. Specifically his election demonstrated that two related arguments which had been raging in the United States for the past decade or so were now finally settled. The first concerned the growth of Soviet power, and the second had to do with the decline of American power.

I

IN RETROSPECT it seems strange that there should have been any argument at all, let alone a ferocious one, over the growth of Soviet power. After all, the basic facts were available and they were reasonably clear. It was no secret that in the course of the negotiations to resolve the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, one of the Soviet representatives, Vassily Kuznetsov, told a member of the American team, John J. McCloy, that the Soviet Union would never let such a thing happen to it again. In an "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation with the United States, the Soviets had been forced to back down by superior American power. Their naval power had been no match for ours, and the strategic nuclear balance looming behind the conventional match-up had been even more overwhelmingly favorable to the United States. In short, the Soviets knew that they would be beaten in a limited naval engagement, and that if such an engagement should escalate into a nuclear exchange, their country would suffer much greater damage than they could inflict upon us. It was this situation that, Kuznetsov vowed, the Soviets would never allow to arise again.

Nor was it any secret that the Soviets proved as good as Kuznetsov's word. They embarked on a military build-up so steady and of such impressive breadth and scope that concealment would have been impossible even if it had been the objective. In every category of military power, conventional and nuclear, strategic and tactical, on land, on the sea, and in the air, the Soviets moved relentlessly forward. Quantities were increased year by year while the quality and sophistication of these ever larger arsenals were simultaneously being improved and refined.

The facts, as I say, were known. There might be uncertainty or disagreement over the exact dimensions of the Soviet build-up. Inside the CIA, for example, analysts examining the data came up with a lower estimate of the sums the Soviets were spending on the military than a group of outside analysts ("Team B") looking at the same material. But there was no disagreement among the informed over the upward direction of the general trend.

* * * *

THIS IS THE SECOND PART OF A FIVE-PART SERIES.

THE second major element of the new consensus is the obverse of the first. That is, as Soviet power is now generally recognized to have been rising, so American power is now seen to have been declining; and as the increase in Soviet power is now understood to represent an index of aggressive designs directly threatening to us, so the decline of American power is acknowledged to have brought consequences already bordering on the intolerable, with the almost certain prospect of worse to come unless drastic steps are taken without any further delay.

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NEW YORK TIMES
29 MARCH 1981

SOVIET AID DISPUTED IN TERRORISM STUDY

A Draft C.I.A. Report, Now Being Reviewed, Finds Insufficient Evidence of Direct Role

By JUDITH MILLER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 28 — A draft report produced by the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that there is insufficient evidence to substantiate Administration charges that the Soviet Union is directly helping to foment international terrorism, Congressional and Administration sources said today.

William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, has asked his analysts, the sources said, to review their conclusions, given the substantial opposition to the report from other agencies.

The draft estimate, produced by the C.I.A.'s National Foreign Assessments Center, has stirred debate within Administration foreign policy circles, as foreign affairs spokesmen have publicly accused the Soviet Union of training, equipping, and financing international terrorist groups.

The review of the draft estimate has once again raised questions about the relationship between intelligence officials and policy makers, with some C.I.A. officials concerned that the agency is coming under pressure to tailor its analysis to fit the policy views of the Administration.

Charges in Last Administration

Similar charges were made during the Carter Administration and resulted in frequently bitter exchanges between policy makers and intelligence officials.

Bruce C. Clark, who heads the agency's assessments, or analysis unit, is retiring from the C.I.A. in April, in what officials said was a personal decision unrelated to the dispute over the intelligence estimate on terrorism.

One official said that a successor has not been named, but another indicated that Mr. Clark's successor would be the current director of the agency's operations unit, John McMahon.

The special national intelligence estimate on terrorism was begun soon after the Administration took office, officials said. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. said on Jan. 28 in his first news conference that the Soviet Union, as part of a "conscious policy," undertook direct "training, funding and equipping" of international terrorists.

The Administration has subsequently said that combatting international terrorism is one of its key foreign policy objectives.

'Ample Evidence' on Soviet Role

In addition, Richard V. Allen, President Reagan's national security adviser said in an interview with ABC News this week that "ample evidence" had been accumulated to demonstrate the Soviet Union's involvement in international terrorism. Mr. Allen also said that the Soviet Union was "probably" supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization, which he said must be identified as a terrorist organization, through financial assistance and through support of its "main aims."

Finally, Mr. Allen concluded that Israeli air raids into southern Lebanon should be generally recognized as a "hot pursuit of a sort and therefore, justified."

Officials said that the draft estimate contained some factual evidence to support charges that the Soviet Union was directly aiding and abetting terrorist groups, but that in many instances the evidence of such involvement was either murky or nonexistent.

The estimate, which was circulated for comment to the State Department, National Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, stirred angry debate and response.

commented."

Other Administration and Congressional officials, however, voiced concern that the agency was once again being asked to tailor its views to fit the public pronouncements of senior Administration officials.

"There would not have been a review if the estimate's conclusions had totally supported the Administration's charges," the official said.

6

REUTER

29 March 1981

CIA:

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‡AM-Terrorism‡

WASHINGTON, March 29, Reuter -- Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger today disputed a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report that there was no substantial evidence of Soviet involvement in international terrorism, calling it ''a very preliminary draft.''

Mr Weinberger said he had no doubt that ''there is good clear evidence that the Soviets have been participating in the training and equipping of groups, that for want of a better term, can be called terrorist groups.''

But he added that the CIA report, some details of which were published in a Washington newspaper today, had ''specifically not been issued'' and did not constitute the final judgement of the CIA.

''Apparently it is just a draft....a very preliminary draft of the thinking of some of the people,'' he said in an interview on ABC's Issues and Answers program.

The Reagan Administration has charged that the Soviet Union is directly helping to foment international terrorism and, in his first news conference on January 28, Secretary of State Alexander Haig said Moscow, as part of a ''conscious policy,'' undertook ''the training, funding and equipping'' of terrorists.‡

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THE WASHINGTON POST
29 March 1981

CIA Said to Doubt Soviet Tie to Terrorism

Associated Press

A draft report prepared by the CIA "strongly disagrees" with Reagan administration contentions that the Soviet Union is a key supporter of international terrorism, government sources said yesterday.

The sources, who asked not to be identified, said the CIA conclusion is contained in a draft of a national intelligence survey being circulated on Capitol Hill and within the administration.

"It strongly disagrees with Reagan's and [Secretary of State Alexander M.] Haig's contention that the Soviets are behind international terrorism," a source said.

The survey also includes assessments prepared by the Pentagon and the State Department, according to the sources.

"The Defense Intelligence Agency concludes that the Soviets are in it [support for international terrorism] up to their necks," one source said.

"There is no smoking gun. And since you don't have that, no, the Soviets aren't behind international terrorism," is the way one source summarized the CIA's findings.

The sources said CIA admits there is "circumstantial evidence" of Soviet involvement in terrorist activities, but insufficient "credible evidence."

"The [CIA] conclusion is a highly political one," one source said.

The sources declined to say exactly what data the CIA relied on, noting that much of it included classified secrets.

The assessments are contained in a report known as a National Intelligence Estimate. The final report is not expected to be made public.

The CIA is the primary agency responsible for preparing the intelligence estimate.

Haig said on Jan. 28 in his first news conference that even though the Soviets have been the targets of terrorist activities, "they today are involved in conscious policies which foster, support and expand" international terrorism.

"I think it is clear that we have an unprecedented, at least in character and scope, risk-taking mode on the part of the Soviet Union not just in this hemisphere, but in Africa as well," the secretary of state said.

Haig ordered a review of administration efforts to combat international terrorism.

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NEW YORK TIMES
26 MARCH 1981

ESSAY

The Five Families

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, March 25 — Only experienced Mafiologists understand the division of power and turf in the Reagan syndicate. Five families dominate the foreign policy scene:

1. *The Meese Family.* Big Ed's chief foreign policy *caporegime* is Richard Allen, whose *consigliere* is Richard Pipes, the recently-slapped-down hard-liner. This White House family was reluctantly forced to go to the mattresses this week with:

2. *Big Al's Family.* Underboss of the Haig gang in Foggy Bottom is Larry Eagleburger, although William "the Judge" Clark, from the Meese family, is permitted to attend all but blood-family meetings. Other clans were content to let Big Al's family appear to be dominant until Big Al — who is said to sprinkle turfbuilder on his corn flakes — began to believe his own adulatory cover stories. However, the Haig men retain close ties to:

3. *Cap the Knife's Family.* Cap's Pentagon clan boasts Frank "the Fence Jumper" Carlucci, who brought with him complete knowledge of the family jewels of:

4. *Casey's Family.* This upriver C.I.A. mob, with underboss Bobby ("That's My Real Name") Inman and European button man Hans Heymann, is reluctant to share its secrets with the smallest and weakest of the group:

5. *Willie the ACDA's Family,* which is automatically suspect because the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is required by statute to blab to the Capitol Hill fuzz. The Meese family blocked Gen. Ed Rowney from becoming the ACDA's godfather because he was too close to Big Al's family, and the job has been offered to Eugene "the Yalie" Rostow. *Caporegime*-in-place is Michael Pillsbury, threatened by Scott Thompson if the Meese family proves willing to accept two Democrats to head ACDA.

As we all know, when Big Al demanded to be named *capo di tutti capi* on any occasion that all five families came under attack, the Meese clan countered with "crisis manager" George Bush, who has the undisputed stature of a Lucky Luciano. Haig, who learned tantrum-throwing from the expert, knew enough not to threaten to resign this time — his family franchise

What only Mafiologists know, however, is that this clash goes beyond ego-tripping and also deals with the substantive question: Which family shall control the spy satellites? Cap the Knife's Air Force owns them and is required to share info with the ACDA family, but Casey's family evaluates the data and Big Al would be disadvantaged in a crisis without the word from Rhyolite and the "Big Bird."

A similar turf dispute, which remains hidden from fuzz on the Hill and the peachfuzz in the galleries, is brewing between the Cap the Knife and Casey families. Casey's National Intelligence Estimates report on potential enemies, and do not evaluate U.S. forces; Bobby the Underboss wants to include United States defense potential in his reports. But since these estimates must also go to the fuzz, Cap's family in the Pentagon will go to the mattresses before it permits the fuzz to play one family off against another.

We should not be misled, however, by lurid tales of inter-family poaching and scrapping. Certain basic rules have been agreed to among the five clans:

1. *No cable should be sent overseas without the approval of all five families.* This rule has always been adhered to. Disagreements are often thrashed out at "IG" (Interagency Group) meetings at the level of Richard Burt of Big Al's family, and Richard Perle of Cap the Knife's family, obviating the need for too many Apalachin-like "SIG" (Senior IG) gatherings of the dons. Not yet settled: whether policy speeches must be signed off on by all five families.

2. *Every family should tell the fuzz the same story.* This rule is rarely breached, which made Big Al's heartfelt singing to the House such a source of consternation. The favored means of communication to the fuzz is through "the Jefferson group," an informal multifamily group formerly called "the Madison Group"; the approved fuzz informer is Jesse Helms' *consigliere*, John Carbough.

3. *No family should leak to the peachfuzz to embarrass another.* This rule has been shattered: Evans and Novak have detailed Big Al's triumphs over Cap the Knife, and Marvin Kalb showed the text of a SIG Pakistan study on NBC television (fortunately, nobody saw it).

Can there be peace among equally powerful families, or must one of them predominate?

Much depends on Big Al's quest for haigemony. Though he is embarrassed today, he plans a quiet coup next week: State's Larry the Eagle, accompanied by ACDA's Michael the Pill, are going to Brussels for a meeting of the Special Consultative Group to discuss Theater Nuclear Forces. Months from now, the other families will discover that this meeting was considered by Europeans to be the cold dawn

NEW YORK TIMES
20 MARCH 1981

Discordant Voices

A Rash of Opposing Statements Bring Reagan Foreign Policies Into Question

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 19 — During the Presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan often took the Carter Administration to task for vacillation and confusion in its foreign policy statements, and last month his counselor, Edwin Meese 3d, assured a national television audience that, by contrast, the Reagan Administration "will speak with one voice."

News Analysis

But lately the Republican newcomers have discovered that it is easier to promise harmony and consistency than to practice it.

A flurry over the comments of Richard E. Pipes, the Harvard expert on the Soviet Union who is now a member of the National Security Council staff, is merely the latest in a string of foreign policy bobbles, disagreements and reversals that have irked and worried foreign officials and embarrassed the White House and State Department.

Mr. Pipes caused a stir when he was quoted, but not identified, in a Reuters news agency interview as saying that there was no alternative to war with the Soviet Union if the Russians did not abandon Communism. He was also quoted as saying that Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of West Germany was susceptible to Soviet persuasion.

West Germans Were Unhappy

The West Germans were unhappy and the White House so concerned that reporters were quickly summoned by the White House press secretary, James S. Brady, who issued a terse statement disavowing Mr. Pipes's remarks as neither authorized nor an accurate reflection of policy. High-level State Department officials were equally vexed at Mr. Pipes's stridency.

On Monday Mr. Brady was disavowing another Administration official, John A. Bushnell, acting Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.

On Thursday Mr. Bushnell, seeking to play down American involvement in El Salvador, told reporters at a background briefing: "Our impression is that this story is running about five times as big as it really is." Referring to the 54 American advisers sent to that country, he added that "judging by the press coverage of this I would have thought we had deployed a whole division."

Privately some Administration officials were embarrassed, acknowledging that press coverage of El Salvador had largely responded to the Administration's own aggressive efforts to publicize outside aid to the leftist guerrillas there.

'Speaking for Himself'

White House strategists, feeling it was a mistake to get into a confrontation with the press, sent Mr. Brady out to say that the President did not feel the situation was being exaggerated and that Mr. Bushnell "was speaking for himself."

There have been other zigzags as well. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger created concern in Europe when he unexpectedly raised the possibility that neutron warheads might be deployed in Western Europe. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. rushed out a cable to reassure the Europeans that this was not United States policy.

Navy Secretary John F. Lehman, meeting with reporters in early March, came out against continued American observance of the strategic arms agreements signed with Moscow in 1972 and 1979. By nightfall the State Department felt obliged to disavow Mr. Lehman's comments and to say for the first time that Washington would abide by the agreements as long as the Russians did.

The State Department has done its own fast turnarounds, too. On Friday Mr. Haig talked ominously about forthcoming Soviet military maneuvers in Poland and how that situation was getting tense again. After some meetings in Moscow the department changed its tune and said it was no longer so concerned, though privately some officials were fearful of having sounded the alarm once too often.

Soviet Intentions Often Unclear

Soviet intentions are often unclear. The Carter Administration sounded alarms about Poland last December that were not borne out by Soviet actions.

But the Reagan Administration's problems run deeper than that. Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Democrat of New York, charged yesterday that "the up-and-down, roller coaster, zigging and zagging" of statements suggested that the Administration's policy was "essentially based on a reaction to the Soviets" without a positive strategy.

Privately, some Administration officials acknowledge that the Reagan foreign policy team has still not worked out an overall policy framework or conceptualized the intellectual underpinnings of its daily actions. "Aside from opposing the Soviets, we don't really have a foreign policy," said one experienced diplomat. "All this is such a change that people are disoriented," said another career diplomat. "There's a lot of confusion inside the Government."

What compounds the problem is that the Administration recruited a number of highly articulate, strong-minded, outspoken and often hard-line intellectuals who were accustomed to airing their views, and they find it hard to break those habits and become anonymous bureaucrats.

Very Pessimistic Estimates

Mr. Pipes, for example, was the well-known leader of the "B Team" intelligence assessment in 1976 that produced very pessimistic estimates of Soviet abilities and intentions that were considerably at odds with official estimates.

Since then he has written widely about the militancy of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet expansionism and Soviet preparations for fighting nuclear war, and has traced the roots of what he sees as Soviet terrorism to 19th-century Russian history. In a harbinger of the Administration's early statements, he wrote of the Moscow leadership last year: "We must expose its support of terrorism as widely as possible. It must be made absolutely clear that these actions will no longer be tolerated."

Even Administration officials who agree with those views privately assert the need for greater discipline in the new foreign policy team. Some suggest that such problems are part of the learning process for a team unaccustomed to official responsibilities. Others predict that such problems will persist until the President and his top advisers have solidified their basic policy framework.

NORWICH BULLETIN(CT)
8 March 1981

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ON PAGE 1.

The CIA's blunders coul

This three part Bulletin series on 20 years of CIA estimates of Soviet military capabilities reviews two decades of charges that since the early 1960s the CIA has systematically underestimated Soviet military spending, technical capabilities and weapons deployment.

Today's first installment, "The Security Blanket That Failed," explores the scope of the blunders as seen by a number of experts who have analyzed the reports during both Republican and Democratic Administrations.



By WILLIAM F. PARHAM
Bulletin Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The U.S. government has wasted billions of dollars over the past two decades on inaccurate estimates and forecasts of Soviet military spending and capabilities, according to present and former U.S. intelligence and defense officials.

Ever since the Soviets encouraged the U.S. in the late 1950s to overestimate Soviet deployment and accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which led to the famous "missile gap", U.S. Presidents and Congresses have reached arms limits agreements with the Soviets and have determined U.S. defense investments on the basis of inaccurate intelligence about what the Soviets were spending on defense and what weapons they were planning to deploy, strategically as well as tactically, The Bulletin has learned.

The inaccurate intelligence has been the subject of often heated debate within the intelligence community since the mid-1960s, with some critics claiming they were forced out of the CIA for questioning the agency's figures. Recently, more ominous questions have been raised about possible explanations for the errors.

Was it simply the result of bureaucratic bungling or stubbornness on the part of those involved, some of the critics ask. Or was it the result of Soviet deception possibly including "moles" or Soviet agents in high positions in the U.S. government?

Whatever the cause, it is beginning to dawn on Capitol Hill and throughout the new Administration that the money wasted on the poor estimates may be only the tip of a very unpleasant iceberg.

An even more significant cost of the U.S. intelligence community's persistently low estimates may be realized in the hundreds of billions of dollars the U.S. may decide to spend during the 1980s on extremely expensive crash programs, such as the MX missile, to prevent the Soviets from gaining An irreversible military advantage, experts say.

If the crash catch-up programs fail over the next decade, says one analyst on Capitol Hill, the ultimate cost of the mass
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to be even further off in five years than it is now.

— The CIA was apparently caught unawares by the introduction, refinement ordeployment quantity or timing of at least 18 major new Soviet weapons systems and technologies.

Also, analysis of the annual Posture Statements of the various Secretaries of Defense against subsequent developments shows the CIA was caught by more rapid or extensive development or deployment than it had expected of numerous systems and technologies, including:

— A large deployment of Soviet medium bombers in the late 1950s and early 1960s;

— A large deployment of medium/intermediate-range ballistic missiles (M/IRBMs) in the same period;

— The deployment of a second generation of sub-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SS-N-8s, on a fleet of Yankee-class subs in the mid-1980s;

— The deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads on ICBMs;

— The development of a third generation of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the SS-16,

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ON PAGE A19

THE WASHINGTON POST
12 February 1981

Philip Geyelin

The Reigning White House Soviet Scholar

Back in 1976, when George Bush was head of the Central Intelligence Agency and in charge of preparing the annual National Intelligence Estimate, he stirred up a big brouhaha by going outside the government for a "second opinion" on the critical question of the Soviet Union's global strategy.

To the distinct discomfort of the professionals on the inside, Bush called in Harvard Prof. Richard Pipes, a Russian history scholar and close student of Soviet affairs. And Bush set up what came to be known as "Team B" with a mission to second-guess the findings of the official government estimators ("Team A").

The net effect was to introduce into the final report a much dimmer view of the Soviet Union's global strategy, of its military capabilities, of its designs for world hegemony and of its willingness to resort to nuclear war in pursuit of its purposes.

Today George Bush sits in the vice president's office in the White House. And right across the street, in the Executive Office Building, in an office with a splendid view of Washington landmarks, sits the same Prof. Pipes. He is now on the inside as a member of the National Security Council staff—a member, you might say, of "Team A" with a view of Soviet intentions that, if anything, has grown grimmer over the ensuing four years.

Along with the rest of the Reagan NSC staff, Pipes is under tight wraps: no public pronouncements; everything for "background"; logs to be kept of all other-than-social telephone calls. But it is not hard to get a grasp of his current thinking from assorted recently published works, with a little unattributable instruction from the professor himself.

Pipes on the Soviet Union is a crash course well worth taking, if for no other reason than what it tells you about the Reagan team's taste in Sovietologists. Just how direct a hand he will have in policymaking is hard to say. Secretary of State Alexander Haig is plainly bent on making the State Department the be-all-and-end-all of foreign policy "formation." He will have Walter Stoessel, a former ambassador to Moscow and career-long Soviet expert, in the No. 3 job and, as his top man for policy planning, Paul Wolfowitz (another former member, incidentally, of "Team B").

Still, Pipes will be the reigning White House Soviet scholar, working for National Security Adviser Richard Allen, who will be reporting to the president through White House Counselor Ed Meese. One way or another, then, the thinking of Richard Pipes is pretty much assured a hearing.

What you find in his writings are the scholarly underpinnings for much of what both Reagan and Haig have been saying about the Soviet hand in world terrorism and/or Moscow's master plan for world domination.

"The roots of Soviet terrorism, indeed of modern terrorism," Pipes wrote recently, date back to 1879, when an organization called "The People's Will" was created in a small Russian town, Lipetsk. This small band of political assassins, which, among other things, murdered Czar Alexander II, Pipes argues, is the true "source of all modern terrorist groups, whether they be named the Tupamaros, the Baader-Meinhof group, the Weathermen, Red Brigade or PLO."

Today, Pipes maintains that the Soviet Union "encourages and employs terrorism because terrorism is a handy and relatively cheap weapon in their arsenal to destroy Western societies. . . . We must expose its support of terrorism as widely as possible. . . . It must be made absolutely clear that these activities will no longer be tolerated.

On the broader question of Soviet designs, Pipes reaches far back into pre-Communist Russian history for his theory that military has always been the dominant element in Russian society.

"Militancy—that is, a commitment to violence and coercion—and its principal instrumentality, militarism," he wrote recently, "seem to me as central to Soviet communism as the pursuit of profit to societies with market-oriented economies."

In Commentary magazine last year, he argued in an article called "Soviet Global Strategy" that "Marxist-Leninism is by its very nature a militant doctrine." It is also, he went on, "an international doctrine. . . . The phases in the evolution of mankind are global in scope and cannot be contained (except transitionally) within the limits of the nation-state."

He sees Russia as historically expansionist, perpetually seeking to acquire new territory, which requires new buffers, which in turn must be assimilated, requiring yet more buffers, in an endless process. The Soviets, he insists, will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons, not as deterrent, or a threat—but actually use them, as a part of global strategy. The ultimate aim—indeed a necessity for the success of Marxist-Leninism—is the destruction of capitalism.

Ronald Reagan, it could be argued, needs little encouragement in these beliefs. But anytime he's looking for intellectual and historical reinforcement, he will find it right across the street, in the office of Prof. Pipes.

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ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 30

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
1 FEBRUARY 1981

THE RUSSIA REAG

By Harrison E. Salisbury

As Ronald Reagan and his advisers sit down in the Oval Office to map American strategy for the 1980's, the Russian actuality that confronts them may be less formidable than what some of them may have perceived. But this is not necessarily a cause for rejoicing. Greater dangers may arise from debilitating Soviet weaknesses than from supposed Soviet military might.

Probably not since World War II, when the Soviet Union struggled to evict its German invaders, has the long view from the Kremlin windows been so bleak. The solutions to crushing problems at home and abroad seem beyond the grasp of Soviet planners.

The real world that Leonid I. Brezhnev and his elderly Politburo comrades acknowledge in the privacy of their meeting rooms contains few of the superlatives that dominate Pravda's political verbiage.

It is, in fact, becoming increasingly evident that the principal danger to world peace is not posed by the nefarious schemes of Communist plotters set on fomenting revolutions and overwhelming the West with military might, but by the Soviet Union's reaction to failures and frustrations that stem from incurable flaws within its own creaky system.

This assessment is, obviously, hypothesis. No one, perhaps not even any of the solemn old men who sit around the long table in the Kremlin palace, has all the facts. And certainly not this writer. But it is not difficult to reconstruct a semblance of the *tour d'horizon* on which Mr. Brezhnev must be basing his calculations. The closer President Reagan and his advisers can replicate the view from the Kremlin windows, the more effectively will the new administration be able to construct an American policy to deal with any Soviet threat.

There can be no question that the reports Mr. Brezhnev receives from his aides depict an international landscape replete with hostile, intractable and dangerous elements. There is, of

portantly, a profound crisis in the chronically unsettled Soviet barrier zone — this time in Poland, an area that poses unusual historic hazards for Russia. And there is the 4,600-mile frontier with China, guarded by one million Soviet troops, about one quarter of the Red Army, and backed by countless nuclear weapons targeted against China's principal cities. For 10 years, this enormous Soviet force has been positioned against a perceived threat of war with China. There is nothing at present to suggest that this apprehension of impending danger will disappear in the next decade.

The view westward is no more reassuring. Now that détente has gone down the drain, the United States and its European allies (plus Japan) loom threateningly on the Soviet horizon as an entity more suspicious of Moscow today than at any time since the height of the cold war. In Soviet eyes, the United States and its allies are perceived as a capitalist monolith of rampant military and economic strength, a colossus that grows more and more formidable in violation of every precept of Marx and Lenin.

When Mr. Brezhnev casts his attention inward, on his own country, he confronts evidence even more disturbing. Until 10 years ago, the Soviet gross national product rose at a buoyant rate of 8 percent to 10 percent annually. Since 1970, the rate of growth has dwindled. The G.N.P. for 1980, United States experts estimate, increased by barely 1 percent. Not since Stalin launched his first five-year plan more than 50 years ago has so sluggish a peacetime growth been recorded. Soviet agriculture, in particular, is a catastrophe: Annual shortfalls of millions of tons of grain have, time and again, put the Soviet Union in the humiliating position of being dependent on hostile powers, including the United States, for help in feeding its 260 million citizens.

The history of recent years, a history of decelerating Soviet production relative to American growth, contains no evidence that Moscow can quickly reverse its economic stagnation. The latest C.I.A. statistics indicate that the United States, despite its own economic woes, now outproduces the sclerotic Soviet Union by 40 percent. Put another way, the United States is now capable, some experts contend, of spending $10 for every $6 allotted by Moscow in the accelerating arms race without crip-

ment of Soviet military capability, concluded that the Soviet Union was engaging in a massive arms buildup — although many Western analysts now believe this was never actually achieved. Earlier, an in-house team concluded that the C.I.A. had been underestimating what the Soviet Union was spending on defense. Its calculations indicated that the Soviet Union's defense spending was actually in a range of 11 percent to 13 percent of its G.N.P., not the 6 percent to 8 percent previously estimated. The 1976 C.I.A. figures, which Team B used in reaching its conclusion about the Soviet defense buildup, were based on a reassessment of the ruble's real purchasing power in the Soviet Union. These currency adjustments, however, do not affect the amount of military hardware produced by the Soviet Union.

That same year, other military experts estimated that by 1980 the Soviet Union's defense spending would rise to an annual rate of 18 percent of its G.N.P. By way of contrast, the United States has recently been spending about 6 percent of its G.N.P. on defense. President Carter's 1982 budget projected a defense increase of 5.3 percent (about 5.6 percent of the nation's G.N.P.) for the next fiscal year.

Current C.I.A. estimates of Soviet defense spending calculate the increase annually during the late 1960's and 70's at about 3 percent to 4 percent, roughly equal to the growth of the Soviet G.N.P. in recent years. What now interests Western defense experts is the future relationship between Moscow's arms spending and its sluggish G.N.P.

□

Is the bad news for Leonid Brezhnev good news for the new President of United States? It *sounds* like good news. It *sounds* very optimistic. But there is a paradox here. Weakness, particularly internal weakness, in a world power can sometimes be more dangerous than strength. A secure nation negotiates with confidence. A na-

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THE BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE
25 January 1981

'Hawk' or realist?

Reagan adviser Pipes insists he's the latter

By Nina McCain
Globe Staff

Richard Pipes arrived in America on his 17th birthday, July 11, 1940. He and his father and mother had fled from the Nazi invasion of Poland.

One of his most vivid memories of his new country was seeing an advertisement with a quotation from Benjamin Franklin.

"It said something like, 'Unforeseen events need not change the course of men's lives.' I laughed. I had witnessed the outbreak of war in Poland, seen my house destroyed, been forced to leave home and migrate thousands of miles."

The chasm between American optimism and the Eastern European experience of the ravages of war has shaped Richard Pipes' view of the world and, for the next few years, Pipes will have a hand in shaping America's foreign policy. The Harvard professor will be the specialist on the Soviet Union for the Reagan Administration's National Security Council.

He is one of the leading figures in a group of intellectuals who are lumped together under the label "neoconservative," many of whose members write for the combative Commentary magazine. Pipes shares with them a conviction that America has grown soft and sleepy about national defense and a determination to lead a reawakening.

Pipes says he and and like-minded members of the Committee on the Present Danger are "the same kind of people who, in 1936 or 1937, would have backed Churchill in England. [People who said] Germany is arming, preparing for war, and we are doing nothing."

Substitute the words "Soviet Union" for "Germany" and you have a rough notion of Pipes' approach to US-Soviet relations.

Pipes is the latest in a series of Soviet experts to serve in the highest councils in Washington. Like those who have preceded him, from Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen and George Kennan to Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Marshall Shulman, Pipes brings his own interpretation of US-Soviet relations to the job.

Although he shares a common Eastern European background with Kissinger and Brzezinski, Pipes is sharply critical of what he regards as their "ego trips," and of the doctrine of detente which Kissinger first espoused and more recently downplayed.

The problem with detente — the pursuit of arms limitation, trade agreements and a stabilized US-Soviet relationship — Pipes argues, is that the Russians aren't playing by the same rules. While American strategists talk about nuclear parity and deterrence, the Soviets are aiming for superiority and, ultimately, victory.

Often described as a "hardliner" or "hawk," Pipes prefers to think of himself as a realist.

"If you want to prevent nuclear war, or to contain the damage, you have to look at it realistically," Pipes said in an interview last week. "That does not mean I am in favor of nuclear war. You would have to be insane (to favor such a war) . . . I am a very pacific person I don't even own a gun."

Pipes is particularly critical of the notion, which he says has been sold to Americans by a succession of political leaders of both parties, that nuclear war is "unthinkable" and "unimaginable."

"The idea that the explosion of one nuclear bomb means the end of mankind leads to paralysis," he says. "You have to look at it very coldly . . . If a physician is confronted with a terrible disease, he is not likely to cure it by tearing his hair out. You want a physician who is cool."

A tall, slender man whose dark hair is in retreat from a high forehead, Pipes personifies cool. Juggling an interview and a steady stream of phone calls from well-wishers, he managed to be gracious, pleased and unflustered.

Pipes is an expert on 19th century Russian who has spent 34 of his 57 years at Harvard, first as a graduate student and then as a professor. As he tells it, if the Harvard history department had been more flexible, he might not be on his way to Washington now.

After a couple of years at a small college in Ohio and three years in the Air Force, Pipes came to Harvard interested in the history of art and philosophy, which he wanted to combine somehow with the Russian studies he had begun at Cornell under Air Force auspices. "The history department was very strictly set up, then and now," Pipes recalls, "and they said I couldn't do both. The regulations forced me to choose between Russian history and my other interests."

Pipes makes his home with his wife Irene in a handsome old house on a quiet side street in Cambridge. (Two grown sons live in other parts of the country.) Japanese prints, paintings and pieces of sculpture fill the rooms, evidence of his continuing interest in art. But other interests — in photography, cross country skiing and swimming — have fallen by the wayside in recent years as Pipes has devoted more and more of his time to the debate over US foreign policy.

He first caught the eye of Washington insiders in 1970 when he delivered a paper on US-Soviet relations to the American Historical Association. An aide to Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) liked the paper and Pipes became a consultant to Jackson's Permanent Committee on Investigations.

But it was not until 1976 that he gained national attention when he headed the "B-team," a group of non-governmental experts brought in by President Ford's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to assess US estimates of Soviet strength. The experts looked at the same data used by the "A-team," the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and came to startlingly different conclusions.

The team's highly critical report charged that the CIA had consistently underestimated the nature and extent of the Soviet threat. It warned that the Soviets would soon be militarily superior to the US and could use that superiority to force US withdrawal from crucial areas like the Mideast.

Coming in the midst of the Nixon-Ford era of relatively good relations with the Soviet Union, the report struck at the very foundations of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and created turmoil within the intelligence community.

Out of the "B team" came the Committee on the Present Danger (there was some membership overlap), and a widely-discussed article in Commentary in which Pipes set out his views on Soviet strategy.

In that article, entitled "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," he argued that Americans have been deluded into believing that the So-

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ON PAGE A-23

NEW YORK TIMES
9 JANUARY 1981

IN THE NATION

Beware Of 'Gaposis'

By Tom Wicker

The Reagan Administration has a new case of an old malady — military "gaposis." As Secretary of Defense-designate Caspar Weinberger testified at his confirmation hearings, the new team will come into office believing that it must bridge a strategic gap that now gives the Soviet Union a distinct advantage over the United States.

Twenty years ago the Kennedy Administration took over with much the same view. Just as Ronald Reagan campaigned last year on the supposed lead the Russians had taken in military power, so John F. Kennedy made much in 1960 of the "missile gap" he and other critics of the Eisenhower Administration believed to exist.

Then as now, there was official backing for that notion. The Air Force reported that by 1964 the Russians would have the ability to produce several times the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles that the U.S. planned. The House Appropriations Committee forecast a 3-to-1 Soviet lead in ICBM's by the end of 1962.

Once in power, however, Mr. Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, discovered that neither U-2 flights nor other intelligence means could verify any extensive number of Soviet ICBM launching sites. By November 1961, Hanson Baldwin, the military editor of The New York Times, could report that new Defense Department estimates put Soviet ICBM strength at 30 to 75, instead of the 200 to 1,000 the missile gappers had variously predicted. The United States then deployed 180 Atlas missiles, and had 18 more ready to go on line, with the second-generation Minuteman nearing deployment.

Mr. Kennedy never officially disavowed the missile gap, but he never referred to it again, either. That doesn't mean, of course, that Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Reagan are in for the same experience, but it does suggest that they might well stay loose until they've seen all the evidence on today's reputed gap.

The basic source for that gap is the report of "Team B," a group of experts on military and Soviet affairs who in 1976 reviewed C.I.A. estimates on Soviet strength and reported it much greater than previously believed. This view was heavily based on a C.I.A. reassessment of Soviet military spending, which concluded that such spending had jumped from 6 to 8 percent of the gross national product to 11 to 13 percent — or "doubled," as American hard-liners liked to put it.

The Team B estimate is now gospel among conservatives of both parties, including Mr. Reagan and his advisers; but if they bring as hard an eye to the new gap as Mr. McNamara did to that of 1961, they'll find that what the C.I.A. actually said about the apparent Soviet increase in defense spending was as follows:

"This does not mean that the impact of defense programs on the Soviet economy has increased — only that our appreciation of this impact has changed. It also implies that Soviet defense industries are far less efficient than formerly believed."

Arthur M. Cox, a former State Department and C.I.A. official, writing in the Nov. 6 New York Review of Books, interpreted this to mean that the Soviet military effort absorbed more Soviet G.N.P. than previously believed *not because defense spending actually had doubled* but because the C.I.A. had raised its estimate of how much Soviet G.N.P. was absorbed by inefficient military production. Thus, in January 1980, the C.I.A. reported that Soviet "defense activities" for 1970-79, estimated in constant dollars, "increased at an average annual rate of 3 percent" — about the same rate at which the U.S. and its NATO partners have raised theirs in the last four years.

Paul Warnke, the former Carter Administration arms negotiator, advanced much the same thesis at a debate sponsored by the Center for Defense Information in New York last Oct. 15. In rebuttal, Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, retired, a member of Team B and a former Director of Defense Intelligence, failed — at least in my view — to refute the Cox-Warnke interpretation.

General Graham insisted that a Soviet defector had confirmed the supposed increase in Moscow's military program. Citing another factor in Team B's conclusion, he also suggested that the Russians had "poured 200 times the U.S. effort into civil defense" in preparation for starting a nuclear war. But Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has derided the idea that civil defense could save Soviet cities from an American attack, even after a Soviet first strike. Mr. Cox said the Russians contend their effort is only a defense against a much more limited attack by the Chinese.

Mr. Weinberger, at his hearing, had the good sense to reject the current fad for fixed-percentage increases in military spending and to pledge to re-study the Carter Administration's overblown basing plan for 200 MX missiles in Utah and Nevada. To that good start, the new team should add a searching examination of a strategic gap often proclaimed, as in 1960, but no better documented then than now.

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ON PAGE A-13
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 December 1980

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Van Cleave as SALT Negotiator?

The confidential recommendation to President-elect Reagan for "a pause" in new SALT talks, coupled with the possibility of defense strategist William Van Cleave's becoming Reagan's arms control negotiator, points to a decisive break with arms control philosophy that any SALT treaty is a good SALT treaty.

The unpublicized proposal for Reagan to go slow in new superpower nuclear arms talks came 10 days ago from the transition team turned lose on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Now required reading by Reagan's national security strategists, the report is described by those who have studied it as "exactly what the president-elect wants."

It espouses full linkage, advocates complete disclosure of widely alleged Soviet violations of past agreements and insists that the rebuilding of U.S. military strength to provide a "margin of safety" should precede a new SALT treaty.

That happens to coincide with arms control philosophies long held by Van Cleave, the brilliant iconoclast whose undiplomatic candor has cost him the Reagan administration posts he most wanted: the second or third top Pentagon job under Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. During the presidential campaign, Van Cleave was Reagan's principal adviser on arms control, a policy area intimately known to the University of Southern California professor.

What Weinberger and other top-level Reaganites have found abrasive about Van Cleave both during the campaign and more recently in the post-election transition could be his greatest asset as chief American negotiator with stony-faced Soviet bargain-hunters in the Kremlin. "Bill as our nuclear arms negotiator," a Reagan insider privately remarked, "would be exactly right in sending Moscow the message that Reagan is one president who won't be rolled over on SALT."

Van Cleave was a member of the 1971-72 arms control negotiating team but resigned before the Nixon administration accepted and signed SALT I in Moscow in 1972. But in testimony before a Senate subcommittee headed by Sen. Henry Jackson, he warned that the treaty contained weaknesses that might prove dangerous in the future—a prophecy that has come all too true in the past eight years.

Van Cleave also served on Team B, the famous group of outside experts appointed in 1976 by then-Central Intelligence director George Bush as a check on the CIA's own expert assessment of U.S. and Soviet military strength.

Conceivably, Van Cleave, whose reputation for intellectual honesty emerged unscathed from his battles with Weinberger and other Reagan insiders, might decide that being chief arms control negotiator is a challenge not large enough for him. Reagan agents sounding him out on the prospect think he can be won over, mainly with the argument that no one else could have as much symbolic impact on Moscow.

An equal argument might be found in the strong tone of the ACDA transition team's report to the president-elect and the fact that it is having an enthusiastic reception by senior Reagan advisers. The team was headed by James Malone, ACDA's general counsel during the Nixon-Ford administration. Its central proposal: that until completion of a "thorough, interagency reassessment of all arms control and national security strategy . . . a pause in all arms control negotiations" is essential.

If, as expected, that becomes the president-elect's policy, the Reagan administration would follow an arms control strategy exactly opposite that of Jimmy Carter four years ago. Carter rushed into SALT talks with Moscow, but when he got an agreement 2½ years later, opposition ran so high that he did not even try to push it to a vote in the Senate.

Reagan's transition team warns against "unilateral arms reductions" by the United States in hope of enticing Soviet reciprocity. That is a deliberate reminder of the Alice-in-Wonderland arms control theory of the Carter administration during its blinkered days when Carter claimed the West no longer need have an "inordinate fear" of communism. The report's strongest argument for going slow is that SALT has become "a permanent excuse for Western failure to come to grips with the Soviet military challenge," a dictum Van Cleave himself might have written.

The shrewd move to confront the Soviets with the cold-steel will and determination of Bill Van Cleave as chief American SALT negotiator could help put arms control, which is clearly an important aspect of the superpower relationship, into proper perspective after 10 years of dangerous experimentation.

Senate critics who would try to shoot down Van Cleave would soon learn this fact: Reagan wants a new SALT treaty, but a treaty that is good, not bad or only fair, for the United States. With Van Cleave as his negotiator, he would not lose any sleep worrying.

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NEW YORK TIMES
8 DECEMBER 1980

Reagan Urged To Reorganize U.S. Intelligence

By JUDITH MILLER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7 — President-elect Ronald Reagan's transition team for the Central Intelligence Agency has proposed several sweeping changes in the organization and operations of the nation's intelligence programs, including increased emphasis on covert action abroad, according to Mr. Reagan's advisers.

The aides said that a preliminary report on the C.I.A. was completed late last week and is to be submitted to Mr. Reagan's transition headquarters tomorrow. The panel is headed by J. William Middendorf 2d, former Secretary of the Navy, who is president of Financial General Bankshares, a Washington-based bank holding company.

In addition to calling for an enhanced role and increased financing for covert activities, the report recommends greater attention to counterintelligence to combat what is viewed as a growing threat of Soviet espionage and international terrorism.

Central Records System

This could be accomplished, the report is said to suggest, through the creation of a central records system that would be used by both the C.I.A. and domestic law-enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such a move has been resisted by Government officials in the past on the ground that it could pose a threat to the civil liberties of American citizens.

The report, Mr. Reagan's aides added, also recommends the establishment of a competitive system of intelligence analysis, intended to provoke wider debate on sensitive international issues. Under the proposal, the Central Intelligence Agency would be forced to defend its conclusions against those of other intelligence agencies, such as the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

According to several aides, these steps could be taken without legislation. But they added that the proposals, and the transition effort itself, had already prompted deep anxiety and debate within the agencies. Moreover, the wide-ranging debate over the structure of the intelligence bureaus and the quality of intelligence they produce have recently exacerbated long-standing tensions on the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Though Mr. Mittendorf declined to discuss the report, he said in an interview yesterday that he favored a more "aggressive" approach to intelligence and that the report's recommendations were aimed at "increasing the productivity" of the intelligence agencies.

William H. Casey, Mr. Reagan's campaign director, who is a strong prospect for the post of Director of Central Intelligence, is known to hold similar views. However, it is not known whether either Mr. Casey or Mr. Reagan will approve the transition team's recommendations.

The proposals are similar to several contained in a recent report prepared for senior Reagan advisers by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington-based research group. However, the proposals touch on a number of complex issues that have been debated for years by intelligence officials.

Among the most sensitive of the proposals is the call for the competing centers of analysis. Many intelligence experts believe that the idea is good in principle but difficult in practice, as a previous attempt reflects. Four years ago, a group of outside specialists was asked by George Bush, then Director of Central Intelligence and now Vice President-elect, to appraise Soviet military potential and intentions.

Trouble in the Agencies

The group, known as Team B, concluded that the C.I.A. and other agencies had underestimated the Soviet buildup and that Moscow was bent on achieving strategic superiority. The effort sparked an acrimonious debate in intelligence circles and upset C.I.A. analysts when reports of Team B's conclusions appeared in the press.

Reagan aides contend that under its plan, the competing analyses would be provided not by outsiders but by such other intelligence bureaus as the Defense Intelligence Agency. While the Reagan aides believe that this approach would improve the overall quality of American intelligence, C.I.A. officials maintain that the Pentagon intelligence apparatus is not capable of functioning as an effective counterweight.

Moreover, some intelligence experts contend that competing centers of analysis, as once existed, would overemphasize disagreements among intelligence agencies. The President now receives a consensus view from the Director of Central Intelligence in so-called National Inteligence Estimates, in which disagreements among intelligence bureaus are usually noted only in footnotes.

A Longstanding Debate

The report's recommendation that a "central file" be established to enhance coordination of counter-intelligence activities is likely to be opposed by civil liberties groups. The file would contain data collected on the activities of suspected foreign agents, including their dealings with Americans. Such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union have maintained that this information could violate citizens' privacy rights.

Finally, there has for years been a growing debate over the push for a larger

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NEW YORK TIMES
7 DECEMBER 1980

Soviet's Military Buildup A Major Issue for Reagan

By RICHART BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 6 — The steady growth of Soviet military power, a matter of prime concern to the incoming administration of President-elect Ronald Reagan, has emerged as one of the most troubling problems facing the United States and its Western allies.

Moscow's military buildup, in the view of some American specialists, could signify an ideologically inspired drive for political domination. In the view of others it reflects a sense of insecurity deeply rooted in Russian history.

The Soviet Military: Its Power and Limits
First of three articles

Also not easily answered is the question which country is the more powerful: the Soviet Union, with 3,658,000 in the armed services, based on conscription for two or three years and an obligation in the reserves to the age of 50; or the United States, with its force of 2,050,000 volunteers.

An Issue of National Concern

In the area of nuclear weapons there is agreement that the Soviet Union has attained "strategic parity" with the United States.

In conventional forces, the Soviet Union is ahead in numbers of weapons and troops. But this superiority is viewed as offset by American technological supremacy. The Soviet Union is trying to catch up and in such categories as ground-combat vehicles is said to have surpassed the United States.

As the Presidential election campaign illustrated, the debate over Soviet military power has become an issue of national concern.

In part the focus on Moscow's military might reflects concern in the Pentagon and in Congress over the status of the American military, with some asserting that American forces have declined in size, quality and readiness.

However, the Soviet Union's buildup has also fostered questions over its strategic goals. In the last 15 years it is said to have pursued a sustained program of expanding its nuclear deterrent and its conventional forces.

Four years ago a debate was stirred in American intelligence circles after a group of academic specialists was asked by George Bush, then Director of Central Intelligence and now Vice President-elect, to appraise Soviet military potential and intentions. The group, known as Team B, concluded that the C.I.A. and other agencies had underestimated the Soviet buildup and that Moscow was bent on achieving strategic superiority.

Debate on Soviet Intentions

On one side of the present debate, specialists such as Richard E. Pipes, a Harvard professor who advises Mr. Reagan and who directed the Team B effort, point to Moscow's buildup to assert that it harbors aggressive designs.

Other specialists, including Arthur Macy Cox, a former State Department and C.I.A. analyst, contend that there is a danger of exaggerating the Soviet buildup. They assert that Moscow, from its point of view, faces threats from nearly every direction and feels it must rely on military power.

As much as a fifth of the Soviet military budget, it is estimated, is directed not against the West but against China. And Soviet forces in Europe have another peripheral function: keeping the Eastern European allies in line.

Most of the Soviet units added to the area since 1967 were sent in during the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Soviet forces in Eastern Europe would also be likely to participate in any intervention in Poland that the Soviet Union might decide to make.

Moscow's nuclear potential is constrained, in some respects, by Soviet-American arms agreements.

The 1972 treaty on antiballistic missiles puts limits these defensive systems, and both sides appear willing to continue to comply with the 1972 interim accord on long-range offensive missiles, which set existing arms totals as ceilings: 2,358 for the Soviet Union and 1,710 for the United States. That accord did not cover long-range bombers.

The Reagan Administration, Republican leaders say, will scrap the 1979 treaty that was signed by President Carter but has not been ratified. It calls for limiting each side to a total of 2,250 missiles and bombers. However, Republican aides have indicated that talks on a new agreement could begin soon after Mr. Reagan enters the White House.

The 1962 crisis over the Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba, which ended when the Russians, confronted with superior American power, agreed to withdraw the missiles, is thought to have marked a turn in the Soviet-American arms competition.

Although the United States was building up at a faster rate in the early 1960's, the Soviet Union soon began to take the initiative. Intelligence specialists believe that, after the 1962 crisis and the ouster of Nikita S. Khrushchev from power in 1964, Moscow's leaders vowed that never again would the Soviet Union allow itself to be humiliated by the United States.

Consequently, during Leonid I. Brezhnev's tenure, the Soviet military budget is estimated to have grown by 3 or 4 percent annually in the late 1960's and in the 1970's.

Noting this growth, William R. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, said recently that Moscow had outspent Washington on defense by $240 billion in the 1970's.

Distortion of Manpower Costs

This and other estimates are challenged by Mr. Cox and Franklyn D. Holzman, an economist at the Harvard Russian Research Center. They contend that the C.I.A.'s practice of calculating the size of the Soviet military budget in the equivalent dollars it would cost the United States exaggerates the cost of manpower, which is paid less in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Holzman and other experts agree that, with an economy 60 percent that of the United States, the Soviet Union now spends at least as much for the armed forces as the United States, or the equivalent of $165 billion a year.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said early this year that the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union should not be viewed in isolation but rather in the context of the respective allied military efforts.

According to Pentagon experts, the allies in Western Europe spent $76 billion for defense last year compared with $20 billion by the East Europeans. The International Institute for Strategic Studies says that the Atlantic alliance's total spending thus slightly exceeds that of the Warsaw Pact.

At the same time, the institute contends that the Soviet bloc spends its military funds more efficiently because it uses standardized Soviet equipment.

Interviews with American intelligence aides, defense officials and academic specialists indicate that Moscow has increased its power in nearly every military sector.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1980

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The Strategic Imbalance

The top-secret, year-end intelligence report on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, the gravest since World War II, is getting final touches—and, for a change, no major dissents—before being sent to President Carter and President-elect Reagan shortly.

Between the lines, the report from Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, demolishes hopes of the arms control lobby that a new arms limitation agreement (SALT) somehow can restore the strategic balance of power. One official familiar with its details told us the report spells this out: growing superiority of Soviet strategic missiles can only be overcome by "new production, not new controls."

Known as National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-8 covering the new year of 1981, the report is the first in several years to emerge from the intelligence community without serious dissent from the CIA's Turner. "The admiral has hardly any footnotes," one insider said. Footnotes are the traditional mechanism for dissenters to register disagreements without forcing major revision in the main text. For the past three years, Turner and some of his Soviet specialists have either been ferocious footnote writers, or have been the targets of profuse footnotes by Pentagon realists.

The CIA's tendency to downplay Soviet progress in outspending and outproducing the United States in the weapons of strategic warfare has not been limited to the Carter administration. Beset by internal feuds, the CIA in 1976 hired outsiders (known as "Team B") to help its own experts prepare the NIE 11-3-8 covering the first year of Carter's presidency.

Since then, Turner's dissents to the findings of other agencies have tended to dilute the final product. Thus, the estimate for 1981, now getting finishing touches is the first in years solidly backed by both career and political officeholders in the intelligence community.

Their agreement shows that debate over Soviet superiority has been resolved in favor of experts who were once called alarmist by the arms controllers. Those arm controllers, in turn, are forced into the back seat.

To the incoming president, the more than 350 pages of NIE 11-3-8 will make frightening reading, for all of his campaign promises to build U.S. strategic strength back to "a margin of safety." The report contradicts the major Carter administration claim that this nation's strategic strength gives it "essential equivalence." That was a dubious conclusion when it was first pronounced nearly four years ago and one now torn to shreds in the new intelligence estimate.

Tearing it to shreds were Carter's repeated decisions slicing off and discarding one strategic program after another. They included the B1 penetration bomber, the neutron warhead for the defense of Western Europe, accelerated development of the big land-based MX missile, the Trident submarine and cruise missiles.

Carter's thesis was the heart of error: we don't need these systems because we already have essential equivalence; what we need is arms control.

Instead, warnings issued when Carter became president have prematurely borne their bitter fruit. He was warned that the United States would face a "window of vulnerability" by the mid-'80s even if he ordered full speed ahead on these discarded systems. He did not; and the "window" is now prematurely open. Reagan has little chance to close it during his first term.

This reality explains why Reagan's national security insiders were so angered by the distortion of Reagan's SALT position given the West German Bundestag by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. This reality makes a grotesquerie out of Sen. Charles Percy's message to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev that Reagan places the highest priority on a SALT accord.

The new NIE 11-3-8 study of the strategic balance mocks such pleasantries. Reagan will assume office at a time of gravest danger to this nation. Nothing but diplomacy and perhaps a little bravado stand between U.S. security and Soviet power to wipe out U.S. land-based missiles and bombers with a single counterforce attack.

Arms control talks, or even agreements that eliminate major hazards from Carter's dying SALT II treaty, cannot rectify the strategic imbalance that Turner is about to document for Carter and Reagan. The CIA's findings leave only one route to safety: production of new weapons systems, without any speed limit.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC
8 November 1980

Thinking the unthinkable.

The New Brinksmanship

by Tad Szulc

For the first time since the 1950s, the possibility of nuclear war with the Soviet Union appears to be seriously accepted by key figures inside and outside the US government. What long have been unthinkable thoughts now are entertained by influential men and women in Washington. Meanwhile the Carter administration is moving apace with measures designed to prepare the US—and US public opinion—for the contingency of major wars. It is a new phenomenon, based on the hardening conclusion that the Soviet Union's overwhelming concern, aside from a determination to achieve strategic superiority over the US, centers on assuring itself of military endurance and survival as a functioning society after a protracted nuclear exchange. A senior White House foreign policy specialist says: "In 30 years, I never thought war was really possible: now I think it *is* possible—if not necessarily probable."

What does it all mean and where does it lead? Is it a question of correct or incorrect perceptions held by officials in Washington and Moscow? What are the implicit dangers of such attitudes? There are no precise answers to these questions. But certain realities are observable. In the US, the military response to the perceived Soviet threat includes the go-ahead for the MX mobile missile system, the work on the "invisible" Stealth bomber, a controversial shift in nuclear targeting strategy against the Soviet Union, recent decisions to accelerate the production of weapons-grade plutonium, and the restoration of US chemical warfare capability. These preparations are developing in a new psychological climate that has evolved steadily since early 1980 and goes well beyond the forums of the presidential campaign.

The new climate, dampening the euphoria of the Soviet-American détente of the last decade, can be traced to the mounting evidence of the build-up of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last December, and, most recently, the dangers surrounding the current Persian Gulf hostilities. Thoughtful analysts at the Pentagon and the National Security Council staff emphasize Soviet advances in the accuracy of their huge SS-18 missiles (plus the fact that their throw-weight greatly exceeds that of US intercontinental missiles); the deployment of medium-range SS-20 missiles in Europe, and the direct involvement of combat forces beyond Soviet borders, from Angola and Ethiopia to Afghanistan. "The grand development in recent years by the Soviets is the projection of their power into the world," says a senior Pentagon expert. And frequent and unexplained movements of Soviet troops have worried the administration and have led to secret alerts by US armed forces this year.

The result of all this is that the hawks and doves in and out of the government nowadays speak in strikingly similar language about the inexorable deterioration in Soviet-American relations and its long-range consequences—although their points of emphasis vary. Of course nobody in Washington desires or actually predicts a nuclear war. But the Carter administration—and the Reagan team—are proceeding along a

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THE WASHINGTON POST
25 October 1980

Carter Held Hope Ev
Shah Had Lost



First of a series

By Scott Armstrong
Washington Post Staff Writer

During the revolutionary turmoil that pulled down the shah of Iran, President Carter clung to the belief that the shah could be saved, even though the shah himself had lost faith in his own power, a five-month investigation by The Washington Post has found.

Two months before the shah fled to exile, when Iran was aflame with protest, the president's national security adviser personally telephoned the Iranian ruler, urging him to use military force to smother the revolution.

A few weeks later, the president was advised to abandon the shah by an outside foreign policy expert whom he called in for counsel. Tell the shah to take a long vacation, the president was told, and begin preparing for a new government in Iran. The president said he couldn't do that to an important allied leader and wouldn't.

Indeed, in that same period, State Department sources say they worked to soften the draft of a message from Carter to the shah, urging again the use of force against the domestic opposition, although the White House insists that no such message was ever sent. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and his top aides feared such a message would lead only to considerable bloodshed and possibly civil war, turmoil that could only worsen America's position in the future of Iran.

The president held to his hope, even when most of his top foreign policy advisers were urging him to ease the shah off his throne and begin the transition to whatever political forces would follow in power. In the final weeks, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, once one of the shah's staunchest supporters, cabled his exasperation to Washington. The president's attitude, he said, was "shortsighted and did not understand where the U.S. interests lie."

One month later, in any case, the shah was gone, permanently exiled. While the American president was surrounded by conflicting counsel on whether the peacock throne could be saved, one person, ironically, who knew with certainty that the shah was doomed was Mohammed Reza Pahlavi himself.

The shah, notwithstanding his reputation as a bloodthirsty tyrant, disregarded eleventh-hour advice from Washington to get tough with street demonstrators and opposition leaders. He was convinced in his own mind that force could not prevail for long. He knew that he was slowly dying of cancer and was anxious to leave behind a stable nation that his young son could rule. Finally, confused by conflicting signals from the United States and pressured by European leaders to abdicate, the shah in his last month in power moved to accommodate the moderate opposition, to live with some dissent and relinquish some of his vast powers.

cused of abandoning the shah prematurely. In fact, Carter still hoped to preserve the shah's power long after intelligence reports and top foreign policy advisers insisted, as a matter of realism, the United States must assist the orderly transition to whatever political forces were going to displace the peacock throne.

This much is certain: The fall of the shah involved a bitter though collegial contest among the president's key advisers, contending for control over foreign policy and veering back and forth in their prognoses for events, stalemating policy with their disagreements.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser, appears intransigent in this account, stoutly resisting the "unthinkable" outcome that lay ahead, demanding the toughest policy line and ultimately prevailing over others who saw the future more clearly.

Vance, preoccupied with other matters, arms talks with the Soviet Union or the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks, was strangely inattentive to the alarm bells within his own department until it was too late to make a difference.

And the U.S. intelligence community, once again, seems badly out-of-focus in perceiving the realities of popular discontent within an allied nation. Some in government did see the picture in Iran clearly, but their perceptions simply did not get through to the president and his policymakers, especially if their distasteful warnings collided with the established official view.

Still, this is not just diplomatic history. The events in Washington and Tehran that presaged the triumph of the Iranian revolution remain with us still as unresolved complications in the hostage crisis and the future of relations with Iran. Until one knows all the

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NEW YORK TIMES
20 OCTOBER 1980

Why the U.S., Since 1977, Has Been Misperceiving Soviet Military Strength

By Arthur Macy Cox

WASHINGTON — A few weeks before the inauguration of President Carter in January 1977, the dramatic conclusions of a new Central Intelligence Agency estimate were leaked to the news media. The study reportedly found that the Soviet Union was moving rapidly to achieve military superiority over its adversaries and was acquiring a combination of strategic offensive and defensive forces that would permit it to fight and win a limited nuclear war. The so-called Team B report has had dramatic and continuing impact on the defense debate in the United States, especially in the Congress. But the Team B findings, though never adequately challenged by the Carter Administration, are based on misinterpretation of the facts.

Team B was made up of 10 military experts, all hard-liners, who were asked by George Bush, the Director of Central Intelligence at that time, to make an independent assessment of Soviet military strength. Though none of them were members of the C.I.A. professional staff, Mr. Bush nevertheless adopted their analysis as the official C.I.A. estimate, rather than that of Team A, the regular C.I.A. staff analysts. According to Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, one of the members of Team B, there were three major factors that influenced the Team B re-evaluation: A difference in the strategic doctrines of the United States and Soviet Union; a new C.I.A. estimate of Soviet defense spending that concluded that the percentage of the Soviet Union's gross national product absorbed by defense had jumped from 6-to-8 percent to 11-to-13 percent; and the discovery of a very important Soviet civil defense effort. Team B asserted that the civil defense program meant that the Russians were preparing a capacity to survive an American counterstrike.

The C.I.A.'s Team B report has had a 'dramatic and continuing impact' on debate for years

On civil defense, at least, the Carter Administration has rejected the conclusions of Team B. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said last Aug. 17: "I don't think massive civil defense programs are going to succeed in protecting the population of countries that try it. I think that the Soviet civil defense program, although it probably is 10 times as big as ours, would not, in my judgment prevent Soviet industry or a great fraction of the Soviet population from being destroyed in an all-out thermonuclear war. . . . In a limited [nuclear] war if you target cities they're not going to be saved by civil defense."

The Soviet Union itself acknowledges that civil defense measures would provide little protection against the United States' nuclear arsenal. The Russians maintain that their civil defense is primarily for the purpose of providing some protection in the event of war with China.

Undoubtedly the greatest impact on public opinion came from the Team B assertion that the Soviet Union has doubled its defense spending. Most members of Congress believe this today. So, it seems, do most editorial writers. The C.I.A.'s revision has become part of the conventional wisdom of defense policy.

Richard M. Nixon in his new book "The Real War" writes: "In 1976 the CIA estimates of Russian military spending for 1970-1975 were doubled overnight as errors were discovered and corrected. . . . Thanks in part to this intelligence blunder we will find ourselves looking down the nuclear barrel in the mid-1980s." But Mr. Nixon, Team B, the Congress, and the news media have been misinformed. The true meaning of the C.I.A. report has been missed. Here is the C.I.A.'s explanation for its change of estimates, as published in its 1976 report: "The new estimate of the share of defense in the Soviet [gross national product] is almost twice as high as the 6 to 8 percent previously estimated. This does not mean that the impact of defense programs on the Soviet economy has increased — only that our appreciation of this impact has changed. *It also implies that Soviet defense industries are far less efficient than formerly believed.*" (Italics are mine.).

So while the C.I.A. increased its estimate of the percentage of Soviet gross national product spent on defense from 6-to-8 percent to 11-to-13 percent, there had in fact been no doubling of the rate of actual defense spending. C.I.A. analysts had been crediting the Soviet Union with a degree of industrial efficiency that was close to that of the United States. What they discovered was that Soviet defense production, in fact, was not efficient. Thus, the Soviet defense effort was absorbing a greater share of the gross national product than previously believed. What should have been cause for jubilation became the inspiration for misguided alarm.

In fact, there have been no dramatic increases in Soviet defense spending during the entire decade. In its official

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NEW YORK TIMES
22 SEPTEMBER 1980

Nuclear Gains by Russians Prompt a Reaction by U.S.

By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 21 — The United States military, long used to having a clear edge over the Soviet Union in nuclear might, is being forced to adjust to a new era in which the American strategic arsenal is becoming outdated and ever more vulnerable.

In recent statements, President Carter, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and other senior officials have asserted that, in the area of nuclear weaponry, the United States is still "second to none." At the same time, however, Mr. Brown and his top aides have started to contend that if present trends in the nuclear balance continue, the United States, by the mid-1980's, could find itself vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Moscow.

Mr. Brown, for example, told a group last month at the United States Naval War College in Newport, R.I., that, without improvements to the ballistic missiles and heavy bombers that make up the country's deterrent force, Washington could face "at best a perception of inferiority, at worst a real possibility of nuclear coercion."

Defense: Is the U.S. Prepared?

Second of seven articles.

Throughout the 1950's and 60's, the United States led the Soviet Union in nearly every measure of strategic power, including numbers of missiles and bombers, warhead totals and overall weapons performance. But Moscow, spending as much as three times more than Washington on nuclear forces during the 1970's, is generally seen as having attained what analysts call "rough parity" in strategic power.

In a national intelligence estimate prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency early this year, it was estimated that Moscow could surpass the United States in nearly every measure of nuclear capability by 1985.

Administration officials maintain that, under Mr. Carter, Washington has begun to counter Moscow's growing missile power. Nevertheless, military specialists acknowledge that several serious problems in the nuclear arsenal need to be rectified in the next few years, including these:

¶American missile and bomber forces are becoming increasingly vulnerable. For the first time, Mr. Brown said last month, the Soviet Union might now be able to destroy all 1,053 of the Air Force's land-based missiles in their underground silos in a surprise nuclear "first strike." A few weeks earlier, William J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for research and engineering, told a House Armed Services subcommittee that Soviet bomber defenses were rapidly improving and that over the next 10 years Moscow could find a means of detecting and destroying the Navy's 41 missile-carrying submarines.

¶Components of the nation's nuclear arsenal are wearing out. The mainstay of the Air Force's nuclear bomber forces, the B-52, is about 20 years old, and officials report that the planes suffer from an increase in expensive maintenance problems. The service's 53 Titan 2 missiles, meanwhile, have also been in place for two decades and have recently been plagued by a series of well-publicized accidents The problems besetting the Titan 2 were vividly demonstrated in Damascus, Ark., last week when a fuel tank of one of the missiles, punctured by a falling socket wrench, exploded and sent a cloud of toxic chemicals into the air.

¶The Government's facilities for manufacturing nuclear weapons are said to be in bad repair. A confidential report prepared recently for the Department of Energy, the agency assigned the task of producing nuclear warheads, concluded that "serious deterioration of equipment and utilities has occurred over the past several years which could seriously impair our ability to meet the nuclear weapons [requirements] forecast for the 1980's." At the Pentagon, aides said that over the last 15 years, several Government plants producing critical materials and components for nuclear warheads had been shut, producing significant delays in weapons programs. One official, for example, said the deployment of a new version of the Army's Lance tactical missile had slowed by 18 months because of a shortage of plutonium for the system's warhead.

¶Malfunctions are plaguing the strategic early warning and communication system. In two instances over the last year, computers at the headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command in Cheyenne Mountain, Colo., have malfunctioned, triggering false alarms in which missiles and bombers were made ready for take-off. Congressional auditors, meanwhile, reported earlier this year that a new generation of computers for the military's worldwide command and control system would not be able to handle the demands created by a major military crisis. The existing system, moreover, is considered vulnerable and inadequate.

Capacity to Retaliate

Pentagon aides stressed that, while these problems were real, none of them meant the United States was in danger of losing its capacity to retaliate after a Soviet nuclear attack. They said, moreover, that intelligence reports indicated that American nuclear forces, as a whole, were still superior to the Soviet arsenal in terms of readiness and reliability, although Soviet forces were considered more powerful.

In addition, they said that Mr. Carter had approved numerous programs over the last three years meant to remedy the emerging nuclear deficiencies. Although in 1977 the President canceled the B-1 bomber, which was proposed as a replacement for the B-52 force, officials said that Mr. Carter's decision to equip the older bombers with air-launched cruise missiles in the next few years would guarantee the Air Force's ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses through the 1980's.

The 1,000-mile range missiles, which fly at treetop altitudes, would permit B-52's to "stand off" from Soviet air defenses, a less demanding role that officials believe will save wear and tear on the aging bombers.

Farther in the future, Secretary Brown and other senior Pentagon aides are excited about the prospects for deploying a Stealth bomber, which would be nearly invisible to Soviet radar.

Submarine Realignment

At sea, the Navy this year deployed the first of a new class of Trident missile submarines that will gradually replace the 10 Polaris vessels built in the 1960's. Each of the new submarines will carry 24 Trident 1 missiles, a 4,600-mile-range missile that

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BOSTON GLOBE
7 September 1980

Heroin, banking, CIA

WORLD PRESS /
By ALAN BERGER

Last week, while American newspapers were describing congressional efforts to pass tough new laws protecting the CIA, a front-page article in the London Sunday Times implicated the agency in shady dealings reminiscent of the disclosures made five years ago in the Senate's Church committee hearings on intelligence activities.

The Sunday Times article was an investigative report looking into "a series of mysterious disappearances and violent deaths around the world." Heroin traffickers and couriers as well as bank officers and CIA personnel have been among the "dozen or so" people who disappeared mysteriously or died violently. "Police on four continents are trying to find the exact link between these deaths, the CIA and the collapse of a Sydney (Australia)-based bank, Nugan Hand International," the Times reported.

Saying "the story has a plot worthy of John Le Carre," the Times' investigative team offered these "initial conclusions" from its inquiries:

- "Nugan Hand, which boasted offices or representatives in a dozen countries and an annual turnover of $1 billion, was a banker for the heroin trade.
- "And there is evidence that the bank was nurtured, and may even have been set up, by the CIA."

One strand of the intricate "Nugan Hand affair" begins in Australia with a Melbourne coroner's inquest into the murder of a young couple, the Wilsons, whose bodies were dug up recently from shallow graves near a surfing beach. The Wilsons, who were both shot in the head, had been couriers for Terrence John Clark, an alleged heroin trafficker who "imported 48 kilograms of heroin — worth $2 million of kilo — into Australia in just nine months," according to an assistant commissioner for crime in the Australian city of Victoria.

Before their death, the Wilsons told Australian police everything knew about Clark's heroin o tions. Subsequently, two senior cials of Australia's Federal Narc Bureau who were in the pay of C "handed him tapes of the Wilsons making their statements." Clark has long since disappeared, but, according to the Times, "Melborne's coroner said he was in no doubt that Clark hired hit men to kill the Wilsons."

Official investigations of those records that survived the collapse of the Nugan Hand bank revealed that Nugan Hand had been "banker to big heroin traffickers ... but, undoubtedly, the senior and most sinister trafficker was Terrence Clark."

On Jan. 27 of this year, Frank Nugan cofounder of Nugan Hand, "was found shot dead in his Mercedes-Benz sedan on a lonely road in the Blue Mountains, 100 miles west of Sydney." After Nugan's death, his American partner, Mike Hand, phoned the bank's business associates and told them, according to the Times account: "You're not going to believe this, but it looks like Frank ripped off a stack of money."

Then, after calling in a liquidator and "blaming his former partner for everything that had gone wrong, Hand disappeared." In his wake he left what the Times described as "chaos." Records were missing, and there were debts totaling $50 million. But most puzzling of all to the Times was that "almost no creditors have publicly emerged to stake their claims. Why?

The Times' explanation was "that Nugan's Hand's chief client was the CIA, and that the bank was set up to move covert funds into Southeast Asia.

resentative' who had served with the OSS (a forerunner of the CIA) and been a commander in Vietnam. Nugan Hand's man in Taiwan was flight services manager for Civil Air Transport, another CIA-owned company. And the Manila's 'consultant' was Gen. Ray Manors, a Vietnam veteran, who is now helping the CIA to analyze the failed attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran."

Another associate of the bank mentioned in the Times investigation was Walt McDonald, an economist who was a CIA "consultant" for 25 years and a close friend of John Arthur Paisley, the CIA's deputy head of the Office of the Office of Strategic Research, "whose bloated body was fished out of Chesapeake Bay, Md., in 1978" with "40 pounds of diving weights strapped to his waist and a buillet hole behind the left ear." Speculatively, the Teams raised the possibility of a link from the Nugan Hand affair to Paisley that would run through McDonald.

A less speculative link was to former CIA director William Colby, whose visiting card was found on the dead body of Frank Nugan. Colby told the Times he "was simply Nugan's US legal advisor. 'There was no connection between Mr. Nugan and my intelligence background, he said.'"

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ON PAGE A-1

BOSTON GLOBE
3 August 1980

Soviets have 'death ray,' US believes

By John Bierman
Special to The Globe

WASHINGTON — Much of the American intelligence community seems convinced the Soviet Union is on the brink of developing a range of directed-energy weapons — the "death rays" of old-fashioned science fiction.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is belatedly accelerating its own program in an attempt to catch up.

For some time, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency and Air Force Intelligence have been at odds over just how far advanced the Soviets are in this revolutionary branch of weaponry.

According to Aviation Weekly, information collected and analyzed during the past few months indicates the Soviets now have an operational, land-based laser weapon capable of putting low-orbiting US spy satellites out of action. And, according to the authoritative technical weekly, they also have an even more awesome particle-beam device in the preprototype stage.

Until recently, Air Force Intelligence was unable to convince the rest of the intelligence community — and consequently the US government — that the Soviets were forging ahead in this crucial branch of weapons technology, which the US has been pursuing at what a senior Pentagon scientist concedes is "an academic pace."

Maj. Gen. George F. Keegan, head of Air Force Intelligence, resigned in 1977 in protest when the Administration did not heed his warnings. Now he feels vindicated, and many inside the Pentagon agree.

Interviewed at his home near Washington this weekend, Keegan said, "It gives me little pleasure to have been proven right."

"The development of beam weapons is even more momentous than the development of the atomic bomb. Its implications for the security of the free world, in this decade, are so awesome that [illegible] political comprehension of this government and most leaders of the free world."

Directed-energy weapons are devices that can send concentrated destructive beams thousands of miles at tremendous velocities. These are either high-energy lasers, which travel at the speed of light and destroy or disable their targets by heat; or particle beams, which travel slightly slower. Particle beams are like controlled and directed bolts of lightning, which achieve their destructive effect by punching a hole in their target.

Unlike the strategic nuclear weapons, which they could render obsolete, beam weapons would not wreak mass destruction. Instead, their effect would be precise and concentrated, and their targets would be more likely to be military, not civilian.

For example, beam weapons — either earth-based or mounted on space stations — could destroy or disable enemy reconnaissance satellites. Operating from space, they could intercept and destroy enemy intercontinental missiles within seconds of launching.

The first superpower to make such weapons systems operational would therefore be able to blind its opponent, by taking out the "eyes" of its spy satellites, and neutralize its armory of strategic missiles. Hence Keegan's somewhat apocalyptic view of their significance.

According to Aviation Week, the most ominous recent evidence of Soviet progress in this field has been provided by a spy satellite that spotted a huge laser or particle beam device at a Soviet ballistic missile site at Saryshagan, near the Russo-Chinese border.

Construction at the site reportedly began last November, and Air Force Intelligence estimates about it began to appear within three months. Aviation Week quotes one intelligence analyst as saying: "There is no doubt that they are building something at that location and no doubt that it is an energy-directed weapon. The differences of opinion are only over what kind of beam weapon it might be."

US intelligence has reportedly given the Saryshagan project the codename "Tora." The guiding scientific spirit behind it is believed to be Soviet academician A.I. Pavlovski of the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute in Moscow.

Project Tora is only part of what apparently is a large Soviet beam-weapon effort. For example, what the US Air Force once believed was a nuclear underground test site at Semipalatinsk — "Semi-P," as it is known to US intelligence — now appears to be another experimental site for beam weaponry. Like Saryshagan, Semi-P is in the desolate Kazakhstan Republic.

Another facility, at Krasnaya Pahkra, about 30 miles south of Moscow, is put in the "gee whiz" category by US intelligence, because of the caliber of work apparently going on in an underground cavern. Here the Soviets have reportedly developed the ground-based laser, which may be able to put out of action the low-orbiting US spy satellites, Big Bird and KH11.

The widely-respected Aviation Week also reports that US analysts believe the Soviets are close to perfecting a multishot, land-based laser that could hit US satellites 3000 miles in the air, while a longer-range program would threaten early-warning satellites orbiting at 25,000 miles.

Meanwhile, US intelligence has information the Soviets are developing an 11-ton space station that could take such weapons aloft within this decade. Operating from space, they would be immune to the problems caused by the earth's atmospheric conditions.

Aviation Week's military editor, Clarence Robinson, cites as additional evidence of Russian superiority in particle-beam weapon research the fact that three out of four accelerators being tested in the US are based on Soviet designs.

Politics has been a major factor in the US failure to move ahead as quickly as the Russians on beam weapons

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AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
28 July 1980

Technical Survey

Soviets Build Directed-Energy Weapon

Washington—Directed-energy weapon that could be the first step in a revolutionary concept of warfare is being constructed by the Soviet Union at Saryshagan, a ballistic missile range near the Sino-Soviet border in Southern Russia, according to high-level U. S. officials.

Many U. S. intelligence analysts believe the weapon is an early prototype of a new-design charged-particle beam device, and that it may be used within a year or so in tests against ballistic missile targets.

If successful, it could open a whole new era of warfare in which beams of energy are used to engage and destroy targets. Directed-energy weapons, according to top-level Defense Dept. officials, could bring about a radical change in the balance of power in the world.

There is general agreement among some U. S. intelligence agencies that the device at the range located in Kazakhstan is a directed-energy weapon—a generic term encompassing both particle-beam and high-energy laser weapons. The device being constructed at Saryshagan is code named Tora.

"The argument that once existed between Air Force, Defense and Central Intelligence agencies over whether the Soviets are involved in developing charged-particle beam weapons and their rate of progress is no longer valid," one Pentagon official said.

"If we were looking for a smoking pistol two years ago, we've got one now," one U. S. beam weapons expert said. "Particle beams as weapons are real, and we can see the Russian machine taking shape from overhead stuff," a reference to photographic reconnaissance satellites.

There still are some differences of opinion among U. S. analysts and physicists on the facility being constructed at Saryshagan. Some of the officials believe it could be a pulsed-iodine, exploding flash wire pumped, high-energy laser. The predominant opinion, however, is that the device is an electron-beam, air-cored betatron accelerator using a series of magneto explosive generators to produce the high power pulse necessary to accelerate the beam.

"There is no doubt they are building something at that location, and no argument that it is a Russian directed-energy weapon," one analyst said. "The differences of opinion are only over what kind of a beam weapon it might be."

Construction at the site began last November, according to U. S. officials, and Air Force intelligence estimates began to appear in February with briefings to high-level officials of the Carter Administration by late spring.

USAF officials have been briefing other service intelligence agencies on the Tora project and Air Force officers are hoping for agreement on a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).

U. S. officials are closely watching the Saryshagan installation, and the high resolution from the U. S. KH-11 reconnaissance satellite has convinced a number of experts knowledgeable on Soviet charged-particle beam physics that the device is a design with the imprint of Soviet physicist A. I. Pavlovski. His work at the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute in Moscow is evident in the betatron and in the use of explosively powered generators, U. S. officials explained.

Pavlovski has achieved fame and has been named to the Soviet Academy of Sciences for his work with pulsed power systems. He has been instrumental in developing high-power compact generators for use with air-cored betatron accelerators, and the U. S. has many drawings and photographs of the generators and accelerators from Soviet scientific literature along with the physics computations.

"The power supply for charged-particle accelerators, operating in the single pulse regime, usually is effected from condensers of inductive storage devices of electrical energy," according to Pavlovski and several of his associates. "More frequently, condenser banks are used, whose power capacity often reaches tens and hundreds of kilojoules and have a mass of many tons. These power supply sources can be used mainly under steady state conditions. At the same time, there are problems that require the use of transportable accelerator facilities. Because of this, a power supply system has been considered for high-powered, pulsed air-cored betatrons from magnetocumulative generators with a specific power capacity that is greater by a factor of thousands or tens of thousands than condenser devices. The generation of powerful electrical pulses in the generators is achieved by the efficient conversion of the chemical energy of explosives into electromagnetic energy by means of compression of a magnetic field by conductors moving under the action of the explosion."

When Pavlovski talks about the mobility of the system to power a betatron accelerator at the power levels he hints at, according to U. S. experts, he is making a thinly veiled reference to a weapons application.

From the U. S. reconnaissance photographs, Defense Dept. officials said, there can be little doubt that there are rows of magneto explosive generators all lined up behind required shielding. Wires lead from them to an intermediate location, and from there to an electron injector and to accelerating modules of the betatron.

What seems to be confusing the issue over whether it is a particle-beam or high-energy laser is recent information from the Soviet Union through a variety of intelligence methods on development of a pulsed iodine laser.

"There is no monolithic service position, no clean and convincing particle-beam position," one physicist said, "based on the somewhat equivocal information. We have excellent photographs of the outside of the machine, but none of the inner workings of the accelerator. What is convincing is that there are Pavlovski generators powering the long, cylindrical device which certainly resembles a betatron accelerator.

"Soviet scientists emphasize pulsed pumping of iodine lasers and that confuses the issue. But you don't need a long path of that kind for a high-energy laser weapon. It would tend to be a stubby, compact design, not a long, thin accelerator-like machine."

In an effort to determine if the Soviets are making a scientific breakthrough in laser weapons with a short wavelength iodine laser at Saryshagan, the Air Force has contracted with the Los Alamos scientific laboratory to build and test an iodine pulsed laser along the lines of the device at the range.

"It really doesn't matter much whether it's a particle-beam or a laser weapon," one U. S. official said. "What's important to remember is that it has an awesome supply of energy from explosive generators, and it has a movable nozzle to aim and control a beam. There is little doubt from the location that the Soviets intend to test it in the atmosphere against dynamic targets."

The Soviet Union has a large-scale high-energy laser weapons development program and a massive charged-particle beam effort, according to U. S. intelligence estimates. The Soviets already have an operational carbon dioxide gas dynamic laser weapon pumped by an electron beam. U. S. analysts are expressing con-

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COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW
JULY/AUGUST 1980

Reporting for duty: the Pentagon and the press

Between Vietnam and Afghanistan, the press forgot a lesson: beware of Pentagon sources. Recent national security coverage reveals a militant press—and few conscientious objectors

by ROGER MORRIS

George Kennan called it the greatest "militarization of thought and discourse" since World War II. With the embassy hostages languishing in Teheran and Soviet troops crossing the Afghan border, American opinion this winter bristled with a strident, frustrated chauvinism—and, from sea to shining sea, American journalism bristled with it.

In part, the coverage of events may have only mirrored the national mood or heated political rhetoric, but much of the season's combativeness clearly belonged to the slant and conventions of the news media themselves. "The Chill Of A New Cold War," "Back to Maps and Raw Power," headlined *Newsweek* and *Time*, respectively, over January stories that thoroughly justified their titles. Writing from what he called "a sense of black despair," syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft joined a widespread and sometimes bitter editorial attack on what was seen as misguided restraint in Washington. The Carter administration had shown "no stomach for striking a deterrent posture," Kraft complained in an early February column, and "has not yet faced up to its responsibility as a superpower."

For most of the media, the meaning of the Iranian and Afghan crises seemed plain enough: the United States had become ominously weak, and its Soviet enemy defiantly, perhaps decisively, stronger. "A wide spectrum of military leaders," *The Washington Post* somberly reported on January 3, a few days after the Soviet occupation of Kabul, hoped that recent events might at least have "a shock value that could prove beneficial." These crises should underscore U.S. military needs, said the unnamed leaders, and "help cure the Vietnam 'never-again' hangover of the American public."

Of the urgency of those "needs" there appeared little doubt. The *New York Times*'s venerable military correspondent, Drew Middleton, wrote a steady stream of articles on the subject from January through March. Drawn from a variety of "experts at the Pentagon," Middleton's catalog of American military disabilities seemed enough to give the fainthearted patriot grounds for emigration. It would take a decade to "redress" recent Soviet military gains, he reported. The Merchant Marine and Atlantic fleets might be fatally weak in wartime, he explained in a pair of articles. In another piece he warned that "without a state of national emergency or a tougher system of production priorities," there would be a two-year lag in increased production of new weapons. Another ominous article reported that prominent Israeli military sources had learned of huge Russian arms caches in the Middle East. To top things off, on March 9 Middleton

Roger Morris, who has often written on foreign affairs for the Review, *is a contributing editor of* The New Republic. *James Matthew Lyons helped to research this article.*

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STRATEGIC REVIEW
Summer 1980

DEBATE OVER U.S. STRATEGI
A MIXED RECORD

LES ASPIN

THE AUTHOR: Congressman Aspin is Chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and serves on the House Armed Services Committee and the Government Operations Committee. He was first elected to Congress in 1970. Aspin served in the U.S. Army from 1966 to 1968 as an economic adviser in the office of the Secretary of Defense. He is a graduate of Yale University, received a Master's degree from Oxford University and a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

IN BRIEF

The charge has resounded in recent times that the United States intelligence community has chronically and woefully underestimated both the pace and magnitude of the Soviet strategic build-up. Yet, an analysis of the available record of forecasts with respect to eight major Soviet weapons developments—extending from the first Soviet A-bomb explosion in 1949 to the improvements in Soviet ICBM accuracy and yields in the 1970s—shows that the performance has been mixed, consisting of overestimates as well as underestimates, and in at least two instances of predictions that were on or close to the target. Few of the mistakes that have been committed in forecasting can be attributed to errors in intelligence gathering; most of them have been the function of more-or-less inevitable human foibles. With the demise of SALT, estimates of future Soviet strategic programs are apt to be wider off the mark than they would have been under a SALT II Treaty, because the reference points provided by the Treaty for U.S. intelligence have been removed, and precisely because the human element in intelligence evaluation and forecasting is thus again maximized.

"It is . . . a matter of record that the growth of the Soviet ICBM force was underestimated for a decade after the 'missile gap' by the entire intelligence community—including Pentagon 'hawks.'"

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.)

"But the history of the past twenty years shows quite the reverse. Few indeed are the instances when the Soviet military threat later turned out to be greater than the estimated 'worst case.' Usually, the government's experts overestimated the danger."

George B. Kistiakowsky

The death of SALT II turns the focus of U.S. strategic intelligence away from "verification" and back to the old business of "forecasting." SALT provided for some degrees of restraint and certainty: We knew how far the Soviets were allowed to go, and the task was to verify their compliance with these restrictions. Without SALT, there are no limits or guidelines. The United States must rely purely on its skills in strategic forecasting—in projecting the future, including future Soviet strategic intentions and capabilities.

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STRATEGIC REVIEW
SUMMER 1980

DEBATE OVER U.S. STRATEGI
A POOR RECORD

WILLIAM T. LEE

THE AUTHOR: Mr. Lee is a consultant to several government agencies and private research organizations, and he has written widely on Soviet military strategy and economic matters. Mr. Lee served with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1951 to 1964. He is the author of *Soviet Defense Expenditures in an Era of SALT* (USSI Report 79-1).

IN BRIEF

Congressman Aspin's assessment, while heralding a welcome Congressional attention to the problems of U.S. strategic forecasting of Soviet weapons developments, does not portray accurately the U.S. intelligence community's past performance in this crucially important arena. His scoring of the eight cases of forecasting selected not only is too generous to the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, but it also neglects the relative weight of the mistakes committed—particularly in the failure to forecast the formidable build-up of Soviet strategic capabilities in the 1970s. The record of intelligence estimates becomes even more grievous when looked at in the larger compass of the CIA's responsibilities, notably its estimates of Soviet defense expenditures. A ratified SALT II Treaty could not ease the problem; the solution, rather, lies in badly needed improvements in the intelligence interpretation of the ample evidence available.

Congressman Les Aspin has offered an assessment of U.S. intelligence forecasts of Soviet weapons systems development and deployment that says, in effect: We have won some, lost some and tied some. Moreover, he implies that this is about the best one can expect from intelligence forecasting of Soviet weapons technology and deployments.

Congressman Aspin's assessment is welcome on three counts. First, it needs pointing out, as he does, that the U.S. intelligence services have a mixed record in forecasting Soviet weapons development: there have been some overestimates as well as many underestimates. Second, public recognition of some of the intelligence underestimates by a member of the Congressional Select Committees on Intelligence is long overdue. Third, at a time when the Congress and the Executive Branch are negotiating a charter to govern the activities of covert intelligence collection and action, our attention needs to be focused also on the neglected question of how to accomplish improvements in the intelligence analysis and projection of Soviet forces that threaten our survival. We are about a decade late in realizing that the repeated and

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NEW YORK TIMES
25 MAY 1980

Reagan Advisers Hold Somber View of Soviet Intentions

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 24 — Late in 1976, as Jimmy Carter was preparing to enter the White House, the American intelligence community was jolted by a forceful critique from an officially appointed panel of outside experts who contended that the Soviet Union was striving not just for strategic parity with the United States but for nuclear superiority.

This estimate of the Soviet Union's long-term strategic buildup and its intentions, a striking dissent from American intelligence estimates over the years, became sharply controversial. Members of the outside panel, known as the "B team" because the Government's intelligence experts were called the "A team," were accused of being alarmist hard-liners bent on increasing American military programs or scuttling the strategic arms limitation talks.

Since then the American intelligence agencies and even President Carter have come to accept the B team's central conclusion about Moscow's strategic goals. Moreover, members of the B team have become key foreign policy advisers to Ronald Reagan, the almost certain Republican Presidential nominee.

The foreign policy and defense advisers to the former California Governor, now numbering over 90, have been extended beyond predominantly conservative Republicans to include such experienced officials as former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert F. Ellsworth; former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Charls E. Walker; Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a sprinkling of such Democrats as Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, a Georgetown University professor of government.

Handful of Team Members

At the core of the working groups is a handful of key B team members — William R. Van Cleave, a defense-policy analyst at the University of Southern California; Richard E. Pipes, a Harvard historian who has written many books on the Soviet Union; Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Seymour Weiss, former director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at the State Department.

The other active figures working closely with Richard V. Allen, Mr. Reagan's principal campaign coordinator for foreign policy, are Fred C. Ikle, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Laurence H. Silberman, former Deputy Attorney General and Ambassador to Yugoslavia; Robert W. Tucker, a political science professor at Johns Hopkins University, and Lieut. Gen. Edward L. Rowny, who resigned as the Joint Chiefs' representative at the strategic arms talks to oppose ratification of the second strategic arms limitation treaty.

"It's a Republican group, right astride of Republican views on foreign policy and defense," said Mr. Allen, a 44-year-old specialist on Soviet and international economic affairs who was Deputy Assistant to President Nixon. "There are differences within the group, but if we have any area where there's unanimity, it would be for increased defense spending."

Beyond that, the writings of the intellectual inner circle reflect a somber world view, akin to Mr. Reagan's but possibly more pessimistic. Long before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan aroused new skepticism about détente and Soviet strategy, the Reagan advisers were disturbed by the buildup of Soviet power and Soviet outward thrusts and alarmed at what they saw as the loss of American nuclear superiority and the general shrinkage of American power.

Soviet Preparing for War

Writing in Commentary in July 1977, Professor Pipes, who headed the B team, argued that the American concept of nuclear deterrence was becoming outmoded because the Soviet Union was preparing to fight and win a nuclear war. The Russians, he wrote, sought "not deterrence but victory, not sufficiency in weapons but superiority, not retaliation but offensive action." He added that "the regime is driven by ideology, internal politics and economic exigencies steadily to expand."

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NEW YORK TIMES
13 MAY 1980

Soviet Nuclear Edge in Mid-80's Is Envisioned by U.S. Intelligence

By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 12 — American intelligence services have concluded that in the next few years the Soviet Union could achieve an edge over the United States in every major measure of strategic nuclear power, including overall numbers of missile warheads, Carter Administration aides said today.

The aides said that the projection was one of the principal findings of a national intelligence estimate completed by the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government intelligence bureaus. The estimate is now being circulated among high-level policy makers and has been presented to President Carter.

According to officials familiar with the document, the Soviet Union, in the absence of the new nuclear arms treaty, could possess a missile arsenal in 1985 capable of delivering as many as 16,000 nuclear warheads against the United States. Officials estimate that the United States, in the same year, is likely to have a missile force equipped with about 8,000 warheads.

Debate Over Numbers

Some military experts contend that both Washington and Moscow possess so many nuclear warheads that comparisons of total numbers does not make much difference. However, American officials have traditionally pointed to Washington's lead in warheads to argue that Moscow has not surpassed the United States in strategic power.

Moreover, some academic specialists believe that growth in the numbers of Soviet nuclear warheads in the coming decade could neutralize the Administration's plans for building a new mobile missile, the MX.

While other aspects of the intelligence estimate have apparently caused disputes, the projections on warhead numbers have been welcomed by diverse elements in the Government.

Importance of Arms Pact

Proponents of arms control in the White House and the State Department said the estimate demonstrated the importance of approving the strategic arms pact, which would place limits on numbers of Soviet warheads. The treaty, signed June 18, 1979, was before the Senate when the Soviet Union intervened militarily in Afghanistan. The Administration then asked that consideration of the pact be postponed as part of its effort to induce Moscow to withdraw its forces.

At the Pentagon, officials said the report strengthened their case for deploying the Air Force's new MX mobile missile, which would give American forces an additional 2,000 warheads in the late 1980's.

Other defense aides said that Moscow's growing nuclear arsenal, set against Washington's improved political ties with

sign a smaller portion of American missiles against targets in China and a larger number against the Soviet Union.

The balance in strategic forces has been gradually shifting against the United States since the late 1960's, when Moscow initiated programs to deploy new land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. During the 1970's, the Soviet Union was able to establish an edge in such measures of strategic power as overall numbers of missiles and long-range bombers and the total payload that these systems can carry.

Clear U.S. Advantage in Numbers

But the United States, with a larger part of its missile forces equipped with multiple warheads, possessed an advantage over the Soviet Union in the 1970's in the number of nuclear weapons that could be delivered by the two sides' forces. Accordingly, in the annual Defense Department report in January, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said that Washington possessed a total force of about 8,000 warheads on its land- and sea-based missiles, compared with 6,000 for Moscow.

Officials said that over the next five years the American total was unlikely to change significantly. In 1985, they said, the land-based missile force would be equipped with about 2,100 warheads while sea-based rockets would carry about 5,700 warheads.

3,000 More U.S. Warheads

Air Force bombers, they added, could deliver another 3,000 nuclear weapons, consisting of bombs and air-launched cruise missiles.

During the same period, the officials said, the intelligence estimate reports that without the new arms pact Moscow could put as many as 11,000 warheads on its existing force of 1,400 land-based missiles, and as many as 5,000 additional warheads could be fitted to Moscow's 950 submarine-launched rockets by 1985.

Together with about 1,000 weapons that could be carried by Soviet bombers, the intelligence group's "high estimate" for Soviet warheads in 1985 is 17,000, officials said.

The officials said that if the new arms treaty was finally ratified, this total could be cut by about half. By placing a ceiling of 820 on land-based missiles equipped with multiple warheads and by freezing numbers of nuclear bombs that could be placed on individual missiles, the new accord, officials said, would permit Moscow to deploy only about 8,500 warheads through 1985.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-18

THE WASHINGTON POST
9 May 1980

Soviets' Power Sparks Intelligence Rift

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

An extraordinary split has developed between military and civilian intelligence agencies over conclusions reached by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency about the balance of strategic military power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The military agencies are arguing that the CIA summary of a top-secret government-wide assessment of the power balance, which goes to President Carter, is "not representative" of the analytical work that went into preparing that assessment.

Perhaps more importantly, the military contends that the job of comparing U.S. and Soviet forces and how they might fare in an atomic struggle constitutes what is called a "net assessment." Preparing such assessments, they contend, is the prerogative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department rather than the CIA.

The CIA, this argument goes, should confine itself to figuring out what the Soviets are doing.

The dispute centers on the latest version of the National Intelligence Estimate, which goes from the nation's top intelligence officer, CIA chief Stansfield Turner, a former admiral, to the president.

That Turner is at the center of this dispute is not surprising. The ex-Navy man has been the target of some criticism from both military and civilian defense officials in recent years as he, under Carter's orders, has solidified his sometimes controversial control over the nation's intelligence apparatus.

Because the National Intelligence Estimates are widely circulated among the top rungs of government, and are so authoritative, these estimates have great importance within the bureaucracy in shaping future U.S. national security policy on many issues.

Officials say that the NIE summary contains what is called a "footnote" but which in fact is a sharp dissent by the Pentagon's military-run Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) together with the intelligence chiefs of the three armed services.

Administration sources call the breadth of the split with the civilian-run CIA "unprecedented." A well-informed Pentagon source says: "It is fair to say this is probably as strong an assertion of dissent on the part of the DIA to the director of central intelligence" as has been registered.

The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the super-secret National Security Agency did not join in the dissent, sources say.

The actual conclusions of the report are highly classified, but sources suggest they contain a mixed bag of assessments that trouble the military.

On the one hand, the defense agencies are said to believe that the report underestimates the relative momentum of the Soviet strategic military buildup in comparison to that of United States, arguing in effect that the picture is even grimmer than presented.

Yet the military also contends, other sources say, that the new report overestimates the Soviet threat that could be mounted against the Pentagon's planned MX super-missile.

The military is counting on the MX as its future land-based, long-range missile force. Critics contend the Soviets, with their bigger missiles, will always be able to lob enough atomic warheads at the MX shelters to make survival of a few of them not worth the huge cost, estimated by some at more than $60 billion. Supporters of MX argue that the Russians wouldn't use their missiles in that fashion.

CIA officials say that full-scale net assessments, involving such things as paper war games to figure out who wins, are indeed the Pentagon's job. The CIA claims it is not doing that but rather has been using "a more sophisticated form of analysis in recent years" and "adding some judgments" to its findings rather than just counting Soviet missiles.

The CIA officials contend that many people within the government find this technique helpful in assessing the power balance, a claim confirmed in interviews with civilian officials elsewhere in government.

Some CIA officials suspect the military objections at this time may have an element of politics to them, seeking perhaps to take advantage of an election year to support those arguing for higher defense spending in face of the Soviet threat.

Pentagon sources suggest it undoubtedly will be left to the president to resolve the dispute over who does what kind of assessment. The report summary also has gone to Capitol Hill, and sources say the House subcommittee of intelligence oversight probably will begin closed-door hearings next week on the report, including the disputed "footnote."

The National Intelligence Estimates, produced by the entire U.S. intelligence community, normally include at least two main volumes, the summary and the back-up factual and analytical data.

The summary section of the disputed NIE, number 1138, was completed in mid-March. The second volume of back-up data is scheduled to be circulated very soon, sources indicate.

In the past, there have been other dissenting footnotes to these reports. But officials suggest they usually have been over technical matters, such as the debate over the range of the new Russian Backfire bomber and whether it is aimed at U.S. targets or other targets closer to the Soviet Union in China.

In the current dispute, the DIA and military chiefs are understood to have "disassociated" themselves from the summary presented by Turner, contending that it concentrates too much on quantitative information and gives too little weight to Soviet military doctrine, policy, overall capability, momentum and future programs.

Similarly, the military is said to contend that the kind of analysis used in the summary distorts judgments and that these are shaped too much by U.S. thinking, rather than on Soviet thinking, on strategic matters.

Though Turner also is not without his critics elsewhere in the civilian-run agencies of government, on this issue the former admiral seems to have supporters.

One administration source says he has "a grudging admiration for Turner in refusing to budge from his position once he and his analysts are convinced they are right."

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 397-399

THE NATION
5 April 1980

SOVIET INTENTIONS

The C.I.A.'s Great Debate

DALE VAN ATTA

The concept of a monolithic American intelligence community which moves with one voice and makes irrefutable conclusions based on vast technological and human resources has been eroding ever since the Iranian revolution caught them by surprise in the winter of 1978-79. The mixed reviews they have received over their predictions and advice regarding the Afghanistan invasion has further challenged any notions of infallibility.

Ignored in most of the commentary on "intelligence failures," however, is a basic issue that has caused a deep schism among key analysts for more than a decade—the intentions of the Soviet Union. Only the analysts, reviewing covert information from ingenious listening devices and spies, are expected to give their final estimation to the President. But it turns out that they don't know any more than the rest of us—or at least have the same disagreements over such issues as the usefulness of the SALT II treaty and Russia's next step after taking Afghanistan.

No document has shown this schism more clearly than an internal Central Intelligence Agency paper coded "Top Secret Umbra" and entitled: "Understanding Soviet Strategic Policy, Objectives." The relatively dry but erudite account of splits in the community over this issue was authored by a C.I.A. analyst, Fritz Ermarth, and disseminated to about 100 top policy makers on December 8, 1975, in the *National Intelligence Daily*, a supersecret newspaper. The unprecedented decision to publish such an analysis immediately after the appearance of the "National Intelligence Estimate," which represented the community's consensus on the subject that year, was explained by the editors as an attempt to air "the spectrum of arguments that specialists in the intelligence community had to deal with in reaching the estimate's key judgments."

Insiders agree that Ermarth's analysis still holds up and reflects even more accurately the "groupings" of analysts over the Afghanistan situation today than it did for those on the SALT II debate at the time. Ermarth, who is now a high-level strategic adviser on the National Security Council, began:

> The subject of Soviet strategic policy and objectives is very elusive. Pertinent evidence is voluminous; but it almost never speaks for itself. Interpretation of the evidence always involves our preconceptions about the Soviet Union as a nation, international politics, the meaning of power, and the condition of our own country.

Because of their sometimes limited access to actual Russian documents, Ermarth observes, U.S. analysts "do not have complete and explicit intelligence" on Soviet military doctrine. "Although we differ on important details, analysts inside and outside the U.S. intelligence community tend to agree on the broad outlines. . . . Soviet doctrine clearly postulates that war-waging forces are desirable for both deterrence and conflict, emphasizes counter-force capabilities and targeting, and stresses the value of preemption as well as the need to have a survivable retaliatory capability."

Where the analysts divide, however, is on the questions of the sway of the military in the Politburo and the importance Soviet leaders attach to military doctrine. Continues Ermarth:

> Where we differ most is on how important doctrine actually is for Soviet policy or how well it reflects the actual thinking of Soviet leaders.
>
> Some of us believe that it is quite literally prescriptive for and descriptive of Soviet behavior. They point out that the Soviets have serious deployment or R&D [research and development] programs in all areas required by their war-fighting strategic doctrine. Whatever the obstacles, the Soviets keep plugging away at the requirements of doctrine, perhaps only falling back temporarily when technological problems are severe, as in the ABM [anti-ballistic missile] area.
>
> Others tend to regard Soviet doctrine as much less prescriptive for actual military policy. They see in it a good deal of pretense and exhortation really intended to support troop morale, ideological prejudices, and parochial service interests. They point to the quasi-religious themes of "victory" and "superiority" in the literature as examples.
>
> They believe that Soviet political and military leaders are free to ignore doctrine when they make practical decisions, as these leaders have habitually ignored or manipulated the ideas of Marx or Lenin. In this view, Soviet decision-makers admit to themselves that attaining the requirements of doctrine is vastly more difficult than pontificating on them.

As for assessing the *role* strategic power may play in any Soviet foreign policy move, that too is difficult, according to Ermarth, because "again we have to start with ambiguous evidence and divergent interpretations." But he is able to narrow down the divisions into two rough groupings:

> Some of us believe that the Soviet acquisition of overall strategic equality has given the USSR a new platform from which to exploit opportunities and to press its global interests, even to the point of accepting strategic confrontation with the U.S. They believe that the political role of strategic power impels the USSR to increase that power which will, in turn, give the USSR even greater sway in the world.
>
> Others take the view that at present levels the two sides' strategic forces tend to cancel each other out and that, always cautious, Soviet behavior in potential confrontation areas will be governed primarily by local risks and opportunities. Those of this opinion believe it to be not only objectively true, but also to be shared by the leaders of the USSR.

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BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
March 1980

Query

For a doctoral dissertation on National Intelligence Estimates, I would like to contact former military and civilian intelligence professionals. Of particular interest are people who participated in drafting, editing or approving National Intelligence Estimates or those people assigned to the Office of National Estimates, the National Security Council staff, Military Intelligence staffs, or inter-Agency analytical working groups between 1950 and 1964.

Please contact Daniel Flamberg, 220 West 93rd Street, New York, New York 10025.□

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 19-20
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
25 February 1980

Strategic Cuts Laid to Faulty Intelligence

Washington—Defense Dept. factions pressing for a new manned bomber are demanding more accurate U.S. intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union's strategic weapons capability.

The bomber proponents claim that the U.S. must move immediately toward either a stretched version of the General Dynamics FB-111 with increased range and payload, or to the Rockwell International B-1 to counter Soviet strategic superiority.

According to several high-level Pentagon officials, President Carter's decision to halt B-1 production and to delay engineering development of the MX advanced ICBM was the result of faulty National Intelligence Estimates. The Carter B-1 decision came after he received Central Intelligence Agency estimates of Soviet strategic weapons strength issued in December, 1976. This was the most recent National Intelligence Estimate at the time Carter took office in early 1977.

The President's decision to delay the cruise missile program also was based on inaccurate intelligence estimates, the officials claim. In the 1976 National Intelligence Estimate Carter used in deciding on B-1 bomber production, the CIA estimated the Soviets' capability then and where they would be vis a vis the U.S. in 1982 and 1985, the officials said. "And they were off by an order of magnitude in estimates of real Russian nuclear weapons capability," one Pentagon official said.

He added that in the spring and summer of 1978 a new National Intelligence Estimate was prepared that for the first time began to pick up Soviet strategic nuclear weapons momentum, ICBM accuracy, basing and numbers of reentry vehicles being deployed. The year before that the Strategic Air Command had already determined from available information that the USSR had reached parity with the U.S. and that the momentum was continuing with the aim of achieving nuclear weapons superiority.

In the last two National Intelligence Estimates, in 1978, and again in 1979, there were massive jumps in the analysis of Soviet nuclear force capability, one official contends.

Another Defense Dept. official added that there already is a severe problem with the ICBM leg of the triad surviving an attack by Soviet ICBMs now on line, and that there is no way for the U.S. to begin to reverse this situation until the MX system starts to become operational in 1986. But it will be 1989 before MX is fully operational. USAF asked for an initial operational capability of 1983 but could not get the Administration to move the missile into engineering development because of the intelligence estimates, the officials emphasize.

Because of the vulnerability of the ICBM force, the U.S. must look at the bomber leg of the triad to take up the slack in warhead delivery. "We only need a bomber system through the 1980s, but it must be more efficient than the Boeing B-52 in terms of being able to penetrate Soviet air defense," one service official said. He added that the Soviets are testing new-technology weapon systems now at Sary Shagan that make not only bombers but cruise missiles as well vulnerable if the tests are successful. He added that the U.S. already is in the early phase of looking for a countermeasures system.

Officials in the Pentagon believe the U.S. is now in a position where there are few choices available to the President. The Minuteman force could be virtually eliminated by a first strike Soviet attack, they said, so that in reality the U.S. will be able to rely only on its bomber and submarine-launched ballistic missile forces in the 1980s.

Part of the problem, one official said, is that the U.S. will only receive information of "a gross attack warning within the first few minutes from an early warning satellite. If it is not degraded by jamming." He said it would be 15-18 min. before U.S. targets could be determined.

"ICBMs and SLBMs could be launched in response, but we would still be gathering information on the location of the attack, and we must be capable of saving a portion of the force in reserve for second strike or war fighting capability. This gives an added impetus to acquiring a new manned bomber—pronto," he said.

The official explained that if the U.S. early warning system and ground-based, over-the-horizon radars could determine that only the Minuteman force was under attack, the U.S. could have the options of trying to ride out such an attack or could launch on warning. "But we need a new defense support system early warning spacecraft to aid us in making targeting assessments, and funding has been delayed on it," he said.

Part of the problem is that Defense Secretary Harold Brown is expressing doubts about the capability of the B-1 to penetrate Soviet air defense and survive.

Penetration Feasible

"That logic doesn't hold up," another Defense Dept. official said, "If the pilots flying tactical aircraft in NATO countries must penetrate Soviet air defenses their survival chances are at least as good and probably not as good as a bomber hardened to the nuclear environment with countermeasures equipments. So you see, the implications in this logic go far beyond a new manned bomber. We are convinced that we are smart enough through a combination of tactics and electronic countermeasures to keep pace with the air defense threat."

He added that the Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air Command and U.S. Air Forces Europe are all confident that aircraft still can penetrate the USSR and survive.

The U.S. has invested 10 years in development time and about $5 billion in the B-1 bomber program. "There is no doubt that the B-1 is the best penetrating aircraft the U.S. has ever developed, and if we can manage to live with the cost we should acquire it," the official added. "But we could get the stretched FB-111 a year or so faster and at $7 billion less than the B-1. In today's climate of a significant USSR nuclear weapons advantage it will be hard to get anyone to say that that year's difference may not be important."

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
5 February 1980

Turner 'Very Optimi
CIA's Futur

But Critics Despair That Spy Agency Can't Do Good Job

Second of two articles

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

Looking casual in a navy blue cardigan but speaking intensely, Stansfield Turner gazed out the glass wall of his office, atop the CIA headquarters at Langley, over the bare dusky woods toward the distant lights of Washington and exuded confidence about his organization.

"I'm just very optimistic these days," Turner said. "I've been very impressed by the quality of our human intelligence activities," the CIA director said. And U.S. technical intelligence is superlative, he added.

In other government offices in the city, most of them looking across concrete courtyards at other offices instead of having spacious views, in the private offices of people who have left the government, in small restaurants, in telephone calls from coast to coast, others talk about the CIA, too.

Some, like former CIA Director William E. Colby and former Deputy Director Enno Henry Knoche, talk for quotation about things like restrictions on the agency. But most prefer to discuss the agency's problems from the protection of anonymity.

Turner understandably is angered by this, especially on the most emotional aspect of his three-year tenure at Langley, the forced retirement of people from the clandestine services. He argues that he rejuvenated an aging agency.

"The next time someone tells you," he said, "that Turner is the stupid bastard who cut the size of the agency out here, look at the color of his hair. . . . This is a young man's game, and we are better equipped today than we were three years ago" for clandestine operations.

The CIA is composed of three main branches. The clandestine or operations branch handles spying and covert operations, like intervening secretly in other countries' affairs or organizing guerrilla movements. Another branch supervises technical intelligence, including reconnaissance satellite photography and communications intercepts. An analytical branch pulls information together for government policymakers.

The controversy that has marked Turner's almost three years at the agency focuses on the operations branch. There is also widespread but less publicized distress around Washington about analysis.

In both cases, Turner inherited problems. His critics say he exacerbated them; his supporters contend that he has done much to clear them up.

Once Was Twice as Large

The Vietnam war and the CIA's "secret army" in Laos, added to worldwide spying, pushed the number of agency operatives to 8,500 in the late 1960s — roughly double its present size. As the Nixon administration began to reduce U.S. commitments in Indochina, personnel had to be reduced by attrition, transfers and other means.

During his brief tenure as CIA director, James R. Schlesinger speeded up a cutback. Colby, his successor, continued the program, and so did George Bush during his year as director. Most sources agree that they were handled sensibly.

Then President Carter took Turner from his navy admiral's command and sent him to Langley. He arrived with what the old CIA hands considered to be a skeptical, even hostile, attitude.

This set a chilly tone to his takeover, despite his own explanations that he simply wanted to bring better management to a sometimes uncoordinated operation. His suspicions of the need for drastic changes were quickly reinforced by the resignation of John Stockwell, a 40-year-old agent in the unsuccessful CIA effort in Angola.

sent out the first 212 pink slips on Oct. 31, 1977.

Although smaller than previous cuts, this one was handled differently and hit harder at lifetime professionals in the spying and paramilitary trades.

Says Cuts Helped Agency

"The cuts in personnel that everyone still complains to me about have strengthened the agency's covert action capabilities," Turner said.

"You don't run a good, strong paramilitary or covert action program with a bunch of 55-year-olds," he said. "What I've done is cut out high-grade superstructure . . . and doubled the input into the clandestine services . . . so that we have a group of young tigers, and there's enough accumulated experience and expertise around to guide them."

This is strongly challenged by people in a position to know.

"Whatever Turner says, they can't put on a show," says a Pentagon official who is very familiar with the CIA's present operational capabilities. "We know that over in this building."

Other sources spell this out in more detail. One says the CIA's corps of paramilitary specialists who could help organize, for instance, a more effective Afghan resistance to Soviet control has declined from about 200 to 80, and many of the 80 lack the broad experience needed for effectiveness.

But Colby comments that, if the people in an operational area feel CIA help is vital, they will find ways to speed it up.

The worst part of Turner's changes, numerous present and retired officials say, is what they did to CIA morale. While he recognizes that morale suffered, but contends it is now coming back up, others say that it is at best bumping along side-

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ON PAGE A1-4

THE WASHINGTON POST
31 January 1980

Intelligence Estimate Said To Show Need for SALT

By Michael Getler
and Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writers

The nation's top intelligence officials this week are completing a grim new estimate predicting that without a Soviet-American strategic arms agreement, Soviet rockets in 1989 will be able to rain nearly 250 percent more atomic warheads on the United States than they would if constrained by SALT II and successor agreements.

The new National Intelligence Estimate—NIE 1138-79—indicates that by 1389, the Soviet could have about 14,000 highly accurate warheads mounted on their land-based missile force aimed at the United States. Under current plans, the United States would have only a fraction of this amount. By U.S. estimates, the Soviets would have about 6,000 such warheads under a SALT II treaty, which would expire in 1985 but could be extended.

These still-secret figures are the first concrete contribution to an emergency debate within the government about one consequence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequent derailing of SALT II, that has received scant public attention thus far.

This debate is prompted by the widely pereived conclusion that the United States is in danger of entering into a tense period of confrontation with the Soviet Union without a coherent or broadly supported policy of dealing with nuclear weapons.

The administration hoped it had such a policy built around the SALT II treaty and a program of new strategic arms procurement that went with it. Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this policy—like the treaty—was in serious trouble, but now it appears to be on the verge of unraveling.

Senior administration officials now see a dangerous paradox—that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, potentially a threat to U.S. security, has prevented passage of a Soviet-American arms agreement that they believe clearly serves the country's security interests.

For these officials, the new National Intelligence Estimate provides proof that SALT II would put crucial constraints on a Soviet missile buildup that otherwise could threaten the survivability of the U.S. retaliatory missile force.

Several officials in the White House, Pentagon and State Department said in interviews in recent days that the prospect of a world without SALT—so starkly defined by the new N.I.E.—could jolt the country and the Senate into the realization that SALT II is now more urgent than ever.

But other administration officials and numerous sources on Capitol Hill expressed the belief that the Senate could never be convinced to act favorably on SALT II this year while Soviet-American relations are tense.

While the intelligence estimate is normally classified, some government officials who support SALT are willing to discuss the broad figures privately, believing they support the case for the treaty.

SALT critics in the Senate and elsewhere reject alarmist views of the world without SALT, arguing that the Soviets will not reach the high numbers of warheads predicted in the N.I.E. because they will not need them.

By extending the new intelligence estimate out to 1989, the intelligence officials throughout the government who prepare National Intelligence Estimates for the president cover the period in which the new U.S. super-missile, the MX, is supposed to be fully deployed.

The United States is currently planning to build 200 of these huge missiles, each carrying 10 warheads. The idea is to truck them around concrete "racetracks" in desert valleys of Utah and Nevada, hiding them at random in 4,600 concrete shelters as protection against a Soviet strike. The system is estimated to cost between $30 billion and $100 billion.

But the arcane arithmetic of nuclear forces that drives the arms race could change dramatically without SALT limits in force, raising questions about whether this MX project—a scheme of unprecedented cost and complexity—is the right answer.

Under SALT, government specialists estimate the Soviets could possibly aim 3,000 warheads at the MX silos, with the rest of their arsenal aimed at other U.S. missiles and military and civilian targets. About half the MX force would survive a Soviet attack, they believe, enough to still deter a Soviet strike in the hope that

But with 14,000 Soviet warheads, some 11,000 could be aimed at the MX silos, almost quadrupling the threat and calling the whole MX project, as now conceived, into question.

To maintain survival of half the MX force under an uncontrolled Soviet expansion, specialists say that the first crude estimates undertaken indicate it could mean tripling the land needed in Utah and Nevada to handle still more silos and double the cost.

It is this kind of calculation that some top civilian officials believe will have what one called "a profound and sobering impact on people's perceptions of what the realities of a world without SALT will mean."

The idea of building a budget-busting MX that might not even fulfill its mission is certain to reopen old arguments and start new one on American procurement policy.

For example, some members of Congress and administration officials are already talking privately about reviving earlier ideas for missiles that can be carried aloft and fired from airplanes. Other ideas are to move toward a new class of less expensive, more accurate missile-carrying submarines, or even to go back to the idea of installing anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses around existing missile silos to protect against attack. ABM's are banned by the SALT I treaty, so reverting to them would amount to "the death of arms controls," one official said.

For now President Carter has declared a policy of respecting the limits on arms contained in both the SALT I and II agreements. The Soviets' willingness to do the same, when the SALT I agreement on offensive weapons has lapsed and the SALT II treaty has not been ratified, will be tested this spring.

To continue respecting the SALT I limits, the Soviets will probably have

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MARINE CORPS GAZETTE
January 1980

Professional Note

USMC steps up in intelligence

by Capt Roger E. Mahoney

Earlier this year the Marine Corps was welcomed into the national intelligence community when the Director of Central Intelligence, retired Adm Stansfield Turner, notified the Commandant of his decision to elevate the Marine Corps to observer status on the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB). It is not insignificant that this move followed closely the elevation of the Commandant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

What needs to be explained in light of this move is what part the Marines can play in intelligence matters on the national level. Or perhaps just as important—what benefit will the Corps realize from this enhanced stature?

Figure 1 displays the members of the NFIB and shows the kind of company the Marine Corps will enjoy as a member of the national intelligence community.

The mission of the NFIB is to advise the Director of Central Intelligence on national intelligence matters, including the budget. The Board helps coordinate national intelligence production and seeks optimum coordination between all intelligence collectors, producers, and users. The NFIB is thought to be the only forum where representatives of the entire intelligence community come together to discuss common or singular problems.

The role of actually aiding in the production of national intelligence is a tricky matter. The HQMC intelligence division is certainly not sufficiently manned to allow the taking on of a major role in the preparation of national intelligence products. The Marines have always been, and will probably continue to be, intelligence *users* and not producers. It is not an unforeseen possibility, however, that we will be tasked to contribute analytical personnel, from time to time, to aid in the formulation of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).

An NIE, usually classified, is a national level judgment rendered at the direction of the President's National Security Council. It is based on review and analysis of all intelligence available which bears on the subject. The Director of Central Intelligence has under him a staff of topically or regionally designated National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). When a

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THE EVENING JOURNAL (Wilmington, Del.)
27 June 1979

Was Dead CIA Official a Soviet Agent?

By JOE TRENTO and RICHARD SANDZA

WASHINGTON — A member of the secret U.S. team formed to check independently on CIA assessments of Soviet military stremgth says someone ought to find out why information about the group's activities was leaked.

Deceased ex-CIA official John A. Paisley has been identified as a source of the leak. And Seymour Weiss, one of the leaders of the secret team, said yesterday it could be that Paisley was working for the Soviets. Other members of teh unit — known as the B Team — pooh pooh the notion, but Weiss said he thinks some investgative body ought to check into Paisley's motives.

Paisley, then supposedly retired from the CIA, served as liaison between the agency and the secret B Team. He died mysteriously while sailing on the Chesapeake Bay Sept. 24. He was identified yesterday as the source of at least one major leak in 1976 about the B Team's highly classified work.

Based on stories in the News-Journal papers about Paisley, his role in the U.S. intelligence community and discrepancies in the identification of his body, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been investigating the case since last October.

Paisley's wife, Maryann, will hold a press conference today to release new evidence she says was overlooked in the autopsy of the body identified as her husband, and to produce witnesses who believe he was murdered.

Several of the experts on Soviet weaponry who served on the B Team said yesterday Paisley was the prime suspect of leaks that resulted in news articles damaging to their secret mission.

The reporter who wrote the 1976 story confirmed that Paisley was a prime source for his New York Times article. David Binder's story revealed That some members of B Team thought the CIA had underestimated Soviety military strength. The story shocked the intelligence community because the team's very existence was supposed to be top secret.

Binder conceded that while it is highly unusual to reveal a confidential source, he was doing so in this case because he believes his source, Paisley, is dead. He wrote a recent Look Magazine article on why Paisley may have committed suicide.

Weiss, a former State Department official who was ambassador to the Bahamas when he served on the B Team said that prior to press revelations about Paisley's CIA activities he had no reason to suspect that the 55-year-old official might have been disloyal. He now says that in light of recent disclosures, Paisley "could have been working for the other side."

Other members of the B Team say, however, that Paisley may have leaked the information out of loyalty to the agency, where he worked for 24 years and participated in developing some of the assessments that came under the scrutiny of the B Team.

The B Team's role was to see if the CIA — and Paisley — had done a thorough job in assessing Soviet strength. Paisley served as executive director or coordinator of the team and had access to the highest level of classified material.

When he disappeared last year he was working on a report for the CIA about the B Team project. A draft of that report was on his boat, the Brillig, when it was found adrift in the Chesapeake Bay.

The B Team was formed in 1976 by George Bush, then CIA director and now a Rpublican presidential contender. The team was made up of national defense experts, none connected with the CIA, who were given access to all U.S. intelligence secrets, weapons and systems information.

Weiss and other B Team members said their report concluded that the assessments done by the CIA "grossly" underestimated Soviet military strength. Because information leaks about the B Team would tend to discredit it's findings, Weiss theorizes, U.S. policymakers would be less in-

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ON PAGE A6

THE BALTIMORE SUN
27 June 1979

Report says Paisley was suspect in leaks

Wilmington (AP)—Several members of a secret U.S. intelligence team claim John Paisley was the prime suspect of leaks to newspapers about their project, according to the Wilmington *News-Journal*.

Mr. Paisley, a former Central Intelligence Agency official who served as a liaison between the agency and the team, disappeared while sailing in the Chesapeake Bay September 24.

The secret "B Team" of experts on the Soviet Union was set up by the federal government to test CIA assessments of Soviet military strength, according to the newspaper.

The article quoted David Binder, a reporter for the New York *Times*, as saying Mr. Paisley was the prime source for his article about the team's highly classified work.

In that story, Mr. Binder wrote of the B Team's opinion that the CIA had underestimated Soviet military strength. Mr. Binder told the *News-Journal* that while it is highly unusual to reveal a confidential source, he was doing so in this case because he believed Mr. Paisley was dead.

Some members of the team told the *News-Journal* that they felt Mr. Paisley may have leaked the information out of professional loyalty to the agency where he worked for 25 years. During that time, he participated in developing some of the assessments the B Team was scrutinizing.

The B Team's role was to see if the CIA —and Mr. Paisley—had done a thorough job in assessing Soviet strength.

Seymour Weiss, a former State Department official, said a Soviet agent would want to discredit the team's conclusion that the CIA was "underestimating Soviet strength." He said such discrediting would "prevent U.S. policymakers from reacting by getting tougher."

Mr. Weiss said that anyone connected with leaking secrets from the team could be a double agent.

At the time Mr. Paisley disappeared, he was working on a report for the CIA about the B Team project, the newspaper said. A draft of the report was found on his boat when it was found drifting on the Chesapeake Bay, according to the article.

Meanwhile, an attorney for Mr. Paisley's estranged wife has called a press conference for today to present evidence that the former oficial, who was thought to have committed suicide, was murdered.

The press conference was scheduled for Solomons, Md., near where Mr. Paisley's boat, the Brillig, was found aground last fall.

The body identified as Mr. Paisley's was recovered a week later, floating in the bay. The body was weighted with diving belts and a bullet wound was found in the head.

THE WASHINGTON POST
17 June 1979

Article appeared
on page B-7

Jack Anderson

SALT II: Speeding the Arms Race

Few issues are more confusing to the average American than SALT II. Experts with the best information and the best intentions have come down on diametrically opposed sides of the controversy. So how is the bewildered citizen supposed to figure out what it's all about?

On the face of it, SALT seems straightforward enough: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Judging it on this basis, most Americans have supported what they understandably see as an agreement that will put a lid on our extravagant defense spending.

But our associate Dale Van Atta, after reviewing scores of top-secret documents and interviewing several knowledgeable intelligence sources, found the picture confusing and contradictory. However, one thing emerges crystal clear: The treaty signed by President Carter and Soviet boss Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna will stimulate the arms race, not stop it. That was the case with SALT I, and there is no reason to suppose SALT II will have a different effect.

To put it bluntly, the Russians cheated on SALT I. The Americans responded by trying to develop new weapons, such as multiple-warhead missiles, that would meet the letter of the treaty, if not its spirit—a technique that might be called "legal cheating." In both cases, the results were the same: increased military spending, not disarmament.

The difficulty in the SALT agreements seems to be that they are based on the premise that, to prevent a nuclear holocaust, each of the superpowers must have enough deliverable bombs to ensure the other's destruction—on equal terms of horror. If either the United States or the Soviet Union could wipe out the other without itself suffering total obliteration, SALT would be a failure. Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, with possibly unintended irony, terms this concept "Mutual Assured Destruction"—MAD.

Former President Nixon and his national security Svengali, Henry Kissinger, spelled out the four operating principles of MAD in the top-secret National Security Decision Memorandum 16 of June 24, 1969, for the guidance of our military leaders:

"1. Maintain high confidence that our second strike [retaliatory] capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.

"2. Maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis.

"3. Maintain the capability to deny the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer.

"4. Deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidential launches to a low level."

Insiders told us that these "Dr. Strangelove" guidelines have not been changed by President Carter.

Under SALT I, the four MAD principles actually provided the impetus for increased military spending to develop new missiles that would be our insurance against World War III. The agreement limited the number of missiles permitted to each nation—a ceiling that had not yet been reached—but not the number of warheads in each missile.

Both Russia and the United States used that loophole in SALT I to increase their nuclear stockpiles without actually violating the treaty. Not content with such legal stretching of the pact's provisions, the Soviets simply resorted to violations of the SALT I agreement, the record indicates.

American adherence, generally, to the letter of the treaty put the United States in a declining strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. SALT I allowed the Russians to catch up to our once-superior strategic position.

To counter this development, the Pentagon asked for and received bigger and bigger appropriations to develop more frightening weapons, on grounds that we must keep abreast of the Soviets' legal and extralegal arms buildup.

The same thing began happening again even before the SALT II treaty was signed. President Carter has explained that SALT II demands that we increase our armament to the ceilings set by the latest agreement. Political analysts told us that only under the shadow of SALT II—and Americans' fear that they would wind up second-best to the Russians—would such increased military expenditures gain public acceptance.

The long-term increase in defense spending serves a short-term domestic political goal: It may appease Senate hawks who would otherwise vote against ratification of the SALT agreement. Carter, meanwhile, is selling SALT II on the basis that, without the treaty, the arms race would be even hotter. This, of course, is a theory that can never be proven.

However, using all the facts at their disposal, analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency have raised doubts about the theory. According to one of the CIA's secret National Intelligence Estimates, the experts concluded: "If a SALT II agreement is not achieved, we believe that the Soviet leaders' objectives for their strategic forces would be much the same."

Warning that the Soviets can be expected to be far more aggressive with the agreement than we will be, a CIA estimate explains: "Deeply held ideological and doctrinal convictions impel the Soviet leaders to pose as an ultimate goal the attainment of a dominant position over the West, particularly the U.S., in terms of political, economic, social and military strength."

Whether this eternal goal of Soviet policy will be affected by SALT II and, if so, to what extent, the CIA cannot tell.

In the end, the experts conclude, it all seems to boil down to this: With or without SALT II, the best deterrent on both sides is mutual ignorance of intentions. The Russians don't know what the man in the White House would do in a particular situation, and we don't know what the men in the Kremlin would do.

In an uncertain world, uncertainty may be our best hope for survival.

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THE WASHINGTONIAN
May 1979

CAPITAL COMMENT

Edited by Joseph Goulden

May 1979

The Langley File

Turner Is in Trouble

Another wave of departures at the Central Intelligence Agency—many of them under pressure—has so outraged some senior officials that one of them, in only halfhearted jest, is advocating a "coup d'etat" to topple Director Stansfield Turner.

Certainly Langley contains the classic ingredients for revolution: an autocratic and unpopular leadership, a demoralized citizenry, loss of pride, and bumbling performance.

The person being pushed by the intelligence community for Turner's chair is Frank Carlucci, his present deputy. A skilled bureaucrat, Carlucci is one of the few high-level Nixonites to retain power in the Carter administration. He first gained prominence as a troubleshooter in HEW, then luckily sat out the Watergate years as ambassador to Portugal, and came to the CIA in 1977.

Although Carlucci has no intelligence background, pros respect him as a talented administrator with the good sense to keep his hands off daily agency operations. "As director," says one official, "Carlucci would be content to work as a manager and not try to play superspy."

Turner commands no such respect among intelligence careerists serving under him. He is blamed for the current brain-drain of resignations that is stripping the agency of what one person calls its "intellectual cadre." The more than 300 resignations since January 1 include such key figures as William Christison, chief of the office of regional and political analysis; Vincent Heyman, chief of the operations center; and Sayre Stevens, deputy director of the National Foreign Assessment Center.

To insiders, these departures are even more serious than Turner's "Halloween Massacre" in 1977, when he summarily fired, retired, or reassigned more than 800 clandestine operatives, many by terse form-letter.

"In 1977," one official says, "Turner got rid of the spooks. This time he got rid of the brains." Even loyalists concede the CIA was overloaded with Cold War-era covert officers. Yet they decry Turner's ouster of analysts responsible for refining the rivers of raw intelligence that flow in daily from agent and embassy reports, satellite pictures, and electronic intercepts.

Stansfield Turner

Frank Carlucci

Rightly or wrongly, the view within the CIA is that Turner is preoccupied with self-promotion. He wants to incorporate the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's spy branch, into the CIA, and elevate the post of director of Central Intelligence to Cabinet rank.

Turner lost both these attempts during the last round of budget writing. But he continues to curry favor with the White House, and particularly with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national-security adviser. Turner is accused by subordinates of rewriting National Intelligence Estimates to avoid any SALT II or détente ripples. He is also said to have cut off the agency's Iranian desk from key message traffic during the Shah's final turbulent days. Defense Secretary Harold Brown, also knocked off the routing list, dispatched a spy of his own to pilfer a copy of one key cable from the National Security Council.

Prognosis: The intelligence community is capable of toppling an unwanted director—witness the hapless Theodore Sorensen. The same voices are now being raised, in quiet congressional offices and elsewhere, against Stansfield Turner. By fall, expect Jimmy Carter to see Turner as heavy baggage and find someplace else to send him.

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL
April 1979

STAT

Grim New Intelligence Assessment Released On USSR Strategic Arms

A NEW NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, NIE 11-3-8, "paints a darker picture" of Soviet strategic arms progress than its predecessor, completed in the fall of 1977, informed Administration sources have told *AFJ*. The highly classified new assessment is nicknamed "NIE Eleven and Three-Eights."

According to sources who took part in preparing the assessment and are intimately familiar with its final content, it contains "nothing new or startling, but shows things moving more rapidly than before." Specifically, "the Minuteman problem is coming faster," according to one source, a reference to the land-based missile's increasing vulnerability to a Soviet first strike because "the whole accuracy picture" of Soviet ICBMs is "changing dramatically." Contributing to Minuteman's earlier than expected vulnerability is the fast rate at which the USSR has been "fractionating" its missiles, that is, adding greater numbers of warheads to them.

Sources say the new assessment projects "much uncertainty on Soviet force loadings," how many warheads of what type each missile carries. "We don't know how they're loaded; we can't look under the nose-cone." Under SALT II, the Soviets as well as the US would be prohibited from deploying land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with more than ten warheads each. However, a *New York Times* report of March 14th by Richard Burt says that the CIA has evidence the Soviets have been adapting their largest missile, the SS-18, to carry 14 warheads.

The SS-18 was tested more than a year ago, in October of 1977, with a new warhead called "Mod 4" that demonstrated an accuracy of 0.15 nautical miles, or less than 300 meters. The Defense Department tells *AFJ* that it has no evidence the Soviets have *deployed* ICBMs with an accuracy better than 500 meters.

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WILMINGTON NEWS JOURNAL
1 April 1979

Paisley was adviser on 1st SALT treaty

By JOE TRENTO
and RICHARD SANDZA

WASHINGTON — Former CIA official John A. Paisley participated in the negotiations of the first strategic arms limitation treaty, intelligence sources confirmed last week.

Paisley was in Helsinki, Finland, to advise the U.S. negotiators on the nation's capability to monitor Soviet compliance with the treaty, according to intelligence sources. The treaty was signed in 1972.

Paisley's disappearance while sailing in Chesapeake Bay last year had caused grave concern among members of the U.S. Senate and the intelligence community.

Their concern centers around the SALT II treaty currently being negotiated. Senators — and other government officials — uneasy about arms limitation are trying to determine whether Paisley's disappearance has anything to do with his intimate knowledge of the nation's intelligence network. He was especially knowledgeable about the nation's super-secret spy satellite system — the very reason he was sent to the SALT I talks.

Committee members are also upset about the handling of a note found in Paisley's personal papers. The note, according to a source on the committee, was in Paisley's handwriting and said, "Now, what about Shevchenko?"

The CIA destroyed the note, telling the committee it had no significance, a committee source said.

Arkady N. Shevchenko, who until his defection held the top Soviet job at the U.N., was the Soviet's leading expert on disarmament. Shevchenko defected last April.

The CIA on Friday continued to refuse comment on the Paisley case.

Because of its concern about Paisley's fate and its possible effect on the SALT situation, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence launched an investigation into the Paisley affair.

That investigation became bogged down in January and the committee asked the Justice Department for help. The FBI was then asked to review the information available to the Senate.

The outcome, reported last week, didn't make the Senate committee feel any better. Sources in the Senate have told the Sunday News Journal that the FBI merely confirmed the finding of the Maryland State Police that Paisley probably committed suicide. The Justice Department recommended no further Paisley investigation.

The CIA has repeatedly denied that any classified documents were found among Paisley's papers. But sources in the intelligence community have told the Sunday News Journal that among Paisley's papers was a top-secret CIA telephone directory, which contains the names of employees — both undercover and otherwise.

In the past the CIA has pressed for prosecution of people who have removed telephone directories from headquarters at Langley, Va. Last year one man was sentenced to 15 years in prison for stealing a telephone directory that was less sensitive than the one in Paisely's papers. The phone books would be very valuable to Soviet agents — tantamount to giving them a blueprint for penetration, an intelligence source said.

Paisley was deputy director of strategic research at the CIA when he retired in 1974. He was subsequently given several assignments on contract until his disappearance.

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THE GEORGETOWN INTERNATIONAL NEWS
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
13 March 1979

STAT

STAT

The "New" C.I.A.

By Bill McIlhenny

Until a few years ago, [CIA] foreign intelligence analysts were perhaps the most obscure participants in the foreign policy process.

During the last five years or so, most of that has changed dramatically as the average CIA analyst has emerged from his previous anonymity and silence.

So asserts Dr. Brian Latell, former Associate Coordinator for Academic relations and External Analytic Support in the Central Intelligence Agency. In fact, the past five years have seen numerous far-reaching changes—including structural reorganization—which, have in effect, opened up the CIA's research and analysis components. The result has been to make these components more responsive to a greater public and private audience. Latell, who is currently at Georgetown teaching a course on the revolutionary process in Latin America, states that because of this new openness, "the public derives more from its tax dollars spent for intelligence. . .and the CIA has benefited from useful critiques from outside observers."

Typical of these changes is the CIA's increasing participation (since 1972) in the Library of Congress' Document Expediting Project (DOCEX), by which unclassified studies are distributed to subscribers outside of the government. Among these subscribers are over 100 university libraries. Intelligence reports so released—including, according to Latell, "some of the agency's most important analytic works"—have grown in number from only 29 in 1972 to approximately 150 last year.

Among the works received through DOCEX have been estimates of Soviet and Chinese energy capabilities and analyses of political elites.

Further, although they must still be conscientous with regards to sensitive sources, CIA analysts are encouraged to participate and function much as their academic counterparts. In 1977 alone, 300 analysts attended conferences and conventions in their areas of interest and according to Latell," they openly and freely identified their agency affiliation." Likewise, Latell assorts, a "vigorous new effort is currently underway to add a number of additional experts to our panels of consultants."

Perhaps one of the most important internal CIA reorganizations was the creation last year of the National Foreign Assessment Center. The center, which Latell stresses is "completely overt," consolidated "all of the CIA components that do substantive research and estimates under a single management." The center specialists, he continues, "examine and assess the political, economic, military, scientific, and technological affairs of foreign countries." The center is organized into several offices, such as the Offices of Economic Research, Political Analysis, and Geographic Research, which Latell likens to various departments at a university. "We operate as

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much so that it has almost become a cliche. After all, who can be against human rights? Who?

But is it not time to bridge the gap between rhetoric and action? To my mind, the time for action is long overdue. There are specific steps this body can take and I want to make one specific suggestion today.

For almost three decades now, the Senate has failed to ratify the first major human rights treaty drafted since World War II—the Genocide Convention. The purpose of this treaty is simple: declaring genocide an international crime, whether it is committed in times of war or peace. What could be more straightforward? More ethical? We are simply attempting to outlaw the heinous, outrageous, crime of genocide—the mass murder of members of racial, ethnic, national, or religious groups.

Over the years the list of supporters of the Genocide Convention has grown in number so that now every major religious and civil rights group in America supports this treaty. So does the American Bar Association. And even more importantly, President after President—Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter—have repeatedly called on the Senate to act.

Yet despite this broad support, the Genocide Convention has languished before the Senate. But this 30-year embarrassment could be overcome in a matter of days with proper consideration and action by each and every Member of this body.

As my colleagues have heard me say time and again, the case for ratification is extremely strong. For the benefit of my 20 new colleagues, I would like to review the case for ratification.

First, the United States is the only major Western nation that has failed to ratify the Genocide Convention. This failure has been a constant source of embarrassment to our representatives abroad, a source of confusion and puzzlement to our allies and a souce of delight to those wishing us ill. It simply makes no sense to ask our reprcsentatives to fight for human rights in international forums, only to be embarrassed time and again by our lack of action on human rights treaties here in the Senate.

Second, the development of international law requires the agreement of the major nations of the world. Our ratification will speed the development of international law in this vital human rights area.

Third, U.S. ratification will help to spur renewed interest in human rights treaties by the newly emergent nations of the world, which achieved independence long after these treaties were drafted.

Fourth, President Carter has made human rights the cornerstone of our foreign policy—a move which many of us in the Senate have both urged and applauded. But our Nation's representatives need the tools to carry out this policy and this treaty will strengthen their hand.

And, finally, ratification is important because it is the right thing to do. It is an important moral stand to take and it is in the best of American traditions of standing up for the underdog—the oppressed.

Mr. President, let us begin this Senate with a pledge—a pledge to lead the movement for human rights both here and abroad.

The hour is already late.

But we can do no less.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

THE LATEST ESTIMATES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC STRENGTH

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, Senator WALLOP and I wish to take the time of the Senate today to discuss a matter of very large consequence, in our view. My distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from Wyoming, and I are members of the Intelligence Committee and it is infrequently that we are able to come to the floor to discuss the matters with which the Intelligence Committee deals. Indeed, we do so today in large measure because we are at a beginning of a Congress and the beginning of a cycle in the activities of the executive branch, and, as such, we are free to discuss a matter which would not necessarily be possible to discuss later on. This has to do with the latest estimates of Soviet strategic strength and intentions. Since 1974, when Albert Wohlstetter, writing in "Foreign Policy," used some newly released data to show that Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile deployments had exceeded our intelligence predictions in certain respects, there has been a growing concern that the intelligence community may have been generally underestimating the extent, the dynamism, and the seriousness of purpose of the Soviets' long and persistent buildup of their military and, in particular, of their strategic forces.

In order to get a better handle on this question, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as it was then known, initiated in 1975 an experiment in "competitive analysis."

As an aside, it seems to me to have been one of the inspired actions of the then chairman, Leo Cherne, and it was, of course, completely supported by the distinguished head of the CIA at the time, the Honorable George Bush.

In this experiment, the B team, a panel drawn from persons inside and outside the Government who had, over the years, taken a generally more somber view of the Soviet military buildup, was assigned the task of reanalyzing the data available to the official estimators. They were to see if Soviet behavior admitted of explanations other than those offered in official intelligence community documents and which might better account for the persistence of the Soviet buildup.

The B team report was critical of past estimates of Soviet strategic strength and reached somber assessments of the challenge posed by it. Unfortunately, information concerning this report, which, like the national estimates themselves, was highly classified, was leaked to the press at the end of 1976. As a result, the Select Committee on Intelligence undertook an investigation of the B team episode, as it was known, and we issued a report in 1978. This, of course, is a public report.

The majority on the committee, who are our colleagues and with whom we share the closest association, concluded, that "past national intelligence estimates could have profited from drawing in experts on Soviet strategic questions from outside the intelligence community, both in and out of Government, and from subjecting NIE analyses and judgments on this and other areas to competing assessments from such sources." However, it went on to fault the "competitive analysis" experiment on the grounds that:

> The composition of the B Team dealing with Soviet objectives was so structured that the outcome of the exercise was pre-determined and the experiment's contribution lessened. The intelligence agencies were cast inaccurately in the role of "doves" when they in fact represented a broad spectrum of views.

In separate views appended to the majority report, Senator WALLOP and I, in parallel and in complete accord, noted that the very existence of the B team was a sign of the serious questions which had risen concerning the accuracy of our estimates of Soviet strategic strength. We both noted the importance of the B team's assessments, and I even ventured the opinion that:

> Their notion, that the Soviets intend to surpass the United States in strategic arms and are in the process of doing so has gone [in the past year] from heresy to respectability, if not orthodoxy.

Now, Mr. President, the purpose of our rising today: there is now some evidence on this matter in the form of an open letter to President Carter, signed by more than 170 retired generals and admirals. I ask unanimous consent that this letter, published in the New York Times last Sunday, be reprinted in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks, along with an earlier article referring to it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUMPERS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. In this letter, the retired officers state:

> The National Intelligence Estimate, the most authoritative U.S. government evaluation of intelligence data, acknowledges at last that the Soviet Union is heading for superiority—not parity—in the military arena. This represents a complete reversal of official judgments that were a substantial factor in allowing our government to pursue detente and overall accommodations with the Soviet regime.

I hasten to point out that I have not yet seen the National Intelligence estimate to which the retired officers refer. After I have seen it, I will not be able to speak so freely about it in open session. For this reason, I wish to speak now on the basis of the open letter and of an article in the New York Times of January 12, which discusses the letter. I feel justified in doing this on the grounds that these 170 retired generals and admirals probably possess sufficiently good connections to know what they are talking about, and being men of good character and reputation, would not mis-

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ON PAGE A-8

THE BALTIMORE SUN
24 January 1979

In the nation

CIA recruiter doused with paint at Ohio State

Columbus, Ohio (AP)—A Central Intelligence Agency recruiter was splattered with red paint during a demonstration at Ohio State University yesterday.

The recruiter, a woman whom Ohio State police refused to identify, was doused with paint but not injured as she worked in the placement office of the College of Engineering.

Article appeared
on page A-16

EL PASO TIMES
22 January 1979

STAT

Disposal Urged For 3 Men in '50s CIA Files

United Press International

The Central Intelligence Agency confined the head of a foreign political party to a mental hospital at the height of the Cold War and considered disposing of him when he refused to stay put.

The 29-year-old political leader, who had been working clandestinely for the agency, was one of three "disposal problems" described in CIA documents released last week under the Freedom of Information Act.

The heavily censored documents—made public at the request of the Church of Scientology—did not reveal the fate of the three men.

A 1952 memo discussed the disposal of an unidentified "young, ambitious, bright" leader of a small political party "ostensibly working for independence" of an unidentified foreign country.

The memo said the CIA arranged for him to be taken into custody by his country's police after learning he was considering selling out to another intelligence agency.

The document said the young politician was held in prison for six months until he became a "nuisance" and the police "told our people to take him back."

It said the CIA then put him in a mental hospital "as a psychopathic patient" even though "he is not a psychopathic personality."

"He has now been in a hospital for several months and the hospital authorities now want to get him out since he is causing considerable trouble," the document said.

The memo then suggested brainwashing the agent into sticking by the CIA. If that fails, it said, "disposal is perfectly O.K."

A 1951 memo asked a "senior representative" of an unidentified department for help in disposing of two other troublesome agents.

"These two men are disposal problems, one because of his lack of ability to carry out a mission and another because he cannot get along with . . . the chief agent of the project," the memo said.

The memo, in an indication that at least one of the agents was being held in solitary confinement, said he "is already somewhat stir crazy and has tried to escape twice."

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ON PAGE A-14

WASHINGTON STAR
21 JANUARY 1979

Super-Secret Court to Decide Who Can Be Bugged—Legally

By Robert Pear
Washington Star Staff Writer

Sometime soon, probably next month, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger will designate seven federal judges to sit in Washington on a special court like no other court in the world.

The tribunal will conduct all its business in secret and will have one main purpose: to approve or disapprove warrants for electronic surveillance of spies, counterspies, embassies, international terrorists, saboteurs and, in exceptional cases, American citizens with information deemed essential to national security.

The judges, drawn from different regions of the country, will be entrusted with some of the most sensitive secrets of the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

"The most skilled foreign intelligence agents in the world will be seeking this information," Defense Secretary Harold Brown predicted.

Court orders will identify the target of surveillance, describe the technique and state "whether physical entry will be used to effect the surveillance."

THE NEW COURT was one of several checks on the intelligence community required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.

In signing the measure last October, President Carter said that it "requires, for the first time, a prior judicial warrant for all electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes in the United States in which communications of U.S. persons might be intercepted."

Previously, presidents claimed an "inherent" constitutional right to conduct warrantless wiretaps for foreign intelligence purposes, even though they acknowledged the need for a warrant when tapping telephones to gather evidence of a crime.

Under the new law, the U.S. attorney general would have to approve any application for a warrant before it is submitted to a judge.

This is one of many new responsibilities assigned to the attorney general by a president and a Congress anxious to curb abuses by the intelligence agencies.

IN AN EXCEUTIVE order last year restructuring the intellligence community, President Carter gave the attorney general a large role in overseeing and monitoring all intrusive activities that might invade citizens' privacy.

"I have had responsibility for holding the intelligence community to the rule of law," Attorney General Griffin B. Bell said in a recent speech.

Bell, who spends one-fourth of his time on intelligence matters, must issue or approve procedures for numerous activities such as television surveillance, undercover participation in domestic organizations and the FBI's foreign intelligence program.

On Dec. 21, Bell met with CIA Director Stansfield Turner and Chief Justice Burger to discuss security procedures for the new foreign intelligence court.

It is not known yet where the judges will meet.

THE COURT WILL be a new venture in every way, as critics pointed out during debate on the bill last year.

Rep. Robert McClory, R-Ill., declared: "This special court itself is unprecedented. The secret hearings are unprecedented. The secret record is unprecedented." Never before, he said, has a court been able to pass upon the exercise of executive authority with regard to national security and foreign affairs.

On the other side of the political spectrum, Rep. Robert F. Drinan, D-Mass., also denounced the bill, saying it was "totally unprecedented in the whole history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence."

Carter, Bell, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy and the current directors of the FBI, CIA and NSA all endorsed the legislation, in part because it clears up confusion created by conflicting court decisions about what intelligence officers can and cannot do.

"Judges add an aura of legality to the process . . .," said Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo. "Each and every act of electronic surveillance authorized by the special court would be ipso facto legal."

Arthur S. Miller, a George Washington University law professor, found it curious that government officials would support a bill supposedly circumscribing their authority. "That makes me nervous," he said, referring to their enthusiasm for the bill.

The American Civil Liberties Union supported the proposal, even though it opposes wiretapping as an unreasonable search and seizure of the type prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

ACLU FAVORED the bill because it repealed an "inherent" presidential power, established a warrant requirement and finally set a criminal standard for the issuance of warrants to tap U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens.

In other words, whenever a citizen is to be the target of surveillance, there must be evidence that his activities "may involve" a crime.

The new law sets carefully graduated standards that give maximum protection to citizens and resident aliens; somewhat less protection to foreign visitors, diplomatic personnel and illegal aliens; and still less protection to embassy premises.

The distinctions may seem irrelevant, but aliens, such as David Truong, the Vietnamese expatriate convicted of espionage, have been targets of surveillance in several celebrated cases.

Under the new law, the attorney general, without a court order, can authorize electronic surveillance of communication channels used exclusively by embassies and foreign powers. This type of warrantless surveillance is legal only when there's "no substantial likelihood" of intercepting communications of an American citizen.

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ON PAGE A8

THE NEW YORK TIMES
12 January 1979

170 Retired Top Military Officers Warn Carter of a Soviet Challenge

By DREW MIDDLETON

More than 170 retired generals and admirals have warned President Carter of what they describe as an "increasing Soviet challenge" to the United States.

In an open letter, they said a National Intelligence Estimate that is described as "the most authoritative U.S. Government evaluation of intelligence data" had finally acknowledged that the Russians were "heading for superiority, not parity, in the military arena."

The letter said an American interagency study on the global military balance concluded recently that "in a nonnuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East; Israel alone might deter Soviet combat forces' intervention or prevent the completion of such deployment."

Were it not for the ability of Israel's ground forces, the officers declared, the United States would have to station significant forces and equipment in the Middle East.

Soviet Objectives Described

The signers, among whom were 6 generals, 15 lieutenant generals and 4 admirals, included Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Paul L. Freeman Jr., former Army commander in Europe; Gen. T. W. Parker, former Army chief of staff in Europe; Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, who was commander of the China theater of operations at the end of World War II; Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, former chief of staff, United States forces, Korea, and Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., former chief of intelligence, United States Air Force.

They urged Mr. Carter to recognize Israel's value as an ally that can defend itself and said Israel should be reinforced to avoid sending American forces to the area.

The Soviet Union's "imperial objectives" were described as the neutralization of Western Europe, partly by denying it access to oil, the encirclement of China and the isolation of the United States.

The letter said the Soviet focus on the Middle East to reach these objectives represented "a real and growing threat to Western security." It said Soviet influence and power had expanded in the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan had come under Soviet control and "anti-American forces" were harassing the Governments in Iran and Turkey.

Cuban mercenaries were described as carrying out Soviet policies in Angola, Ethiopia, Zaire, Syria and Lebanon.

Debate on Arms Accord

In appealing to the President to "restore the global military balance," the writers foreshadowed what is expected to be a national debate over the second strategic arms limitation treaty. In the absence of an "indispensable military equilibrium," they said, "we oppose a 'deal' that freezes the current imbalance and reinforces permanent Soviet strategic superiority."

The letter said the challenge was growing in these areas:

¶The Soviet Union has developed seven ICBM missile systems since 1965, the United States one.

¶The Russians have invested heavily in submarine-launched ballistic missiles and modernized their ICBM's.

¶The so-called Backfire bomber, which the letter lists in the Soviet strategic arsenal although the Russians call it a medium-range aircraft, "is capable of delivering weapons anywhere in the United States without refueling."

¶Soviet advances in multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) are rapidly overcoming the American lead in the quantity and quality of nuclear warheads.

¶The development of Soviet naval power threatens vital sea lanes that provide resources essential to the United States.

The writers also mentioned a point raised by nuclear scientists, academic students of Soviet policy and many foreign and American intelligence analysts: "Soviet defense literature expressely rejects the Western doctrine of 'mutual assured destruction.' It rejects specifically the notion that nuclear war means suicide. Soviet forces are structured to fight, survive and win a nuclear war."

Mr. Carter was urged to build a coalition of "genuine peace," including Israel and Japan as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations.

DES MOINES REGISTER
5 January 1979

CIA, FBI accountability

It was only a few years ago, during the turbulent 1960s and early '70s, that government intelligence agencies rampaged out of control, opening mail, breaking into homes and offices, illegally tapping telephones, infiltrating community organizations, planning murder, overturning governments.

Thousands of innocent American citizens became victims of these rogue agencies. The public is potential prey today, because Congress has failed to enact a comprehensive law governing operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency.

The legislation is foundering because of an increasingly conservative Congress, the opposition of many intelligence officials, fading interest by the public and the inherent difficulty of drafting a workable, fair law.

Failure to enact such a law would be disastrous. The CIA, the FBI and the NSA have demonstrated devastatingly for many years that they cannot be trusted to operate effectively and honorably outside the law, and Congress cannot be trusted to perform its oversight functions.

Such a law should require the CIA to restrict its activities to the collection of intelligence. That's what it was created to do. It was not created to plan the assassination of foreign leaders, or play assorted dirty tricks.

Those tricks have consistently backfired in the faces of their planners: the phony revolution in Chile; the planned murder of Fidel Castro; and the installation of and support for Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as shah of Iran.

The FBI should be required by law to restrict itself to the investigation of actual or suspected crime. It must not be allowed to pervert the criminal law by using it to harass political dissidents or spy on community groups or commit burglary. Similar restrictions must be placed on the NSA.

These organizations have operated for years on the basis of vague laws and, in the case of the NSA, a secret executive order. Admittedly, it will be difficult to write a law tight enough to protect the privacy and security of Americans and flexible enough to enable the intelligence community to do its job.

But it surely is not impossible, and various independent groups that have investigated intelligence abuses have urged that it be done, including the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee.

Without public clamor, it will be easy for Congress to evade its responsibility and permit the intelligence community to go its own way, accountable to no one but itself. Before that happens, the Congress and the electorate should remember the wisdom of philosopher George Santayana: Those who forget the mistakes of the past are doomed to repeat them.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
24 October 1978

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Question Centers on Documents He Handled

Senate Panel Presses its Paisley Probe

By Michael D. Davis
Washington Star Staff Writer

Despite a Maryland State Police declaration that former CIA official John A. Paisley almost certainly shot and killed himself earlier this month, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is continuing an investigation into the nature of Paisley's work.

The Senate committee is attempting to determine whether certain classified documents to which Paisley had had access had been handled appropriately, sources said.

Last week Col. Thomas Smith, superintendent of the Maryland State Police, said investigators believe Paisley shot himself to death and fell into the bay from the deck of his 31-foot sailboat. But, he said, the death officially is classified as "an undetermined death" because the evidence is not conclusive enough to make a formal ruling of suicide.

A SOURCE close to the Senate committee told The Washington Star that federal investigators will complete their investigations within 10 days.

The CIA has denied that Paisley, who retired from the agency in 1974 but continued to serve as a consultant on Soviet military affairs, had access to classified materials or that classified materials were found on his sailboat or in his Washington apartment.

The committee is expected to review those documents that were turned over to the CIA by Paisley's wife. The Star has learned that those documents concerned work that Paisley was doing as coordinator of the CIA's B Team, a panel of civilians who do contract work for the agency.

The B Team made a recent assessment of Soviet military strength based on highly classified information that it received from the CIA, according to the source. The CIA's A Team, a group of agency employees who are given the same information as the B Team and asked to make an assessment, gave a much "softer" report on Soviet military capabilities in a report it issued last February.

THE COMMITTEE source said that the difference in assessments "is not significant" but that Paisley's work with the team "by the very nature of the reports he wrote" indicated that he did have access to classified information.

The source said the committee is attempting to determine whether the documents recovered from Paisley's sailboat and from his apartment should have been kept under stricter security.

The source said the committee does not at this time believe that there was an intelligence compromise or that Paisley was involved with the theft earlier this year of satellite documents.

"The committee has a mandate to see that proper procedures are used in the handling of intelligence documents and that is what the committee is doing in the Paisley case," the source said.

JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES
March 1978

West look Easts

Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray By W. T. Lee (National Strategy Information Center Inc, New York, 1977), $2.00, 74 pages

In 1976, a heated debate arose amongst senior members of the US intelligence community as to the accuracy of official CIA estimates of Soviet defence spending. As a result President Ford's national security advisers set up a second team of specialists to make an independent assessment of Soviet defence spending, using the same sources as the official CIA team.

The independent team assessed Soviet defence effort at approximately double the official estimate. The official estimate has since been revised, in fact doubled, to bring them in to line with the independent team's high figure, but many US commentators still consider this to be a significant underestimation of the actual Soviet military budget.

In his paper the main portion of which was originally written as a chapter of a larger study (*Arms, Men, and Military Budgets—Issues for Fiscal Year 1978*, Crane Russak, NY, 1977) the author seeks to throw light on the preparation of the two estimates, and explain why the first official estimate was so very low. He has succeeded in producing an admirable summary of the main points of the estimates debate, and in giving a clear account of how the two estimates were arrived at. This alone makes the work worthy of attention.

The author, however, is far less enlightening as to why the estimates differed so widely, and why the CIA were so ready to adjust the official estimate to agree with the independent team. In this latter regard, the work poses more questions than it answers, and casts a shadow on the integrity of the official CIA team. In view of the fact that the whole estimates controversy has become a burning political issue, this result may not be accidental.

C. N. DONNELLY

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
30 April 1978

Closer C.I.A.-White House Ties Raise Doubts on Agency's Independence

By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 29—The Carter Administration's drive to make analyses prepared by the intelligence community more relevant to White House needs is raising questions in Administration and Congressional circles over whether the Central Intelligence Agency is able to exercise independence on sensitive policy issues.

This concern is said to be reflected in a report by the Senate Intelligence Committee, scheduled for release in the near future, which suggests that a much-publicized C.I.A. study on Soviet oil production may have been manipulated by the White House.

The committee report says that the study's conclusion that the Soviet Union would become a larger importer of oil in the early 1980's was probably wrong, but that the White House used the prediction to develop public support for President Carter's energy program.

Some officials maintain that this episode, which occurred last year, is symptomatic of a new set of delicate problems that the Administration is encountering in trying to make intelligence estimates more relevant to Administration policy.

With top foreign policy officials taking an important role in determining what the C.I.A. addresses, the agency may be too accommodating, some aides suggest. "When the White House orders up a study," one agency official said, "it is usually pretty clear what results it is looking for."

The Administration has made a concerted effort, in its plan to reorganize the intelligence establishment and in recent changes made by the Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner, to strengthen and centralize assessment capabilities that withered in the Vietnam period and were further weakened by interagency feuding in the Nixon-Ford years.

Addressing New Questions

The Administration's effort, which began last summer, is also designed to redirect intelligence work to such new problems as terrorism and nuclear proliferation, which are of growing interest to policy-makers. These steps have won the approval of most intelligence officers as well as the two congressional intelligence committees.

But in undertaking these changes, several intelligence officials said recently, the Administration has begun to confront a familiar problem: how to insure that intelligence information that appears to run counter to existing policy is neither suppressed nor distorted. This problem, officials said, first emerged in a serious way in the mid-1960's.

According to intelligence officials who served at the time, C.I.A. estimates that appeared to challenge President Johnson's policy of increasing military commitment to South Vietnam were ignored by such top foreign-policy aides as Eugene Rostow, the Presidential national security adviser. Accordingly, communications between the C.I.A. and the White House became increasingly strained. As the former Presidential adviser, McGeorge Bundy, testified recently before Congress, C.I.A. Director John McCone's access to President Johnson declined sharply after 1966.

The estrangement persisted during President Nixon's first term, when, according to one former official, the C.I.A. became "a service operation for Henry Kissinger." The official said Mr. Kissinger, as Presidential adviser, strongly distrusted Richard Helms, then the Director of Central Intelligence, and made sure that analysis work on important intelligence questions was performed by his own staff.

The C.I.A.'s problems were compounded in the Nixon years by its disagreements with Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who contended that the agency's estimates of the growth of Soviet military capabilities were too low. In the early 1970's, Mr. Laird argued with Mr. Helms over whether a new Soviet missile, the SS-9, was equipped with multiple warheads. Although the C.I.A.'s contention that the missile did not possess such a capability was ultimately proved right, the dispute badly damaged the credibility of C.I.A. estimates.

Central Section Dismantled

Morale was further weakened when James R. Schlesinger, upon becoming director of the agency in 1973, responded to concerns over intelligence bias by dismantling the central analysis section in the agency, the Office of National Estimates. Aided by the Board of National Estimates, a group of academics and specialists who advised on intelligence questions, the office had built a reputation for accuracy and independence in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years.

Mr. Schlesinger replaced both the Board and the Office of National Estimates with a group of national intelligence officers, each responsible for a different area of analysis. "There was a feeling," one official recalled, "that they were a bunch of staff officials whose basic job was to match intelligence evidence to the views of the White House."

Now, in the Administration's effort to make sure that the C.I.A.'s views are not shunted aside, the role of the Director has been strengthened and an effort has been made to insure that Admiral Turner sees Mr. Carter at least once a week. At the same time, a Cabinet-level intelligence committee has been established, enabling such consumers of intelligence information as Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold R. Brown to define their needs.

Within the agency, Admiral Turner in October established the National Foreign Assessment Center, headed by Robert R. Bowie, Mr. Turner's deputy for national intelligence. Officials say that the center, similar to the old Office of Estimates, is designed to improve analysis by pulling together estimates done by different C.I.A. offices and other agencies.

There is widespread agreement that C.I.A. studies now have greater visibility in the Government and that agency reports are becoming more useful to policy-makers. The problem, as the official put it, "is that while C.I.A. work is no longer ignored, there is a growing danger that intelligence and policy will become indistinguishable."

Reinforced by Turner

This danger is said to stem from the Administration's attempt to make the Director of Central Intelligence a more influential figure—a tendency that has been reinforced, officials say, by Admiral Turner's strong appetite for political power.

"They may not know it," said a former high-ranking intelligence official, "but they are on the verge of turning the Director of Central Intelligence into a political job."

In the case of the C.I.A. study on Soviet oil production, the Senate committee has not accused the agency of shaping its findings to meet White House needs. The committee reportedly has suggested that the C.I.A. made an analytical error in its report, but more troubling, according to some committee officials, is that Mr. Carter announced the findings last April in dramatic fashion at a press conference, in an obvious appeal for support for Administration energy plans.

In some other cases in the last year, some members of the Senate committee believe, the C.I.A. has bent facts to meet White House views. One example is said to be a contention by the agency that a proposed Soviet-American accord limiting strategic arms could be verified using reconnaissance satellites, an opinion apparently questioned by several intelligence officers.

Another alleged instance is the failure of the C.I.A. to warn the White House of possible dangers in moving ahead with Mr. Carter's plan to withdraw some 30,000 ground forces from South Korea. "It was pretty clear that the President had made up his mind on the issue, so the agency simply fudged over the question of whether the pullout would create a military risk," a member of the Senate committee said.

THE WASHINGTON POST
29 April 1978

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ON PAGE A-13

Clayton Fritchey

What the Next Treaty Is Up Against

The White House team is understandably elated by the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty, but it is not a very useful rehearsal for the far more important battle coming up over the terms of the U.S.-Russian agreement on the limitation of strategic arms.

Treaties, which require two-thirds approval by the Senate, have seldom been the upper chamber's finest hours, for on critical occasions the opposition, in the wounded words of Woodrow Wilson, has often been led by "little bands of willful men."

No two "bands" seem to be alike, however. The one that shattered Wilson by rejecting U.S. participation in his League of Nations dream was largely motivated by isolationism and political partisanship. The opposition was led by prominent Republicans such as the late Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts.

In the Panama Canal fight, there was an outburst of old-fashioned jingoism, with the hard core of opposition coming from an ad hoc coalition of Reagan-type Republicans and ultra-conservative Democrats, mostly provincial in character.

The opposition to SALT II is different —and more formidable. The leaders are worldly and experienced in foreign affairs. Partisanship is not a factor; some of the chief critics have held high office under liberal, Democratic presidents. They are respected for their intelligence and knowledge, plus their record of patriotic public service. But what conspicuously unites them is a seemingly unshakable suspicion of any arms agreement that is as acceptable to Russia as to the United States.

Their apparent conviction or fixation (depending on how you look at it) is that the United States will somehow get the worst of any deal. In any case, no president, Democrat or Republican, has so far been able to negotiate a SALT pact that satisfied them.

Since Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford were unable to win over their SALT critics, can Carter succeed where they failed? It's a tough challenge, but first the administration has to understand what it is up against. The main is a frozen frame of mind that goes back almost 30 years to the early days of the cold war.

Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, a nuclear authority and President Eisenhower's highly respected assistant for science and technology, thinks the problem originated in NSC-68, a National Security Council paper produced in 1950 under the chairmanship of Paul Nitze. It warned President Truman, in effect, that Russia was out to conquer the world, including the United States, and would stop at nothing.

Kistiakowsky takes special note of Nitze because he is perhaps the most articulate spokesman for the SALT critics and because his words carry weight, owing to his distinguished career in government as, among other things, deputy secretary of defense, secretary of the navy and a SALT negotiator.

Some years after NSC-68, Nitze helped draft the panicky "Gaither Report," which in 1957 secretly warned Eisenhower that Russia was overtaking the United States militarily, including missile development. Eisenhower, unimpressed, pigeon-holed the alarm, but it leaked out, and in 1960 John F. Kennedy made the so-called "missile gap" a successful election issue.

After becoming president, Kennedy discovered the "gap" was largely the figment of overheated imaginations, and he had the grace to admit it. A year later, in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, America's nuclear superiority was so great that Russia was forced to back down.

"During the missile buildup, the test-ban debates and the ABM scares of the 60s," Kistiakowsky observes, Nitze was a high Pentagon official, and more recently "was a member of the 'Team B' and one of the moving spirits of the Committee on the Present Danger."

Team B was the designation for an outside group of hardliners who charged that the CIA underestimated the Russian threat. The Committee on the Present Danger is a relatively new defense-minded organization that also sees Russia taking over the world, although in real life Soviet influence has been steadily dwindling, even in the communist sphere.

Shortly before Ford and Chairman Leonid Brezhnev met and agreed in principle on SALT II, Nitze, one of the negotiators, resigned as a sign of no confidence in the agreement, although the final terms had not yet been resolved.

When Paul Warnke, who served with Nitze at the Pentagon, was named as Carter's chief SALT negotiator, Nitze opposed his nomination, and ever since has been leading the attack on Warnke's efforts to get a new arms agreement.

It isn't as if Nitze were a lone voice, for his state of mind is shared by other prominent cold warriors. As Kistiakowsky says, "men of Nitze's persuasion are entitled to their opinion, and no one should question their motives or their good faith." But the American public, he adds, may well ask whether their opinion "is a reflection of reality or a repetition of the all too familiar myth-making of the past."

It is difficult, he says, "to regard these doomsday scenarios as anything more than baseless nightmares." That's the message Carter must get across to the American public if he hopes to get SALT II through, for the opposition won't succumb to the kind of appeasement and blandishments that marked the Panama Canal finale.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
17 February 1978

Senators Assail '76 C.I.A. Estimate of Soviet Power

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 16—The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has criticized the Central Intelligence Agency and, implicitly, the Ford Administration for the handling of a controversial effort to analyze Soviet strategic capabilities and aims in 1976.

In a report issued today, the 17-member panel said the attempt to estimate Soviet capabilities through "competitive analysis" by separate teams—one from inside the United States intelligence community and the other made up of outside specialists—had been compromised by press leaks and by one-sidedness.

The estimate caused some controversy after it was reported on Dec. 26, 1976, in The New York Times that both teams had concluded that the Soviet Union was striving for strategic superiority over the United States.

There were allegations at the time, also alluded to in the committee report, that members of the so-called B team of outside specialists had deliberately conveyed information about the competitive analysis to the press to undermine the arguments of the A team of inteligence regulars.

Today's report noted that the competition was undertaken at the request of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which was disturbed about what it believed to be optimistic intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic strength. The board was abolished last year by President Carter.

While praising the contribution of the team of outside specialists as "most rewarding" on technical questions, the Senate panel, following a year of study, said competition on estimating Soviet strategic aims was "more controversial and less conclusive" than relying on a single estimate.

The panel also asserted that the B team, headed by Prof. Richard Pipes, head of Harvard University's Russian Research Center, "reflected the views of only one segment of the spectrum," namely a conservative approach toward the Soviet Union.

Three Senators Dissent

The committee criticized the intelligence community, particularly the C.I.A., for basing its so-called national intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union's military power "narrowly" on "hardware questions" of weaponry. Instead, it said the agency should address "the wider framework of other dynamic world forces, many of which are essentially the creatures of neither U.S. nor Soviet initiative or control."

The committee report was issued with dissents from three senators.

Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado, charged that "the use of selected outside experts was little more than a camouflage for a political effort to force the national intelligence estimate to take a more bleak view of the Soviet strategic threat."

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, said the B team notion of a Soviet drive for superiority in strategic arms "has gone from heresy to respectability, if not orthodoxy" in "what might be called official Washington."

And Senator Malcolm Wallop, Republican of Wyoming, accused the committee majority of attempting "to denigrate the B team" by conveying the impression that the group of evaluators assembled by the C.I.A. contained many different points of view while the outsiders constituted "a narrow band of zealots."

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ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A-7

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
10 MARCH 1978

John P. Roche

Intelligence estimates and a grotesque report

The Senate Committee on Intelligence issued a report last month on the 1976 exercise in which an in-house government intelligence group ("Team A") and a group of knowledgeable outsiders ("Team B") were given the same data on Soviet strategic capability and objectives and asked to submit their assessments. Team B, led by the distinguished Harvard Russian expert Richard Pipes, found Team A's evaluation wholly inadequate for both downplaying Soviet strength and willingness to employ it. There was a great brouhaha at the time because the central thrust of Team B's critique was leaked to the press.

Now comes the intelligence committee, in grotesque fashion, deprecating the technique of bringing in outsiders and insinuating Team B was packed with Bolshie-bashers. Deploring leaks, "worst-case" thinking, and the emphasis on military criteria, the committee never raised the key question. Indeed, at the outset the report states that "no attempt (has been made) to judge which group's estimates concerning the USSR are correct"!

The point of an intelligence estimate, at least in a rational universe, is to present an accurate picture. Thus it is ironic that in the same time frame that Team B is chided for its bias, its position has been adopted in essence by the president, the secretary of Defense, a Brookings Institution study, Sir Harold Wilson and, on the left, the Chinese communists.

As Sen. Pat Moynihan put it, dissenting from his brethren: "The subject of the 'Team B' report has been before our committee for a year now, during which, if I am not mistaken, rather a striking shift has taken place in the attitude of what might be called official Washington to the then-unwelcome views of this group of scholars and officials. Their notion, that the Soviets intend to surpass the United States in strategic arms and are in the process of doing so, has gone from heresy to respectability, if not orthodoxy."

Why then, if Team B was on target, should the committee expend so much effort attacking its credentials? Well, as usual, there is a history, in this case of National Intelligence Estimates consistently underestimating Soviet capabilities.

In a Washington speech last spring, Fred C. Ikle, Paul Warnke's predecessor as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated bluntly that "in intelligence you would expect you would underestimate (Soviet developments) once or twice or three times. If you underestimate the eighth time, really, you ask for a change. But we underestimated a ninth and tenth time."

This dogged inaccuracy led in 1976 to the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of private citizens since abolished by President Carter, to suggest the two-team contest. The proposal was, of course, bitterly opposed by the relevant bureaucracies and, when it was approved by President Ford, the word went out that Team B was picked by biased, anti-detente, conservatives.

As Sen. Gary Hart said in his supplementary opinion to the recent committee report, the concept of "competitive analysis and use of selected outside experts was little more than a camouflage for a political effort to force the national intelligence estimate to take a more bleak view of the Soviet strategic threat."

This episode illustrates a general problem in media bias: the designation of anyone who suggests the Soviets are building mobile missiles or killer satellites a "conservative," or — in George Kennan's phrase — a devotee of "chauvinist rhetoric." Why is it "conservative" to make accurate statements? The logic seems to run backward: 1) all people of good will want to avoid war; 2) if Brezhnev & Co. are not men of good will, there will be war; therefore 3) Brezhnev & Co. must be men of good will; and 4) anyone who says different is a chauvinist, hysterical conservative: a war-lover.

Auto-hypnosis is certainly protected by the First Amendment, but there are practical reasons why our intelligence services should not be permitted to make a career of it. But because of this weird media response to Team B, or the Committee on the Present Danger (to which I belong), there is no verification of track records. Paul Nitze does not dance with joy watching Moscow play fast and loose with SALT; indeed, the accuracy with which he has called the shots is profoundly depressing. We would all be happier to be proved wrong.

Finally, if knowing your customers is to be "biased," we confess to bias. I recall in the 1940s being bitterly denounced as a Red-baiter by the Stalinists for saying Trotsky had been murdered by the GPU, father of KGB. Pravda said he was "killed by a disillusioned follower," Jacson-Mornard. Last year in Moscow, at the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Ramon Mercader, alias Jacson-Mornard, was made a "Hero of the Soviet Union." I was "biased," but was I inaccurate?

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A-1
WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
1 MARCH 1978

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Told Helms to Keep It Quiet

LBJ Was Told in '68 That Israel Had Bomb

By John J. Flalka
Washington Star Staff Writer

The CIA informed President Johnson in 1968 that Israel had the atom bomb, but Johnson told then-CIA Director Richard Helms to drop the matter, according to a former high-ranking CIA official.

"Don't tell anyone else," Johnson is quoted as saying, "not even Dean Rusk (then secretary of state) and Robert McNamara (then secretary of defense)."

The Johnson-Helms conversation was described in a secret briefing to a dozen top officials of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in February 1976 by Carl Duckett, then the CIA's third-ranking official. NRC investigators later interviewed Duckett and printed a four-page account of his story in their report, a heavily censored version of which was released last weekend.

ACCORDING TO the document, Duckett briefed the NRC officials as part of a commission inquiry into whether nuclear material had been diverted or stolen from the United States.

The report is part of the agency's internal investigation of allegations that its executive director misled two congressional committees when he told them last summer the NRC had "no evidence" that there had ever been a nuclear diversion.

Censors at the NRC had cut holes in many pages of the 252-page document, eliminating any reference to "sensitive" aspects of the case, which involves a chain of circumstantial evidence developed by the CIA that highly enriched uranium was somehow diverted to Israel from a private nuclear fuel plant at Apollo, Pa.

In most copies that were stamped "unclassified" and released by the NRC, the Duckett interview was entirely cut out, leaving holes in the pages and even in the index where Duckett's name appeared. However, a copy of the report obtained by The Washington Star contained a segment of the Duckett interview.

Joseph J. Fouchard, the NRC's director of public affairs, said he had no comment on how the information had appeared in an unclassified version of the report. A similar account of the Duckett briefing appeared in December in Rolling Stone magazine.

IN THE INTERVIEW with NRC investigators, Duckett noted that the CIA had verified in a number of ways that Israel had become a nuclear weapons power. A type of bombing practice done by Israeli A-4 jets, Duckett said, "would not have made sense unless it was to deliver a nuclear bomb."

The account states that "Mr. Duckett raised the question of whether the U.S. had intentionally allowed material to go to Israel. He said that if any such scheme was under consideration, he would have known about it and he never heard so much as a rumor about this. He, therefore, does not believe there is any substance to this allegation."

Duckett said the CIA drew up a "National Intelligence Estimate" reporting Israel's A-bomb capability in 1968 and stated that he showed it to Helms.

Helms, he said, told him not to publish it. He said Helms said he "would take it up with President Johnson."

Helms, according to Duckett, later replied that he had spoken with Johnson and that Johnson had told him to keep quiet about the matter.

HELMS COULD NOT be reached immediately for comment. However, he was interviewed about the Duckett briefing a month ago during a closed session with House and Senate investigators. According to several persons who were present, Helms' memory was hazy about what Johnson's reaction had been.

Duckett has refused to respond to reporters' phone calls since rumors of his involvement in the Apollo case began circulating several months ago.

The interview notes that by 1976 "from the CIA's intelligence point of view, the diversion did not matter" because by that time Israel had begun producing plutonium weapons from a small nuclear "research" reactor that had begun operating in the mid-1960s.

The incident, however, matters to the NRC and the Department of Energy. Until just recently, officials from the NRC and DOE's two predecessors, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration repeatedly told Congress and the press that there has never been evidence of a diversion of "significant quantities" of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, both of which can be made into nuclear weapons.

"By the end of the meeting it was a pretty somber group," Duckett later told NRC investigators. He said that William A. Anders, then the NRC chairman, told him that "in light of the sensitive nature of the information he was going to go to the White House."

The report states that Anders called James E. Connor, secretary to President Ford's Cabinet, and said he couldn't tell Connor what had been discussed in the briefing because of "classification considerations," but stressed that the White House should have the briefing.

Another commissioner, Richard T. Kennedy, went to Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Ford's assistant for national security affairs, and told Scowcroft the briefing had "raised questions but no answers."

Shortly afterward the Ford administration reopened an investigation into the Apollo company, Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp., which had been investigated by the AEC and the FBI during the mid-1960s when the company reported that 202 pounds of highly enriched uranium it had been processing under a series of government contracts had been lost. At the time of the suspected diversion, the United States was virtually the only supplier of highly enriched uranium for commercial purposes in the world.

AT THAT POINT the government's safeguards on highly enriched uranium rested mainly on the metal's value, roughly $4,500 a pound. The regulations assumed that a company would guard the material like gold. NUMEC, however, reported a huge loss and when the loss could not be explained, promptly paid the AEC more than $1 million.

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