

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WASHINGTON POST
Date 2 DEC 1986

THE CIA IN TRANSITION

Casey Strengthens Role Under 'Reagan Doctrine'

By Patrick E. Tyler
and David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writers

When the Soviet Union shot down a Korean Airlines plane in September 1983, an angry President Reagan told CIA Director William J. Casey that the United States should send U.S.-made antiaircraft missiles to Afghanistan to help the rebels shoot down a few Soviet military aircraft in retaliation.

Casey was willing, but the plan was never approved, in part because of a reluctant Central Intelligence Agency bureaucracy, according to one source. Some top CIA officials argued that introducing U.S. weapons into that conflict would escalate it dangerously, end any possibility of "plausible denial" of U.S. involvement for Washington and alienate Pakistan, the main conduit for covert American aid to the rebels.

Now, with the decision to begin supplying U.S.-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the rebels in Angola and Afghanistan, the Reagan administration apparently has dispensed with such cautionary diplomacy. In so doing it has thrust the CIA into a far more public role as the lead agency in carrying out the United States' secret diplomacy.

This stepped-up commitment, under what some administration officials have called the "Reagan Doctrine," is dedicated to the president's vision of effectively supporting anticommunist "freedom fighters" in their struggle against Soviet-backed Marxist governments in the Third World.

An earlier article in this occasional series examined the evolution and debate over the "Reagan Doctrine." This one focuses on the role of the CIA in implementing that doctrine and the agency's remarkable growth during the tenure of Casey, the former Reagan campaign manager turned spymaster.

Casey's influence, both in rebuilding the CIA and as a trusted counselor to the president, has made him a critical and sometimes controversial player in the administration.

During his five years as CIA director, the intelligence budget has grown faster than the defense budget and the agency has rapidly rebuilt its covert-action capabilities with a goal of restoring the prestige of the CIA's Directorate of Operations. The "DO," as it is called, suffered a series of purges and investigations during the 1970s and its image was smeared by disclosures of past assassination plots, use of mind-altering drugs and spying on U.S. citizens.

Since that time, a new generation of senior managers has ascended to the top of the CIA, and they in general have been a more cautious breed, eager to avoid risky operations that would embarrass the agency if disclosed.

But Casey is not a prisoner of that past.

He is one of the anti-Soviet "activists" in the top echelon of an administration that has promoted stepped-up U.S. involvement in the struggle to "roll back" recent Soviet gains in the Third World. While supporting the CIA's more cautious career bureaucracy, Casey also has moved quietly—sometimes in his political channels—to prepare his agency for a more aggressive role in countering Soviet influence in the Third World.

to promote the administration's goals in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the Third World. More than once, according to sources, Casey has angrily rejected CIA analyses that did not mesh with the anti-Soviet pronouncements of White House policy-makers and speech writers.

One key senator has said that relations between Casey and the committees are at an all-time low. The penalty for Casey could come in the next two months as the committees prepare to make the largest cuts in the intelligence budget since the Carter administration.

Some officials see Casey's most formidable challenge in Reagan's second term as facing severe budget cuts mandated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction act. This comes as the U.S. intelligence community is projecting multibillion-dollar outlays for a new generation of high-technology spy satellites that some officials say are badly needed to guard U.S. interests until the end of the century.

Some critics charge that Casey is 40 years out of touch with intelligence management and shows obsessive interest in mounting covert operations in the style of the World War II Office of Strategic Services, where he cut his teeth on clandestine warfare under Gen. William J. Donovan. His critics point out that these were tactics of a bygone era. The country was at war; the more covert operations the better.

Continued

WASHINGTON POST
14 March 1986

CIA Official Sherman Kent, 82, Dies

By Bart Barnes
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sherman Kent, 82, a Yale University history professor who came to Washington in the summer of 1941 and became a major figure in the development of this nation's intelligence community, died March 11 at his home in Washington. He had a form of Parkinson's disease.

He was an early recruit of the Office of Strategic Services, the World War II predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, and he served abroad as well as in Washington. When the war ended he returned briefly to Yale. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean conflict he joined the CIA. From the early 1950s until he retired in 1967, he was director of the Office of National Estimates of the CIA.

At his retirement, he received a Career Civil Service Award for having played "a unique role in the development" of the CIA. He also received a President's Award for Distinguished Federal Service, with an accompanying citation stating that he had played "a unique role in improving the contributions of intelligence to our national security."

Colleagues in the intelligence community said Mr. Kent ended, or at least curbed, "a strong tradition of equivocation" in intelligence estimates.

Mr. Kent's particular genius, according to former colleagues, went to both method and organization. First, he had a rare ability to glean significant facts and decipher trends from the morass of information reported from a worldwide network of intelligence sources. And second, he perceived at an early stage that the effectiveness of the National Intelligence Estimate, for which his office was responsible, would depend on direct access to the White House.

"He saw the main art form in which the CIA would distinguish itself was in having the ear of the president," said one former colleague.

As director of the Office of National Estimates, Mr. Kent presided at meetings of intelligence representatives from a variety of departments and agencies—Army, Navy, Air Force, State Department, Atomic Energy Commission and the like—and then sent to the president a distillation of their findings.

His office dealt with such issues as the rate of Soviet aircraft and nuclear weapons production. One notable success was its ability to advise the White House six months in advance of Sputnik in 1957 that the Soviet Union had the capability of launching an earth satellite.

Described as "intellectually demanding but not arrogant," Mr. Kent habitually wore red suspenders, and he liked to hook his thumbs in the galluses and put his feet up on the table during high-level meetings. He was said by friends to have been blunt and forceful and to have had a profound and colorful command of profanity that was "most useful," in the words of a colleague, "in keeping the Army and the Air Force in their place."

Born in Chicago, Mr. Kent moved to California as a child. He lived in Washington from 1911 to 1917 when his father, William Kent, was a Republican congressman from California. He attended Sidwell Friends School here and graduated from Yale, where he also earned a doctorate in history. Throughout his life he refused to be called "Doctor."

By the summer of 1941 he had been teaching a popular course in modern European history at Yale for several years when William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan, a New York lawyer and World War I Medal of Honor winner, invited him to come to Washington.

At the time Donovan was assembling a cadre of the brightest minds he could find in academia, law and business to determine the nation's intelligence needs in a world war that was certain to involve the United States.

In 1942, Donovan became the first head of the Office of Strategic Services, and his recruits became the first OSS officials. Mr. Kent was put in charge of the Africa section and later was chief of the research and analysis branch. He served in Washington, North Africa and Italy.

After the war Mr. Kent became acting director of the Office of Research and Intelligence at the State Department, taught at the National War College and then returned to his professorship at Yale.

He wrote a book, "Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy," that was published in 1949 and was said by columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop seven years later to have been "the most important postwar book on strategic intelligence."

Mr. Kent's tenure at the Office of National Estimates covered a tumultuous period that included not only the fighting in Korea but also the collapse of French rule in Indochina, the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis and U.S. entry into the war in Vietnam.

In retirement, he wrote a book based on his boyhood experiences on a brother's ranch in Nevada and he produced an unusual set of blocks for children called "Buffalo Blocks."

He is survived by his wife, Elizabeth Gregory Kent of Washington; one daughter, Serafina Kent Bathrick of New York; one son, Sherman Tecumseh Kent of Oklahoma City, and four grandsons.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
17 January 1986

To Check on the CIA, Send In the B Team

By EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

The ambiguous nature of secret intelligence is often not fully appreciated, especially by top Central Intelligence Agency executives who boast that they are privy to the intentions of the Kremlin through sources that report to them directly from its inner sanctum, the KGB.

The "facts" that proceed from secret intelligence are not discrete objects, like marbles, that can easily be separated by color, lined up and counted. They tend to change their shape, color and meaning depending on how, and by whom, they are arranged.

Consider the case of Vitaly S. Yurchenko. He came to Washington last August as a "defector" from the highest stratum of the KGB. Then, after the deputy director of the CIA, John N. McMahon, had staked his reputation on the quality of Yurchenko's information and CIA Director William J. Casey had proclaimed him "for real," Yurchenko returned to Moscow.

Despite this embarrassment, Casey continued to assert that Yurchenko had provided extraordinarily important information to the CIA during his curious visit. That very same week, on the basis of a briefing about the case by his national-security staff, President Reagan said categorically that "the information he provided was not anything new or sensational." He added that the putative defector had told the CIA nothing more than it "already knew."

Clearly the CIA director and his deputy, and the President and his national-security adviser, had looked at the same set of secret intelligence "facts" from the same defector, but they arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions about their value.

The issue goes far deeper than the credibility of a single defector. It cuts to the core of the CIA's assumptions about Soviet deception. Does, for example, the KGB systematically attempt to mislead American intelligence by allowing its agents to reveal misleading data? The CIA's current position on this vexing question, as stated in a letter sent to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, is that it can find no evidence of such kinds of deception on strategic issues in the past 20 years. Counterintelligence experts outside the government, such as those at the Rand Corp., reached the opposite conclusion.

The problem can be resolved neither by insiders, who are committed to a denial of deceptions, nor outsiders, who lack access to the highly classified data. Nor does the evidence speak for itself. What is needed to break this conceptual logjam, if only on a temporary basis, is another "B Team."

The B-Team idea stretches back a decade, when George Bush was the CIA director. Data from reconnaissance satellites had raised serious doubts about the CIA's assessment of Soviet bomber and ballistic strategy. The question again was not the raw data but what might be missing from it. In order to settle the matter, Bush appointed two teams to look at the same data. The A Team, headed by Howard Stoertz, the CIA's national intelligence officer on the Soviet Union, consisted entirely of CIA insiders; those on the B Team, headed by Richard Pipes, a professor of Russian history at Harvard, were all outsiders (with proper clearances) who were not committed to any prevailing view of Soviet strategy.

The most dramatic result of this unprecedented competition was a radical reassessment of the Soviet threat, based on the B Team's conclusion that the CIA had seriously underestimated the accuracy of Soviet missiles. It also shook up much of the complacency at the CIA.

Casey, at his confirmation hearings, suggested that there was definite value in these kinds of competitive analysis. If so, the current crisis in counterintelligence presents a golden opportunity for a new B Team.

The team should be chosen by Casey, not in his capacity as the director of the CIA but in his wider role as the head of the intelligence community. As in the model of the 1976 B Team, these experts should be drawn both from other U.S. intelligence services, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, and from think tanks, such as Rand and R&D Associates, that have been working on these problems for a decade or more. To head the team, Casey might consider a senator who has served on the intelligence committee and is respected for independent thinking on these issues, such as Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) or Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.).

Since this B Team's primary purpose would not be to investigate but rather to test the CIA's imagination, it should have a limited mandate and be confined to two or three specific issues. These might include Soviet use of double agents and Soviet disinformation tactics to confuse anti-ballistic-missile strategy and mislead U.S. submarine deployments. The idea would be to test the proposition that analysis with diverse views might discern different clues from the same raw data. The results, again, might prove both surprising and useful.

Edward Jay Epstein, the author of "Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald," is completing a book about international deception.

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A-29

WASHINGTON POST
27 December 1985

Nicaragua Rebels Linked to Drug Trafficking

U.S. Investigators Say Contras Help Transport Cocaine in Costa Rica

By Brian Barger and Robert Parry
Associated Press

Nicaraguan rebels operating in northern Costa Rica have engaged in cocaine trafficking, in part to help finance their war against Nicaragua's leftist government, according to U.S. investigators and American volunteers who work with the rebels.

The smuggling operations included refueling planes at clandestine airstrips and helping transport cocaine to other Costa Rican points for shipment to the United States, U.S. law enforcement officials and the volunteers said.

These sources, who refused to be identified by name, said the smuggling involves individuals from the largest of the U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary, or contra, groups, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) and the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE), as well as a splinter group known as M3.

An M3 leader, Sebastian Gonzalez Mendiola, was indicted in Costa Rica for cocaine trafficking a year ago. No other contra leaders have been charged.

A new national intelligence estimate, a secret Central Intelligence Agency-prepared analysis on narcotics trafficking, alleges that one of ARDE's top commanders loyal to ARDE leader Eden Pastora used cocaine profits this year to buy a $250,000 arms shipment and a helicopter, according to a U.S. government official in Washington.

Bosco Matamoros, the FDN spokesman here, and Levy Sanchez, a Miami-based spokesman for Pastora, denied that their groups participated in drug smuggling.

[Matamoros said the charges were a "dirty and repulsive insinuation against our movement that impugns our integrity and our morality."]

Cornelius J. Dougherty, spokesman for the Drug Enforcement Administration, said the DEA is aware that drug traffickers use airstrips in northern Costa Rica to transship cocaine, but has not examined the political affiliations of those involved. Dougherty said the DEA focuses its Latin American enforcement efforts on the cocaine-producing nations of South America, rather than on countries, such as Costa Rica, that are used in shipping the drugs to the United States.

Earlier this year, President Reagan accused the leftist government of Nicaragua of "exporting drugs to poison our youth" after a Nicaraguan government employe, Federico Vaughan, was indicted by a federal grand jury in Miami.

But Dougherty said DEA investigators are not sure whether Sandinista leaders were involved.

Rep. Samuel Gejdenson (D-Conn.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called on the administration last week to investigate the allegations "with the same vigor that they would devote to charges of left-wing drug trafficking.

"After all, the victims of narcotics smuggling are not able to differentiate between left-wing and right-wing cocaine," he said.

State Department deputy spokesman Charles E. Redman said the United States "actively opposes drug trafficking" and that the DEA is not conducting any investigation of the charges.

"We are not aware of any evidence to support those charges," Redman added.

The U.S.-backed rebels, fighting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, operate from base camps in Honduras to Nicaragua's north and from Costa Rica, to its south.

Contra leaders claim a combined force of 20,000 men, although some U.S. officials say the actual number is much lower. The Costa Rica-based rebel groups are smaller and more poorly financed than those in Honduras.

Associated Press reporters interviewed officials from the DEA, the Customs Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Costa Rica's Public Security Ministry, as well as rebels and Americans who work with them. The sources, inside government and out, spoke on condition that they not be identified by name.

Five American rebel supporters said they were willing to talk about the drug smuggling because they feared the trafficking would discredit the war effort.

The five—including four who trained rebels in Costa Rican base camps—said they discovered the contra smuggling involvement early this year, after Cuban Americans were recruited to help the Honduran-based FDN open a Costa Rican front.

> *"... The victims of narcotics smuggling are not able to differentiate between left-wing and right-wing cocaine."*
>
> —Rep. Samuel Gejdenson

These American rebel backers said two Cuban Americans used armed rebel troops to guard cocaine at clandestine airfields in northern Costa Rica.

They identified the Cuban Americans as members of the 2506 Brigade, an anti-Castro group that participated in the 1961 Bay of Pigs attack on Cuba. Several also said they supplied information about the smuggling to U.S. investigators.

One American rebel backer with close ties to the Cuban-American smugglers said that in one ongoing operation the cocaine is unloaded from planes at rebel airstrips and taken to an Atlantic Coast port where it is concealed on shrimp boats that are later unloaded in the Miami area.

Continued

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 6-B

WASHINGTON TIMES
2 October 1985

STAT

Space weapons development opposed, not research, Moscow negotiator says

FROM COMBINED DISPATCHES

GENEVA, Switzerland — Chief Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov yesterday said Moscow had never opposed basic scientific research but was sticking to its demand for a ban on development and testing of space weapons in return for reductions in the superpowers' nuclear weapons arsenals.

Mr. Karpov, speaking to reporters before resuming presentation of new Soviet proposals at the 7-month-old superpower arms talks, said the Soviet proposals are reasonable and are aimed at making a success of the Nov. 19-20 summit in Geneva between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhael Gorbachev.

But he also said the proposed deal links any limitation of existing long-range and medium-range nuclear weapons to a scrapping of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, and a ban on space weapons, including testing and development.

Mr. Reagan has repeatedly said SDI, commonly known as "star wars," is not negotiable and last week repeated that his $26 billion program would be continued to develop a defensive shield that can shoot down missiles in space.

The Soviets have proposed a 50 percent cut in the approximately 11,500 "nuclear charges" or warheads in their arsenal.

The U.S. arsenal contains 10,645 total warheads. But only 2,130 of those are on the more accurate land-based missiles compared to 8,500 Soviet highly accurate ICBM warheads.

A recent National Intelligence Estimate, however, indicates the number may be difficult to verify, thereby making warhead constraints difficult to negotiate.

The still-secret National Intelligence Estimate indicates that the main Soviet ICBM, the SS-18, may be deployed with 12 warheads instead of the 10 permitted under SALT II, according to U.S. government sources familiar with the estimate.

Last June, a Soviet negotiator in Geneva told U.S. negotiators the Soviet SSN-20 Typhoon ballistic missile has been deployed with 10 warheads instead of the nine originally estimated by American intelligence analysts, the source said.

"As a result, constraints on Soviet warheads will be impossible to verify or negotiate," the defense expert said in commenting on the latest Soviet proposal.

Mr. Karpov said the Soviets were not opposed to "basic research, basic science." But he added that, "We are against any research that leads to the creation of space strike weapons."

"Every sane man shouldn't want the 'star wars' project," he said. "It leads to more instability. It leads to an increasing danger of war . . . despite all words to the contrary."

The Soviet proposals — said by officials in Washington to call for cuts of up to 50 percent in nuclear arsenals if SDI is abandoned — were outlined by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in his meeting with President Reagan last Friday at the White House and presented to U.S. arms negotiators in plenary sessions Monday and Tuesday in Geneva.

The New York Times yesterday quoted American officials as saying the Soviet proposal called on the United States to reduce its long-range and medium-range nuclear weapons by 50 percent, while offering a reduction that would cover only Soviet long-range weapons.

The chief U.S. arms negotiator, Max M. Kampelman, on Monday said the Soviet proposals were "interesting" and would be "studied with care," but he made no comment after yesterday's meeting. Mr. Kampelman was expected to return to Washington today.

Asked if the Soviet Union was taking such a tough stand on SDI that it could block any arms agreement, Mr. Karpov replied, "We are taking a reasonable stand. We are trying to do everything we can that the meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev is successful, but of course if takes two to do a tango."

"Our proposal is as balanced as I stay on my feet. It covers all three areas of our discussions and is well-balanced. It is balanced as far as the whole complex of problems is concerned."

The Geneva negotiations, which began March 12, deal with space and defense, strategic nuclear weapons, and medium-range systems.

Bill Gertz contributed to this report in Washington.

WASHINGTON TIMES
7 August 1985

Soviets fill craters, dig new ones to fool U.S. on missile accuracy

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Soviet Union is trying to deceive the United States about the accuracy of one of its nuclear missiles by filling in impact craters from test warheads, and by digging false craters to be photographed by U.S. spy satellites, says a U.S. government defense expert.

Recent photographs obtained by satellite reconnaissance taken in the early morning showed Soviet troops concealing test craters from incoming SS-19 warheads launched the night before at Soviet missile test sites on the Kamchatka peninsula, the expert said.

The photographs also show military personnel digging false craters in a wider radius, the expert said.

The SS-19 carries up to six multiple, independently targeted warheads — called MIRVs — on three known nuclear warhead modes. With a force of 360 missiles, it is the most widely deployed Soviet first-strike ICBM.

Revelations about the accuracy of the SS-19 appear to be part of a dispute within the U.S. intelligence community over estimates of the SS-19's accuracy.

The controversy seems to involve different views of analysts from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency and the outcome could sway administration defense policy on strategic modernization programs, the defense expert said.

The Soviet deception is one of several reasons why Pentagon analysts dissented from a U.S. intelligence community assessment of the decreasing accuracy of the SS-19 and which was reported to pose less of a first-strike nuclear threat to U.S. strategic forces, the expert said.

Press reports citing the 1985 National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet strategic weapons trends said the CIA revised its estimate of the SS-19 warhead accuracy. The new judgment, reflected in the still-secret estimate, retroactively downgrades the CIA's previous analyses of the first-strike SS-19 since it was first tested in 1973.

Missile warhead accuracy is measured through a process called circular error probable — the radius of a circle within which at least 50 percent of a missile's warheads fall.

The SS-19's accuracy reportedly fell from a CEP radius of 330 feet to 440 feet, according to a report earlier this month in the National Journal. The loss in targeting ability would seriously affect U.S. assessments of the missile's ability to knock out "hardened" missile silos.

Public support for a very expensive military buildup over the last five years has been based in part on the idea that the United States is now more vulnerable to Soviet attack because of major increases in Soviet missile capabilities during the 1970s.

Defense experts believe the revised estimate of SS-19 accuracy could undercut the Reagan administration's strategic modernization program.

If Soviet missiles are deemed less accurate, critics of the administration's defense buildup in Congress could succeed in cutting the U.S. strategic modernization program.

The new estimate could strengthen support for the administration's plan to place new missiles in older, more vulnerable silos. The administration has been battling Congress over the deployment of the MX "Peacekeeper" missile.

Critics have charged that placing the larger MX in existing silos would leave the only U.S. ICBM capable of deterring a Soviet first strike vulnerable to such an attack.

Congress cut MX funding to 50 missiles, half the number requested by the administration.

A New York Times report on the SS-19 published July 19 states that the DIA disagreed with the revised accuracy estimate of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence community components. The dissent is reportedly outlined in a footnote to the NIE.

DIA believes the SS-19's accuracy has improved since the first uncoded electronic intercepts of flight data were made between April 1973 and March 1974.

Since 1974, only a small portion of the data has not been encoded, and therefore its characteristics — such as accuracy and weight — have been more difficult to determine.

"As a missile gets older, it gets better — not worse — through modifications," the expert said.

Another reason for the dispute on SS-19 accuracy, the expert said, is that the latest NIE indicates that the largest-sized Soviet ICBM, the SS-18, is expected to be deployed with more warheads than it has been tested with. To date, 10 warheads have been detected on tests of the SS-18.

"When it upgraded the estimate of SS-18 warheads, the CIA felt it had to downgrade the SS-19 in order to be partially consistent with its old bias of underestimating Soviet strategic forces," the defense expert said.

The latest intelligence estimate reportedly states that future modernizations of the SS-18 will put 12 warheads on each missile, according to the defense expert.

The controversy over Soviet missile accuracy dates to 1976 when two competing teams of intelligence analysts offered divergent opinions of the evolving accuracy of Soviet missile warheads.

The so-called "A-Team, B-Team" study revealed that Soviet missile accuracy was increasing faster than anticipated by previous CIA analyses. As a result, a "window of vulnerability" to Soviet attack would exist in the early 1980s before the United States could modernize its forces.

"The CIA is trying to revert to its original estimate of Soviet missile accuracy trends," the expert said.

The agency was charged by a team of analysts from outside the CIA with underestimating Soviet missile accuracy developments.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency expert Matthew Murphy would not comment on the details of SS-19 accuracy, but he said missile accuracy is determined by "national technical means," the government euphemism for intelligence gathered by satellite reconnaissance and electronic listening posts.

An ACDA statement in response to reports of SS-19 accuracy warned against drawing "erroneous" conclusions about Soviet strategic cap-

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ARMED FORCES JOURNAL
August 1985

CIA Sees Soviet Strategic Buildup, But Critics Slam Report's Release

by Michael Ganley

The Soviet Union is on the brink of a massive expansion of its strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces, according to a new intelligence estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In rare public testimony, intelligence officials told Senate Members at a joint hearing of the Armed Services Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Subcommittee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee June 26th that the USSR's arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads could grow to 12,000 by 1990 from an estimated 9,000 warheads today. Without continued arms control restraints, the officials estimated, the number of deployed Soviet warheads could rise to between 16,000 and 21,000 by the mid-1990s.

Some conservative Republican Senators, apparently frustrated by the Congressional slowdown of the Reagan Administration's military buildup, urged the White House to release the CIA report and let CIA officials testify in open session about it. The report is based on conclusions of a secret new National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet military forces prepared by the CIA.

Some Senate Democrats, however, complained that Republicans were playing "partisan" politics with the intelligence assessment and damaging the CIA's credibility on Capitol Hill.

The CIA assessment and testimony came only two weeks after President Reagan announced June 10th that the US will continue to comply with SALT II despite intense pressure from conservatives in Congress to renounce the accord.

The Soviets could deploy more than the predicted 3,000 new nuclear warheads in the next few years, according to information provided *AFJ* by one Republican Senator's office.

Those documents show a potential Soviet warhead increase in the next six to seven years of between 2,956 and 5,072, even under current SALT I and SALT II restraints. The US, by contrast, must dismantle nearly four times as many warheads as the Soviets between now and 1991 in order to stay within the treaties' limits.

Some of the new Soviet missiles are designed to carry more warheads than older ones they replace. The numbers of launchers would still remain within the SALT I and SALT II accords, however. Because the US is deploying hundreds of single-warhead, air-launched cruise missiles, which are counted as launchers under the SALT accords, its Trident modernization program would raise the total number of launchers above treaty limits unless older Poseidon subs and Minuteman missiles are retired.

About 7,600 US warheads, over two-thirds of which are based on nuclear submarines, are currently deployed. Only modest future increases in the number of US nuclear warheads are planned, depending upon how many M-X missiles are approved by Congress. (The Senate voted to cap deployment at 50 M-X missiles, while the House voted on June 18th for only 40 missiles, the difference to be resolved in a House-Senate conference that began July 11th.)

Growth in Number of Deployed Warheads on Soviet Strategic Intercontinental Attack Forces by 1994



Source: *Soviet Strategic Force Developments*; CIA paper presented in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommitee, June 26, 1985.

Republican Pressure

The Republican who pushed hardest to get portions of the new intelligence report released was Sen. James A. McClure (R-ID). On June 6th, McClure, along with Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Steven D. Symms (R-ID), wrote President Reagan asking him to release as much of the information in the new National Intelligence Estimate as possible. They told the President that because the new report—NIE 11-3-8-85—predicts "a dangerously worsening state of Soviet military supremacy. . . . We consider a full public understanding of the evolving military imbalance between the US and the Soviet Union to be essential. . . ."

McClure

Shortly after receiving the letter, the White House ordered release of a declassified version of the intelligence report's conclusions, according to Hill sources.

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NEW YORK TIMES
28 July 1985

How the U.S. Assesses Soviet Weapon Capabilities

By BILL KELLER

WASHINGTON — The Government periodically issues reports reciting specifications of Soviet weapons with the itemized precision of a hardware catalogue. They are sources of fascination for Soviet-watchers, and they underpin authoritative studies such as the weighty reappraisal of the superpower balance released last week by a Library of Congress expert, John M. Collins.

But occasionally there is a reminder that what we think we know about Soviet weapons, we can rarely claim to know for sure.

The most recent example is the revisionist intelligence assessment of a missile called the SS-19, a six-warhead mainstay of the Soviet missile force. Since the late 1970's, the SS-19 has been classed as a "silo-killer," accurate enough to have high likelihood of destroying American missile silos. Government sources say that a new, classified National Intelligence Estimate, a consensus of intelligence experts, has concluded the missile is less accurate than previously thought, by more than a third. The estimate has led many analysts to conclude that the missile is not, after all, a reliable silo-killer.

The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency vigorously dissented, defending the earlier accuracy estimates. And in any case, downgrading the SS-19 does not substantially diminish the Soviet military threat — the 3,060 independently targetable warheads on the bigger SS-18 missiles are still considered accurate enough to destroy most American targets. Still, the putative accuracy of the SS-19 has helped shape the United States image of the Soviet war machine, contributing to the notion of an American "window of vulnerability," and influencing the 1979 arms talks.

The Duplicity Factor

One problem with intelligence about Soviet weaponry may be duplicity. The United States has accused the Russians of camouflaging missiles sites and encrypting the signals given off by their test missiles, both violations of arms control treaties because they impede verification. In 1979, according to a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst, American satellite photographs of the Kamchatka firing range were said to have caught the Russians digging holes and planting dummy warheads to try to spoof American eavesdroppers. Both sides practice various forms of what's called "strategic deception."

More often, the Soviet-watchers' handicap is the inherent complexity of their detective work.

The estimate of what a Soviet missile can do, for example, is a distillation of hundreds of pieces of data, mostly technical. Reconnaissance satellites take high-resolution photographs of the launch site, perhaps providing information on the size and configuration of the missile. Radars in the Aleutians and elsewhere plot the missile's trajectory in test flight. High-orbit satellites and RC-135 aircraft based in Alaska record telemetry — the FM signals given off by transmitters Russian scientists attach to monitor their missile's vital parts.

These crucial intercepts may tell eavesdroppers how many warheads were tested, or how steady and reliable the missile is in flight. Ships in the region may help plot where the warheads land.

Once the raw data are gathered, the intelligence agencies begin debating what to make of it all. The course of a missile lobbed into the Pacific may be known with some precision, but it is a matter of educated guesswork what point in the ocean the Russians were aiming for. The agents may have collected dozens of clear signals from the missile in flight, but which frequency was transmitting the fuel flow, and which the steadiness of the gyroscope? "The data base is fairly common," said Jeffrey T. Richelson, author of a new book on United States intelligence. "What can change from agency to agency, and even from person to person, is the analysis."

One reason is the analysts make different assumptions. A missile was tested with 10 warheads and 2 decoys. Will the missile be deployed with 10 warheads, or 12? John Prados, author of a book on estimates of Soviet weaponry, argues that even with the great leaps in the sophistication of intelligence-gathering equipment, faulty assumptions about Soviet intentions have often produced misleading intelligence that propelled American policy. For example, exaggerated American estimates of Soviet antimissile defenses in the 1960's spurred the development of multiple-warhead missiles.

One source familiar with the new disagreement over the accuracy of the SS-19 said the earlier estimates had been based on assumptions about how rapidly the missile would improve. The Central Intelligence Agency, this source said, judged from recent telemetry readings that the missile had not improved as much as expected. The Pentagon insisted that the new readings, taken through a fog of Soviet encryption, were too fragmentary to be given much weight.

Although the agencies deny it, many intelligence experts say that the bureaucratic imperative puts its own spin on weaponry estimates. Conservative intelligence buffs contend the C.I.A. tends to put a benign slant on its estimates in order to encourage arms control; the agency is an important player in arms negotiations and verification. Liberals say the Defense Intelligence Agency and the military service intelligence operations tend to justify the military budget by portraying the Russians in the most sinister light.

"Sure, estimates have political input," said one Government intelligence evaluator. "But for the most part, the intelligence community is objective. The problem is simply that we can only know things so well."

CONTINUED

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 6-A
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
21 July 1985

Soviet missile lesser threat than 1st thought, CIA says

By Richard Gross
United Press International

WASHINGTON — Reassessing the Soviet SS-19 intercontinental missile, the CIA has concluded that the nuclear-armed weapon is not as accurate and poses less of a threat to the U.S. missile force than first believed, administration sources said.

The U.S. intelligence community had characterized the missile as having the capability of destroying U.S. Minuteman missiles in their silos.

But the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency disagrees with the revised CIA evaluation, contained in a secret report called the National Intelligence Estimate.

"We believe the CIA view is completely wrong," a Pentagon official said Friday of the assessment, speaking on the condition he not be identified.

"We believe the CIA analysis is based on incorrect assumptions. They've made a mistake. We are convinced the CIA is wrong and will be proven wrong over time."

The Pentagon estimates that the Soviet Union has deployed 360 of the six-warhead SS-19s. U.S. officials used the SS-19 and the bigger SS-18, which carries 10 warheads each, to support arguments for building the 10-warhead MX to give the United States an appropriate nuclear counterpunch.

The CIA re-evaluation of the SS-19's capabilities was reported by Michael Gordon in Friday's issue of the weekly National Journal magazine. Administration sources confirmed the account.

The article quoted a Pentagon official as saying the revised CIA estimate had reduced the projected accuracy of the SS-19 by "better than a third," extending the radius of the missile warhead's circular error of probability from 1,000 feet to 1,300 feet. The circular error of probability, known as CEP, is the radius of a circle in which a warhead has a 50 percent chance of falling.

A Pentagon official said the revised CIA estimate "did reduce" the estimated accuracy of the SS-19 warhead, but he declined to go into detail.

U.S. officials suggested that the reassessment was valueless because there is widespread agreement in the intelligence community that the SS-18 can knock out all 1,000 Minuteman.

NATIONAL JOURNAL
20 July 1985

CIA Downgrades Estimate of Soviet SS-19 . . . Saying Missile Too Inaccurate for First Strike

By Michael R. Gordon

Key U.S. intelligence officials have revised their estimate of the capabilities of the Soviet Union's SS-19 missile and no longer believe the intercontinental ballistic missile has the accuracy to threaten U.S. missile silos in a first strike, government officials said.

The new assessment is reflected in the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) prepared by the National Intelligence Council, a panel of intelligence experts chaired by a deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But there is not unanimity on the SS-19's capabilities, according to a Pentagon official.

"The CIA has revised its estimate of the SS-19's accuracy; the DIA has not," the official said, referring to the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). While the CIA's view is reflected in the main text of the NIE, a footnote states the DIA's dissenting view, the official added.

The SS-19 figured prominently in public debate during the Carter Administration. In 1977, intelligence projections showed the missile's accuracy—as well as that of the SS-18—was improving at a quicker rate than earlier forecast. "Analysis of intelligence data on new versions of the SS-18 and SS-19 missiles indicates that by the early 1980s, a substantial threat to our Minuteman will exist," said the Defense Department's fiscal 1980 report to Congress.

The view that the SS-19 was a "silo killer" encouraged the notion that the "window of vulnerability"—the time when U.S. land-based missiles would be vulnerable to Soviet attack—had opened earlier than expected.

In addition, those assessments of the SS-19 influenced the U.S. negotiating approach in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In light of intelligence estimates, the Carter Administration in 1977 was amenable to a Soviet suggestion that the treaty set an over-all limit on multiple-warhead land-based missiles, including the SS-19. Previously, the Carter Administration had pushed to limit the multiple-warhead SS-18, the largest of the Soviet land-based missiles, according to Walter B. Slocombe, a Carter Administration Defense official.

At present, the Soviets have 308 SS-18 missiles, each of which can carry up to 10 warheads under the terms of the SALT II treaty, for a total of 3,080 warheads. There are 360 SS-19 missiles, each carrying 6 warheads, for a total of 2,160 warheads.

The view that the SS-19 is a silo killer is still expressed in Pentagon publications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fiscal 1986 military posture assessment states that "today, the most accurate versions of the SS-18 and SS-19 missiles are capable of destroying most time-urgent and hardened targets in an initial attack on the United States."

The new CIA reassessment, however, casts doubt on this view. "It is no longer a silo killer," said a State Department official familiar with the reassessment.

A Pentagon official said that "what the CIA basically says is that given the large increase in CEP it now associates with the the SS-19, the individual probability of kill is low." "CEP" is a technical measure of missile accuracy that stands for "circle error probable" and refers to the radius of a circle within which 50 per cent of a missile's warheads can be expected to fall. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that the CEP of the latest models of the SS-18 and the SS-19 is 300 meters.

In its reassessment, the CIA has increased its estimate of the SS-19's CEP by "better than a third" and now puts it in the range of 400 meters, the official said. That would mean that the SS-19 would not provide a high-confidence capability against a U.S. missile silo even if two SS-19 warheads from two separate missiles were aimed at the same U.S. missile silo.

"Even two gives you low confidence of killing a silo," the Pentagon official said. "You could use three or four and



NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE A-1
19 July 1985

U.S. Study Finds a Soviet ICBM Is Less of a Threat to Missile Silos

By BILL KELLER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 18 — United States intelligence officials, in a revised assessment of a Soviet missile known as the SS-19, now believe that it is too inaccurate to pose a threat to American missile silos, Administration sources said today.

The new appraisal, which differs from assessments by the Pentagon, is contained in a secret report, the National Intelligence Estimate, which is prepared once a year by the Central Intelligence Agency and represents the consensus of United States intelligence experts.

Administration sources said that the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency dissented in a footnote to the document and stood by earlier estimates of the missile's accuracy.

The purported capacity of the SS-19, an intercontinental ballistic missile, to destroy United States missile silos has been an important political factor in American arms control considerations and in the campaign to build an American counterpart, the MX.

Officials said the military significance of the revised estimate of SS-19 capabilities was minimal because another Soviet ICBM, the SS-18, is believed accurate enough to threaten missile silos.

The revised estimate of the SS-19 was first reported by Michael R. Gordon in an article to be published Friday in the weekly magazine National Journal. The information was confirmed today by Administration sources.

Some Officials Draw a Lesson

Present and former Government officials said one lesson to be drawn from the new estimate is that intelligence reports used as the basis for major decisions often seem fragile and uncertain. The intelligence agencies generally rely on the same data — in this case, observations of Soviet missile tests — but differ in interpretation.

A former national security official, referring to the revised estimate, said, "It shakes my confidence in our ability to know what the Soviets are doing."

The Pentagon estimates that the Soviet Union has deployed 360 SS-19 missiles with six warheads each, a total of 2,160 warheads. The 308 SS-18 missiles have 10 warheads each, a total of 3,080.

In 1977, the Central Intelligence Agency said the accuracy of the two missiles was improving faster than expected, posing the danger that by the early 1980's or sooner, they would be able to wipe out the 1,000 American Minuteman missile silos in a pre-emptive strike.

That estimate was central to the view that the United States faced a "window of vulnerability."

It also influenced President Carter's approach to the arms control talks, officials said. The American negotiators had initially focused attention on the SS-18, and sought to negotiate a treaty limiting the size and destructive power of missiles. But after the C.I.A. estimate of 1977, the Carter Administration accepted an overall limit on numbers of multiple-warhead missiles and, because of Soviet resistance, set aside efforts to limit destructive power.

The 1977 estimate has continued to be influential. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Congress in February in a report on the American military posture:

"Today, the most accurate versions of the SS-18 and SS-19 missiles are capable of destroying most time-urgent and hardened targets in an initial attack on the United States."

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger has frequently cited the accuracy of the two missiles in the same breath when arguing for the MX. A major justification for the MX has been the need to match the silo-killing ability of the two Soviet missiles.

Administration officials said the new estimate of the SS-19 was open to interpretation, but one official said the best estimate of the missile's abilities was significantly lower than earlier estimates.

The National Journal article quotes a Pentagon official as saying that the new estimate had reduced the projected accuracy of the SS-19 by "better than a third."

The technical measure of missile accuracy is called circular error probability, which is the radius of a circle within which a warhead has a 50 percent probability of falling. The National Journal said the revised estimate had extended the radius from 1,000 feet to 1,300 feet. Administration officials said they would not dispute the National Journal figures.

A Pentagon official familiar with the report said that even if the estimate was accurate, it would still leave the Soviet Union with 3,000 more accurate warheads on SS-18 missiles, or three for every Minuteman silo.

One Administration arms control specialist said the new estimate might give the United States more time for missile modernization and might be used to defend the Administration's plan to put the MX missiles in fixed silos. Critics have said that the MX would be a sitting duck in fixed silos because of the accuracy of the Soviet missiles.

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WALL STREET JOURNAL
16 July 1985

REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Winnable Nuclear War

Caspar Weinberger has until November to assess Soviet treaty violations and suggest a response to the president. Yet from public reports of a 1985 National Intelligence Estimate, 11-3-885, the impact should be known: a "dangerously worsening state," senators briefed on the report say, of "Soviet military supremacy."

The response must be a defense to shield U.S. forces, and someday cities, from nuclear attack. For years, policy makers have held to the belief that things like NIE estimates, and terms like "supremacy," are moot. After all, we and the Soviets have so many weapons; *some* of them will survive an attack; the attacker gets blown up in a "second strike"; so he never attacks. No need to fret about missile accuracy, ABM technology or Soviet treaty violations: Whatever the numbers are, we have a stable stalemate of Mutual Assured Destruction.

The NIE assessment, representing the collective wisdom of the Central Intelligence Agency and all three services, raises questions about that thinking. It describes a furious Soviet warhead expansion, from 6,000 in 1978 to perhaps 12,000 today and 20,000 by 1990 (see table). It notes a vast research effort to locate subs at sea, mount defenses against U.S. cruise missiles and "stealth" bombers, and extend the range of Soviet weapons, possibly lasers, to vital U.S. communications satellites.

Offensive Weapon Production (1984)

Weapon	*Soviets*	*U.S.-NATO*
1. ICBM	200	0
2. SLBM	200	80
3. SLCM	850	665
4. IRNF	150	70
5. SRBM	350	0

Key: 1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, 2. Sub-Launched Ballistic Missile, 3. Sub-Launched Cruise Missile, 4. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, 5. Short-Range Ballistic Missile.

Yes, there is such a thing as "supremacy." Assured Destruction ceases to be Mutual if one side can find the other's deterrent forces, wipe most of them out and ward off any surviving retaliatory missiles with its own defenses.

Perhaps the most serious threat concerns relatively obscure developments in submarine warfare. Many MAD strategists assume submarines are inherently invulnerable to attack. Indeed, 11-3-885 suggests that both the Soviets and the U.S. need a breakthrough in order to locate strategic subs at sea. Yet, as intelligence officials warned in testimony on 11-3-885 before a House-Senate hearing, "We are concerned about the energetic Soviet research and technology efforts" aimed at precisely this problem.

The Soviets have tested a "synthetic aperture radar" that may soon render visible the internal ocean waves that submarines disrupt. They used an SAR to track their own subs from Salyut 7. In 1978, a U.S. SAR mapped the ocean bottom at depths of 500 feet. In all, a dozen more exotic detection schemes have been suggested, from using blue-green lasers in order to follow changes in plankton behind a submarine to spotting thermal, chemical or magnetic "scars" a sub leaves.

Cruise missiles enjoy a similar patina of invincibility. Yet the Soviets have already practiced intercepting U.S.-type cruise missiles with look-down, shoot-down radars on the Fulcrum and Foxbat supersonic interceptors. Given their sluggish battle-management computers, the Soviets could not knock down every last U.S. cruise missile should America launch a first strike. But after a Soviet first strike, the Soviet network of 2,500 planes and 13,000 surface-to-air missiles wouldn't face all U.S. forces—just the fraction that survives an attack. There would be ample time for Soviet civil defense to prepare for a counterattack by slow-moving cruise missiles and bombers. As NIE briefers said, "The Soviets will be able to provide an increasingly capable air defense for many key leadership, control, and military" installations.

Of course, the U.S. will soon deploy missiles and bombers with stealth technology, which uses coatings and electronics to spoof radars. Yet stealth is one-directional: It cannot yet evade multiple sensors. The U.S. has tested detection of stealth systems by bouncing radars off the ionosphere. Stealth might also be countered by a "passive infrared" sensor in space; the U.S. is already building prototypes of such a sensor.

This does not mean cruise missiles or subs are inherently vulnerable. Thermal or electronic sensors will be countered by technologies to disguise those signals. In turn, more sophisticated sensors will learn to overcome these muting techniques or to read still other signals. And on and on.

Yet in this race, the U.S. carries one severe handicap. To comply with the 1972 ABM treaty, U.S. leaders are holding back on the deployment of defensive technology. The Soviets, despite treaty constraints, have begun mass production of a nationwide ABM-X-3 system, according to 11-3-885. As the U.S. adheres to MAD, trying to match the Soviets offense-for-offense, it will likely fall further behind. Aside from obvious short-term limits on weapons-production capacity, there may be political limits to how long a democracy can compete in such a demoralizing race.

Thus, the U.S. needs not a few hundred more warheads but a dramatic increase in the security of 8,000 existing warheads. The answer: Defend those forces. Mr. Reagan already proposes a shield to render nuclear weapons obsolete. Early layers, based on the ground, could be started now. This would be a step away from MAD and toward a multilayer shield for cities. It may be the only way to meet the threat to deterrence itself.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-33

WASHINGTON POST
27 June 1985

Soviets Would Add Arms Without Treaty, Hill Told

Testimony Counters SALT's Critics

By Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Staff Writer

A top intelligence officer told a Senate hearing yesterday that the Soviet Union would increase the number of warheads on its nuclear missiles if unconstrained by the unratified SALT II treaty with the United States.

The testimony of Lawrence K. Gershwin, national intelligence officer for strategic programs at the National Intelligence Council, conflicts with the views of SALT II critics in the Reagan administration who express doubts that the Soviet Union would increase its nuclear warheads even if the treaty lapsed because Moscow already enjoys a large strategic edge over the United States.

Asked by Sen. Dan Quayle (R-Ind.) if there would be a "significant difference" in the number of warheads deployed by Moscow in the absence of SALT II, Gershwin replied, "There would be some difference and that's clear."

He cited the case of the SSX25 mobile, single-warhead missile now being prepared for deployment in the Soviet Union. Moscow, he said, has "certain potential" to arm the missile with multiple warheads if not for limits imposed by SALT II.

President Reagan announced June 10 that the United States would continue to comply fully with the treaty, siding with advisers who argued that abandoning SALT II would benefit Moscow more than Washington. Each superpower has said it will avoid undercutting the SALT II treaty as long as the other does the same.

The public appearance of intelligence officers became an issue at the hearing.

Gershwin and Robert M. Gates, deputy intelligence director for the Central Intelligence Agency, testified before a joint session of two Senate defense subcommittees called to review an unusual report on Soviet strategic developments prepared by the two officials.

The report, which concluded that the Soviet Union is poised for a major expansion of offensive nuclear weapons and defensive systems, was derived from the usually classified National Intelligence Estimate.

Parts of the estimate were declassified for public release yesterday at the request of the White House. Republican senators, frustrated over cuts in the administration's defense budget, had urged Reagan to release intelligence findings to document the extent of the Soviet threat, according to Senate sources.

The public appearance of intelligence officers who normally testify in closed sessions became an issue at yesterday's hearing, with Democratic senators calling the move politically motivated and Republicans defending it as a way of keeping the public informed.

Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.) criticized the administration for "making partisan and ideological what is central to the national security." Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) said the hearing "seems to have more of a political than intelligence purpose" and asked Gates if his appearance did not "compromise the CIA's credibility."

Gates, saying he would not "address motives of the White House," replied that professional intelligence officers "face somewhat of a dilemma."

"We're fully aware of the dangers of a public presentation to the integrity and objectivity of our assessments," he said. "We also recognize the value of making available on a broad basis a commonly agreed set of facts for discussion of Soviet strategic force development."

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A9
NEW YORK TIMES
26 June 1985

STAT

Soviet Reported to Build Up Nuclear Arsenal

By BILL KELLER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 25 — The Soviet Union is in the midst of nuclear weapons building boom that could double its arsenal of nuclear warheads by the mid-1990's if treaty restrictions are removed, according to new forecasts by Government intelligence agencies.

The report, to be presented to a Senate hearing Wednesday by analysts for the Central Intelligence Agency, says that the Soviet Union has made "major strides" in developing missiles that can travel by rail or road, with nearly a fourth of its warheads expected to deployed in this less vulnerable way by the mid-1990's.

The report also predicts that Soviet military spending will grow by four percentage points more than the inflation inflation rate over the next several years, more than double the intelligence agencies' estimates of Soviet spending in recent years.

A Pentagon official familiar with the report cautioned that the intelligence agency forecasts "are projections, and when you get 5 and 10 years off, they can be fairly shaky. There's probably a lot of truth, and a lot of misinformation, in those estimates."

The intelligence report, based on the classified National Intelligence Estimate, an annual document distilled from data compiled by all of the Government's intelligence services, is to be presented to an unusual public hearing of two Senate panels Wednesday morning.

Advance copies of the declassified version were sent to lawmakers and key aides today.

A Pentagon official said the decision to report on the intelligence estimate in a public hearing was approved at the White House and was designed to muster popular support for the President's embattled military budget.

Another Defense Department official added that the "bleaker picture" of the Soviet military buildup would help win public and allied support if President Reagan decides to respond in kind to what he says are Soviet arms control treaty violations.

Report on U.S. Responses

The President agreed this month to abide by limits on the unratified 1979 treaty limiting strategic arms, but has asked the Pentagon for a mid-November report on possible American steps if reported Soviet transgressions continue.

Conservatives in Congress have long lobbied for more public reporting of intelligence data, saying this would counter attempts to cut the military budget.

The new report, in a statement that goes beyond previous estimates, says, "By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed intercontinental nuclear attack forces — land and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers — will be replaced by new and improved systems."

The report added a number of details to the picture of Russian power contained in the Pentagon's annual publication, Soviet Military Power, released in April.

For example, the intelligence report forecasts that the Soviet Union will be able to increase its arsenal of nuclear warheads from the present 9,000 to 12,000 by 1990.

Possible Soviet Buildup

If arms-control limits contained in the 1979 treaty are eliminated, the estimate said, they could expand to between 16,000 and 21,000 deployed warheads in the mid-1990's.

The intelligence report said the "most notable" trend is Soviet emphasis on mobile missiles, which "represents a major resource decision" because such systems are costly to operate and maintain.

The new report says the Soviet Union last year embarked on an accelerated program for constructing new bases for its SS-20 intermediate range missiles, and that some of those bases were being converted to house new SS-25 missiles, a single-warhead missile capable of reaching the United States.

The Soviet Union is preparing to deploy the SS-25 this year, and the 10-warhead SS-24 next year, the report noted. The SS-24, as has been reported before, is to be put in silos at first and then based on railroad cars.

WASHINGTON TIMES
25 June 1985

Soviets plans surpass limits called for in missile treaty

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Central Intelligence Agency is expected to release its annual estimate of Soviet weapons growth tomorrow in what the Reagan administration regards as the most dismal projection to date of a U.S.-Soviet military imbalance, according to an administration defense expert.

The estimate says the Soviet Union is likely to deploy a nationwide mobile anti-ballistic missile defense system in 1986, according to the official.

The ABM modernization is described as the "rapid deployment of the ABM-3 mobile ABM system on a nationwide basis in 1986," the administration official said.

The Soviet Union has cited the terms of the 1972 ABM treaty in a propaganda offensive against President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. If SDI research moves to the deployment stage, Moscow claims the system would violate the ABM treaty.

"The Soviets will have a nationwide ABM system operational by 1987, when the Moscow ABM-3 is completed and the Pechora-class [ABM] radars are completed," the administration official said. Three thousand mobile ABM interceptors will be operational by 1987, the official said.

Based on the new intelligence estimate, the official concluded that Soviet plans to exceed the ABM treaty limits are "already visible."

A declassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate, numbered 11-3-8-85, is to be made public tomorrow at a joint Senate hearing of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the Armed Services Committee.

The new study outlines the current U.S. view of trends in Soviet weapons developments, primarily dealing with strategic missile and launcher programs, the official said. A product of the combined U.S. intelligence community, it is produced annually in order to provide the president with an assessment of Soviet military deployment and development trends.

Besides the CIA, other intelligence agencies contributing to the estimate are the National Reconnaissance Office, which handles satellite photographs, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and several other organizations.

Other key forecasts on strategic weapons programs include:

- By 1990, the Soviets will have deployed 700 new SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs, all with "rapid reload and refire capability."
- The Soviets have begun mass producing the new Delta IV ballistic missile submarines capable of carrying 10-warhead SS-NX-23 missiles. Typhoon-class submarines are also entering mass production with four new subs under construction.
- A new "stretch Yankee-class" submarine capable of launching supersonic SSN-24 cruise missiles will become operational this year. Modified versions of the SSN-18, SSN-20 and SSNX-23 are also expected to be flight tested this year.
- Over the next decade, the Soviets are expected to greatly expand their strategic air forces by producing up to 140 Bear H Tu-95 bombers capable of delivering long-range cruise missiles. Forty Bear bombers have already been detected as operational.
- Production rates for the Backfire bomber will continue at 30 per year through the 1990s.
- A production facility for the Blackjack bomber is "almost complete," and U.S. intelligence expects production will begin sometime before the end of this year.
- A new generation of short-range and intermediate-range nuclear missiles is undergoing flight tests at a Soviet test range.
- In the next five years, "over 3,000" cruise missiles will be deployed.

The new assessment projects that Soviet spending on weapons will increase by 4 percent to 6 percent throughout the 1990s, according to an administration official familiar with the estimate.

By contrast, the Congress is pressing the administration to freeze Pentagon defense spending at current levels.

ON PAGE 16
DEFENSE WEEK
24 June 1985

What You'll Hear On The Threat

BY PETER SAMUEL

The Reagan administration this week will make public much of its latest estimate of Soviet strategic developments as presented in classified form in a new national intelligence estimate. Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and national intelligence officer Gary Gershwin are to deliver some of the key judgments on Wednesday morning at a joint hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations subcommittee.

Defense Week reported some of the findings of the new intelligence estimate (June 17, 1985), and more detail has now been made available by an informed source.

The CIA reports that the Soviets are presently deploying 100 SS-24 ICBMs and 200 SS-25s. The SS-24 is a 10-warhead rail-mobile system; otherwise it resembles the MX. The SS-25 is similar in size to the Minuteman III, carrying three warheads, but is mounted on a wheeled vehicle for mobility.

The CIA estimates that some 150 SS-17 missiles will be replaced by silo-based SS-24s and that 200 rail mobile SS-24s will be deployed by the end of the decade. The projection is for 800 SS-25s by 1990. Both systems will have rapid multiple reload and refire capability. There is heavy camouflage and concealment of SS-24 and SS-25 deployments.

The estimate reports "new evidence" that the SS-24 has more throw-weight than the SS-19 and is therefore a very heavy missile.

Flight testing is about to begin of the giant SS-X-26 and the large SS-X-27, regarded as follow-ons to the SS-18 and the SS-19 missiles respectively. In addition, an improved version of the liquid fuelled SS-18, the Soviet's largest missile, is being reported. Modifications to the test versions of the SS-24 and SS-25 have been sighted.

In the submarine branch of the Soviet triad, a new Delta IV boat is reported carrying the long-range SS-N-23 which is said to be in mass production now. In addition to the two Delta IV craft launched, four more are under construction.

Four Typhoon submarines are under construction. One stretched Yankee class submarine converted for cruise missiles is expected to be operational later this year, carrying the supersonic and long-range SSC-N-24 cruise missiles. Modification to the current generation of submarine launched ballistic missiles, the SS-N-18, SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 will begin flight tests late this year.

Forty Bear H Tu-95 bombers carrying the long range AS-15 air launched cruise missile are produced, and another 100 are expected over the course of this year and next. Older Bears are being equipped with the AS-4 air-to-ground missile.

The inventory of Backfire bombers is put at 260 and production is expected to continue at the present rate of slightly over 30 annually into the 1990s. The B-1B equivalent Blackjack bomber plant is nearly complete and production is expected to begin later this year, at the same rate as the Backfire, about 30 a year.

Over 3,000 long-range cruise missiles for air, ground, and sea launch are expected to be deployed by 1990.

Three thousand is also the number projected for mobile ABM missiles to be deployed before the end of the decade as part of a nationwide ground based ballistic missile defense. This will include the ABM-3 system and SA-10s and SA-12s (which are primarily air defense missiles but could have some ABM capability, especially against slower moving SLBMs and Pershing IIs.) The Moscow ABM system will be modernized and the network of Pechora class large phased array radars are estimated to be complete by 1987. The SH-4 and SH-8 missiles associated with the ABM system are reported to be in mass production, so elements of an ABM breakout are, in this account, reported "already visible."

Soviet defense spending is projected to increase between four and six percent annually in real terms based on evidence of production rates, factory expansion, test range expansion and deployments under way.

STAT

DEFENSE WEEK
17 June 1985

Big Soviet Buildup Foreseen

BY PETER SAMUEL

U.S. intelligence is now predicting a large rise in Soviet nuclear warhead numbers—over a thousand this year and possibly 8,000 more by the end of the decade. These numbers reportedly are contained in the CIA series called National Intelligence Estimate, the latest issue of which is coded NIE-11-3-885.

One usually reliable source says the intelligence assessment—on which President Reagan was briefed recently—shows "the world balance of power will have greatly shifted by the 1990s."

In the past six months, the United States has detected a number of new nuclear systems being deployed by the Soviets. The Russians have also accelerated construction of anti-ballistic missile systems.

The report, for the first time, alludes to a possible Soviet "breakout" from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty through the fielding of a nationwide ABM system to intercept U.S. missiles. This could occur by 1990, the NIE reports.

The report comes during the same week that President Reagan unexpectedly decided to continue to abide by the SALT II Treaty limits beyond its scheduled expiration at the end of this year. Reagan's decision will require the United States to withdraw a Poseidon nuclear-missile-bearing submarine within six months of the sea trials of the Trident sub, USS Alaska. Those tests, off the Connecticut coast, are scheduled for this fall.

As compared with the last official U.S. estimates of 9,000, the National Intelligence Estimate says the Soviet Union will, by the year's end, have 11,500 strategic missile warheads. (The United States has some 8,000 nuclear warheads, on average each one-third of the explosive power of the Soviet warheads.)

In the years 1986 to 1990 the Soviet Union is projected by the NIE to add an additional 8,000 nuclear warheads to its arsenal of 11,500. (By contrast, the United States plans at present only to add modestly to its strategic warhead numbers.)

Evidence of the big Soviet nuclear buildup through this year is in the form of intelligence about the deployment of the latest two Soviet intercontinental nuclear systems, the large SS-24 missile and the smaller SS-25.

Twenty bases are being prepared for the SS-25 missiles. At each base, nine sheds with retractable roofs are under construction, but observation of the operations suggests the plan is for 10 missiles to be deployed at each base. The Soviet plan for these road-mobile missiles is for at least one missile per base always to be in the field, so the scheme is assessed as a total of 200 missiles (20 bases of 10 missiles each). Though the SS-25s have been tested as single warhead missiles, one source says they are actually capable of carrying three warheads, and that the force being deployed this year will therefore add 600 nuclear warheads to the Soviet arsenal.

The United States has complained that the SS-25 tests with a single warhead are deceptive because they use only a fraction of the available "throw-weight" or carrying capacity of the missile. Under the SALT agreements, tests with warheads are supposed to use at least 50 percent of available throw-weight.

Some SS-25s are classed in the latest intelligence estimate as already deployed. An old SS-7 base at Yurya, now used to base intermediate range SS20s, has operational SS-25 missiles. One SS-25 in its launching canister on its wheeled launcher was photographed under camouflage nets at Yurya recently, according to the source. The other operational SS-25 base is at Yashkarola.

Also being deployed now by the Soviets are 100 SS-24s, a large 10-warhead nuclear missile similar in design to the long-delayed MX missile. These SS-24s are being deployed out of two bases in the Anchangel area, of northern European Russia. Fifty SS—24s are being deployed at the "test center" of Plesetsk, alongside 200 single warhead SS-16s. Another 50 SS-24s are being deployed immediately at Kostroma, where some have been observed replacing SS-17s in existing silos. At Plesetsk, says U.S. intelligence, there are signs that the SS-24s are going to be deployed immediately as rail-mobile missiles. In this form they are carried in a railroad freight train.

Another new development reported is the addition of another 40 Tu-95 Bear H cruise missile carrying bombers, which has increased the number of Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 2,544.

President Reagan was briefed on these developments recently by the CIA. The staff of the National Security Council has said it supports congressional briefings on the new intelligence. The Senate Armed Services Committee and defense appropriations subcommittee are being urged by conservative senators to hold an unusual joint hearing on the subject.

The White House has also hinted that a declassified version of the report will be made public shortly.

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 7-A

WASHINGTON TIMES
13 June 1985

New report credits Soviets with leap in warhead count

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The White House is preparing to release an unclassified version of a national intelligence estimate, possibly in a Senate hearing requested for today, which shows a dramatic jump in Soviet ballistic missile warhead levels, an administration defense expert said.

Yesterday, Sen. James McClure, R-Idaho, requested an "urgent" joint hearing with the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations subcommittee on defense to make public the key findings of the study.

The national intelligence estimate was the subject of a letter from Sens. McClure, Jesse Helms, R-N.C., and John East, R-N.C. to President Reagan last week. The senators charged that information in the estimate shows "the evolving [U.S.-Soviet] military imbalance."

Sen. McClure, in a letter to Appropriations defense subcommittee Chairman Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, said the White House National Security Council informed him that some findings of the estimate are ready to be released and asked him to request the hearing. The letter was also sent to Armed Services Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz.

A National Security Council spokesman could not be reached for comment.

"This year's National Intelligence Estimate confirms Soviet military supremacy," Sen. McClure wrote in the letter.

A spokesman for Sen. Stevens said the request had been received and aides were attempting to schedule a hearing for today.

According to the administration expert who spoke on the condition he remain anonymous, one finding of the new report shows that warhead levels for Soviet ballistic missiles now total 11,500 warheads.

The new figure represents an increase in some 2,000 missile warheads from figures published two months ago in the Pentagon's annual assessment of Soviet missile warheads. The figures do not include warheads delivered on strategic bombers.

Soviet deployments of the new SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs account for the increase, the official said. The new estimate, he said, indicates that the Soviet Union has begun deployment of approximately 200 mobile SS-25 ICBMs and 100 large SS-24 missiles configured on railroad track launchers.

Besides the new ICBMs, the increase in missile warheads is also attributed to an additional number of warheads on the SS-18 ICBM, the largest missile in the Soviet arsenal. Each SS-18 was thought to carry 10 warheads, but is now estimated to hold 14.

The Soviet deployments contrast sharply with the U.S. missile modernization program. The original proposal to deploy 200 MX missiles, a counterpart to the SS-24, has been cut to 50 by Congress. The only mobile U.S. missile is the single warhead Midgetman mobile ICBM, which is being researched.

Previous reports on the intelligence estimate said up to 20 bases for the SS-25s were sighted by U.S. intelligence. Each base contains nine garage-like buildings with sliding roofs.

The bases are expected to eventually hold 10 missiles each, with one ICBM constantly moving and the rest in buildings, the official said.

The new estimate indicates that 18 mobile SS-25s currently are deployed and operational, the official said.

The new estimate will also disclose that the Soviets have completed testing of the SS-24 and have moved the missile into its deployment phase, the official said.

Intelligence experts, for the first time, have sighted an operational SS-24 under heavy camouflage on a rail launcher at the Strategic Rocket Forces complex at Kostroma, he said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-7

WASHINGTON POST
10 June 1985

Soviets Said To Hurry Missiles

Reagan Expected To Report Today on Their Deployments

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that the Soviet Union is moving faster than expected to develop and deploy new strategic missile systems, according to informed sources.

The conclusions of a "National Intelligence Estimate," which intimates that Moscow may be poised to begin an ambitious round of new missile deployments, will be included in President Reagan's report to Congress today on future U.S. adherence to the unratified SALT II treaty, the sources said.

As reported earlier, the president is expected to announce today that the United States will continue to adhere generally to the limitations of SALT II but will make "proportional responses" to what it determines to be Soviet violations of the pact.

Given the new intelligence estimate, some sources say Reagan may link continued U.S. adherence to the SALT II limits after the treaty expires at year's end to some sign of Soviet restraint in these new missile programs and to steps ending what the United States considers Soviet violations of SALT II.

The new intelligence estimate reportedly concludes that the growth in quality and quantity of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles appears to be faster than anticipated and that two additional large missiles may be flight tested within the next year.

One of the larger ICBMs is looked upon as an updated version of the SS18, but the other may be a new type prohibited by SALT II.

The United States has observed only testing of solid-fuel engines for this second rocket, so little is known of its eventual configuration. A new solid-fuel Soviet ICBM would violate SALT II.

In any case, new ICBM production could put the Soviet Union over the SALT II limits relatively quickly unless it takes steps to eliminate large numbers of old silo-based ICBMs and scrap older submarines, as it has done in the past. In a letter to Reagan last week, Republican Sens. James A. McClure (Idaho), Jesse Helms (N.C.) and John P. East (N.C.) identified the National Intelligence Estimate as NIE-11-3-8-85 and said it indicated "a dangerously worsening state of Soviet military supremacy." The three legislators called on the president to give it "the widest possible distribution in Congress . . . ."

The Soviets increased the number of their ICBM warheads from approximately 5,500 in 1979 to about 9,200 as of last year, growth that was permitted by SALT II. They could add another 2,000 warheads and still remain within treaty provisions, according to a study by the Federation of American Scientists, a group that supports keeping the SALT II limits.

The president has already charged that Moscow violated the SALT II agreement by producing more than one permitted new missile and by hiding information on its ICBM tests.

Reagan is expected to announce the first "proportional response" today—what will be done this fall when a new Trident submarine carrying 24 strategic missiles goes on sea trials, taking the United States 14 missiles over a SALT II limit.

Sources said an older U.S. Poseidon submarine, the USS Sam Rayburn, with 16 missiles, will be removed from active service as a launcher of ballistic missiles. But the process of destroying the sub, as required by the treaty, will not begin.

Instead, the United States will take advantage of the six months' leeway that is allowed on destruction of missiles to determine what the Soviets do in the Geneva arms negotiations and what they do with their missile systems.

The announcement today is expected to settle, if only for the time being, a basic disagreement between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger.

Shultz initially proposed continued adherence to the treaty and a supplemental defense spending request to Congress to show resolve in the face of the Soviet violations.

Weinberger proposed that the president announce that the United States would let the treaty expire, but would not make any immediate change in the size of the U.S. strategic forces or the pace of their modernization.

In the end, sources said, national security affairs adviser Robert C. McFarlane adapted an "adherence-with-exceptions" approach first suggested by Paul H. Nitze, the president's special adviser on arms control, and Kenneth L. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Supporters of the Shultz position pointed out yesterday that the decision does not put the United States in violation of the treaty for the time being and, in effect, continues the policy of observing the unratified treaty. It also allows time for the Soviets to respond before a next step is taken.

Weinberger aides said they were disappointed that the views of the NATO allies and Congress played more of a part in the president's

Continued

AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
18 March 1985

CIA, Defense Intelligence Diverge On Soviet Arms Spending Growth

By Brendan M. Greeley, Jr.

Washington—Central Intelligence Agency estimates of a 1-2% Soviet rate of defense spending growth for 1983 differ from the 5-8% estimated by the Defense Intelligence Agency but do not indicate any split between the two agencies, according to Robert Gates, chairman of the National Intelligence Council and deputy director for intelligence at the CIA.

The CIA figures became available with the publication of a censored version of testimony given by Gates before a closed session of the subcommittee on international trade, finance and security economics of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. The CIA believes that it is too early to estimate 1984 growth, while the DIA believes growth continued at the same 5-8%.

Gates said that estimates of Soviet defense spending are subject to great uncertainties because analysts look at Soviet defense hardware and force levels and figure the cost as equivalent to what it would cost the U. S. to field a similar establishment.

Because prices are determined by different factors in the West than in the Soviet Union, the comparisons are at best indications of relative, rather than absolute, spending levels.

Both agencies agree that there was little real growth from 1975 through 1982, although Soviet defense spending remained at a very high absolute level. "It is time for Washington to take official notice that Soviet military procurement has been stagnant for the past seven years and to stop acting like nothing has happened," Sen. William Proxmire (D.-Wis.) said. "It is true that military procurement has leveled off at a rather high level, and the Soviets have been able to add large numbers of weapons to their inventory despite the slowdown."

USSR Inventory

During the period referred to by Proxmire, 1977-83, the CIA lists the following purchases by the Soviets:

- 1,100 intercontinental ballistic missiles.
- 700 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
- 300 bombers, including Tu-22M/Tu-26 Backfires.
- 5,000 fighters, including MiG-23/27 Floggers.
- 15,500 tanks, including T-72s.
- Substantial numbers of naval surface combatants and submarines.

Gates pointed out that even though the rate of increase slowed or stagnated during the period, the Soviets were already at such a high spending level that they were able to modernize and improve their forces substantially.

"The best measure of Soviet military capabilities for use by U. S. decision-makers is what the Soviets actually have bought, are deploying and are developing—rather than an artificial reconstruction of what it cost them," Gates said. He added that cost comparisons have value only when used as analytical tools by experts who understand their very significant limitations.

Fighter Production

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger made the same point last year when he said the Soviets were producing about 840 fighters a year while the U. S. was producing 350 (AW&ST Feb. 13, 1984, p. 11).

Summarizing CIA testimony over the years, Gates stated that Soviet economic growth, which military growth closely matches, was quite strong during the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s.

The mid-1970s marked a turning point when the economy began to decelerate and eventually fell below 2% growth from 1979-81. Since then, it has rebounded.

The Soviet gross national product is very sensitive to fluctuations in agricultural production, and the slump in GNP in the late 1970s is tied closely to poor harvests in those years. Farm output rose by 6.3% in 1983, reaching an all-time high, and 1984 should reflect similar gains.

Industrial production grew by 3.4% in 1983, and a similar rate seems likely in 1984. The most significant improvement has been in the production of raw materials and intermediate products. Poor performance here in the late 1970s created bottlenecks, which affected the entire economy as requirements outpaced supplies. In some cases, notably steel, imports have been used to take up the slack. Chemical output gains also contributed to growth.

Fuel Concern

The energy situation in the Soviet Union remains a problem. Coal production continues to fall and oil production shows scant growth. Gas production is up, though, and electric power is becoming more plentiful.

The CIA attributes the severity of the late 1970s slump to a transportation system unable to meet demands placed on it in a country whose size requires an efficient network.

A poor showing by the railroads during this period is partly to blame, and improvements in this sector have helped the industrial recovery.

The amount of gas transported by pipeline continues to rise at double-digit rates, but traffic on highways and rivers has declined.

The CIA estimates the share of the Soviet GNP allotted to defense spending at 13-14%, almost double that in the U. S. This 13-14% share has remained relatively constant since 1965 because defense growth has matched economic growth. Some key industries devote disproportionately large amounts of their total output to defense. For example, more than 25% of all machinery production goes to defense as well as 20% of all metallurgy production.

As examples of intangibles that increase the burden of defense on the economy, the military has priority access to:

- Highest quality raw materials for defense.
- Transportation and distribution of raw materials.
- Best industrial workers for the defense industry.
- National pool of research talent.
- Most advanced machinery.

As examples of intangibles that help the economy, the CIA cites possible use of troops and equipment in construction and in helping with the harvest.

CIA estimates of the defense burden do not consider the following:

- Subsidized weapon sales.

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USA TODAY
12 March, 1985

Veil of secrecy tough to pierce

By Richard Whitmire
and John Hanchette
USA TODAY

While the world waited Monday for confirmation of Konstantin Chernenko's death, Soviet television led off its morning programs with a feature on baking pumpernickel bread.

It was the usual frustration with Soviet secrecy for Kremlinologists — those who gather information on the Soviet Union — and many intelligence experts say the veil is more impenetrable than ever.

One reason, say critics of U.S. intelligence: We're relying too much on computers. The CIA and DIA — the Defense Intelligence Agency — have "lost the sense of the classic analyst with the green eyeshades and soup on his tie," said Paul Smith, chief editor of the U.S. Information Agency's *Problems of Communism*.

Another possible reason: "The time of governmental researchers is almost completely consumed with short-term demands from Congress and various administrative offices," says Oberlin College President S. Frederick Starr.

The U.S. intelligence effort also depends on hundreds of university academics, ex-government researchers and professional "think tankers" who pore over obscure bits of information for clues to Soviet life.

For the CIA and DIA, satellites "can flag every new factory building, every new road," said Harry Rositzke, who from 1946 to 1970 worked for the CIA.

"The old signals like who's standing on the Kremlin Wall are still valid," said Jerry Hough of the Brookings Institution. "But there are lots of newer ones you have to pay attention to — who gets TV play, which commentators are on the most, which economists are published — shadows on the cave wall."

20 January 1985

The Director: Running The C.I.A.

By Joseph Lelyveld

FOR THE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency and its frequently embattled leader, William J. Casey, the start of the second Reagan Administration is more than just the halfway mark in a marathon. Ronald Reagan is the first President in 12 years to take the oath of office for a second time, but it has been 16 years since a head of the American intelligence community last managed to continue in office from one Presidential term to the next. On the previous occasion, in 1969, Richard M. Nixon reluctantly gave in to an argument that he should retain Richard M. Helms as Director of Central Intelligence in order to safeguard the nonpartisan character of the office. There have been five directors since, and Casey — whom no one has ever called nonpartisan — has now survived longest of them all.

This can be regarded as a footnote, a fluke, or an indication that the C.I.A. has essentially weathered the investigations and strictures of the 1970's, that it has recovered much of its old effectiveness and mystique. The present director, who would naturally favor the latter interpretation, has tried to function as if it were so, casting himself in the mold of Allen W. Dulles and John A. McCone, who flourished in the 1950's and early 60's, before serious questions had been raised, on either moral or pragmatic grounds, about covert action on a global scale. Like them, rather than like his immediate predecessors, he has been recognized in Washington and beyond for having ready access to the President. Like them, he has not hesitated to make his voice heard at the White House on policy matters as distinct from intelligence evaluations. (Indeed, he might even be said to have surpassed them in this respect, for, serving a President who values the Cabinet as a forum, he has managed to become the first Director of Central Intelligence ever to sit at the table as a participating Cabinet member.) And like Dulles in particular — fondly known to his subordinates as "the great white case officer" because of his consuming passion for espionage and related games — Mr. Casey is believed to have immersed himself deeply in the day-to-day management of clandestine operations.

Yet for an assortment of reasons — some personal, others having to do with changing times and changed expectations of a director — no one would suggest that official Washington has learned to view William Casey reliving his youth.

Conservative members, who can be nearly as harsh, tend to portray him as the opposite of an activist director: that is, as a captive of a Langley bureaucracy whose major objective, it is alleged, is to shield itself from controversy. The two images overlap, in that neither takes him very seriously as an effective Director of Central Intelligence or an influence on policy, either broadly on matters of national security or narrowly on matters specific to the intelligence community.

What is involved here is more than a clash of perceptions about Casey. It is also a clash of perceptions about what a Director of Central Intelligence should be and, beyond that, about how ready the United States should be to intervene secretly — politically and, especially, militarily — in the affairs of other countries. On both sides — those who think this director is too active and those who think he is not nearly active enough — there is a tendency to forget the fundamental insight that emerged from the investigations of the 1970's: that all directors, finally, are creatures of the Presidents they serve. If Presidents hear intelligence about the world that conflicts with what they would rather believe, they have the option of setting it aside. But no director can ignore the President's goals. The different ways directors interpret their jobs reflect differences among the Presidents who picked them.

Joseph Lelyveld is a staff writer for this magazine.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
18 January 1985

Letters to the Editor

Errors Espied

I am complimented that the Journal devoted a front-page article to me on Jan. 11; however, it started out flat wrong with its story that many years ago I tried to purchase a house already promised to the Japanese embassy and that the "brash Mr. Casey didn't get the house." You got the story upside down. Not only did I "get the house" and live happily in it for seven years, but the Japanese embassy had tried to purchase the house that had been promised to me—not the other way around!

The article also claims that I sent one particular estimate "back for revision nine times." The record is that I saw and commented on the last two drafts. What happened was that the analyst who drafted the estimate, based on his 20 years of experience in the region and months of research and visits to the area, felt that deletions made by another staff officer would alter or suppress significant information and judgments at which the analyst had arrived. My role was to restore some of the deletions to ensure that, on a controversial subject, the policymakers got the full range of judgments prevailing in the American Intelligence Community. The estimate was approved unanimously by the heads of all the members of the Intelligence Community. The production of this estimate was reviewed by the House Intelligence Committee, which concluded last week in its annual report that: "dissenting views were printed at the very beginning of the study, a practice the Committee applauds."

While I cannot comment on your allegations attributing certain covert activities to me, your readers should know that any such activity must be directed, authorized and funded by those in the Executive Branch responsible for our national security and by the Congress as well.

WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington

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ON PAGE 9A

BALTIMORE SUN
6 October 1984

The Beating of Drums, the Ringing of Bells

Washington.

ON Wednesday of this week, a Congressional committee investigating the bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut professed its astonishment at the way in which the responsible officials ignored repeated and credible warnings of the attack. American fortifications in Lebanon had

By Lewis H. Lapham

been bombed on two prior occasions in the last 19 months, and the probability of the third attack was, in the words of the committee's report, "so unambiguous that there is no logical explanation for the lack of effective security."

There is, of course, a logical explanation, but it is non-partisan in character and not one likely to attract either votes or applause.

As the committee well knows, the typical informed citizen (like the typical congressman, newspaper columnist or military procurement officer) really doesn't care much for facts. If given a choice in the matter, he prefers to believe in myths. Myths are, after all, easier to understand and easier to remember. They also eliminate the tiresome chore of having to study something other than one's self.

President Reagan, like most novelists and all actors, knows that stories move from truth to facts, not the other way around, and that the tellers of tales seek to convey not the details but the essence of a thing. People like to believe what they're told, to imagine the distant forces of history speaking to them in a warm and human voice.

Mr. Reagan's delight in myths accounts for his genial carelessness with respect to numbers, dates, events and names. His insouciance enrages the officious people in the national media who berate Mr. Reagan for the slovenliness of his memory. In the phrasing of their editorial rebukes, they often sound like an exasperated mother telling her 13-year-old son to clean up his room. They might as well be trying to teach geometry to an elk.

Americans choose to see the world as they wish to see it, not as it is, and this bipartisan habit of mind (as characteristic of Democrats as of Republicans) sets the course of American foreign policy as well as the terms of the national political debate.

By now it has become axiomatic that if a *coup d'etat* takes place anywhere in the world, the gentlemen at the Central Intelligence Agency will be among the last to hear the news, and the State Department will respond with its customary expression of polite surprise.

Certainly this was true in Iran, not only with respect to the advent of the Ayatollah Khomeini but also with regard to the seizure of the American hostages. In the course of the subsequent recriminations, it was discovered that none of the embassy officials could speak Farsi. Six months before Yuri Andropov died, the American Embassy in Moscow lost track of his whereabouts and, to the best of anyone's knowledge, nobody in the American government ever knows what the Israelis will do next.

A week ago, it was reported in Washington that the CIA had cashiered one of its operatives because he persisted in sending dispatches insultingly at odds with what his superiors wished to believe about Mexico. Precisely the same question — about the political uses of intelligence data — lies at the root of the argument in the trial that will begin next week in New York between General William Westmoreland and CBS News.

The indifference to facts shows up in so many other American advertisements for reality that it isn't fair to locate the genius for myth in any one city or profession. The book publishers in New York, like the makers of television docudramas in Hollywood, routinely mix the elements of fact and fiction in a compound substance malleable enough to fit the molds of whatever images the public wishes to buy in large volume.

The ritual finding of facts belongs to the category of religious spectacle. As the campaigns increasingly come to resemble corn or harvest festivals, so also the loud shouting of facts bears comparison to the beating of drums and the ringing of bells. The oldest and wisest members of Congress know that if enough committees keep up an incessant din for 40 days and 40 nights, then, with the rising of the hunter's moon, a great spirit will descend and turn the facts into myths.

Lewis H. Lapham is the editor of Harper's Magazine.

WASHINGTON POST
5 October 1984

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Soviet Arms Spending

Ellen Goodman's column on Sept. 25 ["Force Feeding," op-ed] is one of several places where I have seen the CIA's method of measuring Soviet defense spending criticized. According to her, the CIA's method is to count up Soviet military equipment and personnel and calculate how much it would cost the United States to produce the same amount of equipment and field the same number of personnel. Obviously, this method does not actually tell us how many rubles the Soviets are spending on defense since, as Ellen Goodman points out, the cost of producing things in the Soviet Union may differ from the cost of producing them here. For this reason, she describes the CIA method as "fanciful," "bizarre" and "bogus."

If we do not know the actual Soviet cost of producing a specific item, using the U.S. cost of the item as an estimate seems to me as good a method as any other. Even when we do know the Soviet cost, I think it is better to use the U.S. cost. For example, she notes that the CIA calculates the cost of a Soviet private at $573 a month (the U.S. cost), even though the Soviets pay their privates only about $100 per month. If the CIA were to use the actual Soviet cost, its calculations would show that the United States was "outspending" the Soviets on military personnel even if the Soviets had five men in uniform for every one of ours. Under the circumstances, to use Soviet costs to measure their defense efforts and U.S. costs to measure our defense efforts would be dangerously misleading.

WILLIAM W. CHIP
Washington

PORTLAND OREGONIAN
28 September 1984

Analyst quit in CIA dispute

Compiled from staff and wire reports

WASHINGTON — The senior Latin America analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency resigned in May after William J. Casey, director of the CIA, insisted that he revise a report on Mexico so it would support Reagan administration policy, intelligence officials asserted Thursday.

The intelligence officials told the New York Times that Casey wanted the report to portray the economic and political problems of Mexico as a threat to its internal stability, as well as an indirect danger to the overall security of Central America and the United States.

The officials said that when the analyst, John R. Horton, refused to revise the report on the ground that intelligence data did not support such an alarmist conclusion, Casey had the report rewritten by another analyst.

A spokeswoman for the CIA, Kathy Pherson, said that Casey would not comment on the Horton case and that the agency could not discuss specific intelligence estimates because they were classified. She confirmed that Horton left the agency in May but said he did so after his contract expired. Other intelligence officials said Horton's contract would ordinarily have been renewed but that he decided to leave the agency.

"There is pressure from Casey on subjects that are politically sensitive to jigger estimates to conform with policy," Horton said Thursday.

He declined to comment further about his departure from the CIA, saying he was preparing an article on his views for publication next month.

Administration officials said that Casey wanted a tougher report from Horton, in part to help persuade the White House to approve a program of covert and economic American pressures on Mexico to induce its support for U.S. policies in Central America.

PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (ME)
7 September 1984

'Zealotry' called CIA crimp

By CLARK T. IRWIN JR.
Staff Writer

American policy in Central America is being decided in an atmosphere where White House "zealotry" and "very strong ideological clamps" prevent full discussion of options, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer said Thursday in Portland.

In his first interview since resigning as Latin American specialist on the National Intelligence Council in May, John R. Horton told the Press Herald that "Where there's a strong political feeling in the administration, there's pressure to skew intelligence estimates."

Horton was interviewed at the home of his son, lawyer Mark Horton, before a talk for the World Affairs Council of Maine.

Despite his resignation, Horton said he has no policy fight with the current administration.

"I think our broad policy in Central America is completely correct," he said, describing that policy as supporting a restoration of democracy and civilian government in El Salvador, resisting rebels supported by Nicaragua and Cuba and "opposing the attempt of the Sandinistas (the Nicaraguan revolutionary junta) to close their society up completely."

His objection, he explained, is to political pressures for intelligence officers to massage their "national intelligence estimates" to conform to political goals and the "inferior quality of discussions" resulting from the squelching of some points of view.

CIA Director William Casey called Horton out of eight years of retirement last year to help prepare intelligence appraisals of Latin American countries for the National Intelligence Council. The council's members represent the CIA, the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the armed forces.

As chairman of the team doing Latin American estimates, Horton gave Casey an estimate on the political, economic, military and diplomatic strength and capabilities of a major Latin American country important to U.S. policy concerns.

But the CIA director "wanted the estimate to come out a certain way" to strengthen the case for administration policy, Horton said, "and kept constant pressure on me to redo it."

"I refused to do it, so he finally had the thing rewritten over my dead body, so to speak," at which point Horton resigned.

That experience, he added, is not typical of the estimating process, which he believes is producing more and better readings than during the Carter administration.

The more general concern, he said, is that incomplete discussion of options for carrying out policy could lead to decisions that will eventually harm the country's intelligence services.

For example, he said, "It's no secret" that Cuba and Nicaragua are supplying arms, communications assistance and espionage data to the leftist rebels in El Salvador.

Since "Interdiction (military attempts to cut support) hasn't worked and can't work," and since no one is seriously proposing to remove the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua forcibly, Horton argued, it might be prudent to discuss offering Nicaragua a deal of reduced pressure if they stop supporting the Salvadoran revolutionaries.

But Casey's final vote at National Foreign Intelligence Board meetings — this being a group which reviews the National Intelligence Council's estimates — and "constant crunching back and forth" between the administration and "pragmatic people" at the State Department tends to suppress such discussion, Horton said.

On the administration side, he said, there is a group of "very bright people" including U.N. Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick, Casey and Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle, "who are either against any type of compromise with the Sandinistas, or if not against it, suspicious that State can't handle it.

"There's a real distrust of the State Department," Horton said, "this feeling in the administration that 'State's soft.'"

Aside from the risk of the country's being given flawed policy decisions because of unexamined options, Horton said, there's the "institutional risk" that the CIA will be left holding the bag.

"At some point," he continued, "Reagan and Casey are going to be in some other world or retired from public life. If any cans get hung around anyone's neck for Central America, it won't be Reagan's or Casey's — it's going to be the CIA's."

That could lead to a repeat of the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam backlash against the agency and again impair the country's ability to supply its decision-makers with the best intelligence information and analysis possible, Horton fears.

A registered Democrat, Horton also said, "I want to be fair about this thing. . . . It's not just this administration."

When the Sandinistas seized power in Nicaragua in 1979, he said, President Carter's National Securi-

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WASHINGTON POST
27 August 1984

JACK ANDERSON

Chemical Arms In Terrorism Feared by CIA

The gravest "clear and present danger" posed by chemical and biological weapons is not from aggressor nations, which are restrained by fear of retaliation, but from terrorists or lunatics who decide to use these hideous weapons for blackmail or to publicize their causes.

A secret CIA "Special National Intelligence Estimate," which had the concurrence of eight other federal intelligence agencies, expresses concern that the use of poison gas by the Soviets and the Iraqis (who got the ingredients from West German companies) "could influence the attitudes of terrorists toward use of chemical and biological weapons."

The report, which was reviewed by my associate Dale Van Atta, points out that chemical-biological weapons are not yet popular among terrorists—probably because they're terrified of them. But it warns that "one successful incident involving such [lethal] agents would significantly lower the threshold of restraint on their application by other terrorists."

In fact, these weapons have been used in isolated cases by terrorists and others. In 1978, for example, a Palestinian group injected cyanide into citrus fruit exported by Israel. Huk guerrillas in the Philippines poisoned pineapples destined for export. In both cases, rapid and effective response to the discovery of the poisoned fruit prevented fatalities.

Similar incidents of "consumer terrorism" have been attributed to individuals, like the person who injected cyanide into pain-reliever capsules, and the ex-convict in Australia who threatened to infect herds with hoof-and-mouth disease last January.

The low cost of chemical-biological weapons and their relatively easy availability make them attractive to terrorists. Once they have overcome their fear of the weapons through training—by the Soviets, for example—terrorists will see the advantage of deadly agents that can be smuggled into a target area virtually immune from detection.

It costs hundreds of millions of dollars to build a nuclear bomb, whereas any reasonably intelligent biology or chemistry student can make a kilogram of deadly Type A botulin toxin for $400, according to Pentagon consultant Joseph Douglass. He adds that with a forged research permit a terrorist could get anthrax germs by mail for $35. One supply house offers samples of five toxins, including the probable lethal ingredient of "yellow rain," for less than $100.

A group of experts told a United Nations panel in 1969 that "for a large-scale operation against a civilian population, casualties might cost about $2,000 per square kilometer with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons, $600 with nerve-gas weapons and $1 with biological weapons." Inflation may have changed the figures, but not the deadly bargain ratio.

The United States is wide open to terrorists with chemical-biological operations in mind. The only federal agency that monitors the sale of deadly pathogens is the Agriculture Department. Universities and other research laboratories are poorly guarded, and the necessary knowledge is easy to gather.

"Clandestine production of chemical and biological weapons for a multiple-casualty attack generally raises no greater technical obstacles than does the clandestine production of chemical narcotics or heroin," the CIA report concludes.

Among law enforcement agencies, the Secret Service is particularly aware of the near-impossibility of protection against chemical-biological attacks. An expert told the presidential bodyguards that he could stroll through the White House with a tour group and leave behind an undetectable poison that would kill all the building's inhabitants by the next morning.

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
25 June 1984

Special Report

INSIDE CIA
What's Really Going On?

Covert actions, such as mining of Nicaraguan ports, make the headlines. But developments elsewhere in America's secret spy agency are even more far-reaching.

After a four-year program to beef up the Central Intelligence Agency, the results can now be seen—a spy service with new muscle and influence to match.

Flush with money and manpower, the CIA is back at work worldwide, operating on a scale not seen since the Vietnam War.

Even its mission has been expanded. On top of espionage, intelligence analysis and covert operations, the agency has joined the wars on terrorism, international drug traffickers and Soviet theft of U.S. technological secrets.

One thing has not changed. CIA involvement in covert operations still stirs passions and controversy. Congress is threatening to bar funds to finance the "secret war" against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

The turnaround, pushed hard by President Reagan and CIA Director William J. Casey, has elevated the spy unit from a state of disrepute during the 1970s to a newfound position of power and influence on foreign policy.

Central to the agency's changing fortunes is Casey, whose close political and personal ties to Reagan give the CIA the kind of White House access—and credibility—it has not had for years. The despair that gripped the organization during what were called "the troubles" has lifted.

But some critics fear that the revitalized agency is becoming too influential and that Casey has too much say in the shaping of U.S. policy. Others warn that covert actions will drag America into combat.

Congress, while attempting to keep a tight rein on the CIA, actually began pushing the buildup of the organization even before Casey took over and has strongly supported it since. This backing stems in part from a need for better intelligence about a growing Soviet military capability. The CIA is also seen as providing America with a means of intervening in world crises without sending in combat units.

Headquartered in the Washington suburb of Langley, Va., the supersecret agency, with up to 18,000 staffers, has long been embroiled in controversy. While most concern has focused on covert activities, these are by no means the most important part of a broader mission.

Clandestine Wars Return

Nowhere is Casey's influence more apparent than in the revival of covert action—missions

some of them filled b

The effects of this being felt around the

- In Afghanistan, support for Moslem tion forces. Annual the like—now is said
- In El Salvador, t political groups in th Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) in the victory of José Napoleón Duarte.

All told, says one official with access to inside information, the agency is engaged in about half a dozen large-scale covert operations overseas. The CIA may conduct as many as 50 minor secret projects. That number, while far smaller than in the CIA's peak years, nonetheless marks a significant increase in covert action under Reagan.

Far and away the most eye-catching operation is in Nicaragua. Under Casey, officials report, some 73 million dollars has been spent to build up anti-Sandinista *contra* forces to 12,000 rebels.

The CIA has coordinated airlifts, planned attacks and built a sophisticated communications network for the largest paramilitary action since the Vietnam War—activities that have sparked charges that the agency's covert operations have gotten out of hand once again.

But Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a frequent critic of the CIA, says: "The question is: Did Reagan leap in to start up operations? And the answer is no. While the inclination to use covert operations is stronger, there's still a great deal of care."

Even within the staff at Langley, Casey's enthusiasm for

CIA Director Casey on Capitol Hill for hearings on secret operations.

CHUCK FARRITY—USN&WR



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NEW YORK POST
19 March 1984

SOVIETS DOUBLE NUKES TARGETED TO HIT U.S.

By NILES LATHEM
Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — The Soviet Union has nearly doubled the number of missiles pointed at the U.S. since the SALT II treaty in 1979, according to a grim analysis by U.S. intelligence agencies.

Senior Defense Department and Congressional officials told The Post that a National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency showed that the Soviet nuclear arsenal aimed at the U.S. has increased by an astonishing 80-85 per cent since the SALT accord.

This is far greater than the increase of the U.S. nuclear weapons targeted at the Soviet Union over the same time period.

Officials said that the analysis has sent shockwaves throughout the White House and the National Security Council and poses a major dilemma for President Reagan who is anxiously seeking to avoid confrontations with the Kremlin during this election year.

In a recent appearence in Congress, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle admitted that the size of the Kremlin nuclear force has grown by more than 75 percent.

But officials who have seen the CIA/DIA estimate, completed this month, say that the still secret figures are more staggering than what Perle revealed.

According to these sources, the Soviets:

- Increased their total number of nuclear warheads pointed at the U.S. from about 5000 in 1979 to 9400.
- Increased the total number of missile launchers to nearly 2500 which officials say violates a SALT limit of 2225.

These figures include all submarine-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles. They do not include nuclear warheads from strategic bombers — an area where the U.S. is known to have an overwhelming edge.

Despite the Reagan administration's massive defense buildup over the past three years, the number of U.S. nuclear warheads now aimed at the Soviet Union is about 6000.

At the same time, the total number of U.S. missiles launchers will decrease from 1850 to about 1800 next year to comply with the SALT treaty, officials say.

The intelligence estimate comes on the heels of the recent completion of a 275-page report of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency which details more than 40 Soviet violations of the SALT accords.

Although Reagan has said publicly in the past four months that he believes the Soviets are violating the SALT accords, officials believe that if Reagan were to challenge the Soviet Union and make a major issue out of these violations it would result in a new outbreak of tensions with the new Kremlin leadership.

CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS
9 January 1984

YELLOW RAIN

U.S. claims it has incontrovertible proof the Soviet Union is involved in use of toxin weapons, but evidence it has made public is tenuous

Lois R. Ember, C&EN Washington

For years, and from faraway places have come reports of death and sickness from the skies. The tales from ruggedly independent and mostly illiterate mountain people of Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan tell of aircraft-, rocket-, and artillery-delivered clouds of yellowish material that killed rapidly and grotesquely those directly hit. Villagers more fortunate and further away became ill, but with a strange combination of symptoms.

Survivors often told tales of mysterious yellow rainlike spots on or near their villages that they called yellow rain and associated with deaths and illnesses. These tales spurred U.S. investigations. First U.S. embassy personnel collected the victims' grim stories. Then military physicians examined these people, now in refugee camps, for signs of chemical agents used. And finally, the U.S. launched an intensified search for physical evidence.

From the early surveys came the speculation that three possible agents—a harassing agent, a nerve gas, and an unknown chemical—were being used. Chemical analysis of collected material proved futile. No traditional chemical agent—no riot control gas, mustard gas, or nerve gas—could be detected. And still the reports of skin irritation and loss of blood, of nausea and vomiting, of dizziness and trembling, and of death flooded local embassies after alleged yellow rain attacks. The mysterious toxic agent causing these symptoms remained elusive to the chemist's probe for seven years.

NEWS ANALYSIS

Then on Sept. 13, 1981, in West Germany, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig addressed the Berlin Press Association. In an otherwise unnotable speech, Haig said: "For some time now, the international community has been alarmed by continuing reports that the Soviet Union and its allies have been using lethal chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan . . . . We now have physical evidence from Southeast Asia which has been analyzed and found to contain abnormally high levels of three potent mycotoxins—poisonous substances not indigenous to the region and which are highly toxic to man and animals."

With these words, amplified the next day by undersecretary of State for political affairs Walter J. Stoessel and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, an obscure issue was thrust into the spotlight.

The physical evidence that Haig referred to turned out to be a single leaf and twig from Kampuchea. This vegetation was contaminated with parts-per-million [illegible] of three mycotoxins, substances produced by Fusarium fungi. This detection of fungal

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 January 1984

US declassifies documents on Latin America policy

Washington

President Eisenhower told his top advisers in 1954 the US was in Latin America to fight "a war . . . against communism," according to documents declassified by the State Department.

In a National Security Council meeting in November 1954, Eisenhower said: "You must think of our policy in Latin America as chiefly designed to play a part in the cold war against our enemies. Russia would shortly step into any vacuum if we allowed one to develop in Latin America."

One declassified national intelligence estimate, prepared under CIA director Allen Dulles, warned that the presence in Latin America of United Fruit Company, which was influential in the Eisenhower administration, was increasingly resented by independent Latin American governments.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC
28 November 1983

Casey's smart (and rich), but does he run a fi

TINKER, TINKER, TINK

BY MORTON KONDRACKE

UNITED STATES intelligence apparently had an idea that the so-called Party of God, an Iranian-connected, Syrian-protected Shiite Moslem group that car-bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut last April, was planning an attack on U.S. Marines. But U.S. intelligence did not have agents inside the group and therefore could not warn with precision that it was planning the truck-bombing that killed more than 230 Marines on October 23. U.S. intelligence knew, too, that Cuba and the Soviet Union were militarizing Grenada, but again the United States had no intelligence agents on the island and underestimated Cuban troop strength. The U.S. had not penetrated Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement, and did not know that Bishop's colleagues were planning to oust and kill him. And when Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica reported to the White House press on October 25 that "we noted with great interest the movements between Soviet Embassies and known activists" prior to Bishop's assassination, it also was news to White House policymakers.

DRAWING BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

On the other hand, the Central Intelligence Agency did predict correctly that the Soviet Union would not invade Poland in 1981, but would crack down through Polish authorities instead. Using its superb technical capabilities, U.S. intelligence was able to develop a precise analysis of how Korean Air Lines' Flight 007 was tracked by the Soviet Union, lost, found again, and shot down. And, several months before Leonid Brezhnev's death, the director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, reported to President Reagan that Brezhnev likely would not be succeeded by a collective leadership, as agency analysts had concluded. "Chernenko peaked too soon," Casey wrote Reagan in a memo. "Kirilenko faded in the stretch bet money, I'd say across the board."

Casey's prescier lance, is likely to b ing to well-inform more disturbing tell the President dropov had pushe

zier was kidnapped by the Red Brigades in Italy, the C.I.A. dug hard to discover who had him and where; but U.S. officials say that in general, journalists like Claire Sterling have put together a better picture of international terrorist networks than the C.I.A. When Turkish gunman Mohammed Ali Agca shot the Pope, they say, the President found out more about Soviet and Bulgarian involvement from *Reader's Digest* than from U.S. intelligence.

The C.I.A. can't know everything, but the Republican Party correctly declared in its 1980 election platform that "the United States requires a realistic assessment of the threats it faces" and "must have the best intelligence capability in the world." The platform said, "Republicans pledge this for the United States." Three years into this Republican Administration, the United States certainly has a better intelligence capability than it did in 1980—it could hardly fail in that—but overall it is still far from the best in the world. Can William J. Casey make it so? Well, he gets credit for trying—even from his adversaries—but there's reason to doubt that he can.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 November 1983

Nicaraguans May Vote on Assembly; CIA Assesses Rebels

MANAGUA, Nicaragua (AP)—This country's leftist junta is expected to announce the date for long-promised elections on Dec. 4. But political sources said Friday that the balloting probably will be for a constituent assembly, not for president.

"There exists a great possibility that (junta coordinator Daniel) Ortega will announce Dec. 4 the date for elections for a constituent assembly," said a political source who spoke on condition he not be named.

"The plan for a constituent assembly could be stalled only if some last-minute delay or problem comes up," another source said.

Rafael Solis, deputy commander of the Council of State, told journalists recently that Ortega would announce the election date Dec. 4., when the council, which now serves as the nation's legislature, completes its six-month session.

The political sources said that the constituent assembly would probably write a new constitution to outline future presidential elections. Nicaragua has not had a constitution since the 1979 ouster of the rightist regime of the late strongman Anastasio Somoza.

The leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front, in power since the revolution, has said repeatedly that elections will be held in 1985. The Sandinistas' critics, including President Reagan, charge that the government has reneged on promises to hold early elections and develop a system of political pluralism.

The Reagan Administration is providing covert aid to rebels fighting to overthrow the Sandinistas. Washington contends that Nicaragua helps infiltrate arms to leftist guerrillas in U.S.-backed El Salvador.

CIA Appraises Rebels

The Washington Post reported Friday that the CIA has concluded that U.S.-backed guerrillas in Nicaragua lack the punch to topple the Sandinistas. Quoting congressional sources, the newspaper also said there are indications that Washington is beginning to give some thought to how the war by the counterrevolutionaries can be wound down.

The CIA says the rebels lack the military capability, financing, training and political support to overthrow the powerful and well-entrenched Sandinistas, the newspaper said.

(In Washington on Friday, a senior Administration official told a reporter that the CIA assessment "has been overtaken by events." He said that the CIA analysis "goes back to last summer. Since then the 'resistance' forces *(contras)* have become much stronger, the population has become much more supportive in parts of Nicaragua, and the weaknesses of the (Sandinista) regime have become much more apparent.

("The Administration is clearly in favor of continued support for the resistance forces. It is not at all their purpose to overthrow the (Sandinista) government, but to try to bring about change," he said.

(Asked if recent Sandinista overtures to the Roman Catholic Church, business and the press, provided evidence of such change, the official replied: "We are not interested in cosmetic changes. But it is clear that by diverting their energies, they are forced to reduce the amount of aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas.")

Interior Minister Tomas Borge said Thursday that Nicaragua would be willing to get rid of its Cuban military advisers if Honduras and El Salvador get rid of their U.S. military advisers.

Withdrawal of all foreign forces in Central America is a cornerstone of a proposed regional peace treaty drafted by the so-called Contadora Group—Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and Venezuela.

Cubans Reported Leaving

Government sources say that 1,200 Cubans of the more than 8,000 here—most of them civilians—already have left for home. The United States has 55 military trainers in El Salvador and about 200 in Honduras.

An Interior Ministry source said Friday that Borge plans a 10-day tour of the United States to lecture at universities and meet with congressmen, religious leaders and the news media.

Meanwhile, the publisher of the newspaper La Prensa, an important voice of opposition to the Sandinista government, said Friday that the newspaper will suspend publication indefinitely Dec. 7 for lack of paper.

"Our paper reserves are running out and the shipments of paper that friendly businesses in the United States and Canada have promised us cannot arrive before Dec. 7," publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro said at a meeting with the newspaper's more than 200 employees. "Therefore we are obliged to close the paper indefinitely."

La Prensa, which has clashed frequently with the leftist government, has had problems with newsprint supply for the past two years.

Financially strapped Nicaragua has only limited foreign exchange to buy such foreign-made goods as newsprint, and the government recently reduced newsprint allocation to Nicaragua's three daily papers. They now can print only 10 pages on weekdays and 14 on Sundays. Because of this, La Prensa asked for donations of newsprint from newspapers abroad.

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WASHINGTON POST
25 November 1983

U.S.-Backed Rebels Can't Defeat Nicaraguan Regime, CIA Finds

By Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA has concluded that there are no circumstances under which a force of U.S.-backed rebels can achieve a military or political victory over the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua, according to congressional sources.

In addition, there are indications that the administration, despite its tough public posture, is beginning to give some thought to how the war could be wound down and how an amnesty for the American-supported forces could be arranged.

In a National Intelligence Estimate provided to the congressional oversight committees this fall coinciding with crucial votes to continue funding to the rebel forces, the CIA said the U.S.-backed "contra" forces made up of 10,000 to 12,000 guerrillas lack the military capability, financing, training and political support to overthrow the powerful and well-entrenched Sandinista government with its relatively large and well-equipped standing army of 25,000 soldiers and even larger militia forces.

The CIA analysis, according to these sources, concludes that the Sandinista leadership is controlled by hard-line Marxists who will not give up in any kind of military confrontation with the contras. In addition, the CIA has concluded that the U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary forces have not been able to win enough support in the Nicaraguan population to overthrow the Sandinistas, who seized power four years ago after ousting Gen. Anastasio Somoza.

Administration officials said on previous occasions that they did not think the U.S.-backed force was strong enough to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, but the rapid growth of the rebel army from its original 500-man level authorized by Congress and the loosely defined administration goals left many members of Congress uncertain as to President Reagan's true intentions in Nicaragua.

With the new CIA analysis, Reagan has also stated for the first time that he wants a general amnesty for U.S.-backed rebels who have been fighting the Sandinista government as part of the CIA-directed force. Reagan included the amnesty provision in a secret document justifying the covert action to Congress. The amnesty provision would be a precondition to a cessation of hostilities, sources said.

The document, a presidential "finding" under the National Security Act, was presented to the congressional committees in September by Secretary of State George P. Shultz and CIA Director William J. Casey.

The amnesty provision is not spelled out in any detail in the finding, and a number of questions have been raised in the congressional committees as to how it would be applied and enforced. It is not clear whether exiles who are fighting the Sandinistas would be allowed to return to their homes in Nicaragua or win back property seized by the government.

But the most recent discussions between the administration and Congress have created the impression that the administration is giving careful thought to how to end the 2-year-old secret war against Nicaragua. The amnesty provision addresses an issue that has been unresolved in two years of private consultations between the administration and congressmen fearful that Reagan and the CIA were slowly committing the United States to thousands of Nicaraguan exiles whose fate would be uncertain if a negotiated settlement of regional tensions were reached in Central America.

Last spring, Casey warned in private of a potential "bloodbath" if Congress withdrew support from the U.S.-backed rebel forces.

The House cut off funding for the covert operation twice this year, but in a compromise with the Senate, legislators ended the session by approving $24 million to fund the covert paramilitary operations at least until June under a mandate to keep military pressure on the Sandinistas until they stop supporting leftist guerrillas fighting the government of neighboring El Salvador.

The CIA has concluded that paramilitary harassment from the U.S.-backed contras, who have been operating from bases in Honduras since early 1982, has caused the Sandinista government to reconsider its support for the Salvadoran guerrillas and may eventually persuade the Sandinistas to abandon the Salvadoran leftists altogether. According to one congressional source, who spoke on the condition he not be identified, there is a bipartisan consensus, especially in the Senate, that the covert policy of the Reagan administration for the first time is consistent with publicly stated policy goals of the U.S. government and the governments of the Central American region.

Under this view, many members of the congressional oversight committees reportedly have become convinced that the administration is willing to end its secret war against Nicaragua as soon as the Sandinistas give concrete and verifiable assurances that they will no longer give aid, command and control and logistical support to the Salvadoran guerrilla movement.

Doubt remains, however, among members who were surprised by an administration effort during the summer to redraft a presidential justification for the covert operation in terms that some members believed would have committed the U.S.-backed forces to an all-out victory over the Sandinista government if it was not willing to make substantial political and diplomatic concessions.

In this draft presidential "finding," the administration said the secret war was necessary to stop the spread of revolution from Nicaragua to other countries. It also stated a necessity to keep up covert paramilitary operations until Nicaragua returned to a democratic form of government, reduced its level of armament and guaranteed press and religious freedoms. Many members considered the latter demands as diplomatic goals, not suitable for inclusion in the secret justification as preconditions to cease hostilities.

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WASHINGTON TIMES
1 November 1983

Daniel Grahar
Sheriff of the 'High Frontier'

By Tom Nugent
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

He's a retired U.S. Army general. He's the former chief of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. And he's the controversial creator of "High Frontier" — a Washington-based public interest group which hopes to end the threat of nuclear war by placing non-nuclear weapons in outer space.

A rather imposing background, you would think at first.

But if you want to understand Dan Graham, *really* understand Dan Graham, then you have to start someplace else.

You have to start, as a matter of fact, with his grandfather's handlebar mustache.

"POW!"

You have to start with the former three-star general, now 58 years old, sitting in his downtown Washington office and pounding his right fist into his left palm: "POW!"

And then he laughs out loud. "My maternal grandfather," says Daniel Orrin Graham, remembering his boyhood days in the cabin on Puget Sound, "was the sheriff of Josephine County, out there in southern Oregon. And he was a character out of a Wild West novel. A ten-gallon hat, a big handlebar mustache, chaps and a horse . . . and he was the *law* in Josephine County!

"Joe Russell. His picture hangs on the wall of the county courthouse, even today. Sitting on his horse, and glaring. And you knew that you didn't want to get crosswise of the law . . .

"Well, I lived with him for a couple of years. I was just a kid. And one day I walked into that cabin . . . I'd just gotten into a fist fight with a half-breed [Indian] kid named Sonny Thompson, and he was a lot tougher than I was, and he thrashed me!"

He laughs again here. It's a raspy sound, since he smokes all the time, like a saw going through dried lumber. "HAARRGGHH!" and yessir, he's having a *good* time, this three-star American general, remembering the pounding he once took. "Well," recounts Graham, "I came in pretty well banged-up, and bawling. And I had the misfortune to run into my grandfather, instead of my grandmother. And he said: 'You been in a fight?'

"I said, 'Yeah.'

"'Did you get whipped?'

"I said yes — and he knocked me clear across the cabin!"

Now the general leans into a threatening crouch, now his voice rumbles ominously as he

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NEWSWEEK
10 October 1983

America's Secret W

Under William Casey, the CIA is back in business wit

In a string of Turkish cities and towns, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency have arranged covert support for Iranian exile groups seeking the overthrow of Ayatollah Khomeini. Two thousand miles away, in the Pakistani cities of Peshawar and Islamabad, other undercover operatives are coordinating the flow of money and matériel vital to rebel tribesmen battling Soviet invasion troops across the border in Afghanistan. The agency also supplies secret aid to friendly forces in Chad, Ethiopia, Angola and the Sudan—and has launched the massive campaign of espionage, air strikes, propaganda and other support for a now notorious "secret war" against the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Clearly, the cloaks and daggers have come out of cold storage at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. For better or worse, the Company is back in the business of covert action—with a global scope and an intensity of resources unmatched since its heyday 20 years ago.

Under the most unlikely director of central intelligence in the agency's history—a mumbling, often maddening tax lawyer and businessman named William J. Casey (page 40)—the CIA has found its ranks expanded, redirected and re-energized for covert confrontation with hostile forces around the world. Casey also has streamlined basic analysis and reporting functions, helped swaddle the agency in a cocoon of controversial new secrecy orders and moved it forcefully into two areas of stepped-up national concern: the fight to keep tons of deadly drugs from coming into the United States each year and the battle to keep scores of critical high-tech advances from being pirated out. Casey's ability to get things done stems in large part from his close and frequent contact with the president (at least two meetings each week, plus frequent phone conversations) and with fellow members of the cabinet (Casey is the first DCI with cabinet rank).

'Mushrooms': Still, the increase in covert action has raised old questions about the wisdom, propriety and effectiveness of American intelligence activities. Critics on and off Capitol Hill say Casey shows an old cold warrior's insensitivity to the potential embarrassment and diplomatic danger that secret missions always pose—and a high-handed disregard for the role of congressional oversight in this most sensitive area. "We are like mushrooms," says California's Democratic Rep. Norman Mineta of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. "They keep us in the dark and feed us a lot of manure."

The most dramatic showdown so far came this past summer when the House Intelligence Committee voted to cut off all funds for further covert support of the anti-Sandinist contra rebels in Nicaragua—a largely symbolic act, since the Senate never concurred. The national debate will flare again in the next few weeks as Congress begins to consider the nation's 1984 intelligence budget, which is reported to have grown at a rate of 17 percent annually for the past three years, faster even than Pentagon spending, to regain the level it held before big cutbacks began back in 1973. The prospects for making any substantial cuts in the face of new Soviet aggressiveness—both the shootdown of a Korean Air Lines jetliner and Moscow's hostile rejection of the latest U.S. arms-control proposals (page 26)—"are not promising," concedes committee chairman Edward Boland of Massa-

Wally McNamee—Newsweek

THE DCI AT LANGLEY: A covert clientele



John Hoagland—Gamma-Liaison

NICARAGUA: Anti-Sandinista contras

events vital to our national security interests, a capability which only the United States among major powers has denied itself," it proclaimed, in pointed reference to the decimation of CIA undercover ranks under President Jimmy Carter and CIA Director Stansfield Turner (operatives were pared down to perhaps 300 from a high in the early 1960s).

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41 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW Y

FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PROGRAM NEWS

STATION CNN-TV AND THE CABLE NEWS NETWORK

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NEWSCASTER: The C.I.A. deals in secrecy. That's its business. Reporters, it follows, have a tough time finding out what's going on inside C.I.A. headquarters. But intelligence expert David Wise has learned of some personnel moves not widely publicized elsewhere. In his commentary tonight, Wise suggests what implications those moves could have.

DAVID WISE: Covering a secret intelligence agency is a little like covering the Kremlin. They don't talk much about what happens inside the walls. So, reporters have to draw conclusions from little things, like who shows up at public appearnces, or what shifts in personnel really mean.

In the same spirit, it's valuable to explore some quiet shakeups that have occurred inside the C.I.A. Little or nothing has been said publicly about these changes, but word has a way of seeping out to those who watch the walls.

In the first change, C.I.A. Director William Casey has tapped two former clandestine operatives to handle the agency's dealings with Congress and the press. J. William Doswell, a former Richmond public relations man who headed Casey's Congressional and press relations, has left C.I.A. Casey split the job in two. He named Clair George, until now the second-highest clandestine operator in the agency, to handle Congress. He put George Lauder, another former spook, in charge of public affairs.

C.I.A. hands deny that the agency's desire to shore up Congressional and public support for its covert operation in Nicaragua was behind these moves.

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON POST
25 July 1983

U.S. Envoys Hint At Possible Latin Naval Quarantine

By George Lardner Jr. and Fred Hiatt
Washington Post Staff Writers

U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua Anthony Cecil Eden Quainton yesterday refused to rule out the possibility of a naval quarantine aimed at reducing the "substantial" flow of arms and supplies to guerrillas in El Salvador.

His stance followed by a day U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick's suggestion that a demonstration of U.S. ability to interdict arms shipments on the high seas might be salutary.

Also yesterday, a top Pentagon official who requested anonymity said that the United States is "playing a little cat-and-mouse game" with the Nicaraguan government, and that a quarantine in the near future is "most unlikely."

Another top-ranking Pentagon official said yesterday that "the time is going to come" when a quarantine would begin if Nicaragua does not slow what the United States claims is a massive military buildup. However, he said there is no timetable for escalating planned U.S. naval maneuvers into a quarantine.

Appearing on "This Week With David Brinkley" (ABC, WJLA), Quainton was pressed to spell out U.S. goals in Nicaragua.

"Our policy," he said, "is not to topple the Sandinista government. Our policy is to try and modify its behavior in some substantial ways which are consistent with our interests and our vital security concerns throughout Central America."

Quainton said the United States wants to "get the Sandinistas to go back to the original goals of their revolution," which the ambassador said included "democracy . . . , a mixed economy and a truly nonaligned foreign policy."

In an interview Saturday on Cable News Network, Kirkpatrick said she thought it would be "useful to remind [the Nicaraguans] that they do not have a monopoly of force in the region."

"Are we showing them that the United States could . . . blockade Nicaragua?" Kirkpatrick was asked.

"Maybe," she replied. "Maybe we'll remind them of that. Maybe we're also doing something relevant to interdicting arms because they use—they do a lot of exporting arms into El Salvador by way of that Pacific corridor along the coast."

The blunt hints on a series of weekend television interviews were matched by growing expressions of alarm from several congressional Democrats. They protested that sending troops to Honduras for joint military exercises and stationing U.S. battleships, carriers and jet fighters off Nicaragua's coasts could violate the War Powers Act.

The Democrats—Sens. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (N.Y.) and Christopher J. Dodd (Conn.) and Rep. Michael D. Barnes (Md.)—also were critical of a pending Pentagon request to more than double the number of U.S. military advisers in El Salvador from its longstanding but unofficial lid of 55 to 125.

Pentagon officials yesterday confirmed that Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger sent that recommendation to the White House last week. On Saturday, a White House spokesman said that such a request is not pending before President Reagan.

Reagan was asked by reporters upon his return yesterday to the White House from Camp David, "What about more advisers for El Salvador?" Waving off questions, he replied, "Not today."

One top Pentagon official yesterday said he believes that a quarantine is "most unlikely" in the near future. He said officials are leaving the possibility open for a reason.

"We're playing a little cat-and-mouse game with them, putting a little squeeze on, making them wonder what's going to happen next," the official said. "Ultimately, the idea is to convince them that allowing the El Salvador guerrillas to use Nicaragua for their headquarters for revolution is not a good idea if they want to keep their own damn revolution."

However, U.S. intelligence officials have concluded that the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua faces little danger of being toppled without a much greater exercise of force, several sources indicated.

The latest National Intelligence Estimate on the troubled region, a composite study reflecting the views of the U.S. intelligence agencies, reportedly was completed June 30.

"It was interesting," one source said, "for the scenario it played out about where do you go from here. There are no good choices down the road."

Another source described it as blunt and confirmed that it had no dissenting footnotes.

Moynihan, who is vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Barnes, who is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Western Hemisphere affairs, yesterday expressed similar conclusions, but without naming administration documents they had in mind.

In his appearance on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WDVM), Moynihan contended that the United States ought to get tough with the Soviet Union instead of fumbling around in Central America. He advocated an ulti-

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ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 1
BOSTON GLOBE
20 July 1983

House, in secret, reportedly hears covert action criticism

By David Rogers
Globe Staff

WASHINGTON – The House, beginning debate on a resolution to cut off covert military aid to Nicaraguan insurgents, went into a rare closed-door session yesterday in which opponents of the Administration's policy cited a recently completed CIA study criticizing the effectiveness of the operation, sources said.

The National Intelligence Estimate, dated June 30, is one of the most detailed, high-level analyses yet within the intelligence community, and the critical tone of the classified document is seriously damaging to the Administration's case, the sources said.

The four-hour closed-door meeting yesterday marked only the third time in more than a century that the House has gone into secret session, and the resolution is an unprecedented challenge to President Ronald Reagan's policy in Central America.

No votes on the resolution are expected until next week, but there appears to be increasing unity in the Democratic leadership behind the resolution to cut off aid, which is sponsored by Rep. Edward P. Boland (D-Mass.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and Rep. Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

"When it comes down to it, I will be with Boland-Zablocki," said Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-Texas). After participating in private talks with the Administration over the past month, Wright said there is a "remote" chance that a compromise can be reached before the House vote.

"It is really a question of what we want to be as a country," said Wright in one of his sharpest criticisms yet of the covert aid. "Do we want to be sneaky country or a straightforward country. . . . We ought to tell the truth."

A united party leadership will strengthen Boland's hand on the floor, but the Springfield Democrat is faced with what appears to be strong Republican opposition and the risk of major defections from conservative Southern delegations such as Florida's. "It looks like a close call, really," said Boland.

While most of yesterday's four-hour meeting was intended as a classified briefing by the intelligence committee for members, some of the speakers drew applause, reflecting the continued partisanship seen earlier in committee votes.

"The applause was partisan," said a liberal Democrat later. "I guess it was predictable but it's not good."

From the outset of the covert operation – in the first year of the Administration – leading members of the Intelligence Committee have questioned the operation. As the insurgent force has grown, so has the controversy surrounding it. As part of a classified annex to the 1983 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress attached language last year to prohibit any aid for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista regime. The same restriction was made law in December as an amendment to an appropriations bill.

Though the Administration has said the operation is within the law, the insurgents have made no secret of their hope to overthrow the government, and Reagan himself has referred to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas based in Nicaragua and neighboring Honduras as "freedom fighters."

"I have no doubt in my mind that that amendment has been violated," said Boland recently. He has criticized the effectiveness of the operation in meeting its stated goal of interdicting arms shipments from Nicaragua to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador.

Rep. Bill Young (R-Fla.), a member of the Intelligence Committee, said there is "hard" evidence that these shipments have been lessened. But according to sources, the National Intelligence Estimate report reflected a consensus within intelligence branches like the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency seriously challenging the program's effectiveness.

"It has some very, very strong stuff," said one source. It reportedly provided the framework for a strong attack by Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), a member of the Intelligence and Foreign Affairs committees, who took the lead with Boland in supporting the resolution.

Young represented the opposition on the GOP side with Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Though attendance dwindled after the first two hours, members said that close to two-thirds of the House was present to hear the opening remarks.

Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-Ill.) dismissed reports last week that the CIA is preparing for a force between 12,000 and 15,000, but yesterday an aide acknowledged that the numbers had "credibility."

WASHINGTON QUARTERLY
SUMMER 1983

Angelo Codevilla is a professional staff member with the Senate Intelligence Committee. Previously, he was a foreign service officer and a fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Dr. Codevilla has written widely on European politics and in the field of intelligence and military policy.

Angelo Codevilla

By focusing so exclusively on rules and standards of operations, the intelligence debate of the mid-1970s did answer the fundamental question of what the United States expects of its intelligence services or what they are to accomplish in order to meet challenges of the 1980s.

The Substance and the Rules

Since the early 1970s, this country's intelligence agencies have been asking, "What does the country expect of us?" That question had not arisen in the postwar period because the American political system had left the agencies to the total discretion of those appointed to lead them. In the early 1970s, factional conflict among those leaders spilled over into a national debate about what America's practitioners of intelligence ought to have foremost in mind. That debate continues.

Recently, Admiral Stansfield Turner, President Carter's Director of Central Intelligence, and his former special assistant, George Thibault, published an attempt both to answer that question and to indict the Reagan administration's handling of intelligence. The author's answer seems to be that the American people expect their intelligence agencies to be as innocuous as possible. They charge that the Reagan administration is undermining the agencies by loosening too many restrictions. The authors thus contend that for our civil liberties' sake, and for the sake of the agencies' own standing in the country, the agencies ought to concentrate on formulating for themselves the right kinds of rules and restrictions. However, one would not suspect from Turner and Thibault's article, that the rules by which intelligence officers live ought to flow from the intelligence profession's substantive requirements.

Nevertheless, in intelligence as in other areas of government, the American people rightly want their employees to accomplish the functions for which they are paid. This author will argue that Stansfield Turner is

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WASHINGTON POST
29 MAY 1983

STAT

Jack Anderson

War— With Butter

President Reagan and the allied leaders meeting in Williamsburg have an unparalleled opportunity waiting to be grasped. If they play their cards right, they can so cripple the Soviet Union economically that the Kremlin will have no choice but to cut back on its military spending.

One serious contributing factor in the Soviet economic mess is the huge percentage of the country's gross national product eaten up in the arms race. The Kremlin has reached the limits of its guns-and-butter balancing act.

The hawks in the Reagan administration hope to push the Russians beyond their economic capabilities by forcing them either to spend billions in response to our new weapons systems or to cry uncle and come to the negotiating table for serious disarmament talks.

How much better it would be all around to flip the other side of the coin and force the Kremlin to disarm by driving it to the wall economically. The president might even consider unleashing the CIA for a little covert action—on the economic front.

All it would take, really, is seeing to it that world oil prices stay down—or fall even lower. Aside from gold—whose price has also been depressed lately—the Soviet Union must sell oil for the hard currency it needs to buy grain and Western technology. The Russians are already undercutting OPEC prices in their desperation to keep the dollars and deutsche marks coming in.

The CIA allowed a hint of the Soviet's precarious economic situation—and its potential for exploitation by the West—to surface in a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE, pronounced "Snee"). It's classified secret, but a copy was obtained by my associate Dale Van Atta.

In the 1970s, the report notes, "rapid increase in Soviet imports from the West . . . was made possible by large windfall gains in export earnings due to the surge in oil prices and the willingness of Western countries to provide large credits, most of which were government guaranteed."

But today the Soviet Union "is encountering growing economic difficulties, which will make it more difficult to increase its imports from the West in the future."

But there is one exception: natural gas.

"Moscow's best hope of improving its strained hard-currency position in the longer run is to secure the cooperation of Western Europe in building large new pipelines for the delivery of additional natural gas in the late 1980s or in the 1990s," the CIA concludes. "With enormous gas reserves and a powerful incentive to earn more hard currency, Moscow is prepared to sell as much gas as the West Europeans will accept."

The inevitable result? "Making Western military-related technology, subsidized credit and locked-in gas markets available helps the Soviet build military buildup," the CIA estimate warns.

On the other hand, the CIA explains, "shortfalls in Soviet hard currency earnings . . . would force further cuts in imports of machinery and equipment." The report adds: "Moscow fears that reductions in food imports would cause popular unrest. . . ."

In other words, selling the Russians grain doesn't help their military machine, it hurts it, by eating up precious hard currency that could otherwise go for guns.

Finally, the CIA points out, the combination of restricted Western technology exports and the Soviets' shortage of hard currency "would raise the cost of Soviet military modernization while at the same time weakening the industrial base for military production."

Unfortunately, American business interests — many of them multinational corporations more loyal to the dollar than to the United States— want to do business with the Soviets and abhor the idea of economic warfare.

Maybe Reagan will be able to resist these powerful forces. Maybe he'll be able to persuade the European leaders to go along with an economic squeeze on the Soviet Union instead of a costly military buildup.

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ON PAGE 3

PARADE MAGAZINE
WASHINGTON POST
13 MARCH 1983

WHY PRESIDENTS STUMBLE

By Jack Anderson

THE U.S. has eyes and ears all over the globe. Yet our Presidents often act like someone who is blind and deaf. They seldom seem to anticipate world events of momentous importance. They have been caught napping by revolutions, invasions and other developments of awesome consequence.

Why is the President invariably so late to act that he can only react? I can tell you that it's not from lack of sound information. He is served by professionals who spend their lives sifting fact from fantasy, truth from propaganda. They produce stunningly accurate assessments—which are routinely ignored by the White House. Consider a few examples of warnings that have gone unheeded:

• President Richard Nixon could have prevented the ruinous 40-fold jump in oil prices had he heeded the available warnings. The federal government, with all the agencies that watch over the oil industry, had an immense early-alert system.

• President Jimmy Carter could have spared the nation 444 days of humiliation if he had just paid attention to the State Department's Iranian experts. With startling prescience, they warned of the likelihood of an attack on the embassy and the seizure of hostages.

• President Carter could have stopped Fidel Castro from shipping Cuba's criminals and crazies to Florida, where they have aggravated the crime rate. The CIA submitted at least five advance warnings of Castro's intentions.

• President Carter might have dissuaded the Soviets from invading Afghanistan, thus preventing the breakdown of détente, if he had acted on advance information. He seemed to be the only one in high places who was surprised by the invasion.

• President Ronald Reagan might have been able to avert the Falkland Islands mess had he reacted promptly to intelligence reports that the Argentines would invade. Indeed, the Argentine generals had the false impression that the invasion would have his blessing.

• President Reagan could have dealt [illegible] ments that an Israeli invasion was "inevitable." Earlier, the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor also was forecast precisely.

In each of these disasters, a President had access to information that would have enabled him to take preventive actions, rather than blunder along. Maybe the correct intelligence never reached the President. Maybe it had been so twisted or toned down that it was easy to ignore. Yet in some cases, I had published the warnings long before events got out of control.

Of course, a President gets bad advice as well as good. Conflicting information comes in from various confidential sources available to him. The real pros among those who provide information have been able to forecast or anticipate events with far more reliability than any President has ever done. The problem is that the politicos around the President either don't know who the reliable experts are or prefer to ignore them.

How does crucial information get cut off at the pass? First, let's examine how a President reaches his decisions.

Though different Presidents have asked for intelligence in different forms, each has received what is known in the intelligence community as the PDB, or President's Daily Brief. The idea is to give a President the most sensitive information U.S. intelligence agencies have gathered in a document he can read in 15 minutes.

WASHINGTON TIMES
4 MARCH 1983

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11A

ARNOLD BEICHMAN

Does the CIA know what it's talking about?

"...The only experts on the Soviet Union are those who sit on the Politburo in Moscow. The rest of us have varying degrees of ignorance." Malcolm Toon, former U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

* * *

"Estimating is what you do when you do not know." Sherman Kent, former chief of the CIA National Intelligence Estimate.

* * *

A page-one story in yesterday's *New York Times* about the Central Intelligence Agency and the Soviet arms buildup could, if true, help make mincemeat of the Reagan administration's defense budget. Unnamed CIA specialists, according to the story, claim the Soviet military spending growth rate has been over-estimated for the last six years.

Instead of a 3-to-4 percent annual increase, corrected for inflation, the growth rate "may have been no more than 2 percent," the Times reported. It went on to say that estimating Soviet military spending "is an inexact art, based on incomplete information, subjective assumptions, and difficulties in translating Soviet ruble costs into dollar values."

The real story about CIA's analysis and estimates branch is that it has had a dismal track record estimating the growth of Soviet military power. It has systematically discounted Soviet military expenditures. CIA analysts also were wrong in their predictions about the stability of the shah of Iran's kingdom, right up to the shah's downfall.

I am no admirer of President Carter but he was surely correct when he sent off a handwritten memo to his top security advisers in 1978 which began: "I am not satisfied with the quality of political intelligence."

In an article in 1979, Robert Ellsworth and Kenneth Adelman described in *Foreign Policy* "staggering CIA errors, compounded over 15 years, in estimating Soviet forces and intentions and strategic weaponry and over-all military effort."

"Beginning in the 1960s," said the authors, "the CIA embarked upon a consistent underestimation of the Soviet ICBM buildup, missing the mark by a wide margin. Its estimates became progressively worse on the law side. In the mid-1970s, the intelligence community underestimated the scale and effectiveness of the Soviet's multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) program. Even more important Soviet warhead accuracies that have already been achieved — and that have equalled U.S. accuracies — had been estimated by American intelligience to be unobtainable by Moscow before the mid-1989s."

How could such mis-estimates have happened, not only under Democratic but also under Republican administrations, right up to the present Reagan presidency?

Ellwsworth and Adelman, who awaits a Senate vote on his nomination as Reagan's arms negotiator, said that the source of the problem lies "within the bowels of the intelligence bureaucracy itself."

American intelligence "has long been stultified by the domination of a clique," which has prevented the upgrading of the National Foreign Assessment Center. CIA Director William Casey has tried to do something about it by involving himself personally in the National Intelligence Estimates machine. But it has taken a long time to take even the first step.

The real bombshell which could destroy the CIA methodology for estimating Soviet military procurement expenditures has just gone off. It is a recently published book, *False Science: Understanding the Soviet Arms Buildup*, by Prof. Steven Rosefielde (Transaction Books, 1982) published under the auspices of the National Strategy Information Center.

The preface to Rosefielde's book is by Patrick Parker, who was deputy assistant secretary of Defense for intelligence a decade ago.

Parker says that during his government service, "I discovered that the CIA's estimates of Soviet weapon expenditures were implausibily low and failed to reflect the rapid quantitative and qualitiative improvements which we were seeing in Soviet weapons systems and technology."

Said Parker: "My own estimates, supported by those of most military intelligence organizations, indicated that the real value of Soviet weapons production was growing at roughly 10 percent per annum, while the agency put the figure variously between 2 and 4.5 percent per annum."

What Rosefielde has done in a brilliant technical and statistical analysis is to demostrate the inconsistencies in CIA estimates of Soviet production costs, inconsistencies which arise from a CIA methodology which "systematically understates technological growth and biases the agency's estimates downward."

Until President Reagan persuades the CIA to adopt his view of Soviet intentions towards the U.S. and the Free World, estimates of Soviet military spending will be subject to all kinds of anti-defense propaganda.

CIA optimism about Soviet intentions leads to one kind of interpretation, Reagan's pessimism or realism about Soviet intentions demands a different kind of interpretation about Soviet arms expenditures.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn recently wrote in *National Review* that "We would understand nothing about communism if we tried to comprehend it on the principles of human reason. The driving force of communism, as it was devised by Marx, is political power, power at any cost and without regard to human losses or a people's physical deterioration."

In estimating Soviet military expenditures, the CIA might be well advised to base its conclusions on what, perhaps, we might call Solzhenitsyn's Law.

Arnold Beichman, a Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution, is a founding member of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence.

E NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
January 1983

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By Philip Taubman

William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, sat at the end of the mahogany conference table in his office. Outside, the late afternoon sun played across the trees that ring the Central Intelligence Agency's headquarters in northern Virginia, filling the windows with a fresco of autumn colors. A short stack of documents, some stamped SECRET, rested at Mr. Casey's left elbow, and a yellow legal pad on which he had penciled several notes was positioned to his right.

"The reason I am here is because I have a lot of relevant experience and a good track record," Mr. Casey said, alluding to comments that he was unqualified for the job and had been appointed only because he was Ronald Reagan's campaign manager. Mr. Casey, an imperious and proud man, had been fuming over the criticism for months, according to his friends, and now, in his first comprehensive interview since taking office, he wanted to set the record straight.

He flipped through the papers and extracted a yellowing clipping from The New York Times that extolled his record as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973. Next, he provided several pages copied from a book about Allied intelligence operations during World War II; he had underlined a glowing assessment of his contribution to the Office of Strategic Services. The final clipping was a story that appeared in The Washington Star in the summer of 1980, describing Mr. Casey's role as Reagan campaign director. The headline: "Casey, the Take-Charge Boss."

It was an oddly defensive performance for a man who, according to classified budget figures provided by Government officials, is overseeing the biggest peacetime buildup in the American intelligence community since the early 1950's. Because intelligence expenditures are secret, it is not widely known that at a moment when the Reagan Administration is forcing most Government agencies to retrench, the C.I.A. and its fellow intelligence organizations are enjoying boom times. Even the military services, which have been favored with substantial budget increases, lag well behind in terms of percentage growth, although military-run intelligence agencies are growing almost as quickly as the C.I.A. Spending figures for intelligence agencies, including the C.I.A., are hidden within the Defense Department's budget. With a budget increase for the 1983 fiscal year of 25 percent, not allowing for inflation, compared with 18 percent for the Defense Department, the C.I.A. is the fastest growing major agency in the Federal Government, according to Administration budget officials.

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intentions, integrity
and capabilities.

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A-16

NEW YORK TIMES
9 JANUARY 1983

C.I.A. Says Soviet Can Almost Do Without Imports

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 — The Central Intelligence Agency, in a study of the Soviet economy, concludes that the Soviet Union's ability to live without imports is much greater than that of most, possibly all, other industrialized economies.

The report, delivered to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on Dec. 1 by Henry Rowen, chairman of the C.I.A.'s National Intelligence Council, seems to support the argument that American trade embargoes against the Soviet Union have only limited effect.

The Reagan Administration has sought to tighten Western controls on trade to the Soviet Union to bring political pressure on Moscow, a policy often at odds with European allies and with some American businessmen.

Capital, Technology and Food

The C.I.A. report said that for the last decade the Soviet Union has used trade with the West to help modernize its economy and make it more efficient. It said that the Russians had relied on imports of capital and technology to increase or maintain production of some raw materials and that food imports had "become critical" to maintaining a quality diet.

Imports of grain and other agricultural products, it said, meant primarily to prevent a decline in meat consumption, cost the Russians $12 billion in 1981, or 40 percent of their hard-currency purchases that year.

But Mr. Rowen said that "despite the large-scale expansion in agricultural imports, the Soviet Union remains basically self-sufficient with respect to food."

He said the average Soviet citizen consumes about 3,300 calories a day, as against 3,520 for an American. The report showed that the Soviet diet consists of far more grain and potatoes than the American diet, but less fish and meat and less sugar. And Mr. Rowen said that grain production in the Soviet Union "is more than sufficient to meet consumer demand for bread and other cereal products."

The report said trade with the West amounted to only 5 percent of the Soviet gross national product. But it seemed to agree with some Administration policy makers when it said the Russians would have to import 15 million to 20 million tons of steel pipe in the next seven years to build the pipelines it has planned, and will need "sophisticated" exploration equipment for its oil and natural gas fields. The Administration has tried to block those exports in particular, provoking feuds with Western governments that have contracted to provide the equipment.

An Ability 'to Remain Viable'

Imports from the West, Mr. Rowen said, "can play an important role in relieving critical shortages, spurring technological progress and generally improving Soviet economic peformance." But he added that "the ability of the Soviet economy to remain viable in the absence of imports is much greater than that of most, possibly all, other industrialized economies."

"Consequently," he concluded, "the susceptibiity of the Soviet Union to economic leverage tends to be limited."

The Soviet Union has always put great emphasis on self-sufficiency. This dates from the earliest days after the 1917 revolution, when most foreign countries did not recognize the Soviet regime, and it continued as a result of the isolation the country experienced in World War II.

Mr. Rowen's report was prepared at the request of Senator William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin. The Senator, who is vice chairman of the subcommittee on international trade, finance and security economics, had asked for "a balanced assessment" of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet economy.

This was the second C.I.A. report in a month to point out strengths in the Soviet economy.

Imports

Mr. Rowen said the C.I.A. agreed with Mr. Proxmire that "confusion surrounding the Soviet economy abounds."

"Western observers have tended to describe Soviet economic performance as 'poor' or 'deteriorating' at a time when Soviet defense spending continues to rise, overall Soviet gross national product in real terms continues to increase and Soviet G.N.P. is second in size only to that of the United States," he said, noting the apparent contradicitons.

As a result of recent declines in the rate of growth, the gap between performance and expectations, and the lack of economic efficiency, "the record compiled by the Soviet economy in recent years has indeed been poor," he said.

"Results that are unsatisfactory when measured by this yardstick, however, do not mean that the Soviet economy is losing its viability as well as its dynamism," the C.I.A. official said.

"In fact, we do not consider an economic 'collapse' — a sudden and sustained decline in G.N.P. — even a remote possibility," he said.

The C.I.A. projects, he said, that Soviet economic growth "will remain slow but positive," averaging 1 to 2 percent "for the foreseeable future," although per capita consumption might level off or drop slightly.

Energy Production Rises

Mr. Rowen said that natural gas production had continued to increase at a rapid rate, 8 percent in 1982, and that energy as a whole was increasing, with oil up by about 1 percent and coal 2 percent in the past year. The Russians have also improved their trade with the West, cutting their deficit from $4 billion in 1981 to $2 billion in 1982.

The Soviet gross national product in 1982 was estimated at $1.6 trillion, or $6,000 per capita, roughly 55 percent of the American gross national product.

The C.I.A. estimated Soviet gold reserves at 200 million troy ounces, giving it 35 percent of the world total. Production in 1981 was estimated at 325 tons and its stock at about 1,900 tons, worth over $25 billion at current prices.

The report said a major weakness in the economy was the declining growth of the work force, with only 9 million expected to join in this decade as against 19 million in the 1970's.

Agriculture remains the weakest link. Grain production achieved a record high of 237 million tons in 1978 but has not reached 190 million tons since then. The report also highlighted problems in poor administration, bottlenecks in industry, an overworked railroad system and depletion of many mineral reserves.

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ON PAGE 1

LOS ANGELES TIMES
3 JANUARY 1983

Rebuilding U.S. Intelligence

Casey Shapes Up CIA, Survives as Top Spy

By ROBERT C. TOTH, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—Last summer, several months before Leonid I. Brezhnev died, the Central Intelligence Agency produced a study of Kremlin leadership politics almost 40 pages long. It predicted that a cluster of Soviet officials would succeed Brezhnev, not a strong individual leader.

After reviewing the top-secret report before it was forwarded to the White House, Central Intelligence Director William J. Casey concluded that President Reagan would never wade through it all. So, in a brief covering letter couched in race-track parlance, he boldly predicted which Kremlin contenders would win, place and show.

Kirilenko peaked too soon, Casey told Reagan, and Chernenko faded in the stretch. Andropov is in the lead, perhaps challenged by Ustinov, with Gorbachev the dark horse and a future comer.

On the Money

As it turned out, Casey was right on the money: it was Yuri V. Andropov, not a committee, that succeeded Brezhnev as general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. But the episode is less important as a measure of Casey the Kremlinologist than as a measure of Casey the CIA director and of the methods Casey has developed to run the multibillion-dollar-a-year U.S. intelligence community.

Casey—a scrappy, sometimes arrogant, bulky 69-year-old who retains a trace of his native New York accent—has surprised admirers and critics alike by surviving as the nation's top spy through the first two years of Reagan's tenure. Even more, he has managed to set and maintain a careful but significant pace for rebuilding the nation's intelligence capabilities.

Casey's midterm report card shows that:

—The country has experienced no known "intelligence failures" or "intelligence abuses" during his two years.

—Intelligence budgets, up 20%, have grown even faster than the Pentagon budget.

—Output of analytic studies has jumped a remarkable fivefold over the last years of the Jimmy Carter Administration.

—Covert activities have dropped somewhat in number, but individual operations have grown in size.

—And "intelligence guidelines," which are the do's and don'ts of the community, have been shortened drastically.

Casey's former deputy, retired Adm. Bobby R. Inman, believes Casey will be rated "very high" as a director of intelligence for "totally overhauling the process of making national intelligence estimates—sharply increasing their number, making them shorter and more focused on problems that policy-makers grapple with—plus winning the President's support for rebuilding the intelligence community."

'Substantially Better'

"Under Bill, things are substantially better than the public image suggests," Inman said in an interview.

Ray S. Cline, a former senior CIA official, has praised Casey for seeking to balance, with equally high priority, the need to provide accurate, in-depth analysis with the need to make it timely and useful in helping to answer the hard policy questions of government.

On the other hand, liberal critics such as Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, believe Casey has "moved the CIA backward" in restricting the release of information and in resurrecting its covert action capabilities. And some conservatives, who asked not to be identified, complain that Casey has not shaken up the intelligence community as the Republican Party platform of 1980 promised a Reagan Administration would do.

Be that as it may, Casey—a veteran of American intelligence operations during World War II, a multimillionaire with an entrepreneurial bent and a former senior federal official in financial and economic areas—has no intention of leaving the job.

"I'm enjoying it," he said in an interview, "and we're making progress. I intend to stick with it."

Twelve months ago, it was far from obvious that Casey was either enjoying the job or was going to keep it long.

At that point, he was reeling from his early and almost disastrous decision to hire a fellow Reagan campaign worker, Max Hugel, as chief of the CIA's clandestine operations—a "very conspicuous mistake on my part," Casey later called it. Hugel quit after private financial irregularities were alleged in the press, but three senior Republican senators called for Casey's resignation.

The Senate Intelligence Committee re-examined Casey's financial background, too. It grudgingly con-

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RADIO TV REPORTS, IN

4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Jack Anderson Confidential STATION WJLA TV Syndicated

DATE December 18, 1982 7:30 PM CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT The CIA and Banking

JACK ANDERSON: This is Wall Street, the center of the international banking system, a system on the edge of a crisis so severe that the Central Intelligence Agency is preparing drastic measures. Something must be done to avert the breakdown of the Free World's monetary system.

The crisis developed after $600 billion in risky loans were made to 40 underdeveloped countries, countries too poor to pay them back.

Richard Dale is a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington. The CIA came to see him because he's one of the foremost authorities on international banks. He spoke with my colleague Terry Repack.

RICHARD DALE: Well, as I understand it, the CIA takes the view that the momentum towards collapse is already far advanced and that the political will to anticipate the problems that may arise is simply not there. And I think they take a rather skeptical view about the whole problem; namely, that governments will not act until, in a sense, it's too late. And that is one particular interpretation.

So I think they say, right, we will not solve this problem ahead of events; we will have a global bank holiday before anything is done, and that will be the stimulus to get governments to act and cooperate to pull us out of this.

But, of course, the CIA's job, if I may say so, is to look at the downside risks. They're always looking for the worst case. That is the nature of their job. So that was their focus.

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PLAYBOY MAGAZINE
December 1982



WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS

article

By ROBERT SCHEER

A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE has occurred in the U.S. since the election of 1980. Our leaders during the time of Ronald Reagan have come to plan for waging and winning a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, and they are obsessed with a strategy of confrontation—including nuclear brinkmanship—that aims to force the Soviets to shrink their empire and fundamentally alter their society.

That obsession has gone beyond the discussion stage. President Reagan had been in office less than a year when he approved a secret plan to

how the u.s. government has come under the control of men who believe that nuclear war can be waged and won

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NEWSWEEK
22 NOVEMBER 1982

PERISCOPE

The FBI Investigates the Freeze Movement

President Reagan's charge at his press conference last week that Soviet agents are involved in the domestic nuclear-freeze movement was based on a secret Federal Bureau of Investigation study. The White House has identified the Reader's Digest and State Department reports as Reagan's sources. In fact, after reading one Reader's Digest article outlining a Soviet link with the freeze movement, the president asked the FBI to confirm the charge. The bureau reported that there is hard evidence that Moscow has tried to infiltrate and exploit the U.S. peace movement. But according to one bureau source, the report does not contend that the Kremlin inspired the movement or controls its leaders. FBI counterintelligence chief Edward O'Malley's recent testimony on the subject before the House intelligence committee is under review for possible declassification. Freeze advocates, including Republican Sen. Mark Hatfield of Oregon, have challenged Reagan's accusation. Similar charges were made repeatedly against the anti-Vietnam War movement; no significant Soviet involvement was ever proved.

The PLO's Missing Members

Israeli intelligence says it has discovered that the camps in Tunisia that accommodated 1,000 PLO guerrillas after their evacuation from Beirut are now empty. Israeli officials suspect that the fighters have made their way back to the Mideast—either to Syria or Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. American Mideast specialists say that Syria has recently tightened its border watch to prevent PLO fighters from sneaking back into Lebanon; they speculate that Syria is fearful of provoking an Israeli attack.

How to Stop Soviet High-Tech Spies

Washington's campaign to stop the Soviet theft of technology may handicap American businessmen more than the secret-snatchers, according to a Senate study to be released this week. The Senate's Permanent Investigating Subcommittee reports that the Commerce Department tries to protect so many high-tech commodities that its limited resources are spread too widely to be effective. The proposed solution: having the intelligence agencies work harder to pinpoint the particular innovations that Moscow covets most; security measures could then be concentrated on those areas. The panel also recommends that customs officers be given broader powers and that the federal wiretap law be expanded to permit easier surveillance of suspected poachers.

The CIA: In From the Cold

The Central Intelligence Agency has boosted its influence to new levels during the Reagan administration, by at least one measure. Under Director William Casey, the CIA has sharply increased its production of National Intelligence Estimates. Based on both public and secret information, the NIE's address such topics as Soviet nuclear strength, international terrorism and world oil reserves. The reports are designed to be used by policymaking officials, but they are often ignored. Nonetheless, the number of NIE's can be a rough indicator of the CIA's standing. When Jimmy Carter was president the CIA turned out about 12 a year. That number more than tripled during the first year of the Reagan administration and will probably reach 60 in 1982.

China Arms Iraq

China has set up a stall in the Middle East arms bazaar. United States intelligence officials say that China is now a major source of military supplies for Iraq. According to a new report, Iraq buys one-quarter of all its weaponry from China; that accounts for half of China's arms-export total. Most Chinese weapons are based on Soviet models, which makes it easy for Iraq to integrate the Chinese equipment into its largely Soviet arsenal.

ERIC GELMAN with bureau reports

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THE WASHINGTON POST
14 NOVEMBER 1982

Vietnam Anguish: Being Ordered to Lie

A Mississippi colonel explains how it feels to cover up, and to tell the truth

Gains Hawkins is the administrator of the Dugan Memorial Nursing Home in West Point, Miss., and chairman of the Clay County Republican Party.

By Gains B. Hawkins

A FAMOUS LADY columnist who writes for The Washington Post called the other day and asked if I had any regrets about participating in the making of CBS' controversial documentary on the *mis-* or *un*counting of the enemy in Vietnam — the documentary that has led Gen. William C. Westmoreland to file a $120-million libel suit against CBS. In a state of mild shock at being called by a famous lady newspaper columnist, I could only mumble something about "Yes" and "No."

With all my wits intact I could have answered a bit more eloquently, "Yes, there is some anxiety — a concern that I will appear to be a fink or a rascal, or a sensation monger or worse; and some private annoyance that life in relatively quiet retirement in this little community of West Point on the black prairie of northeast Mississippi will never be the same again.

But, no, too, Miss Mary (I should have said), there is a compulsion here, a tardy realization that the tale must come out no matter what the personal pain or annoyance. In truth, the retelling is somewhat like the war itself, Miss Mary. It hurts, and it is larger than all of us.

When the deception began is not clear in my memory. Years have passed and memory can be like the smoked glass through which one is warned to look at an eclipse. Even when the deception was going on there was a wish not to remember, as if the not remembering would somehow belie the happening itself. But it began to happen sometime during the last three or four months of my 18-month tour of duty that ended in the early part of September 1967.

The tour began in February 1966 as a reunion and a challenge. The reunion was with then-Brig. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, the chief intelligence officer of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. I had served under the general before when he held a similar post at the Army's Pacific headquarters in Hawaii. There, under the tutelage of Gen. McChristian, this career Army intelligence officer had first discovered the intellectual challenge of an area of military intelligence work called "order of battle."

Order of battle intelligence, broadly speaking, is everything one must know about an ememy's military force. This knowledge comes from studying the units of that force; where exactly they are located; how many people are in them; what types and how much equipment and weaponry they possess; their organization or command structure; their supply system; their tactics; their state of training; their state of morale, or will to fight; their actual effectiveness in combat, and probably most important, the quality of their leadership, from commander-in-chief down to squad leaders. This is a slow, deliberate way to study a military force. It is also a technique we needed to use to try to understand the Vietnamese communists.

■ ■

During the quarter century I spent wearing the Army uniform, intelligence was my principal endeavor. Drafted in early 1942 out of a tiny teachers college in the Mississippi Delta to serve in The Big War, I was later commissioned a second lieutenant and did my thing in Europe as a very junior intelligence officer (where I served briefly with then-Col. McChristian).

Discharged as a captain in the Army Reserve in 1946, I returned to Delta State Teachers College to complete my degree, taught high school English and somehow managed to earn a master's degree in English at Ole Miss just in time to be drafted again for service in Korea.

The Army was good to me. It paid me well and held out the promise of security in retirement at a fairly youthful age. It taught me Japanese, sent me to Asia, then launched me permanently in the area of intelligence by sending me to Stanford University to concentrate on the countries of the Far East.

I held no pretensions of finding a place on the Army's fast track to a general's stars. I was happy as a duck on a pond doing the academic work of an intelligence analyst, and I appreciated the pay, which was much better than that of Mississippi school teachers. I had found my home in the Army, and I was proud of my home.

Vietnam was the ultimate test for professional intelligence officers. There field commanders could not draw circles around hilltops or towns and make them military objectives simply because they were important pieces of real estate. In Vietnam the critical problem was not real estate, but finding and destroying the enemy's military force. Intelligence officers had to find the enemy before the enemy could be confronted and destroyed.

And so it was that in early 1966, bored with a job as an intelligence personnel officer at Ft. Holabird in Baltimore, I had sent a note to Gen. McChristian in Saigon offering my services. A few weeks later I was saluting him at his desk inside the MACV compound.

Considering our previous relationship in Hawaii, I was not surprised when the general told me I would oversee the production of order of battle intelligence. In his words, I was "Mister Order of Battle." This was the challenge.

The title was reiterated again and again during the months I served him. And I have always believed there was a special motive for these persistent reminders by the general to his staff, to visitors and to everyone else up and down the line.

There were almost as many vociferous estimates of the enemy force in Vietnam as there were interested parties. But Gen. McChristian wasn't interested in journalists' guesses or field commanders' "gut feelings." He demanded a plodding, painstaking analysis of the bits and pieces. This was to be my responsibility.

■ ■

Keeping the books on the communist force was a complicated task because the force itself was Byzantine. There were the North Vietnamese Army units. There was the massive infiltration effort which provided additional regiments and individual

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THE ATLANTIC
November 1982

CHOOSING A STRATEGY FOR WORLD WAR III

BY THOMAS POWERS

IN THE YEARS SINCE 1945, DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC nuclear policy in the upper reaches of the American government has centered on a single overriding question—what to do "if deterrence fails." The phrase is characteristic of the rigid etiquette that governs official talk about nuclear weapons. It means war, and especially a big general war between the United States and the Soviet Union—war of the old-fashioned, all-out sort, in which even fear of The Bomb would take second place to the struggle. Officials have learned to be wary of talking in public about nuclear war. It just gets them in trouble. But in private they talk about war all the time. None of them wants such a war. In truth, none of them expects it—now or ever. But deterrence *could* fail. What do we do then?

For the general public, nuclear war means something like the end of the world—a single burst of destruction in which cities would be flicked off the face of the globe in a whirlwind of fire. That is not the way military men look at things. They may vaguely threaten to scrape Russia flat down to the primeval gravel, but that's mainly for show, to put the other side in a serious frame of mind. "When the balloon goes up," as they sometimes say, the time for threats is past. Then you have got to fight, not just kiss the kids good-bye and push the button. The general public may be content with the awful either/or, but the military instinctively rebels against the idea that the end of deterrence is the end of everything else.

When war comes, armies fight with the weapons at hand. Nuclear weapons are a prominent feature of the arsenals of both sides. How are they to be used? What should we point them at? How many should we fire in the opening salvo?

In the early days of the nuclear era, the bombs were so cumbersome, so hard to deliver, and above all so few that they were reserved for only the most dramatic targets. As a practical matter, that meant cities. In 1945, it meant Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the late 1940s, it meant Moscow and Leningrad. In the fall of 1948, for example, the United States had about 100 bombs, but the early bombs took two days to assemble by a team of twenty-four. We didn't have teams enough to assemble them all at once. Such bombs as we had were under the control of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was reluctant to turn them over to the Air Force in advance. The generals sometimes didn't even know how many bombs we *had*. Until 1948, the only airplanes that could deliver the bombs were specially modified B-29s, slow craft, vulnerable to attack en route, so limited in range that they had to be based in Europe. Military targets tend to be small, numerous, protected, hard to find and hit. For purely technical reasons, then, the first nuclear weapons were pointed at "strategic" targets, that is, targets the loss of which might affect the morale or the war-making potential of the enemy. The wars of the late 1940s, if they had taken place, would have lasted a few weeks, and would have consisted of devastating blows on Russian cities, ports, and industrial sites.

By the early 1950s, these problems had been solved. The AEC agreed to let the Strategic Air Command (SAC) keep bombs on its airfields. We had a fleet of new intercontinental bombers to deliver them. The bombs themselves had a much longer "shelf life" and didn't have to be assembled from scratch immediately before use. Above all, they were more numerous. We had entered, in the phrase used by professional strategists, "the era of nuclear plenty"—in which we still find ourselves. It is also the era of choice. When you've got only three weapons, as we had in July of 1945, it's not hard to decide what to point them at. When you've got thousands, as we have now, and when you can hit anything in a known location on the surface of the earth, as we can now, and, above all, when the Soviets can retaliate in kind, then you have to think hard before deciding what to hit and when to hit it. The decisions imply the course of the war we are likely to see "if deterrence fails."

When Jimmy Carter entered the White House, in January of 1977, he probably would have done away with nuclear weapons altogether given the choice. This may sound like the inevitable preference of any sane man, but none of Carter's predecessors had shared it. Nuclear weapons solve certain kinds of problems; in particular, they are cheaper than men and tanks. Carter's predecessors had all chosen nuclear weapons rather than press Congress or NATO allies to come up with money for men and tanks enough to face the Russians on what is called the "central front" in Europe. Eisenhower's first secretary of defense, Charles Wilson, once said, "We can't afford to fight limited wars. We can only afford to fight a big war, and if there is one, that is the kind it will be." But Carter was a stranger to Washington in 1977; he had not been over and over this

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 October 1982

AMERICA'S SPIES FOUND IT TOUGH

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

"The Soviets," says the bespectacled round-faced man who looks more like a stockbroker than America's top spy, "got virtually a free ride on all of our research and development."

He's talking about secret agents — from the Soviet bloc. And, he says, they plundered America's technological secrets because our own spies weren't watching them.

The speaker is William C. Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and coordinator for all intelligence gathering for the United States. He indicates that things are likely to become much tougher for the Soviets in the world's intensifying spy wars if he has his way.

After years of controversy and cutback, America's spies are finally getting a break.

The Reagan administration is putting more money and manpower into the business of spying, and into countering Soviet bloc spies both at home and abroad.

Exact figures on recruiting for the spy trade and on the money spent on the intelligence agencies are kept secret. But it is clear that after years of decline, spying is now a "growth industry." One of the few government institutions which is hiring new employees in this time of recession is the US Central Intelligence Agency.

In the view of some experts, the effort comes none too soon.

"We've got to strengthen HUMINT," says one of the experts who has access to sensitive intelligence reports, speaking in the peculiar argot of professional spies. He means "human intelligence gathering".

"Our SIGINT (signal intellegence) and pboto intelligence are among the best, but in HUMINT . . . we're lucky if we're among the top 10."

The Reagan administration took power some 21 months ago determined to strengthen intelligence collection, analysis, and operations, and the dozen agencies that make up what is known in the trade as the "intelligence community" are benefiting.

Take the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example. According to one high-ranking intelligence officer, FBI money and manpower was once stretched to the point where the bureau had to stop surveillance of certain known Soviet spies, who, together with European surrogate spies, were operating in an increasingly sophisticated and aggressive manner in this country.

The FBI has become increasingly concerned over the loss to Soviet spies of American high technology information. Although precise figures are closely guarded, it is now clear that the FBI is getting more in way of resources to conduct a more aggressive counterespionage program.

Mr. Casey argues, however, that the intelligence agencies are not so much increasing their budgets as they are building back to where they were before they got cut during the 1970s.

In a more than hour-long interview with the Monitor, Casey said that because of these cuts in money and manpower, intelligence reporting on an increasingly turbulent third world and on a variety of other problems had been drastically reduced. According to Casey, major intelligence analyses, known as "national estimates" often failed to cover third world developments.



US intelligence: focus on the Kremlin, third world countries

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CROSS INDEX CIA 3.03 CIA ESTIMATES (NIE)

For additional information on the above, see:

FILES	DATES
CIA 2.01 NIO - NIE	

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AVIATION WEEKLY & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 4 OCTOBER 1982

U. S. Vigilance Over Soviet Space Activities Increased

Washington—The Central Intelligence Agency and other U. S. intelligence organizations are increasing their vigilance of Soviet space program capabilities at the urging of the new U. S. Air Force Space Command.

"We will push for more attention and understanding for operational space intelligence so it gets at least the same treatment as the missile, air, ground and naval threats," Gen. James V. Hartinger, who heads both Space Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, said.

Hartinger said he has discussed this issue with CIA director William Casey. Casey "agrees that the operational space intelligence area should be a national intelligence estimate placed in a high-priority position—now it's going to be," he said.

Soviet Launch Rate

Continuing high Soviet military space launch rate coupled with new Soviet developments that will increase Russian capabilities during the 1980s has recently prompted Defense and other officials to highlight the threat posed by this Soviet development push.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration deputy administrator Hans M. Mark told an Air Force Assn. symposium here that he wanted to comment on the Soviet military space buildup at the recent United Nations Conference on Space held in Vienna (AW&ST Aug. 16, p. 16).

He was overruled by the State Dept., he said, and in Vienna the U. S. was criticized for space militarization, not the Soviet Union.

Under secretary of Defense for research and engineering, Richard D. DeLauer, told a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee that the Soviet Salyut space station program "engages in military activities and may be the forerunner of a weapons platform."

Under secretary of the Air Force, Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., told the Air Force Assn. symposium that Defense Dept. is concerned with Soviet development of a Saturn 5-class launcher capable of placing an approximate 300,000 lb. payload into low Earth orbit.

In addition to space station launch, Aldridge said Defense Dept. is concerned this new heavy booster could be used to launch large high-energy laser weapons systems. "We will be watching this closely and make sure we have the proper response," Aldridge said.

"We are going to provide the operational pull to go with the technology push that has dominated space flight since its inception," Hartinger said. "We are going to develop space doctrine and strategy. We are going to strengthen the weakest link in space systems development—the statement of operational need procedure."

The new command plans to insure that U. S. military space assets participate routinely in military exercises like those conducted by other elements of the military services.

"We have been exercising everything else but not space. We are going to now," Hartinger said.

Hartinger cited milestones toward bringing Space Command to full capability:

- Activation—The command was activated Sept. 1. This will be followed Jan. 1 by activation of the 1st Space Wing at Peterson AFB, Colo., near NORAD headquarters at Colorado Springs. Space Command's Communications Div. will be activated also on Jan. 1, and on Apr. 1, Space Command will take over Peterson AFB from Strategic Air Command.

The USAF Space Div. that remains under Systems Command was to activate the Space Technology Center at Kirtland AFB, N. M., on Oct. 1. The Space Div. and technology center will be closely aligned with Space Command, although they will remain under Systems Command control.

Command Heads

While Hartinger heads both NORAD and Space Command, the head of Air Force Space Div., Lt. Gen. Richard C. Henry, is also vice commander of Space Command. This is designed to form close ties between developmental and operational Air Force space efforts.

- 1st Space Wing—The new organization will be responsible for world-wide space tracking and missile warning sensors that Space Command will be acquiring from Strategic Air Command.

The new wing will have 6,000 Air Force personnel and 2,000 contractor personnel spread between four primary bases at Peterson AFB, Colo.; Sondrestrom Air Base, Greenland; Thule Air Base, Greenland, and Clear AFB, Alaska. The northern bases have missile early warning sensor responsibility.

Lt. Gen. Henry, vice commander of Space Command, said at the symposium, "Every operational Defense spacecraft in orbit is either national in character or provides support to more than one service or agency.

"My point is that spacecraft are generally strategic in nature and our dependence on them is such that we should start thinking of their deployments as strategic issues."

He posed several questions for Space Command to answer:

- How vulnerable are we to spacecraft attrition by failure or combat?
- If a spacecraft should be lost during launch, how do we recover the lost capability?
- How do we address orbital selection? "We know some orbits are less vulnerable than others. Do we have an orbit strategy?"
- "If we define an orbital strategy that can absorb combat losses, do we have the supportive procurement and launch strategies?"

"Our mission in space is to deliver from on high to our operational forces the electronic bit stream, the written message, oral conversation, a picture or navigation situation wherever the forces need it, whenever they need it and with total certainty," Henry said.

"Space Command's job is to define the orbital strategy and force structure needed to make this come true," according to Henry. □

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
12 SEPTEMBER 1982

Military games

Scary leaks calculated to win weapons funding

By David Wood
Los Angeles Times Service

WASHINGTON — During a breakfast session with reporters recently, Gen. W. L. Creech, commander of the Tactical Air Command, unexpectedly disclosed that the Soviet Union had developed three new fighter planes that might out-perform the best fighters currently in the U.S. arsenal.

The result was alarming headlines in newspapers — and success for the Air Force with a time-honored Washington ploy: the calculated leak.

Earlier, the Air Force had asked Congress for $23 million in the fiscal 1983 budget to begin development of a new-generation fighter. Classified intelligence analyses of the new Soviet threat had been available to key members of Congress, but the request was in danger of falling victim to the pervasive budget-cutting mood on Capitol Hill.

Two weeks after Creech disclosed the previously secret assessment of the new Soviet aircraft, however, Congress voted to let the Air Force go ahead with research and development for the U.S. fighter.

The incident illustrates a bureaucratic maneuver common enough in the past but becoming increasingly prevalent since the Reagan administration took office: selective leaking of intelligence and other information to tilt decisions on important defense questions.

It is a trend that some military analysts fear may fritter away Pentagon credibility and help dissolve national support for building a stronger defense.

It always has been difficult, even under the best of circumstances, to assess accurately the threat posed by the Soviet Union or other potential adversaries and to shape the budget to meet such challenges. And the pressure from American military establishments always has been tremendous.

Indeed, President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, according to the Soviet leader's memoirs, glumly acknowledged during informal talks at Camp David 23 years ago that neither was able to resist the demands of generals who had intelligence reports about what the other side was believed to be doing.

Ironically, as U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis have become more sophisticated, the translation of threat assessment into budget reality has become more frantic.

Despite the Reagan administration's commitment to a five-year, $1.5 trillion increase in military spending, blossoming budget deficit projections have convinced Pentagon planners that they should get new weapons systems approved quickly, before congressional support for big defense budgets evaporates.

As the Air Force competes for funds with the Navy and the Army, defense analysts say, leaks have become more profligate.

"In the old days there were few leaks, and there was always a guy from the FBI in my office the following morning trying to find the leaker," says retired Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). "Hell, now it's gotten so rampant I don't think they bother with that anymore."

Briefings offered

Compounding the problem for Congress and the public is the government's penchant for stamping nearly all intelligence analyses "top secret." As a result, the editor of a respected military journal says, independent verification of leaks has become more difficult.

The Pentagon does offer classified briefings on such issues to members of Congress, but the sessions are not normally well attended. And the public has no access to such briefings, which could give better perspective to issues that have been the subject of selective leaks.

Even experienced congressional staff members with security clearances say they are having increased difficulty digging information out of the Pentagon. "You tend to go to your friends over there," one aide says. "The problem is that your friends tend to share your ideology, and sometimes I feel I'm not getting a balanced picture."

In the resultant cauldron of leaks and rumors, rational, calm and independent thinking on defense often gets short shrift. That is unfortunate because it has become more perilous now for two reasons:

First, the high technology involved in modern weapons systems has dramatically lengthened the time it takes to bring new weapons from concept through production into use. The budget decisions Congress makes this fall will shape the American defense posture well into the 21st century.

Second, because of a slowdown in defense spending in the 1970s, dozens of major weapons systems will become obsolete within a few years. Thus, the nation faces decisions now on a wide variety of important military programs, ranging from the MX missile to the 600-ship Navy and a fundamental re-equipping and retraining of the Army.

Look for evidence

Between "selective" intelligence leaks and the increasing classification of thorough intelligence analyses, it is becoming clear that military intelligence personnel tend to look around for evidence to support their causes.

It was precisely to avoid this problem that the process of gathering, analyzing and collating intelligence data into official "threat assessments" was created.

Under the system, reports on Soviet military technology, weapons production, defense spending, strategy and other subjects are analyzed by the CIA and its Pentagon counterpart, the DIA, as well as by Navy, Army and Air Force intelligence branches. This work then is gathered into one National Intelligence Estimate.

The estimate is supposed to rise above the institutional biases of the individual services and intelligence agencies.

But according to former and current intelligence executives, the process has gotten seriously skewed, with the more "aggressive" DIA gaining an edge over the more traditionally cautious CIA.

Graham, who as DIA director engineered the agency's rise in influence in the White House and national security circles, dates the beginning of the DIA's ascendancy to the early 1970s, when the CIA was widely criticized for consistently underestimating Soviet military power.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 SEPTEMBER 1982

Capital Tactic

Pentagon Arms Itself With Leaks

By DAVID WOOD,
Times Staff Writer

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More Common Practice

The incident illustrates a bureaucratic maneuver common enough in the past but becoming increasingly prevalent since the Reagan Administration took office: selective leaking of intelligence and other information to tilt decisions on important defense questions. It is a trend that some defense analysts fear may fritter away Pentagon credibility and help dissolve national support for building a stronger defense.

Under the best of circumstances, accurately assessing the threat posed by the Soviet Union or other potential adversaries and shaping the budget to meet such challenges always has been difficult. And the pressure from American military establishments always has been tremendous.

Indeed, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, according to the Soviet leader's memoirs, glumly acknowledged during informal talks at Camp David 23 years ago that neither was able to resist the demands of generals waving intelligence reports about what the other side was believed to be doing.

Inaccurate Leaks in 1950s

Nor is the calculating, budget-manipulating government official new on the scene.

In the 1950s, the jobs of 14,000 people in seven states and congressional appropriations of more than $1 billion to develop an atomic-powered bomber were sustained in part by official leaks about Soviet construction of such a plane. Intelligence experts now agree, however, that the leaks were not true.

Ironically, as U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis have become more sophisticated, the rational translation of threat assessment into budget reality has become more frantic.

Despite the Reagan Administration's commitment to a five-year, $1.5-trillion increase in defense spending, blossoming budget deficit projections have convinced Pentagon planners that they had better get new weapons systems approved quickly, before congressional support for big defense budgets evaporates.

As the Air Force competes for scarce funds with the Navy and the Army, defense analyst say, leaks have become more profligate.

"In the old days there were few leaks, and there was always a guy from the FBI in my office the following morning trying to find the leaker," said retired Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. "Hell now it's gotten so rampant I don't think they bother with that anymore."

Compounding the problem for Congress and the public is the government's penchant for stamping nearly all intelligence analyses top secret. As a result, the editor of a respected military journal says, independent verification of leaks has become more difficult.

The Pentagon does offer classified briefings to members of Congress on such issues, but the sessions are not normally well attended. And the public has no access to such briefings, which could give better perspective to issues that have been the subject of selective leaks.

An Unbalanced Picture

And even experienced congressional staff members with security clearances say they are having increased difficulty prodding information out of the Pentagon. "You tend to go to your friends over there," one aide said. "The problem is that your friends tend to share your ideology, and sometimes I feel I'm not getting a balanced picture."

In the resultant cauldron of leaks and rumors, rational and calm independent thinking on defense often gets sideswiped. That is unfortunate any time, but it has become more perilous for two reasons:

First, the high technology involved in modern weapons systems has dramatically lengthened the time it takes to bring new weapons from concept through production

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WASHINGTON TIMES
10 September 1982

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SALT violations, continued

Fresh evidence arrives almost daily that the Soviet Union is violating numerous and significant provisions of the SALT I and SALT II agreements.

A member of the Defense Intelligence Agency has told The Washington Times that the Soviets have constructed between 40 and 220 SS-16 mobile ICBMs now operational at the Plesetsk missile site.

The National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet Strategic Forces, as reported by John Lofton, states as an agreed U.S. intelligence judgment that "the Soviets will break out of the SALT I and SALT II agreements this year." The paper reveals that the Soviets will increase the number of MIRVed missiles to 920, overshooting the SALT II ceiling of 820 missiles by 12 percent in a single year.

These are just two more bits of evidence in a growing mound. The Kremlin, it seems, has violated the letter and spirit of SALT on every major provision, from ABM testing and construction limits to missile and bomber ceilings and non-interference with U.S. verification.

Most disturbing of all, information reaches us that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is about to declare that the Soviets are still "in fundamental compliance" with the SALT accords.

The report, for a congressional committee, will take note of the various allegations, but dismiss them as either insignificant or unproven. It looks like the kind of cover-up the Republican platform of 1980 pledged to end.

It isn't all ACDA's fault, of course. Despite the heroic efforts of a handful of congressmen, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee have refused to open hearings on the matter. Despite its helpful attention to Soviet violations of other agreements — the chemical weapons ban and Cuban missile understanding, for example — the administration is still reluctant to give up publicly on Soviet good faith.

What ACDA needs is a clear directive from the White House to admit that the violations are violations. Convincing the public won't be easy. The president's critics will shout all the predictables; the cowboy, we'll be told, is just looking for an excuse to scuttle talks with the Soviets altogether. The president was insincere all along on arms control, they'll say. No matter how hard the evidence, the media organs of the Left will pronounce it not hard enough.

However, even the polls cited by the nuclear freeze lobby show that Americans do not trust the Russians to keep any agreement that isn't airtight — and SALT I and II are not. The evidence of Soviet violation must be examined with great care. If it holds up, though, the American people need to know.

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WASHINGTON TIMES
8 SEPTEMBER 1982

JOHN LOFTON'S JOURNAL

Reagan spends less than Carter on arms

Ronald Reagan has caught a lot of flak, and many Republican candidates are being put on the spot, because of the president's alleged massive increase in the defense budget. But, a close look at new data reveals that real defense spending — in terms of constant comparable Reagan dollars — is less than it would have been had Jimmy Carter been re-elected.

Furthermore, under President Reagan, defense spending is likely to be significantly less in 1983 than it would have been under Carter. Also, in terms of real defense spending or outlays in 1981 and 1982, the Reagan administration has spent slightly less than Carter planned. Thus, there has not yet been a real increase in U.S. military capabilities.

In fact, Reagan's highly touted military buildup is still largely a promise and will occur — if at all — only in the future.

While it's true that in each year the president has requested defense budgets higher than Carter's, he also has supported congressional cuts.

The new data that compare and contrast the Reagan and Carter defense budgets comes from the Congressional Budget Office. What the CBO has done is convert the last Carter five-year military budget into constant comparable Reagan dollars. This provides a realistic, fair comparison between Reagan and his predecessor. Here are the figures:

In 1981 outlays, Carter proposed spending $160.1 billion; Reagan's figure is $156.1 — which is $4 billion less than Carter. In 1982 outlays, Carter proposed spending $181.7 billion; Reagan, $182.7 — which is $1 billion more than Carter. In 1983 outlays, Carter proposed spending $203 billion; Reagan, $215.9 billion (requested as of April of this year).

For 1983, Congress would have appropriated $203 billion for Carter; for Reagan, $207.4 billion. For 1983, under a continuing resolution, Congress would have appropriated $203 billion for Carter; $182.7 billion for Reagan. Thus, under these figures, Carter would have spent $23.3 billion more on defense than Reagan.

So, regardless of what you've heard or read — as things stand now — Ronald Reagan's defense budget is actually smaller than the defense budget projected by Jimmy Carter. This is undoubtedly the reason why such hardline Reaganite groups as The Committee on the President Danger and The Heritage Foundation have criticized Reagan's military budget as inadequate. Says Robert Foelber, a Heritage defense expert:

"So far the FY 1983 defense budget debate has focused almost exclusively on the economics of defense. It is now time to consider the budget in terms of military requirements, stable deterrence and the realities of the Soviet threat. As they stand, the administration defense budgets cannot reverse the West's decline."

This new information from the CBO is not the only astounding information regarding the administration's military policy. A National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic forces — issued this past spring — reveals that if the Russians continue to build their MIRVed (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) ICBMs (inter-continental ballistic missiles) at the same rate, by the end of this year they will be massively violating the SALT II treaty.

This information was available to the president when he announced this past Memorial Day that the United States would, de facto, be adhering to his pact even though our Senate has never ratified it. On June 29, Reagan declared:

"As for existing agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint."

But, the spring National Intelligence Estimate shows no such restraint. Projecting the existing growth rate for Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, it says that if this continues, by the end of 1982 the Russians will have 920 MIRVed ICBMs, which is 100 more than the SALT II limits allow.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
1 September 1982

Soviets to Meet Goal, CIA Analysis Finds

By Dan Morgan
Washington Post Staff Writer

A classified memorandum prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in August concluded that the Soviet Union will meet its gas delivery commitments to Western Europe "through the 1980s," despite the Reagan administration's efforts to delay construction of the Siberian pipeline.

The memorandum, classified "secret" but circulated widely in the government, undercuts a central administration argument that the sanctions, divisive as they are proving to be within the Atlantic Alliance, eventually will pay off by depriving the Kremlin of western currency needed to support its lagging economy and its military buildup.

For this reason, middle-level officials at the National Security Council, and the State, Defense and Commerce departments are reported to have challenged the CIA conclusions and pressed for a Special National Intelligence Estimate, or "SNIE," of the issue by the entire U.S. intelligence community.

The interagency critique of the CIA memo was reviewed last week by State Department counselor James L. Buckley and sent to the National Security Council. NSC officials, however, declined to discuss the matter yesterday.

The CIA analysis, based on information as of Aug. 6, expresses the view that Moscow has "a wide range of options" to accomplish its goal of increasing natural gas deliveries to Western Europe, including the following:

- "Deliveries could begin in late 1984, as scheduled, by using existing pipelines, which have excess capacity of at least 6 billion cubic meters annually."
- "Using some combination of Soviet and West European equipment, deliveries through the new export pipeline could probably begin in late 1985 and reach nearly full volume in 1987—about one year later than if the sanctions had not been imposed."
- "At substantial cost to the domestic economy, the U.S.S.R. could divert construction crews and compressor station equipment from new domestic pipelines to the export pipeline, or even dedicate a domestic pipeline for export use to ensure capacity adequate to meet contractual delivery obligations."

Only this last choice of relying primarily on their own resources would cause the Soviets much difficulty, the memo said. It could force Moscow to cut back its domestic pipeline construction program, forcing a reduction of domestic gas deliveries by as much as 30 billion cubic meters a year.

That possibility has faded in the last few days as French and British companies have loaded key pipeline components on Soviet-bound freighters in defiance of President Reagan's order June 15 forbidding foreign firms utilizing U.S. licenses from delivering the equipment. But European governments have unanimously rejected these controls and ordered their firms to proceed with deliveries.

The practical problem facing the administration is that enough U.S.-built equipment is in Europe to allow European firms to ship the Soviets as many as 23 complete turbines of the 125 ordered.

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WASHINGTON QUARTERLY
THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Autumn 1982

Raymond L. Garthoff, a retired Foreign Service officer and ambassador, is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. In 1962, serving as special assistant for Soviet Bloc Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State, he participated actively in the Cuban missile crisis decision-making process.

Using his own recently declassified memos, this former senior State Department official examines the military considerations behind U.S. decision making during the Cuban missile crisis.

The Meaning of the Missiles

Raymond L. Garthoff

One of the crucial considerations in U.S. decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 was our evaluation of the military significance of the Soviet deployment in Cuba of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). This fact is obvious, yet at the same time far from clear. It is, for example, well known from several informed accounts that then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had said from the outset that the military significance of the Soviet missile deployment was not unmanageable, and could be offset without having to remove the missiles—whether by compelling Soviet withdrawal or, if that could not be done, then by U.S. military action. Not all military leaders agreed with that judgment, but the question was quickly set aside because of President Kennedy's concern over the political consequences, both international and domestic, if the United States were to acquiesce to the Soviet deployment in Cuba. McNamara did not question that judgment or decision, and he did not deny that there was military significance to the deployment. The actual impact of the missiles on the military balance, therefore, did not become an issue of contention. Indeed, it was not even fully analyzed in the hectic week of initial decisions. But it remained a factor throughout the 13 days of the confrontation until Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the missile systems.

Beyond the narrow circle within the administration dealing hourly with the crisis, the question of what political and military measures of coercion—or concession—

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THE NEWSDAY MAGAZINE (N.Y.)
11 July 1982

Bill Casey at t
Helm:
Quietly in Co

By David Wise
Photo by Ken Spencer

Some weeks ago, an interesting piece of information began circulating in the intelligence community — the closed, spooky world of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the other spy agencies in and around Washington.

The word went out that William J. Casey, the director of central intelligence, had bought an expensive house in the exclusive Foxhall Road section of Washington.

To men and women accustomed to working with fragments, piecing together minute bits of intelligence to form a larger mosaic, the report was immediately seen for its true significance. Better than any official announcement, it meant that Bill Casey, a Long Islander who has a home in Roslyn Harbor, was planning to stick around as CIA director.

There have been times in the past stormy year and a half when it was not at all clear that Casey would survive as the DCI, as the spies refer to their chief. There was a series of disasters. First, Casey named his former political aide, Max C. Hugel, as head of the CIA's cloak-and-dagger directorate. Hugel was soon forced to resign as the result of disclosures in the Washington Post about his questionable business dealings. Then the Senate Intelligence Committee, responding to a barrage of publicity, began probing Casey's own financial past. And Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., chairman of the intelligence committee, once a Republican presidential nominee and still an influential

point-blank for Casey to resign

All of that took place last year Casey's first year on the job. Th storm subsided. The Senate panel in a backhanded way, found Casey not "unfit" to serve. And through i all, the CIA director — Ronald Rea gan's campaign manager in 1980 — managed to preserve his close per sonal relationship with the Presi dent. ("I still call him Ronnie,' Casey has said.)

Among those who must surel have heard the report about th house off Foxhall Road was Casey' deputy, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman who Sen. Goldwater and a lot of oth er members of Congress had openl hoped would be Reagan's origina choice for CIA director. Blocke from the top job, wooed by privat industry with job offers in six fig ures, Inman in April announced tha he was quitting.

In Moscow, the KGB has no doub already heard about Casey's nev house. Very likely, Vitali V. Fedor chuk, the recently appointed chair man of the Committee for Stat Security, better known as the KGB, has already informed President Leonid Brezhnev in the Kremlin.

And the report is true. J. William Doswell, director of the CIA's Office of External Affairs, a smooth, Richmond, Va., lobbyist and former newsman whom Casey brought in as his top public relations man, confirms it. Doswell said that Casey and his wife, Sophia, moved last month from their apartment somewhere in Washington to their new home off Foxhall Road.

career who has managed to stay one jump ahead of trouble, barely avoiding entanglement with the likes of Robert Vesco during Watergate. For example, Sen. Joe Biden of Delaware, a Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee and Casey's most vocal critic, refused to endorse the panel's findings on the CIA director, declaring: "Mr. Casey has displayed a consistent pattern of omissions, misstatements, and contradictions." And Casey's critics also charge he is not really qualified to run the CIA, since his intelligence experience dates from World War II, when he worked for the Office of Strategic Services (the OSS was the

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NEW YORK TIMES
5 JULY 1982

Q&A | Bobby R. Inman

Assessing Government's Approach to Intelligence

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 4 — Adm. Bobby R. Inman startled Washington in April when he announced his intention to resign as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. He said he wanted to go into private business, but associates asserted that the real reasons for his departure were policy differences with the Reagan Administration and mounting frustration over dealing with the White House National Security Council staff. His retirement from the Government and the Navy complete, Mr. Inman sat down last week to discuss intelligence issues.

Q. Is the Reagan Administration using intelligence information as a neutral basis for foreign policy formulation, or, as some critics have charged, is it twisting intelligence data to justify policies?

A. It's been very rare in my experience when an Administration makes an effort to deliberately twist the intelligence to support policy, but there have been efforts over the years to force us to say more than the intelligence professionals believe is safe in terms of protecting sources and methods. I believed we found the proper balance earlier this year on the issue of Cuban and Soviet involvement in Central America. The debate was not with the intelligence but with the policy. I don't believe that the Cuban and Soviet threats were being exaggerated. For years we had a minimal effort dedicated to Central America and did not detect in a timely way the commencement of the training of prospective guerrillas in Cuba. We were slow to recognize the breadth of insurgencies that we were going to face. When we finally accumulated a large body of raw data, and understood the scope of Cuban activity clearly undertaken with full Soviet support, there was a tendency to react with shock. That may well have come across as overreaction. The language used to describe Cuban activity may have been a little more shrill than it would have been had we detected the activity from the outset.

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Q. How has the Reagan Administration changed priorities in intelligence collection and analysis?

A. Early in the Reagan Administration, increased emphasis was placed on gaining a knowledge of events in Central America and the Caribbean, the causes of terrorism and the problem of the transfer of American technology to the Soviets and Communist bloc. Over a longer period of time, there's been a focus on improving knowledge across the third world.

Q. Has the Reagan Administration placed a greater reliance on the use of covert operations than recent administrations?

A. I know of no way that I can talk sensibily in public about specific covert operations. By their nature, there is nothing unclassified about them. I believe historians would agree that every administration ultimately turns to the use of covert operations when they become frustrated about the lack of success with diplomatic initiatives and are unwilling to use military force. Some may begin by being more eager than others. I wouldn't care to characterize any of the administrations I've watched. In the long years of drawing down intelligence capabilities, we almost completely dismantled the nation's capacity to conduct covert operations. The impression that we're running around the world conducting covert operations is plain false. I would add that concern about the extent of covert operations is not just found in Congress. It's also found in substantial depth among intelligence professionals. They are overwhelmingly concerned about the quality of this country's foreign intelligence, and they worry that covert operations, especially when they are exposed and criticized, impact adversely on the more important job of foreign intelligence collection and analysis.

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Q. When the Carter Administration negotiated the second strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, opponents said the United States lacked the ability to verify such agreements. Is that true?

A. We have tried over the last decade to improve the nation's ability to verify arms control treaties. There was valid criticism in Congress that the resulting capability was thin. The requirements for verification with regard to the SALT I and SALT II treaties were substantial but not overwhelming. A more complex treaty will place substantial additional burdens on verification. There are several ways to deal with that. There are, for instance, forms of on-site inspection that would increase verification capabilities, but if you insist on absolute certainty, if you insist on the capacity to detect every violation, you'll never have an arms control process. You have to take some risks. The key is being confident that you will detect any serious cheating.

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Q. What is the state of United States intelligence capabilities?

A. The United States intelligence community, as currently structured and manned, is marginally capable to deal with the world of the late 1980's and 90's. That judgment is shaped by my view that this country's primary problems in that period will be found in the competition for raw materials, natural resources, and markets in an unstable world with the potential for minor conflicts that could escalate in areas where we now have little or no intelligence effort. I do not believe we can do less than we are doing against our principal adversaries, and there are areas where that effort isn't as good as it should be, specifically intelligence on economic and political developments in the Soviet Union. The major strengths of our system involve military matters. Our major weaknesses include a minimal effort both in collection and analysis about many of the non-Communist countries. We lack the encyclopedic effort that will let us understand trends before we get to the level of a crisis.

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Q. Over recent decades, there has been an increasing reliance on electronic and other technical means of collecting intelligence. Has the resulting neglect of human sources damaged overall collection capabilities and quality?

A. A myth has grown up from statements of some officials that we are too dependent on technical collection. There was a period of time when decision makers believed that satellite photography was going to answer all our needs. We're all a little wiser now. No analyst should be left dependent on a single means of acquiring intelligence. Human collection runs the risk of relying on someone who wants to mislead you. Technical collection may leave you without access to cer-

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THE WASHINGTON POST
9 April 1982

Government Experts Challenge Reports of Soviet SALT Violations

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Government specialists say that a string of recent press reports alleging the Soviets have violated the SALT II strategic arms agreement by deploying the outlawed SS16 mobile missile are wrong.

But they acknowledge that there is still some uncertainty and disagreement as to the intended role and present deployment of this weapon, which has been the subject of dispute within intelligence circles for many years.

Informed officials in several government agencies say that a top-secret, just-published U.S. national intelligence estimate concludes there has been no violation thus far of the SALT II agreement by Moscow, even though that 1979 agreement signed by President Carter and Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev has never been ratified by the U.S. Senate and has been all but disavowed by the Reagan administration.

While there is still some ambiguity about the status of the SS16, officials who watch such matters closely agree that it is not deployed in a mobile fashion, which would be a violation of SALT, and that if the Russians ever do deploy a new mobile missile it is not likely to be the SS16.

Secret deployment of the mobile SS16 would fuel an already high state of tension between the two superpowers on nuclear weapons issues.

Both countries, thus far, have continued informally to adhere to the SALT II provisions, apparently with the expectation that some new round of arms-control talks covering strategic or continent-spanning atomic missiles and bombers will eventually take place.

The SALT II treaty and so-called "common understandings" reached between the United States and Soviet Union in that accord specifically require that Moscow not "produce, test or deploy ICBMs of the SS16 type," which are mobile weapons carted around the countryside on wheeled vehicles. Because they are mobile, they would be very hard for U.S. picture-taking satellites to spot and thus very hard to count and verify in any arms control agreement. They would also be hard to attack in a war.

Officials with detailed knowledge of the situation say there has been some dispute about the SS16 ever since test models began to appear in the mid-1970s. The Soviets test-fired the missile from a test range at Plesetsk in 1976 but stopped the testing after the 1979 SALT agreement was signed and have not tested it since then, the sources say.

One authoritative official says that the heart of the latest discussion and the cause for some disagreement about the missile within the top echelons of U.S. intelligence is a new "belief" that the Russians, back in the 1970s, actually produced a lot more SS16s than U.S. spy satellites ever observed being tested. The central question is what has become of these, if in fact they were produced. Are they being used for training or are they being secretly deployed in fixed sites? These are questions being asked, one official said, while stating that there is no evidence of a deployment.

There are some of the original SS16s—one well-placed official put the number at less than two dozen—still at the Plesetsk range. They are said to be in "fixed" positions and "certainly not mobile," as another official put it.

The Pentagon's intelligence arm maintained for some time that there were indeed SS16s at Plesetsk and sources say that there is now more widespread agreement within the intelligence community that the

One experienced official describes the missiles at Plesetsk as "devices still at a test range and in various stages of readiness. But there is no proof that it has ever been 'deployed' . . . and to call it a real system is stretching it."

But on April 3, The New York Post, citing U.S. officials, reported that "three Soviet mobile missile regiments, each equipped with 12 nuclear-tipped SS16 rockets, are poised in the frigid wastelands near Perm" in the Soviet Union.

On April 5, the syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported that there is "a new, still-secret consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, following months of bitter dispute, that the Soviet Union has deployed almost 200 mobile intercontinental missiles in violation of the SALT II treaty."

The next day, State Department spokesman Dean Fischer publicly denied those reports, stating that "our intelligence information does not support these statements."

But immediately following that, The Baltimore Sun reported that "other [unnamed] officials, indignant at the denial" made by Fischer, reaffirmed the main points made by the columnists.

One source says that there seems to be "something or somebody" that has chosen to heighten concern over the SS16 recently, although a top-ranking specialist calls the public descriptions of the situation that have appeared thus far "mostly garbage."

The reports began to appear after President Reagan, at a news conference, claimed that "the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority" in nuclear weapons. Some officials speculate that circulation of the SS16 reports may be meant to add credence to that claim, though they stress they have no idea of whether this particular issue was in the back of the president's mind.

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THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
April 1982

Taylor Branch ON POLITICAL BO

In August 1955, John Prados tells us,* the CIA's Richard Bissell went to the White House to show President Eisenhower some pictures that had been taken from an airplane more than ten miles above the earth. Greens, fairways, and sand traps were clearly visible in the aerial shots of the Augusta National Country Club in Augusta, Georgia, which was not only the home of the Masters but also Ike's favorite golf course. The photos clearly impressed the president, who recognized the topography of certain memorable holes. Then Bissell played his trump card. He pointed out that the pictures actually revealed the presence of golf balls on some of the greens, as well as the flags in the cups. This truly impressed Eisenhower, who must have reflected that sometimes he had trouble seeing the cup when standing over a ten-foot putt. Bissell, on the strength of the demonstration, asked for permission to develop a U-2 spy plane that could produce such pictures from even higher altitudes, and Eisenhower, who was normally skeptical of new military gadgets, heartily approved. Thus, through crafty persuasion and awesome technology, the CIA won its battle against the air force for control of a new spy system.

With technology that has long since made Bissell's U-2 obsolete, the secret services now stand on permanent watch against nuclear attack. Simultaneously, they grapple clandestinely with their adversaries in localized conflicts that policy-makers want to keep quiet, fearing Armageddon. These two functions have brought spy organizations to the forefront of modern politics since World War II, as intelligence activities have expanded on both the highest and lowest of roads. The same Richard Bissell who showed Eisenhower the golf course photographs planned the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The Soviet Estimate is a readable and even-tempered chronicle of the higher road—the effort of the CIA and military intelligence services to keep track of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Prados has assembled the first comprehensive record of American performance in this field, matching predictions of Russian strength against what ends up actually happening in the arms race. Working from National Intelligence Estimates that, ironically, are the most sensitive and yet the most publicly debated spy products we have, he labors to separate the contributions of hard fact from those of prejudice, and he makes convincing judgments about the bureaucratic wars within the intelligence community.

The human element of intelligence mistakes was more easily exposed during the early years, when the spy network was relatively unsophisticated. Shortly before a 1955 Soviet-American summit meeting, the Russians invited Colonel Charles E. Taylor, the air force attache in Moscow, to watch an aerial parade at Tushino Field. Sitting in the reviewing stand, Colonel Taylor was astounded to watch 28 Bison bo
succession of formations. As Prad
twice the number of Bisons attributed to the Russians only a few months before and four times the number of B-52s then in existence. Taylor's alarming report quickly became the basis for another drastic upward revision of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic bombers.

What Colonel Taylor had no way of knowing at the time was that the Russians were so insecure about the American lead in nuclear weaponry that they had circled their few Bisons repeatedly over the airfield as a blustering show of strength. The Russians fooled the Americans—especially the air force, which was eager to be fooled so that it could build more B-52s—and thereby helped create the "bomber gap," which was the first major hoax in postwar strategic intelligence.

Several years later, about the time the CIA and the army and navy managed to push the air force back toward reality on Soviet bombers, the Russians launched their Sputnik. They also tested some ICBMs before they were expected to, causing a wave of apprehension in the United States. The 1958 National Intelligence Estimate predicted that the Russians would solve all their test problems almost instantaneously, and that Moscow would produce and deploy up to 1,000 ICBMs by 1961. By contrast, the United States had only ten ICBMs in 1960. This was the "missile gap." There was a great public scare, and the shape of the weaponry involved encouraged journalists to imply that national manhood was at stake, along with survival. The Alsop brothers reported that the Eisenhower administration was about to "flaccidly permit the Kremlin to gain an almost unchallenged superiority."

As is well known, John Kennedy was elected on his virile pledge to change that with a greatly accelerated ICBM program, but by the time he took office the missile gap was revealed to be a larger hoax than the bomber gap. The CIA, joined by navy and army intelligence, now realized that the Russians had produced no ICBMs at all. The air force, after a Strangelovian campaign of resistance during which Strategic Air Command generals went so far as to claim that Crimean War memorials were actually Soviet ICBMs in disguise, finally conceded.

The result of all this confusion was the Defense Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's well-intentioned but ultimately counter-productive effort to end public disputes between the military intelligence services. To McNamara, such squabbling was inefficient as well as politically embarrassing. He wanted a unified, accurate military position on intelligence matters. In the DIA, however, he got an agency that tended to produce brokered intelligence compromises that were

Taylor Branch is a contributing editor of The Washington Monthly.

**The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength.* John Prados. Dial, $17.95.

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THE ATLANTIC
April 1982

BUT NEVER DANGER TODAY

BY THOMAS POWERS

THE SOVIET ESTIMATE
by John Prados.
Dial, $17.95.

JOHN PRADOS'S FINE history of the intelligence wars, *The Soviet Estimate*, is certain to become a standard work in the field. It's hard to think of an important intelligence issue in the past twenty-five years that Prados does not cover; the "missile gap," Galosh, the Tallinn "upgrade" problem, the A Team, B Team controversy, and other flurries of concern over "monster missiles" and alarming holes in the ground are all there. Intelligence professionals will consult his book to find out what's in the public domain and what's still secret. Students of the national-security community will mine it for data on what we knew and when we knew it.

But ordinary readers probably won't use it at all. They will find it too hard, too dense, too dull, too filled with numbers and acronyms, too obsessive in its attempt to gather in one place all the facts and echoes of contention in the strategic-intelligence business as they have appeared over the years in the professional literature and in congressional hearings. Prados's excellent bibliography, the most comprehensive I have seen, lists hundreds of items. It is one of the curses of research in this field to read the same facts and figures over and over again. How Prados survived his ordeal in the library I do not know. It must have involved years of stupefying tedium. But the result has justified his devoted efforts. Well-thumbed copies of *The Soviet Estimate* will be at the right hand of everyone who tries to understand why the United States and the Soviet Union elected to build enough nuclear weapons to break the back of our civilization.

Prados's comprehensive book raises two great questions about strategic intelligence. First, Is it honest? And second, Why are the analysts so often wrong? The question of honesty is immediately posed by the tendency of analysts to reflect the views and budgetary hopes of the institutions they represent. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, for example, Air Force intelligence consistently predicted a huge Russian bomber-building program. Army and Navy intelligence just as consistently derided these alarms. When the Russians finally did unveil a new long-range bomber, at the annual May Day parade in 1954, something like panic swept the upper echelons of the American government.

The CIA's Board of National Estimates was badly buffeted in those years by conflicting claims. In theory, its paper (the generic term for finished intelligence reports) was supposed to represent the mature conclusions of the intelligence community, after all the hard evidence had been soberly analyzed; but as a practical matter, it had to sound as worried as the officials who were supposed to read its estimates. "Our answer," said one board chairman at the time, according to another BNE official I met a couple of years ago, "is to say nothing is going to happen in the foreseeable future, and say it in the most alarming way possible." The result of this approach was one National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) after another admitting that we were still ahead for the moment but predicting a huge Russian bomber fleet down the road.

But the Russians never produced long-range bombers in any numbers. They concentrated on missiles instead. The BNE was slow to catch on, at least partly because the Air Force wasn't interested in missiles. It was run in the 1950s by World War II bomber generals who liked to fly. They grudgingly funded a low-level missile-research program, largely to ensure that the Navy didn't take over the job and steal away by degrees the Air Force's strategic-bombardment mission. But deep down in the Air Force there were missile colonels convinced that rocket propulsion offered a cheaper, more effective way to deliver nuclear warheads. In love with missiles, the colonels concluded that the Russians were, too. In the intelligence business, this is called mirror-imaging.

One of those colonels recently told me that during the Korean War, when R&D funds flowed to a trickle, he concluded that nothing would budge his Air Force superiors but fear of a Russian missile.

Thomas Powers, author of The Man Who Kept the Secrets, *is at work on a history of*

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22 March 1982

CHEMICAL WARFARE
BY TIM AHERN

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION FINALLY IS RELEASING A REPORT DESIGNED TO PROVE ITS CHARGES THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS KILLED THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE BY USING CHEMICAL WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

THE REPORT, EXPECTED TO BE ABOUT 100 PAGES, IS A DECLASSIFIED VERSION OF A SECRET NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE PREPARED BY THE CIA. IT CONTAINS ''HARD EVIDENCE'' ABOUT THE SOVIET USE OF THE WEAPONS, ACCORDING TO SOURCES WHO DECLINE TO BE IDENTIFIED.

STARTING LAST FALL, A NUMBER OF TOP ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE CHARGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AFGHANISTAN, LAOS AND CAMBODIA. LAST MONTH, SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG JR. SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD ''INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE'' THAT ''SCORES OF THOUSANDS OF NON-COMBATANTS IN ALL THREE TARGET AREAS'' HAVE BEEN KILLED.

ON SUNDAY, VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, SPEAKING AT AN ''AFGHANISTAN DAY'' RECEPTION, SAID THE SOVIETS ''HAVE OPENED PANDORA'S BOX OF MODERN WARFARE. THEY'VE USED CHEMICALS -- NERVE AGENTS, PHOSGENE OXIME, PERHAPS MYCOTOXINS, AND OTHERS. OVER 3,000 DEATHS ALONE HAVE BEEN ATTIBUTED TO THESE.''

BUT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PRODUCED LITTLE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE TO BACK UP ITS CONTENTIONS AND CRITICS SAY PROOF SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC IF IT EXISTS.

A GROUP OF UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS WHO INVESTIGATED THE U.S. CHARGES SAID LAST MONTH THEY COULD NEITHER VERIFY NOR REFUTE THE CHARGES INVOLVING AFGHANISTAN, WHERE SOVIET MILITARY FORCES HAVE BEEN FIGHTING AFGHAN REBELS SINCE THE SOVIETS ENTERED THE COUNTRY IN 1979.

THE SOVIETS HAVE CONSISTENTLY DENIED THE U.S. ALLEGATIONS AND HAVE SAID THE CHARGES ARE PROPAGANDA AIMED AT WINNING SUPPORT FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS TO RESUME PRODUCTION OF U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT PRODUCED CHEMICAL WEAPONS SINCE FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON BANNED THEM IN 1969, BUT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSED BUDGET FOR THE 1983 FISCAL YEAR INCLUDES $705 MILLION FOR MILITARY CHEMICAL PROGRAMS, INCLUDING MONEY TO RESUME PRODUCTION OF NERVE GAS AT A PINE BLUFF, ARK., ARSENAL.

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THE WASHINGTON TIMES
20 July 1982

Foreign

Queen's protector quits; homosexual tie exposed

LONDON (AP) — The queen's police officer, Commander Michael Trestrail, has resigned from the police after acknowledging "a homosexual relationship over a number of years with a male prostitute," Home Secretary William Whitelaw told a stunned House of Commons yesterday.

Whitelaw's brief announcement came an hour after Scotland Yard had said Trestrail, 52, was resigning for "personal reasons," which Britons assumed were connected with the security breach that enabled an intruder to find his way into Queen ELizabeth II's bedroom at Buckingham Palace 11 days ago.

The news came as the state prosecutor's office announced that prowler Michael Fagan will not face charges for the July 9 bedroom intrusion because there was no evidence of criminal intent. Trespassing is a civil, not a criminal, offense in Britain.

Trestrail, head of police at the palace and the man directly responsible for the queen's safety, resigned on Saturday, the Yard said in a short statement.

Scotland Yard is investigating the security lapses that enabled Fagan, a 31-year-old drifter, to enter the queen's bedroom before 7 a.m. on a Friday and chat with her for nearly 10 minutes before an astonished chambermaid discovered him and summoned help.

Fagan, appearing at Bow Street Magistrates Court, was sent for trial at the Old Bailey Criminal Court on three charges: trespassing at Buckingham Palace on June 7 and stealing a half-bottle of wine, a June 26 assault on his stepson and a June 16 car theft. He was ordered held without bail.

Fagan claimed he was the son of Nazi war criminal Rudolf Hess, who has been in prison since 1941 when he flew to Britain from Germany.

State prosecutor Stephen Wooler said the palace break-in in which Fagan stole the wine "was one of a series of irrational acts on his part connected with a deterioration in his matrimonial situation."

Addressing Magistrate Ronald Bartle, Maurice Nadeem, Fagan's lawyer, said, "Let us remember what this case is about. It does not relate to the later incident when my client was in the queen's bedroom."

From the dock, Fagan shouted: "I told you not to mention anything about the queen's bedroom. I don't want her name brought into it. I would rather plead guilty than have her name mentioned in court."

Fagan was led into the packed courtroom amid tight security, accompanied by his wife, Christine, and his parents, Ivy and Michael Fagan Sr.

According to British press reports, which have been confirmed by the government, all of the palace's guards and electronic security devices did not prevent Fagan from entering Buckingham several times.

In another development, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher promised to tell the House of Commons about security at the secret British center which monitors radio and telephone communications.

Mrs. Thatcher will speak today on the matter, but she is likely to give a "broad assessment" rather than provide details, Press Association reported.

The center, called the Government Communications Headquarters, is in Cheltenham, 109 miles northwest of London.

The center, like the U.S. National Security Agency outside Washington, eavesdrops on communications around the world, trying to glean information useful to British intelligence. It has cooperative agreements with its American counterpart and those in other allied nations.

The affair began last Thursday when a Cheltenham man, Geoffrey Arthur Prime, 43, was arraigned at nearby Hereford on a charge the prosecutor said was "of the gravest possible nature."

AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
8 March 1982

Intelligence Estimate Revealed Unintentionally

Washington—A secret U. S. intelligence estimate that the Soviet Union could have the capability to deploy a space-based, high-energy laser weapon station within a year was unintentionally revealed in a House Armed Services Committee hearing in late February, confirming earlier AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY reports (May 25, 1981, p. 40; July 28, 1980, p. 32).

The USSR's accelerated space-based, high-energy laser program was described in a secret statement to the committee by Richard D. DeLauer, under secretary of Defense for research and engineering. It included the assessment that the initial operational capability of the Soviet laser battle station could be as early as 1983, or as late as 1988.

Rep. Ken Kramer (R.-Colo.), a member of the committee, read aloud in a House Armed Services hearing earlier testimony by DeLauer given in a closed session that provided an insight into Soviet laser weapon development activities.

That assessment, based on intelligence community information, concluded that the laser space station could provide an antisatellite weapon capable of destroying U. S. surveillance spacecraft, communications satellities or early warning satellites that operate at geosynchronous altitudes.

By the early 1990s, according to DeLauer's statement, the Soviets could have a large space complex in orbit capable of attacking a variety of targets within the Earth's atmosphere from space.

Kramer's words during the open hearing were labeled inadvertent by staff members, who said that he believed the hearing to be a closed session.

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WALL STREET JOURNAL
1 March 1982

Asian Refugees: Death in the Night

By William Kucewicz

SANTA ANA, Calif.—In 1976 Yang Ying started a new life in this Los Angeles suburb. He and his family fled their besieged native village in the hills of Laos, and were lucky enough to be among the 50,000 fellow members of the Hmong tribe to be admitted to the security of the U.S. With the help of a local Hmong community group, he learned English, acquired a trade in electronic component assembly and got a job.

On Friday evening Dec. 12, 1980, Mr. Yang returned from work, ate dinner with his extended family in their small two-family house and took his two young children for a short stroll. For the rest of the evening, he sat around the table talking with his father and brother and went to bed about midnight. Around 4 o'clock in the morning his wife awoke to the sounds of her husband gagging and gasping for air. She called his father and brother, and someone called an ambulance. But within minutes Mr. Yang, at the age of 25, was dead.

Mr. Yang's relatives say he had been in perfect health until the day he died; he had never even been in a hospital. An autopsy by the Orange County coroner could not determine the cause of death other than to say his heart failed. To this day no one knows what caused Mr. Yang's untimely death.

But whatever killed Mr. Yang has reached epidemic proportions among young, male Hmong refugees here. At the end of 1981, the U.S. government Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta had recorded 39 cases of "sudden, unexpected, nocturnal deaths." Of these, 26 were Hmong, eight others Laotian, four Vietnamese and one Cambodian. Only one was a woman. In addition to the 39, seven new "suspected" cases have been reported so far this year. The CDC calculates that during the last year the death rate for young Laotian males was 87 per 100,000, comparable to the sum of the four leading causes of natural death among U.S. men of similar age.

Unable to Identify a Cause

"This is a strange and fascinating occurrence," says Dr. Anthony Contazerro of the University of California Medical School in San Diego, which runs a referral program for Southeast Asian refugees. There have been at least seven cases of nocturnal deaths in the San Diego area, but neither the coroner's office nor doctors at the Medical Center have been able to identify a cause.

In December the Centers for Disease Control published an initial study, concluding "the deaths reported here share several features that suggest they may constitute a distinct syndrome. They occurred at night or in the early morning hours during sleep and involved mostly young, apparently healthy persons with no premonitory symptoms. Descriptions of the terminal events suggested that the transition from apparent health to death occurred within minutes."

The only publicly suggested cause for the deaths has been that the men were frightened to death by nightmares. Similar deaths have been reported among young Japanese and Filipinos in their own countries, and witnesses have sometimes interpreted the terminal groans as signs of terrifying dreams. However, the CDC report says "careful questioning of the witnesses in the United States indicated that the terminal sounds were those that are often heard following cardiac arrest."

The report does not mention the fact that the Hmong in Laos have been primary victims of biological toxin weapons, commonly called 'yellow rain.'

The CDC report concludes that the heart's natural pacemaker mechanism has suddenly failed for some mysterious reason. "The abruptness of the deaths reported here is compatible with cardiac dysrhythmia, but the underlying mechanism remains unclear." As close as it comes to an explanation is the speculation "there might be a genetic or an acquired disorder predisposing these persons to sudden death."

What the report does not mention is the fact that the Hmong in Laos have been primary victims of biological toxin weapons, commonly called "yellow rain."

These hill tribe people, many of whom fought alongside the U.S. in the Vietnam war, have been a traditional center of resistance to the Communists in Southeast Asia. After the fall of Laos, the Communist Pathet Lao tried to resettle the Hmong in the more controllable lowlands. Those Hmong villages that resisted were attacked. Since 1975 the Hmong have been fleeing across the border into Thailand and telling stories to anyone who cared to listen about "yellow rain." This yellowish powder, dropped over villages and fields by Communist aircraft, causes blistering of the skin, vomiting and massive hemorrhaging, with the victim often choking to death on his own blood.

The U.S. government and independent analysts have confirmed the use of "yellow rain" by Soviet-backed troops in Southeast Asia. According to a still classified Special National Intelligence Estimate, the U.S. now has communications intelligence that shows direct Soviet involvement in the use of these obscene weapons which are supposed to be banned under international law. Secretary of State Alexander Haig said recently that the estimates of non-combatant casualties from these weapons range in the "scores of thousands."

Tests of "yellow rain" samples have identified the killer as mycotoxins of the trichothecene group, which are poisons produced naturally by fungus on grains. Most natural outbreaks of this toxin have occurred in the Soviet Union, though some cases have been reported in the U.S. and Japan. Scientific studies continue on the effects of these mycotoxins on laboratory animals. Little is known, however, about the long-term effects on man of low-level exposure to these fungal poisons.

Many of the Hmong are convinced that the current sudden death syndrome is somehow connected to the use of these toxins or other poisons in Southeast Asia. "This never happened to our people before. Never. We've never seen anything like it in the past," says Xeuvang Vangyi, executive director of Lao Family Community Inc., which runs resettlement and training centers in Los Angeles and more than a dozen other cities in the U.S.

"We've complained already to CDC to check" into a possible connection between "yellow rain" and the sudden deaths, says Gen. Vang Pao, who led the Hmong troops in the Vietnam war. He is now president of the Lao Family organization and is also considered chief spokesman for Hmong refugees. But CDC "won't or can't do anything to help that proof for the people," he adds.

"It's something we've looked into" as a possible cause, explains Dr. Roy Baron, an epidemiologist in charge of CDC's study of these sudden deaths. However, "in the preliminary reports of the manner of death, nothing suggested toxic substances should be proposed" as a likely cause, he adds. The center interviewed families of 25 of the 39 victims of this sudden death syndrome. "Only one had a history of definite exposure (to yellow rain), and two might have. This is a similar proportion of the control group" of young refugees now being monitored, Dr. Baron says.

The Hmong here complain, however, that they can't be sure they have never been exposed to "yellow rain." They explain that the trek out of the hills of Laos to refugee camps in Thailand takes weeks of walking through unfamiliar territory that may have been previously contaminated. If not yellow rain, they add, other poisons are also being used in Asia. They tell of cases of persons becoming ill and even dying from tainted water, salt, meat,

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NEW YORK TIMES
24 JANUARY 1982

U.S. Says Pakistan's Nuclear Potential Is Growing

By JUDITH MILLER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 — An intelligence report has concluded that Pakistan will be able to detonate a nuclear device within the next three years, but is not likely to do so, according to Administration and Congressional officials.

This conclusion is contained in an analysis, known as "Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-81," prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and completed last month.

Intelligence officials assert that Pakistan's reticence to conduct an atomic test stems partly from President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq's unwillingness to jeopardize the Reagan Administration's six-year, $3.2 billion military and economic aid program.

The study also contends that Pakistan is likely to continue developing and stockpiling fissile material that could be used in a nuclear device. Continued development of Pakistan's nuclear program, analysts argue, is likely to prompt increasing suspicion and hostility from India. As a result, according to the report, Pakistan could face a growing threat of a pre-emptive strike by India against its nuclear installations by the end of this year.

India and Pakistan will hold talks in New Delhi next Friday on a security pact. Foreign Minister Agha Shahi of Pakistan is expected to discuss proposals for a "nuclear-free zone" in Southwest Asia with his Indian counterpart, P. V. Narasimha Rao.

'Irregularities' Reported

The discussions are being closely followed by officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency, based in Vienna, which monitors nuclear plants. The agency has been pressing Pakistan unsuccessfully for several months to permit the installation of additional cameras and measuring devices to improve safeguards at Pakistan's 135-megawatt nuclear reactor, near Karachi.

The agency made its request after it detected "anomalies" and "irregularities" at the reactor, which is capable of producing plutonium for atomic weapons. There is no evidence that Pakistan has been diverting fuel from its civilian reactor for nonpeaceful purposes. But the agency expressed concern at a private meeting last September that the current monitoring arrangements were no longer adequate, given Pakistan's ability to produce its own nuclear fuel.

The India-Pakistan talks and the agency's effort to improve safeguards are of concern to the Reagan Administration, which persuaded Congress last month to approve $100 million in aid for Pakistan, a downpayment on the six-year program. In addition, the United States is selling Pakistan 40 F-16 fighter planes on an accelerated schedule. The Administration says Pakistan needs the planes to help withstand Soviet pressures from neighboring Afghanistan.

Pakistan had previously been barred from receiving American aid by a law that prohibits assistance to countries that pursue nuclear weapon programs. Congress suspended aid in 1979 on the basis of evidence that Pakistan had established a worldwide network of purchasing agents, including bogus companies and intelligence operatives, to obtain components for a uranium centrifuge enrichment plant that could be used to make fuel for weapons.

India Detonated Device in 1974

India detonated an atomic device in 1974, but maintained that its test was a "peaceful nuclear explosion," a distinction the United States does not accept.

The Reagan Administration has argued that Pakistan can only be dissuaded from conducting a nuclear test if it would jeopardize a strong security relationship with the United States. The new estimate tends to support this claim.

The estimate's conclusions is privately disputed by some foreign policy analysts, who doubt that Pakistan will be willing to forego a demonstrable nuclear weapons option, in light of the

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THE WASHINGTON POST
22 February 1982

'Grotesque' Evidence Reported On Soviet Chemical Warfare

Associated Press

A secret intelligence report prepared for the White House provides "very grotesque" evidence that the Soviet Union used chemical warfare to kill thousands of people in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, sources say.

The classified National Intelligence Estimate by the CIA contains additional "hard evidence" of Soviet use of potent chemical weapons including so-called "yellow rain," say the sources, who declined to be identified.

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. charged last week that the United States has "incontrovertible evidence" that the Soviets are using chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Laos and Cambodia.

The sources said a "sanitized" version of the intelligence report will be made public within the next several weeks to provide further support for the charges made by Haig and other U.S. officials.

One official familiar with the report said, "A lot of this evidence is very grotesque stuff." But he declined to go into detail.

Casualty estimates are difficult to come by, but they range from 5,000 to 30,000 people, the sources said.

The official said the classified report is a two-volume document totaling several hundred pages. The version to be released publicly, he said, will contain "everything that you've ever wanted to know about yellow rain—and that we can tell you without compromising sources or methods."

Meanwile, in Islambad, Pakistan, Maj. Gen. Esmat Ezz, the head of a United Nations group investigating whether chemical weapons are being used against insurgents in Afghanistan, said they have drawn no conclusions in a two-week tour of refugee camps and medical facilities where more than 2.5 million Afghans fled after the Soviet invasion in December, 1979.

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
22 FEBRUARY 1982

Soviet chemical warfare deaths told

WASHINGTON (AP)—A secret Central Intelligence Agency report prepared for the White House provides "grotesque" evidence that the Soviet Union used chemical warfare to kill thousands of people in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, sources said Sunday.

The National Intelligence Estimate contains additional "hard evidence" of Soviet use of potent chemical weapons, including so-called "yellow rain," the sources, who declined to be identified, said.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig charged last week that the United States has "incontrovertible evidence" that the Soviets are using chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Laos and Cambodia.

In a television interview Feb. 14, he said the poisons have killed "scores of thousands of noncombatants in all three target areas."

THE SOURCES said a "sanitized" version of the intelligence report will be made public within several weeks to provide further support for the charges made by Haig and other U.S. officials.

One official familiar with the report said "a lot of this evidence is very grotesque stuff," but he declined to go into detail.

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The classified report is said to be a two-volume document totaling several hundred pages. The version to be released publicly will contain "everything that you've ever wanted to know about yellow rain, and that we can tell you without compromising sources or methods," the source said.

CIA spokesman Dale Peterson declined comment on the report.

THE SOVIETS have consistently denied using chemical weapons and have said the United States is making such charges as propaganda to win support for the Reagan administration's plans to resume production of chemical weapons.

Some of the most lethal chemical weapons that the Soviets are said to have used are called "yellow rain" because they are released from airplanes as a yellow powder that covers the ground. Symptoms include dizziness, severe itching or tingling of skin with small blisters, nausea, choking, vomiting of blood, shock and death.

Haig's comments indicated the report may include physical evidence of use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan. Previously, there has been little proof of the use of such weapons there, although U.S. officials last fall disclosed some physical evidence of "yellow rain" attacks in Laos and Cambodia.

CRITICS HAVE SAID the charges should be backed up with more detail.

That "hard evidence" is part of the CIA study, the sources said, including chemical analysis of the mycotoxins, poisonous substances that come from some fungi not indigenous to Southeast Asia or Afghanistan.

The preparation of the report began after the U.S. charges were first made last fall. On Sept. 13, Haig said the United States had the evidence, but the State Department later termed it "preliminary."

In November, Richard Burt, director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, told a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee that the United States was "certain" the Soviets were using the weapons. He said "we now have the smoking gun" that includes "physical evidence" of such weapons in Indochina, but said, "we do not, as yet have physical evidence" for Afghanistan.

ON FEB. 8, President Reagan officially notified Congress that the administration intends to resume production of chemical weapons.

In his 1983 Pentagon budget, Reagan proposed spending $705 million for chemical programs, compared with $532 million in the current budget.

The weapons would be produced at the Pine Bluff, Ark., arsenal. Senate opponents came within two votes last year of defeating a request for $20 million to install production equipment at Pine Bluff.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, in his annual report to Congress, said the Soviet Union is "much better prepared" for chemical warfare than the United States.

And in his message to Congress, Reagan reaffirmed the longstanding policy that the United States will not use the weapons first.

The administration wants to produce binary weapons, which have two nonlethal components separately packaged. They combine to form a toxic agent after the weapon is fired.

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MILITARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 1, NO. 6
1981

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence At Sea

by Ernest Volkman

On November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States—a foregone conclusion, one of those little events that will be seen in retrospect to be much more significant than realized at the time.

Team A began to pack its bags for the return home.

Their departure from the Carter administration—as that government began to make way for its successor—marked one of the more sensational developments in the history of American intelligence. For in the space of Election Day 1980, Team A, the national security and intelligence bureaucracy that had on Jimmy Carter's behalf formed Washington's intelligence perceptions, was in effect voted out of office. And Team B—the loose term for a coalition of critics of American military policy—became ascendant.

It remains to be seen whether Team B will do any better than Team A. Arguably, there is some feeling that it can hardly do any worse; the fact is that by the time of Reagan's election, American intelligence was a mess. As we have seen earlier in this series of articles, the intelligence community was increasingly beset by bureaucratic politics and other problems throughout its early history, reaching a climax of sorts during the Kissinger years, when Kissinger's National Security Council bureaucracy virtually usurped intelligence agency functions. Combined with the problems of Watergate and a series of damaging congressional investigations during the 1970s, the intelligence community came very near to falling apart.

Certainly, it was not functioning very well, and by 1976, there was consensus that something was not quite right—a conviction reflected in the squabble over whether American intelligence had badly underestimated the size and dimensions of the Soviet military build-up. This, in turn, led to a whole series of questions on just how well intelligence, particularly the CIA, was doing its job.

By the summer of 1976, the hue and cry about intelligence was in full blast, accentuated by the debate over the projected SALT II treaty and pronounced Soviet foreign policy aggressiveness. As the political pressure began to mount, President Ford decided on a tried-and-true political expediency to take the heat off. He appointed an "outside panel" of intelligence and military experts to review the performance of the American intelligence community in estimating the size and threat of the Soviet military apparatus. Before long, this outside panel—known more formally as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—became known as "Team B" to distinguish it from the national security establishment it was reviewing, known in turn as "Team A."

It is difficult to imagine a more tenseful situation: Headquartered in the CIA's Langley headquarters, Team B members were paid out of CIA funds (which is the faint equivalent of paying an IRS auditor to audit your taxes) and were given total access to CIA intelligence. Tension also was due to the fact that everybody was perfectly aware of Team B's predilections, which happened to be outright skepticism that the American intelligence community was accurately gauging the Soviet Union.

The Team B leader was Richard Pipes, a noted Russian history professor from Harvard whose sympathies were regarded as distinctly conservative. The members of the rest of the group were much better known in the intelligence community, including Paul Nitze, an ex-Pentagon official; Paul Wolfowitz, a former strategic analyst with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Army [illegible], formerly head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (and whom the CIA con- ▶

"...American intelligence began to badly underestimate the Soviet SLBM program, and by 1967 the underestimate was pretty severe."

MILITARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 1, NO. 5
1981

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Redux: *Kissinger's Coup*

by Ernest Volkman

Early in 1969, not long after he had assumed the post of National Security Adviser to President Nixon, a displeased Henry Kissinger sat in his White House office reading a current CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). With obvious disgust, Kissinger finished reading the document, and in large letters, wrote across the top of it, "Piece of crap!"

Of such little events are major controversies often made, and that angry little scrawl by Kissinger turned out to be only the opening shot in what finally became a bloody bureaucratic battle in which American intelligence was the battleground. Ultimately, dozens of careers were ruined, the intelligence community became bitterly politicized, and American intelligence suffered an unprecedented crisis of confidence. Indeed, the effects of that battle are still being felt today in the American intelligence community, which has never quite recovered.

In this series of articles on the problems of American estimative intelligence, we have taken some pains to point out the debilitating effect of politics (and its handmaiden, bureaucratic politics) on the intelligence process. From the first Soviet atomic bomb test through the Cuban Missile Crisis to the great anti-ballistic missile debate of the 1960s, the invidious effect of politics can be seen again and again. It is possible from this, in fact, to postulate a **First Law of Intelligence: Where Politics Tread, Intelligence Becomes Oatmeal.** Not very inspiring, perhaps, but it makes the point.

Which brings us to Henry Kissinger—or, more accurately, a period during which American intelligence became so politicized, it can scarcely be said it even functioned, certainly not as it was designed to do. In a sense, of course, the politicization was inevitable, given the fact that from the first moment he assumed office, Kissinger sought (and very shortly accomplished) total domination of American strategic policy, mainly because he wore two hats—chief security adviser to the President and chief progenitor of American foreign policy.

That is the sort of anomaly guaranteed to cause trouble, and there was trouble very early on. First, there was the problem of the Nixon administration's stated goal of an "era of negotiations," meaning that both Nixon and Kissinger had set strategic arms control agreements, among other bilateral goals, as the first foreign policy priority. There was an intelligence implication in such a policy, since any agreements had to carry a vital prerequisite: verification. And verification itself was a political code word meaning that the American military and certain members of Congress would not buy any bilateral agreement without a firm guarantee that we would be able to detect any cheating by the Soviet Union. Was the CIA up to this task?

Of course, argued CIA Director Richard Helms, but he was disquieted by the question. An old hand at Washington infighting, Helms was perfectly aware of the fact that the last thing he wanted the agency to get involved in was the political minefield of verification. As Helms realized, it was a no-win proposition: If the CIA agreed that verification was feasible, then it risked angering congressional conservatives who felt that the Soviet Union would never live up to any arms agreement. On the other hand, if the CIA dragged its feet on the verification question, then it risked incurring the wrath of Kissinger (and by extension, his boss). The CIA already felt uneasy with Kissinger, whom it suspected (correctly) of wanting to create his own intelligence organization more subject to his ▶

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INTELLIGENCE

INTELLIGENCE TO PLEASE: the ABM

by Ernest Volkman

"With this rocket," then-Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was fond of telling visiting heads of state to Moscow in 1962, "we can hit a fly in space!"

Khrushchevian hyperbole, almost certainly, but even the severest doubters in those days had cause to wonder. After all, the Soviet Union had already orbited the first space satellite, and had followed that up with a series of impressive stunts, including orbiting dogs, a spider (and her web), not to mention mankind's first human in space. Was it possible that the Russians had also discovered a missile so accurate, it could indeed hit the unlikely target of a fly in space?

Many people believed it, but the fact was that Khrushchev's claim, like so many of his other boasts about the superiority of Soviet technology—space and otherwise—had very little relation to the truth.

In fact, the missile the Soviet leader was bragging about—known to the west as the Griffon—was hardly capable of hitting any small target in space. Indeed, there is some doubt whether it could even hit the target the size of a house in space. Still, the Khrushchev boast unwittingly played a large role in one of the nastiest American intelligence controversies of all time, a controversy whose implications echo to this day.

In its simplest form, it is known as the ABM controversy, shorthand that obscures a whole series of complex equations that came into play. Most significantly, there was a political equation and it was that political equation that ultimately was to transform the ABM controversy into a

ligence series, politics plays the most destructive role in the formulation of intelligence estimates, since politics has the most invidious effect in warping intelligence judgments. **Nothing will destroy objectivity faster than the introduction of "political factors" into an intelligence debate; where politics tread, misjudgment is sure to follow.**

The background to the ABM controversy was the Soviet-American arms race that began to reach its most dangerous level by the beginning of the 1960s. Like the trickle of sand in a huge hourglass, the future of that race seemed inevitable: production by both sides of bigger and better ICBMs, increasing accuracy of strategic weapons, advanced missile attack detection systems, and, probably most ominous of all, development of the first anti-missile defenses.

In other words, it was an extremely unstable "strategic arms equilibrium," as the nuclear strategists liked to call it, marked by a constant race between offense and defense. All the while, the "delicate balance of terror" became even more delicate.

The intelligence community, of course, played a vital role in this delicacy, since that community was responsible for the two key sources of information without which neither side could exist:

- early warnings about the latest technological developments, and
- probability of future developments.

But such intelligence work, as noted before, does not take place in a vacuum. It takes place in the context

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INTELLIGENCE

THE GAPS that never were

by Ernest Volkman



It was an anguished David Lilienthal of the Atomic Energy Commission who wrote in his diary on June 30, 1948: "The thing that rather chills one's blood is to observe what is nothing less than lack of integrity in the way the intelligence agencies deal with the meager stuff they have."

For Lilienthal, later to become chairman of the AEC, his government experience—especially his relationship with the American intelligence community—was not only anguishing, but very nearly frightening, as well. As Lilienthal and a few other people in the government were aware, American intelligence was a joke; the estimating process, particularly, was little better than offhand guesswork, there was a nearly total dearth of hard data, and what little data existed was the focal point of a juvenile series of arguments between the military intelligence services and the newly-created civilian Central Intelligence Agency.

Lilienthal's diary entry took place in the midst of what seems today to be an absurd argument. Earlier that year, Lewis Strauss, AEC chairman, had met defeat in his attempt to begin a large-scale monitoring program for detecting possible Soviet nuclear testing. As noted in the preceding article in this series, Strauss had argued that only such a program would be able to detect the existence of a Soviet atomic weapons program, since at least one open-air test was necessary to "prove" such weapons. To no avail, Strauss insisted that without a monitoring program, this country would have no idea of the level of the Soviet program—and, most importantly, whether the American intelligence community was right in assuming the Russians would need about twenty years to end the American atomic weapons monopoly.

Lilienthal watched the bureaucratic jockeying in this little argument with growing unease: the smug reports to congressional committees by the intelligence agencies which confidently predicted an American atomic monopoly far into the future were based, as Lilienthal knew, on the flimsiest of evidence. Worse, Strauss was being balked in his attempt to get a monitoring program by the very same smugness: since the Russians would take so many years to develop an atomic bomb, why waste money monitoring something that did not exist? Appalled, Lilienthal realized that the American intelligence community had no clothes.

As things turned out, Strauss finally did get his monitoring program, but only after he shifted money secretly from his agency to the Air Force, which carried out the actual monitoring. In September of 1949, one of the Air Force monitoring planes detected the irrefutable evidence that the Russians had carried out at least one open-air test of an atomic bomb.

The fact that Strauss and the AEC were vindicated (not to mention the scientists who had been predicting a Russian atomic capability by 1949) turned out to be almost meaningless, because the intelligence community seemed to have learned nothing from its mistakes. In fact, they were about to commit an equally wrong-headed blunder, this time on the opposite end of the scale. To be more precise, they were about to create the Bomber Gap and the Missile Gap. How those two serious intelligence failures developed tells us a great deal about the problems of estimative intelligence.

The difficulty with the bombers stemmed directly from the imbroglio surrounding the first Soviet atomic test. As we have seen, that failure was one primarily of underestimation—judging the Russians as technological primitives incapable of carrying out such massive and difficult feats as producing an atomic weapons program. When the Russians actually did what the intelligence community said they could not, the shock waves from that event spread throughout the government, especially in the ➤

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GOD and ICE WATER: the problem with American Intelligence

By Ernest Volkman

As Lady Astor was saying aboard the *Titanic* that fateful night, "I asked for a glass of ice water, but this is ridiculous."

A MAGNIFICENT EPITAPH for the formidable *grande dame,* but don't let its tragicomic content obscure a fundamental lesson her quip can teach us, a lesson we might summarize as Lady Astor's First Law of Communication and Intelligence: It's very well to have all that information, but what's the use if you're drowning in the stuff?

It is not stretching a simile too far to suggest that Lady Astor's problem — too much ice water on the upper decks when only a small glass would have done nicely — has a direct relationship to the current problem of American intelligence. But what does ice water on the *Titanic* have to do with current intelligence? A great deal, for while we are now in the midst of the greatest intelligence explosion in history — a byproduct of this century's great information explosion — the fact is that we are still left with the same sort of problem that has bedeviled government intelligence organizations ever since Moses sent Aaron to scout the desert: we may know a lot, but do we really know what's going on?

Probably not, judging by some of the more introspective conclusions by members of the intelligence community. As Robert Huffstutler, director of strategic research at the CIA, was saying at a recent academic conference on intelligence, "We've gotten pretty good at bean-counting, but we still have problems in evaluating the overall political situation."

In other words, not so much the actual intelligence collection itself, but the real hard part: *estimative* intelligence, that curious marriage of fact and viewpoint which aims not only to tell how many missiles the enemy has but what he intends to do with them. In a word, this is "intellection," the process by which raw intelligence is translated into judgments—judgments that form the basis of policy, military and otherwise.

The Intelligence Myopia

As we've learned the hard way, in international politics, intelligence is only useful if subjected to analysis and evaluation. And since intelligence must be evaluated, that is the nub of the current problem. Plainly, there are some serious problems with current intelligence. Iran is just one example, but there is little to be gained by rehashing newspaper headlines; the various failures of current intelligence (and the successes) are well known. More to the point, it is important to understand how the current structure and processes of American intelligence contribute to those failures, what forces beyond that community's control play a pivotal role, and what can be done to remove the problems.

Summarily, that is the purpose of this and subsequent articles. They have several biases:

1. The American intelligence community has a structural problem that inhibits its effectiveness.

2. The American intelligence community is dominated to an invidious degree by the policymakers, especially the White House.

3. The American intelligence community is obsessed with current intelligence, part of a larger problem: too much policy under pressure.

So much for the biases. As for assumptions, they are fairly straightforward. One, the concern here is with the total intelligence process, which is defined as what happens after the beans are counted. That can be summed up by saying that estimative intelligence — the pro[illegible] basis for decision-making — is the most subtle (and therefore the most difficult) kind of intelligence. It is also the most critical, since, as we shall see, failures in the estimative intelligence process can have the most profound implications. A second assumption: Contrary to general public perception, there is no real problem with intelligence *collection*, except, as indicated earlier, there might be too much of it. So much of it, in fact, thanks to the marvels of modern technology, that estimative intelligence often is in danger of being overwhelmed. A case of the tail wagging the dog.

There are few men of wisdom in the intelligence community who would quarrel with the definition of estimative intelligence once given by Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, former deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence: "We can't tell you what God is going to do on Tuesday of next week. But we probably can tell you when He's getting mad."

Fair enough, but it is well to remember that only one month before the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, a carefully-drawn National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the Soviet Union was "unlikely" to emplace offensive missiles in Cuba. (Luckily, the then-CIA Director John McCone concluded otherwise.)

Preconceptions and Other Biases

But how, in the face of strong evidence — photographic, historical and otherwise — could any analyst have concluded that the Soviet Union had no nefarious designs in Cuba? Were the analysts idiots? Far from it, and that leads to the central point of these articles: It is men who make estimative intelligence, and it is men who are subject to the kinds of pressures, preconceptions, politics and whatever that warp intelligence judgments. The problem with estimative intelligence is not the estimators, but the fact that estimations do not take place in a vacuum. They take place in the context of political pressures and the needs and attitudes of powerful men who do not like to hear evidence contrary to what they are positive is established fact.

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