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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

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The policy that Soviet Russia was to follow in the event of an international war was formulated and worked out in detail over a period of many years. The whole era since 1914 is considered an era of wars which would generate revolutions and of revolutions which generate wars. For, said Lenin, "the world never knew an important revolution which wasnot bound up with war."1/ To this Lenin returned again and again: "The experience of the history of revolutions, of great conflicts, teaches that wars-- series of wars-- are inevitable."2/ This view, incidentally, determined Lenin's wholly hostile attitude towards all disammament programs. He regarded them as material for propaganda and not as matters of realistic policy. For his own country he considered a maximum degree of military strength to be an object of first necessity.

At congresses and in the press problems of the future war were analysed and studied with thoroughness. As the fruit of such studiesthe program theses of 1927 3/ present a most interesting classification of future wars. These fall into three groups:

1/ Lenin: Works, v. 24, p. 122.

2/ Lenin: Speech of December 21, 1920. Works, v.26, p. 12.

3/ The Eighth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, May 29, 1927.

(1) "Wars of imperialist states among themselves." This refers to wars of great powers exclusive of Soviet Russia. The first World War as well as the present one from September 1, 1939, to June 22, 1941, also comes under this definition. In wars of this kind Soviet Russia stands aloof from military operations, while her friends in all the countries actually at war are obliged to followthe traditional rule, i.e., to convert the war into a revolution.

(2) "National revolutionary wars against imperialism, including colonial war." This refers to China, Central Asia and similar territories, where the imperialist side may be represented by France or Holland, or, most commonly, by Britain. In wars of this kind the national and colonial movements are entitled to communist sympathy and help as against the parent states and great powers. Only in the countries of the latter states should war be converted into "civil war", i.e., revolution.

(3) "Wars of capitalist counter-revolution against proletarian revolution and countries of socialist reconstruction." By these are meant wars against Soviet Russia. The policy to be followed here assumes clear outlines. The Soviet Union would defend itself, while the communist parties within the countries of its opponents (Britain and France were held to be the principal opponents) were to hamper the military operations of these governments and as far as possible convert their anti-war activities into a pro-Soviet revolutions. Thus a war against Soviet Russia (a war "on vertical lines") was to be converted

into internal wars in the countriesof her opponents (wars"on horizontal lines").

An interesting fact about this classification is its failure to include the type of war an actual example of which made its appearance after June, 1941, a war involving a coalition of Soviet Russia with Britain and the United States. It cannot be said that a combination of this kind was completely ruled out by Bolshevik theory. Its possibility under certain situationshad to be admitted. But the admission wasmade reluctantly and in termsthat were too general, while in the official program a war alliance between Russia and the principal countries of world capitalism was not even mentioned.

There was a time, in the very beginning of the Soviet regime, when many Bolshevik leadersregarded such a coalition as an outrage againstthe basic principles of their doctrine. Lenin's efforts to teach these leaders realistic politics have already been mentioned in this connection. But, as the years passed, this irreconcilable attitude changed, and the same Bukharin who at one time was so perturbed at the thought of such a colition, later stated in a speech on the communist program:

"We have grown up so much that we can conclude a military alliance with the bourgeoisie of one country and use its help in order to crush the bourgeoisie of another country. This is a question of strategical and technical expediency alone." He could not help foreseeing revolution even in the countries ofhis allies, however: "If as time goes on the bourgeoisie of such an allied country happens to

suffer a defeat, other tasks will arise, which you will easily visualize yourselves." Here the minutes record: ("Laughter of the audience.") 1/

Echoing Bukharin, the draft program spoke of this combination vaguely and as if it were reluctantly: "Since formation of coalitions between proletarian states and certain capitalist states against other bourgeois states is quite permissible, the question of policy in war depends on each individual case." But there was utter clarity in the declaration that in all circumstances "the proletariat of all countries" was obliged not only to defend the Soviet Union, but also "to expand it in order to expand the base of revolution."

Despite the Bolshevik dislike for it, the Soviet-English-French coalition began increasingly to loom as a possiblity as the anti-Soviet trend in German policy grew more and more pronounced after 1933. At the same time it was emphasized with increasing frequency that should such a coalition materialize, Soviet Russia, by virtue of her special position, would wage her own, separate, war. "An answer to every attack on the territory of the USSR", wrote Radek on December 16, 1933, "would be war actions of the Soviet Union. . . But a situation might then arise in which the Soviet Union would be engaged in actions parallel to those of the enemy of its enemy, or would therefore be interested in joint action with him." These cautiously formulated phrases of Izvestia, which were no doubt checked in the Kremlin, were a program of an eventual coalition with Britain and France:

1/ Bukharin: Speech onthe Program of the Communist International, November, 1922.

Firstly, such a coalition could come into being only in the event of an attack (by Germany) on Soviet Russia-- this is an indispensable condition.

Secondly, in such a war the course of action of the Soviet government would be parallel to that of Britain and France who would be not so much allies as "enemies of our enemies". This is none other than the idea of a separate war within the framework of a military coalition.1/

The problem, strictly speaking, received no further study, although it constantly grew in importance. Clarity was deliberately avoided-- the theme was an awkward one. A war coalition of Soviet Russia with Britain and France demanded from the communist parties of those capitalist countries that they support their national governments so long as Soviet Russia was fighting on their side. This was obviously a delicate subject. Atthe Congressof the Communist

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1/ Fifteen years earlier these same principles were set forth in the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Bolshevik Party, which was written by Trotsky and had the approval of Lenin. The resolution said: "In a war with Germany we adopt all means in order to arm and equip our revolutionary army in the best way with all it needs, and to obtain this wherever we can, consequently from the capitalist governments as well. At the same time the Party preservescomplete independence of its foreign policy, undertakes no political obligations towards the capitalist governments, and considers their proposals in each individual case from the standpoint of expediency." In terms of today, the first part of this resolution might be described asdealing with lend-lease aid, and the second part, with a separate war.

International in 1935, after stating that the main task of the communists of the world is "to help bring about a victory of the Red Army by anymeans and at any cost", the delegate Ercoli, presenting the official report, evaded the concrete problem:

"If anybody asks us what this position means and how we are going to act . . . we can give a single answer-- in each given case we shall act as Marxists . . . We have a leader,Comrade Stalin, who has always found the line that led to victory . . ." 1/

This was the report offered. At first glance, it may appear to be very little-- "act as Marxists", "we have Stalin". After fifteen yearsof theoretical studies and of practice based of these studies- after volumes of resolutions-- the statement sou nded like an admission of confusion, a loss of orientation. Actually, there was hidden in it something of great significance. It was the admission that henceforth communism would not always be able to conduct its foreign policy in the open, with its strategy publicly announced; that its policy would not be the product of collective discussion by all communist parties; that certain inevitable actions would have to be taken which to many would be unexpected and incomprehensible; that complete power and authority would be placed in the hands of the leader; and that obedience, even to sometimes imcomprehensible directions, was the chief duty of all the component elements of world communism. When there is a storm at sea, the prime duty of everyone aboard the ship is to obey the captain; Argument and discussion cannot be tolerated.

1/ The Communist International,1935, No. 23-24.

International in 1935, after stating that the main task of the communists of the world is "to help bring about a victory of the Red Arm

Not freedom of action, but order and military discipline are what is needed. And only the captain knows what course to follow and what is to be done at every moment.

This was the antitheses of the simmering political movement, the lively exchange of views, the struggle of ideas, of the early 20's when the Communist International was being founded. Properly speaking, the old pattern of the Communist Internation became superfluous if the only standard was "we have theleader". It was not without reason that many years later, on May 15, 1943, the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in deciding to dissolve itsorganization, cited that congress of 1935, which thus became its last congress. If strategy is the businessof the Commander in Chief, congresses are useless.

During these years Europe was being given an object lesson in foreign policy by Berlin, a lesson which dimmed the reputation of traditional international diplomacy. It was demonstrated tha t the grandest aims could be achieved by the crudest of methods. The Fuehrer was arming Germany,but swore that his only object was "equality of rights" for Germany,not war-- and people were much impressed. He was building amighty air fleet, but only as a defense against the Soviet air fleet, he asserted, and many accept ed the statement at its face value. He annexed territories, but each time swore that he would never do it again-- and there were sighs of relief in the chancelleries. He never tired of "guaranteeing the frontiers" and of making platitudinous speeches about peace--and he was almost believed. The

crudest form of deception proved to be a first class weapon in world politics, while wise international diplomacy, grey with age, showed itself as a little girl, inexperienced, studpid and repeatedly deceived.

All this helped to intensify the Moscow tendency toward authoritarianism. Let the leadermake history. This was no time for schemes, systems and principles. Abstractions were to yield places to vigorous action, to "realistic policy". Communism entered the war with this mental attitude, an attitude which in turn determined Soviet war policy. There was no pronunciation of communism--only a new strategy.

Communist thought now proceeded from the promise that, in its scope and intensity, the new seriesof wars and internal upsets was unprecedented in history and therefore demanded a special home and foreign policy. The Soveit State which expected to be involved in the war must, even before the war broke out, and especially during the course of the war, turn itself into a military camp with rigid discipline,and subordination. In anticipation of the reverses and retreats inevitable in all conflicts, among political reefs, of concluding new alliances and breaking off old ones, the leader was to be invested with absolute authority and be given the right to lead without being compelled to explain his military plans and his diplomacy when it was important that these be kept secret. To thisend the leader must be raised so high above the masses that nobody would dare to criticize him. His infallibility was to be the way to invincibility.

Opposition wasnot to be tolerated either on the eve of the war or during its progress. Doubts cause criticisms, criticisms opposition

opposition internal strife, and strife may mean defeat. Doubters must de destroyed. It is better to destroy a thousand innocent people than to have the common cause destroyed. In war, not relaxation but tightening of the reins of the regime isnecessary. It might be a good thing, perhaps, in order to prevent some serious defeats, to give the generals officers and strategists more freedom. But possibly they would reach a war concept that was opposed to the leader's! No, it was safer to risk a retreat than to relax the reins on the officers. It might be a good thing, perhaps, to make some concessions to the peasants and raise their spirits, if only by promises of future reforms. But was it possible, in starting campaigns for a new social order, to make concessions at the same time to the old order at home? It mightbe better,perhaps, to release from their places of confinement, hundreds of thousands of people and to enlist them in the work of defense. But so much resentment must have accumulated in the breasts of these people that it would be necessary either to continue on the part of concessions,or to return them to their distant places of confinement. No, better no concessions to anybody--no compacts with any movements--no amnesty, no democratic laxigy, no political liberties.

Applied to foreign policy this trend of thought leads to an independent, separate war. Of course, at each stage of it one has to look for allies, and to reckon with them when they are found. But allies may change--inevitably they will change. Time was when the friendship with Germany was regarded as "cemented by blood". Later,the

Moscow radio would repeat, "Long live democracy!" at frequent intervals. Later still, drinking a toast to President Roosevelt, Moscow would exclaim: "God help him in his efforts!" Later, again, promises would be given to Japan that strict neutrality would be observed. Then the Communist International would be dissolved. It is important therefore not to merge with the allies, not to become dissolved in the democratic sea. A common war-- that was possible, but post war aims remained different. The own road is the best road.

Another problem related to the coming war occupied the minds of the communist leaders as much as it formerly had. This was the problem of the revolutionary consequences of the war. The axiom and basic thesis were still found in Lenin's idea that every deepgoing revolution was bound up with a war, and that in our epoch big wars engendered revolutions.

In the case of a purely imperialist war (i.e., one in which Russia did not participate) revolutionary events could occur in the countries of either coalition or of both; while in a war against the Soviet Union, revolutionary upheavals, it was expected, would shake the countries attacking Russia. Hence, from 1934 on, threat of revolution was one of the arguments used against Germany and Japan. Stalin, for example, spoke in January, 1934, in these words:

"The situation is developing towards a new imperialist war. . . But where is the guaranty that the second imperialist war will give better results than the first? On the contrary, it is bound to tangle up the situation still more. Moreover, it will be certain to unloose the revolution and will challenge the very existence of capitalism in many countries, as occurred in the course of the first imperialist war."

As regards the countries that would venture to attack the Soviet Union, Stalin said, on the same occasion:

"It is scarcely possible to doubt that the second war against the Soviet Union will lead to a complete defeat of the attackers, a revolution in several countries of Europe and Asia, and a route of the bourgeois-landowner governments".

"Let not the gentlemen of the bourgeoisie blame us if on the morrow of such a war there are missing from the scene some favored governments now, by the Grace of God, reigning safely. If the bourgeoisie chooses the path of war, the working class chooses the path of revolution." 1/

These categorical statements about the war-revolution and the extensive literature popularizing their ideas marked the middle 30's, the period when Moscow witnessed a growing interest in the glorification of ancient national heroes, especially military ones, and whom the new national notes in Soviet expressions of patriotism began to attract the attention of the outside world. This embryonic nationalism was readily interpreted as Moscow's renunciation of all aims other than those related to national defense. "Evolution of Bolshevism" was again the favorite topic in all languages. Side by side with these trends, however the unimpaired soundness of the traditional communist ideas was constantly stressed by the Communist leaders. In this there was no real contradiction. As formerly, "turning an imperialist war into a civil war" was held to be the policy during a war. 2/

In 1938, almost on the eve of the war, an old article of Stalin's on "Three Characteristics of the Red Army" was reprinted in the Soviet press and in the form of hundreds of thousands of pamphlets. In this

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1/ Stalin: Speech at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party.

2/ See, for example, Resolution of the Congress of the Communist International of 1935.

article Stalin saw as the first characteristic of the Red Army its function as "an instrument of the workers' and peasants' rule", and the second characteristic in its being an army "of the brotherhood of peoples of our country", of all the nations comprising the Soviet Union. But the third characteristic was this:

"Our Army", wrote Stalin, "is an army of the world revolution, an army of the workers of all countries"; for, as Stalin went on to explain, it was trained and educated in the spirit of internationalism. A blend of old internationalism with Soviet nationalism has been the basic line of communist ideology of the last decade. Revolution was not repudiated, nor was communism, but the supreme consideration was the safeguarding of the Soviet Union. Nucleus of world communism, the Soviet Union was the only fatherland, and its defence, a national task for the Russians was an international task for all communists. Hence, expansion of Soviet territory also became a goal of world communism-- a peculiar substitute for revolution.

For among the many prophesies and prognostications of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin which eventually came true, one very important one failed to materialize. The prediction of "a series of terrible wars" after the peace treaties of 1918-19 came true. The diagnosis of the world situation as one of unstable equilibrium, and the appraisal of the role of Soviet Russia in contributing to that instability were correct. The conviction, offered as counsel to others, that it is impossible to appease Hitler, and the assertion in 1938 that "war is already on" were

also right. But over a period of twenty-five years these evaluations of facts of international relations were invariably accompanied by predictions of internal revdutionary shocks resulting from international crises. The shocks, the decisive political battles, however, never materialized; internal cirses of revolutionary nature grew ever fewer; at the same time, where internal shocks did occur, they bore an anti-revolutionary rather than revolutionary character. The whole world had moved far to the right in the past twenty years, and only by looking through the perspective of these years can one realize the great extent of this shift. In no country did "war against war" assume anything like the proportions of a strong popular movement. In no country was there anything remotely suggesting conversion of "an international war into a civil war." In particular, the expectation of an anti-war movement in Germany in the case of war also remained unrealized. But how many sincere hopes were attached in Moscow to this scientific prediction!

The invariable failure, over a period of a quarter of a century, of all promises and expectations of victorious revolutions has had its effect on Russian communism. Today it is no longer confident that the new war will yield different results. The war is already more than half through, is probably drawing to a close, but no important revolutionary movements have been observed anywhere. The old tenet that the world is "in a helpless situation" until revolution opens a new road, is no longer unreservedly accepted. More and more frequently this statement of Lenin's is quoted:

"There are no absolutely helpless situations. . . To try to prove in advance a case of absolute helplessness would be mere pedantry, playing with ideas and catchwords. In this and similar questions the true 'proof' can be supplied only by practice."

If a war could end without revolutions, it was all the more important that the sphere of the only Soviet state be expanded. This form of expansion of the sphere of communism implied a division of the task of communism in the war into a number of individual tasks:

(1) In Soviet Russia, a victory over the German coalition and the expansion of the Soviet sphere.

(2) In countries adjacent to Soviet Russia, creation of pro-Soviet or pro-Russian movements acting in opposition to their former government.

(3) In countries allied with Soviet Russia, support of their war effort, and especially support of future Soviet claims to an ex-

tended sphere of influence.

(4) In countries of the German coalition and in occupied Europe, -- the only countries in which the old revolutionary scheme remained intact-- creation of revolutionary movements.

This last group was also the only one which fitted into the framework of the old Communist International.

Experience has shown that the outside world, and the great allies of Soviet Russia in particular, are reconciled to possible territorial changes, but are painfully sensitive to so-called "Sovietization" of new territories, i.e., to the expansion of communism. In other words, to these countries nationalism and its aims are more acceptable than communism. As a counterpart to this, past experience, especially that of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-40, demonstrated to the Soviet government how great a mistake it is to conduct a war which has the Communist International for its sponsor.

When at the end of November 1939, the Soviet government decided on a war with Finland there was immediately formed a new Finnish government made up of prominent members of the Communist International with Otto Kuusinen at their head. The outside world saw in this the confirmation of the view that the Communist International was an organ of communist imperialism. At the time this impression caused considerable damage to the efforts of Soviet diplomacy. Opponents of the Soviets gained new adherents in those who were ready to recognize the rights of Russia to new "strategic frontiers" in Finland. Dissolution of the Kuusinen government in March 1940, was a notable defeat for the Soviets.

The fact was noted in Moscow. When the new war broke out

it was decided not to repeat the error. Both communism and the Communist International were pushed into the background. "Communist International", the old official journal of the organization bearing its name, no longer appeared in a number of foreign language editions--English, French, German, and Spanish-- and even its Russian edition was forbidden for mailing to other countries. Communist parties in many countries were also driven into the background.

National slogans replaced communist slogans. "Slav conferences" a non-party Union of Polish Patriots, a non-party movement of Yugoslav guerrillas, non-party newspapers, non-party broadcasts in all languages from Moscow, appeals to the religious elements in neighboring countries--these and similar activities took the place of the work of the Communist International. The more insistent the discussions of war aims between Moscow, London and Washington, the clearer the claims of Moscow to Eastern Europe, the more dangerous, even harmful, the Communist International became. "You say you do not aim at extending your frontiers?" the press of the world asked Moscow. "Very well, But you have another firm, the Communist International, and under the name of this firm you will be sovietizing other countries."

From the point of view of communist policy the Communist International had to be "liquidated". The actual disbandment came, if anything, too late. But at the moment of the Soviet-Polish rupture. (April-May, 1943) when the world, looking to the precedents of 1919 and 1920, expected the appointment of a new Polish government by Moscow, the Soviet government, overcoming

its previous hesitation, dissolved the International and thus disarmed the critics. Though delayed, the dissolution of the International justified Moscow hopes: it was appraised by many as a breaking away from a program of international communism, which was precisely what Moscow desired.

It would be, however, a great mistake to overlook the fact that the Russian leaders keep loyally to the banner of the dissolved organization and that they have called it up with the same feelings and the same hopes with which the American soldiers rolled up their banners on Batan. As late as 1938, in his "History of the Communist Party", Stalin deemed it necessary to repeat the oath he gave over the grave of Lenin:

"On leaving us Lenin bade us be loyal to the principles of the Communist International. We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will not spare our lives in fortifying and expanding the union of the toilers of the whole world, the Communist International!"

The thing that mattered to Stalin was not the form, the outer garb, but the inner content. He made no attempt to conceal it in his comments on the dissolution of the International. He saw the advantage of the act in making it impossible to suspect Moscow of the intention of interfering in the life of other peoples and of bolshevizing them. At the same time, in his opinion, the dissolution would facilitate the unification of popular, i.e., pro-Soviet, movements, "regardless of party affiliation or religious faith,

into a single camp of national liberation." 1/

Similarly, the Executive Committee of the Communist International in its resolution of May 22, 1943, proposing to dissolve the organization, referred to the precedent of the American Communist Party, which had been out of the International since 1940. Henceforth all the national parties were to have the same status as that of the American party.

Plainly, nothing was farther from Moscow's thoughts than to deprive itself of such a forceful weapon of world policy as the power to direct the activities of numerous parties in other countries. Coordination and management of those activities are more necessary to the Soviet government now than at any time before. Never in the history of Soviet Russia was there a moment when aid from inside Britain and America and from the neighboring European countries was more important than it is towards the end of this war.

The mortality rate among international political organizations is very high, and nearly always the cause of death is internal strife. The latest example was the League of Nations. The Communist International was spared this fate. Its existence was not threatened at the moment of its dissolution, by the internal struggle of the national parties which composed it, and there is today no reason to expect any disagreements or antagonisms>

1/ Stalin: Letter to Reuter's correspondent King, May 29, 1943.

which would set the communists of one country against those of another-- the communists of America or of Britain, for example, against those of France or Russia. The single leadership, the guiding iron hand, the instructions and material help continue without the official Communist International.

An independent policy in the countries of occupied Europe, acting as a counterpoise to the policies of the London governments-in-exile, has played a prominent role in the activities of the Soviet government both before and since the dissolution of the Communist International.

As a military factor guerrilla warfare has played an important part in this war for all governments. During the long period of the German occupation each government-in-exile has worked out its own system of relations with the fighting groups of its country, and at the same time the strategy and tactics in the struggle against the forces of the invaders gradually assumed a definite form in each of these countries. Secret printing presses, counterfeit documents, armament, acts of sabotage, extent of military activity -- these are the questions which guerrilla warfare has had to answer constantly, and of which the outside world has known next to nothing. Every military act of the guerrillas produced inevitable counter-measures on the part of the occupying forces and inevitable victims from among the innocent population. The more intense the fighting action, the greater the number of victims; while an attempt at a popular uprising, even of local scope, was doomed to be drowned in rivers of blood and to lead to wholesale razing of towns and villages. The strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare therefore presented problems of exceptional difficulty. These were solved in different ways, according to the circumstances of each case. By and large, however, the dominant tendency in this warfare has been not to stake everything on a single opera-

tion, to spare the population, and to wait for the approach of the Allied armies before setting in motion a general uprising.

The governments-in-exile tried to time strong popular movements to the moment when the Allied armies approach their particular lands, and when national uprisings can be transformed into military operations in line with those of the liberating armies. In the interim they confined themselves to paving the way for the future and, through their agents, to organizing single acts of resistance. Revolts of disarmed populations having no chance of success without help from outside, would only serve the Germans as a pretext to drown whole nations in blood. Great devastation, deep despondency and a breakdown of morale among the tormented nations would be the result of such tactics.

In the ideology and practice of Moscow, guerrilla warfare has occupied quite a different place. Here is was viewed as a peculiar synthesis of a military, anti-German organization with a popular revolutionary movement. The largely voluntary character of the guerrilla bands, their self-imposed discipline, their highly secret and dangerous operations, brought them close to the type of traditional underground revolutionary organizations.

This view of guerrilla warfare was taken over directly from the Russian civil war of 1918-20, in which guerrillas played a highly important role. Since those days the association of guerrilla warfare with revolutionary fighting has taken deep roots, whence the great importance of the question of guerrilla movements in Soviet interna-

tional policy. In eastern Europe guerrilla organizations have become the points of support for building the future sphere of Soviet influence, and in western Europe they became nuclei of revolution.

At first their activities were directed only against the Axis powers. Their banners carried only patriotic, national slogans. They promised all freedoms at home and accused Hitler of suppressing religion, particularly the Catholic religion. But what differentiated them from other national movements was their methods, not slogans--their mass attacks, uprisings, seizure of territories, whatever the price that had to be paid for them. These popular movements of revolutionary character, as they spread wider, rose higher in their aims, and changed with the change of political conditions, were to be transformed into the great revolutionary movement which had been awaited by the communists throughout the past quarter century.

Since the second half of 1942 this policy began to develop on a growing scale in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France and other countries. Everywhere its progress followed a more or less uniform pattern, for it was guided from a single center. The question around which everything revolved was this: Was the resistance to be active or passive? Was the attitude to be one of expectancy or one of offensive? Moscow broadcasts in all the Slav languages and Moscow representatives in all the occupied countries were calling for an activity which, growing from day to day, was to lead spontaneously to great popular uprisings against the German and Italian rule. Demands for such activity were addressed from Moscow to all the London governments-in-

exile, although everybody was aware that these demands would meet with refusal.

"Partisan warfare", the Communist International wrote in January 1943, "is at present becoming the universal form of strength of the oppressed peoples, and will play a role of the first importance at the decisive stage of the struggle . . . Armed partisan warfare is necessary in order to prepare a national armed uprising which is to complete the struggle for the driving out of the occupants". This was a clear statement of the program of revolution at the final stage of the war.

The question of guerrilla warfare caused and intensified conflicts between Moscow and London. The first, although not the most serious, conflict related to the Yugoslav question and the struggle between the opponents and supporters of the War Minister, General Draha Mihailovich.

The communist radio station "Free Yugoslavia" accused the Yugoslav government and its supporters of "proclaiming the slogan of inaction, of patient waiting for better times"; because of this, "the Yugoslav guerrillas had to engage in a struggle not only against the troops of the occupation but also against the traitors, the Chetniks of Gen. Mihailovich." This internal struggle which at times became sanguinary was directed against some very influential and by no means inactive military organizations of Gen. Mihailovich. The London radio, speaking in the name of the Yugoslav government, demanded subordina-

tion of all fighting forces to Mihailovich. But "Free Yugoslavia" (from Russia) replied:

"How can the National Army of Liberation and the guerrilla groups be required to submit to Mihailovich who, together with his Chetniks, as has been proved by documents, is taking part in the offensive of the armies of occupation against our resisting people? . . . The struggling Yugoslav people are being stabbed in the back by the so-called Mihailovich Chetniks, who are everywhere fighting on the side of the occupants helping them to suppress Yugoslav guerrillas."

Guerrilla bands entrenched themselves in some Yugoslav districts (mainly in Bosnia), set up a local administration, and established communications with Moscow. The Yugoslav government accused these groups of having set up "small Soviet republics." The guerrillas, for their part, called themselves "patriots", conducted their propaganda on a national, not a class, basis and tried to enlist the support of the clergy, while one of the planks in their program was freedom of religion in opposition to the German war on Christianity. "Are these the soviet republics we are building?" "Free Yugoslavia" asked. "Isn't it ridiculous to assert that Father Karamakevich and dozens of other priests are building soviet republics in Yugoslavia?"

Actually, all the support of this movement came from Moscow and, with its goal looming in the future, it was, if not officially "Soviet", still the "People's" Yugoslavia for which the government, the army and the patronage of a great power were ready and waiting.

Somewhat later than in Yugoslavia, the situation in Poland followed a similar development, except for the fact that neither the Polish government in London nor the revolutionists in Poland had large military forces to back them. The inner struggle, however, was over the same question: passiveness or action?

"Can the people be mobilized under the banner of passiveness?" the Polish Wolna Polska (Moscow) asked. "Can the people be mobilized under the banner of waiting? . . . They will be wrong who hope by means of insinuations to dip a gulf between the fighting guerrillas, the people's vanguard, and the nation as a whole. Who, giving orders from abroad, can forbid the people to engage in active struggle? . . . We regard propaganda of the policy of passiveness, of waiting, as treason to the interests of Poland . . . The lying arguments about avoiding the sacrifices of unncessary victims cannot withstand criticism."1/

To these appeals from Moscow and to certain guerrilla acts in Poland, Premier Sikorski replied from London:

"I cannot give orders for a revolt because I shoud risk downing my nation in a sea of blood."

At that time the Soviets were landing parachutists in Poland for the purpose of organizing "cells of resistance" and a series of uprisings. Sikorski protested this "interference with Poland's inner affairs". When some of the parachutists perished, Moscow put the blame on the Polish government, but it was declared in London that "the Polish government had given no such orders". Thus in Poland, too, civil war was assuming a sanguinary form.

1/ Wolna Polska, March 1, 1943.

Sikorski's protest brought on himself and his government, "the apostles of passiveness", a sharp attack from the "Polish Patriots" in Moscow:

"The Premier has no need to offer excuses for not proclaiming the slogan of uprising. But an uprising is not a Chinese dragon which leaps out of a box when one presses the button . . . The Premier cannot summon to an uprising, but he does proclaim the slogan of waiting with clear conscience . . . Now those who set out to battle the enemy must fear not only the German bayonet, but also a shot from behind a corner, a treacherous stab in the back." 1/

Similar events were taking place even in Czechoslovakia in spite of her repeated protestations of loyal cooperation and of friendliest relations with Moscow. Directions beamed in the Czech language by Moscow broadcasts were of a much more radical nature than those from London. While Premier Benes recommended "watchful waiting", the Communist organis accused him of spreading "sentimental slush". Far-reaching plans have been devised also in regard to Czechoslovak units formed in Russia under Colonel Svoboda, whose military sucfesses had been stressed in the Pravda.

On guerrilla warfare in Czechoslovakia the Communist International had this to say:

"The weakness of the Czech national struggle lies in the fact that in Czechoslovakia they still wait for liberation from outside, as a result of the defeat of the Hitlerite armies on the war fronts. It

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1/ Wolna Polska, No.2

is no longer possible to wait patiently for the development of military events at the front-- it is necessary to organize fighting activity in Czechia and Slovakia. But among the members of the Popular Front (i.e., between the Czech Communist Party, on one side, and the Benes and socialist parties on the other) there are differences of opinion as regards the possibility and expediency of armed partisan warfare against the occupants."1/

Moreover, these tactics were not confined to the Slav nations. The same problems arose in western Europe. On May 13, 1943, commenting on leaflets which had been circulated in Holland and which called for a general uprising, the Dutch radio in London said: "Do not let yourself be provoked". This was accompanied by the statement that appeals to direct action were actually playing into the hands of the Germans who were waiting to pounce on Holland with heavy reprisals.

As in other occupied countries, the French communists were building their own guerrilla movement. "Free Riflemen" argued bitterly against those who denied the possibility of forming guerrilla armies in France, in view of the absence of mountains in most parts of the country.

Maurice Thorez, the leader of the French communists, who stayed at Moscow during the war years (the French military tribunal passed a sentence on him as a deserter during the time of the Soviet-German pact), came out in the autumn of 1942 with bitter denunciations of

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1/ Communist International, 1943, No. 1.

"believers in waiting who, it is said, are waiting for the Second Front", "the irresolute people doubting the necessity of immediate, energetic action", and the people who criticize "partisan activity and all forms of fighting action". "Passiveness is dangerous!", Thorez was exclaiming. 1/

On May 9th, 1943, General Giraud considered it necessary to address the French people in the following words:

"Above all, do not grow impatient. Do not give any pretext for savage and sanguinary repression. Wait until we are ready to strike together, from the North as well as from the South, from the East as well as from the West."

General De Gaulle was undoubtedly personally of the same opinion, but the participation of Communists in his organization probably prevented him from making a similar declaration.

1/ Communist International, 1942, Nos. 8-9.

Russian guerrillas operating in the rear of the German army were one thing. Their purpose was the same as that of guerrillas of every army in every war: they were disrupting the front and the supply lines of the enemy. Partisan activity under Communist leadership in occupied countries was another thing. Here the leaders tried to direct the burning hatred of the populace into another channel.

In the Communist concept, the partisan movement has many of the features of a revolutionary civil struggle: complete secrecy, mutual responsibility, centralized leadership, methods of armed fighting, and strict discipline. This is precisely the idea of a revolution as entertained by Russian Bolshevism until 1917. The history of the Comintern records a number of rebellious and general strikes which were paid for with large numbers of victims, although the futility of these rebellions and strikes could easily have been foreseen. Rebellions of this kind weakened the resistance of various nations to different kinds of European fascism.

The chief aim of the new organizations of war time, bearing different names but similar in essence, was to create a basis for post-war movements in which the anti-German motif would be replaced by another. In Moscow, international relations of the near future are viewed very soberly, and it is considered highly probable that the European nations will have to choose between East and West, between London and Moscow. It is possible that the weaker nations will be compelled to lean upon one of the two surviving great powers in Europe.

Thus the struggle inside the occupied nations described above is even now taking the definite shape of a contest between orientation toward Russia on the one hand and orientation toward the Anglo-American bloc on the other . . . It is only natural that the Soviets are leaving nothing undone to prepare and strengthen their position for that, possibly not far-off, time.

In the opinion of Moscow the eight governments-in-exile in London are capitalist governments ready for treason. Because of their capitalist interests they are not active enough in their struggle against Germandand Italian fascism. In contrast to them, the patriotic workers of those countries are rallying around the Communists, and are beginning to change their attitude of waiting to an attitude of action, to guerrilla warfare and to open revolt. Thus, not two but three forces are involved in the struggle in occupied Europe: the foreign conqueror on one side, the intransigent, revolutionary proletariat on the other, and between them, the "national Bourgeoisie", which throws its weight now on one scale, now on the other.

Such is the latest concept of Moscow about things in Europe, a concept which grew from mere theory to actual practice in 1943.

In the foregoing account only the occupied countries have been dealt with. Hungary and Rumania, even Germany, have been omitted from the list. Yet in the great post-war perspective visualized by Moscow, Germany stands in front of all other countries of the world. It may be said without exaggeration that for Moscow everything depends on the post-war future of Germany and her inner political development.