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1	DCI		✓		
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13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA	✓	(D)		
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	NIC/NBA		✓	(2)	
21					
22					
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Remarks:

Executive Secretary

5/20/83

Date

3617 (10-81)

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State Dept. review completed



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SUBJECT:

SIG on NSSD 4-82

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FORM 8-82 **26** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(40)

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 20, 1983

SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO: Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs

Robert Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

David Pickford
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

William V. Vitale
Director, Office of the Executive
Secretariat
Department of Energy

Executive Secretariat
Central Intelligence Agency

Lt. Col. Dennis J. Stanley
Special Assistant for NSC Affairs
Joint Chiefs of Staff

FROM: NEA - James A. Black *per*

SUBJECT: SIG on NSSD-4/82: State Issue Paper on the Role of
Israel

Attached is State's Issue Paper on the Role of Israel for
discussion in connection with NSSD-4/82 at the meeting to be
held next week.

Drafted: NEA/RA: PCWilcox, Jr: bam
5/20/83 X21154 WANG 655A(p2)

CIA TS 830129
COPY *[Signature]*

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"Israel's principal role against a Soviet threat should be the use of its air and naval power to help defend the eastern Mediterranean. It might also provide intelligence, overflight and access rights, and use of its medical and maintenance facilities. We do not envisage the direct use of Israeli forces in the Southwest Asian region, nor extensive U.S. use of Israeli bases. United States defense cooperation with Israel focused on Southwest Asia would make military access to other states of the region difficult."

In regard to the substantive issue, the context in which Israel is a "strategic asset" for the United States has been the subject of prolonged debate. While there is general agreement on the desirability of planning for an Israeli role in scenarios involving Soviet forces in the eastern Mediterranean, there is no agreement on the feasibility of even the military utility of using Israeli facilities and forces in Southwest Asian scenarios, except perhaps to neutralize Syria or Soviet forces operating out of Syria.

This disagreement arises from differing assessments of the reaction of the Arab and Islamic states of the region to both: (a) an awareness of US-Israeli military planning and cooperation directed toward meeting a Soviet thrust, and (b) actual conduct of operations involving Israel in the event of Soviet aggression. One view is that either the Arabs already believe that there is US-Israeli planning or that planning could be conducted secretly to avoid adverse reactions. This view holds that in the event of a Soviet thrust, the gravity of the situation would submerge regional antagonisms, at least temporarily, in favor of meeting a common foe. Another view is that covert cooperation is not possible and that the states of the region regard Israel as the most immediate danger to their security and political cohesion -- with concerns about Soviet designs secondary. What these states regard as Israel's willingness to use force beyond its borders to promote its security interests, the prospect that Israel would not readily withdraw from territory occupied in military operations, and perceived U.S. inability to control these actions, could drive some toward accommodation with the Soviets or at least prevent them from cooperating with us should it become known that the U.S. and Israel cooperate on Southwest Asian security.

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ISSUE: INCORPORATING STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL
INTO NSSD-4 (SOUTHWEST ASIA STRATEGY) AND THE
SUBSEQUENT NSDD

DISCUSSION

There is a procedural concern arising from the sensitivity of Southwest Asian governments to this issue, i.e., should the Israeli role be discussed in NSSD-4? Exposure of the rationale for US-Israeli joint planning could disrupt our continuing efforts with moderate Arab states to gain access to crucial facilities, pre-position equipment and conduct joint planning and exercises. Controversy arising from such exposure could jeopardize our present level of security cooperation in the region, possibly inducing basic changes in our bilateral relations and adversely affecting the credibility of our capacity to project force into the region. Early exposure could also interfere with our strategy to obtain Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and with our efforts to move forward the peace process.

Because of the possible severity of the consequences of further public disclosure of US-Israeli military planning, this risk should be minimized. Because of the danger of NSSD-4 or the subsequent decision document being leaked, it would be advisable to remove language from the current study which defines or refers to a role for Israel in Southwest Asia. This role could be considered in a restricted group, with the results recorded separately. Experience with publicity, in both the U.S. and Israel, about sensitive matters affecting policies in the region, suggests that exceptional procedures are warranted.

Alternatively, and preferably in the view of the Department of Defense, the following could be substituted for the present paragraph five on page 40, with other references to an Israeli role in Southwest Asia being removed from pages 43, 46 and 47:

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WASHFAX RECEIPT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

20 MAY 1983 13 42

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S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 933 CLASSIFICATION SECRET SENSITIVENo. Pages 3FROM: POWllcox, Jr.NEA/RA211545254A(Officer name)(Office symbol)(Extension)(Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NSSD-4/82 Meeting Schedule memoTO: (Agency)

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REMARKS:

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