EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	✓			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	NIO/USSR-EE		✓		
21					
22					
	SUSPENSE				

Date

Remarks:

STAT

9/10/87
Date

3637 (10-81)

PRIORITY

Form No. 160 Use Previous Editions (13)
1 Dec 56

ES SENSITIVE
8227068

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Executive Registry
82-5746/1

September 9, 1982

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Interagency Group No. 30

TO :OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
ACDA - Mr. Joseph Presel
USDA - Mr. Raymond Lett
CIA - [redacted] 25X1
Commerce - Mrs. Helen Robbins
Defense - COL John Stanford
JCS - MAJ Dennis Stanley
Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
UNA - Amb. Harvey Feldman
USIA - Ms. Teresa Collins

SUBJECT: Draft NSSD 11-82

In response to tasking assigned by Interagency Group No. 30 on August 27, the attached State draft, with Defense inputs, addresses topics 4 & 5 of NSSD 11-82. In accordance with instructions contained in NSSD 11-82, addressees should handle this material on a strict need-to-know basis.

There will a meeting of the IG chaired by Assistant Secretary Designate Richard Burt at 3:00 p.m., September 14 in Room 6226, Department of State. The meeting will consider the draft submissions by State/Defense and CIA and consider next steps in the policy review process.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

SEP 10 10 43 AM '82

ER

Attachments:

1. State Draft

DCI EXEC REG

SECRET/SENSITIVE

L118 NSSD 11-82

II. Meeting the Soviet Challenge

The Soviet propensity for challenging the West and running risks to undermine U.S. interests requires a sustained Western response if Soviet ambitions are to be frustrated. It is also clear that the necessary firm and measured long-term Western response to the Soviet challenge requires that the United States exercise fully its capacity for leadership. This demands a comprehensive, long-term U.S. effort to induce Soviet restraint by shaping the environment in which Soviet policy decisions are made.

A. Shaping the Soviet Environment

(1) The Military Balance

Foremost in shaping the military environment Moscow faces is the US-Soviet military balance. The U.S. must modernize its military forces so that several goals are achieved:

--Soviet leaders must perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second-place or deteriorating strategic posture. Doubts about the military capabilities of U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent forces, or about the U.S. will to use them if necessary, must never exist;

--Soviet calculations of possible nuclear war outcomes, under any contingency, must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for the Soviet leaders to initiate a nuclear attack;

--Leaders and the publics in all states must be able to observe that this indicator of U.S. strength remains at a position of parity or better. They will then understand that U.S. capacity for pursuing the broader US-Soviet competition shall not be encumbered by direct Soviet coercion of the U.S.;

--The future of U.S. military strength must also appear to friend and foe as strong: technological advances must be exploited, research and development vigorously pursued, and sensible follow-on programs undertaken so that the viability of U.S. deterrent policy is not placed in question.

In Europe, the Soviet leadership must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO focused on three primary tasks: strengthening of conventional forces, modernization of intermediate-range nuclear forces, and improved mobility and sustainability for U.S. units assigned rapid deployment and other reinforcing missions to the NATO area and Southwest Asia. Worldwide, U.S. general-purpose forces must be ready to move quickly from peacetime to wartime roles, and must be flexible to affect Soviet calculations in a wide range of contingencies.

The US-Soviet military balance is also a critical determinant shaping Third World perceptions of the relative positions and influence of the two major powers. Moscow must know with certainty that, in addition to the obvious priority of North American defense, Eurasian and other areas of vital interest to the U.S. will be defended against Soviet attacks or threats. But it must know also that areas less critical to U.S. interests cannot be attacked or threatened without serious risk of U.S. military support and of potential confrontation in that or some other area.

(2) Cooperation with Our Allies:

One of the central propositions of U.S. foreign policy throughout the post-war period has been that an effective response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial democracies. At the same time, there will continue to be inevitable tensions between our unwillingness to give the allies a veto over our Soviet policy, and our need for allied support in making our policy work. More effective procedures for consultation with our allies can contribute to the building of consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. However, we must recognize that, on occasion, we may be forced to act to protect our vital interests without allied support and even in the face of allied opposition.

Our allies have been slow to support in concrete ways our overall approach to East-West relations. In part because of the intensive program of consultation we have undertaken, allied governments have expressed rhetorical support for our assessment of the Soviet military challenge, our rearmament program, and our negotiating positions in START and INF. Less progress has been made in obtaining allied action in the vital areas of upgrading conventional defense and in planning for joint military action to protect vital Western interests in the developing world, particularly the Persian Gulf. With INF deployments scheduled to begin in 1983, West European governments will come under increasing domestic pressure to press us for progress in START and INF. In the likely absence of an acceptable INF agreement with Moscow, we may need during 1983 to subordinate some other policy initiatives with our allies to the overriding objective of obtaining allied action to move forward on INF deployments.

Although it will be more difficult to achieve a durable consensus with our allies on East-West economic issues, we must seek to do so. The current intra-alliance dispute over exports for the pipeline underscores European (and Japanese) unwillingness to support a strategy which they see as aimed at undermining the detente of the 1970s. Nonetheless, we must continue to persevere in this painful process of reeducating our European partners. At the same time, our ability to convey a sense that the U.S. is open

to the possibility of improved relations with the USSR if Moscow moderates its behavior will be important to obtaining allied support.

(3) Third World Cooperation

As in the 1970s, the cutting edge of the Soviet challenge to vital U.S. interests in this decade is likely to be in the Third World. Thus, we must continue our efforts to rebuild the credibility of our commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on our interests and those of our allies and friends and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures. We must where possible erode the advances of Soviet influence in the developing world made during the 1970s.

Given the continued improvement of Moscow's force projection capabilities and the Soviet emphasis on arms aid to pro-Soviet Third World clients, any effective U.S. response must involve a military dimension. U.S. security assistance and foreign military sales play an important role in shaping the security environment around the periphery of the USSR and beyond Eurasia. But security assistance will not be enough unless we make clear to the Soviets and to our friends that the U.S. is prepared to use its own military forces where necessary to protect vital U.S. interests and support endangered friends and allies. Above all, we must be able to demonstrate the capability and the will for timely action to bring U.S. resources to bear in response to fast-moving events in Third World trouble spots.

An effective U.S. policy in the Third World must also involve diplomatic initiatives (e.g., the President's Mid-East proposal, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the Namibia initiative) to promote the resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation. The U.S. should counter, and if possible weaken or displace, Soviet aid relationships, particularly those involving states that host a Soviet military presence or act as Soviet proxies. This of course requires corresponding changes in the recipient state's international policies. The U.S. must also develop an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives to demonstrate the relevance of the free economies to the economic problems of the developing world, while exposing the bankruptcy of the Soviet economic and political model. In this connection, we must develop the means to extend U.S. support to individuals and movements in the developing world that share our commitment to political democracy and individual freedom. We have forsaken much of the competition by not having the kinds of long-term political cadre and organization building programs which the Soviets conduct.

Possibly the greatest obstacle we face in carrying out this approach in the developing world is the problem of obtaining adequate budgetary resources. As in the case of our rearmament program, pressures for budgetary restraint are certain to generate calls for reduction of the resources devoted to meeting the Soviet challenge in the developing world. These pressures must be resisted if we are to be able to meet our commitments and secure our vital interests.

(4) The Soviet Empire (Eastern Europe, Cuba, Third World Alliances)

As noted above, there are a number of important vulnerabilities and weaknesses within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should seek to exacerbate and exploit. This will involve differentiated policies, e.g. Angola is different from Poland, Cuba is different from Vietnam. We will need a different mix of tools for each. The prospects for change may be greater on the extremities of Soviet power (Soviet alliances in the developing world) than closer to the center of the Soviet empire (Eastern Europe) -- though the latter obviously offers potential as well.

Eastern Europe: Although the Polish crackdown cut short a process of peaceful change, the continuing instability in that country is certain to have far-reaching repercussions throughout Eastern Europe. In addition, the deteriorating economic position of East European countries and the possible long-term drying up of Western resources flowing to the region will force them to face some difficult choices: greater dependence on the Soviets and relative stagnation; or reforms to generate a renewal of Western resources.

The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region. We can advance this objective by carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. This policy of differentiation in Eastern Europe is the subject of NSSD 5-82.

Afghanistan: Possibly the most important single vulnerability in the Soviet Empire is Afghanistan, where Moscow's imperial reach has bogged Soviet forces down in a stalemated struggle to suppress the Afghan resistance. A withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan followed by a real exercise of self-determination by the Afghan people would encourage other democratic and nationalist forces within the Soviet Empire and increase the likelihood that other Third World countries would resist Soviet pressures. Thus, our objective should be to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political and other costs remain high while the occupation continues.

Cuba: The challenge to U.S. interests represented by Moscow's alliance with Cuba requires an effective U.S. response. The Soviet-Cuban challenge has three critical dimensions (as well as numerous other problems):

-- Soviet deliveries of advanced weapons to Havana: The flow of advanced Soviet weapons to Cuba has accelerated so as to represent a growing threat to the security of other Latin American countries and, in the case of potentially nuclear-capable systems, the U.S. itself. We must be prepared to take strong countermeasures to offset the political/military impact of these deliveries.

-- Soviet-supported Cuban destabilizing activities in Central America: The U.S. response must involve bilateral economic and military assistance to friendly governments in the region, as well as multilateral initiatives to deal with the political, economic, and social sources of instability. We should retain the option of direct action against Cuba, while making clear our willingness seriously to address Cuba's concerns if Havana is willing to reduce its dependence on and cooperation with the Soviet Union. We should also take steps to prevent or neutralize the impact of transfers of advanced Soviet weapons to Nicaragua.

-- Soviet-Cuban interventionism in Southern Africa: We should counter and reduce Soviet and Cuban influence by strengthening our own relations with friendly African states, and by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to bring about a Cuban withdrawal from Angola in the context of a Namibia settlement and appropriate external guarantees of Angola's security.

Soviet Third World Alliances: Our policy should seek to weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between the Soviet Union and its Third World allies and clients. In implementing this policy, we will need to take into account the unique circumstances which influence the degree of cohesion between the Soviet Union and each of its Third World allies. In some cases, these ties are so strong as to make the Third World state a virtual proxy or surrogate of the Soviet Union. We should be prepared to work with our allies and Third World friends to neutralize the activities of these Soviet proxies. In other cases, ties between the Soviet Union and a Third World client may be tenuous or subject to strains which a nuanced U.S. policy can exploit to move the Third World state away from the Soviet orbit. Our policy should be flexible enough to take advantage of these opportunities.

Finally, we should seek where possible and prudent to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries.

(5) China

The continuing Sino-Soviet rift -- motivated by racial enmity, ideological competition and security concerns -- provides the U.S. with some leverage over Soviet international behavior. However, our ability to capitalize on these potential strategic advantages depends upon the durability of the Sino-American rapprochement. Given the Soviets' strategic interest in undermining Sino-American relations, and particularly in preventing U.S. arms assistance to China, we can expect that Moscow will seek to disrupt our relations with Beijing. We will have to remain alert to such Soviet maneuvers and be prepared to counter them with initiatives of our own. Equally, we will need to manage carefully our relations with Beijing to avoid giving Moscow any exploitable opportunities.

B. Bilateral Relationships

It will be important to develop policies which give us maximum leverage over Soviet internal policies. Even though we recognize the limits of our capabilities to influence Soviet domestic trends and developments, the U.S., especially when working together with our allies, does have some capability to influence Soviet resource allocation through a variety of policy initiatives, such as our own defense spending and East-West trade policies. Through our radio broadcasting and other informational programs directed toward the Soviet Union, we may be able to accelerate the already advanced erosion of the regime's credibility with its own people, thus weakening the ideological basis for Soviet external expansionism. We also can offer private and other forms of assistance to forces seeking to promote democratic change. We can publicly and through quiet diplomacy seek to advance the cause of individual human rights in the Soviet Union.

Despite the post-Afghanistan, post-Poland attenuation of US-Soviet bilateral ties, there remain sectors of the bilateral relationship that are important to Moscow and thus to any effort to induce moderation of Soviet conduct.

(1) Arms Control

Arms control negotiations, pursued soberly and without illusions, are an important part of our overall national security policy. We should be willing to enter into arms control negotiations when they serve our national security objectives. At the same time, we must make clear to the allies as well as to the USSR that our ability to reach satisfactory results will inevitably be influenced by the international situation and the overall state of US-Soviet relations. However, we should be under no illusions that ongoing arms control negotiations will give us leverage sufficient to produce Soviet restraint on other international issues.

U.S. arms control proposals should be consistent with necessary force modernization plans and should seek to achieve balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. The START, INF, and MBFR proposals we have tabled meet these criteria and would, if accepted by the Soviets, help ensure the survivability of our nuclear deterrent and thus enhance U.S. national security. The fact that START and INF negotiations have begun has for the present somewhat reduced public pressure on us and on Allied Governments for early arms control agreements with Moscow. In the absence of progress in START and INF, however, we should expect that pressure to grow again.

(2) Economic Policy

U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must be seen in a strategic context. At a minimum, we must ensure that US-Soviet economic relationships do not facilitate the buildup of Soviet military power. We must also bear in mind that U.S. controls on the critical elements of trade can also influence Soviet prospects for hard-currency earnings, and raise the cost of maintaining their present rate of defense spending. We need to develop policies which use the leverage inherent in U.S. and Western economic strength to modify Soviet behavior over time. Thus, our economic policies should provide negative and, where appropriate, positive incentives for more responsible Soviet behavior, while avoiding any subsidies of Soviet economic development. Although unilateral steps may be necessary for certain strategic or political imperatives, agreement with the Allies on the fundamental ground rules of trade will be essential if we are to take advantage of Soviet economic weaknesses.

There are, however, real limits to Western leverage on the Soviet economy. The Soviet system is still basically autarchic, and the USSR can substantially protect itself against foreign economic pressure. The difficulty of organizing effective multilateral restrictions on trade with the USSR is illustrated by our experience with the grain trade. Given the enormous Soviet difficulties in agriculture and the growing Soviet dependence on grain imports, suspension of grain trade by all Western and Third World suppliers would be a potentially important source of leverage over Soviet behavior.

However, it proved impossible to organize effective, sustained multilateral restrictions on international grain trade with the Soviet Union during the period of the post-Afghanistan grain embargo. This permitted the Soviets to shift their grain purchases from the U.S. to other suppliers, thus minimizing the impact of the grain embargo. Other major grain suppliers remain unwilling to contemplate restrictions on grain exports to the USSR, thus unilateral restrictions by the U.S. would impose costs

on U.S. farmers without giving us additional leverage over Soviet behavior. Under these circumstances, U.S. grain sales should be permitted to proceed, while still subject to overall foreign policy control.

While recognizing the problems and difficulties inherent in developing a unified Western approach to economic relations with Moscow, we should nonetheless seek a consensus including the following basic elements:

1. Credits. The key objective is agreement on common restrictions on official credits and guarantees to the USSR and establishment of a mechanism to monitor official credits and guarantees.

2. Technology Transfer. The policy should include a unified and strengthened position on military-related high technology and equipment containing that technology.

3. Energy. The objectives here are twofold: a) to reach consensus on the need to minimize Western dependence on Soviet energy supplies; and b) to enhance Western leverage in this key sector by agreement on the equipment and technology to be made available to the USSR.

4. Foreign Policy Controls. There must be allied consensus that foreign policy, i.e. non-strategic, controls on trade with the Soviets may be imposed, primarily in crises, in support of clear objectives and with criteria for removal of the controls.

5. Differentiation. The traditional approach of treating each of the East European countries as distinct entities on the basis of their own policies will be maintained. This offers the best opportunity to encourage pluralism and independence in East European countries.

(3) Official Dialogue

We can expect the Soviets to continue to press us for a return to a US-Soviet agenda centered on arms control. We must continue to resist this tactic and insist that Moscow address the full range of our concerns about their international behavior if our relations are to improve. US-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve our interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior and to drive home that we will act to ensure that the costs of irresponsibility are high. We can also use such contacts to make clear that the way to pragmatic solutions of regional problems is open if Moscow is willing seriously to address our concerns. At the same time, such contacts must be

handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions which it would not otherwise secure.

A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at the level of Foreign Minister is essential, both to facilitate necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet leadership and to maintain allied understanding and support for our approach to East-West relations. Secretary Haig met with Gromyko on three occasions between September 1981 and June 1982, and this pattern of frequent Ministerial-level contacts should be maintained in the future.

We can expect that the question of a possible US-Soviet summit will continue to be raised by the Soviets, our allies, and important segments of domestic opinion. Every American President since Franklin Roosevelt has met with his Soviet counterpart. In some cases, U.S. Presidents have attended summits for the purpose of establishing personal contact with their counterparts (e.g. Kennedy in Vienna) or in the vague expectation that an improvement in US-Soviet relations would flow from the summit (e.g. Johnson at Glasboro). In other cases, allied pressures for East-West dialogue at the Head of State level have played a major role in the Presidential decision to meet at the summit (e.g. Eisenhower at Geneva and Paris).

The approach to summitry which prevailed throughout the 1970s held that American Presidents should not meet with their Soviet counterparts until there were concrete US-Soviet agreements ready to serve as the centerpeice of the summit. However, these summits did not always produce durable improvements in US-Soviet relations, and sometimes complicated management of US-Soviet relations by generating expectations that could not be realized.

In any summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart we would want to ensure that concrete, positive results were achievable. We would also need to ensure that any summit were timed to achieve the maximum possible positive impact in terms of U.S. interests.

(4) Assertion of Values

The U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union must have an ideological content which asserts the superiority of Western values of freedom, individual dignity, and political democracy over the repressive and authoritarian character of Soviet society. We need to create a sense that history is moving in the direction of forces which support free elections, free enterprise, a free press, and free trade unions. We need specific programs to support this offensive. Among the instruments which we should employ are:

--Increased U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet Union, particularly VOA and RFE/RL;

--A systematic and energetic U.S. effort to counter Soviet disinformation and "active measures" campaigns directed at U.S. interests;

--A positive and assertive effort to support democratic elements in both communist and non-communist countries, taking into account the special requirements and vulnerabilities of democratic forces seeking to survive in a hostile environment.

The role of US-Soviet cultural, scientific, and other cooperative exchanges should be seen in light of our intention to maintain a strong ideological component in our relations with Moscow. We should not further dismantle the framework of cooperative exchanges which remains from the 1970s unless new incidents of Soviet irresponsibility require us further to attenuate the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. We should look at ways exchanges can be used to further our ideological offensive.

III. Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing our Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior

The interrelated tasks of rebuilding American capacity for world leadership and constraining and, over time, reducing Soviet international influence cannot be accomplished quickly.

We face a critical transition period over the next five years, and our success in managing US-Soviet relations during this period may well determine whether we are able to attain our long-term objectives. Despite the long-term vulnerabilities of the Soviet system, we can expect that Soviet military power will continue to grow throughout the 1980s. Moreover, the Soviet Union will have every incentive to prevent us from reversing the trends of the last decade which have shifted the world power balance in Moscow's favor. Thus, the coming 5-10 years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets will test our resolve.

These uncertainties, moreover, will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political succession to Brezhnev. As noted above, we cannot predict with confidence what policies the various succession contenders will espouse. Consequently, we should not seek to adjust our policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and negative) for any new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. Our posture should be one of a willingness to deal, on the basis of the policy approach we have taken since the beginning of the

Administration, with whichever leadership group emerges. We would underscore that we remain ready for improved US-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to us; the burden for any further deterioration in relations would fall squarely on Moscow.

We should be under no illusion about the extent of our capabilities to restrain the Soviet Union while American strength is being rebuilt. Throughout the coming decade, our rearmament program will be subject to the uncertainties of the budget process and the U.S. domestic debate on national security. In addition, our reassertion of leadership with our allies, while necessary for the long-term revitalization of our alliances, is certain to create periodic intra-alliance disputes that may provide the Soviets with opportunities for wedge driving. Our effort to reconstruct the credibility of U.S. commitments in the Third World will also depend upon our ability to sustain over time commitments of resources, despite budgetary stringencies. As noted above, these constraints on our capacity to shape the Soviet international environment will be accompanied by real limits on our capacity to use the US-Soviet bilateral relationship as leverage to restrain Soviet behavior.

The existing and projected gap between our finite resources and the level of capabilities needed to constrain Soviet international behavior makes it essential that we: 1) establish firm priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and 2) mobilize the resources of our European and Asian allies and our Third World friends who are willing to join with us in containing the expansion of Soviet power.

(1) U.S. Priorities

Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a strong military, capable of acting across the entire spectrum of potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., our allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should deterrence fail. Achieving this strategic aim largely rests, as in the past, on a strong U.S. capability for unilateral military action. Strategic nuclear forces remain an important element of that capability, but the importance of other forces -- nuclear and conventional -- has risen in the current era of strategic nuclear parity.

Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation with allied and other states and greater utilization of

their resources. U.S. military strategy must be better integrated with national strategies of allies and friends, and U.S. defense programs must consider allied arrangements in the planning stage.

U.S. military strategy for successfully contending with peacetime, crisis, and wartime contingencies involving the USSR on a global basis is detailed in NSSD 1-82. This military strategy must be combined with a political strategy focused on the following objectives:

-- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will also require that the U.S. take allied concerns into account. In this connection, and in addition to pushing the allies to spend more on defense, we must attach a high priority to a serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with our military strategy, our force modernization plans, and our overall approach to arms control. We must also develop, together with our allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations consistent with the U.S. policy outlined in this study.

-- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its position in Afghanistan. This will require that we continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, we should keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground remain high.

-- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that we continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require that we maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East European countries.

-- Building and sustaining a major ideological political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about change inside the Soviet Union itself. This must be a long-term program, given the nature of the Soviet system.

-- Maintenance of our strategic relationship with China, thus minimizing opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

-- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship.

This will require that we use a variety of instruments, including diplomatic efforts such as the Contact Group Namibia/ Angola initiative. U.S. security and economic assistance in Latin America will also be essential. However, we must retain the option of direct use of U.S. military forces to protect vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from the Soviet-Cuban connection.

(2) Cooperation with our Allies

As noted throughout this paper, we must cooperate with our allies to restrain Soviet expansionism. Only the U.S. can directly counterbalance Soviet power, but our allies can often more effectively intervene in regions of historic interest to maintain peace, limit opportunities for Soviet opportunism, and oppose Soviet surrogate activity.

While rejecting a unilateralist approach, we cannot permit our approach to US-Soviet relations to reflect only the lowest common denominator of allied consensus. The challenge we face from the Soviet Union requires U.S. leadership which will inevitably lead to periodic disagreements in an alliance of free nations, such as NATO. This is an enduring dilemma which has confronted American Administrations throughout the postwar period. It cannot be finally resolved, but it must be managed effectively if we are to maintain the unity of purpose among free nations on which U.S. security depends.

IV. Articulating Our Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional Support

The policy outlined above is a strategy for the long haul. We should have no illusions that it will yield a rapid breakthrough in our relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in our effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to mount for change in our policy. We can expect appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" US-Soviet relationship. This is inevitable given the historic American intolerance of ambiguity and complexity in foreign affairs. Moscow may believe that if pressure from allies and publics does not drive this Administration back to Soviet-style peaceful coexistence and detente, the USSR can hunker down and concentrate on neutralizing the Reagan foreign policy until a new, more pliable U.S. Administration emerges.

We must therefore demonstrate that the American people will support the policy we have outlined. This will require that we avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in US-Soviet relations. At the same time, we must demonstrate credibly that our policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for US-Soviet relations.