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DCI/ICS 7006-87
20 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Director, Public Affairs Office *h*
Deputy Director for Intelligence *lk*
Director, Intelligence Community Staff *GA*

FROM: STAT
Deputy Director for Requirements & Evaluation, ICS

SUBJECT: The Texas Speech, Revisited

1. This memorandum is for your information, unless you desire to issue guidance.

2. In early March, I gave a speech for you in Austin, Texas, entitled "Arms Control in U.S. Intelligence" (copy attached). STAT
 STAT

3. Because of your role in having someone from CIA give this speech, I thought it would be nice--and graceful--to tell you about this subject. STAT

6. What more may I do for you here?

Attachment: a/s
Speech

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SUBJECT: The Texas Speech, Revisited

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Arms Control and US Intelligence: The Estimative Process

An Address at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
University of Texas at Austin

by
Central Intelligence Agency
March 3, 1987

STAT

As one of the lead-off hitters at this conference, so to speak, I certainly want to help get it started successfully. Doing so means that I want to keep your attention, deal with the subject Acting Director Gates agreed to address, and not preempt my upcoming colleagues--who no doubt have a lot of their own stimulating thoughts to give you.

I would like to speak today about our estimates--a basic feature of the many-faceted, vital role played by US intelligence in this nation's arms control effort. In doing so, I will lay out basically what US intelligence does, the context in which we do it, and--lastly--give you my humble opinion about how well we do it. All these thoughts ought to be even more useful to you during the follow-on talks on political, military, and technological issues.

When we speak of arms control, we include the topics you read or hear about regularly--such as strategic systems (e.g., ICBMs)--as well as less exciting topics--such as the US-USSR Hotline. And we include all of the nations engaged in arms control with the US--not just the USSR, although it requires the majority of our efforts by far.

The most prominent and well-known feature of our role is our "estimates." I use this word broadly to encompass all of our products we give to policy officers--from the quite formal National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) down to the oral, tactical advice given during the negotiations.

The contents of all these products are equally diverse. Examples include assessments of: weapons--both characteristics and deployments, specific negotiating goals and tactics, key foreign officials, US capabilities to monitor compliance (or not), secrecy and deception efforts, as well as basic objectives and strategies.

As context, I think it useful to recall that US intelligence is a full partner in the various arms control processes that have been going on in the modern era for more than two decades. Our partners are policy officers in the Executive Branch and the

Congress. We participate in a team effort, but ours is also an independent role. We do intelligence; they do policy. In this team, we help policy officers figure out what the world is like, what the US should want, and we help them get it. Our efforts extend from Washington to wherever the US engages a foreign government on arms control.

At the same time, however, no one should imagine that this overall, large effort by US intelligence is a one-agency, or a one-person, show. All the agencies in US intelligence participate somehow and each agency has its own internal arrangements and team of officers. A great deal of the effort happens in the inter-agency arenas--within US intelligence, within the Executive Branch, and with the Congress. But some of our work happens more privately totally within specific departments. An example is defense, where DIA plays a large role.

Although the role played by US intelligence varies as the arms control process moves along, there are some key constants we seek to ensure. One is professionalism; another is non-partisanship. Those constants are a central element of the CIA Credo that Director Casey created, and about which he is so proud. This Credo fits the other intelligence agencies too. The Credo notes, and we take pride in the fact that:

"We provide objective and unbiased evaluations and are always open to new perceptions and ready to challenge conventional wisdom."

These attributes are absolutely critical if US intelligence is to be effective in the intense environment associated with arms control. The stakes--beginning with the nation's security--are great; the pressures are severe, as well as subtle.

One of our most important functions, on occasion, is to tell people things they really don't want to hear--facts and assessments that may conflict with their policy, program, or personal agendas. And on occasion we have to shout.

We need very special people to do this hardwork and cope with the long hours. Thankfully, we have them.

In this situation, I cannot stress too strongly how important it is that we in US intelligence protect the secrets we receive. For example, we need access to policymakers to help them. And when they share their visions with us--so that we may help them even more--discretion is a must.

Three Phases of Arms Control

For convenience, I have separated the arms control process into three phases: design, negotiations, and maintenance. In our support to any one arms control area, however, these phases overlap a lot--especially when negotiations are underway for a new accord, much less when a violation may have occurred with an existing accord. Thus, juggling all of the arms control topics and work daily is scintillating business.

The Design Phase:

In what I would call the design phase, that is, when arms control agreements are being contemplated within an Administration, policymakers rely almost exclusively on their intelligence advisors for detailed assessments of relevant Soviet force structures and for projections of future forces. The estimates during this phase are Community reports. Where differences exist between agencies, these are made fully known to our policy colleagues; the holders of diverse views have a chance to present their views and explain what they have done.

This is virtually the last point in the arms control process where we are mostly in control. We are the holders of the highly classified data bases, the recipients of the product from the multiple of sensitive collection assets we employ, and the ones who can best analyze all the information available. The experience of twenty or more years of doing such assessments for the arms control world has given us, and the policy makers we serve, a certain confidence in the work we do.

We clearly don't do a perfect job, but we are pretty good at all this. Are we smug about what we do? We try never to be! In fact, the world sometimes is different than we think, it changes whenever it feels like it, it has little obligation to inform us, and we sometimes make mistakes. We try to remain open-minded, and stay ready to assimilate new data from wherever it might come, even if it disturbs formerly held ideas or conventional wisdom. We are blessed with humility born of experience from having had to change data bases every time new information becomes available.

Of all our estimates, however, I think the one type which has the most impact over time is the category called "monitoring." Monitoring involves the collection,

processing, exploitation, analysis, and reporting of information on foreign activities relating to arms control. During this design phase, we tell policymakers how well--or in some cases, how poorly--we think we can monitor various proposed limitations. Monitoring is extremely important because in arms control, as in other national security areas, trust is meaningful only as far as you can tell with confidence that your treaty partner is behaving.

Our jobs, of course, would be simpler if all we had to do was make a judgment that a provision could or could not be monitored. But our monitoring capabilities are never zero--just as they are never perfect. We have had a long history of describing to policymakers how well we can monitor a provision today, and how well we expect to be able to monitor that provision years down the road--as we attempt to factor in how we expect the world to change. For example, as a result of changes in prospective collection and analytic capabilities.

Lastly, we describe our ability to monitor a provision assuming greater Soviet data denial efforts and our ability to detect any cheating or "sharp practices." In fact, the Soviets are attempting to deny the US data on Soviet military capabilities. These efforts extend to forces covered by arms control, as well as those that are not. In contrast, the new Soviet policy of openness or "glasnost" rarely intrudes into such matters.

The monitoring judgments we provide, however, are by no means the last word in assessing the acceptability of a particular limitation. From our parochial perspective, it makes little sense to adopt a negotiating position or settle on a provision that is very difficult or impossible for US intelligence to monitor effectively. It is hard to imagine that anyone would be comfortable with a situation involving major limitations on nuclear weapons where US intelligence could not tell whether the US' partner in the deal was behaving.

Nevertheless, monitoring is only one element of a verification process that national security decisionmakers have to feel confident about. Verification is a subjective, policy process that incorporates several factors other than our judgments on US monitoring capabilities. These include:

- o An assessment as to whether US national interests, broadly defined, are served better with an accord, whether or not totally monitorable, than without it.

- o An assessment as to whether certain types of cheating, which might plausibly be expected to escape detection, would be militarily significant .
- o The ability and willingness of the US to take countervailing measures, sometimes described as safeguards. They can limit damage from foreign actions that are not in compliance, and have some potential to deter cheating.

Examples of safeguards include:

- US Research & Development. Maintenance of vigorous research, development, and testing programs for limited activities.
- Intelligence Activity. Implementation of a robust national foreign intelligence program.
- Annual Compliance Report. Production of an annual Presidential compliance report to the Congress, tailored to the agreement.

With respect to our monitoring capabilities, there are several generic problems that can compound the difficulties we face. Some of these derive from policy choices, some from technical developments, and some from policy decisions by other nations. Examples include:

- o A desire to limit more important measures of military power, such as throw-weight.
- o The decrease in the size of key weapons and, to a degree, the resulting increase in mobility.
- o A desire to reduce the numbers of weapons, which will increase the significance of verification uncertainties and any cheating.
- o Soviet efforts to increasingly protect information they consider sensitive.

Verification will not be perfect, there will be risks, and significant monitoring problems will continue for some provisions even with improved intelligence capabilities, better treaty language, or such cooperative measures as on-site inspections. The problems can run the gamut, from small to very great, depending on what we are aiming to constrain. They can never be eliminated entirely. And, of

course, people will differ on the acceptability of the risks.

Both prospective intelligence capabilities and policy objectives are subject to change over time. US monitoring capabilities can change over time, both positively and negatively. This is so, in part because they are subject to technical and resource limitations, especially in the competition with other priority needs. In addition, because of Soviet data denial, US intelligence is in a contest as we seek to deal with these denial tactics and the Soviets attempt to learn of our efforts and take even more appropriate countermeasures.

And policy standards and judgments on the importance of verification (including military significance) can also change over time. For example, in 1972, issues concerning biological weapons had less than overpowering urgency. But today, in the light of Soviet noncompliance activity in this area, and the advances of technology, these weapons may very well have taken on a new significance.

During the deliberative processes, when US negotiating positions still are being formulated, our responsibilities for monitoring prospective agreements also can impel us into arguing for positions that--in our view--will serve to make our monitoring capabilities better than they might be otherwise. Yet we understand that monitoring considerations are only part of the verification process--and that legitimate political realities often play a large role in the decisions about the profile of US negotiating stances.

The Negotiating Phase:

Once an Administration has decided on its negotiating position, US intelligence provides support to the several delegations and support committees that are called upon to implement the President's program. US intelligence has a representative on all the various interdepartmental groups that deliberate policy, and on all the backstopping committees that create and transmit policy and guidance to all the overseas delegations.

US intelligence, at this stage, continues to supply policymakers with a rich menu of current intelligence reporting--the product of extensive, longer term research efforts; and community-wide assessments, such as National Intelligence Estimates. These products are frequently hand carried by senior intelligence advisors to the key arms control decisionmakers that they directly support.

Also, US intelligence must be especially concerned about the protection of this nation's secret sources and methods. All too often, there seems to be an expectation that if we can just share pertinent intelligence data with members of foreign arms control delegations, they will "see the light" and be convinced of the wisdom of US positions. It is part of our job to ensure that classified intelligence data are not revealed to foreign citizens during discussions--and we try.

As these diplomatic activities occur, foreign governments try to explain themselves. Sometimes these explanations are done very privately, usually to pass on a "message" or "signal." Some of these signals are real and important; others are contrived. For example, at various junctures of the arms control process, we always see in the press indications of debates within the Soviet polity, of divergent views among ostensibly competing bureaucracies--doves verses hawks, if you will. This is not to suggest that there are not divisions within the USSR's leadership; there are, but it is to suggest that the Soviets know Americans only too well. We love a strange story passed on in strange ways, and the stranger the better, as long as it has a positive overall point.

The Maintenance Phase:

US intelligence's responsibilities in this last phase really begin during the negotiations, as various technical details are debated and compromises or agreements are made. As one example, we must develop and maintain an up-to-date, comprehensive, quantitative baseline of all Soviet weaponry subject to the limitations and reductions called for in the accord.

Once an arms control agreement is signed, our responsibilities include critical support to the Congress during the ratification process. In 1979, for example, the signing of the SALT II Treaty was contemporaneous with the issuance by US Intelligence of an interagency study of US capabilities to monitor the provisions of SALT II. The conclusions of this study were briefed to the Senate Select Committee and served as an input to that committee's report to the Senate during the ratification hearings.

And once an arms control accord goes into effect, US intelligence is charged with monitoring a vast number of activities that collectively make up the web of limitations contained in the deal.

The fact is that once an agreement is reached, we in US intelligence bear sole responsibility in the US Government for monitoring compliance-related activities associated with the accord. Even so, we get lots of free help from our policy colleagues. And we participate deeply in the process of deciding whether violations have occurred. This overall responsibility is not a light or trivial one and we take it extraordinarily seriously.

This monitoring process continues into the indefinite future and produces a flow of treaty-related intelligence data into the policy community. This is aimed at providing the very best data for the matrix in which foreign compliance, or noncompliance, can be judged fully and wisely.

In a very real way, our monitoring work is similar to the classic function of Indications and Warning. Violations of arms control accords clearly are not armed conflict, but they are a very big deal--especially in the political arena. When we became aware of the Krasnoyarsk radar, for example, senior people knew in minutes.

The weight of all these responsibilities causes us to be vitally interested in the totality of the arms control process and stimulates us to protect vigorously US intelligence interests and equities.

An Assessment:

With all of this in mind, it is fair to ask: how are we doing? I propose you judge for yourself at the end of the day.

Although I clearly have an interest in our report card, I happen to believe several basic points about the record of US intelligence over the years in the arms control arena. One is that our collective report card--i.e., of objectivity, accuracy, and foresight--is as good as any of our policy colleagues; and generally, but not always, better. A second point is that US intelligence is a lot better at this work today than 10, 15, or 20 years ago. Among the many obvious possible reasons for this, I think the key one is that we have better, more experienced people doing the work and a lot more of them. A third point is that the largest relative improvements have occurred in the political, rather than in the technical, areas. And a fourth point is that US intelligence understands the fact that data denial, and deception, are real activities--

undertaken by real governments--which we have to help US policy officers try to cope with and overcome.

Beyond these general thoughts, citing specific cases does not seem wise or useful. Every candidate example will start an old fight anew. And senior intelligence officers really ought not be blabbing about successes--or failures--in public. Service in intelligence ought to mean silence for the most part.

In closing, if I do nothing else for you, I hope you carry away from this exchange the most fundamental idea of all: US intelligence is doing its best to help the Executive Branch and Congress deal with arms control, in a non-partisan and professional manner. It's a daunting challenge unlike any other I have ever heard about, as well as a splendid opportunity--even when it is painful personally or professionally.

Thank you for this chance to speak to you; I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

87-0953x

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Phone: (703) 482-7676

17 February 1987

Professor Thomas J. Hirschfeld
 Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
 The University of Texas at Austin
 Drawer Y, University Station
 Austin, Texas 78713-7450

STAT

Dear Professor Hirschfeld:

As we have discussed on the phone, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates is unable to make a firm commitment to speak at the conference on Intelligence and Arms Control on 3 March until he is confirmed by the Senate. However, we are making arrangements for a backup to be available in the instance that the confirmation does not come through in time. Either [redacted] Chief of the Strategic Policy Division, the Office of Soviet Analysis, or [redacted] Chief of the US-Soviet Affairs Branch/Policy Analysis Division of the Office of Soviet Analysis, will be available.

STAT

Enclosed as requested is a photograph and biography of Mr. Gates. We thank you for your patience in this matter.

Sincerely,

STAT

[redacted]
 George V. Lauder
 Director, Public Affairs

STAT

Enclosures

DCI/PAO/[redacted] 17 FEB 87 [redacted] STAT

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
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Executive Secretary

5 Feb 87

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LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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January 28, 1987


Mr. Robert M. Gates
DDCI
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

As concerns the March 3rd Tom Slick Conference here, the tentative schedule I sent you last time now looks firm (see updated copy). Also enclosed is an outline for a first chapter which might help as you think about your own presentation, in the sense that it tries to pull together most of the obvious intelligence/arms control connections in an orderly way. There are, of course, other and different ways of slicing the subject. Nevertheless, it is my hope that this schema will provide the framework, and that the other presentations will somehow fit.

I would appreciate advance copies of anything that you put to paper as far as possible before the third of March, if that can be done, and I look forward to seeing you.

Very truly yours,


Thomas A. Hirschfeld
Tom Slick Professor of World Peace

TJH/sr
enclosures

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Remarks To 17 & 18: Please see "lead off" recommendation in Para #1.

[Redacted Signature Box]

/s/ Executive Secretary
29 Jan 87

Date

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January 20, 1987

STAT

Mr. Robert M. Gates
DDCI
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Further to my letter of November 18 concerning the March 3, 1987, conference here on Intelligence and Arms Control, the schedule and participation now seems firm. As regards the schedule (see attachment), I thought it would be useful for you to lead off with your description of the estimative process, as it relates to the formulation of U.S. arms control negotiations, and the post-hoc maintenance of arms control agreements. After you speak, the moderator will seek discussion at the table, followed by questions from the floor. There will be a reception, hosted by Hans Mark, the Chancellor of The University of Texas System, which the governor, key legislators, and Lady Bird Johnson normally attend, on the evening of the 2nd at 7:00 p.m. I hope you can make this event. The conference itself begins at 9:00 a.m. on the 3rd, preceded by a continental breakfast at 8:00 in the Dean's Conference Room of the LBJ School.

The University has booked you into the Marriott at the Capitol, located at 701 East 11th Street. Transportation between the hotel and the airport and conference sites will be provided by The University. The University will, of course, reimburse you for travel and other conference expenses. We will send you a final schedule, a full program, and other information in the next few weeks. In the meantime, I would appreciate a short bio statement and a photograph for public use, as well as the form of words you would like to appear on the program below your name, describing past and/or current functions. We look forward to seeing you. Please call (512) 471-4962 or write, if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Thomas J. Hirschfeld
Tom Slick Professor of World Peace

TJH/sr
enclosure

P.S. A copy of your text before the conference would be much appreciated, if that is possible.

March 3
TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OUTLINE

9:00-9:15	Welcome - President William Cunningham
9:15-9:25	LBJ School - Dean Max Sherman
9:25-9:40	Introduction - Senator John Tower
9:40-9:50	The Framework - Thomas Hirschfeld
9:50-10:00	Groundrules and Introduction of Speaker - Moderator (Sidney Weintraub)
10:00-10:30	The Estimative Process - Robert Gates
10:30-10:50	Q&A Gates - Panel/audience
10:50-11:00	Coffee Break
11:00-11:30	The Political Dimension - William Colby
11:30-11:50	Q&A Colby - Panel/audience
11:50-12:20	The Military Perspective (Tentative) - Bobby Inman
12:20-12:40	Q&A Inman - Panel/audience
12:40-2:15	Lunch
2:15-2:45	The Technological Dimension - Hans Mark
2:45-3:05	Q&A Mark - Panel/audience
3:05-3:35	The Perspective of the Intelligence User - Paul Warnke
3:35-3:55	Q&A Warnke - Panel/audience
3:55-4:15	Summary - Thomas Hirschfeld

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Remarks To 16 & 17: Pls get together and have a draft ready for DDCI review by 13 Feb.

AH Executive Secretary
28 Nov 86
Date

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THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

EXCISE COPY

86- 5503X

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November 18, 1986

Mr. Robert M. Gates
DDCI
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Thank you again for agreeing to participate in our March 3 colloquium on arms control and intelligence. The list of participants is still the same; James Schlesinger has still not made clear whether he will participate. However, Senator Tower has agreed to open the conference. I hope this conference will help describe the relationship between intelligence and arms control, that is, some sense of the major cross-connections. Thus it should not be confined to the much-discussed problems of verification and compliance, although, of course, these are a necessary and prominent feature. I am therefore requesting participants to consider the arms control and intelligence relationship in three phases: the *design phase*, when an arms control agreement is being contemplated (when the key issues include the limits of our monitoring capability and an assessment of the adversary's side of the military balance); the *execution phase* (essentially the period of negotiations, as the content of the initial U.S. proposal gets modified by being rubbed against the positions of an adversary); and the *maintenance phase* (when the agreed obligations that are intended to constrain adversary behavior become the key issues) and compliance comes to the forefront. Obviously, intelligence plays a different role in all three phases. One assumes the estimative process continues throughout.

For your own presentation, I would appreciate a half-hour-long presentation of whatever you would feel free to say about the nature of the estimative process for each of the three phases of an arms control agreement, using, where possible, familiar historical examples of agreements and particular issues. These could include: in Salt I, whether the SS-9 was MIRVed; and the significance and nature of the Backfire Bomber in Salt II; SS-20 range in INF; the speed at which the U.S.S.R. would MIRV (a SALT I issue); and the issue of telemetry encryption. All of these have been much discussed in the open literature. Whatever specifics you can mention on other subjects would be equally welcome. Your participation will be followed by panel discussions.



B-811-15

Again, we are grateful that you are willing to come. I'll keep you informed on other details as conference planning advances. Please call if you or your staff have any questions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Tom Hirschfeld', written in a cursive style.

Thomas J. Hirschfeld
Tom Slick Professor of World Peace

TJH/sr

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October 7, 1986

Mr. Robert T. Gates
DDCI
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Admiral Inman tells me that you have agreed to participate in our prospective one-day conference on Intelligence and Arms Control on March 3 of next year. I am grateful that you have agreed to come and look forward to welcoming you. Others who have agreed to come are Messrs. Colby, Warnke, and Mark, in addition to Admiral Inman, and yourself. James Schlesinger is another possibility; so is Senator Tower, as a keynoter.

Once the funding and participation are firm, I will send you a tentative schedule, and an annotated outline of what I hope the individual presentations will contain. The conference is supposed to highlight the importance of having professional and dispassionate intelligence work underpin both U.S. negotiating positions and the analysis of compliance issues. Specific past questions like MIRV deployment, telemetry encryption, Backfire, and the difficulties inherent in dealing with new Soviet models (SS-13/25-SS-16/20) could be examined in their historical context, using publicly available information, to illustrate the nature of professional disputes (Soviet practice vs. capability assessment) and essentially political ones, such as Team B.

Because you are a sitting official, I could ask you to describe the estimative process and speculate what improvements you would like to see in the future. If you would prefer to deal with some other subject, please let me know.

Again, many thanks for agreeing to come.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "T. J. Hirschfeld".

Thomas J. Hirschfeld
Tom Slick Professor of World Peace

TJH/sr



B-811-15