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OCA 1851 & 1852 88

SUBJECT:

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 88-1852

17 JUN 1988

The Honorable David L. Boren, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter concerning the conflict in Angola. The enclosed answers to your questions reflect our analysts' best judgments about prospects for a negotiated settlement and associated issues. We fully appreciate the complexity of this issue. We share your concern that the conferees have the best possible information as they consider the issue during the upcoming conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1989.

This reply is also being sent to the Vice Chairman.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

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John L. Helgeson
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure
as stated

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9 June 1988

RESPONSE TO SSCI QUESTIONS ON ANGOLA BY NIO FOR AFRICA
AND CIA'S DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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The long-term track record of the negotiations and reporting on both infighting within the MPLA and with the Cubans indicate that the MPLA and Cuba would prefer a straightforward military victory over UNITA that involves no deals, compromises, or negotiations. Serious consideration of a negotiated settlement that links a Cuban troop withdrawal to implementation of UN 435 and a South African withdrawal from Namibia, hinges on the perception in Luanda that UNITA's strength and backing makes an outright military victory too costly. In Luanda's view, there will be a net improvement in its position if UNITA can be seriously weakened by a withdrawal of outside support--primarily South African--even if there is some trade off in loss of Cuban support.

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Has the Intelligence Community been tasked by the administration to report on...Cuban political, diplomatic, and military intentions...MPLA negotiating strategy and MPLA-Cuban relationship...South African intentions toward withdrawal from Namibia and Angola...Soviet political, military, and diplomatic intentions? What are the results?

As part of a southern Africa policy review in early 1987, the NSC tasked the Intelligence Community to produce several assessments, including:

- Soviet and Cuban objectives and likely courses of action in southern Africa over the next two years; and
- Prospects for the Angolan civil war over the next year.

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In response, under the auspices of the NIO for Africa, Memoranda to Holders of existing estimates were issued:

- SNIE 71-86, Prospects for the Angolan Civil War in 1987 February 1987, concluded that neither side likely would gain a decisive advantage and that the Angolan government's concentration on a military solution underestimated UNITA's political and military strengths and South Africa's commitment, making movement toward reconciliation with UNITA very unlikely.
- NIE 11/70-85, Soviet and Cuban Objectives and Activity in Southern Africa Through 1988 (S), February 1987, concluded that the Soviets and Cubans will continue actively to pursue their goals in the region and are probably willing to escalate their support to the Angolan government to contain the UNITA threat.

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Often, the Intelligence Community does not wait for specific tasking but responds to what are generally regarded as key intelligence issues. In anticipation of policymaker requirements, for instance, the NIO for Africa initiated IIM 87-10007, Namibia: Prospects for a Solution, July 1987, which concluded that prospects are bleak for an internationally recognized Namibian independence settlement during the next five years, primarily because South Africa will not agree to a plan that it believes would allow SWAPO to take power in Windhoek.

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Finally, in response to requests from the NSC and State Department, the Intelligence Community issued NI SIIM 88-10001, Angola: Implications of a Cuban Troop Withdrawal for the Military Balance (C NF), January 1988. It concluded that neither the Angolan government nor UNITA would likely gain a decisive advantage were a plan implemented for Cuban and South African withdrawal from Angola and Namibia, respectively, but that UNITA would be the net gainer if outside aid continued.

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In addition to the above Intelligence Community efforts, the separate agencies have each devoted considerable attention to problems and prospects for negotiated settlements in the region. The agencies for the most part have not received formal, written taskings from policymakers for analysis on this subject which, nonetheless, is a key topic in community day-to-day current intelligence reporting and longer term analysis. Most products were instead self-initiated or the result of informal discussions between policymakers and intelligence managers. Efforts to anticipate and respond to policymaker requirements figure in our formal tasking of various intelligence collectors.

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A complete listing of each Agency's analytic products on these topics would be encyclopedic. Rather, a sampling follows:

State/INR has responded to policymaker requirements either in the Secretary's Morning Summary or in Info Memos to senior officials. For example:

- South African Anti-SWAPO Military Operations in Angola, January 1986. Pretoria builds up its anti-SWAPO campaigns both to provide cover for its support of UNITA and to justify its positions on UNSCR 435, which they would either like to change or evade in the context of a regional settlement.
- Angola Negotiations, September 1987. Luanda has solid reasons to want to negotiate seriously on CTW; Moscow and Havana have good reasons to go along.
- Angola: Cubans--Reluctant Internationalists, February 1988. Havana has reinforced Luanda substantially, but appears reluctant to become directly engaged in large-scale fighting. So far, continued combat has not impeded progress in CTW talks.
- Angola: Maneuvering for Political and Military Advantage, May 1988. Luanda and Havana believe Cuban reinforcements have turned the tide but appear to recognize the need for a political settlement. South Africa has responded cautiously, but further fighting is likely as both sides seek to turn battlefield strengths into political advantages.

- Angola: Prospects for National Reconciliation, June 1988. Despite the legacy of civil war and foreign involvement, national reconciliation could occur and could take several forms. [REDACTED]

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DIA in response to formal or informal requests has produced at least seven papers and four briefings on these issues during the past few years. In addition, it provided the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ISA) with at least a dozen informal deskside briefings. Beyond these contributions, DIA has issued several major studies of relevance, among them:

- Angola: The 1985 Government Offensive and Its Implications, May 1986. The offensive was distinguished by a marked increase in government military effectiveness (for example, new weapons and tactics) and possibly greater Soviet and Cuban involvement.
- Angola: Air Defense Capabilities, November 1986. An important element of Angola's strategy is an air defense network in southern Angola designed to end South African air superiority.
- Cuban Military Involvement in Angola: Benefits Outweigh Costs, December 1987.
- Insurgency Force Study: UNITA, June 1988. UNITA has a wide range of capabilities and has grown to at least 60,000 combatants. [REDACTED]

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CIA's Directorate of Intelligence has not been formally tasked to report on these issues specifically, but they have been key topics in its research program and longer term analysis as well as day-to-day current reporting and briefings. For instance:

- Angola: UNITA's Prospects in 1986, February 1986. Savimbi, with his hopes of forcing Luanda into negotiations dimmed by the 1985 government offensive, is prepared for a protracted conflict. There is a growing danger that Soviet, Cuban, and South African support to their clients in the offensive this year may draw the outsiders into more direct conflict.
- South Africa: Implications of Angolan Intervention, December 1987. South Africa's military intervention at Mavinga to help UNITA defeat the Angolan offensive may presage more active support in the future. Pretoria probably believes its actions have sent a clear message to Western governments that a successfully negotiated settlement requires South African approval.

- Angola: Dynamics Within the MPLA Leadership, March 1988. Pervasive Soviet and Cuban influence in MPLA policymaking, arising from their critical military assistance, limits Angolan flexibility on foreign policy issues. MPLA political dynamics will remain essentially unchanged over the next year and probably constrain Luanda's ability to implement or even propose a more flexible CTW timetable that might satisfy South Africa.
- Angola: More Cuban Troops Likely, May 1988. Cuban likely will augment its forces in Angola, probably with an eye to inducing South Africa to pursue negotiations seriously or risk getting drawn more directly into the fighting. Castro almost certainly has decided he must deal with Pretoria from a position of strength.
- USSR: Two-Track Approach on Angola, May 1988. Moscow has been discussing possibilities for resolving the conflict in Angola and Namibia with several countries, but it continues to send enough military assistance to ensure the needs of Angolan and Cuban forces. The Soviets are unlikely to push Luanda and Havana to sign an agreement in the near term or to press Angola to consider national reconciliation before a settlement is achieved. [REDACTED]

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What tasking has the Intelligence Community received on South African intentions toward withdrawal from Namibia and Angola? What evidence is there of South African commitment to withdrawal from Namibia and Angola? Beyond oral assurances? Is there any intelligence reporting indicating specific discussions of withdrawal plans?

Beyond the informal taskings for separate agencies mentioned above, the Intelligence Community as a whole has not received specific requests for analysis on South African intentions toward withdrawal from Namibia and Angola. Evidence about South African intentions on this matter is ambiguous and contradictory. Intelligence Community analysts believe that recent participation in international and bilateral talks suggests Pretoria has moved closer than it has ever been toward agreeing to some formula for withdrawal--but there is no compelling evidence that South Africa will agree to implementation of UN Resolution 435 without extracting significant concessions, particularly regarding withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. [REDACTED]

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What are South Africa's minimum conditions concerning Angola for implementing U.N. Resolution 435? Do these conditions go beyond Cuban troop withdrawal? Has recent South African reiteration of their commitment to U.N. Resolution 435 been interpreted as a new and significant development?

The recent deployment of Cuban troops near the Namibian border has amplified South African desire for a complete Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, but Pretoria would almost certainly ask that additional conditions be met before it agreed to implement the UN independence plan for Namibia. We believe the South African government at a minimum would ask the Angolan government to agree to a nonaggression pact--which would put an end to Luanda's support for South-West Africa People's Organization and African National Congress insurgents--before implementation of UN 435. Additionally, Pretoria would probably press for some form of participation by UNITA in the Luanda government as part of a settlement package. The South Africans, in our view, may also insist on a pre-independence constitutional framework for Namibia--which would provide guarantees for minority (white) rights--or even a UN resolution affirming South African sovereignty over Walvis Bay--an issue now deferred until after Namibian independence. South Africa would probably also call for some revisions of the ten year-old plan to accommodate internal Namibian developments--such as the expansion of the South-West Africa Territorial Force--not provided for when UN 435 was approved.

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We would not characterize recent South African statements of commitment for UN 435 as an important or significant departure from previous policy. Since the passage of UN 435 in 1978, the South African government has paid lipservice to the resolution but avoided implementation by linking it to Cuban troop withdrawal. Pretoria, however, has raised other objections to the UN plan, including alleged UN bias toward SWAPO, and experimented with several internal Namibian political structures in order to establish a government capable of competing with SWAPO in UN-sponsored elections or running the country if South Africa declared unilateral independence for Namibia.

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Is there intelligence reporting which suggests South Africa is prepared to accept a settlement in which UNITA does not form part of a new Angolan government? What intelligence is there on South African support for UNITA participation in a government in Luanda? Is such a power-sharing arrangement a realistic prospect?

We have no information which suggests that Pretoria is willing to accept a final settlement of the Angolan situation without UNITA participation. South African officials have consistently stated that there can be no real settlement to the Angolan civil war without national reconciliation. Pretoria, in our view, considers UNITA's participation in a future Angolan government as its only guarantee of a friendly neighbor.

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A power-sharing arrangement between the MPLA government and UNITA, especially one that includes UNITA President Savimbi, is unlikely at this time, in our judgment. The MPLA leadership appears unified in its rejection of reconciliation with UNITA because they fear Savimbi's presence in a coalition government could jeopardize their hold on power. We believe some Angolan officials may be willing to negotiate with UNITA--but not Savimbi--to reach an

[redacted]

accommodation. Such negotiations would probably be designed primarily to sow discord within the insurgent group by suggesting that a solution is possible if Savimbi relinquishes power.

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What are P.W. Botha's long-term intentions and immediate plans regarding South Africa's presence in Namibia and Angola? How do these compare with those of the military and security forces? How are they likely to be affected by further buildups and possible escalations of combat between Cuban and South African forces along the Angolan-Namibian border?

President Botha probably is content for now to pursue his two-track policy of paying lipservice to UN 435 while working--albeit ineffectively--toward the establishment of a credible interim government capable of governing an independent Namibia or of competing with SWAPO in UN-sponsored elections. Pretoria likely sees its participation in the current round of negotiations as prudent in light of the increased Cuban presence near the Namibian border. We do not believe, however, that Botha is anxious to implement the UN independence plan for Namibia, and he probably would prefer to delink the timing for implementation of the UN independence plan for Namibia from the Cuban troop withdrawal issue.

[redacted]

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Despite the Cuban augmentation, South African forces continue to operate in southern Angola. We believe Pretoria is intent on maintaining forces there to operate against SWAPO insurgents, although the Cuban deployments probably have already limited South African freedom of movement in the area.

[redacted]

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Over the longer term, President Botha probably would like to conclude a deal on Namibian independence that ensures South African regional security and protects him from rightwing criticism that he had "sold out" Namibian whites. To that end, Botha would probably insist upon additional conditions for an independence settlement that could include: a nonaggression pact with Angola, participation by UNITA in the Luanda government; a written constitution agreed upon prior to independence which guaranteed minority (white) rights in Namibia; third party guarantees for peaceful implementation and adherence to the plan; and retention of the Namibian territorial force created by--and, for the most part, loyal to--South Africa.

[redacted]

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There are no major divisions between President Botha and the South African military establishment regarding plans and intentions toward Namibia, in our judgment. For both, the Namibia issue is largely a question of security. President Botha and senior military officials are committed publicly to preventing a hostile SWAPO-led government in Namibia and probably believe they can eventually defeat SWAPO militarily.

[redacted]

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The deployment of additional Cuban troops near the Namibian border or an escalation of the military conflict would probably

harden South Africa's negotiating positions. Despite the risks inherent in an expanded military conflict, President Botha's concern for South African regional security interests and over rightwing criticism at home would make it difficult for him to back down in the face of Angolan/Cuban military advances. [REDACTED]

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What military installations would the South Africans have to give up if they were to effect a withdrawal from Namibia? From Angola? What threat from the ANC, SWAPO or other groups might they anticipate if they were unable to maintain their operations against these groups from their present forward bases? What resource losses might they anticipate?

South Africa would theoretically have to give up at least five military bases in Namibia except its small garrison at Walvis Bay which Pretoria claims is an integral part of South African territory. The expansion of the indigenous Namibian Army--the South-West African Territorial Force (SWATF)--over the last few years, however, complicates the withdrawal issue. UN 435 does not provide for SWATF, which is loyal to South Africa and now numbers some 14,000 men. [REDACTED]

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The territorial forces and the Namibian police are primarily responsible for counterinsurgency operations against SWAPO guerrillas. Counterinsurgency forces conduct preemptive strikes on SWAPO insurgent camps in southern Angola. South Africa maintains no permanent military installations in Angola. [REDACTED]

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If SWATF forces remained at forward bases in northern Namibia and the South Africans continued to supply SWATF, South Africa's counterinsurgency efforts against SWAPO would not be substantially weakened, in our judgment. Moreover, Pretoria is unlikely to withdraw from Namibia unless an agreement has been reached on Namibian independence. The South Africans are unlikely to accept a settlement which does not include a nonaggression pact limiting SWAPO and ANC use of Angolan territory, although South Africa probably would have no guarantee that Luanda would adhere to the pact. South Africa would potentially face a more significant security threat if its withdrawal from Namibia led to a SWAPO takeover. [REDACTED]

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What commitments have been made by all parties involved in the recent meetings in London? What might constitute concrete evidence of a commitment by any side to begin the withdrawal process?

No commitments were made in London except for the agreement to continue the discussions at an African site. The Angolans and Cubans reaffirmed in principle their commitment to a total Cuban withdrawal and Pretoria restated its commitment to UN 435 as a basis

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for Namibian independence. The agreement on an African venue, however, has recently broken down and, although all parties assert that they want another meeting soon, there is no consensus on where.

[redacted]

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The only concrete evidence of a commitment to begin the withdrawal process would be for South Africa to agree on a specific date to implement UN 435 in exchange for Angolan and Cuban agreement on a date to begin withdrawal of Cuban troops. [redacted]

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Is there any evidence of disagreement among the MPLA, Cubans, and the Soviets regarding conditions for MPLA-UNITA reconciliation? What are the maximum terms the MPLA is prepared to offer?

There is no evidence of any substantial disagreement among the Angolans, Cubans, and the Soviets over conditions for an MPLA-UNITA reconciliation. There are some indications that the Soviets believe UNITA must eventually be taken into account politically--because they believe UNITA enjoys the support of a significant portion of the population. [redacted]

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At present, the MPLA refuses to consider any form of reconciliation and power-sharing with a Savimbi-led UNITA. Instead, Luanda offers clemency for individual UNITA members, excluding Savimbi, in what it calls its "harmonization" program that would integrate UNITA members into existing Angolan social, governmental, and political organizations dominated by the MPLA. [redacted]

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If the MPLA Government, with Cuban support, offers a reasonable Cuban troop withdrawal proposal, how is South Africa likely to react?

We believe that a Cuban troop withdrawal proposal considered reasonable by the MPLA, and perhaps even by other governments, could still be rejected by the South Africa government. For example, Pretoria might well reject a plan even going as far as simultaneous Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and implementation of UN 435 if it precluded any change of the UN independence plan for Namibia.

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If South African resists such steps, how else could Cuba be motivated to remove its troops from Angola?

Cuba's negotiating flexibility continues to be tied closely to tactical events in Angola, and Cuban President Castro is determined to pursue negotiations that would allow him to claim a "victory" in Angola. That "victory" would entail implementation of UN 435, South African withdrawal from Namibia, and a cutoff of assistance to UNITA. Short of that there are no ready inducements or threats that would motivate a Cuban troop withdrawal.

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Pressure from the Soviet Union to withdraw could be an effective motivator, but the evidence indicates that the Soviets are not yet willing to apply such pressure in the absence of a regional settlement that includes South African implementation of UN 435. A

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Havana might give some consideration to an offer by the United States to partially lift the US trade embargo against Cuba or to reestablish full diplomatic relations with Havana, but, absent any guarantees for Angolan security, Havana is likely to see such a proposal as a sellout of its Angolan allies. Even the threat of a major engagement with South African troops or a defeat at the hands of South Africa is more likely to cause Castro to dig in his heels than encourage a withdrawal.

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The MPLA government has also indicated that it hopes a successful mediation effort will result in diplomatic recognition by the US Government. Under what conditions does it expect US recognition.

Although the issue of US diplomatic recognition has emerged on several occasions over the years, it has never been central to the negotiations over a regional settlement. Luanda apparently accepts the view that US recognition could be discussed following a regional settlement and it has not pushed strongly for US recognition.

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How do the MPLA, the Cubans, and the Soviets perceive US Government policies in southern Africa? Do they perceive the combination of mediation and aid to UNITA as pieces in a complicated tactical maneuver or as evidence of policy disagreement within the US Government?

Despite years of name-calling, the MPLA, Cuba, and the Soviets believe that the US-mediated negotiations offer the best chance of a regional settlement leading to a South African withdrawal from Namibia.

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Angolan officials attuned to US political dynamics have reported on Congressional opposition to administration policy and have recommended that Luanda intensify its lobbying efforts on the Hill.

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 88-1851

17 JUN 1988

The Honorable William S. Cohen, Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

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Director of Congressional Affairs

10 June 1988

Rec'd 10 June
P Judge Webster:

Senators Boren and Cohen recently sent us a letter asking a number of specific questions on Angola. The NIO and the DI have crafted a first-rate response. You noted you wanted to see our response before I send it to the Senate Committee. When I receive your approval, I will sent these letters. The Committee has requested our response by 15 June so that it will be useful for their mark-up of the 89 Authorization Act.

Please advise.



John L. Helgerson

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| TO : D/OCA | | CONTROL # OCA 88-1851 & 52 | DATE OF REQUEST 15 May 1988 |
| FROM : | | SUSPENSE DATE | |
| SUBJECT : Letters to Chairman Boren and Vice Chairman Cohen enclosing answers to their questions on the conflict in Angola | | | |
| NOTES <div style="text-align: center;"> <i>John H. Should be send copy of letter & reply to State? To DMR (Wanda) to Christensen</i> </div> | | | |
| COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices) | | | |
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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