

**Page Denied**

Next 13 Page(s) In Document Denied

~~SECRET~~



# AGENDA

---

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

# Off-Site Managers Conference

30 October - 1 November 1988

## SUNDAY, 30 OCTOBER

1700-1800 COCKTAILS (Cash Bar)

1800-1900 DINNER

1900-1930 WELCOMING REMARKS .....DCI

1930-2100 IMPLICATIONS FOR CIA OF CONTINUING THIRD WORLD INSTABILITY .....

- Director Near East and South Asian Analysis
- Chief Near East Division
- Chief Africa Division
- Director of Global Issues



25X1

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**MONDAY, 31 OCTOBER**

0730-0830 BREAKFAST

0900-1100 PRINCIPAL TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES OF THE 1990S AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS .....

25X1

[Redacted]

- Director of Research & Development

Julian Caballero

- Director of Development & Engineering

[Redacted]

- Director of Information Resources

- Chief Collection Requirements & Evaluation Staff

STAT

1100-1200 FREE TIME

1200-1300 LUNCH

1300-1430 DEVELOPING THE NEXT GENERATION OF AGENCY LEADERS. (What are our responsibilities as component chiefs? What skills, assignments, and experiences are critical to success as a senior Agency officer? How can we prepare the appropriate people for these positions?) .....

25X1

[Redacted]

Director of Training & Education

Chief East Asia Division

Director of Technical Services

Frank Ruocco - Director National Photographic Interpretation Center

John Ray - Director of Logistics

1430-1500 BREAK

1500-1630 THREE HIGH PROFILE ISSUES: COUNTERNARCOTICS, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE .....

25X1

[Redacted]

Associate Deputy Director for Counterintelligence

Chief Latin America Division

Chief Counterterrorism Center

1630-1800 FREE TIME

1800-1830 COCKTAILS (Cash Bar)

1830-1930 DINNER

1930-2000 THE COMING TRANSITION AND EMERGING NEAR-TERM REQUIREMENTS.... DDCI

**SECRET**

**Page Denied**

25X1

25X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 November 1988

STAT

[Redacted]  
Administrative Officer, DCI  
7D 19, Original Headquarters Building

Dear Jim:

Just a note to let you know how much we all appreciated the enormous effort that went into the first Off-Site Managers Conference. You must be justly proud of its success. It could not have been run more smoothly and the arrangements, both food and lodging, which you made pleased everyone.

Many thanks for a great job well done.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William H. Webster".

William H. Webster  
Director of Central Intelligence

PAO 88-0386

14 November 1988

JUDGE:

Attached are your remarks at the Off-Site Managers Conference 30 October-1 November 1988. Your introductory remarks were taped, and we have included an edited transcript for your review. Your concluding remarks were not taped, but we have worked from your outline to reconstruct "summary points" of that presentation.

We believe that both sets of remarks will be helpful to you as you prepare for press briefings. The "summary points" provide a review of your accomplishments as Director.

If you would like us to disseminate either set of remarks, we will be glad to do that. We have received a number of requests for your comments at the Off-Site.

25X1




Bill Baker

Attachments:  
As Stated

25X1 CI/PAO/WMB  
X2053

Distribution:

- 25X1 orig. - DCI
- 1 - D/PAO
- 25X1 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - ER
- 25X1 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - PAO Registry
- 1 - PAO Ames
- 25X1 1 - [Redacted] (Chrono)



SECRET



B-800=15

SECRET

REMARKS

BY

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AT THE

DCI OFF-SITE MANAGERS CONFERENCE

OCTOBER 30, 1988

SECRET



SECRET

Many have asked why we are holding this conference now. The "why now?" is a function of time. When the Executive Conference met at a retreat earlier this year, we decided that we should try to expand attendance at the next off-site to bring in the thinking of -- and communicate some ideas to -- a broader range of senior management. Bob Gates and I had two back-to-back trips out of the country that limited how early in the fall  could schedule this. Then with the election coming up and all the problems that experience tells us might occur with transition teams and others involved, this turned out to be the only weekend for us to hold this conference. For those of my fellow spooks who wish they were home Halloweening on Monday, I can only apologize. I'm one who enjoys that holiday, but this was the only time we could get together.

STAT

This conference is intended to be a four-way dialogue: upwards and downwards and back and forth across the directorates. I came here to share some thoughts with you, but even more to listen to you. During the past year and a half I've managed to get around to most of the offices that are represented here tonight, but there are others I still want to see. Bob has filled in, visiting other areas when he could, and I hope to hear more and learn a great deal more about this organization -- mostly about the people in it.

I have been in a number of places and have consistently found people who are proud of what they're doing and who understand what they're doing. I still think of the faces of the young men and women going through the CT graduation ceremony; the pride of those in Agency offices such as FBIS,

SECRET

**Page Denied**

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

SUMMARY POINTS: DCI CLOSING REMARKS AT OFF-SITE CONFERENCE

Introduction

- I'd like to get your reaction to what we have completed over the past two days.
- I encourage you to jot down one or two observations about what we have discussed and pass them to Jim Taylor.
- In short, we have been looking at ways to turn vulnerabilities into opportunities.

Responding to Crisis Situations

- Although we are not in competition with the media, we need to improve our reporting on crisis situations.
- We must keep in mind the DCI's obligation to provide timely intelligence to the President and key policymakers.
- We need to reconcile the plea of DI analysts for information with the DO concern for protecting sources and methods.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

### Responding to Technical Challenges

- Again, we must view challenges as opportunities. In a time of constrained resources, we must make better use of what we have.
  - We must formulate a strategic information management plan to guide our long-term technological growth. Such a plan must be based on user participation.
  - Managers must become more computer literate if we are to ensure wise use of our technical resources.
- We must be aware that, with our greater capacity to collect and process information comes a greater counterintelligence vulnerability, especially in the area of computer security.

### Leadership Challenges

- I am interested in promoting growth and encouraging a wide range of experience for Agency managers.
  - The reluctance of directorates to "share their stars" hinders this goal.
  - The need to provide opportunities for minorities and females to advance within the Agency is necessarily a part of this goal. We must make affirmative action a focus of our efforts, moving immediately when we see someone with the potential for greater responsibility.
- We need to encourage cross-fertilization through rotational assignments. For these to be beneficial for the office and the individual, we must put a premium on fairness and candor.

SECRET

SECRET

- We must provide opportunities and separate tracks for experts and managers through a variety of mechanisms, including executive fellowships, rotationals on the IG staff, SIS-grade positions for experts, and lower-level exchanges.
- We all, as senior managers, have a duty to ensure a smooth transition to our eventual successors.

#### High-Priority Intelligence Issues

- Counterterrorism: our effort on this issue is firmly in place.
- Counternarcotics: our effort in this area still needs firm definition. We provide a wide range of support, and our efforts are not always coordinated. We must further define how our work in this area relates to our efforts on terrorism.
- Counterintelligence: we need to consider whether a separate career path is advisable; we also need to reach a consensus on the appropriate and effective use of the polygraph in this area.

#### The Transition to a New Administration

- As the DDCI discussed earlier in our conference, the transition poses three major tasks for us:
  - We need to reexamine our methods of disseminating our products, especially concerning the National Intelligence Daily.
  - We need to think about how we can improve our relationship with policymakers.
  - We need to consider the future of covert action.

SECRET

SECRET

### Oversight and Public Scrutiny

- We all must understand our public affairs functions and how such efforts can promote Agency interests.
  - We must be known to be accountable -- but only for what we are responsible for, and this distinction must be made clear to the press and the public.
  - The speeches I make are intended to build public confidence in the CIA. To ensure their accuracy and propriety, they are always coordinated within the Agency.
- John Helgerson has as good an understanding of Congress and the oversight function as anyone I know. I would like to elaborate on his remarks at this conference by making the following points:
  - Although we don't want to diminish our relations with Congress, we do want to keep our level of support manageable.
  - We should consider reducing the number of briefings we give on the Hill.
  - We must place our emphasis on being right the first time; retractions are costly and time-consuming.
  - We need to counter Congress's tendency to micro-manage us, especially in the area of sources and methods.
  - We need to stress the positive in our dealings with Congress.
  - We must learn to live with the leaks from Congressional staffers.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

- All the changes in the USSR and their many policy implications make it more difficult for us to know exactly what the policymaker needs.

#### Review of Accomplishments as DCI

- Some may remember the situation two years ago, when we were confronting the Iran-Contra investigations.
- Two years later, we see few negative articles in the newspapers, and we are not being challenged as we were.
- With your help, I have guided the Agency through the most challenging time in our history.
- I'd like to be remembered for guiding the Agency through the difficult Iran-Contra period -- for restoring public confidence and for improving relations with Congress.
- And I'd like to be remembered for the initiatives I've undertaken during the past two years.
  - Ensuring objectivity in the preparation of NIEs and other intelligence assessments. (We are no longer accused of "cooking the books.")
  - Developing guidelines for dealing with Congress.
  - Strengthening internal review of covert action through the CARG:

SECRET

- Strengthening the mandate of the Inspector General.
- Establishing the Counterintelligence Center and making other efforts within the Intelligence Community to deal with the hostile intelligence threat.
- Avoiding further executive and legislative constraints on intelligence, including the proposed 48-hour notification and GAO audits.
- Making intelligence a vital component in NSPG deliberations on key foreign policy issues such as the Persian Gulf, Panama, and arms control.

25X1



- Strengthening CIA-FBI relations.
- Finally, leading this conference of our Agency's senior management as we discuss the difficult challenges ahead.



Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release  
2012/08/15 : CIA-RDP90G01353R000500570002-7

**Pre Denied**

STAT  
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release  
2012/08/15 : CIA-RDP90G01353R000500570002-7

SECRET

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT:** (Optional)

Do We Want Gorbachev to Succeed?

**FROM:**

Fritz W. Ermarth  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

**EXTENSION**

**NO.**

NIC #03256-88

**DATE**

4 November 1988

**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)

**DATE**

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

**OFFICER'S INITIALS**

**COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Executive Registry

04 NOV 1988

2.

3.

B DDCI

*2 Nov*

4.

5.

8 DCI

8 Nov. 11/9

*MBW*

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Fritz W. Ermarth  
C/NIC 7E47 HQS

12.

13.

*Orig note to C/NIC 11/1988*

14.

15.

25X1

4/9

Fritz - this is a very thoughtful response of the kind intended by my question - which clearly does not have a yes - no answer. I suppose the problem is in the definition of "Succeed" - we know our definition but are we so sure of G's.

FORM 1-79 **610** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

*B-800-IR*

SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #03256-88  
4 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: Do We Want Gorbachev to Succeed?


At the off-site, you asked whether we want Gorbachev to succeed. I wasn't quite satisfied with my response and the ensuing discussion, so I'd like to try again in this memo.

I cannot improve on Bob Gates' formulation: If success means a more effective version of the Soviet system as we know it historically and currently, the answer is "NO." We would face an intensified security challenge because of improved Soviet tactics in the international sphere and a strengthened Soviet economy; while under a revived system of one-party rule, the Soviet citizen would enjoy no guaranteed expansion of human and political rights, whatever the transient pleasures of glasnost.

On the other hand, if success means irreversible trends toward a more liberal, tolerant, decentralized, and open society--undoing many features of Russian-Soviet political culture we discussed [redacted]--then the answer is "YES." As Westerners, we are inclined to believe that any reform which makes the USSR more efficient and productive must, per force, make it freer.

The trouble and promise of the Gorbachev reform effort--for us as well as many Soviets who share our values--is that it harbors both possibilities, as well as possibilities for failure that bring out the very worst in the Russian-Soviet political tradition. Grim possibilities include a conservative reaction that could, in the extreme, be violent and repressive. Intelligent Soviets do not rule this out, and neither should we. Were we observing the lively politics and vibrant cultural life of the USSR in the 1920s, we would have found it hard to imagine a return even to the relatively mild autocracy of the tsarist era, not to mention the megadeath brutality of Stalinism.

All portions Secret



1  
SECRET

✓ B-800-IR

X-ref: C-303AA-IR

SECRET

The possibilities of failure also include that of violent social revolution in which the nationalities as well as the haves and have-nots in the society go after each other. Such upheavals usually destroy first those fragile few who believe in law, tolerance, and the protection of the individual from the state. Social revolution seems much more likely to produce a new brand of autocracy than a more liberal, law-governed state. Moreover, a replay of the Russian Revolution and Civil War in the nuclear era could be dangerous.

Our task as intelligence officers is to track as best we can the trends which are shaping the unfolding possibilities. Many conflicting trends are at work at the same time. To track them, we must pay more attention to what leaders and audible spokesmen are saying, but also as best we can to what largely silent, fearful, and resentful masses of the population are thinking. This is not easy for the Soviet leadership; it's even harder for us. But neither the Kremlin nor the CIA can afford to be surprised on this front.

25X1

25X1 A second task--the one I stressed in my remarks [redacted] is managerially easier, but politically and intellectually challenging enough: that is, to keep visible events in the USSR in a historical and cultural perspective for our customers, to highlight the significance of the new and different while constantly reminding of the deep cultural obstacles to orderly liberalization. So far, I think we've fulfilled this second task pretty well because of the expertise and professionalism of the Soviet-watchers in our intelligence community. Having somewhat underestimated the pace at which Gorbachev, for his own power-political reasons, would radicalize the political agenda is a less grave sin than prematurely assuming that the reform process is already on the high road to success.

This, then, leaves the policy question of how the United States should try to influence the form of and prospects for "success" of the Gorbachev reform era. I'll offer my personal view.

First, our main legitimate preoccupation should be to exploit the outreach of Soviet policy for our own security interests, remaining wary that the long-term effects of various deals could run against our interests, e.g., promoting "denuclearization" of Western Europe. Our biggest problem will be maintaining the integrity of the structures that keep the peace, such as NATO, the nuclear deterrent, our worldwide military capability, in the face of a seductive and soporific Soviet diplomacy. These structures cannot be rebuilt as fast as Moscow could revert to "old thinking" and threatening ways.

Second, we have to realize that our ability to influence Soviet internal evolution is marginal, but not zero. The political, moral, economic, and military health of the West is itself a powerful stimulus to liberalizing

SECRET

reform in the USSR, as it has been for Russia over several centuries. The Russians envy and fear us, as Kennan once said, for what we are, not for what we do. But the envy and fear are accompanied by a desire to emulate which is, on balance, healthy. The West must remain something to be emulated because it cannot be overcome.

Third, we must emphasize those interactions which promote the liberalizing of the society, not the strengthening of the Soviet state. For this reason, our own programs for creating subterranean tunnels to get Western information and ideas into the USSR are, if anything, more important in the era of glasnost than ever. They put pressure on the system in the right direction. They also prepare for the all-too-probable day when the conservative reaction sets in and our modest programs become, once again, the main bearers of glasnost in the USSR. Striking the right balance in our official and overt policies on behalf of freedom in the USSR is not easy. For example, bargaining with the Soviet government about freer dissemination of Western publications is a worthy effort, but it risks our admission that control of the press is a legitimate government function. Or take the example of the Moscow human rights conference: Some would expect that the West's acceptance of this idea would spur Moscow to new steps, such as releasing all political prisoners and formally abolishing politically repressive laws. But others fear that such a conference would put the stamp of Western acceptance on a system still far less free than Pinochet's Chile or Greece under the colonels.

Finally, the question of economic support. Odom's admonition to applaud but not finance perestroika is sound to a first approximation. But we need not be too dogmatic about how this works out in practice. I can imagine circumstances in which the progress of political and economic reforms has reached the point where, assuming we ourselves can afford it, we might well consider programs to help improve the lot of the Soviet consumer. We have to gauge very carefully the difference between help that spurs reform and liberalization, on the one hand, and measures that help the regime avoid reform and preserve resource allocation patterns threatening to us, on the other. Here again intelligence analysis of Soviet internal, military, and foreign policy developments will be critical; and our policy problem in practice is likely to be, not whether we should help Gorbachev, but whether we should try to stop others from doing so. Over the decades, the USSR has received a lot of help from the West, as Imperial Russia did before it. Hoover's famine relief in the 1920s saved many lives and helped to consolidate Soviet power. Lend-lease helped defeat Hitler and bring Soviet power to the heart of Europe. Western capital and technology transferred to the USSR in the 1930s helped to build the Stalinist economic order, and in the 1950s to restore it after the war. This ambiguous history is something that we should not forget.

SECRET

SECRET

To understand and remember the lessons of history is, perhaps, the bottom line. Those lessons do not condemn us to a stingy, closed-minded reaction to Gorbachev. They allow us to respond positively while keeping our powder dry. Striking this balance will test our intelligence and maturity as severely and more subtly than all the challenges of the Cold War so far.



Fritz W. Ermarth

SECRET

SECRET

NIC #03256-88  
4 November 1988

SUBJECT: Do We Want Gorbachev to Succeed?

25X1

DCI/C/NIC:FWErmarth:

Distribution:

DCI  
DDCI  
SA/DCI  
ER  
ExDir  
D/PAO  
DDO  
DDI  
D/SOVA  
D/EURA  
C/SE/DO

25X1

VC/NIC  
NIO/USSR  
NIO/ECON

5  
SECRET

SECRET

O/DDI  
03517X/88

3 NOV 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:

[Redacted]

Director of Global Issues

SUBJECT: Instability in Communist Countries

1. At this week's off-site managers conference I mentioned in my presentation on political instability that most of our effort to date has focused on the Third World. Given those comments I believe it is useful to review the work we do have under way against the issue of instability in Communist countries.

2. Our research effort on instability in the coming year will focus heavily on the Communist countries in an effort to get a handle on the political repercussions of reform. We hope to develop ways to monitor changes as they occur and get a sense as to their potential for triggering sudden policy adjustments or in the extreme, a replacement of a regime or form of government.

3. Our kickoff effort is a two-day conference on instability in the Soviet Union at Airlie House December 12-13, planned jointly with SOVA. The session will feature a host of experts on the Soviet Union and political instability to explore the potential for a major change in policy, regime, or system. One day of the conference will be devoted to scenarios of dramatic change in the USSR and identification of critical variables we can monitor. We have recently let a small personal services contract that will summarize the history of political unrest in Russia and the Soviet Union. A similar paper is being prepared on Eastern Europe by an outside expert. I have attached a copy of the conference agenda for your information.

DCI  
EXEC  
REG

*1 R route off-site*

[Redacted]

All portions SECRET

SECRET

*C.I.C-303AA-TR*



SECRET

SUBJECT: Instability in Communist Countries

4. In addition to the paper, we plan to organize a series of country specific seminars on Eastern Europe employing outside experts to discuss instability prospects and indicators. We hope to build on our own work and previous work done by EURA to develop country specific indicators and produce assessments of instability prospects in selected East European countries. With the sets of indicators developed from these seminars and the Soviet Union conference, we hope to produce eventually a companion publication to the Political Instability Quarterly.

5. Our work on other Communist countries will include a look at reform in the Asian Communist countries and further expansion of our earlier work on the consolidation of power in Marxist-Leninist states. On the latter issue, we will be sponsoring a conference late this month on lessons learned from anti-Marxist insurgencies which will include a segment on government control.

25X1



Attachment:  
As stated

## Prospects for Political Instability in the Soviet Union

Conference at Airlie House 12-13 December 1988

### Conference Objectives

This two day conference will bring together some 75 Soviet specialists, political science experts on comparative politics and dramatic political change, and analysts from the intelligence community to discuss the prospects for political instability in the Soviet Union. Specifically, we are interested in exploring scenarios of mass-based as well as elite-based opposition to the current leadership and the potential for a major change in policy, regime, or system. Drawing on a wide range of expertise, the presentations and discussions should provide some tentative answers to the following questions.

What insights can we gain from past episodes of political turmoil in Russian and Soviet history that may help assess current prospects for Mr. Gorbachev and his program?

What are the lessons learned from East European attempts at reform and are they applicable to the Soviet Union today?

What does the comparative work on political instability provide in the way of theories and/or analytical frameworks that would be helpful in understanding political change and the potential for instability in the Soviet Union?

What might the "dynamic" process of regime-threatening political instability in the Soviet Union look like? What factors would be important to mobilization of opposition groups? What role might external players or events play? What are the likely regime responses to either elite-based or mass-based opposition and are they likely to ameliorate or to aggravate the situation? What combination of factors or events could produce heightened nationalities violence (including insurgency or civil war), widespread collective political opposition to the regime, a military coup, or a political coup from either conservative or radical elites?

Can reform proceed relatively smoothly under Gorbachev or his allies? What factors/conditions would have to apply to this "success" scenario?

What are the implications for the United States of growing political problems for Gorbachev? How might Soviet foreign policy be affected by internal political stress?

Conference on Prospects for Instability in the Soviet Union

12-13 December 1988  
Airlie House

12 December (Monday)

8:30-9:15 Arrive, register, check-in.

9:15-9:30 Welcoming Remarks  
Conference Objectives and Scope

9:30-10:30 Point/Counterpoint: Can Gorbachev Succeed?  
2 presentations/1 discussant

1 presenter will take an "optimistic" view about Gorbachev's chances for success in retaining power and making some progress on reform. What conditions must obtain for Gorbachev to succeed?

[ ] Duke University

STAT

1 presenter will take a more "pessimistic" view about Gorbachev's ability to retain control over the short to medium term, the most likely causes leading to his demise, and his most formidable opponents.

[ ] Kennan Institute

STAT

Discussant: [ ] MIT

STAT

10:30-10:45 Break

10:45-12:15 Social/Economic Change and Instability  
2 presentations/1 discussant

1 scholar on cross-national patterns of political instability will outline the major variables and patterns common to the evolution of regime-threatening instability. Which of the analytic frameworks or explanatory theories seem most relevant in assessing the prospects for top-down reform and political instability in the Soviet Union?

[ ] Harvard University

STAT

1 scholar on risks of moving from a centralized to a decentralized economy. Can the Soviet Union revitalize its economy without major political disruptions?

[ ] Brookings: invitation extended)

STAT

Discussant: [ ] Boston University

STAT

12:15-13:15 Lunch

13:15-15:00 Instability in Communist Countries: The Historical Track Record  
2 presentations/1 discussant

Patterns of Political Crises in Russian and Soviet History. A Soviet scholar will discuss past episodes and periods of political turmoil--both successful and unsuccessful challenges to regime authority--in terms of factors that were common to these periods of instability and to the success or failure of antiregime efforts. Are these conditions or factors operative today?

[ ] University of Chicago

STAT

Political Turmoil in Eastern Europe. What are the lessons learned from unrest in Eastern Europe? What were the major issues, groups, government responses, and role of external factors/players? How effective were regime responses? Are there similarities/differences to the Soviet Union today?

[ ] Union College

STAT

Discussant: [ ], Air University

STAT

15:00-15:15 Break

15:15-17:00 Erosion of Regime Legitimacy as an Indicator of Instability  
1 presenter, 2 discussants.

A Soviet expert will address the basis for the legitimacy of the CPSU and whether Gorbachev is threatening these. Can he forge a new social contract and basis for legitimacy? In whose eyes does he need to remain "legitimate?" What are the empirical indicators of the erosion of Gorbachev's or the party's legitimacy? What are the implications for Soviet foreign policy and the United States?

[ ], Oberlin College

STAT

Discussant: [ ] Memorial University

STAT

Discussant: [ ] Brown University

Dinner and Keynote Address  
[redacted] Harvard University

STAT

13 December (Tuesday)

8:30-8:45 Opening Remarks

8:45-10:15 Assessing the prospects for mass-based or collective anti-regime action.  
2 presenters/2 discussants

Presentation on scenarios of heightened nationalities violence and anti-regime activity, including insurgency and secession.

[redacted], Memorial University

Discussant: [redacted] independent contractor

STAT

Presentation on scenarios of organized political opposition, including "revolution" from below.

[redacted], Columbia University

Discussant: [redacted]

STAT

10:15-10:30 Break

10:30-12:15 Assessing the prospects for elite-based coups.  
2 presenters/2 discussants

Presentation on scenarios of a political coup from conservative or radical elements.

[redacted], Yale University

Discussant: [redacted] MIT

STAT  
STAT

Presentation on scenarios of a military coup

[redacted] Rand Corporation

Discussant: [redacted] Brown University

STAT  
STAT

12:15-13:30 Lunch

13:30-15:30 Roundtable on Prospects for Instability in the USSR and Indicators of "Turning Points"  
Selected participants of past two days will be asked for their assessment of most likely developments, critical variables that will determine a smooth vs. disruptive outcome, and indicators of how we can monitor these variables and distinguish between a "crisis" situation, a turning point, instability as potential for change vs. instability as commotion. Implications for the US and Soviet foreign policy will be summed up.

25X1



03 NOV 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

25X1

FROM : 

SUBJECT : Off-Site Conference


*Jim*

1. Here are my views on the off-site conference, which I did not have a chance to set down and get to you before we all left for Headquarters.

2. Although not initially enthusiastic, I found the conference very interesting, stimulating and useful. A similar but shorter conference a year after the inauguration of the new Administration would offer a good opportunity for stock-taking and for reviewing how effectively the Agency is responding to its new masters. Other than for that exception and for holding one a year after any new DCI's entry on duty, to increase his understanding of the organization he heads, I suggest holding them no more often than once every two years.

3. I found all the presentations stimulating. Perhaps the least successful was that on Developing the Next Generation of Agency Leaders, which seemed to focus on rotational tours and the need for more women and minorities to the virtual exclusion of all else.

25X1



DCI  
EXEC  
REG

SECRET

*B-800-IR*

OTS-608-88  
10 2 NOV 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

25X1

FROM:   
Director of Technical Service

SUBJECT: DCI Off Site

1. During his closing remarks, the DCI instructed attendees to submit two comments to you about anything pertaining to the off site. My two comments:

(a) This was an extremely valuable exercise. It permitted Agency managers to share their views on a broad range of subjects affecting the Agency. I suggest such an off site be a yearly affair.

25X1

(b) The DCI's concluding remarks were excellent. I suggest, however, that some additional guidance, possibly from the Deputy Directors, be passed to the attendees--on those contentious subjects for which there is no consensus.

25X1

2. Thanks for organizing such a memorable off site.

25X1

Distribution:  
0 - Addressee  
1 - ER  
1- D/OTS

25X1

DCI  
EXEC  
REG

CONFIDENTIAL

B-800-IP

SECRET

PAO 88-0359

24 October 1988

JUDGE:

Re: Your Remarks at the Agency Managers' Off-Site Conference

[Redacted]

October 30, 1988 7:00 p.m.

STAT

This is the final version of a draft you were given on Friday, 21 October. It incorporates the comments of the DDCI and includes [Redacted] record of the number of facilities you have visited. (the DDCI's copy of the draft with his suggested changes is attached)

25X1

Russ Bruemmer has also reviewed the speech and likes it.

Because there will be about [Redacted] people in the audience, we have provided you with a full text rather than talking points. The full text is repeated on the cards.

STAT

*[Signature]*  
Bill Baker

Attachments:  
As stated

25X1

DCI/PAO/WME [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Distribution:

Orig. - DCI

1 - D/PAO

25X1

1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]  
1 - [Redacted]

SECRET



1 - ER

1 - PAO Registry

1 - Ames (Hold)

25X1

1 - [Redacted]


*B-800-IR*



SECRET

PROPOSED REMARKS  
BY  
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AT THE  
AGENCY MANAGERS' OFF-SITE CONFERENCE  
OCTOBER 30, 1988

25X1



SECRET

SECRET

I WANT TO WELCOME YOU TO WHAT IS A "FIRST" FOR THIS AGENCY. WE HAVE NEVER HAD SO MANY TOP-LEVEL MANAGERS TOGETHER FOR A CONFERENCE. I HOPE THIS IS THE FIRST OF MANY.

THIS FIRST CONFERENCE IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT GIVES ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO TELL YOU WHAT I'VE FOUND IN MY YEAR AND A HALF HERE. AND TO TELL YOU, AS WELL, WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN WHEN WE LEAVE THIS CONFERENCE.

I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TELL EACH OF YOU INDIVIDUALLY HOW PROUD I AM OF THIS ORGANIZATION AND ITS WORK. I WILL TELL YOU THAT IN MY PROFESSIONAL LIFE, I'VE HAD SOME INTERESTING AND CHALLENGING ASSIGNMENTS. BUT NONE HAVE BEEN MORE DEMANDING OR CHALLENGING THAN WHAT I'M DOING NOW.



25X1

SECRET

**Page Denied**

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

AS WE CONSIDER WHAT OUR PART SHOULD BE IN THE NATION'S  
COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS, CONSIDER THE EFFECTS OF THE NEW OMNIBUS  
DRUG ACT.

AS WE EXAMINE THE EFFECTS OF GORBACHEV'S "NEW THINKING",  
CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLECTION, FOR ANALYSIS, FOR  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND FOR SUPPORTING THE NEGOTIATION AND  
MONITORING OF ARMS AGREEMENTS.

AND AS WE DEAL WITH THE REALITIES OF OVERSIGHT AND WITH THE  
RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE BUILT WITH CONGRESS, CONSIDER WHAT EFFECT THE  
NUMEROUS BRIEFINGS AND REPORTS THAT WE PROVIDE CONGRESS HAS HAD ON  
OUR RESOURCES. LAST YEAR WE PROVIDED OVER 1,000 BRIEFINGS, AND SENT  
UP OVER 5,000 REPORTS. OVER 15% OF MY TIME WAS SPENT DEALING WITH  
THE HILL. AND I KNOW SOME OF YOU SPENT AT LEAST 25% OF YOUR TIME  
DEALING WITH CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR STAFFS. WE MAY, IN THE FUTURE,  
LOOK FOR WAYS TO CUT DOWN THE NUMBER OF BRIEFINGS, OR EVEN THE  
NUMBER OF REPORTS WE ARE REQUIRED TO SEND, ESPECIALLY IF IT CUTS  
SIGNIFICANTLY INTO OUR RESOURCES.

SECRET

SECRET

ALL OF THIS IS PRELUDE, OF COURSE, FOR DEALING WITH THE COMING TRANSITION. WE ALL RECOGNIZE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO PROVIDE COMPLETE SUPPORT TO THE TRANSITION TEAMS. BUT -- AND I HAVE TAKEN NO POLLS -- I WOULD BET THAT IF WE WANTED A CONSENSUS ON DESCRIBING A SINGLE EVENT THAT WOULD OCCUPY THE MOST PEOPLE FOR THE LONGEST TIME WITH THE LEAST VISIBLE PAYOFF, IT WOULD BE PROVIDING INFORMATION TO TRANSITION TEAMS.

BUT FOR THE NEXT TWO DAYS, LET US PUT ASIDE THE DEMANDS OF TRANSITION TEAMS, OF CONGRESSMEN, OF SENIOR POLICYMAKERS, OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, AND CONCENTRATE OUR ENERGIES AND CONSIDERABLE SKILL ON HOW BEST WE CAN USE OUR RESOURCES TO FULFILL OUR MISSION.

YOU ARE THE SENIOR MANAGERS I COUNT ON TO MAKE US INTO A COHESIVE FORWARD-MOVING ORGANIZATION, AND I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR THOUGHTS BOTH ON THE ISSUES I'VE MENTIONED AND ON SOME OF THE OTHER ISSUES THAT ARE OF CONCERN TO YOU. I WELCOME OUR TIME

SECRET

SECRET

DOWN HERE AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF  
LEADING THE AGENCY. I LOOK FORWARD TO A CANDID EXCHANGE AND  
WORTHWHILE CONFERENCE.

SECRET


ATT, DDA-14114-88  
 ER Hand. e.  
 - 2015-88

**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

DDA SUBJECT FILE COPY

SUBJECT: (Optional)

DA Suggested Topics for the DCI Managers' Offsite



FROM:

EXA/DDA  
 7D18 Hqs

EXTENSION

NO.

DDA 88-1462

DATE

13 July 1988

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

1. EA/ExDir  
 7D55 Hqs

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

ORIG: EXA/DDA

11.

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - DDA Subject w/att
- 1 - DDA Chrono w/o att
- 1 - EXA/DDA Chrono w/att

12.

13.

14.

15.

DDA REGISTRY  
 FILE# 100-20



R. 800-1R

DDA 88-1462  
13 July 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant to the Executive Director

FROM: Carmen M. Diggs  
Executive Assistant to the  
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: DA Suggested Topics for the DCI Managers' Offsite

1. Following are suggested discussion topics for the DCI Managers' offsite to be held in October:

STAT

- Individual privacy vs the Agency's need to know. (Interesting conflicts between what we should and do know and the individual's desire for privacy and efforts to withhold information).

STAT

- Update on new personnel policies and procedures and the future of Agency pay and compensation systems, an update on the NAPA study.

STAT

- Models and procedures for succession planning in the Agency and strategies and procedures for Executive Development.
- Space planning, especially in the "backfill" area and the Agency's master plan for the use of outbuildings in the future.
- Promotion Systems in the Agency (IG view).
- A forward look at Agency programs from the Comptroller's perspective (resources, cuts, etc.).



Technology Resource Issues

- Impact of the increasing Agency dependence on information systems.
  - Personal Computers (PC's) are the "New Center of the Universe" for information systems: organizational implications.
  - More investment in automation to meet productivity goals.
  - Recapitalization of critical information technology is largely unfunded.
  - Enhanced training requirements for a static high technology workforce.
2. I do hope this input will be helpful.

STAT



**Page Denied**

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

SUBJECT: Managers' Offsite Conference

ORIG:EXDIR:JHTaylor:be

Distribution:

- 0 - DCI w/atts.
- 1 - Ea Addt'l Adse w/atts.
- 1 - ER w/atts.
- 1 - EXDIR Chrono w/atts.
- 1 - DCI ADM w/atts.

**Page Denied**

Next 11 Page(s) In Document Denied

EA/ Executive Director

20 May 1988

NOTE FOR: DDA  
DDI  
DDO  
DDS&T

SUBJECT: Offsite Conference for  
Agency Managers

The DCI has indicated that he would like to pursue the suggestion raised by Jim in the attached memorandum.

STAT  
STAT  
[redacted] therefore, has been asked to set up a managers conference [redacted] this October. Would you please offer suggestions to Jim or to Stan with respect to the most appropriate speakers and for other topics that you think would be worth discussing.

STAT  
Thank you.

[redacted]

EA/EXDIR

Attachment

cc: D/OTE

ER  
EA/EXDIR



B-800-1R

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1

25X1

25X1

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

DCI/DDCI Executive Staff

28 October 1988

NOTE FOR: DCI

SUBJECT: Paperwork on Off-Site

The other day you asked whether or not we had received any advance paperwork on the Off-Site Conference. My answer was no, not to my knowledge. I spoke to Mr. Taylor and he tells me that he did forward a memo to Bob last May proposing this Off-Site and that Bob in turn spoke to you about it at that time. Attached is a copy of the memo from the Executive Director to the DDCI.

*Barry*

*starts*

SHEET

ER 2015 88

17 May 1988

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

*See folder to DCI - let's proceed RG*

*question?*

*Return to Ex Dir.*

DCI  
EXEC  
REG

*B-800-R*

11
12
13
14
15

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT:** (Optional)

Off-site Conference for CIA Managers

**FROM:**

Executive Director

**EXTENSION**

**NO.**

ER 2015 88

**DATE**

17 May 1988

**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)

**DATE**

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

**OFFICER'S INITIALS**

**COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Deputy Director of  
Central Intelligence

17 *→*

2.

3.

*Ex Dir*

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.



12.

13.

14.

15.

*Dir talked to DCI -  
let's proceed*



*B-800-1R*

STAT



**Page Denied**


Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1

25X1

25X1

**SECRET**



**Director  
Central Intelligence Agency**

---

**Off-Site Managers Conference  
30 October - 1 November 1988**

---

**DEPUTY DIRECTOR**

**SECRET**

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15 :  
CIA-RDP90G01353R000500570002-7

*Deputy Director*  
**BOB Gates**

**BOB Gates**  
*Deputy Director*

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15 :  
CIA-RDP90G01353R000500570002-7



# DCI Off-Site Managers Conference

Bob - DCI should write to me,  
ask me to get Deputies together, define  
an executive development goal (or goals),  
and propose a program which will meet  
the goal. Approach should parallel exactly  
his challenge to redesign the IG.

We could do this, and it would work.

J

ILLEGIB

**Page Denied**

Next 35 Page(s) In Document Denied

STAT

STAT

MENUS FOR OCT 30 - NOV 1

SUNDAY OCT 30th

HORS D' OEURVES

Barbequed Shrimp  
Vegetable Crudite with Curry Dip  
Fresh Fruit and Cheese Tray

DINNER

Assorted Tossed Greens with Herb Vinegarette  
Roast Tenderloin of Beef with Bernaise Sauce  
Stuffed Baked Potato  
Fresh Vegetable Medley  
Rolls, Butter  
Fresh Fruit Cobbler  
Coffee  
Wine: Red Liberty School Cabernet

MONDAY OCT 31st

BREAKFAST

To be served Buffet Style at each billeting facility. Will need to be informed if breakfast will need to be served in Quarters 3.

Scrambled eggs, Bacon, Sausage Buffet  
Toast, Bagels, Pastries  
Cereal, Assorted Milk, Fresh Fruit  
Orange Juice, Tomato Juice, Coffee, Hot Tea, Sanka

LUNCH

Minestrone Soup  
Chunky Chicken Salad Plate with Fresh Fruit  
Croissants/ Butter  
Raspberry Sorbet  
Coffee, Iced Tea

HORS D' OEURVES

FIRE VENISON  
Mushrooms Stuffed with Crabmeat  
Fresh Vegetable Crudite with Spinach Dip  
Fresh Fruit and Cheese Mirror

MENUS con't pg 2

DINNER

Assorted Tossed Greens with Balsamic Vinegarette  
Paupiette of Flounder with Duxelles of Mushrooms  
Saffron Potatoes  
Fresh Vegetable Medley  
Rolls, Butter  
Chocolate pate with Apricot sauce  
Coffee  
Wine: Chateau St. Michelle Chardonnay

TUESDAY NOV 1

BREAKFAST

Pancakes, Bacon, Sausage Links Buffet  
Toast, English Muffins, Pastries  
Cereal, Assorted Milk, Fresh Fruit  
Orange Juice, Grapefruit Juice, Coffee, Sanka, Hot Tea

LUNCH

Tossed Greens with Dressings  
Cold Cut Buffet with: Tuna Salad, Roast Beef, Slice Ham, Sliced Turkey, Salami  
Assorted Cheeses and Breads  
Relish Tray and Condiments  
Yogurt, Potato Chips, Fresh Fruit, Chocolate Brownies  
Coffee, Iced Tea

**SECRET**