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SUBJECT:

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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88-4337/1

November 22, 1988

Mr. Paul Seabury

[Redacted]

Dear Paul:

I apologize for taking so long to respond to your letter of early October, with which you enclosed your paper on "Secret War".

I finally was able to read the paper recently and found it most interesting and useful. I suppose one of the reasons I found it so was the degree to which it parallels my own thinking on some of these issues. At the risk of testing your patience, I in turn have enclosed the texts of two speeches germane to your topic. The first, "War By Another Name," I delivered two years ago in California. The second on current developments in the Soviet Union I delivered to the American Association for the Advancement of Science Conference here in Washington last month. I hope you find them of interest.

I am able to offer you some reassurance and information on the Agency's analysis on the problem of Soviet proxy operations. You will be gratified to know that during my watch as DDI we established a Foreign Subversion and Instability Center with [Redacted] analysts that addresses the question of Soviet and surrogate subversive activities primarily in the Third World. It also deals with front groups and other similar types of operations. Best of all, as it is not located in a regional office, it looks across the globe and is able to discern patterns both in subversion and instability that I find insightful and useful. In short, I think we are making good progress on these kinds of problems.

Again, many thanks for your letter and accompanying paper.

Regards,

[Redacted Signature]

Robert M. Gates

Enclosures:  
As Stated

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War By Another Name

An Address to the Commonwealth Club of California  
by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
November 25, 1986

The most divisive and controversial part of American foreign policy for nearly four decades has been our effort in the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments, to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to promote economic development and democracy.

Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence, establish strategically located client Communist states, and to gain access to strategic resources.

But while we may debate strategy and how to respond, the facts of Soviet involvement in major Third World conflicts are undeniable. Consider two very painful memories:

- It is clear that the Soviet Union, and Stalin personally, played a central role in prompting North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950, the cause of our

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

STAT

PAUL SEABURY



Executive Registry

88-4337X

Mr. Robert Gates  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C.


Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a paper which I presented last week in Washington at the U.S. Institute of Peace for a conference on "secret war".

I became intrigued by the problem of Soviet proxy operations during my time on PFIAB, when I began to surmise that the Agency was not doing too good a job of analysis on the subject. I hope that this defect has been remedied!

I hope you find the paper interesting.

Best regards,

  
7 October 1988

*ps - won esp. at pp. 57-67.*

SECRET/PROXY WAR

by Paul Seabury

This meeting, dealing with the nature and future of "secret war," is timely, coming as it does when, to some observers, "peace is breaking out all over." A few weeks ago, the cover of The Economist featured an idyllic beach scene: paternal, lanky Uncle Sam stretched out in a beach chair in a state of blissful contentment; in the foreground (or foresand!) a group of jolly kids besporting themselves with shovels making little sandcastles: Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterand, Helmut Kohl, Mikhail Gorbachev, Deng-Shao Peng, and Noburu. The Economist's cover slogan is arresting: "Oh, what a peaceful world." A picture is better than a thousand words, as the saying goes, and disputes the currently fashionable thesis of Professor Kennedy as to America's imminent decline and fall.

The evidence put forth for this world-view, to be sure, is comforting to all who are concerned with peace. The Afghan war, it seems, may be coming to an end, as Soviet forces continue their slow march home. A cease-fire has brought the long, murderous war between Iraq and Iran to an end, at least for the time being. Negotiations over the fate of Cambodia seem to be making progress. Negotiations over Namibia and Angola (Castro to the contrary) seem to portend the withdrawal

of Soviet and Cuban forces from that interminable conflict. "In extricating the Soviet Union from conflicts in Afghanistan, southwestern Africa and Cambodia," writes James Markham in The New York Times, "[Gorbachev] hopes to consolidate his own country's status as a superpower. . . . Peace makes strategic sense."

We have it, too, on the word of one distinguished Soviet historian, Dr. James Billington, that such developments may mark a sea-change in Soviet foreign policy. "The wave of revolution--and the idea of violent convulsive upheaval effecting meaningful social change--is becoming anachronistic. The heady era of decolonization and Marxist-inspired revolution is over."<sup>1</sup>

But then, only a few months ago, The Economist's depiction of the overall situation was dark indeed. In its issue of March 12, 1988, The Economist listed 25 "little wars"--civil and international--as being Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Iran/Iraq/Lebanon, Angola/Namibia, Chad, Ethiopia and Ethiopia/Eritrea, Western Sahara, Mozambique, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, Burma, India, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Laos/Vietnam, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Of these, on my inspection, at least 17 were those in which the Soviet Union and/or its proxy

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1. New York Times, 14 August 1988.

affiliates, were actively engaged, whether in direct combat or in the support and supervision of it. From the ranks of the ravens of Spring came the swallows of Summer, but the somewhat diminished flock of the former remains disturbingly large.

I

These days two contrary cottage industries are busy speculating as to the respective declines of American and of Soviet power. While those predicting the former have inspired debate among foreign policy intellectuals,<sup>2</sup> there appears to be much greater consensus (among Sovietologists, at least) that the Gorbachev era is one in which the Soviet Union, plagued by manifold domestic difficulties, now faces grave choices in its priorities, to escape otherwise inevitable economic decline. Inevitably, this means that Soviet leaders will recognize their own (what Paul Kennedy calls) "imperial overstretch." As one task-force of American foreign policy experts conclude, Gorbachev's assault on a "whole series of ingrained (domestic) practises and attitudes" is commingled with his assault on an "often militarized foreign policy." Regrettably (so say the authors of this report), "the West has

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2. See my "The Solvency Boys," The National Interest (Fall 1988), a review of Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.



not come to terms with these changes." "While Gorbachev has as yet made no significant effort to scale back existing Soviet global commitments, he has given lower priority to the military expansion of Soviet interests than his predecessors."<sup>3</sup>

This benign view is shared more vigorously by Mr. Armand Hammer, in the aftermath of the recent Moscow Summit. Hammer writes:

In the three years since Mr. Gorbachev has acceded to power, the Soviet Union has engaged in no new adventures around the globe, it has sent no "military advisers" to developing trouble spots. In itself, this suspension of expansionist activity marks a significant break with Soviet foreign policy throughout the greater part of this century.<sup>4</sup>

Much can be said for the view that there has been an abatement of Soviet offensive political warfare in recent months. Within the top Soviet leadership, there are signs of

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3. "How Should America Respond to Gorbachev's Challenge?", Joseph Nye, Harvard University, and Whitney MacMillan, Cargill, Inc., Task Force Co-chairman. Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York, 1987, pp. 9-11.

4. Armand Hammer, "Behind the Soviet Pullout from Afghanistan," New York Times, 4 June 1988.

profound disagreement as to foreign policy priorities. Spokesmen such as Foreign Minister Eduard Scheverdnadze put forward the view, consonant with Gorbachev's line, that peaceful coexistence must not be seen as a tactic in an endless class struggle. Instead, as he has argued, it must be seen as a necessity in an age of nuclear weapons and ecological disasters. In a speech this past summer, he argued further that the USSR could not afford both to modernize and to match Western "military-technological novelties." This may not be much of a concession to Western skepticism, yet it manifests a gnostic heresy, to which other Soviet leaders have responded. Gorbachev's main adversary, Yegor Ligachev, on the Politburo, has put a different patina on Soviet global priorities, in a widely televised address to party members in Gorky some weeks ago. In this speech, Ligachev openly confronted the ideological issue as to the abandonment of Lenin's legacy. As Pravda reported him, Ligachev dwelt upon a critical ideological issue: that of general-human, as contrasted to proletarian-class interests, in world politics.

They [the interests] are fundamentally and profoundly interrelated. The true meaning of socialism is the liberation of man and mankind from all forms of exploitation and suppression. But can we as communists remain aloof from global programs, from struggles

against the nuclear threat and for the saving of civilization? No, we cannot. Should humanity fail to win this struggle, attempts to improve the life of the working people . . . to ensure the basic interests of the working class and the right of peoples to be in charge of their own fate, will lose their meaning.

We proceed from the class nature of international relations. Any other formulation of the problem can only inject confusion into the minds of the Soviet people and of our friends abroad. The active inclusion of general-human problems into the solution of the social and national liberation struggle does not at all mean any artificial de-emphasis of the social and national-liberation struggle.<sup>5</sup>

## II

I dwell on this controversy as preamble to my paper on Soviet secret warfare, since there is considerable misunderstanding in the West these days as to the components

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5. Pravda, 6 August 1988. Ligachev's address to the Gorky party meeting was broadcast by television widely in the Soviet Union--a notable event since such media statements on major controversial matters is reserved for the Chairman of the Central Committee.

of Soviet power. In a recent article, Zbigniew Brzezinski, for instance, took note of the likelihood that by the year 2110 A.D. the Soviet Union would rank fifth among the economic powers of the world (below even China!). The Soviet Union, he concluded, "is a one-dimensional rival. It is a credible challenger in the military realm alone." This, he says, will continue to be true. Glasnost notwithstanding, the Soviet Union will remain a dangerous adversary. True enough.

Brzezinski is correct, that is, if we observe world politics as what I would call (after Hans Morgenthau's worldview) Morgenthauwelt, a world peopled by Powers and lesser States, each endowed with special attributes and interests. In such a world today, the Soviet Union indeed is a heavily-armed anomaly with few attractive internal endowments--cultural, economic, or otherwise. To observers inclined to accept the Morgenthau view, the one distinguishing feature of the U.S.S.R. as an "actor" is its enormous military might, by which it still towers over all other powers.

Officially, and in practice, the Soviet Union, even under Gorbachev, stubbornly and officially denies the existence of Morgenthauwelt. As Ligachev in early August of this year reminded his Soviet TV watchers (his important speech was not reported at the time in U.S. major newspapers), the world is composed of, and is still divided between, competing political systems. This view has been reflected in other recent Soviet

theoretical writings in the time of glasnost and perestroika. In a recent Soviet strategic study, Lenin's original authentic formulation is reaffirmed: "The entire world has become the arena of the struggle between the two systems. The struggle between the two systems is the axis around which evolves the whole domestic and international life of all states of all types."<sup>6</sup>

It must be said that Soviet foreign policy assets simply cannot be weighed according to its material military might, and that Soviet assets today, as always, include its own ideological commitment to political warfare--a commitment that today features assets of great importance no Soviet leader has dared to abandon, and prominently have figured in their "correlation of forces." These assets not only augment Soviet military power; they also endow the U.S.S.R. with the credentials as leader of a very widespread political proxy system, a large part of which may be described as a system of Secret Warfare. Thus a critical assessment of Soviet international behavior must examine not only overt Soviet state behavior in the context of selected issue-areas of interest to Westerners, but Soviet assessments of its own

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6. Ju. Ja. Kirsin, V.M. Popov, and R.A. Savuskin, Politceskoe sodержanie sovremennykh vojn (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), p. 255. Quoted in Françoise Thom, Moscow's 'New Thinking' as an Instrument of Foreign Policy (Toronto: MacKenzie Institute, 1987), p. 10.

authentic position as sponsor of (to use Ligachev's words) the social and national liberation struggle. Even in practical Morgenthau terms, what would be the costs and benefits of abandoning the elaborate system of proxy warfare that the U.S.S.R. has developed over the years? A system, it must be added, that consists in large part of covert operations: secret warfare.

### III

Leninist doctrine about the primacy of political warfare--the perpetual friend/foe relationship--views it as valid precursor, surrogate, and handmaiden to actual physical conflict. This predisposition, to see international politics chiefly as struggle, including clandestine war, measures all relations as ones imbued with conflictual character. This being so, Soviet theorists do not share the conventional Western means of judging power among nations, including armed forces. Thus (to return to the remark of Zbigniew Brzezinski), the Soviet Union in its own terms is not a "one-dimensional rival," nor merely a "credible challenger in the military realm alone," if by that is meant "merely" the capacity to mount a major war, and "win" it.

The chief reason why the Soviet Union should not be assessed as a power on the basis of its military attributes

alone is that these are but part of a larger panoply of strategic resources, diligently cultivated over the years since the 1950s. These strategic resources, cultivated and deployed on a vast geographic scale, form a complex system of organized political warfare, an asset of immense importance to Soviet strategy. The system can, for want of a better word, be described as the "Red Orchestra." Any assessment of Soviet perestroika consolidation and retrenchment in world politics today must take into account the vigor and vitality of this strange, formidable system of proxy forces, unprecedented in reach and scope. It goes without saying that no other power in world politics today commands a similar orchestration of political warfare. For that matter, no great power in history ever has succeeded in doing so. This system may conceivably decay and collapse but, then, it may not. It is of great importance for Western observers of Soviet behavior in this time of neo-detente to watch closely for signs of possible fundamental change in this system, particularly as to Soviet strategic thinking about it. Over the past quarter century, this proxy system--the Red Orchestra--as it has grown in scope, has engaged itself in widely dispersed conflicts in many regions of the world--notably Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Nowadays, Moscow sends out signals that it seeks help from the West to disengage from involvement in the Third

World. The question is whether these signals are false, whether they contain elements of truth, or whether, possibly, they may portend some profound sea-change in Soviet thinking about the world around them. If the latter were true, then the twin global concepts that govern Soviet theoretical world views would be brought into question: the concept of Socialist Internationalism, and of Proletarian Internationalism. The former, both a political and a legal concept, refers to international relations among countries of the Socialist Commonwealth; the latter conveys the idea of the solidarity of the world revolutionary movement. Writing in a Soviet military journal in 1977, about the ideological instruction of military cadres, a leading Soviet general gave flavor to the strategic objectives of the Soviet Union, in its offensive against the enemies of socialism:

Bourgeois ideologists still seek to distort the social role played by the armed forces of the socialist countries in the modern world. . . . Implacability toward the enemies of socialism is not confined to defense of our concrete achievements; it presupposes an active offensive against subversion, ideological sorties, and all hostile phenomena. . . . Marxist-Leninists do not oppose any and all wars, only the unjust, aggressive wars of imperialism.<sup>7</sup>



Such features of Soviet assets in the international system are essentially incommensurable with those of all other actors in world politics today, thus making it impossible to speak of Soviet power as somehow comparable with the power of other major actors in world politics. Furthermore, given the extraordinary complexity of the network of Soviet (and Soviet proxy) operations, it is also difficult to assess the weight and combined influence of them, or to weigh them somehow against the assets and influences of others.

#### IV

Some may find it difficult to assess the successes and failures of Soviet proxy offensives in the Third World in the past twenty years; there can be little doubt as to the enormous, if not tragic, costs of wars of national liberation, or about their influence upon military thinking in the United States. Leaving aside the bloody record of these past wars (including Korea and Vietnam), at current count twenty-five such wars are being fought, including some of quite long

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7. Maj. Gen. D. Volkonogov, quoted in R. Judson Mitchell, Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 83.

duration--"broken-backed wars." Taken together, they lead some observers to conjecture that, in the foreseeable future, wars will very likely perpetuate this pattern; these will be "low intensity conflicts." None of the "little wars" has flared into far-reaching physical conflict; none have proved Sarajevo-like, igniting large-scale direct fighting between major powers. Each in its own "little" way has had its own unique characteristics, and combination of belligerents.

To generalize about this sorry record of late twentieth century warfare, one may say that: (a) none of it has been among or between history's most skilled practitioners of warfare, the European states; (b) nearly all of it has been fought in Asia, Latin America, and Africa; (c) most of it has taken place within or among the residual legatees of Europe's now-liquidated empires; and--most notably--(d) almost all of these "little wars" have directly or indirectly involved the Soviet Union and its many proxies.

Such a journalistic overflight merely maps current sites of actual shooting wars as of 1988; some, like the struggle in Guatemala, have been going on intermittently for a very long time, with periods of calm followed by resurgence of fighting. Such intractable insurgency wars have led some observers, in despair, to conclude they will never go away. As one said, "It has become more than obvious that insurgencies do not die--they fade away only to return at another opportune

time."<sup>8</sup>

One limitation upon this sort of journalistic photography is that it ignores recent past "little wars" that have stopped; it fails to speculate upon future locales. Not infrequently, a site of supposedly consummated warfare serves as a staging base for future offensives. From a Soviet/Cuban perspective, Angola, now hotly contested, has been a base for further operations in the offensive against Namibia, while Namibia, seized, then would be a stepping stone toward South Africa.<sup>9</sup> Such is the nature of dubious battle, informed by strategic purpose, that transitory outcomes open the way to subsequent movements of events.

Even as every unhappy marriage is a unique form of hell, so each of these "little wars" has its unique proximate causes, passions, and participants. Considering them in the aggregate, however, they share a certain unity, being (in Soviet and proxy eyes) part of the broader struggle of Proletarian Internationalism--battles in a larger political war waged against the West, against the United States in

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8. Cesar Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," in Georges Fauriol, ed., Latin American Insurgencies (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), p. 121. The author might have added a caveat: they go on, sporadically, until victory, when they stop and become something else.

9. By the same token, Grenada was to have been the stepping stone for Cuba and the Soviets into the English-speaking Caribbean.

particular. "Wars of national liberation" are wars to break the hated influences of advanced industrial societies. As the recent report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence, points out, these conflicts in the Third World

are obviously less threatening than any Soviet-American war would be, yet they have had and will have an adverse cumulative effect on access to critical regions, on American credibility among allies and friends, and on American self-esteem. If this cumulative effect cannot be checked or reversed in the future, it could gradually undermine America's ability to defend its interests in the most vital regions, such as the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific.<sup>10</sup>

The authors of this report might have pointed to an interest far more vital to the United States--the political tranquility of North America--now ominously threatened by the presence of Soviet and Cuban proxy activities south of the U.S. border. Massive destabilization of Central America has been a feature of the 1980s; massive destabilization in Mexico

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10. Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 13.

could be a feature of the 1990s--a prospect that inspires dread in those few who have the intellectual stamina to envisage such a contingency.<sup>11</sup>

In its long history, the Soviet Union has been no stranger to proxy activities. The Comintern embodied the principle of international solidarity under Moscow's control, yet its collective strength was based upon its principal components, notably the European Communist parties. These now are in eclipse; yet to compare the old Comintern with the contemporary proxy system is to see the latter in its most primitive form. In recent years, the Soviet proxy system (excluding its innumerable other political fronts, which are not the subject of this study) dramatically contrasts with the Comintern, as to the nature of components and to capacity for power projection.

In its mature contemporary form, the principal cast of actors in the network of Soviet proxies, parties, and fronts consists of the Soviet Union and twelve socialist states in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. These are Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, North

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11. See Sol Sanders, Mexico: Chaos at our Doorstep (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1986). It should be pointed out, of course, that proxy offensives can be tuned on or off, downward or upward, as the occasion requires. Some can even be abandoned. Proxies themselves can be dumped. At present there seems to be no Soviet inclination to carry things too far in Mexico.

Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Angola. In addition, it makes use of one nominally un-Marxist but vigorous actor, Libya, and the PLO, a largely Marxist "state without a state." These proxies, together with the Soviet Union, today are linked together in cooperative ventures of varying intensity in many parts of the Third World; they also are linked together in a complex, crosshatched system of friendship treaties.<sup>12</sup>

Proxy warfare is as old as the hills. Few great nations have foresworn recourse to it, at least at some time in their history. Whether proxies are called "hirelings," "lackeys," "cats' paws," "running dogs," or simply "loyal allies," the generic significance of proxies is always the same: get somebody else do your nasty work for you. The idea of the proxy has enjoyed a bad reputation throughout history; the proxy is inferior either as your substitute or auxiliary; the proxy can be abandoned, if necessary. What is important, however, in the case of Soviet proxies is the organizational and ideological cement--real or artificial--that binds them in a league of common struggle. It would be a severe mistake, in assessing the wide range of Soviet proxy activities, to see the participants as merely Soviet stooges, and thereby


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12. See Avigdor Haselkorn, "Strategic Implications of the Soviet Treaty Network," American Foreign Policy Newsletter, Vol. 9, No. 1 (February 1986).

discount ideological enthusiasm and commitment. Yet from a Soviet strategic perspective, the USSR indeed dominates as conductor of the Red Orchestra. How then does the ideological momentum of the movement as a whole--its verve, as it were--enter into Soviet calculations as a strategic asset? Would Soviet policymakers, aware of the value of such precious assets, ever seriously contemplate abandoning them, say, for "reasons of state," and the temptation to become simply a Great Power among powers?

To study the webs of alliances within the "Socialist International" is to realize fully the importance of this system to the Soviet leadership as an extension of its influence in world politics. Few Westerners, to my knowledge, have spent much time poring over a map to discern the range and complexity of these networks. Formal treaties of friendship and alliance, all a matter of public record, are useful as starters. Wholly aside from the bilateral ties between the USSR and individual Warsaw Pact satellites, a few observations can be made about interesting anomalies in these interlocking arrangements. (The attached map, though based upon information three years old, is somewhat helpful.)

This global treaty network--a system of bilateral pacts among the many alliance partners of the Soviet Union--consists in mutual support agreements, linking such improbable partners as Laos and Nicaragua, Mongolia and Libya, Vietnam and Syria,

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South Yemen and the GDR, North Korea and Mozambique, along with other more obvious pairs--Cuba and Angola, for instance. Today, Sandinista Nicaragua has security pacts not only with the Soviet Union, but with Warsaw Pact states such as Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and Vietnam. The aim of such new infusions of socialist solidarity is thus to consolidate in Central America the first "socialist" revolutionary platform on the American mainland. A "system of mutually beneficial cooperation"--to use ex-Soviet President Podgorny's phrase--transforms Soviet strategic moves into the "collective" will of "peaceloving" socialist states--a network the strategic purpose of which is to politically isolate the United States, both regionally and in the United Nations. More importantly, to use Avigdor Haselkorn's words, it has served to provide Moscow "with the necessary political facade to transform its otherwise unilateral strategic initiatives into legitimate acts sanctioned by the 'collective' will of the 'peace-loving nations.'"13

Proxy, or surrogate, political warfare--no stranger to the affairs of nations at all times--reaches a high level of complexity in recent Soviet practice. Its several basic uses must be divined. To repeat, proxies can do your dirty work for you. Proxy actions, notably clandestine ones, can be

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13. Ibid., p. 2. I am indebted to the author for information on which the attached map is constructed.

disavowed; in the murky underworld of such political warfare, the trail of responsibility often vanishes in obscurity. The multiplicity of national actors and revolutionary movements involved in particular operations can entail a division of labor--a social division of labor!--and burden-sharing, in which the cost in terms of materiel and human lives can be dispersed. Multiple actions, at least in their overt forms, can create the appearance, if not the reality, of true international solidarity.

As Paul Henze, an observer of Soviet destabilization measures, has remarked,

We are past the point where it serves the interests of any party except the Soviet Union to adopt the minimalist, legalistic approach which argues that if there is no documentary evidence or some other form of incontrovertible proof that the Soviet government is behind something, we must assume that it is not. The curious and equally illogical counterpart to this attitude, so prevalent among journalists and academics in the past decade, is to treat the U.S. government in exactly the opposite fashion.<sup>14</sup>

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14. Paul Henze, Goal: Destabilization: Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability, and Terrorism in NATO South (Marina del Rey, Calif.: European American Institute for Security Research, 1981), pp. 2-3.

V

As to the chief types of proxy (surrogate) operations, there are at least eight. These are:

1. The dispatch and use of proxy front-line troops for actual conventional combat operations. Since World War II the most apparent of these Soviet campaigns have been the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Saudi-Egyptian war, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (the October War), and the Angolan and Ethiopian campaigns in Africa.

2. The furnishing by proxies of materiel for combat operations and destabilization in regions such as North Africa (the the Polisarios in Morocco), the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, Central and South America. On a somewhat smaller scale, similar proxy operations have been directed toward the Basque region of Spain, Northern Ireland, Turkey, and Chile. The chief proxies in these actions have been Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Communist Vietnam, Bulgaria, North Korea, and Nicaragua (to El Salvador, Colombia, etc.). Here, incidentally, we encounter flow patterns, that is, transfers through one or more proxies to different ultimate destinations, for purposes of concealment. Thus, Soviet aid to Nasser's Egypt in the 1950s originally was funneled through Czechoslovakia, shrouding the original source. Soviet aid to

Central American and Caribbean guerrillas until recently has been filtered through Cuba--now more brazenly overt. We may call this logistical mode "camouflaged provenance."

3. Furnishing clients with proxy internal forces, especially to replicate totalitarian systems of internal control, in order to consolidate regimes and pacify populations. The main donors of such assistance today are East Germany, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam and Bulgaria. The chief recipients have been Libya, Ethiopia, Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Grenada, Vietnam-controlled Cambodia, Zimbabwe, the Seychelles, and Nicaragua.

4. Furnishing proxy professional training facilities for client guerrilla terrorist groups. The chief locations of such facilities today (other than the USSR itself) are or recently have been Czechoslovakia, Syria, PLO-controlled South Lebanon (before the Israeli invasion and Syria's expulsion of the PLO), Bulgaria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and East Germany.

5. Orchestrating clandestine drug-traffic operations, either for purposes of political destabilization or for funding other proxy operations. The chief proxy states for this seem to be Bulgaria and Cuba--the one aimed toward West Europe and Turkey, the other toward the United States.

6. The proxy furnishing of ideological training to client cadres. The chief proxy states involved in this appear

to be (again, other than the USSR itself) the GDR and Cuba. Client cadres include nationals of many countries not now subjects of major offensives: South Americans, Western Europeans, South Pacific islanders, etc.

7. The proxy furnishing of infrastructural economic and technical aid to new revolutionary clients. Such aid can include seemingly benign facilities: constructing airports and harbors; building communications systems and roads.

8. Soviet assignation of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks to proxies (e.g., Cuba, East Germany).

(Omitted from this catalogue is the traditional network of front organizations that operate from headquarters outside the Soviet Union and that are important for propaganda offensives, a subject not included in this study.)

It has been in the normal nature of Third World proxy offensives that each of them, in and of itself, rarely has appeared earthshaking. American media reporting of them, such as it is, normally deals with seemingly isolated particulars, rather than with significant strategic configurations. A further difficulty lies within the U.S. intelligence community, which, well aware of clandestine particulars, nonetheless often is loath to release information to the public for fear of compromising its methods and sources. Finally, it might be said at the present time that many

Americans with more benign world views simply do not want to know much about proxy operations since such knowledge might clash with their policy preferences.

(So it was, in the congressional Contragate hearings in 1987, that, while Colonel Oliver North and others were publicly savaged for their miniscule clandestine operation to aid the anti-Sandinista forces, virtually no interest was displayed in the vast array of clandestine proxy forces in Nicaragua and surrounding areas (Cubans, Soviets, Bulgarians, East Germans, and so on.)

The American "attentive public" rarely hears much news of most Soviet proxy operations; in the major media they normally go entirely unreported anyway.<sup>15</sup>

## VI

Surrogate, clandestine political offensives have been difficult for democracies to combat successfully. One observer has recently noted that the expression "low intensity conflict" often used to describe such offensives is actually inapt. He suggests instead that we call them "amorphous wars"--conflicts that involve threats to American security but

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15. During the Arab-Israeli October War, which hit the headlines in a big way in 1973, there was virtually no reporting of the presence of North Korean and Cuban combat forces on the Arab side.

are not so appreciated. "In amorphous wars," he says, "threats are difficult to categorize, to analyze, and to comprehend . . ." To identify the enemy is difficult--who is he, actually? The amorphousness can be in the eye of the beholder; he may not want to face the consequences of knowing; such knowledge might require him to do something! The very diffuseness of the threat, more often, is confusing; such a war may be fought on widely separated fronts or axes--sometimes whole regions.<sup>16</sup>

The expression "amorphous war" invites intellectual confusion. The dictionary tells us that amorphous means "having no definite form," "being without definite character or nature," "lacking organization or unity." Amorphousness is by no means the same thing as stealth or secrecy; what appears formless, furthermore, may seem so only because it remains unexamined. The appearance of amorphousness actually may be deliberate deception--as is camouflage. The strategy of proxy, or client, political war may consist in pursuing purposes clandestinely, but this does not mean it is formless.

For the last two decades, American policy elites have been loath (or unable) to recognize the full nature of the Soviet proxy system aligned against the United States. Fragments of it surface from time to time, when some

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16. Stephen Cimbala, "Amorphous Wars," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 75.

newsworthy event occurs; terrorism, one aspect of this fearsome system, is now agreed to be a truly international formation--abetted, and to some extent trained, by the Soviet Union. As the late William Casey wrote not too long ago:

The chain extends around the globe. Part of the subversive threat we face in Central America is stimulated by outsiders who are well-versed in terrorism. For example, Italian Prime Minister Craxi stated in early February [1986?] that Nicaragua hosts 44 of Italy's most dangerous terrorists--a statement corroborated in part by a former Red Brigade terrorist who stated that at least five of his former comrades now serve as con-commissioned officers in the Sandinista Army. Nicaragua, by the way, is a major recipient of aid from Libya, and recently played host to Iranian Prime Minister Musavi. Strange how the same names and faces keep turning up whenever the subject is international terrorism!<sup>17</sup>

Terror can strike almost anywhere--in Burma, Berlin, Blackpool, Bogota, even the Capitol in Washington.

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17. "The International Linkages--What Do We Know?", in Uri Ra'anani, et al, Hydra of Carnage: The International Linkages of Terrorism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 9.



Unfortunately, it is but one feature of the proxy system, its most photodynamic yet by no means most strategically significant one. The true nature of proxy political warfare can be judged only in its entirety, and by contemplating a few of its most significant struggles. The system of proxies must be understood holistically. The failure of most Westerners, particularly Americans, to comprehend what Vladimir Bukovsky has called the "conceptual character of the Soviet system and the ideological roots of Soviet policies" is, one would hope, remediable; the starting point would be to recognize that the Soviet system today is far more comprehensive and far-reaching than the "Soviet empire," which is commonly understood to refer exclusively to the USSR, its East European satellites, and its sprawling multinational empire east of the Urals.

## VII

One might, of course, begin with the parts of this far-flung system and work toward the whole. For starters, we might turn to one element, the Palestine Liberation Organization, an active participant in Soviet proxy operations in Africa and Latin America. Recent PLO language conveys some indication of the flavor of a truly internationalist cause:

The Palestine resistance movement which leads the

struggle of the Palestinian people is an organic [sic] part of the forces of world revolution: the socialist countries, the international liberation movement, and the working class parties in the capitalist countries. . . . The Palestinian revolution is an integral part of the three forces of international revolution, and its victory is dependent upon the victory of these forces, and its victory represents a definite support for these forces in their struggle against imperialism and its local tools.<sup>18</sup>

In another province--the Caribbean--similar language appeared in the Basic Treaty between Castro's Cuba and the now-defunct New Jewel Movement (then in control of the tiny island of Grenada):

[The two Parties] brotherly united by the same ideals of struggle as well as of active solidarity in favor of the peoples that struggle for national liberation, and likewise sharing the same convictions against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, Zionism, and racism, become aware of the need to unite efforts and coordinate actions of cooperation in the different

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18.

activities within their scope.<sup>19</sup>

Vigorous strategic, yet ultimately unsuccessful, attempts of the Soviet Union to destabilize Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s provide a classic case in point. These operations, designed to destabilize NATO's southern flank, went virtually unnoticed in the American press at the time. Organizing terror on a massive scale throughout Turkey, the Soviets-- chiefly through proxies--invested vast amounts of money, arms, and trained personnel, which flowed from Bulgaria, Syria and Europe into the country. Both right- and left-wing terrorists were financed directly from abroad, for example, through funds brought in diplomatic pouches. Between 1977-1980, Turkish authorities estimate that the total cost of Turkish terror to the Soviets was in the range of \$1 billion. Interrogation of terrorists and their supporters revealed substantial Bulgarian, Syrian, and Palestinian backing, along with circumstantial evidence of deep Soviet, East German, and other East European involvement. (This terror offensive--which ultimately failed in its objective to weaken and overthrow the Turkish constitutional regime--was fought both in Turkey and abroad; throughout Europe and in the United States, many Turkish diplomats were assassinated, chiefly by "Armenian"

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19. See Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall, The Grenada Papers (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies), p. 50.

liberation fighters, many of whom were trained in PLO camps in Lebanon.)<sup>20</sup>

### VIII

What outwardly may seem formless and random may have an inner, if highly complicated, organizational logic. As will be detailed below, scattered through the Communist world are many camps and other training facilities of a truly international character. In Cuba, the Soviet Union, the GDR, Bulgaria, and elsewhere, these camps train political warfare specialists recruited or drafted from such states as South Africa, Morocco, Iran, Iraq, South Yemen, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Chile, India, Laos, Burma, and Bangladesh. Such camps are international prep schools of terror and destabilization.<sup>21</sup>

Observers are divided as to the degree of cohesion and

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20. Henze, Goal: Destabilization, pp. 26-27, 33-45.

21. A recent published interview with a black South African ANC "freedom fighter" captured by UNITA forces testifies to the unusual complexity of such networking. In the space of ten years this man underwent training in intelligence, guerrilla combat, urban war, sabotage, and Marxist ideology in such widely dispersed clandestine locales as Angola, Cuba, East Berlin, and Sofia, Bulgaria. In these diverse training centers he had met and fraternized with European, Asian, Latin American, and Middle Eastern co-trainees. (See Walter Rueb, "Von Havanna bis nach Ost-Berlin: Der ANC ist mit seinen Terroristen uberall," Die Welt, March 1988.)

purpose in this networked system of surrogate political war: Is it centrally directed or is it diffuse and capricious? Is it an orchestra or is it a jam session? Is it subject to Muscovite micromanagement? Or does it proceed on its own merry "pluralistic" way, with various ups and downs, as opportunities present themselves to individual actors?

The greatest impediment to our understanding of it, to repeat, is the secrecy not only of operations but also of regimes; all the actors function in closed societies, disclosing what they choose to disclose, misrepresenting what they choose to misrepresent, about plans, decisions and operations. True to their original Marxist/Leninist model, they are cabalistic. As to the inner workings, we learn of them fitfully, from collections of captured documents, from defectors, from captives, photography, and so on. In actual practice the variegations and combinations differ. Our two major troves of captured documents--those of Grenada's New Jewel Movement and of the PLO headquarters in Lebanon--display with great clarity such inner workings but in themselves are far less illuminating than, for instance, what might be learned from those from major centers of power.<sup>22</sup>

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22. See Seabury and MacDougall, eds., Grenada Papers for Party and State archival documents seized by the U.S. Army in 1983. For a sample of captured PLO archives, seized by Israeli forces in Lebanon in 1983, see Ra'anani, et al, Hydra of Carnage. These two collections of documents are derived from the only archival materials seized from a totalitarian state by democratic forces since the overthrow of the Third Reich in

From a strategic perspective, however, one thing is no secret--namely, the Soviet-proclaimed doctrines of wars of national liberation. Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of this was made in 1970 by the then Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko, in a speech to Foreign Ministry employees:

In his speech to the Third Congress International, V.I. Lenin said: "Millions and hundreds of millions are, in fact, the overwhelming majority of the globe and are coming forward as independent, actively revolutionary factors. It is absolutely clear that the coming decisive struggle for world revolution will see a movement of the majority of the world's population, at first directed toward national liberation, then turning against capitalism and imperialism, and perhaps playing a more revolutionary role than we expected." Continuing what was begun by Lenin, the foreign policy of the Soviet state applies many forces . . . to bring nearer the hour of triumph of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>23</sup>

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1945. They are the only archival materials ever seized from a Communist or proto-Communist state or party since Nazis seized provincial archives in the city of Smolensk, only to have them resealed by the U.S. Army in 1945.

23. Cited in Albert Weeks, Soviet and Communist Quotations (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers), p. 105. The same line of messianic thinking is engraved in the current Soviet Constitution: "The foreign

## IX

One way to deal with the question of "orchestra or jam session?" is to investigate the provenances, destinations, strategic targets, and functional specializations of these cooperative forces. As mentioned above, in addition to the Soviet Union, the chief provenances of proxy forces are, in rough order of magnitude, Cuba, North Korea, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Libya, the PLO (diplomatically recognized as having state attributes by all members of the bloc), Vietnam, Rumania, and Poland.<sup>24</sup>

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 policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favorable for building communism in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation" (Weeks, Ibid.)

24. An analogous form of the socialist division of labor is to be seen in operations elsewhere than in the Third World--namely, in intelligence gathering. See Henri Regnard, "Eastern Europe Serves the Soviet Union by Gathering Intelligence in the West," Aussenpolitik, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 354-361. See also Ion Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons, for a detailed account of how Ceausescu's Rumanian intelligence operated in acquiring Western high technology for covert delivery to the Soviet Union, and Rumania's role as patron of the PLO. The recently assassinated PLO deputy to Arafat, Abu Jihad, served as a Rumanian agent (Pacepa, p. 25). Oddly, the Soviets make great use of Vietnamese students in Western Europe in what Regnard describes as a "veritable rampage in all directions (electronics, energy resources, telecommunications, and computers)" as one means by which Vietnam repays the USSR for its very substantial aid (Regnard, p. 359).

PROXY PROVENANCES\*  
(SUPPLIERS)

TASK	USSR	CUBA	N. K.	VN	P.L.O.	DDR	SAND.	LIBYA	SYRIA	CZECH	BULG.	POL	ETHIA
ARMS MNFRS	X		X							X			
ARMS SHIPPERS	X	X	X	X				X	X	X			
AIR TROOP TRANSPORT	X												
TERROR TRAINING	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING	X	X		X	X	X				X			
CONV. WAR TRAINING	X		X		X								
PRAETORIAN GUARDS		X	X			X							
SECURITY POLICE TRAINING		X	X			X							
CONCENTRATION CAMPS		X				X							
COMBAT FORCES: GROUND	X	X	X			X		X					X
COMBAT FORCES: AIR	X	X	X										
ECON. COLLECTIVIZATION		X								X	X	X	
IDEOL PURIFICATION MASSES		X		X		X							
PROPAGANDA TRAINING	X	X			X	X	X			X			
BASE CONSTRUCTION	X	X									X		
INTELLIGENCE TRAINING	X	X				X							
UNCONVENT. COMBAT FORCES		X					X	X					

29  
33a

27

\*Does not include activities of front organizations-eg., World Peace Council, World Council of Churches, CISPES, A.N.C., etc.



X

Some who study these proxy provenances observe an intriguing "functional division of labor" (or what could also be called a "socialist division of labor") in shared tasks of political destabilization, combat operations, regime-protection for new clients, security police, command/control/communications, and "revolutionary transformation" of captured societies. The attached chart sketches some of these missions and by whom they are carried out. While much is known publicly of Cuban military operations in Africa and Latin America, less is known about Cuban political warfare operations, in the ideological and operational training of international brigades, and about their roles in political destabilization in South America. What has been particularly interesting over the past fifteen years has been the role of the East German regime in certain specialized fields--establishment of command/control/communications systems for security forces in newly-conquered countries, training of security police, construction of block warden systems for neighborhood monitoring (in Nicaragua, this task has been carried out by Cubans), training cadres for intelligence work, and establishment of concentration camps. These missions have been observed in Libya, South Yemen, Ethiopia, the Sudan,

Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. GDR policy functionaries were observed in Grenada at the time of the collapse of the Maurice Bishop regime. (In addition, the principle headquarters for the outlawed African National Congress are located in East Berlin.) So extensive have been East German operations in Africa, that West German cynics now refer to them as the new Afrikakorps.<sup>25</sup> Recent West German estimates of Third World trainees in East-bloc ideological and political warfare institutes put the number at more than 100,000. (See attached map.)<sup>26</sup>

By far the one Marxist/Leninist state (other than the Soviet Union) that engages in truly far-flung, intensive missions is North Korea. While some Pyongyang-watchers have made much of that regime's nonalignment between Peking and Moscow, most if not all North Korean operations in the Middle East and the Third World have been missions compatible with Soviet, not PRC, goals.

In the late 1960s, as the Soviet Union began broad

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25. Even before Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to rescue the threatened pro-Soviet regime, East German technicians were in control of Afghan government communications, monitoring telephone systems throughout the country.

26. "Die Roten und ihre hungernden Kostgaenger," Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, No. 50, 11/12/87, p. 34. For a comprehensive account of GDR military and police operations in East Africa (Ethiopia in particular), see Henning von Loewis of Menar, "Die DDR als Schrittmacher im weltrevolutionaeren Prozess," Deutschland Archiv, No. 1 (1980), pp. 40-49.




372.34

DDR PROXY LOCATIONS

offensives against pro-Western, Third World countries, Kim Il-Sung established what today has become a huge program for training international terrorists. Today, more than 30 training sites reportedly exist in North Korea, while more than 5,000 terrorists and guerrilla warriors have been trained abroad in camps located in North Korea, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East. Pyongyang furnishes training in urban and rural guerrilla warfare, close-quarters fighting, sabotage, military reconnaissance, and so forth. (Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, for instance, was first trained in North Korea.) North Korean trainers have worked regularly with Polisario units based in Algeria, with SWAPO forces for battle in Southwest Africa, and with both Yasir Arafat and George Habash, rivals within the PLO. When U.S. and Caribbean forces arrived in Grenada in 1983, a cadre of North Korean advisers were discovered to be training the New Jewel Movement's political army. After the Sandinista seizure of power in Nicaragua, 300 North Korean military advisers, along with Cubans, East Germans, and Bulgarians (who, incidentally, also set up and organized the Ministry of the Interior) soon appeared on the scene. North Korean fighter planes have participated in wars both in Africa and the Middle East. The list of African countries alone, where North Koreans have an active presence as combatants, instructors, and palace guards, is lengthy and includes Libya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Ghana,

Zimbabwe, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Benin, Uganda, Angola, and Ethiopia. (See attached map depicting North Korean global activities.) While a North Korean presence in the Seychelles supposedly ended in 1986, Soviet planes recently have flown in a new contingent to reinforce the Marxist/Leninist regime of France-Albert René (himself, oddly enough, a close longtime friend of the late Maurice Bishop of Grenada). "Juche," an ideological invention of Kim Il-Sung, known to some as "Marxism/Leninism in Korean dress," today plays a significant political-war role in both Africa and Latin America. (Recent North Korean hosted meetings of leftists and terrorists in Havana and Lima, Peru--attended by groups from Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, Guyana, and elsewhere--testify to the growing influence of Pyongyang in the Western Hemisphere.)<sup>27</sup>

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27. Descriptions of North Korean overseas operations can be found in North Korea: Surrogate or Self-Reliant? (Washington: Malodn Institute, 1988); and Daryl Plunk, "North Korea: Exporting Terrorism," Asian Studies Center Backgrounder (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, Feb. 1988). See also Joseph Bermudez, North Korean Forces (Boston: Jane's Publications, 1988). It is little known nor long remembered that Cuban ground forces and North Korean air units fought against Israel in the October War of 1973.



XI

Equally as ambitious, if far less endowed with resources, the Palestine Liberation Organization since its inception has played a far-reaching role in Soviet destabilization activities in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Turkey, Central America, South America and, more recently, in South and Southeast Asia. Graduates of PLO terror training camps in Lebanon and elsewhere have plied their trade not only in the Third World, but in Western Europe as well. As one observer noted recently, the "list of groups that have attended the Palestinian camps since 1969 is a veritable 'who's who' of left wing insurgents and terrorists."<sup>28</sup>

The roster of PLO-trained nationalities and tribes is impressive--from North Africa: Dhofaris, Polisario, the Iranian National Front, Kurds, and Eritreans; from Europe: the Turkish People's Liberation Army, Armenians, the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof Gang (now the Red Army Faction), the German Revolutionary Cells, the IRA, the Basque ETA, South Moluccan emigres, etc.; from the Western Hemisphere: Uruguyan Tupamaros and Nicaraguan Sandinistas, the Monteneros of

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28. Walter Alan Levin, "Soviet-PLO Relations, 1967-1987: Motivations and Contradictions," MA thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1988, p. 63. The most infamous individual graduate is Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turkish assassin who nearly succeeded in killing Pope John Paul II in 1982. Agca spent a month in PLO training in Syria before being posted to Europe.

Argentina, and the Vanguarda of Brazil, etc.<sup>29</sup> Aligning itself with the USSR has also meant alignment with multifarious "progressive" forces far beyond the PLO's specific regional interests--a characteristic of most proxies. (Vietnam, for instance, has reciprocated PLO help by providing air defense training to them.) One of the strangest instances of international reciprocity occurred in 1973 in the Lod Airport in Tel Aviv. A Japanese Red Army unit massacred Puerto Rican pilgrims returning to America to help the Palestinian PFLP in an operation named after a Nicaraguan rebel! In Asia, the PLO has been active in numerous insurgencies, including Guam, Thailand, the Philippines, and, as mentioned above, in Sri Lanka. (See attached map.)

As for Latin America, the long-standing connections of the PLO with Castro's Cuba sealed an alliance linking both to "the victories in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Africa and Latin America." Palestinians, themselves trainers, have been trained in Cuba, while Cuban instructors have been trained in Palestinian camps in the Middle East. Through the Cuban connection, the PLO first established its own influence in Central America, notably in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The flavor of this latter connection is to be seen in the recollections of Miguel Bolanos Hunter, a former Sandinista

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29. Ibid. Sandinistas actually have taken part in Palestinian actions against Israel.





counterintelligence officer:

FSLN-PLO relations . . . go back to the 1960s. The first links were arranged through Cuba. For instance, Patrice Arguello first met with the PLO in Cuba. From Cuba he went to Europe and studied in Belgium, and then he went to train with the PLO. Later, he died on a mission. . . . There were quite a few Sandinistas with PLO training . . .<sup>30</sup>

Another Sandinista has recalled:

There is a long standing blood unity between us and the Palestinian revolution. . . . Many of the units belonging to the Sandinista movement were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970s, Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and in other places in the "Black September battles." It is natural, therefore, that in our war against Somoza we received Palestinian aid for our revolution in various forms.

Blood-ties also link the PLO to Salvadoran and Nicaraguan

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30. Ibid., p. 75.

Communist leaders: the Nicaraguan Minister of Transportation, Charles Zarouk, is of Palestinian descent; Shafik Handal, General Secretary of Salvador's Communist party, and his brother Farad are also Palestinian.<sup>31</sup> PLO members also formed part of the International Brigade that helped bring the Sandinistas to power. In 1979, shortly before the overthrow of Somoza, a plane reportedly flying medical equipment from Beirut to Nicaragua was found instead, when intercepted in Tunisia, to be carrying 50 tons of ammunition.

XI


In the Socialist International panoply, Castro's Cuba is by far the most interesting of all Soviet clients and proxies. For students of power politics, it defies comprehension: a small island country, with a population scarcely larger than New York City's, a nearly bankrupt economy, and huge unemployment. By economic standards, Cuba today would qualify as a banana republic. In Batista's time, no one could have imagined that by the 1980s an impoverished Cuba's presence and influence would permeate Latin America; North, West and East Africa; and the Middle East, or that its hubristic leader

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31. Ibid., pp. 63-77. Shafik Handal assisted the U.S. Communist party in founding the U.S.-based pro-Salvadoran guerrilla organization, CISPES (Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador).

would stand tall among the rebellious chieftains of Third World militancy. Today, as one observer puts it, Cuba is "a small country with a big country's foreign policy." One obvious if insufficient explanation of the gap between Cuba's scarce internal resources and its pretentious global capabilities is that the gap is filled by huge annual Soviet benefactions; the Soviets are assured that "what the Cubans do abroad will serve their purpose."<sup>32</sup>

Since the late 1960s, Cuba's long proxy contribution to the war against the West has grown formidably. Many of its covert exploits are scarcely known or recalled in the West. (See attached map.) By 1969-1970, for instance, Cuban military units were in place in Jordan, Syria and Iraq. When the Yom Kippur War erupted in October 1973, Cuban troops were hastily flown in from Havana to bolster flagging Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. There Cuban soldiers took heavy casualties from Israeli artillery. Their able then-commander, Arnaldo Ochoa, subsequently (1985) restructured the Sandinista Army in Nicaragua, and recently (1988) has been sent by Castro to take command of beleaguered and demoralized Cuban forces in Angola. (Even less well known was the Cuban role in the original organization of Polisario guerrilla forces in

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32. Robert Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does Cuba Act Alone?", in Barry Levine, ed., The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean Basin (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 207.



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**CUBAN OVERSEAS  
ACTIVITIES**

CUBAN TROOP ADVISERS  
RIAN: BUREAU 11 MAY 1960

Morocco, an operation they mounted clandestinely from the Canary Islands).

In one respect, Castro's Cuba is the ideal prototype of a Soviet proxy; in another, a significant anomaly. While other proxies' contributions to Socialist International operations are functionally specialized, Cuba's contributions are comprehensive and across-the-board. Indeed, except for several of the Soviets' old-time regulars, the East bloc satellites, Cuba performs all of the proxy functions I have enumerated above, in addition to certain tasks it has perfected by itself. (One interesting innovation, later copied by the Soviets in Afghanistan, has been the abduction and training of young children from conquered countries, to form the basis of future overseas leadership cadres. Young Angolans, for instance, are trained for this purpose on the Cuban "Isle of Pines," now called the "Isle of Youth." The Isle currently contains eighteen international camps for children from ten countries.)

The network of Cuban military advisers and troops, while now chiefly in Angola and Nicaragua, extends far beyond those two countries into seventeen others--a network as extensive as the North Korean one: Angola, approximately 40,000 troops today; Ethiopia, 6-7,000 troops and advisers; South Yemen, 1,200 troops and advisers; Libya, 2,000 troops and advisers; Mozambique, ca. 1,000 advisers. Lesser numbers of Cubans

operate in Syria, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, North Korea, Sao Tome, Algeria, Uganda, Laos, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Benin, and Cape Verde.

In another respect, Cuba is a genuine anomaly in the roster of proxies. While dependent upon Soviet funding, Castro's pursuit of a global "internationalist" foreign policy by no means always squares with Soviet purposes and, on more than one occasion, has been profoundly at odds with them. In Grenada, for instance, toward the end of the New Jewel Movement's rule, Castro's fidelity to Maurice Bishop clashed with the Soviets' switch of support to Bishop's murderer and Stalinist rival, Bernard Coard. In East Africa, Castro's Horn of Africa priorities diverged significantly from Moscow's. On more than one occasion, Castro's Latin American priorities have significantly differed, and well may do so in the future. The emotional sources of Castro's hatred of the United States differ from Muscovite ones--the case often being made that this boundless, ambitious, personal hatred in Castro's mind preceded his ideological conversion to Marxism/Leninism. Castro surely regards his own messianic role as independent of the Soviet Union. Today, also, his deep resistance to Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost measures parallels the bitter PRC recriminations with Khrushchev's revisionism in the 1960s.

For such reasons, the special relation of Cuba to the

Soviets must, as one observer has put it, be seen as symbiotic rather than simply surrogate.<sup>33</sup> Insofar as Castro claims for himself the mantle of Third World leadership in his chosen war against the United States, Soviet and Cuban goals clearly differ in emphasis and priorities.

## XII

The small Caribbean island of Grenada, which briefly and tragically experienced Marxist/Leninist rule, merits close inspection for several reasons. Ironically, it is the only country in our century ever to be liberated from Communist rule. For this reason alone it merits attention, since once the New Jewel Movement died of self-inflicted wounds, and invading American forces captured party and state papers, Grenada provided scholars and analysts an intimate picture of the inner process by which a conquered nation is subject to "socialist transformation."

The brief, agonizing Grenadan experience under Communist rule also illuminates our study of the nature of the Soviet proxy system. Every locale of Communist political warfare is unique, and so too is the experience of it. Grenada is no

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33. See Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Third World, and the Soviet Union," in Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., The Soviet Union and the Third World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 123-147.



exception, and therefore it would be risky to generalize too much from this one now intimately-known episode.

What makes Grenada particularly interesting is that, during the brief time of the New Jewel rule, Grenada was both a subject and an object of proxy operations: the ruling movement drew upon human material and financial resources from many other parts of the Socialist International in order to embark upon its programs of domestic Gleichschaltung. But, at the same time, the miniscule Bishop regime already was embarking upon regional subversive adventures, joining with Castro's Cuba in ambitious schemes to extend Marxist-Leninist control over other English-speaking Caribbean countries, Jamaica and Barbados, in particular. Their dual aim was the transformation of their tiny island into a collectivized Communist society, and the mobilization of military and paramilitary power for tasks in Central America, the Caribbean, and possibly also in West Africa. In these latter tasks, we see that, with Cuban help, Grenada would become a power-projector in black Anglophone regions. The joining of Black nationalism, anti-imperialism, and Marxism-Leninism under the aegis of Castro thus meant, in effect, that the New Jewel Movement, seeking power in the socialist world, would voluntarily be a proxy of a proxy.

In the span of three years, aid--material, financial, and human--flowed into Grenada from Cuba, Libya, the Soviet Union,

Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, the PLO, North Korea, and East Germany. Grenadan "students" were sent abroad to Cuba, the Soviet Union, Hungary, East Germany, and elsewhere, for military, political, and professional training. (Grenadan "students" sent abroad encountered cultural problems in multinational training schools and camps. As one Grenadan report from Cuba noted, they had a "special problem" in dealing with PLO "students," "because of their difference in lifestyle." The Grenadans, the report continued, "are accustomed with [sic] their Caribbean language, and sometimes the Palestinians take offense at obscene language, and would either threaten or strike their colleagues." Palestinians also accused the Grenadans of stealing. Other reports told of reverse situations--of West African students inducing Grenadans into homosexual relationships, using suspect drinks and "black magic." Grenadan students in Moscow encountered far different problems in adjusting to Slavic culture and Russian weather.)<sup>34</sup>

Arms materiel flowed in from Vietnam, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and elsewhere. Professional advice was sought from Vietnam as to how the New Jewel Movement might "reeducate" its population, in special camps, to rid Grenada of reactionary,

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34. See Stephen Schwartz, Grenada: The Fate of A Cuban Colonial Possession (unpublished ms., Washington, D.C., June 1988), especially pp. 44-45.

bourgeois, and anti-social elements. In Grenada, Cubans (rather than East Germans) provided essential instruction in the creation of security policy systems, neighborhood surveillance, and counterintelligence. Cuban advice also was sought concerning methods of subduing recalcitrant Christians, churches, and orders.

From the beginning, Havana, not Moscow, called the tune in Grenada. Grenadan emissaries in Moscow found themselves low in the pecking order of Soviet priorities; captured documents show little evidence of Soviet "micromanagement" on the island. Yet toward the end of the New Jewel Movement's brief and stormy life, as the "revo" faltered and splintered, clearly the Bernard Coard faction that overthrew Maurice Bishop enjoyed Soviet support. Coard, the apparatchik, contrasted with Bishop, the charismatic leader. (When arrested by American authorities, Coard was carrying KGB intelligence equipment.) The anger displayed by Castro on learning of Bishop's murder was genuine, and directed in part at suspected Soviet complicity. Clearly, the Soviets had seen the need for tighter and more ruthless means of exercising power.

Grenada, in microcosm, illustrates the tensions and frictions among major proxy elements, and also the contrast between Soviet and Cuban priorities--apparent also in Nicaragua, where cautious Soviet involvement contrasts with

Cuban adventurism.

XIII

The Libyan Khadafi regime, no stranger to African, Middle Eastern and European terror activities, is also deeply engaged in Latin American actions. Regarded widely as a loose cannon on a pirate ship, Khadafi has intruded extensively into Central America and the Caribbean, some operations dating back to the late 1960s. In 1969, Sandinista representative Benito Escobar arranged for 50-70 Sandinistas to be trained in PLO camps in Lebanon; several years later other cadres were sent to be trained in Khadafi's Libyan camps. In 1979, Khadafi invited Central American guerrilla leaders, including Sandinistas, to a conference in Benghazi, promising financial and military support for their movements. Tomas Borge, a founder of the FSLN, then used Libyan money to buy arms from Vietnam and North Korea. Later, after vast amounts of Libyan funds had flowed to Managua, the Sandinistas hosted a celebration of the 11th anniversary of Khadafi's ouster of Americans from Libya. As one Sandinista leader observed then, "The ties between the Libyan people and the Nicaraguan people are not new, but were consolidated when the Sandinista Front struggled in the field of battle to win the liberty of our homeland."

A strange event in 1985 showed interproxy solidarity between Communist Nicaragua and Libya; at that time, Sandinistas recruited domestic forces to join Khadafi's "Green World Guard" (a force mobilized to accompany Khadafi to the United Nations). Further, huge shipments of Libyan arms have clandestinely flowed to Nicaragua, and Libyans also have worked closely with Sandinistas in Nicaraguan joint ventures in sugar production, cattle raising, and other economic ventures. Libyan involvement in Chilean and Caribbean terror ventures, and leftist movements in Antigua, Dominica, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Martinique, and St. Lucia have also been noted. Libyan aid to South Pacific insurgencies began in 1986, concentrated on Vanuatu, New Caledonia, and Fiji.

What all this indicates is a networking among Soviet proxies for reciprocal aid, independent of any direct Soviet control or supervision. This component of the proxy system, in its spontaneity and sometimes ebullient enthusiasm, differs somewhat from more direct Soviet operations. By now, after twenty years, a blooded camaraderie links revolutionary groups across the Third World, joined by memories of past common struggles against the imperialists, and the anticipation of wars to come. As a Caribbean newspaper, the Daily Express of Trinidad, observed recently, "The trouble is that, left to Libya, the Caribbean would soon become not a 'zone of peace,' a phrase that militants of the left like to raise when it

suits them, but a sea of blood."<sup>35</sup>

XIV

Some weary Western observers of Soviet proxy warfare are by now so inured to its presence in Third World regions that a mood of cynicism occasionally informs their analysis. "All wars of insurgency," writes one author, "are long and slogging conflicts, often inconclusive. Such wars do not end suddenly with one side declaring 'victory.' Insurgencies can simply fade away--and then reappear when new strategic realities promise greater success."<sup>36</sup> To make things worse, of course, new insurgencies may break out or flare up in unexpected places; swift coups may bring rapid seizures of power; and another round of difficulties commences. Today's attention to relatively new scenes of such conflict focuses upon such disparate scenes as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, East Timor, and the South Pacific, while others, perhaps Panama and Mexico, stand in the wings awaiting their turn.<sup>37</sup>

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35. For the details, see U.S. Department of State, Libyan Activities in the Western Hemisphere, August 1986.

36. H. Joachim Maitre, "The Dying War in El Salvador," in Walter Hahn, ed., Central America and the Reagan Doctrine (Univ. Press of America, 1987), p. 133.

37. For a discussion of new Soviet and Soviet-proxy activities in the South Pacific, see George Tanham, "Subverting the South Pacific," The National Interest, No. 11 (Spring 1988). The Soviet-supported drive to "denuclearize" the newly independent

In these new sites of contention, where Soviet proxies are known to be present, the Soviets themselves, as usual, remain modestly in the background. This discretion is typical of most such encounters. For Soviet leaders, U.S.-Soviet relations long have been strategically paramount; these constitute for them the central axis of world politics. In most such engagements, the Soviets have clearly preferred low-risk operations; for them, there has been a marked dislike for deploying their own military forces in combat. In this regard the Red Army's Afghan invasion has been a remarkable exception; but the "lesson" now may be read by Soviet leaders as advising greater, rather than less, reliance on proxies in the future. After all, the costs and risks of this direct adventure have proved immense.

There is an irony in this, since Soviets, on the strategic offensive, have waged war indirectly, while, on two major occasions, the U.S. (in Korea and Vietnam) found its armed forces up front, taking brutal casualties. And there is a certain gloomy aspect to the future of America's capability (or collective will) to mobilize its own proxy forces for

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South Sea "nations" has been carried out chiefly through Communist-dominated Australian labor unions and other such fronts. A possible consequence of this "antinuclear offensive" would be to bar U.S. naval forces from South Pacific ports; combined with successful operations in the Philippines, directed at Subic Bay facilities, the U.S. naval presence in the region could be severely crippled.

effective countermeasures. The congressional "Contra Hearings" of 1987 may well be a watershed of profound importance for any effective U.S. clandestine attempts to engage in covert actions. The Soviets--content with small, carefully orchestrated, and marginal moves unlikely to arouse the American public--normally display a greater degree of patience than their American counterparts. Angelo Codevilla has described this as a "discriminating retail approach to warfare."

XV

An assessment of the proxy system's value to the Soviet Union is in order. Now, when the Soviet Empire is beset with troubles within, with the consequences of its Afghan adventure, and with troubles in its East bloc satellites, one might wonder about the future value of the system to the broad goals of the Soviet state.

The first thing to be said is that, from an ideological standpoint, any outright abandonment of the proxy system would be almost inconceivable. A repudiation of Socialist Internationalism, especially with respect to the Third World, would profoundly undermine the legitimating foundations of the Soviet system as a whole. As one observer recently has written, anticipating Ligachev,



"a more than marginal change in the [Soviet] leadership's attitude toward the struggle for ascendancy in the underdeveloped world is unlikely because the leadership would see any profound shift as undercutting the Soviet raison d'etre. The perpetual effort to press outward has become enshrined in the leadership's self-image and has also become embedded in the myth about the historic role of the Soviet state which helps justify the party's rule. Short term compromises, even small retreats, are justifiable. . . . Accepting and legitimizing a long-term derailment of the locomotive of history is another matter entirely."<sup>38</sup>

But such a manifest abandonment of these proxy assets also would jeopardize the loose alliance the Soviets long have enjoyed with profoundly anti-American and anti-Western forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America--forces I have described. To any observer of the composition of this strange admixture of forces, it should be evident that the degree of its solidarity arises from authentic and powerful, commonly-shared hatreds. The revolt against the West, after all, had its

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38. Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Union in the Less Developed World," in Korbonski and Fukuyama, Soviet Union and the Third World, p. 300.

proximate origins in the Bolshevik Revolution in the twentieth century. Though the sources of such animosity vary considerably (and in some instances long antedate that revolution), taken together, their strength has been a source of profound reassurance to the Soviet leadership. Even from a purely practical, strategic viewpoint, the anticipation and subsidization of revolts against the West (to the extent they succeed) help to confuse and destabilize the West itself--no small objective. Some today may argue that rumblings of nationality discontent in Soviet Asia inevitably will tarnish the USSR's reputation as protector of Third World causes; yet this very challenge, one might well argue, could inspire greater dedication to revolutionary zeal elsewhere. It also should be pointed out that strategic destabilization, followed by "revolutionary consolidation," has advanced the purely military aspirations of the Soviet Union, as reflected in the strategic correlation of forces.

Only someone with foreshortened vision could ignore the evolution of the Soviet State as a global military power in contest with the United States and its allies. Today, among many other things, the USSR has a two-ocean navy, with bases in Southeast Asia and in the Caribbean. Some of the Soviets' and proxy conquests in Africa, Latin America, and Asia have important strategic value. (Reports of Soviet and Bulgarian airport, harbor, and submarine base construction in Nicaragua,

augmenting Soviet bases in Cuba, must be considered harbingers of future aspirations. Current Soviet maritime and political probings of the South Pacific region also are disturbing.)

From a strategic standpoint, one major triumph, not only for the Soviet Union but also for several of its proxies, would be a successful destabilization of both Central America as a whole, and Mexico. Any major upheaval in Mexico conceivably could cause profound social dislocation inside the United States--a domestic crisis of a magnitude seldom seen in American history; so great would be its repercussions that America might well follow George McGovern's advice and "come home," abandoning its commitments both in East Asia and Western Europe. Such a prospect would fulfill not only Soviet aspirations, but those of North Korea, the PLO, if not all other proxies put together, another telling argument for the maintenance of the system!

In the eyes of some Western observers, including quite competent economic analysts, the costs of the Soviets' extended overseas empire--both its maintenance and enlargement--are considerable. The economic evidence (including the huge costs of maintaining the Castro regime, Vietnam, etc.) is fragmentary but powerful.

It long has been the conventional wisdom in the West that empires are burdens; the swift divestiture of overseas colonies by Europeans after 1945 bore eloquent witness to this

view. It is shared also by some Russians. In Solzhenitsyn's Letter to the Soviet Leaders, written before his exile, he pointed to the costs of empire as a chief reason for the impoverishment of the Russian people.

XVI

Twenty years after Khrushchev launched his support for wars of national liberation in the Third World, those countries unfortunate enough to be liberated now are basket cases--their economic infrastructures ruined, in some cases their peoples afflicted by famine, in some their ruthless regimes challenged by insurgency. All are heavily burdened by costs of huge military and police establishments. Nicaragua is only the latest victim of the costs of national liberation; still others may join it. Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen, all are telling examples of Socialist victory. Cuba, the first such Third World victim, has languished in economic desolation for more than two decades, its economy propped up by huge Soviet subsidies. From a purely cost-accountant standpoint, one might wonder how many more such Pyrrhic victories the Soviet Union's proxy campaigns can sustain. The prospects of economic bankruptcy plague all newly-established Marxist-Leninist regimes in Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. How the Soviet Union could sustain them

economically is an interesting question.

Ironically, while all of these states today depend heavily upon the Soviets or their proxies for military/police support, many have had the presumption to court Western governments, banks, and other institutions for aid to rescue them from their self-inflicted misery and their ill-fated social experimentation. Vietnam, its economy in ruins, now is joining the queue; Nicaragua may not be far behind. It would be ironic, if what Marxism-Leninism has joined together in enmiseration, capitalism may bail out--to relieve or rescue not only the decrepit Soviet economy, but also the devastated outer provinces of its extended empire, and of the Socialist International.

Ratios of cost/benefit for dynamic, aggressive empires depend upon the nature of defined objects and purposes. What are the criteria of value? In the matter of Soviet proxy actions, two radically different standards exist--one derived from the strategic goal, the other from purely economic considerations. If the strategic object is that of political warfare--to destabilize, weaken, and overthrow adversaries--then proxy warfare proves cheap indeed, when compared with the cost of other means to such an end. If the object is that of enrichment, then in the long run the cost of "empire maintenance" becomes profoundly dear. The cost of the Vietnam proxy war, to the Soviet Union, was trivial; to the

Vietnamese, the cost of war and its consequences were staggering. Vietnam is now heavily dependent on Soviet aid. Yet that cheap and victorious war had profound effects upon the morale, prestige, and political will of the main adversary, the United States. The ledger book of the Vietnam war is one which cost accountants cannot manage alone.

So it is, particularly, with human lives; for if life be held dear, the lives of proxies are far less so. In the aggressive spread of Soviet influence by war since 1950, few Russian lives have been lost, while millions of proxies have perished in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The "correlation of forces" has been advanced through indirect means.

We therefore see that the nature of true "costs of empire" may be measured by antithetical criteria. Were the Soviets to abandon their long-held strategy of political war against the West and attend to neglected matters at home, they might do this in knowledge of the savings that might ensue. But, in any event, the savings, in economic terms, would not be particularly great. Most proxy operations are very cheap. Were the Soviets to persist in their Third World political warfare, in solemn commitment to old traditional goals, the costs would be small compared with the cost of alternative methods of expansion such as direct aggression.

To repeat, the fundamental question to ask of Soviet

choices is: What would be the real political costs to the Soviet Union of outright relinquishment, abandonment, or even repudiation of the spirit of proletarian internationalism common to it and to all Communist states and movements? How much does an authentic, common hatred of free societies serve to bond such diverse forces to long-term Soviet purposes? Put differently, can such states and movements, feeding off and enmiserating their own peoples, continue indefinitely as an effective force in world politics?

Envy, hatred, and apocalyptic utopian expectations have animated the Red Orchestra. The Satan of Milton's Paradise Lost, after all, was a peer among peers in solidarity with other fallen angels. Milton likened these subnatural beings to earthbound forces familiar in Western memory; his description of them is strikingly akin to those that have given rise to today's Socialist Internationalism:

A multitude, like which the populous North  
Pour'd never from her frozen loyns, to pass  
Rhene or the Danew, when her barbarous Sons  
Came like a Deluge on the South, and spread  
Beneath Gibraltar to the Libyan sands.

### Conclusion

The convenor of this meeting asked me to furnish concluding observations of a constructive sort. What can be done?

His instruction reminds me of a version of the Aesopian ant and the grasshopper story: As winter approached, the idle and indigent grasshopper consulted his friend the ant as to how he could survive the impending dark season. The ant said, quite simple! Turn yourself into a cockroach, find a warm kitchen, and a radiator and you will fare very well. That is all very well and good, said the grasshopper, but it is also impractical. I cannot change myself into a cockroach. Be that as it may, replied the ant; I am only offering you policy guidance.

One way directly to meet this complex, ubiquitous challenge of secret war would be to reply in kind; fight fire with fire; fight proxies with proxies. But as recent events have shown--Conragate being the most dramatic--the American political temperament is such that such action is virtually out of the question even when it is not covert; America's reputation as a reliable sponsor of anti-Communist movements has been drastically compromised by its abandonment of such friends.

Several years ago the so-called Reagan Doctrine promised



a strategic counteroffensive directed at vulnerable and remote outposts of Soviet proxy war, to achieve signal reverses to Soviet fortunes. Many such troubled outposts, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and Nicaragua, have been plagued by the resistance of local freedom fighters. Unambiguous and indirect American support for them, coupled with support of other friendly nations, might cause the Soviets to reconsider the costs of their support of "national liberation forces," and of "Socialist Internationalism" when, in the aftermath of victory, comes ruination and civil war. What is to be gained, some might say, by "national liberation victory" when this is followed by unalloyed defeat and/or costly indefinite maintenance of remote barricades? But since the measures taken under the Reagan Doctrine were half-hearted and/or abandoned, then these dubious battles will be settled on way or another by forces with little U.S. participation. Perhaps the American mood may change, but the American reputation for fickleness will remain. America does not do well at proxy operations and everybody by now knows this. The grasshopper cannot become a cockroach.

Still, in eyes of a watching world, the Soviets now face a profound dilemma: the aftermath of tactical victories for proletarian internationalism. Some past victories, as that in the proxy Vietnam war, were profoundly important boons for them. Others have proved Pyrrhic: stabilized ruination, as

in Cuba; protracted conflict or ignominious defeat, as in Afghanistan. Any of these prospects surely are of small comfort, save to those who continue to be infatuated by the ideological compulsions of authentic Leninist doctrines, or by those Soviet strategic theoreticians who view such Third World adventures as an end-play, the ultimate aim of which is finally to isolate the United States from critical strategic zones of world politics. That there may be an admixture of motives--of relentless, cautious geopolitics bonded with conventional Leninist ideology--goes without saying. If the prime foreign policy aim of the Soviet leadership remains that of politically detaching the United States from key regions of the world, by strategies of destabilization, neutralization, and orchestrated secret terror, in concert with its proxies, then we deal with a certain form of Realpolitik--one which has met with singular successes in the past, and some failures.

The record of the Reagan Doctrine has been, on the contrary, one of singular failures and some successes. It would seem now to have promise of success in Afghanistan, tragic failure in Central America, uncomfortable and problematic stalemates in East, West, and South Africa. In these regions of failure or stalemate, where Soviet proxy war has been most evident, a basic reason for this has been a combination of intense domestic political opposition and the penchant of official American diplomacy to strive for

diplomatic compromises in the name of "peace." Such indeed is the massive political opposition to effective measures in Central America that the Soviets and their proxies now have clearly consolidated their base in the continental Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine has been tacitly abandoned.

To repeat: What is to be done? A few thoughts are in order:

1. It just may be that Professor Billington's view is correct: the "heady era of decolonization and Marxist-inspired revolution is over." (In which case it well may be the Soviets will find other fish to fry in pursuit of their interests. In South America, for example, Soviet state-to-state diplomacy today places great emphasis on courting nationalist, anti-Yankee sentiments within Latin establishments, rather than in toppling them; it has made great headway. The same is true elsewhere.)

2. Concerning Professor Billington's prophecy, as far as U.S.-Soviet relations are concerned, the proposition needs to be subjected to the closest scrutiny for significant empirical confirmation. What evidence is there that the proxy alliance is actually disintegrating or put on the back burner or still very much alive? It is necessary to test the tides. For beginners, one interesting minimal scrutiny would begin by asking, with what vigor or laxity do the Soviets and their proxies continue to recruit, train in terror camps, and

despatch professional cadres of secret warriors to operational areas? Such a scanning would look at camps in Cuba, East Germany, Nicaragua, and the Middle East. This is not an impossible intelligence task. It should be done in a comprehensive way, preferably in cooperation with friendly intelligence services.

3. The principle of fullest possible disclosure of proxy war should be allowed. A slackening of direct Soviet engagement should be regarded as meaningless if the slack is taken up by Soviet proxies. In southern Africa, for instance (including Angola and Namibia), a Soviet disappearance is meaningless if their chief proxies there--East Germany and Cuba--continue the ruthless advance of proxy liberation warfare.

Fullest disclosure should mean that the U.S. government be obliged periodically to report to Congress and the American public on the state of Soviet global proxy operations. It ought also to mean that such findings be systematically brought to the attention of the Soviet as well as the American people. Today, as discussions and debates on policy issues are tolerated by the Soviet government and party, inevitably attention will turn to this key issue: Of what profit is it to the Russian people that the Party and State continue these distant, demeaning assaults on international public order? Does proletarian internationalism and national liberation as

fundamentals of the Soviet system require the U.S.S.R. perpetually to sponsor movements of social disintegration abroad? Such questions already are being raised, if cautiously and obliquely, even in official journals such as Pravda. The questioning should continue; it requires knowledge and information. The revelations of past misdoings (such as the Nazi-Soviet Pact) should be accompanied by revelations of current and equally obnoxious contemporary doings. The instance of Ethiopia comes particularly to mind. Glasnost can apply to foreign policy!

4. Since Western, and particularly American, media have paid scant attention to the complex and clandestine aspects of Soviet proxy warfare as I have described them, while dwelling upon intimate details of feeble and often foolish American operations, the media must be encouraged to take on this task. Some years ago, Peter Braestrup wrote a book analyzing the American media's response to the Vietcong Tet Offensive--a matter it widely misrepresented at the time to the American public. He called it Big Story. But there is a far bigger story in secret war, the details of which are not impossible for reporters to draw out.

"Secret war," the theme of this meeting, should arouse the professional appetite of investigative reporters. Often, things that are secret are only so because efforts to explore them have been fitful, lazy, or lacking in conceptual,

analytical common sense. I have been struck, for instance, by a vast and growing body of little-known monographic works, scholarly or otherwise, to be found in specialized bookshops (such as Kramer's in Washington) that deal with pieces of this complex proxy problem. Ambitious reporters well could begin a career by consulting them.

5. Finally, there has been a tendency in American diplomatic language and practice, particularly before summit conferences, to stress the importance of joint Soviet/American attention to the resolution of "regional conflicts." All well and good. But as such regional conflicts normally are ones fed and fired by the political warfare strategies of the Soviet Union, a diplomacy that seeks only a resolution of them in the name of cease-fires and signed agreements should pay far greater attention to the political issues at stake, and not to the aim of bringing temporary end to fighting. The political aim should on all occasions dominate diplomacy in the quest for international order.