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per telephone Jim Brown - 15 Sept 1988  
MFR OCA 3137-88*

9/13/88

Name/Date



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

September 12, 1988

**SPECIAL**

OCA 3036-88

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer

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SUBJECT: Draft Defense, Energy and FEMA testimony on interagency anti-terrorism efforts.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please provide us with your views no later than

12:00 NOON - TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1988

Direct your questions to Jim Brown (395-3457), the legislative analyst in this office.

Assistant Director for  
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: Jim Jordan  
Francine Picoult  
Frank Kalder

Tom Palmieri  
Arnold Donahue

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**"DRAFT"**

**9 SEP 1988**

**UNITED STATES SENATE**  
**COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY**  
**SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW**  
**OPEN HEARING ON TECHNO-TERRORISM**  
**SEPTEMBER 15, 1988**

**INTRODUCTORY REMARKS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
**MR. CRAIG ALDERMAN, JR.**  
**DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

224-3406

*invited*  
*Z*

FBI  
 Energy  
 FEMA  
 DOD

**MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM CRAIG ALDERMAN, JR., DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY. I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES, AND FOR GUIDANCE AND OVERSIGHT FOR PLANS AND PROCEDURES, BY WHICH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROVIDES MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES PEACE AND IN WAR.**

**THEREFORE, AS A GENERAL INTRODUCTION FOR OUR CONTRIBUTION TO YOUR INQUIRY, I WILL ADDRESS THE CAPABILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THAT INQUIRY INTO**

**"HOW THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS STRUCTURED, EQUIPPED AND PREPARED TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES USING OR AIMED AT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES..., AND**

**"...WHAT MECHANISMS EXIST TO COOPERATE AND COORDINATE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT,...TO INTERACT WITH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT,...AND**

**"...WHICH AGENCIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT ASPECTS OF COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION."**

**THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S POLICIES AND PLANNING ARE FOUNDED ON OUR ADHERENCE TO THE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND TO THE SUBJECTION OF MILITARY POWER TO CIVILIAN**

**CONTROL. WHILE THAT DISTINCTION MAY SEEM OBSCURE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC IF TERRORISTS WHO ARE COVERTLY SPONSORED BY A FOREIGN POWER ARE OPERATING ON U.S. SOIL, THIS COMMITTEE IS WELL AWARE THAT THE PRIMACY OF CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IS FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY, AND THAT THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY CAN ONLY BE THAT OF SECONDARY SUPPORT, AT THE REQUEST OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES, WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT NEEDS EXCEED CAPABILITIES.**

**I, THEREFORE, WANT TO INTRODUCE BRIEFLY THE SPECIFIC ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN PROVIDING MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES, AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS TO OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES, AS A PRECEDENT FOR OUR ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THE SCENARIOS YOU HAVE POSED.**

**FIRST, IN THE MOST OBVIOUS ARENA OF SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE MILITARY RESPONSIVENESS WITH MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT, TECHNICAL ADVICE, AND FORCES IS WELL COORDINATED, EVEN WHILE MAINTAINING THE LEGALITIES OF CIVIL PRIMACY. WE HAVE PROCEDURES, PLANS AND YEARS OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN ASSISTING BOTH FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, THROUGH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (INCLUDING THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION); AND THE STATES. THAT ASSISTANCE IS PROVIDED THROUGH MECHANISMS BY WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAY AUTHORIZE MILITARY ASSISTANCE (WITH OVERSIGHT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE) IN RESPONSE TO A FORMAL REQUEST FROM ANY STATE. THAT SUPPORT, WHICH WE MANAGE UNDER A SYSTEM COVERING BOTH CIVIL**

**DISTURBANCES AND COUNTERTERRORISM, IS COORDINATED FOR ALL MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DOD COMPONENTS BY THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.**

**ADDITIONALLY, THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY IS THE EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PROVIDING LOGISTICAL AND LIFE SAVING SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES FACED WITH ANY FORM OF DISASTER. IN THE RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD SITUATIONS OF NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS DECLARED A MAJOR DISASTER UNDER THE DISASTER RELIEF ACT, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS IMMEDIATELY ABLE TO SUPPORT A FEDERAL CIVIL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE THAT NORMALLY IS COORDINATED BY THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY-MANAGEMENT AGENCY. FURTHER, IN THOSE EMERGENCIES IN WHICH IMMEDIATE ACTION BY A MILITARY COMMANDER CAN ASSIST CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN SAVING HUMAN LIFE OR PROTECTING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS OR PROPERTY, THE MILITARY AND OTHER DOD AGENCIES ARE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF FUNDING.**

**FINALLY, WE HAVE A LONGSTANDING AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING A DECISION BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO APPLY DOD FUNDS FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES, IF NECESSARY PRIOR TO A PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY. SUCH EMERGENCY REQUESTS ARE RECEIVED DIRECTLY BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OR PASSED TO THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY IF RECEIVED BY OTHERS), AND EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY THEN ARE PASSED**

**TO ANY APPROPRIATE DOD AGENCY. THOSE DECISIONS OFTEN ARE IMPLEMENTED ON A JOINT SERVICE BASIS THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE AGENCY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WITHIN THE 48 CONTIGUOUS STATES, AND BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND FOR HAWAII AND THE PACIFIC TERRITORIES, BY THE COMMANDER OF THE ALASKAN AIR COMMAND FOR ALASKA, AND BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND FOR PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS.**

**THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT EXERCISES POLICY OVERSIGHT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, WHICH MAY BE EMPLOYED UNDER A VARIETY OF SCENARIOS, RANGING FROM SUPPORT OF GENERAL WAR EFFORTS TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SITUATIONS, WHICH MAY INCLUDE RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IN THE ABSENCE OF OPEN, ARMED HOSTILITIES OR WARFARE IN THE UNITED STATES, ONLY A RARE AND EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCE WOULD LEAD TO EMPLOYMENT OF ANY UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM OR OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES; AND, EVEN IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE FORCES WOULD BE EMPLOYED ONLY IN THE LEGAL POSTURE OF PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT CIVIL REQUEST.**

**THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ATOMIC ENERGY HAS GENERAL OVERSIGHT OF A NUMBER OF HIGHLY SPECIALIZED TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AGENCIES, WHICH CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL HAZARDS. IN MOST OF THOSE EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, OTHER**



**THAN EMERGENCIES ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR DEALING WITH MILITARY WEAPONS, THE TOTAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CATASTROPHE WOULD BE ADDRESSED BY FEDERAL INTERAGENCY ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE LEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, OR THE FBI, WITH DOD ONLY FURNISHING TECHNICAL ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE AS APPROPRIATE. AGAIN, MANY OF THE OPERATIONS FOR THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL SUPPORT TEAMS FALL UNDER THE EXECUTIVE AGENCY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY I HAVE DISCUSSED EARLIER.**

**BEFORE WE ALL RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION ONE SPECIFIC DOD PROGRAM AND ONE GENERIC CAPABILITY WHICH BEAR INDIRECTLY ON THE TOPIC AT HAND.**

**THE DOD KEY ASSET PROTECTION PROGRAM (KAPP) IS A BASIS FOR OUR PLANNING TO ASSIST CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES IN THE PROTECTION OF CERTAIN CIVILIAN-OWNED FACILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS CRITICAL TO DOD'S ABILITY TO MOBILIZE, DEPLOY OR SUSTAIN OUR MILITARY FORCES IN A NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY. THE LIST ITSELF IS CLASSIFIED, AND ONLY IN ITS SECOND YEAR OF CONTINUOUS DEVELOPMENT. THE PROCESS OF MILITARY PLANNING WITH THE CIVIL SECTOR WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUAL FACILITIES IS DEVELOPING UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, FORCES COMMAND, FOR THE 48 CONTIGUOUS STATES, AND THE COMMANDERS MENTIONED EARLIER FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, THAT PLANNING PROCESS EMPHASIZES THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MILITARY**

**CAPABILITY AT THE GRASS ROOTS LEVEL, WHICH MAY PROVE IN TIME TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO PEACETIME DETERRENCE OF, AND RESPONSE TO, TERRORIST ATTACKS ON TECHNOLOGICAL TARGETS IN THE UNITED STATES.**

**KEY ASSET PROTECTION PLANS WILL BE DEVELOPED BY THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD STATE AREA COMMAND (STARC) FOR EACH STATE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE OWNERS OF THE FACILITIES AND THE CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES HAVING JURISDICTION. I EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT, THESE PLANS ARE DEVELOPED AS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCIES OR WAR; AND, PRIOR TO MOBILIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, THEY WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.**

**THE EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD UNDER AUSPICES OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE THE NATIONAL DEFENSE; AND THE MAJORITY OF OUR WARTIME CONTINGENCY PLANS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD UNITS. HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT OF PEACETIME TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. SOIL, THE NATIONAL GUARD FORCES PROVIDE TO EACH STATE A VERY SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITY FOR AUGMENTATION OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE AND CIVIL DEFENSE RESOURCES. WE HAVE DESIGNED THE KEY ASSET PROTECTION PROGRAM WITH THE AWARENESS THAT PLANS MADE FOR IMPLEMENTATION BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UPON MOBILIZATION CAN BE EQUALLY EFFECTIVE FOR IMPLEMENTATION BY THE**

**GOVERNORS UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES AND OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITIES, AND THAT PLANNING AND EXERCISES TO PROTECT SPECIFIC KEY ASSETS BUILD GENERIC CAPABILITIES FOR RESPONSE TO A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE THREATS, INCLUDING TERRORISM.**

**TO CONCLUDE, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MAINTAINS A BROAD RANGE OF CAPABILITIES FOR RESPONSE TO TECHNO-TERRORISM USING RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS; AND FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE EXPECTED TO KEEP PACE WITH DEVELOPING THREATS. WITH THESE CAPABILITIES, WE ARE READY TO SUPPORT CIVIL AUTHORITIES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS, WHICH MAY BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ALONE OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE STATES. WE ALSO SUPPORT THIS COMMITTEE'S INITIATIVE TO REVIEW THE GOVERNMENT'S PREPAREDNESS FOR A COORDINATED AND EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO ANY FORM OF POTENTIAL ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES, WHICH WE VIEW AS A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND OF OUR ABILITY TO EMPLOY THE NATION'S MILITARY POWER EFFICIENTLY DURING ANY NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY.**

**THANK YOU.**

**DRAFT**

**STATEMENT OF EDWARD V. BADOLATO  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENERGY EMERGENCIES  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY**

**BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**SEPTEMBER 15, 1988**

**DRAFT**

*Stan Trumbauer, JL-242  
566-1365*

*3/5/88*

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss energy emergency preparedness with particular emphasis on concerns that terrorists might attack domestic energy systems.

While we have made good progress in this area and there is a great deal of activity taking place, there is still much to do. As you may imagine matters dealing with the vulnerabilities of our domestic energy systems become quite sensitive and must be handled delicately lest we create a shopping list for those who would do them harm. Accordingly, we have undertaken a number of quiet initiatives with federal and state agencies and the energy industries with the goal of reducing the vulnerability of our energy supplies. In view of the open style of this hearing, I will restrain my remarks to accommodate these sensitivities. Some details, if needed, should be discussed in closed session or the information provided in classified form.

As requested for discussion purposes, my remarks address an electric power disruption, referred to as Technoterrorism Scenario 3. I will also refer briefly to the Department of Energy's capability to respond to another type of technoterrorism, nuclear terrorism.

In the hypothetical mid-winter electric power disruption scenario, terrorists simultaneously bomb transformers and switches in the northeastern United States. The attacks cause a major disruption of electricity in the northeast. After two weeks, only 35% of electricity in the area has been restored, with New York City receiving less than 50% of its requirements. Related problems include traffic light failures and abandoned vehicles causing massive traffic jams which block emergency vehicles, isolation of a light water nuclear power reactor from the grid, and partial failure of the gas pipeline system because of lack of power.

I would like to briefly discuss three aspects of this scenario; First, activities undertaken in advance to mitigate the risk of experiencing such a disruption; Second, the Energy Emergency Management System for coping with a disruption, and finally, the nature of response actions which would occur. My discussion is intentionally general in nature. Some details, if needed, should be discussed in closed session or the information provided in classified form.

The specified electric power supply disruption is severe and unprecedented, with only 35% of electricity supplies to the northeast having been restored after two weeks. After past bulk power supply system disruptions, service restoration time as been measured in terms of minutes, hours or a day or so at most. For example, full restoration took 13 hours in the 1965 New York City blackout. Restoration of the 1977 New York City blackout took 25 hours.

In all past electricity disruptions electric utilities have restored service without federal assistance. Primary reliance for service restoration continues to be on electric utilities.

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However, much has been done and more actions are underway to mitigate the risk of experiencing severe power supply disruptions. For example:

- o Following the 1965 New York City blackout, the electric utility industry formed the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) to ensure that adequacy and reliability are properly considered in utility planning and operations.

With specific reference to electric power disruptions which might result from technoterrorism:

- o DOE has conducted exercises involving such scenarios in the northeast in April 1987 and in the San Francisco area in December 1987. Similar exercises have been conducted during the past five months with participation by emergency personnel from most of the "lower 48" states' energy offices. These exercises permit us to identify potential problems and to test crisis management plans.
- o At the request of DOE, NERC formed the National Electric Security Committee to develop proposals to reduce the vulnerability of electric power systems to technoterrorism. The Committee submitted its recommendations in July and the matter is on the agenda of the NERC board's October meeting.
- o At the request of the National Security Council, an Interagency Group on Energy Vulnerability (IG-EV) has been formed. A Subgroup is currently working on (1) energy crisis management reflecting national defense priorities, and (2) mitigating the risk of disruption of energy supply systems to technoterrorism. On electric power systems, the most vulnerable components, as the Subcommittee has suggested, are power transformers, particularly Extra High Voltage (EHV) transformers.
- o DOE is working with the energy industry to improve physical security. Such activities include providing threat briefings to industry officials, and making available to industry the physical security training expertise at DOE's Central Training Academy, formerly applied only to nuclear weapons facilities and DOE properties.
- o DOE has implemented a procedure for transmitting intelligence community threat advisories to the energy industry, when appropriate.

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- o The industry advisory committee of the National Communications System has formed an Electric Power Task Force. The Task Force is meeting with representatives of the electric power industry for the purpose of identifying what each industry needs from the other during emergencies, and developing cooperative service restoration procedures.

DOE's Office of Energy Emergencies (OEE) has led the Department's efforts to carry out its non-nuclear emergency preparedness strategies. OEE's mission is to assure that adequate U.S. energy is available, at reasonable cost, to support national priorities during emergencies. As shown in Figure 1, three Offices under my leadership carry out this mission.

1. The Office of Energy Emergency Policy and Evaluation: Monitors, evaluates, incorporates and disseminates energy emergency initiatives and developments in support of the OEE preparedness mission.
2. The Office of Energy Emergency Plans and Integration: Develops energy emergency response plans that include the use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and strengthening commitments to the International Energy Agency and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
3. The Office of Energy Emergency Operations: Ensures that the U.S. infrastructure (i.e., industry, state and local governments) is able to meet national priorities in the event of catastrophic and defense-related emergencies.

In the performance of its mission, OEE draws upon the resources and activities of other DOE offices and also coordinates with other government agencies and industry for energy emergency planning and procedures. As depicted in Figure 2, a broad spectrum of energy emergencies...peacetime through war...involve the resources of OEE. Natural disasters, political disruption, terrorism and sabotage have highest peacetime priority. Crisis and wartime priorities involve energy emergency preparation for mobilization, conventional and nuclear war.

The way in which DOE responds to energy emergencies involves general and operational planning, procedures, budget and, most important, human resources. An effective crisis management system requires an experienced, mature, well trained staff that is flexible enough to plan for and respond to a variety of emergency situations. The 71 professional and support staff in the current organization of OEE include experts in oil, natural gas, electric power and coal, as well as economists, engineers, analysts, computer programmers, data processors and administrative staff. To be ready for an unexpected emergency, the staff receives, on a continuing

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basis, advanced training both in technical and managerial skill. This emphasis on training and preparation has the objective of ensuring that DOE has a relatively small, technically competent staff that is well versed in energy crisis management policy and procedures and is capable of rapidly responding to emergencies.

Many natural and man-made events can cause disruptions of the domestic energy supply system. Some of these, such as equipment failure or an act of vandalism, are routinely handled by industry, while large regional problems, such as the aftermath of an earthquake or potential multisite sabotage, may be serious enough to require government coordination or assistance.

Multisite sabotage and terrorist incidents represent potential threats in the United States. Worldwide, terrorism has been rising about 10-15% a year. In the United States, we have been relatively fortunate because acts of sabotage against our electric power systems have not reached levels of severity sufficient to cause a major sustained outage. However, some third world countries have experienced substantial power system disruptions (e.g., El Salvador, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Mozambique, Afghanistan and Guatemala).

Terrorist organizations also have attacked power facilities in Western Europe. In the past, these attacks generally were poorly designed and executed, but recent attacks by the same organizations have shown a higher level of technology and better planning. This may portend more effective actions against power systems in the future.

Energy-related terrorism in the United States would be a particularly significant threat in a time of national defense mobilization. The Soviet Union has an unconventional warfare capability (i.e., Spetsnaz units) which has assigned missions to cripple the West's industrial infrastructure, particularly its vulnerable energy systems, prior to an outbreak of hostilities. While the Spetsnaz focus appears to be on Western Europe, the potential for such actions in the United States cannot be dismissed. However, even in the absence of a superpower confrontation, there is the possibility that potential third world adversaries could sponsor attacks on the energy infrastructure in the United States, and OEE is working with industry to mitigate this problem.

From an emergency preparedness standpoint, OEE's first priority effort is on the bulk electric power system which is vital to economic and social stability and to national security. Electric power is uniquely vulnerable because, unlike coal or oil, it cannot be stored and must be available at the instant of demand. Over 225,000 miles of bulk power transmission lines...many stretching over remote and unprotected areas...connect the Nation's power plants to the distribution companies serving local consumers. Although seldom the cause of a serious disruption to supply, transmission lines have been the most common targets for terrorist groups. Substations, most of which also are isolated



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and unprotected, are particularly exposed. This problem is exacerbated because many critical components cannot be easily replaced, with repair or replacement times possibly measured in weeks or months.

The petroleum industry enjoys a high priority in U.S. domestic emergency preparedness policy for coping with vulnerability. Its major points of vulnerability are pipelines, refineries and storage facilities. However, both source and transportation flexibilities tend to reduce the potential impacts of disruptions to petroleum supply. For example, crude oil and petroleum products can be purchased from other sources (e.g., imports) and transported by several modes including water, rail and fuel trucks.

Natural gas systems are particularly exposed with the most vulnerable components being pipeline interconnections, river crossings, compressor stations and city gate stations. The natural gas transmission and distribution systems, consisting of more than one million miles of pipeline, presents an extremely complex set of targets. Dual fuel capacity in many industries would mitigate, to some extent, the impacts of a major disruption to the domestic supply of natural gas.

Although coal supplies 25% of our energy, the dispersed nature of the supply system makes it unlikely that even a large hostile action could have a major national impact.

The DOE program of vulnerability reduction and mitigation consists of four phases, as follows:

Phase 1 (DOE/Industry). In-house case studies and simulations to assess the vulnerabilities of candidate energy systems;

Phase 2 (DOE/Industry). Outreach to industry owners and operators to advise of discovered vulnerabilities and to obtain cooperation;

Phase 3 (Industry). Introspective vulnerability assessments by system owners and operators to determine enhancements which may be in accordance with normal business objectives; and

Phase 4 (Interagency Group). Assessments of remaining vulnerabilities and judgements as to whether they constitute an unacceptable risk to national security and, if so, the nature and type of remedial actions which may be warranted.

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The present status of our vulnerability programs is as follows:

ENERGY SYSTEMS	<u>Phase 1</u> Studies/ Simulations	<u>Phase 2</u> Cooperation with Industry	<u>Phase 3</u> Industry Actions	<u>Phase 4</u> Government Initiatives
o Electric Power	Done	Done	In Progress (NERC)	..
o Natural Gas	Done	In Progress	..	..
o Petroleum	Done	In Progress	..	..
o Coal	In Progress	..	..	..

DOE utilizes a generalized emergency response process that provides systematic decision-making in response to any energy emergency, whether in electric power, oil, gas or coal, or in the event of an international or domestic energy crisis. The Energy Emergency Response System (EEMS) is organized to assess the nature and extent of an energy emergency and, by drawing upon the total support activities and expertise of DOE, to develop response options. Besides establishing response procedures for each major energy type, the EEMS process also is designed to respond to a variety of possible emergency scenarios, such as an international disruption in oil supplies, defense mobilization, major natural disasters, energy system sabotage, or major accidents involving energy systems.

In the draft DOE Order 5500.5, "Energy Emergency Planning and Management", currently under Departmental review for concurrence, the EEMS concept is defined and the policies and procedures for administering the EEMS are clearly established as are the general criteria for developing and coordinating DOE's energy emergency planning activities. As the non-nuclear energy component of DOE's overall Emergency Management System, the order describes the EEMS organizational relationships and integrates its concept of operations into the emergency processes of the Department. The EEMS process has been successfully tested in several large scale exercises.

The key organizational component of EEMS is the Energy Emergency Management Team (EEMT), consisting of a cadre of departmental experts and chaired by myself; Figure 3 illustrates the EEMT structure. As DOE's principal internal energy crisis management body, the EEMT has met numerous times in recent months to provide status briefings and projections for the Secretary of Energy on the likely energy impacts of earthquake pipeline damage, the Persian Gulf USS Stark incident, oil tanker mining activities off Kuwait, the Red River washout of an oil pipeline in the

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southwestern United States and, most currently, drought effects on the nation's energy systems. In typical situation meetings, the EEMT is provided an up-to-date detailed intelligence briefing, and analysis of the energy impact of the incident, and recommendations for appropriate response actions.

The operational concept of EEMS is illustrated in Figure 4. The continuum begins with routine monitoring of the energy situation to determine whether it is necessary to activate the EEMT and the EEMS process. Next, the situation is analyzed, various response options considered, recommendation made and finally implemented. Each step in the flow of activities allows for termination of the EEMS process if it is no longer necessary, or recycling if the emergency continues.

In the event the specified scenario occurred despite warnings, or in the absence of a warning, the following chain of events would be set in motion.

Affected utilities would immediately implement local curtailment plans, begin damage assessment and reconstitution planning, and report the incident, as provided by federal regulation, to the DOE Emergency Operations Center.

NERC would notify other utilities throughout the U.S. and Canada of the incident, using its hotline. Utilities would increase their physical security using in-house resources, available state and local law enforcement personnel, and professional security firms.

The report of an incident of this magnitude would trigger activation of the Energy Emergency Response System. A Situation Analysis would be performed by DOE in cooperation with utilities, state governments and federal agencies including FEMA, the NRC and the FBI. The DOE Energy Emergency Management Team would meet to assess the situation, as would the Interagency Group on Energy Vulnerability. The severity of this scenario suggests a war or pre-war situation. If that is the case, a Presidential declaration of a national emergency would be recommended. Work on developing federal response options would begin.

Public Information activities on the incident would be initiated, including:

- o Drafting a President statement declaring a national emergency and authorizing activation of the NDERs.
- o Developing public statements and talking points for key DOE spokesmen.
- o Developing background papers and fact sheets explaining DOE response mechanisms.

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- o Coordinating public information activities with other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the utility industry.
- o Responding to media requests for information and interviews.
- o Holding or participating in press conferences.
- o Responding to requests from Congress for information, briefings and hearings.

After a national emergency was declared, the President would authorize the Secretary of Energy to activate DOE's National Defense Executive Reserves. The reservists would (1) relocate to the appropriate Emergency Operating Centers; (2) advise DOE Headquarters of damage to electric power facilities and availability of power in the region/sub-region; (3) recommend electric power curtailments as necessary; (4) recommend restoration priorities and monitor restoration work; (5) requisition essential equipment, fuels, material and supplies; and (6) request assistance from DOE Headquarters in obtaining manpower, material, equipment, and fuels.

The Defense Department's plans for protecting key energy nodes would be implemented. The National Guard and reserves would be used to protect such facilities if necessary.

Under the Executive Branch's lead agency concept, DOE would take the lead for the federal government. Overall, the responses developed and implemented would fall into one of three categories. First, responses to limited electricity supplies. Such responses are primarily demand curtailment and implementing service priorities reflecting essential national security and state and local needs. It should be noted that state energy plans do not currently consider essential national security needs. Second, reconstruction of the electric power transmission system.

Typical response actions to limited electricity supplies and to reconstruct transmission facilities are summarized in Table 1 (attached).

Finally, responses addressing other problems resulting from the incident, such as physical security of key facilities, ensuring supplies of fuel for the diesel generators at the nuclear reactor which is isolated from the grid.

There is some concern regarding the disruption notification process. DOE has no statutory authority to require reporting of disruptions affecting national gas, petroleum or coal. DOE regulations require reporting of major electrical outages, but reports are not always promptly received. Monitoring of major wire services is used to help identify serious energy incidents.

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Turning to nuclear terrorism, the Department of Energy, pursuant to Executive Order 11490, as amended by Executive Order 11953, is assigned responsibility to participate in the conduct, direction, and coordination of search and recovery operations for nuclear material, weapons, or devices; to assist in the identification and deactivation of improvised nuclear devices (INDs) and/or radiological dispersal devices (RDDs); and to render advice on radiation and damage probabilities in the event of the detonation of an IND. This authority complements and is in addition to the Department's general authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and other generic legislation to maintain a technically based response capability in a state of readiness to handle nuclear emergencies.

There is a variety of actual or potential situations involving nuclear materials which could lead to a DOE response. These include:

- o Acts of terrorism
- o Extortion
- o Stolen material
- o Lost or missing material
- o Dispersed material
- o Material offered for sale illegally

Countering nuclear threats requires teamwork by federal, state, and local agencies. The FBI has overall jurisdiction at the federal level and is responsible for the legal aspects of any counterthreat actions taken. DOE has the capability of providing technical personnel and equipment to assist in locating, characterizing, and neutralizing nuclear threat devices.

To provide appropriate technical assistance promptly, the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), under the operational control of the Manager, Nevada Operations Office (NV), has been created by DOE to provide the capability to respond to these specialized nuclear emergencies. Many NEST capabilities are also applicable to nonnuclear emergencies, and could be made available to assist the FBI on a case-by-case basis, as required.

NEST personnel and equipment are prepared to:

1. Evaluate the credibility of a nuclear threat.
2. Search for a nuclear threat device or radioactive material.
3. Identify the kind and quantity of radioactive materials involved.
4. Assess the probability of nuclear explosive yield or spread of radioactive material.

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5. Assess the potential for personnel injury and property damage in the event of activation of a threat device.
6. Assist in the render safe and disposal operations.

The need for a specialized emergency response team such as NEST is infrequent. Therefore, the majority of NEST personnel are assigned to other tasks in their day-to-day work but remain on-call for a NEST activity as required. The majority of personnel who have volunteered for NEST field assignments are involved in other DOE nuclear programs, especially the nuclear weapons program. Most of these personnel are from DOE/NV, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), or EG&G/EM, Inc. Under an interagency cooperative agreement, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) experts from the Department of Defense (DOD) will participate with DOE/NEST personnel in dealing with a nuclear threat, when warranted by the nature of the problem.

The following outlines the approximate sequence of events in a "classical" NEST scenario:

FBI informs DOE/HQ that a nuclear threat has been received, and provides the threat message together with any other available pertinent information.

DOE/HQ/EOC passes the above information to the Communicated Threat Coordination Center at LLNL which commences the threat assessment process.

EOC passes the same information to DOE/NV which relays it to appropriate members of the NEST Community.


If or when it appears possible that a deployment of NEST personnel and equipment may be directed, each NEST organization is asked to assume an alert posture; locate appropriate personnel and have them stand by on-call; assemble appropriate equipment and prepare it for shipment; maintain a communications watch so they can be contacted and respond quickly if a deployment is ordered; etc.

This concludes my prepared testimony. I will be happy to answer your questions.

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*FIGURE 1*

# OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENERGY EMERGENCIES



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
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FIGURE 2



# Energy Emergency Curve



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~~Figure 3~~  
FIGURE 3

## EEMT MEMBERSHIP

### CORE GROUP

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
AND ENERGY EMERGENCIES

CONGRESSIONAL, INTER-  
GOVERNMENTAL, AND  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

GENERAL COUNSEL

DEFENSE PROGRAMS

ENERGY INFORMATION  
ADMINISTRATION

MANAGEMENT AND ADMIN-  
ISTRATION

POLICY, PLANNING AND  
ANALYSIS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER  
SECRETARY

### AUGMENT GROUP

PETROLEUM RESERVES

FOSSIL ENERGY (OTHER  
THAN PR)

NUCLEAR ENERGY

CONSERVATION AND  
RENEWABLE ENERGY

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY,  
AND HEALTH

09/09/88

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
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# Energy Emergency Management System: Simplified Diagram



Continued

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STATEMENT OF  
THE HONORABLE GEORGE WOLOSHYN  
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR  
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE  
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

BEFORE  
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE

SEPTEMBER 15, 1988

MR. CHAIRMAN, IT IS A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE YOUR COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF POTENTIAL TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF TECHNOLOGY TO ATTACK THIS COUNTRY AND HOW THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD DEAL WITH THESE TYPES OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS.

THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF MY TESTIMONY WILL BE ON FEMA'S RESPONSIBILITY IN PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES USING SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGIES. THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM IS FOCUSED IN THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON TERRORISM (IG/T), WHICH IS CHAIRED BY L. PAUL BREMER, III, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. THREE LEAD AGENCY ASSIGNMENTS ARE IN PLACE FOR MANAGING TERRORIST INCIDENTS THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR INCIDENTS OCCURRING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES; THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (FBI) FOR INCIDENTS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES; AND THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FOR HIJACKED AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT.

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12148, FEMA HAS BEEN DELEGATED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COORDINATION OF PREPAREDNESS AND PLANNING TO REDUCE THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. FEMA IS NOT AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCY AND MAINTAINS NO INTELLIGENCE FILES. WE DEPEND UPON THOSE AGENCIES WHICH HAVE A LEGAL CHARTER TO COLLECT AND DISSEMINATE INTELLIGENCE. WE ARE NOT A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY AND DO NOT COORDINATE ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANS. FEMA REGARDS CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM AS SIMILAR TO CONSEQUENCES OF OTHER TYPES OF LARGE SCALE

CATASTROPHIC EVENTS OR EXTRAORDINARY SITUATIONS. THE SAME NEEDS MAY EXIST, E.G. MEDICAL CARE, FOOD, SHELTER, EVACUATION, ETC., AND THE SAME RESPONSES AND CAPABILITIES ARE CALLED FOR: COORDINATION, EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTERS, AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY.

FEMA HAS MADE IMPORTANT AND VISIBLE STRIDES IN IMPROVING THE CAPABILITY OF THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES TO RESPOND TO MAJOR EMERGENCIES OR EXTRAORDINARY SITUATIONS. FEMA HAS HELPED DEVELOP PLANS, COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, RESPONSE TEAMS, INTERAGENCY PROCEDURES, AND TRAINING FOR ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT.

FEMA HAS ASSISTED THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL IN DEVELOPING THE NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR EMERGENCY COORDINATION (NSEC), WHICH IS A MECHANISM FOR ENSURING THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROVIDES TIMELY, EFFECTIVE, AND COORDINATED ASSISTANCE TO STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN EXTREME CATASTROPHIC TECHNOLOGICAL, NATURAL OR OTHER DOMESTIC DISASTERS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE. RESPONSIBILITIES CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES BY STATUTE OR OTHER AUTHORITY, AND EXISTING EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CAPABILITIES, ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS RESPONSE SYSTEM AND WILL BE USED WHEN POSSIBLE.

IN CONJUNCTION WITH NSEC, THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS HAS ASKED THE DIRECTOR OF FEMA TO DEVELOP A NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PLAN WITH A FUNCTIONALLY-ORIENTED STRUCTURE AS A COMPANION APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCIES. THIS WILL ASSURE A CONSISTENT RESPONSE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF AN EMERGENCY AND WILL ELIMINATE THE NEED TO CHANGE RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN THE MIDST OF A CRISIS.

FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT THE NATIONAL AND, AS APPROPRIATE, REGIONAL/FIELD LEVELS IN THE AREAS OF: ECONOMICS, ENERGY, HUMAN SERVICES, LEGAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONAL GROUPS MAY BE ESTABLISHED WHEN APPROPRIATE. EACH FUNCTIONAL GROUP WILL BE CHAIRED BY A LEAD DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY WHICH WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR IDENTIFYING GROUP MEMBERS, EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES, OPERATING PROCEDURES AND EMERGENCY ACTIONS, AND FOR COORDINATING ITS EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES WITH THOSE OF OTHER FUNCTIONAL GROUPS. IN ADDITION, THE PLAN WILL INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT TO DESIGNATE LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING THE OVERALL FEDERAL RESPONSE.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN (FRERP). FEMA SERVED AS OVERALL COORDINATOR IN DEVELOPING THIS PLAN. THIS JOINT UNDERTAKING OF ALL THE AGENCIES, WHICH WOULD RESPOND TO ANY INCIDENT INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR TERRORISM, CULMINATED IN NUMEROUS MAJOR FIELD EXERCISES, SOME INVOLVING APPROXIMATELY 2,000 FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR PERSONNEL. THESE EXERCISES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A FEDERAL RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE ABILITY OF ALL RESPONDERS TO WORK TOGETHER.

ANOTHER MAJOR STEP WAS THE CAPABILITY FEMA DEVELOPED IN RESPONSE TO WHITE HOUSE TASKING IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES FOR PLANNING AND RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL CATASTROPHIC EMERGENCIES AT THE 1984 SUMMER OLYMPICS. THE PLAN WAS TITLED, "A NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR RESPONDING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION AT SPECIAL EVENTS." THIS NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN OUTLINES HOW FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES WOULD RESPOND TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION OR AN EMERGENCY THAT COULD THREATEN

THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY DURING SPECIAL EVENTS. THIS PLAN WAS ALSO IMPLEMENTED AGAIN DURING THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL EVENTS:

- ° 1984 NEW ORLEANS WORLD'S FAIR
- ° 1984 AND 1988 REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTIONS
- ° 1985 PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION
- ° 1987 PAN AMERICAN GAMES

THE MITIGATION OF AND/OR RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AS OUTLINED IN YOUR ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS REQUIRES THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF A SET OF INTEGRATED FUNCTIONS BY LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. AT EACH LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, MULTIPLE AGENCIES MAY EACH PERFORM SEVERAL DISTINCT PREVENTION/RESPONSE FUNCTIONS. SOME OF THESE FUNCTIONS ARE LARGELY OR ENTIRELY A STATE OR LOCAL PREROGATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY. OTHER FUNCTIONS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF AND ARE PERFORMED LARGELY BY FEDERAL AGENCIES. YET OTHERS ARE PERFORMED JOINTLY BY STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES (OR LARGELY, PERHAPS ENTIRELY, BY FEDERAL AGENCIES IN INSTANCES WHERE THERE IS A PRESIDENTIAL DISASTER DECLARATION.

IF A MAJOR TERRORIST EVENT OCCURS AS STATED IN YOUR THREE SCENARIOS, FEMA WILL WORK WITH FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN RESPONDING TO, AND RECOVERING FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALL TYPES OF EXTRAORDINARY SITUATIONS, INCLUDING TERRORIST INCIDENTS. OUR PLANS CALL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL RESPONSE CENTER AND JOINT INFORMATION CENTER IN, OR NEAR, THE AFFECTED AREAS AND TO SUPPORT THESE FIELD OPERATIONS WITH EXISTING EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTERS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE.

AS PART OF A COORDINATED FEDERAL RESPONSE TO A MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENT, FEMA WOULD DEPLOY AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT) TO THE SCENE, LED BY A SENIOR



FEMA OFFICIAL (SFO). THE ERT WILL BE SUPPORTED BY AN EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM (EST) HEADED BY AN EST DIRECTOR. THE EST WILL OPERATE FROM THE FEMA EMERGENCY INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTER (EICC) IN THE FEMA HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. THE SFO WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE DIRECTOR, FEMA, AND WILL COMMUNICATE AND PROVIDE INFORMATION AND REPORTS THROUGH THE EST USING THE OPERATIONAL FACILITIES OF FEMA.

TO SUPPORT THE SFO AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE CENTER, FEMA HAS DEVELOPED AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NEMS) THAT IS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE FULL RANGE OF INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS IN EVERY PHASE AND TYPE OF ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT. NEMS PROVIDES AN OVERALL NATIONWIDE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT THROUGH VARIOUS INFORMATION PROCESSING AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS AS EMERGENCY SITUATIONS DICTATE. IT ALSO PROVIDES FOR INTERCONNECTIVITY WITH SYSTEMS OF THE WHITE HOUSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CIA AND OTHER FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL SYSTEMS HAVING NATIONAL EMERGENCY FUNCTIONS. IT CONSISTS OF THE PHYSICAL FACILITIES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR FEMA'S VITAL MANAGEMENT MISSION. INITIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT WILL CONSIST OF FEMA'S FIXED AND MOBILE CAPABILITIES.

AS PART OF OUR MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS, RESOURCES ASSESSMENT EFFORTS, FEMA WORKS CLOSELY WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND SHARING OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DATA BASES AND AUTOMATED MODELING CAPABILITY WHICH SUPPORT INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING. DURING 1988, FEMA SPONSORED TWO DATA BASE AND MODELING WORKSHOPS TO PROMOTE CLOSER RELATIONSHIPS AMONG EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND THE CIVIL SECTOR.

THIS DATA IS USED TO ASSIST EMERGENCY MANAGERS TO MONITOR OUR STATE OF READINESS AND TO ASSURE CONTINUED PRODUCTION CAPABILITY IN A NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY. IT IS ALSO USED TO DEVELOP PROJECTIONS, ANALYSES, AND OPTIONS TO SUPPORT THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO AVAIL ESSENTIAL RESOURCES FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION NEEDS IN MAJOR DOMESTIC DISASTERS AND NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. IN THE EVENT OF TERRORIST ACTS, RESULTING IN A DISRUPTION ON A POTENTIAL PORTION OF NEW YORK CITY'S "HIGH TENSION ELECTRIC POWER GRID", FEMA WOULD BE ABLE, USING THE INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (IEMIS) AND THE INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM (IMEASY), TO DEVELOP AND DISPLAY MAPPING, GRAPHICS AND ANALYTICAL DATA IDENTIFICATION OF INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY LOST AND THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WITHOUT POWER. IF THE DISRUPTION SHOULD LAST FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, FEMA WOULD BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY SUPPORT, I.E., HEAT, FOOD, WATER, THE AFFECTED POPULATION NEEDS.

E.O. 12148 HAS GIVEN THE DIRECTOR OF FEMA THE MANDATE TO PROVIDE A SINGLE SOURCE TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT CAN TURN FOR REPORTS OF THE DAMAGE INCURRED, THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO RESPOND, AND THE RELIEF ACTIONS UNDERWAY FOLLOWING A MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENT.

LET ME TURN NOW TO SOME OF THE OTHER THINGS FEMA IS DOING TO ENHANCE THE NATION'S CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH-TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM.

INTERAGENCY NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM RESPONSE PLANNING  
FEMA IS A MEMBER OF THE NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL, (NBC) WORKING GROUP OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON TERRORISM (IG/T). THIS GROUP IS EXAMINING OUR GOVERNMENT'S CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO NBC THREATS, AND WORKING ON PLANS, PROCEDURES AND CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL

TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THE NBC WORKING GROUP HAS ALSO DEVELOPED AN ACTIVE PROGRAM OF EXERCISES TO TEST RESPONSE CAPABILITY. VARIOUS EXERCISES HAVE INVOLVED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ALONE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COORDINATING WITH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. OTHER FEMA COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION ACTIVITIES INCLUDE:

- IG/T, EXERCISE COMMITTEE
- NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM (NEST), OPERATIONS WORKING GROUP
- NEST, DAMAGE LIMITATION WORKING GROUP
- CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBGROUP
- NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM EXERCISE COMMITTEE

#### INTERAGENCY ENERGY ACTIVITIES

FEMA IS A MEMBER OF THE INTERAGENCY GROUP ON ENERGY VULNERABILITY (IG-EV). THE MISSION OF THE IG-EV IS TO EXAMINE THE VULNERABILITY OF U.S. ENERGY SYSTEMS, AND TO PREPARE OPTIONS TO REDUCE THIS VULNERABILITY OR TO MITIGATE THE IMPACTS OF DISRUPTION TO ENERGY SYSTEMS. U.S. ENERGY SYSTEMS INCLUDE: ELECTRIC POWER, CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (IMPORTS, PRODUCTION, REFINING, DISTRIBUTION), NATURAL GAS AND COAL.

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND FEMA HAVE COLLABORATED ON AN INDUSTRY-SENSITIVE STUDY OF THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA NATURAL GAS SYSTEM AND COMPLETED A STUDY TARGETED AT THE MITIGATION AND MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL GAS SYSTEM EMERGENCIES. WE ARE JOINTLY DEVELOPING THE FOLLOWING: (1) A NATIONAL NATURAL GAS OUTREACH INITIATIVE; (2) A PILOT SECURITY PLANNING PROGRAM FOR ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES; (3) A SCOPING STUDY CONCERNING THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE ELECTRIC POWER NETWORK; AND (4) A PILOT STUDY OF SAN DIEGO AND LOS ANGELES THAT RELATES DEFENSE INTERESTS TO ENERGY SUPPLY.

FEMA IS A MEMBER OF THREE WORKING GROUPS CREATED TO SUPPORT THE IG-EV. THE ENERGY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT SUBGROUP (EVAS); DATABASE AND PROJECTIONS SUBGROUP AND THE RESPONSE DEVELOPMENT SUBGROUP. FEMA ALSO PARTICIPATES ALONG WITH DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN AN EVAS WORKING GROUP (WG) THAT IS DEVELOPING ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES TO BE USED BY GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY FOR ASSESSING ELECTRIC POWER VULNERABILITY ON A NATIONAL SCALE. IN 1987-88, THE IG-EV SPONSORED JOINT EXERCISES IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA (ONE IN SACRAMENTO AND ONE IN SAN FRANCISCO). THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY SIMULATION ARE:

1. METHODS MUST BE DEVELOPED TO ASSURE NEEDED SUPPLIES OF ENERGY TO ESSENTIAL END-USERS; AND,
2. ENERGY REQUIREMENTS MUST BE ESTABLISHED FOR CRITICAL USERS (E.G., MILITARY FACILITIES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES AND ESSENTIAL STATE/LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICE.

WE ARE ASSISTING THE IG-EV TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM BENEFIT BY LOOKING AT INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS IN TERMS OF THEIR VULNERABILITY TO A REGIONAL OR NATIONAL LEVEL OUTAGES. TOWARD THIS END, FEMA HAS HELPED SPONSOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER-AIDED DELPHI METHODOLOGIES THAT CAN BE USED TO MITIGATE THESE KIND OF DISRUPTIONS.

#### OTHER INTERAGENCY AND JOINT INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

THE WORK OF SEVERAL OTHER INTERAGENCY AND JOINT INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT GROUPS CURRENTLY ADDRESSING MOBILIZATION ISSUES AND PROBLEMS MAY HAVE SIGNIFICANCE IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS WITH NATIONAL IMPACT.

THE NATIONAL MOBILIZATION INTERAGENCY GROUP (NMIG) IS PART OF THE CURRENT INTERAGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM. THE NMIG IS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL FROM THE MAJOR

DEPARTMENT AND AGENCIES IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN RESPONDING TO A SCENARIO OF EVENTS LIKE A MAJOR ELECTRIC POWER OUTAGE.

THE NMIG CONTAINS VARIOUS SUBGROUPS WHICH ADDRESS SPECIFIC ISSUES WITHIN THE MOBILIZATION ARENA: 1) THE ECONOMIC AFFAIRS SUBGROUP DEALS WITH THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICY ASPECTS OF A MOBILIZATION; 2) THE MOBILIZATION READINESS SUBGROUP ADDRESSES POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY DURING AN EMERGENCY; 3) THE STANDBY AUTHORITIES SUBGROUP EXAMINES EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES NEEDED FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY; AND 4) THE ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION SUBGROUP ADDRESSES WAYS TO EFFECTIVELY ORGANIZE THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES.

IN JANUARY, 1986, A JOINT INDUSTRY GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED TO LOOK AT IMPORTANT ISSUES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION (TIM).

THE TIM GROUP IS COMPRISED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANUFACTURERS AND CARRIERS AND OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DEFENSE AND JUSTICE, THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION AND FEMA. THE GROUP IS CO-CHAIRLED BY THE NATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY.

FOR THE PAST YEAR, THE TIM GROUP HAS FOCUSED ON SEVEN ISSUES:

- PERSONNEL STATUS, PROTECTION, AND RELOCATION
- MAINTENANCE OF STOCKPILES AND INVENTORIES
- DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES
- GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
- DEPENDENCE ON OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS  
(ELECTRICITY, TRANSPORTATION, ETC.)

- 10 -

- TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE SURGE REQUIREMENTS
- JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES (FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL)

FINAL REPORTS ON THE FIRST FOUR ISSUE AREAS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND WORK IS CONTINUING ON THE LAST THREE ISSUE AREAS.

IN LATE JUNE, FEMA HOSTED AN INTERAGENCY MEETING ON PREPAREDNESS FOR WATER SUPPLY EMERGENCIES WITH THE U.S. ARMY CORP OF ENGINEERS (USACOE), ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), AND THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (USGS). THE MEETING WAS REQUESTED BY THE WATER, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. THE MEETING FOCUSED ON THE VULNERABILITY OF PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS AND THE NEED TO IMPROVE OUR PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONDING TO DISRUPTIVE EMERGENCIES AND ON NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCIES AND THE RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THESE AGENCIES AND THE COUNCIL'S WATER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD TO PURSUE WATER PLANNING WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.

HAVING MENTIONED HOW WE DEAL WITH THE PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM WE WOULD LIKE TO NOTE FEMA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S KEY ASSET PROTECTION PROGRAM (KAPP). THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PROGRAM IS TO DEVELOP AND PROMOTE THE SECURITY OF KEY ASSETS WITHIN THE U.S. TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS BY PROVIDING TO THE OWNERS OR MANAGERS OF SUCH ASSETS APPROPRIATE ADVICE, GUIDANCE AND PLANNING ASSISTANCE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MEASURES. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH ASSISTANCE IS TO ENCOURAGE OWNERS AND CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO PROTECT KEY ASSETS FROM SABOTAGE, ESPIONAGE, AND OTHER HOSTILE OR DESTRUCTIVE ACTS, AND TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECT OF ATTACK DAMAGE.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM INCLUDING THE COMPILATION OF THE KEY ASSET LIST HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO THE U. S. FORCES COMMAND (FORSCOM) AT FORT MCPHERSON, GA. WE NOTE THAT MILITARY FACILITIES ARE NOT INCLUDED ON THE LIST. PROTECTION OF THESE FACILITIES IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY COMMANDERS.

FEMA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THIS PROGRAM STEMS FROM A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT SIGNED AUGUST 15, 1988, IN WHICH FEMA HAS AGREED TO COORDINATE NOMINATIONS FOR THE KEY ASSET LIST FROM OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES AND PROVIDE THIS INPUT TO FORSCOM.

AS A RELATED MATTER, WE WOULD LIKE TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO A LETTER THE DIRECTOR FORWARDED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL JULY 26, 1988, CALLING HIS ATTENTION TO THE SHIFT IN PHYSICAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES CONTAINED IN THE REVISED E. O. 11490, AND RECOMMENDING THAT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ) CHAIR AN INTERAGENCY GROUP WITH PLANNING/OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ASSET PROTECTION PROGRAM. DOJ HAS SUBSEQUENTLY CONCURRED WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION AND DELEGATED THE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FBI.

WITH RESPECT TO DEALING WITH THE PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM, TITLE I OF THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT, PRIORITIES SUPPORT CAN BE AUTHORIZED TO OBTAIN THE NEEDED MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT TO HELP RESTORE THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM AND TO PRIORITIZE AND ALLOCATE DELIVERY OF POWER TO DEFENSE AND ESSENTIAL CIVIL USERS.

NATIONAL EMERGENCY TRAINING CENTER (NETC)

NETC SERVES AS A NATIONAL FOCAL POINT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY OF EMERGENCY MANGEMENT TRAINING TO ENHANCE EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE NETC CAMPUS OFFERS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING TOGETHER SENIOR EXPERTS FROM THE U.S. AND ABROAD TO EXAMINE CRITICAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS. THIS SHARING OF INFORMATION AND OPERATING PRACTICES BETWEEN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY (FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL), THE FIRE SERVICES, EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES AND CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNERS IS PARTICULARLY GERMANE TO CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF A TERRORIST ACT. OF PARTICULAR NOTE IN OUR TRAINING WORK IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PRACTICAL EXERCISES (CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INCIDENTS, ETC.) STRESSING HOW VARIOUS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SPECIALITIES AND LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR CAN AND SHOULD WORK TOGETHER.

IN CLOSING, FEMA'S AUTHORITIES HAVE PROVIDED A STRONG BASIS FOR THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES TO PLAN FOR, RESPOND TO, AND COORDINATE EFFORTS TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST INCIDENT. THE AGENCY'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN MOBILIZATION PLANNING IN RESPONSE AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF DISASTERS AND IN THE BUILDING OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES AT ALL LEVELS ARE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE NATION'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM.