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Soviet Economic Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: Politics in Command

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

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March 1986

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**SOVIET ECONOMIC AID
TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
POLITICS IN COMMAND**

Information available as of 29 January 1986 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved for publication on 3 March 1986 by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

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
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Figure 1
Soviet Economic and Military Aid Extended to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1959-84



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KEY JUDGMENTS

We believe that over the next five years Moscow will allot most of its African economic aid to self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist states—such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique—with enough going to other “socialist-oriented” countries (particularly Guinea and Mali) to protect Soviet economic and political equities. Historically, 70 percent of Moscow’s African aid pledges have gone to Marxist client and socialist countries. These states are also Moscow’s principal military aid recipients in Africa. In our view, Soviet economic assistance will remain a useful supplement to Soviet military assistance, Moscow’s principal tool for expanding and entrenching Soviet interests in Africa (military commitments outstrip economic pledges by almost 3 to 1).

Despite the seriously deteriorating economic conditions in most of these recipient states, Soviet economic aid has been relatively small.¹ The \$4.6 billion in economic aid pledged by the Soviets since 1959 is by no quantitative measure competitive with Western programs, which have delivered—on more concessional terms—more than \$100 billion in food, technical services, and project assistance. Moscow has failed to come to the aid in a significant way even of Ethiopia, its principal African client, during the country’s ongoing food crisis.

Despite the small size of Soviet economic aid, these programs nonetheless are often high-profile influence builders and contain remarkably few real costs since 90 percent are credits. The programs are very useful instruments for both short- and long-term advancement of Soviet interests, promoting bilateral economic ties and dependence on Soviet advisers and equipment. They also provide a cover for intelligence activities and, through the scholarship program, a truly long-term “seeding” effort for future subversion. In addition, much of Soviet economic aid carries tangible economic returns to the USSR, supplying important commodities and some hard currency payments for often inferior Soviet goods and services.

For example, economic aid has given the Soviets political or financial rewards at low cost by:

- Increasing access to African governments and societies through the provision of Soviet advisers, doctors, and teachers in 25 countries. In 1984 Moscow maintained over 9,000 technicians

¹ This paper does not discuss East European or Cuban economic aid programs, which are of lesser magnitude and essentially parallel Soviet economic assistance to Africa and support Soviet regional goals.

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on the continent. In Soviet client states, such as Angola and Ethiopia, the USSR has achieved direct access to domestic policymakers, allowing it to influence day-to-day operations of the economy and to formulate development plans.

- Adding Soviet-trained personnel to the ranks of African elites through academic scholarships. Since the late 1950s, more than 45,000 students from almost every state in Africa have attended Soviet universities. We estimate that Moscow still recruits up to one-third of its African scholarship holders without the knowledge of their home governments.
- Obtaining sources of strategic and other commodities. Moscow imports substantial amounts of bauxite from a Soviet-aided project in Guinea that underwrites at least one-fourth of Soviet domestic alumina production. The Soviet Union also supports its fishing catch with 2 million tons annually from African coastal waters under fisheries agreements with 17 states.
- Generating hard currency and opening new markets for Soviet products. Less than 10 percent of Moscow's African aid has consisted of grants. The remainder has been in the form of credits that are repayable over 10 to 12 years at 2 to 5 percent interest, often in hard currency. Payments for Soviet technicians also bring in hard currency earnings to Moscow. In addition, equipment sales to Africa have increased tenfold over the last decade to more than \$500 million annually, and Moscow is projected to earn nearly \$1.2 billion in hard currency for equipment to the Ajaokuta steel mill in Nigeria, a "red elephant" unlikely ever to produce steel profitably.

On the other hand, economic aid has not produced unalloyed benefits for Moscow:

- In the wake of an increasingly desperate economic environment, Africans have become more vocal in their criticism of the small size and poor quality of Soviet aid.
- Most African governments are wary of the political and subversive content of the Soviet academic program and attempt to limit student exposure to it.
- There is little evidence that Soviet proselytizing has been successful with a large number of African students. Soviet education and training tend to generate an aversion to the Soviet system among most African students.

Moscow's economic aid program is not designed to provide help to struggling African nations but to enhance Moscow's own economic and political standing. The Soviet Union will continue to try to maximize

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the political impact of its small effort by relying heavily on academic scholarships and technical assistance. We believe low-cost exchanges will dominate the program and account for the bulk of Soviet aid to most African aid recipients.

In our view, Moscow's future economic assistance to nonsocialist African states will largely be limited to situations that offer opportunities for concrete economic or political returns. The Soviet Union will be alert for chances to invest in oil-producing states—such as Nigeria—and in countries that produce strategic minerals. Moscow will also be prepared to offer economic assistance to help it establish closer relations with Zimbabwe, a country that is attractive to the Soviet Union because of its extensive mineral resources, potentially compatible leadership, and proximity to South Africa.

Nevertheless, we doubt that large new economic aid agreements with African states are in the offing, except possibly to Moscow's closest and most beset clients, or to make a breakthrough in Soviet relations with a strategically important country, such as Zimbabwe. The USSR will remain unwilling to commit sizable resources for uncertain political payoffs. For their part, African leaders are aware of the ineffectiveness and niggardliness of Soviet economic aid and will almost certainly continue to look first to the West for required assistance. We believe African leaders will also continue to apply for Soviet economic aid, regardless of its drawbacks.

Moscow's failure to provide adequate economic support to its African clients has several implications for the United States:

- Moscow, in most cases, will not discourage its major aid recipients from seeking Western assistance so long as these states remain politically aligned with the Soviet Union and dependent on Soviet military assistance.
- The leaders of major Soviet client states—for example, the Marxist regimes in Angola and Ethiopia—are unlikely to distance themselves ideologically from Moscow over the issue of economic aid because of their dependence on Soviet and Cuban military and security assistance, but the deficiencies in Soviet economic aid could provide the United States with some limited opportunities to enhance its influence with socialist African states disillusioned with the USSR. For example, states that once looked predominantly to Moscow for aid such as Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, and Mozambique have already begun to distance themselves in varying degrees from the Soviet Union.

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— To free such countries of their Soviet entanglements, Western countries would have to supplant Moscow's military supplier and advisory role, in addition to pouring billions of dollars annually into their economies. We believe, however, that the Marxist client states would be reluctant to fully replace Soviet with Western assistance even if given a choice.



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DISCUSSION

1. This paper analyzes the main trends in Soviet economic assistance² to Sub-Saharan Africa and estimates the most likely course of such aid over the next five years.³ As in other areas, the African economic program has been used largely to support political allies and promote Soviet trade flows, rather than to foster the orderly development of African economies. Soviet economic aid to Africa has included the provision of goods and technical services on credit or free of charge, as well as an extensive scholarship program that provides free academic and technical training to African students. Although the Kremlin has placed increasing emphasis on its military program in Africa since the mid-1970s—military aid commitments have outstripped economic pledges by almost 3 to 1 (see figure 2)—Soviet economic aid continues to be useful for its recipients, given Africa's serious economic needs and the high visibility attached to foreign economic assistance projects. [redacted]


2. Moscow's basic objectives in Africa are similar to longstanding Soviet goals elsewhere in the Third World:

- To erode Western and Chinese influence and substitute its own.
- To promote the creation of Marxist regimes closely allied with the USSR and to protect those regimes, especially from internal opposition.
- To gain access to air and naval facilities.
- To obtain selected strategic raw materials for the USSR and its allies and to achieve a capability over the long term to disrupt vital Western access to strategic raw materials.

² Economic assistance includes grants and credits with repayment terms of five or more years that fit international definitions of concessional aid because of low interest rates or other soft terms. Much of Soviet aid is in the form of supplier credits, which, while meeting the above criteria, are in actuality less concessional than most Western bilateral assistance. [redacted]

³ This paper does not discuss East European or Cuban economic aid programs, which are of lesser magnitude and essentially parallel Soviet economic assistance to Africa and support Soviet regional goals. [redacted]

Figure 2
USSR: Economic and Military Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1959-84



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- To earn hard currency through equipment sales and other programs. [redacted]

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Allocation of Aid: A Political Process

3. Soviet political and ideological considerations generally have outweighed economic criteria in determining which African countries receive Soviet aid (see table 1). Several factors have accounted for this approach over time:

- Decolonization, political ferment, and the rise of liberation movements on the continent created many newly independent and uncommitted states susceptible to Soviet influence.
- As the self-proclaimed leader of the international Communist movement, Moscow has been determined to steer African political and economic development in Soviet-approved directions to forestall Chinese ideological leadership.

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Table 1
USSR: Economic Aid Agreements
With Sub-Saharan Africa

Million US \$


	Total	Marxist/Socialist States	Non-Socialist States
Total	4,645	3,175	1,470
1959-79	2,560	1,125	1,435
1980	330	330	
1981	155	150	5
1982	745	745	
1983	310	290	20
1984	545	535	10

Table 2
USSR: Economic Aid to
Sub-Saharan Africa,
Extended and Drawn, 1959-84

Million US \$

Recipient	Extended	Drawn
Total ^a	4,645	2,215
Angola	563	43
Benin	15	4
Burkina	6	3
Cameroon	8	6
Cape Verde	8	3
Central Africa Republic	3	3
Chad	5	3
Congo	74	34
Equatorial Guinea	2	2
Ethiopia	1,290	558
Gambia	2	NEGL.
Ghana	110	41
Guinea	399	223
Guinea Bissau	37	30
Kenya	49	4
Liberia	NEGL.	NEGL.
Madagascar	85	28
Mali	137	105
Mauritius	13	2
Mozambique	220	95
Niger	2	2
Nigeria	1,207	521
Rwanda	1	1
Sao Tome and Principe	NA	
Senegal	8	8
Seychelles	29	7
Sierra Leone	34	4
Somalia	164	101
Sudan	65	32
Tanzania	44	22
Togo	NEGL.	NEGL.
Uganda	35	16
Zambia	30	13

Figure 3
USSR: Economic and Military Agreements With
Sub-Saharan Africa by Major Recipient, 1954-84




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— Most countries have not met Moscow's economic criteria for a large-scale program. There have been few opportunities to market Moscow's traditional large public-sector undertakings because of the low level of development in Africa. At the same time, most African countries do not have the hard currency and resources that Moscow usually demands as repayment for Soviet projects.

4. Consequently, Soviet aid recipients in Africa have predominantly been states that are socialist oriented by Moscow's standards. Since 1959, socialist-oriented countries have accounted for almost 70 percent of the USSR's aid commitments in Africa (see figure 3 and table 2).

^a Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

5. In the 1980s the USSR's African economic aid recipients fall into several groups of varying interest to Moscow:



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
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


through deliveries to the Nigerian steel plant. Moscow's aid effort compares with some \$100 billion in assistance delivered to Africa by Western countries and multilateral organizations over the same period (see figure 4) 

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Figure 4
USSR and Western Economic Commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1959-84



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7. Most African states cannot effectively use and are not able to support the huge processing and manufacturing complexes and giant hydropower schemes that have traditionally been the USSR's aid specialties. Because of this inability of African countries to absorb most Soviet aid, the sectoral distribution of Moscow's aid to Africa has deviated somewhat from Soviet programs in other areas (see figure 5). Whereas the Soviets previously had not made much agricultural assistance available to African countries, Moscow has recently begun to engage in large-scale agricultural development programs. 

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The Economic Aid Program: Still a Limited Effort

6. Over nearly three decades, the USSR has extended only about \$4.6 billion in economic aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, 15 percent of its \$30 billion in commitments to the non-Communist developing world. Only about \$2.2 billion of the aid extended has been drawn down, about the same ratio as in other areas. Disbursements over time have averaged less than \$100 million annually—less than one-twentieth of 1 percent of Soviet GNP—although in the past four years they have increased by \$250 to \$300 million annually


8. A sectoral distribution of Soviet assistance shows that:

- Heavy industry, power, and multipurpose projects have absorbed only 60 percent of the allocations to Africa.
- Budgetary support and basic needs projects have accounted for 15 percent of the pledges to Africa.

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Figure 5
USSR: Sectorial Distribution of Economic Aid, 1959-84



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— Agricultural assistance has reached an unprecedented 17 percent of Soviet assistance to Africa, largely because of new Soviet credits to Ethiopia for agricultural development. [Redacted]

9. In spite of the relatively high proportion of budgetary and public services aid in the African program, Moscow has provided almost no relief aid, particularly food, to African countries. The Soviet program suffers particularly in comparison with the US effort: in the 1980s Moscow has on average provided less than \$5 million annually for relief assistance compared with the \$270 million average in food aid that the United States has delivered annually to Africa (see table 3). Moscow has failed to come to the aid in a significant way of even Ethiopia, its principal African client, during the country's ongoing food crisis. Even with the world's attention focused on Ethiopia's severe economic crisis, the USSR provided only \$6 million in food and medical assistance last year, compared with \$950 million from Western sources. We do not foresee any substantial improvement in the Soviet relief aid performance through the end of the decade. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Table 3 *Million US \$*
United States and USSR: Food Aid Disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa

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	United States *	USSR
Total	2,840	52
1954-70	590	1
1971	55	
1972	45	
1973	40	3
1974	110	13
1975	105	7
1976	95	4
1977	110	3
1978	160	2
1979	180	4
1980	285	3
1981	315	1
1982	205	5
1983	230	3
1984	315	3

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
sive purposes.



Figure 6
USSR: Economic Credits and Grants, 1954-84


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US \$30.0 Billion



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11. Soviet economic aid has not been provided on generous terms. Less than 10 percent of African aid has consisted of grants (see figure 6), although grants have become a somewhat more important component (\$260 million) over the past five years. Much of this has been taken up by price subsidies on crude oil to Ethiopia and has not burdened the Soviet economy. The remainder of the aid has been in the form of credits that are repayable over 10 to 12 years at 2 to 5 percent interest, often in hard currency. In comparison, almost half of Western assistance has come in the form of grants, while most Western credits are repayable over 30 years at 3 percent interest. In most cases, Moscow does not provide turnkey services (including funding of local costs and management of all phases of project construction) that African states need to assure successful implementation and operation of projects.




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have balked at adding extra burdens to their overextended economy.

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12. Moscow may find the terms of its African aid program easing by default, however, as major recipients seek debt relief for their increasingly troubled economies and request extended periods for repayment. Until now, however, the burden for African states has been manageable. Scheduled economic aid repayments to the Soviet Union from Africa (excluding Nigeria) total only \$65 million annually; only Ethiopia has rescheduled. Nigeria, which currently is repaying \$100 million annually, may be forced to seek rescheduling in the next few years.



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13. **The Economic Impact.** In the early days of independence, African states that had adopted socialist systems expected Soviet assistance to replace funding that they had formerly received from metropole countries; 25 years of limited assistance have conditioned most African countries to the realities of Soviet aid.

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14. For Moscow's major clients, which have troubled economies and deteriorating infrastructure, the lack of Soviet support is more difficult to reconcile. While orienting their economic, political, and military structures along Soviet lines, these countries expected the USSR to make a major contribution to their considerable economic needs. Soviet leaders, however,

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
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Soviet Views on Client Economic Interaction With the West

Soviet academic writing on the economics of socialist-oriented states—the theoretical category into which all of their African clients fall—and the role of Western aid in their development shows that several different schools of thought exist on this issue:

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— A few Soviet theorists have argued that economic interaction with the West will inevitably promote neocolonialist dependency and the eventual subjugation of socialist-oriented states and thus have advocated the elimination of ties with the “capitalist way of production and exchange” as soon as possible.


— At least one Soviet theorist has advocated an approach that has overtones of Lenin’s “New Economic Policy” of the 1920s. This would involve basing national development on agricultural growth and avoiding “left extremist” policies of nationalization, forced industrialization, and detachment from Western aid and trade. The economy would presumably take on a more socialist form at some unspecified time in the future, following the creation of an adequate economic base.

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— Most recent discussion has been dominated by the view that trading with and accepting aid from the West is an unavoidable necessity for socialist-oriented states in a “complex world economy,” especially in view of Moscow’s frequent statements on the limits of Soviet economic largess. Some theoreticians have worried that this could lead to gains in political influence for the West at the expense of the Soviets, while others have expressed confidence that, as long as proper political control was maintained by the Third World government, the country’s socialist orientation would not be in jeopardy.


Outlook

36. In the past, Soviet leadership changes have had a dramatic impact on Moscow’s economic aid policy. After Stalin’s death, the flamboyant Khrushchev fashioned a program that featured large commitments to a few recipients designed to establish Moscow’s legitimacy as a major actor in the Third World. Many of these agreements were never fulfilled. Following Khrushchev’s fall, the more conservative Brezhnev-Kosygin regime made major revisions in the program that deeply cut assistance to Africa. The Soviets became more cautious in allocating funds to large projects; the stability of the recipient and the viability of the project were major criteria. 


This question remains one of the more “wide open” subjects in Soviet international relations theory, and no one line has yet emerged as a guide to official views and policy. 

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37. The younger and more dynamic Gorbachev probably will have the time and the political clout to reshape the Soviet aid program if he deems it necessary. Nevertheless, in our view, given Gorbachev’s domestic economic considerations, it is unlikely that the pattern of Soviet economic assistance to Africa will change dramatically. The program is heavily focused on Marxist states that cannot be abandoned for political and strategic reasons. Although the Kremlin would no doubt like to minimize the amount of assistance

provided these countries, it does not want to give the impression that it is letting its Marxist allies down, and we cannot rule out major new economic commitments to its closest African allies. 

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42. Gaining political access and influence will remain the overriding objective of the Soviet aid program in Africa. The USSR's recent performance in Ethiopia underscores the intent of the program. It is not designed to provide help to struggling African nations, but to enhance Moscow's own economic and political standing. The Kremlin will try to maximize the political impact of its small effort by relying heavily on academic scholarships and technical assistance. These low-cost exchanges will dominate the program and comprise the bulk of Soviet aid to most of the USSR's African aid recipients. [Redacted]

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Implications for the United States

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44. To free such countries of their Soviet entanglements, Western countries would have to supplant Moscow's military supplier and advisory role in addition to pouring billions of dollars annually into their economies. We believe, however, that the Marxist client states would be reluctant to fully replace Soviet with Western assistance even if given a choice. [Redacted]

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ANNEX

The Early Years Revisited

1. The USSR launched its economic aid program in Africa during the first wave of decolonization in the late 1950s when opportunities arose for Moscow to establish ties with newly independent countries eager to break with former colonial powers. From its first agreement with Guinea in 1959, and continuing into the early 1960s, economic aid served as the USSR's principal instrument to gain influence with emerging African states. Moscow extended nearly \$500 million in economic assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa from 1959 to 1964 and only \$50 million in military aid, a pattern that corresponded with African desires to reorganize their economies along socialist lines and to break their economic dependence on the West. In the early years, Moscow focused on radical regimes in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, which some Soviet theorists deemed likely to follow the "noncapitalist path of development." These "revolutionary democracies" received more than half of the USSR's economic commitments to Africa through the late 1960s []

2. The sense of euphoria generated by rapid political change, however, led to exaggerated expectations on both sides concerning the role of Soviet aid as a catalyst for African economic development and as a foundation for Soviet influence on the continent. Moscow expected political dividends to flow automatically from economic assistance and overlooked the intricacies of providing meaningful development programs for countries whose economic futures depended on significant inputs of funding, modern agrotechnology, top-quality expertise, and guaranteed export markets. The USSR's assistance was often inappropriate and wasteful. Moscow assigned economic aid haphazardly with little concern for its viability, allocating large umbrella credits to cover a wide range of agricultural, industrial, geological, and prestige projects, such as stadiums and hotels. Few projects were

properly appraised before they were started; many were subject to long delays or never completed. Soviet miscalculations were exacerbated by Africa's weak economic infrastructure, made worse by the precipitous withdrawal of colonial administrators and technicians, a shortage of local skilled workers and managers, stagnation of Western markets, and political instability. The overthrow of friendly regimes in Ghana and Mali in the mid-1960s demonstrated the program's failure to guarantee political control for Moscow. []

3. By the mid-1960s, the Soviet bureaucracy was questioning the utility of economic aid to the Third World. The fall of Khrushchev and subsequent demands for a more conservative aid policy resulted in the elimination of umbrella credits, more care in studying project feasibility, and a more precise tailoring of projects to African needs and Soviet interests. The new pragmatic aid approach signaled a Soviet retrenchment in Africa. After 1964, average annual commitments fell by 25 percent to about \$50 million a year for the succeeding decade, and Africa's share in total Soviet assistance packages declined even more. The Kremlin's only significant aid agreement over the next 15 years was for a mining project in Guinea, which secured Moscow a 30-year supply of 2.5 million tons of bauxite annually. []

4. By the mid-1970s economic aid had been relegated to a distant second place as the USSR rapidly concluded more easily implemented military transfer agreements to gain favor with new Marxist regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. For these states combined, military aid offers averaged almost \$1 billion per year from 1975 to 1979, while economic extensions averaged less than \$60 million annually. During the 1980s, however, the Soviets stepped up their commitments in response to increasing pressures from these states. []

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Table 6 *Million US \$*
USSR: Economic Aid Extended to Sub-Saharan Africa,
by Recipient and Year

Recipient	1959-75	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	Total
Total	1,007.3	126.0	63.9	13.4	1,350.9	328.4	154.7	746.2	309.8	544.4	4,645.0
Angola		50.5	10.5	1.6	0.1			450.0		50.1	562.8
Benin	5.3		0.5		4.6		4.2				14.6
Burkina	5.7			0.1						0.1	4.9
Cameroon	8.0										8.0
Cape Verde				2.5	5.3		0.2			0.1	8.1
Central Africa Republic	3.2	1.0									3.3
Chad	5.0										5.0
Congo	45.9					0.1	28.0				74.0
Equatorial Guinea	1.6							0.6			2.2
Ethiopia	104.4		25.0	1.9	140.2	188.8	62.2	232.0	266.5	268.5	1,289.5
Gambia	2.3										2.3
Ghana	93.0		1.0				1.3	10.5	0.1	4.1	110.0
Guinea	231.7		0.8			3.3				163.2	399.0
Guinea Bissau	0.5	20.6					0.4	15.1			36.6
Kenya	48.7										48.7
Liberia						0.1					0.1
Madagascar	13.4	1.0		5.9		50.0		5.6		9.0	84.9
Mali	88.8		2.1	1.0	0.7	0.6	6.2	22.5		14.9	136.8
Mauritius	5.0									7.9	12.9
Mozambique	14.0	45.3	5.0			85.5	45.0	4.6	17.3	3.7	220.4
Niger	2.1			0.2							2.3
Nigeria	7.2				1,200.0						1,207.2
Rwanda	1.0										1.0
Sao Tome and Principe		NA									NA
Senegal	7.6		0.5								8.1
Seychelles				0.2					6.0	22.5	28.7
Sierra Leone	28.0	5.0					1.5				34.5
Somalia	161.0	3.5									164.5
Sudan	64.8										64.8
Tanzania	20.0		18.5					5.3			43.8
Togo										0.3	0.3
Uganda	23.9								11.0		34.9
Zambia	15.2						5.7		8.9		29.8

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