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Washington, D. C. 20505	P&PD	
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE		
08 May 1987		
China: Reassessing the Role of Foreign Ted	chnology	25 X 1
SUMMARY		
After several years of rapidly—and haphazardly Western technology, Beijing is reassessing the role of China's industrial modernization. Growing concerns all ineffective use, and disruptions in some fledgling inductorer scrutiny and tighter controls over the acquisition and know—how. These changes will probably, over time Chinese industrial capabilities and export competitiven Beijing will be more selective in importing technology, opportunities remain bright in some sectors.	such technology in bout costs, stries have led to on of both equipment ne, strengthen ess. Although	25 X 1
This memorandum was prepared by Off Information available as of 8 May 1987 was used in its prepared of the Chief, Trade China Division, OEA		25X1 25X1


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Emerging	Problems			
Thre China's mod		npted Beijing to rea	ssess the role of	foreign technology in
techi holdi Acco than and mass	nology imports c ngs from \$17 bil ording to Chinese a hundred color refrigerator assel sive expenditures	contributed to the of Ilion in December of a press reports, Chi television product mbly lines. Many of	framatic drop in C 1984 to \$10.5 billic inese traders, for e ion lines and doze of these deals con	elicate and unnecessar china's foreign exchang on in December 1986. example, imported mor ens of washing machin nmitted China to uture in order to impor
repo being	rts last year indic g used effectively		raction of the impeared such as con	y publicized Chinese orted equipment was mputers,
their while addit fact	products cannot eat the same t tional surplus pro	t compete with low imepurchases of oduction capacity. e foreign-equippe <u>d</u>	ver priced, higher duplicate product The Chinese pres	are strapped because quality imported good tion lines have created s has also criticized the have kept China
New Initia	tives			
technology, benefits fro foreign tech and technol competitive	but rather to red m the technology nnology, if put to logical advancem	duce unnecessary ly it must import (so good use, provide nent. China also vi narkets, as well as	purchases and find ee figure 1). Beiji es a cost-effective ews foreign techn	expenditures on foreig d ways to increase the ng still believes that shortcut to industrial ology as vital to its ntually substituting
by Brazil ar	d India to protec	ct their infant elect South Korea, which	ronics industries have nearly elimi	n the legislation adopt -yet more stringent th nated government ment and export grow

Figure 1
China: Technology Imports by Central Authorities, 1979–86*



* Data from China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade reflect contracts staned. not actual shipments. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/15: CIA-RDP90T00114R000200390001-4

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China has implemented a combination of direct administrative controls, economic levers, and worker and manager incentives to control the purchase and improve the use of foreign technology, and to encourage greater use of domestic technologies. Beijing has, for example:	
 Centralized import decisionmaking, and charged industrial ministries with checking domestic availability to ensure imports are not redundant. 	
 Issued regulations linking equipment purchases to transfers of know-how, and offered preferential treatment to foreign partners that help China produce for export. 	
 Encouraged trade corporations and factories to seek the advice of technical consultants and to use feasibility studies. 	
 Raised tariffs and cut domestic prices to shore up sales of domestically produced goods and to protect infant industries. 	
 Sponsored technology exhibits and fairs to make Chinese buyers aware of indigenous technologies that could substitute for foreign ones. 	25 X 1
Beijing Debates Technology Import Policies	
In the aftermath of Hu Yaobang's dismissal, Chinese reformers and conservatives have deepened their debate over issues related to economic policy. China's "open door" to Western technology could become one of the focal points for challenges to recent reform policies.	25 X 1
Throughout 1986, even when reformers generally had the upper hand, Chinese officials expressed differing opinions on the merits and drawbacks of foreign technology, as well as on the policies most likely to yield maximum economic benefits from technology introduction. The debate has centered on several issues:	
o To make or buy technologies.	
o To centralize import decisionmaking or to increase the factory voice in the decisionmaking process.	
o To regulate imports by administrative means, or through greater use of market mechanisms.	
o To direct purchases toward mature sectors such as textiles and machine building or to high-tech industries such as electronics.	

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o To purchase state-of	-the-art or less advanced but more easily assimilated
items.	
indigenously developed tec and greater use of adminis and stronger emphasis on assimilated technologies for probably meet the requirer however, have also promo mechanisms to regulate te technology use, greater in	chnologies and equipment, closer central supervision strative mechanisms to regulate technology imports, less sophisticated but possibly more easily or backbone industries. Soviet technology would ments of many Chinese conservatives. Reformers, ted their policies, which include greater use of market schnology import choices and to encourage effective volvement by factory-level decisionmakers, and publisticated Western technology for high-tech
emphasis on imports of so industries.	phisticated Western technology for high-tech
nd in improving technology u	ress in rationalizing technology import decisionmaking se to be gradual. Bureaucratic boundaries—both
We expect China's prog nd in improving technology u rovincial and ministerial—will	ress in rationalizing technology import decisionmaking se to be gradual. Bureaucratic boundaries—both continue to result in duplicate or unnecessary purchases al personnel, energy supplies, raw materials, spare parts,
We expect China's prog nd in improving technology u rovincial and ministerial—will loreover, shortages of technic nd funds will continue to hind Nonetheless, we believe acidence of duplicate imports omestically. Some successes	ress in rationalizing technology import decisionmaking se to be gradual. Bureaucratic boundaries—both continue to result in duplicate or unnecessary purchases cal personnel, energy supplies, raw materials, spare parts, der technology absorption. The that China will, over time, substantially reduce the and the purchase of equipment China can supply are already evident. Last year, for example, China's
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technolog packaging exports— than impe these sec technolog	e believe the sectors likely to benefit most from improved use of foreign gy are textiles, food processing, household appliances, consumer electronics, g, metallurgy, printing, and plastics. Because Beijing is aggressively promoting and favors technology imports for projects that will generate exports rather rove production solely for the domestic market—we expect Chinese goods in ctors to be increasingly competitive in international markets. Foreign gy will help China improve quality control and upgrade packaging, factors that ted China's penetration of many export markets.	25X1
O	Barriers to Technology Assimilation The vertical structure of Chinese industry continues to make it difficult for users of imported technology to obtain needed raw materials, components, trained managerial and technical personnel, and energy supplies controlled by other ministries or by the Academy of Sciences. Calls for increased "horizontal linkages" between factories, and between enterprises and research units show Beijing's awareness of the bureaucratic barriers that now exist, but Beijing continues to have difficulty implementing the concept.	
o	Too few skilled technical personnel are available to handle the difficult task of assimilating foreign technology. Although links with universities and research institutes are growing as a result of Beijing's encouragement of domestic trade in technology, we believe that progress has been slow, and that few factories have hired technical consultants to work specifically on assimilation of foreign technology.	
o	Insufficient funds for the assimilation phase. Most allocations for technology imports do not provide a cushion for maintenance or repair services, additional training, or spare parts purchases after installation, Chinese proponents of such funding changes argue that Japan spends five to seven times more to assimilate	25X1

Consequences for Technology Suppliers

Despite Beijing's attempts to cut back duplicate purchases, many foreign technology suppliers will find improved opportunities to sell to China during the current Five-Year Plan (1986-90). Overall spending on foreign technology is slated to increase, accelerating in the latter years of the plan. The focal areas for technology import will be the energy, transport, telecommunications, raw materials processing, textile, light industry, machine-building, and electronics sectors. We also expect China to make greater use of foreign experts to conduct feasibility studies, consult on technology


an imported technology than to acquire it initially.

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of fo for ti forei buyii	ort needs, and provide managerial and financial advice. We believe that the shortage reign exchange will prove to be the limiting factor on China's technology imports the remainder of the decade. Chinese buyers will probably look for ways to acquire gn technology without making large outlays of foreign exchange—for example, and used equipment or the rights to dated technology processes, or leasing	05.
equi	pment instead of purchasing it.	25X
supp such gove	Beijing's new policies will probably create additional layers of bureaucracy with m foreign suppliers must negotiate, prolonging negotiations. Foreign technology diers also will face greater pressure to engage in cooperative production projects, as joint ventures and license agreements. The ability to provide ernment-backed concessional financing—already a decisive factor—will become easingly important to foreign firms selling technology to China.	25X
State also	Beijing will continue to find technology from Western Europe and the United es more desirable than that from Japan, in our judgment, but the Soviet Union is emerging as an important source of China's technology (see figure 2):	
	 We expect the US share of China's technology imports at least to stabilize—and probably to increase—over the next five years. US firms will benefit from policies linking equipment purchases to cooperative production, but will face keen competition from European firms, which often include attractive financing with their bids to supply equipment and production technology. 	
	 The market position of West European technology suppliers will remain strong. In the last three years, West German and French suppliers have won several large contracts on the basis of favorable technology and financing packages, a trend we expect to continue. West European suppliers have also benefited from Beijing's desire to diversify sources of technology, and reduce dependence on Japan and the United States. 	
	 Japan's share of China's technology purchases will probably continue to erode for the next few years, as China's central trade corporations enforce Beijing's instructions to direct imports away from Japan—a policy first formulated in 1985 out of frustration with a ballooning trade deficit and the relatively low level of Japanese investment, Japanese sales figures will also begin to reflect China's suspension of imports of consumer goods production lines through 1990 and the effect of the yen's appreciation. 	25X
	• The Soviet Union's share of China's technology imports rose sharply in 1986 and will probably continue to grow over the next few years, as Beijing and Moscow implement a July 1985 agreement on technical cooperation, and as China's interest in acquiring technology through barter—rather than with hard-currency expenditures—grows. Most of the 24 projects covered by the 1985 agreement are in the energy or heavy industry sectors; Beijing welcomes Soviet assistance in energy because Soviet technology is relatively advanced, and for heavy industry because it is a sector that Western investors generally avoid. Most of the joint projects under consideration involve renovation of sites built with Soviet	

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Figure 2
China's Major Technology Suppliers, 1983–86



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