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What Should NATO Do About Conventional Weapons?

ET & the Defense Ministers

by Benjamin F. Schemmer

The annual spring meeting of NATO defense ministers held this May dealt with several important items: 1) cruise missile deployments in the Netherlands; 2) the NATO infrastructure budget; and 3) the armament directors' recommendation on new conventional weapons and sensor systems, the so-called "emerging technologies"—"ET," as they have come to be labeled. The defense ministers gave priority to the development of ET weapons and systems that, in their minds, could be deployed by 1990 or soon afterward.

Many people would like to know exactly which items were approved. Inquiries at the Pentagon about the approved list of 11 items were met with the answer that it was "still classified."

The best description of the intent of the US-proposed program comes from Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Perle and staff point out that the US ET proposals address four principal mission areas: 1) defense against first-echelon forces; 2) the attack of follow-on forces; 3) counter-air; and 4) command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I). Included in the latter are methods to counter Warsaw Pact C^3I systems and electronic countermeasures.

The US is not advocating the attack of follow-on forces at the expense of dealing with forces in contact, as some critics have suggested. Indeed, the ambassadors to NATO recognized this when, on November 9th, they endorsed the so-called "Rogers Plan" for "Follow-On Forces Attack." Under it, General Bernard W. Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, envisions deep strikes into Eastern Europe with new conventional weapons, while maintaining as NATO's first priority the defeat of enemy *front*-line forces.

One of the best reports of the approved ET items came from the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies in London's Whitehall in its May '84 News Sheet #40. The only item conspicuously missing from RUSI's list was a surveillance, target acquisition, and missile tracking radar system along the lines of the US JSTARS program. Discussions here in Washington and at the Farnborough Air Show in England in September have generated the following update to RUSI's list of the 11 ET programs NATO ministers have agreed to pursue. *AFJ* is told it is "about right":

- NATO identification, friend or foe (IFF).
- Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) equipped with a terminally-guided weapon.
- Low-cost powered dispenser (LOCPOD) for use against fixed targets.
- Autonomous precision-guided munitions for 155 mm tube artillery.
- Short-range antiradiation missile (SRARM).
- Stand-off radar surveillance and target acquisition system. (This could be the US JSTARS.)
- Electronic support system—a ground-based system that can process data acquired by various sensors.
- Artillery locating system.
- A medium-range RPV for battlefield surveillance and target acquisition.
- Electronic self-protection (jamming) systems for tactical aircraft.
- Electronic warfare systems for army helicopters.

Without doubt, the NATO Allies want an IFF system. But as then USAFE Commander-in-Chief General Billy Minter indicated in his interview with the *Journal* (Jan *AFJ*), several systems are available—the UK, FRG, French, and the US have candidates—but no one can agree on the one to be chosen. We need a Solomon to figure out what to do. But it is also clear that an IFF system is not a piece of emerging technology. IFF technology is out there waiting to be purchased and installed.

ET is on the NATO list, however, when one talks about terminally-guided weapons for MLRS. First of all, five NATO countries—the US, Federal Republic of Germany, France, UK, and Italy—are planning to deploy MLRS. The US has already done so; the first battery of nine launchers was deployed by the Army in early 1983. The competition for MLRS Phase III is now under way to choose the contractors who will develop, test, and manufacture the millimeter wave radar seeker for the six submunitions each MLRS rocket will carry. This is truly ET and just the type of program that needs to be pushed.

The same should be true for LOCPOD. (In previous US incarnations, this was called the low altitude dispenser system-powered, or LADS-P, then the stand-off attack weapon, or SAW.) Several aircraft companies in the US and Europe are capable of making this weapon. What is strange, however, is that the ministers chose to give emphasis to the attack of *fixed* targets. There is absolutely no problem using LOCPOD for the attack of relocatable (moveable) targets. The present target constraints should be removed (see following article). LOCPOD can also carry terminally-guided weapons which will truly make tactical bombers extremely effective against mobile armor. Why this recommendation was not made remains a mystery. NATO's armament directors missed a great opportunity.

The best that can be learned from these deliberations on LOCPOD and everything else is that the individual nations pushed items in which they had a heavy commitment. Those items which had multinational interest ended up on the list. Once again it was proved that committees are not a place for innovation.

The NATO defense ministers also get high marks for their approval of autonomous and precision-guided weapons for tube artillery. The intent is believed by some to be broad enough to include Copperhead, and it certainly includes systems like SADARM (Search and Destroy Armor). Copperhead is certainly not "emerging" technology; it is in production.

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Reagan's reluctant ban-the-bombers

WASHINGTON — Secretary of State Shultz is leading a motley and rag-tag crew of arms negotiators to Geneva next month to renew the search for an arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union.

If the team can ultimately negotiate a meaningful treaty, it will be the crowning glory of the Reagan presidency — his legacy of peace to future generations.

But, ideologically and philosophically, the team that Shultz is heading strays all over the lot.

At least one top official — Kenneth Adelman, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency — thinks the United States might be better off without the formal treaty Reagan wants.

Adelman says in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs* that he would rather have tacit understandings with the Soviet Union, whereby each side simply reduced its nuclear forces on its own —with no treaty obligation.

"To me the most promising of innovative thoughts," Adelman writes, "is arms control through individual but (where possible) parallel policies: i.e., arms control without agreements (treaties, in particular). In simple terms, each side would take measures which enhance strategic stability and reduce nuclear weapons in consultation with each other — but not necessarily in a formalized signed agreement."

What? No treaty? How can you accuse the Russians of cheating on treaties if there is no treaty? How can you establish strict limits on Soviet weapons systems, outlaw the concealment of Soviet weapons tests or keep your own military men from costly, wild-eyed schemes to strive for imaginary nuclear superiority unless you can point to a formal, legal, binding international agreement?

But you remember Adelman. He's the guy who swore up and down that he never told the Daily News' Ken Auletta that arms control is a "sham." He denied even talking to Auletta — until Auletta produced the telephone bill that showed they had a 25-minute talk. Adelman, the nation's chief arms controller, also says it's hopeless to try to stop the militarization of space.

Another member of the negotiating team, Paul Nitze, a senior and experienced arms controller, doesn't think the Soviets know the meaning of the word "peace." In the same issue of *Foreign Affairs*, he goes into a long, nonsensical discussion of the Russian word "mir," claiming that to the Soviets "mir" really means the peace that comes with the victory of Communism.

This is balderdash. "Mir" is a pre-Soviet word. It means "peace." Now, it is true that every country would prefer to have peace on its own terms. We fought for peace in World War II—but we didn't have in mind the peace that would come from a Japanese victory. We wanted peace with an American victory. Does that mean we didn't understand the meaning of "peace?"

A third member of the negotiating team is Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense, who has courageously, manfully and sometimes single-handledly fought every single arms control agreement negotiated with the Soviet Union over the past 12 years. If there was an inverse of the Nobel Peace Prize, Richard Perle would be a hands-down winner.

Shultz has scored a bureaucratic coup in bringing all these varied voices under his control at Geneva. Perle's strength, over the years, has come from his ability to persuade his powerful patrons—first Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) and now Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger—of the validity of his views. Jackson is dead and Weinberger won't be at Geneva. Perle will be on his own.

AND SO WILL Adelman. The White House made a belated attempt to block the publication of his article, and administration officials are quick to characterize it as his "personal" view. The White House, of course, wants a formal treaty — one that President Reagan can sign in a full-scale, silver-trumpet summit meeting with TV cameras and drum rolls. It doesn't want quiet understandings, quietly arrived at.

Shultz has been given the authority to whip this team into shape. The skeptics of arms control appear to have been stripped of the nooks and crannies from which they have been able to snipe at arms control proposals. From here on in, it should all be out in the open. Maybe now they can make some progress.

WEAPONS...Continued

SADARM is not yet on firm ground in the US. The US Army is not sure it is cost-effective. Congress appropriated $8-million ($3-million reprogrammed from FY84; $5-million in FY85) for SADARM, but House-Senate Appropriations Conferees tied it to whether or not the weapon proves integral to "a satisfactory anti-armor master plan." SADARM should be continued for several reasons, chiefly because it is effective against armor while most other artillery shells are not.

The defense ministers also understood the need for target acquisition systems that can be used with tube and missile artillery, particularly artillery that will fire terminally-guided weapons. What is imagined are systems such as the US Aquila remotely piloted vehicle, the Canadian CL-227 or -289 drone, and Germany's Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm Tucan. These target acquisition systems are part of a total system capable of acquiring targets and sending relevant signals to assessment and fire control centers, which then produce instructions for firing batteries.

This integration of target acquisition and 30 km shooters is something that everyone understands. There is considerable support in NATO for going ahead with these items. They have been in the works for years and are familiar to everyone.

The same cannot be said for JSTARS, a modern surveillance and target acquisition radar. There was only an "expression of interest" in this system from NATO defense ministers, other than Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. This radar will now be carried in the US Air Force C-18 and will allow surveillance and targeting of fixed and relocatable targets out to about 100 km. European interest in the radar system will probably increase after the US has a prototype radar in operation. This will allow distinguished visitors an opportunity to see how the system performs, and then it will be easier to talk a bureaucracy into supporting a system which truly *is* ET. This is the process that led to AWACS being deployed to Europe, and it is the same process that produced support for the ground-based electronic support system.

There is no doubt that fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft need electronic warfare systems for a variety of self-protection and deceptive purposes. There is nothing new about the interest or need, however. If there is any remarkable ET, we can be sure that it will not be discussed in defense forums at low classification levels.

Anyone that is interested in an artillery locating system can buy the US Army's TPQ-35 radar. It worked splendidly in Lebanon.

Thus, the NATO defense ministers get mixed reviews for the ET decisions. Some good systems were supported, others were not. The NATO bureaucracy is not a good forum for making rapid progress. Bilateral arrangements are a much faster way of accomplishing NATO's goal of improving its conventional weapons. NATO should only be informed when key developments have been accomplished, not the other way around. ■ ☆ ■

THE WILSON CENTER / REPORTS
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CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE: CAN THEY MEET THE SOVIET THREAT?

The Center's International Security Studies Program sponsored a seminar October 30, 1984 on NATO's problems in developing an effective conventional defense in Western Europe. This has been an issue since the creation of NATO, because the Soviet Union has always had a marked superiority both in the numbers of troops deployed in Europe and in artillery and tanks. The problem has become much more severe in the last decade because of a significant expansion and modernization of Soviet equipment and because the substantial nuclear advantages enjoyed by the West until 1970 were removed with the creation of Soviet-American nuclear parity.

For the North Atlantic alliance the problem became even more acute with the increase of political debate in the Federal Republic of Germany about the nature of security. This began in the late 1970s as the Soviets initiated deployment of their intermediate-range SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, and it proceeded through the intense political and propaganda battle of 1982-83 as the alliance stood firm and insisted upon the dual course of arms-control negotiations and the deployment of missile systems equivalent to the SS-20. Despite a firm Western response to attempted Soviet coercion, significant shifts have developed in German opinion on defense questions over the last three years. According to Walter Schutze, director of the Franco-German Study Commission in Paris, there is a significant increase in the number of Germans favoring neutrality for the Federal Republic, with that group now reaching 35 percent.

A much larger proportion of Germans favor the removal of all nuclear weapons from NATO strategic arsenals or assurances that the West will never be the first to use them. This poses fundamental problems for NATO, which, through its strategy of "flexible response," has for over 15 years planned to respond to a superior Warsaw Pact conventional attack with tactical nuclear weapons.

The French in the last three years have developed an imaginative new force that promises to resolve some of the difficulties of a conventional alliance defense, said General Georges Fricaud-Chagnaud, one of the designers of the new unit. They have created a rapid mobile force of 47,000 troops called "La Force d'action rapide" (FAR), which has the dual mission of intervening in the developing world and of responding rapidly--through a helicopter-borne force--to battle in the center of Europe. This is extremely important: Since French withdrawal in 1966 from NATO's integrated military command, large questions have remained about whether and when France would participate in any conventional defense. The new FAR, created by the Socialist government of Francois Mitterrand and scheduled to be fully operational early in 1985, has the potential of putting between 15,000 and 20,000 reinforcements very quickly at the front. It also possesses a division of antitank helicopters that could be extremely effective in blunting a Soviet armored assault. But, the French make it clear, the FAR was not developed as a backdoor for reentering the integrated military command. Rather, it is an instrument of French policy that provides a flexible way of signaling early French involvement in a conventional defensive effort.

The FAR does not fully satisfy German concerns, however. It is too small a force to play a major role in stemming an assault by a superior Soviet armored

force. Moreover, it fails to deal with any of the problems at the heart of the German debate over conventional and nuclear weapons. On June 28 of this year, in a speech before the Bundestag, former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt called for an integration of French and German armed forces to greatly strengthen conventional defense. At the core of the Schmidt proposals was the suggestion that France use some of its ample manpower to field additional divisions committed to NATO and that Germany assist in the arming and funding of these divisions. Very few Germans (and not many more French) agree with Schmidt. His ideas nevertheless appear to offer militarily sound (if incomplete) solutions to some of the problems of conventional defense.

In an American set of proposals for dealing with this problem, Robert Komer, former undersecretary of defense for policy, said the challenges facing the alliance were far from impossible. He asserted that the alliance could achieve an effective conventional defense through such actions as building up a full 30-day stock of ammunition and supplies, improving air bases and air defense, establishing more rapid reinforcement capability from the United States, using improved high-technology weapons, and supporting proposals such as those put forth by Schmidt. Komer insisted that the United States would for the foreseeable future have to continue to use some nuclear weapons in its strategy, if for no other reason than to prevent a nuclear preemption by Warsaw Pact forces.

But the Germans remain extremely uncomfortable with any first use of nuclear weapons. The best way to win additional expenditures for conventional defense and restore a consensus on security questions in Germany, they believe, is for the alliance to adopt a no-first-use policy. The real solution to alliance problems, several German participants insisted, is through arms control, on which no progress can be made, they said, until there is a reduction in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Clearly, significant difficulties persist, despite efforts to address the problems and make additional compromises and commitments. European governments see no source of additional income to support expanded and improved conventional defense; Germany in particular faces a dramatic decrease in draft-age manpower for the next 10 years. The fact remains that high-technology weapons providing additional defensive capability against superior Soviet numbers are extremely expensive, and no one has yet proposed a concept for the use of tactical nuclear weapons that meets the requirements of the military situation and is also satisfactory to German and other allied opinion.

Seventh in a series of eight International Security Studies Program seminars on "Collective Security and Western Strategy." The series concluded November 28 with a session entitled "Strategic Views of Europe: U.S. and Soviet Perspectives."

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN BRAZIL: A REVISIONIST VIEW

Brazil's economy is sagging under the weight of 220 percent inflation. Its $100 billion debt is the largest in the world. Only now is it beginning to recover from its worst recession in this century. According to Latin American Program Fellow Persio Arida in a recent Center address, "Economic Stabilization in Brazil: Alternative Paths and Perspectives," it is therefore imperative that Brazil act quickly to resume growth and reduce inflation after it moves to elected government in March 1985.

A professor of economics at Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Arida argued that Brazil needed a short-term stabilization plan if it were to get back on its feet. For Brazil to "fulfill its capitalist vocation," he said, it must abandon a development model based on excessive borrowing and institute reforms

"in three critical areas: a debt reform to alleviate the external constraint on growth; a monetary reform to curb inflation; and a fiscal reform to promote social equity."

Arida offered a revisionist analysis of the Brazilian economy. He contended that Brazil's high inflation rate and huge government deficit were a product of Brazil's external debt crisis, and that it was thus unfair solely to blame domestic policies. Arida, who unlike most specialists supports debt reform, noted that half of Brazil's current inflation was due to IMF-dictated adjustment policies that resulted in trade surpluses in 1983 and 1984.

Arida proposed a monetary policy by which inflation would be brought to a standstill, thereby allowing the immediate resumption of growth and providing some room for fiscal policies that might promote social justice. He suggested that Brazil establish a new currency indexed to the price level, with the old currency freely convertible into the new one. Under his plan, the old currency would eventually disappear--along with the built-in, "inertial" inflation of the old system--without losses in output.

Arida noted that "at least in the Brazilian case, it is unnecessary to impose a recession in order to obtain a trade surplus." Moreover, he said, if the United States continues to adhere to its tight money and loose fiscal policy mix, Brazil would be forced to "decouple from the dollar and allow its exchange rate to float."

In addition, Arida argued for a fiscal reform for Brazil "that would eliminate loopholes and taxes that benefit the wealthiest segments of the population, that would tie public outlays to specific taxes to avoid misuse of public funds, that would promote revenue sharing so that states and municipalities would assume greater responsibility in the provision of public services, that would abolish intermediation taxes that increase interest rates, and that would develop policies encouraging greater use of equity in financial markets."

Fiscal reform must go hand in hand with a redefinition of public and private roles, Arida concluded. Of more immediacy, however, are monetary and debt reforms for decreasing unemployment and alleviating depression-generated social unrest and misery. These measures, he said, would allow Brazil, for the first time since 1980, to flourish once again.

Sixteenth in the Latin American Program's Economic Issues Series, this meeting was supported by the Tinker Foundation. Among those participating were William Colby, now with International Business-Government Counsellors; Peter Bell, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Thomas Glaessner, of the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors; Paul McGonagle, of the First National Bank of Chicago; and Deborah Szekely, recently named president of the Inter-American Foundation.

BRITISH-AMERICAN CONFERENCE: THE RELATIONSHIP SINCE 1945

A wide array of scholars, current and former government officials, and dignitaries from both sides of the Atlantic met at The Wilson Center September 27-29 to examine the historical record of the Anglo-American relationship since 1945.

Two lines of argument were suggested at the outset. The first was that the relationship between Great Britain and the United States had <u>not</u> been "special" in the postwar era; that to the degree it existed during the war it had been short-lived and governed by cold-blooded calculations of interest on both sides; that American toleration of British interests had always been linked to the larger

context of American global strategy.

It was asserted in response that there had been a long-standing relationship of a special kind; that the differences between the two countries had been largely due to ideology rather than interest; that the ability of the British to influence Americans had been excelled by no other nation, and possibly equalled only by the Israelis. Shared beliefs and values about the rule of law, individual rights, and the preservation of constitutional order linked the two societies. The ideological differences cutting across these shared values arose over the nature and desirability of empire, over the shape of preferred constitutional order (specifically the applicability of "federalism" to Europe), and over the use and purpose of military force.

Most agreed that the original and continuing basis of the American-British relationship remained a combination of sentiment and shared interests, particularly the long history of a shared defense of common values against a mutual threat, first Germany from 1940 to 1945, then the Soviet Union. This defense relationship formed the essential bond between the two nations, a bond facilitated by shared values, a common language, and joint World War II experiences that led to personal and institutional ties. But participants noted that there had not been a convergence of interests or a closely aligned approach to policy in the Third World. Palestine, Suez, Vietnam, China, the Yom Kippur War and subsequent oil embargo--all have caused disagreements, sometimes serious ones.

Conference participants acknowledged that multilateral instruments like NATO, the OECD, or the EEC were likely to become even more important in the future. They noted that the idea of a "special relationship" was implicitly bilateral, and could not, therefore, sustain itself in a multilateral context. As the U.S.-West German link increasingly became the crux of the NATO alliance, and as the EEC (with France at its center) became the major institution for European economic policymaking, Britain found its importance to America's policies diminished. The British entry into the Common Market formalized the multilateral context, leaving less latitude for response to American views.

That there has been "a special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain in the postwar era, most at the conference could agree; comparison to other actual relationships, such as those between the United States and Germany (or France, or Japan) made the point. But the special relationship is something that must be learned and relearned as conditions change. One can be led astray by assuming the future will be like the past. There are continuities, as the historical record of Anglo-American collaboration makes plain. But different issues face the United States, Britain, and Europe in the future. The basic task is to build upon the structures crafted by the first postwar generation and to devise new modes of European unity that will not diminish the essential vitality of NATO, the foundation of Western security since 1949.

First in a series of five conferences on "The United States, Britain, and Europe: Changed Relationships in a Changing World," organized jointly by The Wilson Center and the Ditchley Foundations, this first session's participants included Lord Beloff, of Oxford University; Sir Michael Palliser, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London; Sir Oliver Wright, ambassador of Great Britain to the United States; and Richard Neustadt and former Wilson Center fellow Ernest May, of Harvard University.

URUGUAY AND DEMOCRACY

Participants in the Latin American Program's September 12-14 conference "Uruguay and Democracy" puzzled over whether the one-time "Switzerland of South America" could successfully make the transition from 14 years of military rule and reestablish a democratic political system. While there was much discussion of the possible outcomes of the November 1984 Uruguayan elections, the first to be held since Juan Maria Bordaberry was ousted from power by the military in 1973, most attention at the conference was focused on the lessons of the Uruguayan experience.

Participants lamented the absence in Uruguay of a positive relationship between democracy and indicators of development such as education, welfare, and political participation. They found no single set of factors could explain the demise of democratic government in Uruguay, or, for that matter, its Southern Cone neighbors Argentina and Chile.

The pre-1973 political system in Uruguay was the subject of much criticism during the conference. Long dominated by two parties, the Nationals and the Colorados, that system has, during the 20th century, facilitated agreements between and within parties that encourage "clientalism"--the use of politics to promote the welfare of government officials and party members. As a result, efforts to modernize the country's economic and political systems have been neglected. Participants concluded that one lesson of the Uruguayan experience was that genuine competition in the political arena is necessary to sustain a strong democratic system.

A second lesson suggested by the Uruguayan case is that the international economic system can have a significant impact on domestic politics. Uruguay had an "easy economy" during the first half of the 20th century. Beef and hides generated revenue sufficient for Uruguay's population to enjoy a standard of living comparable to Italy's. This prosperity continued during the Korean War, when Uruguay was a major supplier for the U.S. Army. After that, however, much of Uruguay's foreign trade evaporated. Its economy became "difficult." The unrest generated by groups accustomed to steadily increasing economic welfare proved a major factor in the military intervention in Uruguayan politics that began in the 1960s and culminated with the 1973 coup.

Conference participants expressed great interest in the current Uruguayan regime transition, in no small part because democracy has been resurgent throughout South America, with the military leaving power in Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina. But they also noted that democratic politics was a fragile business when conducted under austere economic conditions and in the absence of a tradition of diverse groups working together for common political goals.

This three-day binational conference included as participants Celia Barbato de Silva, of CINVE, Juan Rial, of CIESU, and Aldo Solari, formerly with the Economic Commission on Latin America. Others included Alfred Stepan, of Columbia University; Peter Winn, of Tufts University; Arturo Porzecanski, of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.; Goran Lindahl, of the Institute of Latin American Studies, in Stockholm; and Charles Gillespie, of Yale University.

RELIGION AND POLITICS

A number of Wilson Center fellows this year are studying aspects of religion, the range of relationships between religion and politics, and the possi-

bilities for deriving universal moral standards. Ann C. Sheffield, secretary of the Center's Program on History, Culture, and Society, has organized a series of meetings for those interested in these issues. Because many of the participants are in the early stages of their individual projects, questions for further research and debate still prevail, even over tentative answers.

For participants who come from the troubled societies of the Middle East, the Jewish and Islamic traditions throw light upon the Christian distinction between church and state. In Judaism and Islam, political and religious issues are closely intertwined (and potentially identical) because politics does not exist outside religion. Given the rise of radical religious movements with political programs, such as those in Iran and Libya, is it still feasible, participants asked, to contemplate the possibility of a common morality, or do rival religious and ethnic groups increasingly look inward in self-justification, using the union of religion and politics to discredit the ideas of outsiders? In Iran, for example, one person asked whether the Islamic revolution, rather than a reaction against modernization, is a part of it, a use by Islamic groups of mass mobilization techniques for essentially modern purposes? What are the roles of hatred and revenge in different religious traditions?

For participants concerned with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the evolution of the variety of churches as institutions of dissent--sometimes passive, sometimes explicit, sometimes underground, sometimes official--creates a complex and fascinating mosaic of relationships between church and state. Are there common factors among the Catholic Church in Poland, the Lutheran Church in the German Democratic Republic, and the varieties of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine? J.A. Hebly, of the Institute of Missiological Ecumenical Research, Utrecht, insisted during his guest scholarship at The Wilson Center that there were three distinct approaches.

For participants concerned with the United States, the reappearance of religious institutions in the debate about nuclear war raises a variety of questions. Can the threat of nuclear war provide a basic experience for all people, and therefore provide one of the preconditions for a universal morality? Can some moral norms be acceptable to people from widely different cultural traditions or to people who live simultaneously within two or more traditions making different moral claims?

Ranging from an informal luncheon discussion on "Politics and Religion" to a workshop on "Religious Traditions and the Idea of a Universal Morality," the Center's ongoing meetings on religion have involved the following recent or current Wilson Center fellows: Gene Outka, professor of philosophy and Christian ethics at Yale; Mangol Bayat, of Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies; James Childress, professor of religious studies at the University of Virginia; Byong-ik Koh, Professor of History at Hamlin College, Ch'unch'on, Korea; Joseph A. Komonchak, Associate Professor of History, University of California, Los Angeles; and George S. Weigel, Jr., Scholar-in-residence, World Without War Council, Seattle.

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Improving NATO's Conventional Defenses

"Continued, even redoubled, U.S. sacrifices to improve conventional defenses and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe are to no avail without similar Allied efforts."

by Sam Nunn

THE Senate recently debated my amendment which had as its goal major collective improvements in NATO's conventional defense capabilities. I considered this amendment as "The NATO Conventional Defense Improvements Amendment" and not "The NATO Troop Withdrawal Amendment."

Let me quote an assessment by Gen. Bernard Rogers, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in testimony before the House Armed Forces Committee, March 6, 1984, of the state of conventional defenses in Europe:

> Allied Command Europe's current conventional posture does not provide our nations with adequate deterrence and it leaves the nuclear threshold at a disturbingly low level.
>
> Thus, NATO's deterrence is jeopardized by our current heavy reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons to stop a non-nuclear attack. The remedy is for NATO to strengthen its conventional forces which will also raise the nuclear threshold.
>
> There are a number of shortcomings in NATO's non-nuclear forces that put us in the predicament I describe. However, the fundamental cause is a low level of sustainability. ACE [Allied Command Europe] is simply unable to sustain its conventional forces in combat for long with manpower, ammunition and war reserve material to replace losses and expenditures on the battlefield.
>
> We can not continue to paper over such serious and dangerous military problems in NATO. Here we have the highest military leader of the Alliance stating bluntly that NATO's current conventional posture is little more than a delayed tripwire for early resort to nuclear escalation. The Alliance has spent hundreds of billions of dollars for the common defense to this point.

During the decade of the 1980's and beyond, we need more than a military posture that, to quote Gen. Rogers again, would required "the release of nuclear weapons fairly quickly after a conventional attack. And I'm talking about in terms of days, not in terms of weeks or months." The citizens of both this nation and Europe will, and should, question why their hundreds of billions in defense investment buys such a limited conventional defense that NATO must rely on the untenable military strategy of early resort to nuclear weapons.

Some would argue that the Europeans want it this way; they don't want more robust conventional defenses and are content to rest deterrence of a Warsaw Pact conventional attack on the threat of rapid nuclear escalation.

Others would suggest that it is a matter of economics; that, while a nuclear tripwire may be less than desirable, it is the *best* that can be obtained for the funds that the Europeans are willing to spend on defense.

Still others suggest the Europeans have merely recognized a soft touch, that they know the U.S. will continue to "cover their gaps" by spending the money for all our forces in NATO, for six Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS) division sites, for many hundreds of tactical aircraft, for airlift and aerial tankers to move these assets to Europe in a crisis, and for munition stocks substantially above those of most of our allies. They figure that, as long as the U.S. will spend over 30% of our annual budget ($90,000,000,000) in support of NATO, why should they spend more? (According to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's June, 1984, report, "U.S. Expenditures in Support of NATO," the $90,000,000,000 is for U.S. European-deployed forces and those U.S.-based forces we have pledged as early reinforcements.)

I don't know which reason or combination of reasons can explain the current situation, but I do know that it is high time —indeed past time—to put the issue of European intentions to a reasonable and responsible test. Our Ambassador to NATO, David Abshire, believes that European intentions are changing for the better. I hope he is correct. We must begin, however, to measure programmatic progress and not just intentions. *If* the Allies are *not* prepared to make more modest efforts to improve conventional defenses in the remainder of this decade, while the U.S. plans to spend many hundreds of billions of dollars on our NATO commitment—*if* the Allies really *want*, or will continue to settle for, a nuclear tripwire, *then* I believe the U.S. should recognize this and adjust our own military commitment and our defense priorities. We can provide for a nuclear tripwire—or even what some call an extended tripwire—with far fewer conventional forces and personnel than the U.S. currently has stationed in NATO. This, I might add, with-

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Sen. Nunn (D.-Ga.) is a member of the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Forces Committee.

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A bombardment of nonsense

by Harrison Brown

WE SHOULD BE delighted that the Soviets and the Americans are once again talking with each other about the life and death matters of nuclear war. But whatever happened to quiet, sincere diplomacy aimed at solving problems rather than winning the propaganda race? Not in my memory has the U.S. public been subjected to such an intense bombardment of nonsense concerning foreign and military policy as has emerged in recent months from the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department.

The MX missiles, for example, became "bargaining chips" in the Geneva negotiations, relegating the entire negotiating process to the level of a nice little card game. When we look at what our policy makers are really talking about, I get the strong feeling that "buffalo chips" would be a far more descriptive expression.

The American officials seem to be using every possible means to denigrate the Soviets and their views. When Soviet Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev asked, "Is it not time for those who shape the policy of states to stop, think, and prevent the adoption of decisions that would push the world to a nuclear catastrophe?" dire warnings emerged from Washington that the Soviets are not to be trusted. When he announced a unilateral freeze on deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe, the White House again warned that the Soviet offer was meaningless.

This barrage of gloom and doom statements from Washington will almost certainly hinder the Geneva arms control negotiations. President Reagan should order Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, his hatchet man Richard Perle, Robert McFarlane, and Larry Speakes to keep their mouths shut. Most of us suspect that he is unlikely to do this. Indeed, I increasingly feel that the Reagan Administration really does not want arms agreements that are not solely to the United States' strategic advantage.

Now a meeting is being arranged between the two heads of state. This meeting was urgently requested by President Reagan, and the Soviet leader has, fortunately, agreed with the general concept. Ordinarily one would assume that when two national leaders agree to meet to discuss common problems, they should also be able to explore solutions.

National Security Adviser McFarlane, however, has stressed that the proposed meeting should not be called a "summit" but rather should be viewed as a "get acquainted" meeting. His tone implied, in a statement made over national television, that such a meeting would be like an informal chat over tea and cakes. There would be no agreement—just an airing of common problems.

A genuine summit meeting, by contrast, would be carefully prepared over many months with an agreed-upon agenda. Gorbachev and Reagan would be surrounded by all of their respective governments' experts to ensure that neither made a mistake. The site for such a meeting would have to be something like a convention hall. McFarlane implied that this is the environment in which sound agreements between the two countries should be made.



Peter Kuper, United States

This perception is upside-down. In a small, informal meeting, existing views can be quietly modified, and completely new ideas and future agendas can be proposed and discussed.

During my days as foreign secretary of the National Academy of Sciences, I negotiated a number of scientific exchange agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as other East European countries. The actual negotiations were always formal, with carefully planned agendas. But the most productive work was done when my counterpart and I spent an evening alone quietly going over the agenda. We could usually analyze and come to agreement on most of the problems, with the result that the next day's formal meeting would move along smoothly. And we were able to do this without any kind of chips. □

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out the expense of massive reinforcements and at significantly less cost than we now incur.

I consider myself a longstanding and strong supporter of the NATO Alliance. I have written three reports to the Senate on the subject, have sponsored various legislation over the years to improve NATO's defense capabilities, and was a leader in the floor fights in the mid-1970's to defeat the Mansfield Amendments to cut U.S. forces in NATO unilaterally. I want to emphasize one point at the outset. Although my amendment calls for sizeable troop reductions in the late 1980's if our European allies do not show a willingness to improve conventional defense capabilities, this amendment is *not* intended either as blackmail or as punishment. I am hopeful that no troops will ever be withdrawn by reason of this amendment. It is merely a recognition that continued, even redoubled, U.S. sacrifices to improve conventional defenses and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe are to no avail without similar Allied efforts. We must move forward and improve the Alliance in tandem. We must head for these goals on a bicycle built for two; the U.S. can have the front seat, but it takes someone pedaling behind as well.

An unrealistic and dangerous strategy

In an era of well-recognized NATO disadvantage in theater nuclear weapons, at a time of rough strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it is, in my view, unrealistic and dangerous to rest the fate of the Alliance on a strategy of deliberate, early nuclear escalation. Yet, what Gen. Rogers has described in clear testimony is a situation in which, in the event of a major Warsaw Pact conventional attack on NATO, the Alliance leaders would be faced with choosing "in terms of days, not weeks" between capitulation or NATO being the first to use nuclear weapons. Even if the Soviets limit their attack to conventional means, NATO will be forced to escalate the conflict into a nuclear exchange, an area of Alliance disadvantage. We can not continue this posture.

The U.S. is pledged to ship to Europe, within the first 10 days of such a war, a total of six Army divisions and 20 tactical fighter wings as early reinforcements to the four divisions and seven wings we already have over there. Yet, if this huge early reinforcement nonetheless leads only to "days, not weeks" before nuclear weapons are used, I question the soundess of the basic plan under which we in America are spending hundreds of billions of dollars.

If NATO is going to have to surrender, then six more U.S. divisions added to the four already there more than doubles our "Dunkirk problem." If, instead, NATO is going to resort to early nuclear escalation, our additional divisions will be irrelevant by the time they arrive there.

Gen. Rogers also addressed this situation: "Because of the failure to meet commitments in the conventional area by all nations and through trying to buy Alliance defense on the cheap by relying on nuclear weapons, we have mortgaged our defense to the nuclear response."

To his considerable credit, Gen. Rogers has done everything in his power to correct this militarily untenable situation. Now, the Senate must lend a helping hand. We can not permit the bulwark of Western defense—NATO—to continue this situation endlessly into the future. If it does, the Alliance has no real future.

We can debate why we are in this untenable military trap today, and there are many sides to this argument. However, two things are clear—we must improve conventional defenses; and NATO is not currently planning to make these improvements. This is the case despite Alliance agreements in principle year after year, starting in the late 1970's, to implement specific measures to improve NATO's conventional defense capability.

From a major set of Alliance meetings in 1977 and 1978 emerged the following agreed goals which are still in effect today: the pledge to increase defense spending in each country by at least three per cent per year in real terms; the pledge to acquire a 30-day supply of conventional munitions within five years in the Center Region; and the agreement on what ultimately became the Rapid Reinforcement Plan. These goals have been agreed to in NATO Ministerial Guidance and have been reaffirmed at their annual meetings. The Rapid Reinforcement Plan constitutes the commitment by the U.S. to move a total of six Army divisions and roughly 20 tactical fighter wings from the U.S. to Europe within 10 days to reinforce our forces already there.

As noted, the U.S. has been spending many billions of dollars on Army combat equipment to go into the six POMCUS sites, so that we can fly only the troops from the U.S. to Europe and have them match up over there with their equipment. This means we have to buy two sets of equipment—one here to train with, one there to fight with. We have been spending many more billions to acquire the 20 wings of tactical aircraft for rapid deployment. We have been spending still more billions of dollars on airlift and tanker support, in order to carry out these time-urgent deployment plans. We have been spending billions for U.S. stocks of munitions in Europe, which are well above the 30-day NATO goal and climbing. We plan to spend $52,000,000,000 on munitions for our NATO forces over the next five years to increase this sustainability level even higher.

In return for all this, the Allies agreed to do two things. First, they agreed to provide "host-nation support" in wartime (the provision of some of their reservists and equipment) and to provide rear-area support for our reinforcing combat divisions. To give our allies their due, there has been some progress in this wartime host-nation support area. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee and I have led the fight in Congress to back up these agreements. Second, the Allies also agreed to fund critical facilities and aircraft shelters for our reinforcing aircraft.

Finally, we have carried out our three per cent pledge every year in the process of implementing all of these activities. The Secretary of Defense recently reported to Congress that we have exceeded our three per cent goal every year since 1979 and that the total cost of European-deployed U.S. forces and those U.S.-based forces that we have pledged to contribute to a NATO reinforcement in the early stages of a conflict is "about $90,000,000,000" of the FY85 budget, or over 30% of the entire budget. The Secretary's report also indicates that the total cost of all the U.S. NATO-deployed forces and reinforcements planned over the course of a NATO conflict is $177,000,000,000 in this year's budget.

Meeting commitments

Let me briefly recount what our allies have done to meet *their* commitments. They have *not* achieved the goal of a three per cent increase after inflation, on average, in *any* year since the pledge was made; indeed, the size of their increases has gotten smaller each year. For FY83, the Defense Department estimates that the average Allied increase was 1.9 to 2.1%; for FY84, 1.2 to 1.7%. The U.S., however, has met the goal every year and continues defense spending that is substantially above three per cent real growth. Starting with 1980, our increases have ranged from 4.9% to nine per cent.

No allied country has reached the agreed goal of a 30-day supply of munitions. Allied sustainability is uneven at best; some kinds of munitions are close to the goal, but others are in critically short supply, measured in days, not weeks. Most allies have indicated that they plan little or no progress towards the 30-day goal in their current five-year projections. During the same period, the U.S. will be spending $52,000,000,000 to increase its stocks, which are already substantially larger.

Secretary Weinberger summarized this situation well in his May, 1984, report to Congress on "Improving NATO's Conventional Capability":

The lack of adequate capability to sustain com-

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bat operations for long with . . . munitions . . . is one of NATO's most critical and persistent shortfalls. In war, such shortages would force commanders to curtail operations to avoid running out . . . and the price of such rationing would be measurable directly in lives and kilometers lost. . . . History records that of all the reasons given for military defeat, running out of ammunition ranks near if not at the top.

The Secretary also stated: "The current situation is sufficiently serious that the need to increase munitions stocks is important enough to give that effort a higher priority than other national force improvements."

The situation isn't much better in terms of the facilities and shelters the Allies are to provide on their air bases for U.S. reinforcing tactical aircraft. Our own U.S. main operating bases in Europe are so crowded with our seven wings already there that most of the roughly 20 U.S. reinforcing wings will be scattered across many European air bases operated by other NATO countries. Those bases are called colocated operating bases, or COB's; they have enough space to accept our arriving aircraft. However, these COB's do not have *extra* minimum essential facilities, such as fuel and ammunition storage adequate for seven days operations, *extra* emergency operating facilities, such as control towers and maintenance facilities, and *extra* semi-hardened aircraft shelters to protect our reinforcing aircraft. Without these facilities and shelters that the Allies have agreed to provide, the arriving $50,000,000,000 worth of U.S. aircraft are unlikely to survive, let alone be able to operate effectively.

Where are we specifically in terms of the facilities and shelters to support our early-reinforcement aircraft? Today—six years after the agreement—there are minimum essential facilities in place for less than 20% of our reinforcing aircraft. There still are virtually *no* hardened aircraft shelters for *any* of these reinforcing aircraft. In other words, only a relatively few aircraft will have fuel and ammunition available and they will be unsheltered, in the open, in the middle of World War III. We learned as long ago as the 1973 Middle East War that unsheltered aircraft really are "sitting ducks." Yet, year after year, we renew in the Defense Planning Questionnaire our commitment to deploy over $50,000,000,000 worth of the finest and most modern U.S. fighters to become "sitting ducks." These aircraft have little chance to survive since our NATO allies have been unwilling to provide the roughly $1,000,000,000 extra to fuel, arm, and protect these aircraft. That's right—the total cost to the Allies to provide minimum essential facilities, emergency operations facilities and hardened shelters for our $50,000,000,000 worth of aircraft, is about $1,000,000,000 more. It is incomprehensible that $50,000,000,000 of sophisticated aircraft would be virtually useless because our allies refuse to provide an additional $1,000,000,000 to house them.

We could continue this sorry tale. Let me give only one more pertinent example. The NATO force goals, which are developed every two years by the NATO military commanders and cover six years, are considered an expression of the forces and facilities necessary for the accomplishment of NATO military commanders' assigned missions. These goals are designed to challenge each nation to meet these critical missions.

It should be no surprise to anyone that the performance towards these goals has been less than satisfactory for the most part. In fact, Gen. Rogers recently said that NATO was "running in the wrong direction" in terms of the force goals:

> When we figured out the force goals—not the one we just approved earlier this month but the previous one approved in 1982—we figured that they would require a four per cent real increase in defense spending per year, per nation for each of the six years from 1983 to 1988 to fully meet those force goals. New force goals have just been approved for the years 1985 to 1990. Now we calculate that to meet those force goals fully, it's only going to cost a little over three per cent. So you see we're running in the wrong direction. We're going down to three per cent to meet those force goals. Those force goals, even if fully implemented, won't give us the kind of conventional capability that I've talked about.

Gen. Rogers is pessimistic that the NATO allies will even meet these lower force goals: "When you ask the question do I think it's logical that they're going to be able to meet it, the answer is no."

It is my belief that it is time to challenge our European allies to begin to make good on longstanding commitments like those I have described. Without achieving these goals, a more robust conventional defense of Europe is virtually impossible. It is time to turn our attention to raising the nuclear threshold by improving NATO's collective conventional defenses.

It is time to put to a reasonable and responsible test the proposition of whether the Europeans want to continue a nuclear tripwire posture or seriously want to improve conventional capability. It is shape up or ship out time for NATO.

Goals

Let me briefly describe how my amendment is designed to test this proposition. The test will be comprised of two optional paths: one based on input goals; the other based on output goals.

First, the amendment extends and makes permanent the troop ceiling on U.S. ground forces stationed in NATO at a level of 326,414. This is a cap at exactly the level the Defense Department (DoD) has requested for the end of Fiscal Year 1985. DoD does plan over the next five years to request additional increases. Given the current situation and the lack of any major indication that the Allies are moving forward, it makes no sense for us to increase *our* forces beyond the FY85 level at this time. Since 1977, U.S. forces in NATO have increased by almost 45,000 personnel, while Allied force levels have remained essentially static. Interestingly enough, 1977 was the year the U.S. began to have serious discussions with our allies on improving conventional defenses.

Second, the intent of the amendment is to establish a five-year period during which the NATO allies will be expected to meet certain goals related to improving conventional defense. All of these goals have been formally agreed to by the Alliance, but the Allies may need a year to discover America is finally ready to "fish or cut bait" on conventional improvements.

The amendment works as follows: the Allies would have one year to get ready and then three years of performance would be measured—1986, 1987, and 1988. Serious deficiencies would be corrected at a rate of 20% a year in those three years. By requiring performance over only the three of the five years needed to make up 100% of the deficiencies in the designated areas, Congress will have an opportunity for a midterm review and to make adjustments should unforeseen circumstances arise. The amendment ties future U.S. troop strength in NATO to progress—or lack of it—by the Allies in improving conventional defense capabilities in certain specified areas.

The input-oriented test is the NATO-agreed target of a three per cent average increase in defense spending, after inflation, by the non-U.S. NATO Allies. This goal, first established in 1979, has recently been reaffirmed by the NATO Ministers. If the non-U.S. Allies reach this goal, no troop reductions are required. As indicated, this would be adequate for the Allies to achieve the current force goal requirements.

However, if the Allies fail to meet the three per cent test in any year, the amendment offers an output-oriented path for the Allies to forestall the U.S. troop reductions, by meeting a set of three other goals in specific areas of longstanding deficiency. Each could be considered a "war-stopper" in its own right.

What we are essentially asking the Allies to do is *either* meet the longstanding three per cent increase pledge *or*

- To increase systematically over five years their munitions sustainability to reach the 30-day goal, at the rate of 20% of the shortfall each year. These increases would required the six Center Region Al-

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lies *collectively* to spend less than $1,000,000,000 per year. While these Allies together would have to spend about $1,000,000,000 a year more to get to 30 days, the U.S. is spending $6,200,000,000 this year on *our* NATO munitions, and plans to spend $52,000,000,000 over the next five years to increase our stocks, which are already substantially higher than theirs.

- To commit to an infrastructure funding level adequate to provide over five years the roughly $1,000,000,000 extra needed from the Allies to build the facilities and shelters to give the $50,000,000,000 dollars we have invested in U.S. reinforcing tactical aircraft a fighting chance; the needed facilities and shelters also must be committed to construction at the rate of 20% of the shortfall per year. To meet this test, the Allies would have to agree to contribute about $600,000,000 more to the NATO Infrastructure Fund during the three-year measuring period; $1,000,000,000 is needed to completely close the gap.
- To make significant progress in lengthening the interval between onset of a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact and the time at which nuclear release would have to be requested, as determined and certified to the U.S. Secretary of Defense by the SACEUR, Gen. Rogers.

If, upon reflection and with two years in which to plan and begin responses, the Allies are nonetheless unwilling to make these essential and agreed upon improvements, the U.S. will have a clear indication of Allied intent. It will be evident that the Allies are content with nothing more than a tripwire, and we can begin to reduce the number of our forces stationed in NATO and also begin to reduce our related NATO expenditures.

Let me now describe the reductions. If the Allies do not make the first path of three per cent, and *also* fail to meet any of the three goals under path two, then the ceiling will be reduced by 30,000 per year. If, however, the Allies meet one of the three goals under path two, the ceiling would be reduced by only 20,000; if two out of three under path two, by 10,000; and if they *meet* all three, or if they meet the three per cent, there would be *no* reduction.

Either of the compliance paths offered —the three per cent growth path or the specific goals path—is both realistic and affordable. Moreover, for the second path, the spending is entirely in Europe on European goods and services, and produced by European labor. Indeed, in the case of facilities and aircraft shelters at European bases, the U.S. will also pay more than one-fourth of the total bill as its share of common infrastructure funding. Moreover, nothing in this amendment forces the Allies to do anything that has not been agreed to previously—indeed, agreed and agreed again. All that has been missing is *performance* on the agreements.

Thus, if NATO's *de facto* strategy really is a conventional tripwire with early resort to nuclear weapons, the *last* thing the U.S. should be planning is to send six more divisions and about 1,500 more tactical aircraft into Europe just as the Alliance is ready to escalate to nuclear weapons.

Indeed, if that is the strategy the Europeans want, I believe that a far smaller commitment of U.S. stationed forces than those we now maintain in peacetime would be called for. That is why I regard as wholly appropriate the troop reductions called for in this amendment, if the Allies are not serious about improving conventional capability.

Annual reporting

This amendment also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report outlining U.S. defense expenditures in support of NATO. This report would provide a direct link between our defense spending and our formal commitment to NATO, as reflected in the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire Response. This is an annual document in which the member nations commit forces to NATO. We will be able, using this report, to determine just what this commitment costs.

This reporting will also include an assessment of Allied performance in meeting the following: increasing over-all defense spending; increasing sustainability as well as support for U.S. reinforcing tactical aircraft; improving airbase defenses; meeting NATO force goals; increasing NATO infrastructure funding; increasing trained manpower levels, particularly reserves; increasing war reserve materiel; improving initial defense capability; improving NATO's ability to neutralize enemy follow-on forces, particularly through the use of emerging technologies; improving mine/counter-mine capability; and improving offensive counter-air capability.

With this assessment, Congress will be able to look at U.S. expenditures in support of NATO and how the Allies are performing in certain key areas. Congress can then make judgments on whether the U.S. expenditures should be approved in the annual authorization process or whether they should be reduced.

In my judgment, this is an appropriate way to link Allied performance to our commitment to NATO. If the Europeans simply shift their priorities and resources to meet these formal tests, abandoning other agreed goals, we will soon recognize this shift.

Finally, I must note one area where the U.S. has clearly not done enough over the years—making the "two-way street" in armaments cooperation work. The Chairman and I have been strong supporters of the Emerging Technology Initiative in NATO, and I welcome the recent tangible progress in this area. Nonetheless, our European allies spend a great deal more on U.S. weapons systems and components than we do in acquiring European-developed systems. While some of that can legitimately be justified on the grounds that our worldwide commitments sometimes impose requirements beyond those typically considered by European manufacturers, I am inclined to believe that much more of that stems from U.S. industry and service reluctance to buy somebody else's product, rather than being involved from the very beginning.

If we are ever to get to the point where NATO's resource inputs, which are larger than those of the Warsaw Pact, are efficiently transformed into a larger defense *output*, it must be because we have done a better job of mutual planning, cooperative development, and equitable sharing of production. Therefore, I have included in the amendment a provision to encourage the side-by-side testing—by the Secretary of Defense's Office of Test and Evaluation, not by the services themselves—of systems and subsystems of European manufacture against those developed by our military establishment. This is but a small step toward greater transatlantic cooperation in armaments, but I hope it will mark an important new start, and help persuade European governments that we do *not* want troop cuts, we want more effective conventional defenses, and we are willing to look closely at what they have to offer.

In summary, the U.S. can not continue to expend billions and billions to prepare for the conventional war that our allies are not prepared to fight. These precious resources are better applied for other purposes, to meet our other worldwide interests and commitments.

I am under no illusions about the ability of the legislative branch of one nation to influence the actions of other nations. I am also under no illusions about the many obstacles to improved conventional defense capabilities that would remain even if the Allies fully comply with the goals of the amendment.

It is not a panacea, but it is a beginning —a modest test of whether the vitality of the Alliance is still capable of being energized. If such movement is begun, the amendment has a significance beyond its modest scope.

In my judgment, the citizens of the Western democracies will not long sustain nor support large defense establishments which can only provide a military posture that has as its end result either capitulation or resort to early use of nuclear weapons. In an era of pronounced NATO theater nuclear disadvantage and rough strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., this makes no sense.

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Court Hears Suit on Biowarfare Laboratory

At a recent hearing, the Defense Department offered a new justification for a sophisticated biological warfare laboratory

Last fall, when the Defense Department sought to obtain emergency funds to construct a sophisticated new laboratory for biological warfare tests, it described the project in a series of letters and official statements as "vital to our national security." It characterized the need for the laboratory as "urgent" and said that a negative vote would "adversely affect the defense posture" of the United States, because of increased Soviet biowarfare research. Duly impressed, a handful of congressmen authorized its construction on a crash basis, despite some opposition from prominent micro- and molecular biologists.

In recent weeks, however, a substantially different picture of the laboratory and the government's need for it has emerged in the context of a lawsuit filed in federal court. Instead of arguing that the laboratory is needed to support an expanded test program, the Defense Department has stated in court documents that no changes are contemplated in its present laboratory work. The Pentagon has also acknowledged that there is at present no need for a laboratory as sophisticated as that approved by Congress, and that it actually is being constructed "in anticipation of requirements which may never materialize."

These statements are intended to persuade U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green that the laboratory, to be constructed at Dugway Proving Ground in a remote area of Utah, will have no significant impact on the environment, and therefore that no detailed impact statement need be prepared. Gene LaRocque, a retired Navy admiral who directs the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, and Jeremy Rifkin, a longtime activist on genetic engineering issues, believe that such a statement should be prepared, and so they brought suit against the government late last year (*Science*, 8 February, p. 614).

At a court hearing on 26 April, the government's attorney, Gary Randall, emphasized repeatedly that no change is contemplated in Dugway's existing laboratory work, which is aimed at the development of sensors, equipment, and clothing needed for protection against biological attack. The biological agents to be used in the new lab are the "conventional threat agents identified by past studies . . . and by the intelligence community," the government said in a brief environmental assessment. These include such bacteria as *Francisella tularensis* and *Bacillus anthracis*; such rickettsia as *Coxiella burneti*; such viruses as Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis; and such toxins as tricothecene mycotoxins, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, and *Bacillus anthracis* toxin.

None of these agents requires a level of biological containment greater than that available to the Defense Department at the existing Dugway laboratory, Randall stated—a level known as Biosafety Level 3, or BL3. The new laboratory is to be designed for containment at the highest level, known as BL4, solely because it will provide extra protection for laboratory workers and avert any delay if testing at that level becomes necessary in the future, he said.

> The Pentagon is constructing the lab "in anticipation of requirements which may never materialize."

The driving factor, in short, is not that a BL4 laboratory is actually needed, but that someday its absence might be "adverse to our defensive posture." An aide to Senator Jim Sasser (D–Tenn.), a ranking member of the Senate subcommittee on military construction, said that this admission reinforces his view that "the aerosol test facility is unnecessary at this time and is extraneous to any clearly identified defensive test package." Sasser had tried to defeat the proposal last year, but was outvoted.

Although no work with genetically altered materials "is projected" for the new lab, according to court documents submitted by the Defense Department, it has not been ruled out. "Testing of aerosols of pathogens derived from recombinant DNA methodology is not precluded if a need should arise in the interest of national defense," the government states. Only at this point will an environmental analysis covering such work "be done and documentation prepared and published (subject to security status)," said Amoretta Hoeber, a senior Army official responsible for biological warfare policy and oversight, in a court affidavit.

Edward Lee Rogers, Rifkin's attorney, argued at the hearing that such recombinant DNA research is inevitable and that its risks must be publicly assessed before the laboratory is built. Both he and David Dubnau, a molecular biologist at New York University who testified on Rifkin's behalf, noted that the National Institutes of Health (NIH) guidelines for BL4 laboratories caution against the creation of aerosols. But W. Emmett Barkley, director of the division of safety at NIH, countered in an affidavit for the government that such aerosols can never be entirely avoided and that the safety record of a similar Defense Department lab at Fort Detrick, Maryland, is "excellent" despite routine experimentation with aerosols.

Much of the debate at the hearing focused on whether the Defense Department had adequately considered building a less sophisticated laboratory in which experiments could be conducted with attenuated or nonpathogenic biological "simulants." Robert Sinsheimer, a molecular biologist who is chancellor of the University of California at Santa Cruz, said in an affidavit that the Defense Department had failed to describe any experiments for which simulants were unavailable. Both Dubnau and Richard

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