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Att. 1,

STATEMENT BY
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
to the
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON 31 MAY 1960

The duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under statute and under National Security Council directives pursuant to statute, is to provide the President and the National Security Council with evaluated intelligence relating to our national security.

The Agency has no policy or police functions.

In addition, however, the Agency has the duty, within policy limitations prescribed by the President and State Department, to do whatever is within its power to collect and produce the intelligence required by the policy makers in government, to deal with the dangers we face in the world today, a nuclear world.

Increasingly over the past ten years, the main target for our intelligence collection has been the U.S.S.R., its military, its economic, and its subversive potential.

The carrying out of this task has been rendered extremely difficult because the Soviet Union is a closed society.

Great areas of the U.S.S.R. are curtained off to the outside world. Their military preparations are made in secret. Their military hardware, ballistic missiles, bombers, nuclear weapons, and submarine forces, as far as physically possible, are concealed from us. They have resisted all efforts to realize mutual inspection or "open skies."

The ordinary tools of information gathering, under these circumstances are not wholly adequate. These ordinary tools include both the normal overt means of obtaining information, and the classical covert means generally referred to as espionage.

It is true that from these sources and from the many Soviet defectors who have come over to the Free World and from disaffected and disillusioned Soviet nationals, we obtain very valuable information.

However, these sources and other sources developed through the application of various scientific techniques, while very helpful, did not give us the full intelligence protection this country required against the danger of preparation for surprise attack against us, from bases which might remain unknown and by weapons, the strength and power of which we might not be able adequately to evaluate.

Almost equally serious had been our lack of knowledge of Soviet defense measures against our retaliatory striking power.

Shackled by traditions, we were seeing the power of attack grow while the ability to secure the intelligence necessary for defense against attack was slipping, bound down in part by tradition.

For example, while Soviet spy trawlers can lurk a few miles off our shores and observe us with impunity, the Soviets cry "aggression" when a plane, invisible to the naked eye, flies over it some fifteen miles above the ground.

Either, theoretically, could carry a nuclear weapon. The trawler could deal a much more serious nuclear blow than a light reconnaissance plane.

But, of course, as we well know, no one would think of starting a nuclear war with either an isolated plane or ship.

In this age of nuclear peril we, the Central Intelligence Agency, felt that a new approach was called for in the whole field of intelligence collection.

* * * * * * *

This was the situation, when in 1954, almost six years ago, consultation was initiated on new intelligence collection techniques. We consulted with a group of highly competent technicians in and out of government. From our discussions there emerged the concept of a high-flying, high performance reconnaissance plane. In the then state of the art of aeronautics, it was confidently believed that a plane could be designed to fly unintercepted over the vitally important closed areas of the Soviet Union, where ballistic, nuclear, and other military preparations against us were being made.

We also believed, as a result of these consultations, that the art of photography could be so advanced as to make the resolution of the pictures taken, even at extreme altitudes, of very great significance. On both counts the accomplishments exceeded expectations.

While the developmental work for this project, pursuant to high policy directive was in process, there came the Summit Conference of July 1955.

Here, in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the "open skies" proposal. Moscow summarily rejected anything of this nature, and Soviet security measures continued to be reinforced.

Accordingly, the U-2 project was pushed forward rapidly, and about a year after the 1955 summit meeting the first operational U-2 flight over the Soviet Union took place. For almost four years the flight program has been carried forward successfully.

Speed in getting the program underway had been a top priority. We were then faced, that is in 1955-1956, with a situation where the Soviets were continuing to develop their missiles, their heavy bomber and bomber bases, and their nuclear weapons production without adequate knowledge on our part.

This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable both from the viewpoint of adequate military preparation on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to take counter-measures in the event of attack.

It was recognized at the outset that this U-2 project had its risks and had a limited span of life due to improvement of counter measures; that a relatively fragile single-engine plane of the nature of the U-2 might one day have a flame-out or other malfunction in the rarified atmosphere in which it had to travel. If that resulted in a serious and prolonged loss of altitude, there was danger of failure and discovery.

To stop any enterprise of this nature because there are risks, would be, of course, in this field to accomplish very little.

While air reconnaissance is an old and tried method of gaining intelligence, a peacetime operation of this particular type and on this scale was unique.

But I submit that we live in an age when old concepts of the limits of "permitted" techniques for acquiring information are totally outdated. They come from the horse and buggy days.

I see no reason whatever to draw an unfavorable distinction between the collection of information by reconnaissance at a high altitude in the air and espionage carried on by individuals who illegally operate directly within the territory of another state.

In fact, the distinction, if one is to be drawn, would favor the former. The illegal espionage agents generally attempt to suborn and subvert the citizens of the countries in which they operate. High level air reconnaissance in no way disturbs the life of the people. It does not harm their property. They do not even notice it.

I believe these techniques should be universally sanctioned on a mutual basis and become an accepted and agreed part of our international arrangements.

The USSR has known a good deal about these flights for the last four years. It has studiously refrained from giving the people of the Soviet Union the knowledge they now admit they had.

* * * * * * *

With respect to the U-2 project, I am prepared to support and document these conclusions:--

First, that this operation was one of the most valuable intelligence collection operations that any country has ever mounted at any time, and that it was vital to our national security.

Second, that the chain of command and authority for the project was clear.

Third, that every overflight was carefully planned, fully authorized, and, until May 1, 1960, effectively carried out.

Fourth, that the technical and logistic support was prompt and efficient.

Fifth, that the security which was maintained for this project over a period of more than five years has been unique.

I shall deal with these points in the inverse order in which I have presented them.

First - security. The project was run by a small, closely knit organization at headquarters and in the field. Knowledge of the operation was restricted to a minimum. Over more than five years, since the inception of the project, there has never been any damaging disclosure to interfere with the program.

The existence of the U-2 aircraft was, of course, well known, though its full capabilities, particularly the altitude and range were not disclosed. It had important weather and air sampling capabilities which were effectively used and which afforded natural cover for the project. These weather capabilities were open and publicized.

For example, as far as I know the U-2 is the first aircraft that has ever flown over the eye of a typhoon. It was used very effectively out in the Far East to learn about typhoons which cause so much damage, and we have a very extraordinary series of pictures of the U-2 looking right down at the eye of a typhoon from several miles above the top of it. Of course, the U-2 also had very valuable characteristics as a reconnaissance plane for peripheral flights.

With regard to technical and logistic support:--from the inception of the project, CIA has called on the United States Air Force for support in the form of technical advice and assistance in those fields where the Air Force has the most expert knowledge. These included advice on aircraft design and procurement, operational training of air crews, weather, aero-medicine and communications. I may say the Air Force liberally gave all this support to us.

The CIA also drew on the technical knowledge and advice of those members of the United States Intelligence Board with particular competence in the field of intelligence priorities, -- targeting and the like. Each mission was carefully planned with respect to the highest priority requirements of the Intelligence Community.

The project has been directed by a senior civilian in CIA with high competence in this area of work. He was responsible directly to me and, of course, to General Cabell.

Since the inception of CIA - going back for ten years - personnel from the military services, including the Air Force, have been detailed to CIA for tours of duty. We have had as

8 or 9 hundred of them at one time. These personnel take their orders from CIA, not from their parent service, during their period of detail. The U-2 project, under its civilian director, drew upon both the military and civilian personnel of the Agency. They were assigned to duties in headquarters and in the field staffs which were responsible for carrying out the technical functions of the program. They were chosen in view of their particular qualifications for this particular project.

Third, every overflight, from the inception of the project, and every phase of it, was carefully planned and staffed.

From time to time intelligence requirements were reviewed, and programs of one or more missions were authorized by higher authority.

Within the authority thus granted, specific flights could then be carried out on the order of the Director of Central Intelligence, as availability and readiness of aircraft and of pilot and as weather conditions permitted.

On the afternoon of 30 April last, after carefully considering the field report on the weather and other determining factors affecting the flight then contemplated, and after consultation with General Cabell and other qualified advisors in the Agency, and acting within existing authority to make a flight at that time, I personally gave the order to proceed with the flight of May first.

There was no laxity or uncertainty in the chain of command in obtaining the authority to act or in giving the order to proceed. With respect to the flight authorized on April 30, the same careful procedures were followed as had been followed in the many preceding successful flights.

Now I wish to discuss the value to the country of these flights from the intelligence viewpoint and from the viewpoint of national security considerations. I shall do this within the limitations of what I think both you and I feel are the necessary security restrictions.

Under the law setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, as Director, I am enjoined to protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Naturally I recognize this Committee as an authorized body to whom disclosures can properly be made that should not be made publicly. In so doing I wish to keep within the bounds of what I believe you would agree to be in the national interest to disclose, even here.

I feel that you should share the facts which I confidently believe justified the obvious risks of this project. Such risks were recognized and evaluated at all stages of the project.

For many years, the United States Intelligence Community has been directing its efforts to provide the information which would help to meet the threat of surprise attack. Every available means in the classical intelligence field have been utilized, and over recent years these have been valuably supplemented by the highly technical electronic and other scientific means to which I have referred.

Our main emphasis in the U-2 program has been directed against five critical problems affecting our national security. These are: the Soviet bomber force, the Soviet missile program, the Soviet atomic energy program, the Soviet submarine program. These are the major elements constituting the Soviet Union's capability to launch a surprise attack. In addition, a major target during this program has been the Soviet air defense system with which our retaliatory force would have to contend, in case of an attack on us and a counterattack by us.

Today, the Soviet bomber force is still the main offensive long range striking force of the Soviet Union. However, the U-2 program has helped to confirm that only a greatly reduced long-range bomber production program is continuing in the Soviet Union. It has established, however, that the Soviet Union has recently developed a new medium bomber with supersonic capabilities.

The U-2 program has covered many Soviet long-range bomber airfields, confirming estimates of the location of bases and the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers. It has also acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them.

Our overflights have enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground facilities involved.

With respect to the Soviet missile test program -- this I shall illustrate graphically by showing you the photograph of these facilities, including both their ICBM and their IRBM test launching sites which could, of course, also become and may well be, operational sites.

Our photography has also provided us valuable insight into the problem of Soviet doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. It has taught us much about the use which the Soviets are making of these sites for the training of troops in the operational use of the short and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

The program has provided valuable information on the Soviet atomic energy program. This information has been included in the estimate which we give periodically to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but without referring to the actual source of our data. This has covered the production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, and size of many stockpile sites.

The project has shown that, despite Mr. Khrushchev's boasts that the Soviets will soon be able to curtail the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the Soviets are continuing to expand fissionable material capacity.

The Soviet nuclear testing grounds have been photographed more than once with extremely interesting results. The photography has also given us our first firm information on the magnitude and location of the USSR's domestic uranium ore and uranium processing activities, vital in estimating Soviet fissionable material production. We have located national and regional nuclear storage sites and forward storage facilities.

In general, the program has continued to give useful data on the size and rate of growth of Soviet industry.

The material obtained has been used for the correction of military maps and aeronautical charts.

Among the most important intelligence obtained is that affecting the tactics of the United States deterrent air strike force. We now have hard information about the nature, extent, and in many cases, the location of the Soviet ground-to-air missile development. We have learned much about the basic concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, deployment, and rate of development of the Soviet air defense system, including their early warning radar development.

We have obtained photographs of many scores of fighter air fields previously inadequately identified, and have photographer various fighter-types vainly attempting to intercept the U-2. All of this has proved invaluable to SAC in adjusting its plans to known elements of the opposition it would have to face.

As a result of the concrete evidence acquired by the U-2 program on a large number of targets in the Soviet Union, it has now been possible for U.S. commanders to make a more efficient and confident allocation of aircraft, crews and weapons.

U-2 photography has also made it possible to provide new and accurate information to strike crews which will make it easier for them to identify their targets and plan their navigation more precisely.

We have obtained new and valuable information with regard to submarine deployment and the precise location of their submarine pens.

In the opinion of our military, of our scientists, and of the senior officials responsible for our national security, the results of the program have been invaluable.

The program has had other elements of value. It has made the Soviets less cocky about their ability to deal with what we might bring against them.

They have gone through four years of frustration in having the knowledge since 1956 that they could be overflown with impunity, that their vaunted fighters were useless against such flights, and that their ground-to-air missile capability was inadequate.

Khrushchev has never dared expose this to his own people. It is only after he had boasted, and we believe falsely, that he had been able to bring down the U-2 on May 1 by a ground-to-air missile while flying at altitude, that he has allowed his own people to have even an inkling of the capability which we possessed.

His frustrated military, many of whom know the facts, are far less confident today than they otherwise would have been.

At the same time, in competent military circles among our allies, the evidence of American capability demonstrated by the present disclosure of the U-2 flights has given a new and better perspective of our own relative strength as compared with that of the Soviet Union.

* * * * * * *

At this point I propose to show you some photographs to support my presentation regarding the intelligence value of the project.

Now I shall present the facts with regard to the dispatch of the May 1 flight and the ensuing developments insofar as the intelligence aspects are concerned and insofar as they are known to us.

As to the timing of the flight, there is, of course, no good time for a failure.

I have already presented the circumstances under which I assumed direct responsibility for dispatching this flight.

If this flight had been a success, we would have covered certain targets of particular significance and we would, in the normal course, have wished to analyze its results before scheduling a further mission. When it failed, it was obvious even before we received instructions that we would not try again before studying the cause and effects of failure. In either event, success or failure, after this flight we were not preparing to fly again for several weeks and until further policy guidance was received.

With respect to the timing of the flights, the President, in his speech of May 25, had this to say: "As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

"The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack."

I would point out, also, that if you turn off all flights for months before international meetings and then for some time after such meetings and before trips to the Soviet Union of high American officials or trips here of Soviet officials; if you also estimate that in times of tension flights should be stopped because they might increase the tension, and in times of sweetness and light they should not be run because it would disturb any "honeymoon" in our relations with the Soviet Union; if, on top of this, you take into account that in much of the Soviet Union most days of the year are automatically eliminated because of weather and cloud cover and low Arctic sun, - then you can understand the problem of timing of flights.

If you asked me whether or not a flight would have been made after this particular flight, I cannot give you the answer because I do not know. At the time, we had no authority for any mission other than the one that was then undertaken.

With respect to the flight itself, when the aircraft did not reach its destination within the flight time and fuel capacity given it, it was presumed to be down. But at first we did not know where. It could have been within friendly

territory, in hostile desert, or in uninhabited territory, or within hostile territory where if alive the pilot would have been quickly apprehended as was the case. We did not know whether the plane was intact or destroyed, the pilot alive or dead.

I shall deal in a moment with the statements which were issued during this period of uncertainty.

The question of course arises as to what actually happened to cause this aircraft to come down deep in the heart of Russia.

Let me remind you first that the returns are not yet all in, and so our picture is not complete. However, we do have a considerable body of evidence that permits a reasonable judgment with a high degree of confidence.

Our best judgment is that it did not happen as claimed by the Soviets. That is, we believe that it was not shot down at its operating altitude of around 70,000 feet by the Russians. We believe that it was initially forced down to a much lower altitude by some as yet undetermined mechanical malfunction. At that lower altitude, it was a sitting duck for Soviet defenses, whether fighter aircraft or ground-to-air fire or missiles.

As to what happened at the lower altitude, we are not sure. The pilot may have bailed out at any time or he may have crash landed. The aircraft was equipped with a destruction device to be activated by the pilot as he leaves the aircraft. Again we do not know whether or not he attempted to do so. It should be noted, however, that no massive destruction device capable of ensuring complete destruction could be carried in this aircraft as weight limitations were critical, and every pound counted.

Thus, whether or not the destruction device was used, one might expect sizable and identifiable parts of the aircraft and its equipment to remain.

As to the nature and cause of the suspected malfunction, we are not prepared to pass judgment. But let me remind you that this aircraft and this pilot had proven their high degree of reliability in many technically similar flights, inside and outside friendly territory. When operating as in this case, about 1200 miles within unfriendly, heavily-defended territory, there can be no cushion against malfunction.

* * * * * * *

There has been much comment and questioning with regard to the pilot and his behavior after apprehension. Of course, we only have the Soviets' report on all of this, and we should accept it with caution.

All of the pilots engaged in this enterprise were most carefully selected. They were highly trained, highly motivated, and, as seemed right, well compensated financially. But no one in his right mind would have accepted these risks for money alone.

Since the operational phase of the program started, the reliability record of the plane, for a craft of this character, was little short of phenomenal. It was a tribute to the high skill of the designer, the maintenance crews, and the pilots. Until the May first flight, over about a four-year period of operations, no plane had been lost over unfriendly territory in the course of many, many missions. Several were lost during the training period at home and in friendly territory abroad.

Francis Gary Powers, the pilot on the May 1 flight, is a fourth generation American citizen, born in Jenkins, Kentucky, about 31 years ago. He received a BA degree from Milligan College, Tennessee, in September 1956. Scholastically he was high average. He joined the Air Force in the fall of 1950, as a private and served in an enlisted status until November 1951, when he was discharged as a Corporal in order to enter the Aviation Cadet School to train as a pilot. He attended the Air Force Basic and Advance Pilot Training School at Greenville, Mississippi. Upon completion of this training in December 1952, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant.

His first duty assignment was as an F-84 Commando Jet Pilot with the 468th Strategic Fighter Squadron at Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. He resigned his Air Force Reserve Commission under honorable conditions in May 1956. The reason for such resignation was to join the project we are discussing.

His record with the Air Force had been uniformly good. He was given a special security screening by the Air Force and also a supplemental check by the security office of the CIA.

During his Air Force career, he received training with respect to his behavior and conduct in event of capture, and after entering the employ of the Agency, he took the Agency's escape and evasion course at our training station here in the United States in June of 1956. He had subsequent training in escape and evasion after his assignment to his overseas post in August 1956.

An Air Force Major Flight Surgeon assigned to CIA who worked with the U-2 pilots during their training in the United

and continuously during their stay overseas, had this to say in regard to Francis Powers, "....During the period of my assignment as Flight Surgeon at Adana, I not infrequently shared a room with Mr. Powers and participated in social, flying, and mission duties with him. In my opinion Mr. Powers was outstanding among the pilots for his calmness under pressure, his precision, and his methodical approach to problems. I have flown considerably in jets with Mr. Powers. I would consider him temperate, devoted, perhaps more than unusually patriotic, and a man given to thinking before speaking or acting."

It should be remembered that Powers was a pilot, navigator, a well-rounded aviator trained to handle himself under all conditions, in the air or if grounded in hostile territory. He was not trained as an "agent" as there were no foreseeable circumstances, even the present ones, where he would act as such. Furthermore, such training would have been incompatible both temperamentally and with the strenuous technical demands of his flight missions.

The pilots of these aircrafts on operational missions, and this was true in the case of Powers, received the following instructions for use if downed in a hostile area:

First, it was their duty to ensure the destruction of the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible.

Second, on reaching the ground it was the pilot's first duty to attempt escape and evasion so as to avoid capture, or delay it as long as possible. To aid him in these purposes and for survival he was given the various items of equipment which the Soviets have publicized and which are normal and standard procedure, selected on the basis of wide experience gained in World War II and in Korea.

Third, pilots were equipped with a device for self destruction but were not given positive instructions to make use of it. In the last analysis, this ultimate decision has to be left to the individual himself.

Fourth, in the contingency of capture, pilots were instructed to delay as long as possible the revelation of damaging information.

Fifth, pilots were instructed to tell the truth if faced with a situation, as apparently faced Powers, with respect to those matters which were obviously within the knowledge of his captors as a result of what fell into their hands. In addition, if in a position where some attribution had to be given his mission, he would acknowledge that he was working for the Central Intelligence Agency. This was to make it clear that he was not working for any branch of the armed services, and that his mission was solely an intelligence mission.

These instructions were based on a careful study of our experience in the Korean war of the consequences of brain-washing and of the extent of information which could be obtained by these and other means available to the Soviets.

Whether or not in this instance the pilot complied with all of these instructions, it is hard to state today with the knowledge we have. However, a careful review of what he has said does not indicate that he has given to the Soviets any valuable information which they could not have discovered from the equipment they found upon the pilot's person or retrieved from the downed aircraft.

I would warn, of course, against putting too much belief in what Powers may say, particularly if he is later put on trial. By that time they will have had a more thorough opportunity for a complete brain-washing operation which might well produce a mixture of truth and fiction.

I will now deal with the "cover story" statements which were issued following May 1.

When a plane is overdue and the fact of its takeoff and failure to return is known, some statement must be made, and quickly. Failure to do so, and, under normal conditions, to start a search for the lost plane, would in itself be a suspicious event.

Thus, when the U-2 disappeared on May first and did not return to its base within the requisite time period after its takeoff, action was required.

For many years, in fact since the inception of the operation, consideration has been given to the cover story which would be used in the case of the disappearance of a plane which might possibly be over unfriendly territory.

Because of its special characteristics, the U-2 plane was of great interest to the U.S. weather services and to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the predecessor of NASA. NASA was very much concerned with the scientific advances which operations of these U-2s could make towards greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for other scientific purposes. As already indicated, U-2s have now undertaken many weather and related missions and their functions in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has been distributed freely to the world.

It was therefore natural that NASA's operations be used to explain the presence of U-2s at various bases throughout

the world, although NASA did not participate in the development of intelligence devices, nor did they participate in the planning and conduct of any intelligence missions.

Accordingly, when the May first flight was lost, an initial statement was issued on May 2nd by the Base Commandant at Adana that a U-2 aircraft, engaged in upper air studies and operating from the base was down, and oxygen difficulties had been reported. This was identified in the press as a NASA plane. A search for the plane was initiated in the remote areas of eastern Turkey.

On May 5, early in the day by our time, Khrushchev made his claim that "an American aircraft crossed our frontier and continued its flight into the interior of our country... and... was shot down." At that time, Khrushchev gave no further details of significance.

Apparently as an attempt at deception, Khrushchev followed up his speech the next day by distributing photographs of a pile of junk -- according to experts, pieces of an old Soviet fighter plane -- possibly for the purpose of making us think that the U-2 plane had been effectively destroyed. Since the fake wreckage was quickly identified for what it was, this particular ruse had no effect.

The NASA statement which followed the Khrushchev speech of May 5 developed somewhat further the original cover story. Also on May 5, the Department of State issued a further release which generally followed the cover story. Mr. Dillon has covered this in his testimony before this Committee on May 27.

At this time - on 5-6 May - we still did not know whether the plane or any recognizable parts of it or the pilot were in Soviet hands, or whether the pilot was dead or alive. Furthermore, then we did not know whether Khrushchev desired to blow up the incident as he later did, or put it under the rug and spare his people the knowledge that we had been overflying them.

Hence, in this situation, there seemed no reason at that time to depart from the original cover story.

These two press releases attributed to NASA were worked out in consultation between CIA and NASA and after conferring with the Department of State.

These statements did not come out of any lack of forethought or attention to their preparation or lack of coordination. The basic cover story had been developed some years ago for the

exigency of a failure, and this original cover story was on May 5 modified to meet our then estimate of what was best to say in the light of what little we knew about the details of the May 1 flight failure.

Subsequently, on May 7, Khrushchev adduced evidence that he had the pilot alive, and quoted his purported statements. He also produced certain of the contents of the plane and later various parts of the plane itself. This clearly disclosed the true nature of the mission on which the plane was engaged.

The cover story was outflanked.

The issue then was whether to admit the incident but deny high level responsibility, or to take the course which was decided upon and clearly expressed in Secretary Herter's statement of May 9 and in the President's statement of May 11, and his address of May 25.

In Mr. Herter's appearance before this Committee, he has dealt with the statements which were issued during the period after May 6, except for the two statements involving NASA which I have covered.

I would only add that in my opinion, in the light of all the factors involved, the decision taken to assume responsibility in this particular case was the correct one. Denial, in my opinion, over the long run would have been tortuous and self defeating.

Those who took this decision knew that I was ready to assume the full measure of responsibility and to cover the project as a technical intelligence operation carried out on my own responsibility as Director of CIA. This alternative, too, was rejected because of the many elements making it hardly credible over the longer run.

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This concludes my statement respecting the intelligence aspects of the U-2 project.

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CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF HANDLING OF U-2 INCIDENT

1 May

On Sunday, 1 May, at approximately 0730 hours Washington time, personnel in the CIA operations control center where the [redacted] 25X1 25X1

All key Project personnel assembled in the Agency control center the morning of 1 May to analyze the latest information and to implement appropriate actions to cover the possible loss of the aircraft. Also present were Mr. Walter Bonney, Press Relations Officer, NASA, and Colonel Leo P. Geary, USAF, Project Officer, Mr. Richard Helms, Acting Deputy Director, Plans, and Mr. Hugh Cumming, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. A full scale discussion of proposed texts of a suitable cover story release was held. Mr. Cumming, Mr. Helms, and Colonel Burke went to Mr. Dulles' home about 1500. He proposed revisions in the cover story. This group returned to Colonel Burke's office where they were joined by Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Deputy Director, Plans.

The story as released differed from the one prepared in advance of the mission and distributed to the Field Commander at Adana, to Headquarters, USAFE, Headquarters, USAF, and to the CIA representatives in friendly countries involved in the actual flight plan.

In its final form, the actual release reflected political estimates and inputs of the Department of State and CIA at the time, based on the latest information and the assumption that the aircraft was down deep within the Soviet Union where any story connected with navigational error, pilot hypoxia, or aircraft malfunction would be difficult to sustain. However, in the absence of any verified information on the actual fate of the mission, condition of the aircraft or pilot, and not being certain that the Soviets would admit to a deep penetration, it was agreed that such a covering release did offer the best prospects of being sustained (1) in the event the aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot killed, or (2) should the Soviets take credit for shooting it down, while at the same time electing to move the reported scene of the incident closer to their borders in order to conceal from their own people and the world in general the depth of the penetration.

2-3 May

The revised cover story, backed up by an actual mission flight plan consistent with the purported flight, was sent through CIA communications channels to the Commander of Detachment

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[redacted]

Field Commander was directed to release this story, after

[redacted]

25X1

4 May

On Wednesday, 4 May, before the Soviets had made any disclosure whatsoever, there were meetings at the Department of State attended by Colonel Burke, Mr. Richard H. Davis, Mr. James L. Berry, and Ambassador Bohlen, who went over a question and answer brief prepared by the Agency, principally for use by NASA in the event of Soviet disclosure but designed to be circulated to all affected parties, including USAF Headquarters, Headquarters USAFE,

the Department of State, as well as Detachment 10-10 at Adana. It was assumed that it might have to be amended, depending upon the nature of any disclosure the Soviets might make. The meeting approved the question and answer brief, and it was dispatched to all interested parties in Washington and overseas, the latter through Agency communications channels.

5 May

Khrushchev made his first disclosure. After the NSC meeting at High Point, the President, Secretary Gates, Mr. Gordon Gray, Mr. Dillon, Mr. Dulles and General Goodpaster met to consider the handling of the U-2 incident. It was agreed that the Department of State should handle all publicity and the general outlines of what the Department should say were discussed.

In Washington, there was a meeting in the Department of State in Mr. Raymond Hare's office, attended by Mr. Davis and Mr. Berry of State, and General Cabell and Mr. Bissell of CIA. This meeting was subsequently transferred to Mr. Dillon's office, following the latter's return from High Point.

At 1200 hours, Mr. Hagerty at the White House then made a release stating that the President had ordered an inquiry and that the facts as developed would be forthcoming from NASA and the Department of State.

The NASA Press Officer, Mr. Bonney, received a suggestion from Mr. Hagerty that he hold a press conference as soon as possible as a means of handling the heavy volume of press inquiries. Such a conference was convened at 1330 hours in NASA Headquarters. The NASA press conference was based on the question and answer brief referred to above. In response to direct questioning, Mr. Bonney ~~apparently~~ indicated that the U-2 aircraft had been grounded for equipment checks. On learning of this from Mr. Bonney, CIA sent a message to the U-2 unit in Turkey and later on 9 May to the one in Japan advising them to stand down and to indicate if questioned the stand down was for the purpose of checking equipment, a statement still consistent with the original cover story release. The Edwards Air Force Base NASA Detachment was likewise stood down for a "quick check" of equipment. The afternoon of 5 May, a message was sent to Headquarters, USAFE on Agency channels, coordinated with Headquarters USAF, calling off the dummy air search. At 1430 hours Mr. Bohlen held a background meeting with some 35 press correspondents.

During the meeting in Mr. Dillon's office on 5 May, the Department of State press release was prepared. During its preparation, Mr. Dillon talked on the telephone a number of times with General Goodpaster and at least once with Mr. Dulles regarding the wording

of the release. The Department text, while making reference to the original statement of the missing plane and the oxygen failure, did not wholly commit the Department to this version. This release also referred to the fact that the Soviet Government had been queried as to details and any particulars concerning the fate of the pilot. In this same meeting, the text of the actual note asking the Soviets for details was agreed upon. Mr. Lincoln White, Department of State Press Officer, gave out this release and made certain background remarks at a press conference at 1245 hours.

6 May

There were two radio and press briefings held at the Department of State. One, by Mr. Tully at 1110 hours, and the other by Mr. White at 1235 hours. In reply to a question, Mr. White stated that there was absolutely no "deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space, and there never has been." The statement accurately reflected Mr. White's knowledge of the incident.

7 May

Khrushchev made his second and more detailed statement. There was a meeting from 1100 to 1430 hours in the Director's office, attended by Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell from CIA, Mr. Cumming and Mr. Bohlen from State, and General Goodpaster

from the White House. In this session, a draft statement was prepared for consideration by the Secretary of State which did not go as far as the text actually released.

The final text was drafted by the Secretary of State and Mr. Dillon and cleared with the President, and was released at approximately 1800 hours, acknowledging that "a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken". The DCI was informed by phone of the final decision to, in effect, "come clean". This release, coming six days after the incident, was the first U. S. official statement casting doubts on the initial and only cover story release made Adana, and repeated in more detail in the NASA release of 5 May. On the same day, a public display of a NASA-marked U-2 aircraft was held at the NASA hangar, Edwards Air Force Base, California, as the result of arrangements made by CIA with Lockheed Aircraft Company, to meet insistent press demands for detailed information on the plane and to document further the innocent uses of the aircraft.

8 May

There were no statements by any official source.

9 May

About 1000 hours, a meeting was called in the office of the Secretary of State. In addition to the Secretary and the Under Secretary,

several members of his staff were present, including Messrs. Bohlen, Kohler, Jerry Smith and Macomber. Defense Secretary Gates and Deputy Secretary Douglas also attended, as well as Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell of CIA.

It was decided that Mr. Dulles should brief the Congressional leaders in executive session and tell them the basic facts. Mr. Herter would issue, subject to Presidential approval, a press statement which would clarify the position of the United States Government. Later, after consultation with the White House, it was decided that Mr. Herter would also give his statement to the Congressional leaders prior to public release.

At about 1130 hours, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles returned to their offices and Mr. Dulles spent the intervening time, prior to the 1400 hours session with the Congressional leaders, in preparing his statement. Mr. Bissell shortly returned to the Department of State and attended the session which prepared a first draft of the statement to be made by the Secretary of State. Mr. Dulles did not participate in this drafting session.

Shortly before 1400 hours, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell joined the Secretary of State and drove with him to the Congressional hearing room. While driving to the Capitol, Mr. Dulles showed Mr. Herter the text of his proposed remarks. General Cabell, Mr. Lundahl,

and Mr. Warner joined the group at the Capitol. Mr. Dulles covered the following points: the first overflight was in 1956 and that a considerable number had been made; we tended to disbelieve the Soviet version of the shoot down; valuable information had been obtained. Mr. Bissell gave more details, and Mr. Lundahl showed several selected photographs.

11 May

The President held his press conference.

12 May

General Goodpaster telephoned Mr. Dulles to say that further flights should be suspended.

16 May

The President announced from Paris that high altitude reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union had been suspended since the U-2 incident, in accordance with a decision made on 12 May, and that "these flights would not be resumed". The President

25X1 [redacted]

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complete because unless there is such candor it is most difficult for the Senate to discharge its responsibilities in the field of foreign policy.

As you know, the committee has agreed that these sessions are to be executive. However, in order to make the maximum amount of information available to the public, which must in the final analysis understand our policies if they are to be supported by the people, we have arranged for a high ranking official of the executive branch to delete from the executive transcript any statements or information which might in any way jeopardize the national security. Should any question arise as to whether such deletions go beyond those necessary to protect the national security, I will appoint a bipartisan subcommittee to consider such questions.

I have urged members to limit their questions to those directly relevant to the recent summit conference and incidents related thereto. Although the committee has not considered fully all witnesses it may wish to hear, I have expressed the personal opinion that there is no occasion for private witnesses to be heard on the matter before the committee.

Finally, as you know, the committee has decided that members should for the first time around, at least, limit their period of questioning to not to exceed 10 minutes each.

FOCUS OF STUDY

It is my hope, Mr. Secretary, that our study can be focused on four principal areas: first, the events and decisions resulting from the U–2 incident; second, the effect of these events and decisions upon the summit; third, the policy of our Government regarding the summit meeting; and fourth, the policy of the United States in the future and possible improvement in the execution thereof.

INTEREST IN HEARING

Mr. Secretary, we have some guests from the Senate who have requested to come as observers. I wish to admonish them that this is an executive session, and that they are not to disclose on their own responsibility anything that takes place in these hearings. I might also call to the attention of the committee that it was noted in the press that Tass, the official governmental news agency of Soviet Russia, was the first applicant to purchase a copy of the transcript which will be later released, so we might keep this in mind. The staff of the committee has compiled a set of background documents on events incident to the summit conference. Those documents will be printed as an appendix to the hearings when they are published.

I suggest, Mr. Secretary, that you proceed with your statement for the information of the committee. The Secretary has a statement prepared which will be the presentation of his point of view.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DOUGLAS DILLON, UNDER SECRETARY, AND HON. CHARLES E. BOHLEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate very much your willingness to allow me to make this statement.

This statement is guided very much as indicated by the chairman in the remarks that he has just made in the next to the last paragraph with regard to divisions; namely, the genesis of the summit; the U–2 incident; the events in Paris and the future.

THE THREAT TO BERLIN

I. The genesis of the summit

In order to understand what happened in Paris, we need to look back over the preceding 18 months.

In November 1958, the U.S.S.R. began a new strategy directed toward altering the situation in Berlin and East Germany in its favor. If the Western Powers refused to give up their present position in Berlin and make West Berlin a so-called free city, the Soviet Union stated its intention to proceed unilaterally at the end of 6 months, turning over full sovereignty to the so-called GDR and thereby confronting the Allies with the alternative of capitulation or resort to force which would be met by Communist force.

Though the strategy as it unfolded proved to be more flexible than its original statement, it is still the official policy of the U.S.S.R. Its force lies in the Soviet ability to threaten Berlin, where we are morally committed, but physically exposed.

The Western Powers, of course, promptly rejected the Soviet proposal and reaffirmed their determination to stand by Berlin.

In the months that followed, while the U.S.S.R. elaborated and pressed its strategy, the Western Powers concerted their plans to meet it. They sought to engage the U.S.S.R. in negotiations, thereby clarifying its intentions and either attaining solutions acceptable to the West, or as a minimum, convincing it that unilateral action against Berlin would not be sound.

ENGAGING THE SOVIET UNION IN NEGOTIATION

It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the U.S.S.R. would negotiate on an acceptable basis. In January 1959 the U.S.S.R. proposed a conference to adopt a peace treaty with the two parts of an indefinitely divided Germany.

The Western Powers continued to maintain that a peace treaty could be negotiated and signed only with a united Germany, hence that the reunification of Germany must be settled first.

They also maintained that the only proper solution for Berlin lay in its becoming the capital of a unified Germany, and therefore, they were unwilling to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue. But the U.S.S.R. had held for some time that reunification was solely the business of the Germans and therefore refused to discuss it.

The West persisted during February and March in its efforts to get the Russians talking somehow. It proposed a meeting of Foreign Ministers, with the prospect of a possible summit meeting when due preparations had been made. The U.S.S.R. had repeatedly indicated a desire for that summit meeting since 1956. Finally, a compromise agenda, which did not prejudice the substantive views of either side, was adopted for a Foreign Ministers' meeting and a date was set in May shortly before the expiration of the original Soviet deadline for meeting their arbitrary demands on Berlin.

FOREIGN MINISTERS' DEADLOCK

During the intensive preparations for the meeting the Western Powers developed a new version of their basic position regarding Germany, which was submitted at Geneva as the Western peace plan. It consisted in approaching the unification of Germany through a series of stages, thereby offering the U.S.S.R. a chance to adjust its position gradually to the eventual loss of its hold on East Germany which free elections would presumably bring.

The plan showed flexibility and imagination; it appealed to world opinion; but its rejection by the U.S.S.R. was none the less flat.

The U.S.S.R. stuck adamantly to its previously announced proposals for a peace treaty with a divided Germany. Thus, the basic positions remained totally unreconciled.

Finding no progress possible on Germany, the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. explored the possibility of an interim agreement on Berlin which, without contemplating a basic solution of Berlin as a separate issue, would do something to mitigate difficulties which the U.S.S.R. professed to find there. Though some progress was made in this direction, the U.S.S.R. insisted on language which would have implied the eventual erosion of the Western position in Berlin.

Accordingly, despite the labor of 3 months with only one short adjournment, the Foreign Ministers' meeting ended in deadlock.

HIGH LEVEL TRIPS

The failure of the Foreign Ministers' meeting did not result in a war crisis, however, because a parallel train of events had meanwhile brought hope in a different direction. We took the opportunity of Mikoyan's visit to the Soviet Embassy here in January to arrange informal exchanges of views between the Soviet leader and top U.S. officials.

This was followed in June and July by further visits and exchanges of Kozlov to this country and the Vice President to the U.S.S.R. The fact that these visits took place without public incident and made possible somewhat more realistic communication than usual with the Soviet leadership seemed to offer a possibility—only a possibility, of course—that means of avoiding war and eventually getting Soviet-Western relations into somewhat less dangerous shape might be found by developing these informal contacts.

Accordingly the President decided to go ahead with a move which he and his advisers had long had in mind when the time seemed right. He invited Chairman Khrushchev to visit this country, and the visit was announced before the Foreign Ministers ended their Geneva meeting.

During that visit no progress was made, or indeed expected, on resolving outstanding problems, but a somewhat greater degree of mutual understanding was seemingly attained, particularly on the need to settle international questions by peaceful means rather than by force. There was also a suspension, later publicly acknowledged, of whatever was left of the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin.

PREPARATION FOR THE SUMMIT

After the Khrushchev visit it was judged feasible and desirable by the Western Powers to move toward renewed discussion, this time at the summit. Some flicker of hope for progress on Berlin had appeared at Camp David, whereas Geneva had ended in deadlock. During his American visit Khrushchev had also evinced an interest in the equally vital field of disarmament, and even though disarmament talks were to start in the Committee of Ten at Geneva it was felt that Khrushchev might reserve his constructive moves, if any, for the summit.

Accordingly, after due consultations among the Western heads of government, an invitation to a summit was sent to Khrushchev and accepted by him and after some difficulty over earlier dates the time was finally set for May 16. This move found broad support in Western public opinion.

There ensued an intensive and protracted series of preparations on the Western side, involving repeated meetings not only of the Foreign Ministers and of NATO but even of the heads of government. Within our own Government we also studied most carefully the possibilities of making progress not only on Berlin and Germany but most particularly in disarmament, as well as other aspects of general Soviet-Western relations.

At the December meeting of Western heads of government a consensus emerged that the May summit might well be only one of a series of such meetings, and that it would be largely exploratory. Some modest progress was hoped for, but no major solutions on any front. But if a beginning could be made, the series of talks, possible in a gradually improving atmosphere over the years, might do substantially more.

SUMMIT PROSPECTS DIMMED

In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about "detente." There were comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-United States cultural agreement was signed November 21, and on December 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other powers signed the Antarctic Treaty.

But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess, and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.

Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14

and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal blocwide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation on his speeches available to the committee.

Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight—notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments that he in fact had begun.

The unity of the four Western Powers on Berlin meanwhile presumably signaled to the U.S.S.R. that prospects for eroding the Western position or obtaining Soviet terms on Berlin remained slight. President de Gaulle and other leaders were quite firm in discouraging expectations on this front. The NATO Council in Istanbul May 2–4 also reaffirmed the Western position on German reunification and regretted Soviet refusal to discuss specific practical measures of disarmament. Thus as the summit drew near the prospects for important agreement seemed slender, so long as the U.S.S.R. remained committed to driving the Western Powers out of Berlin and to discussing disarmament in terms of general principles rather than concrete steps.

The Western outlook consistently remained, however, that the summit would be worthwhile. It would afford an opportunity for an exchange of views which would clarify each side's position; it might contribute to some reduction of tensions over Berlin and narrow some of our differences on disarmament. It could be at least a small first step in a long process of improving Soviet-Western relations.

U–2 INCIDENT

II. The U–2 incident

On May 1 occurred the unfortunate failure of an intelligence mission. The U.S.S.R. at once seized on it to complicate the approach to the summit. With regard to the role of the U.S. Government in this matter, I cannot hope to improve on the lucid and straightforward account which the President gave to the Nation Wednesday night. I will, therefore, not attempt to go into detail, although I am of course ready to answer questions concerning my responsibilities.

CENTRAL POINTS IN PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNT OF U–2 INCIDENT

Here I would only like to reemphasize four central points which stood out in the President's account:

1. The U–2 program was an important and efficient intelligence effort. We knew that failure of any mission under this program would have serious consequences, but we considered that the great benefit derived justified the risks involved.

2. The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision. Conditions at a later season would have prevented obtaining very important information. There is never a "good time" for a failure of an intelligence mission. We believe it unwise to lower our vigilance because of these political negotiations.

3. Initial statements by the U.S. Government properly sought first of all to protect the pilot, his intelligence mission, and everything connected with it that might still be kept secret. But when it became clear that plane and pilot were in Soviet hands we believed the Congress and the American people should be given the facts. Thus up to May 7 U.S. statements followed the general line of the cover story, and thereafter were adjusted to the situation as it developed.

4. Since the U–2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case. Announcement of its discontinuance was withheld until the President could convey the fact personally in Paris.

Based on these four points, I believe most Americans will agree that the main course of our actions, given what we knew at any particular time, was sound. In particular, I have doubts that any alteration in the language of U.S. statements would have made any difference in the arbitrary Soviet demands which followed.

KHRUSHCHEV'S ARRIVAL IN PARIS

III. The events in Paris

I should like to give you an account of the major developments at Paris. I shall be as brief as possible, since the details have been widely publicized. But I would like to tell you of those events which in my opinion had a determinant effect there, and particularly those which influenced the decisions of the President.

On my arrival in Paris on Friday, May 13, there was already considerable speculation at the news that Mr. Khrushchev was arriving in Paris on Saturday rather than on Sunday, the day on which the President and Mr. Macmillan were due to arrive.

Mr. Khrushchev's statement on arrival at Orly Airport gave no indication of his subsequent position. It was mild in character and conveyed the distinct impression that he would proceed with the summit conference despite the U–2 incident. Subsequent events showed that this was deliberately designed to conceal his real purpose.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S CALLS ON PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AND PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

On Sunday at 11 a.m., at his request, Mr. Khrushchev, accompanied by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky—which is in itself an unusual procedure which I shall revert to later—called on President de Gaulle at the Elysee Palace.

During this meeting he left with President de Gaulle a memorandum setting forth the conditions which would have to be met by the United States before Khrushchev would be prepared to attend a summit conference. The French delegation provided a copy of this memorandum to the American delegation early that afternoon. The memorandum was subsequently presented by Mr. Khrushchev, without change, as the opening part of his statement to the Four Power meeting on Monday morning, May 16.

After visiting President de Gaulle Sunday morning, Khrushchev called on Prime Minister Macmillan at 4:30 p.m. on the same day and read the same statement of position to him.

The copy of the statement received from the French delegation was, of course, the subject of immediate consultation with the President and with members of the American delegation as to its significance and meaning.

BINDING NATURE OF DECISIONS MADE PRIOR TO KHRUSHCHEV'S DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW

It was our general conclusion, subsequently borne out by the facts, that the position and totally unacceptable demands set forth in this document had been drawn up in Moscow prior to Mr. Khrushchev's departure. In this sense it represented a fixed Soviet governmental position from which even Mr. Khrushchev would not have the authority to depart while in Paris.

I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the collective decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from Moscow. Any substantive changes in these positions apparently required reference back to Moscow before they could be undertaken.

PRESIDENT'S POSITION AT FIRST CONFERENCE MEETING

I should like to emphasize the opinion which was thus unanimously arrived at in the American delegation, since it bore directly upon the position which the President took at the meeting on Monday morning.

It was out of the question, of course, that there should be any acceptance by the President of the humiliating and arrogant conditions of Mr. Khrushchev. We had very much in mind, however, the importance of showing the world that it was Mr. Khrushchev, and no one else, who was placing this summit conference in peril.

The President, therefore, decided before the Monday meeting that the proper course of action, consonant with the great responsibility which he bore and the seriousness of the issues which were to have been discussed at the conference, was for him not to engage in vituperation with Mr. Khrushchev but to demonstrate the restraint and dignity which was incumbent upon the office he holds and which befitted the leader of a great country.

FIRST MEETING OF SUMMIT CONFERENCE—ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUSPENSION OF U–2 FLIGHTS

In connection with this decision, the President resolved to announce to the conference his previously taken decision to suspend further flights of U–2 aircraft over the Soviet Union.

Although the original intention had been to restrict the first meeting of the conference at the summit to the chiefs of state and heads of government and to their interpreters, the President, on learning that Mr. Khrushchev wished to bring Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky, asked Secretary Gates and myself to accompany him to this meeting.

I do not need to describe this meeting in detail beyond saying that Mr. Khrushchev read a statement which, with interpretation, took

fully an hour. He read this entire statement from a prepared text before him. The first part of this statement was the memorandum which he had left with President de Gaulle, plus certain additions which were in the same vein as regards the United States and which referred to Soviet willingness to hold a summit conference within 6 to 8 months. The major addition was the cancellation of the invitation to the President to visit the Soviet Union.

Apart from his statement, which was made public, the President only once joined in the ensuing discussion—in order to make clear to Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues that the suspension of the U–2 flights was not merely for the duration of the conference, but for as long as he was in office.

The balance of the discussion at this meeting, which I should point out was the only one during the entire period in Paris at which the Soviets were present, was largely devoted to attempts by President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan to dissuade Mr. Khrushchev from the irrevocable step of publishing his abusive statement, whose unacceptable conditions would render impossible any conference at the summit, and to Khrushchev's adamant insistence that he would publish this statement and do so at a time of his own choosing. The meeting broke up on the basis of a suggestion by President de Gaulle that the conferees should reflect on this matter for 24 hours and then examine the situation.

BINDING NATURE OF DECISIONS MADE PRIOR TO KHRUSHCHEV'S DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW

This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his departure from Moscow. It is significant in this connection that the statement he issued later that day, Monday, May 16, which was identical with the one he had made at the conference, took no cognizance whatsoever of the discussion at the conference, and in particular of the President's statement concerning the suspension of U–2 overflights.

FINAL PROCEEDINGS IN PARIS

Secretary HERTER. The rest of the proceedings in Paris were anticlimactic. It was apparent to all the Western representatives that there was no possibility of a summit conference short of a changed position on Mr. Khrushchev's part. On Monday, Mr. Macmillan visited Mr. Khrushchev in a fruitless effort to persuade him to withdraw his impossible demands.

On that same day, President de Gaulle decided, with the agreement of the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, to call a session of the summit conference for 3 p.m. on Tuesday, May 17, which was after the 24-hour recess which he had proposed on Monday. He sent invitations in writing to the three other participants.

The President, in accepting, made clear his view that acceptance by the Soviet representative would mean that the Soviets had abandoned the demands which the President had previously found completely unacceptable.

Mr. Khrushchev did not show up at the appointed time for the Tuesday meeting. After a great deal of telephoning between the Soviet Embassy and the French Foreign Office it became clear that he was refusing to attend a summit conference and would only join in what he termed a preliminary meeting to ascertain if conditions could be created for a summit conference. By this reference to "conditions" he obviously meant the acceptance by the United States of all of the conditions he had set forth previously, and indeed he so stated in a written communication to President de Gaulle later that same day.

THE TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE

In the light of Mr. Khrushchev's refusal to attend the summit conference, except on terms which all three Western representatives deemed unacceptable, the three Western heads of government met briefly at 9:30 p.m., on May 17 to approve the final tripartite communique, a copy of which I should like to insert in the record, at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it may be done.

(The tripartite communique referred to appears on p. 235 of appendix 1.)

TRIPARTITE MEETINGS TO ASSESS SITUATION

Secretary HERTER. Thus the summit conference was ended by Soviet intransigence before it began, without addressing the great international issues with which it was supposed to deal.

The following day, Wednesday, May 18, was marked by tripartite meetings of the Western heads of government and their foreign ministers to consider the situation. In these meetings we sought to analyze the reasons for the Soviet attitude, prospects for the future, and the measures that the three Western Powers might adopt.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S PARIS PRESS CONFERENCE

This day was also marked by Mr. Khrushchev's press conference, which was fully reported by press, television, and radio. It was apparently an unparalleled performance of vituperation, abuse, and loss of temper. It should be noted, however, that despite the apparently uncontrolled nature of his remarks and actions at this press conference, Mr. Khrushchev was very careful not to commit himself to any specific course of action in the international field.

ANALYSIS OF SOVIET ACTION

We have naturally given a great deal of thought to the reasons for this extraordinary action by the Soviets in coming all the way from Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose of sabotaging the conference.

I should like to say right off that there are many obscure aspects of this Soviet behavior and that we do not know all considerations and factors which went into its determination. We probably never shall. I hardly need to emphasize here to the members of this committee the complete secrecy in which decisions are arrived at in the Soviet Government and in the hierarchy of the Communist Party, which is the effective ruler of that country. It is only possible to try to deduce

from Soviet actions, after they are taken, the considerations which brought them about. What I give you now, therefore, is at best a tentative estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an estimate which may have to be revised in the light of further information and future events.

DECISION TO WRECK CONFERENCE MADE PRIOR TO KHRUSHCHEV'S DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW

There is one thing, however, that can be regarded as certain: This is that the decision to wreck the conference was made prior to Khrushchev's departure from Moscow. At no point during his stay in Paris—neither when he disclosed his true intentions to General de Gaulle at 11 a.m. on Sunday the 15th nor subsequently—did Khrushchev deviate one inch from his demands that the United States (1) denounce the overflights, (2) apologize to the Soviet Union, (3) punish these flights. Neither the statement made by the President at the one meeting held on Monday nor the serious and responsible efforts of General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr. Khrushchev before and after the President's announcement of suspension of flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his behavior in Paris that he had no authority to modify his position to any significant degree.

SIGNIFICANCE OF GROMYKO AND MALINOVSKY ACCOMPANYING KHRUSHCHEV

The fact that he was accompanied everywhere, and literally everywhere, by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky is an interesting sidelight on this point. There is much speculation as to this change from his previous attitude during his visits both to the United States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings alone with the President and with President de Gaulle, with only interpreters present. The best guess as to the significance of this new factor is that (1) in view of the brutal and threatening attitude he adopted at Paris it was considered desirable to have some tangible evidence of Soviet armed strength in the person of Marshal Malinovsky. Secondly, Gromyko and Malinovsky would be able to testify upon return to Moscow that he had stuck strictly to the agreed position.

DECISION TO CANCEL INVITATION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER; SOVIETS' EXTREME POSITION

It also seems certain that the decision to cancel the invitation to the President was made before Khrushchev left Moscow.

As to what led the Soviets to this extreme position, in regard to the summit meeting which had previously appeared so much desired by Mr. Khrushchev, we enter into the realm of pure speculation, as I indicated earlier. The most we can hope to do in the absence of reliable information is to evaluate the elements and factors which appear to have entered into this decision. I shall try to list them briefly.

SIGNIFICANCE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S DOUBTS OF SUMMIT SUCCESS ON SOVIET TERMS

1. There was considerable indication, particularly during April that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was little likelihood of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the summit. Evidence of Western determination and unity on this point in speeches and statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him to this conclusion. Thus in his Baku speech on April 25, he not only reiterated with the utmost finality his position on Berlin, including his intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German regime, but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success of the summit. By this of course he meant success on Soviet terms.

SOVIET HIERARCHY'S VIEWS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY AND U–2 INCIDENT

2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive, there are a number of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy, particularly his overpersonalization and in Communist eyes overcommitment through personal visits to the United States and France, was arousing at least serious questioning if not opposition to the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the opposition to his conduct of foreign relations which was openly voiced by the Chinese Communists found a sympathetic response among some of his associates, and very probably among the Soviet military.

3. It was against this background that the U–2 incident occurred.

WEIGHING THE FACTORS RESULTING IN CONFERENCE DISRUPTION

A combination of these three factors in our judgment is what resulted in the definite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris conference. To determine how each of these factors should be weighed is, for the moment, beyond our reach.

The U–2 incident was most certainly seized upon and magnified beyond its true proportions as a justification for this decision. It is debatable whether it would have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise another pretext for so radical and violent a position.

It might well be that a lack of success at the summit would have confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult choice, from his point of view, than no conference at all. He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing the conference.

BASIC MISCALCULATION IN SOVIET THINKING

It may seem incredible to you that responsible leaders of a great power should have come all the way to Paris merely for the purpose of wrecking the conference, thereby incurring worldwide condemnation of the Soviet Union and enhancing the sense of unity and purpose among not only the Western Powers represented there but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere.

I believe the answer lies in a basic miscalculation in Mr. Khrushchev's and the Soviet's thinking.

Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped—and this explains his early arrival in Paris—to divide the allies and isolate the United States. He anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands he had set forth and that the conference would then collapse, with the United States bearing responsibility for the rupture before world opinion.

His plans miscarried because our two allies stood solidly and loyally with the United States and refused to be parties to Mr. Khrushchev's scheme. The result, as the whole world knows, was that the position which Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted in the complete isolation of the Soviet Union rather than the United States and in placing the responsibility for the disruption of the conference squarely where it belongs—on his own shoulders.

This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior is strongly supported by the attack which he made at his press conference on General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan for what he termed their lack of objectivity, lack of will and subservience to the allied relationships—in other words, in plain English, for their solidarity with the United States, their loyalty to our common purpose, and their refusal to play the Soviet game.

SIGNS OF NO RADICAL ALTERATION IN SOVIET POLICY

IV. The future

What conclusions should we draw for the future?

I believe the signs are that there has been as yet no radical alteration in Soviet policy, though we can expect the continuance of a propaganda effort designed to split off the United States from its allies. This conclusion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris statements, including those at his press conference. It is supported, somewhat more specifically and definitely, by the statements which he made in Berlin on his way home.

We must remember, however, that, given the nature of the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason that any statement about a phase of Soviet policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain valid in the future.

Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disappointed by the fact that the summit conference was not held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depends, as I have indicated, on actions of the leading Communist countries.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Provisionally, however, I conclude that the implication for U.S. policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be continued. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines with renewed effort. Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our

readiness to get on with outstanding international business in a sober and rational manner.

We must remain prepared to withstand aggressive pressures, not only in Berlin but also elsewhere. I trust that our evident readiness will deter such pressures.

FRESH REALIZATION OF THE DANGERS WE FACE

Among the lessons of Paris, the most important for the free world, including ourselves, it seems to me, is fresh realization of the dangers we face and consequent need for closing of ranks and moving ahead with our own and our allies' programs for strengthening the free world. We came back from Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have allies, and I am sure that our alliances will take new life from this experience.

At the same time I would stress equally the need to expand imaginatively and generously our collaboration with the newly developing countries.

On both accounts, I hope the Congress will give wholehearted support to our mutual security programs as authorized by this committee, which are now more important than ever.

SEEKING TO MAKE PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

We must continue, as the President has said, to seek in a businesslike way to make progress on outstanding problems with the Soviet Union. We intend to go ahead with existing negotiations, to stand by our commitments, and to foster open communication and peaceful exchanges. Above all, we shall not cease from the most determined, patient, resourceful endeavor to find ways to bring the arms race under control and thus to meet the nuclear menace that hangs over mankind.

MAINTAINING A VIGILANT, CALM, AND RESOLUTE POSTURE

I believe in this period it is incumbent upon us, all of us, to keep a calm and steady gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions, statements, and attitudes which might tend unnecessarily to increase international tension. If such an increase is to occur, it should be clearly the fault of the Soviets and we should not do them the favor of providing pretext for action by them which would have this effect.

We should not define as "hard" or "soft" our attitude or policy toward the Soviet Union. To do so is not only to deflect our gaze from the grim reality that confronts us, but even more to plunge us inevitably into fruitless and damaging domestic recrimination. We must now, as in the future, maintain a vigilant, calm, and resolute posture and, insofar as it lies in our power to do so, be accurate in our estimates and effective in our actions.

I would close in expressing the hope that we will not become so fixed in preoccupation with the Soviet challenge as to lose sight of our own constructive purposes—which are larger and more important than merely resisting or reacting to external threats. We have our own vision of the future toward which we want to see the world evolve. We have our own programs for helping to bring that

future about—for holding high the light of freedom, for sharing its message and rewards with emerging nations, for trying to create an international community in which the rule of law will replace the rule of force. It is to these programs that our talents and energies should be rededicated in the uncertain times that lie ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Reporter, I have the documentation mentioned by the Secretary on page 4, which will be inserted in the record at this point. They are the various documents and speeches.

(The documentation referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENTS BY KHRUSHCHEV SINCE VISIT TO UNITED STATES

[Compiled by the Department of State]

The following is a collection of public statements made by Khrushchev from the time of his departure from the United States until May 5, 1960, which are offensive or threatening in nature vis-a-vis the West, particularly the United States. The statements are arranged under the following headings: (1) Berlin-Germany; (2) United States and Western policy; (3) the summit; (4) comments on West during Asian tour. They have been extracted from the following statements and speeches:

Speech in Moscow, upon return from United States, September 28, 1959.
Speech in Vladivostok, October 8, 1959.
Speech to Supreme Soviet, October 31, 1959.
Speech to Soviet journalists, November 14, 1959.
Speech at Hungarian Party Congress, December 1, 1959.
Speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960.
Letter to Chancellor Adenauer, January 28, 1960.
Speech to Indian Parliament, February 11, 1960.
Speech at Delhi civic reception, February 12, 1960.
Speech at Bhilai, February 15, 1960.
Speech at Calcutta dinner, February 15, 1960.
Speech at Jogjakarta, February 21, 1960.
Speech to Indonesian Parliament, February 26, 1960.
Press conference at Jakarta, February 29, 1960.
Press conference at Jakarta, March 1, 1960.
Speech at press luncheon, March 25, 1960.
Speech in Rheims, March 29, 1960.
Press conference at Rambouillet, April 2, 1960.
Speech in Moscow, upon return from France, April 4, 1960.
Speech in Baku, April 25, 1960.

It should be noted that this collection does not include private statements and criticisms of West Germany. On occasion, Khrushchev has been especially offensive and threatening in private talks. The Federal Republic and Chancellor Adenauer personally were the chief targets of offensive public statements on Khrushchev's part during this period. Beginning with his November 14 speech to Soviet journalists, Khrushchev launched a vigorous campaign of slander against the FRG and Adenauer designed to discredit them and isolate the FRG from the West. At times these public statements were truly scurrilous, likening the Chancellor to Nazis, to Hitler, calling him senile, etc.

It is also important to note that in his December 1 speech in Budapest, after a lapse of 3½ months. Khrushchev renewed his threat of a separate peace treaty without any provocation on the part of the West. Apparently Khrushchev then concluded that the West would go ahead with a summit conference and that it was therefore timely to begin exerting pressure on the West on the key issue of Berlin. Moreover, Khrushchev's threat of a separate treaty, in terms of the consequences for the allied position in Berlin, became more explicit and menacing with each succeeding major speech after the December 1 speech, culminating in his April 25 Baku speech threat that the allies would thereby not only be deprived of a legal basis for maintaining access, but would have no right to maintain troops in Berlin.

BERLIN-GERMANY

"The only way [to settle the Berlin problem] is to sign a peace treaty with Germany, and we have submitted a proposal to that effect. There is no evading a peace treaty for anyone, if the other countries on whom the signing of a peace treaty depends stand for peace and coexistence. The vestiges of World War II must at long last be removed, since they constitute a source that nourishes the instigators of a third world war. We are not forcing a solution of the West Berlin problem in point of time; we are setting no deadlines, issuing no ultimatums; but at the same time we shall not slacken our efforts to come to terms with our allies.

"If we try all means and they do not lead to the desired results, we shall have no other way out except signing a peace treaty with whichever of the two German states wants it. And in such a case we shall bear no responsibility for the refusal to sign the peace treaty. It will be borne by those who had an unreasonable approach to the solution of this problem, who did not take the road of easing tension in relations between states but, on the contrary, wanted to preserve the dangerous source threatening the outbreak of a third world war * * *

"We are doing our utmost to make the Soviet proposals acceptable. We do not impose them, but wish to reach agreement through negotiations, though we have every right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany does not wish to sign a peace treaty.

"We have before our eyes the example of the United States of America, which has signed a peace treaty with Japan without us. However, it cannot be held that one side can unilaterally sign treaties while the other cannot, though a peace treaty with Japan was signed earlier to its detriment. * * *

"The liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin will undoubtedly be conducive to this [improving relations]. We wish to reach agreement with all our former allies. This is why we do not fix any time limits. We want the solution of this question to improve, not worsen, our relations. The Soviet Government is ready to try out any conceivable peaceful means to secure a reasonable solution of the German problem, to promote the improvement of the international atmosphere, and to create conditions for disarmament and the establishment of eternal peace on earth for the sake of mankind's happiness.

"But if we do not meet with understanding, if the forces backing Chancellor Adenauer obstinately insist on the 'positions of strength' policy, we shall have no other choice left but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The Soviet Union does not intend to connive with those who are for the continuation of the 'positions of strength' policy. We and our allies would readily sign a treaty with West Germany, but if we do not succeed in this, we shall be compelled to sign a unilateral treaty with the GDR." (Speech at Hungarian Party Congress, December 1, 1959. Khrushchev's first public threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR after his U.S. visit.)

"The Soviet Government considers that a peaceful settlement with Germany is an urgent international question, a question of the very foremost importance. We shall make every effort to have this question solved at last. We sincerely strive to find a solution for the German question together with our allies in the struggle against Hitler Germany. We consider that along with this the question of West Berlin too will be settled on an agreed basis. If, however, all our efforts to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states fail to be crowned with success after all, the Soviet Union, and other willing states, will sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the consequences proceeding from this." (Khrushchev Supreme Soviet speech, January 14, 1960.)

"But what if we do not meet understanding? Could it be that we should live forever without a peace treaty, and forever resign ourselves to an abnormal situation in West Berlin?

"Of course, we cannot reconcile ourselves to such a situation. If the Soviet Union does not meet understanding it will have no other recourse but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the ensuing consequences, including those for West Berlin. That treaty would settle the frontier questions of Germany with the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic. With the signing of a peace treaty it would be clear to all that to strive to alter the existing frontiers means nothing else but to bring matters to a war. We shall not abet aggressive forces which cherish the dream of pushing German frontiers

to the east. If some states refuse to sign a peace treaty it will also be clear to all what they stand for: peace or war, for relaxation of tension and friendly relations or for cold war." (Letter to Adenauer, January 28, 1960.)

"AP CORRESPONDENT. Did you actually say that you will insist on a Western withdrawal from West Berlin regardless of the concessions they may make to Russia's position on disarmament? Did you make this statement to President Gronchi of Italy?

"KHRUSHCHEV. The question is put in a not too correct way. The Western powers are allegedly to make concessions to the Soviet Union on questions of safeguarding peace, while we are to make concessions to the West with regard to Berlin. This is incorrect. These are two independent questions, each of which requires a separate solution.

"Is it only the Soviet Union and the socialist countries that are interested in disarmament, in safeguarding peace? All the peoples are interested in safeguarding peace. This is why it is necessary to consider the disarmament question and solve it in a way beneficial for all countries, for all the peoples, for the cause of peace.

"The question of West Berlin is entirely different. This is a question whose solution has been dragged out for 15 years since the end of the war. How much longer can we wait? A summit conference will meet shortly to strengthen peace, but the leftovers of the last war have not been done away with yet. This situation contradicts commonsense. This is why we shall strive to wipe out the hangovers of war, shall try to convince our allies of the last war to sign a peace treaty with the two existing German states. If they fail to understand this need or if they realize it but refuse to agree, then we shall sign a peace treaty with the GDR.

"When a peace treaty with the GDR is signed, all the consequences of the war against Germany will cease to exist on the territory of the GDR and with regard to West Berlin as well. West Berlin is on the territory of the GDR." (Djakarta press conference, February 29, 1960.)

"Question of FRANCE-SOIR correspondent MICHEL GORDET. 'You are regarded as an advocate of peaceful coexistence and territorial status quo between East and West. If this really is so, why do you question the status quo in Berlin where the military positions of the Western powers are weak?

"* * * If all our possibilities are exhausted and our aspirations not understood, we shall unilaterally sign a peace treaty with the GDR. This will settle the problems connected with the liquidation of the remnants of the war in the territory of the GDR which will sign the peace treaty with us; the problem of liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin will also be settled.'" (Diplomatic Press Association luncheon in Paris, March 25, 1960.)

"We are doing and shall continue to do our utmost to achieve understanding for our policy and to secure the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. I repeat, we shall do our utmost to this end. If the Western powers do not understand our peace-loving position, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR." (Rheims luncheon, March 29, 1960.)

"Fontaine of LE MONDE. Mr. Chairman, you more than once intimated that the Soviet Union would sign a separate treaty with the GDR if the summit meeting did not lead to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Could you say more precisely to what extent such a treaty would affect the communications between the Western garrisons in Berlin and West Germany?

"KHRUSHCHEV. If we do not meet with understanding on the part of the leaders of those countries with which the Soviet Union fought against Hitler Germany, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR alone. However, this is very undesirable for us; we should not like to do so. But if there is no other way out, we—and not only we but a number of other countries that fought against Nazi Germany—will be impelled to sign a peace treaty with the GDR alone, and all rights arising from the surrender of Nazi Germany would then become invalid on the entire territory under the sovereignty of the GDR. Hence, all countries now having garrisons in West Berlin on the basis of the surrender and defeat of Nazi Germany, would lose all rights connected with the occupation of the city. We have declared this more than once and we also reaffirm this today." (Rambouillet press conference, April 2, 1960.)

"We shall do everything to solve this question [German peace treaty] on a basis acceptable to the Western powers. But if our efforts are fruitless, then the Soviet Union will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR. And we are sure that all those who understand the necessity of removing the abnormal situation in the center of Europe will sign it along with the Soviet Union.

"We are also convinced that, despite the efforts of Chancellor Adenauer, the Western powers, sooner or later, will arrive at the same conclusion we have. Life itself will compel them to understand that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states is the only correct solution insuring normal conditions of peace and tranquility in Europe." (Lenin Stadium speech on return from France, April 4, 1960.)

"So that nobody should have any illusions, I would like to state sincerely and directly: those who think this, and those who are going to follow such a policy, are going to be disappointed. The Soviet Government, for its part, will do everything to make our position clear, and will spare no effort to convince our partners of the need to conclude a peace treaty and set up a free city in West Berlin. But if, in spite of all our efforts, the Western powers show themselves unwilling to seek together with the Soviet Union an agreed solution of the question of a peace treaty, and, contrary to common sense, ignore this question, then we shall of course go our own way and will conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

"I think that the Soviet Union will not be alone in concluding this peace treaty. Along with us, it will be signed by many other states which are also convinced of the need for a peaceful settlement with Germany.

"The supporters of an aggressive course where the socialist countries are concerned often reason that allegedly even after the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR, the three Western powers would retain the right as before to the maintenance of their troops in West Berlin. I must say that this is an incorrect interpretation, and a policy which is based on such calculations is doomed to failure.

"It is generally known that the signing of a peace treaty will put an end to those conditions which were brought about by the capitulation of the country. Therefore, when a peace treaty is signed with the GDR, on the whole territory which is controlled by the government of this state, the conditions brought about by the surrender will no longer obtain. Thus in relation to this territory, the rights which the Western powers obtained as a result of the surrender of Hitlerite Germany will also lose effect, including the right to the further maintenance of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

"Some politicians say that they, allegedly, do not recognize the GDR, and therefore they do not want to have anything to do with it. It even gets to the point where they call for insuring the stay of the troops of the three powers in West Berlin, and their rights in relation to that city, as based on the surrender and with the aid of force.

"I must warn such hotheads, that when appeal is not made to right and law, when force is invoked, it is natural that force should be opposed by the force of the other side, a force which will rest on law, on right, and will consequently win the moral support of all countries. It cannot be otherwise.

"Our policy is based on concrete conditions. The Soviet Government is guided by the good intentions of liquidating the remnants of World War II, of removing the occupation regime in West Berlin, and of giving West Berlin the status of a free city. Contrary to the assertions of unscrupulous propaganda in the West, nobody intends to encroach upon the freedom, property, and rights of the inhabitants of West Berlin. They will be given every opportunity and every condition for a free choice of the political and social system they desire.

"But West Berlin lies within the territory of the GDR, and obviously when a peace treaty is signed, the GDR will exercise sovereign rights over its entire state territory. If, therefore, the Western powers should not wish to sign a peace treaty with the GDR, that would not preserve for them the rights on whose preservation they insist. They would then obviously lose the right of access to West Berlin by land, water, or air." (Khrushchev speech at meeting in Baku, April 25, 1960.)

U.S. AND WESTERN POLICY

"There are forces in the U.S. which are acting against us, against the easing of tension, and for the continuation of the cold war. To shut one's eyes to this

would mean showing weakness in the struggle against these evil forces, against these evil spirits.

"* * * I have gained the impression that there are forces in the United States which act not in the same direction as the President. These forces want a continuation of the cold war and the armaments race. Whether these forces are big or small, influential or not influential, whether the forces which support the President can win—and he is supported by the absolute majority of the U.S. people—are questions to which I would not hasten to give a final answer." (Speech in Moscow, upon return from U.S. visit, September 28, 1959.)

"Some militant American generals are trying to frighten us. They are making many speeches with threats against us * * *. I have already said many times that to make militant speeches in our day, when terrible means of destruction have been created, is an extremely dangerous business." (Speech in Vladivostok, October 8, 1959.)

"However, the most bellicose leaders in the West cannot in any way give up the old methods. Echoes of the past are still heard here and there. Take for example the lamentable decision of the U.S. Congress to hold a so-called 'captive nations week' and to offer prayers for their liberation."

"* * * Herter and Assistant Secretary of State Dillon in speeches began something in the nature of psychological attack against the Soviet Union, trying deliberately to distort the character of relations between our country and China * * *. I do not know how it sounds in English, but in Russian attempts of this kind may be called 'bovine logic.'" (Speech to Supreme Soviet, October 31, 1959.)

"Our policy is not a position of strength policy * * *. By the way, I shall reveal—and let people abroad know it, I am making no secret of it—that in one year 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in a factory we visited. This represents millions of tons in terms of conventional explosives. You can well imagine that if this lethal weapon is exploded over some country there will be nothing left there at all." (Speech to Soviet journalists, November 14, 1959.)

"During our talks in Washington I told Mr. Eisenhower that his position differed from mine, of course. I was authorized by the Soviet Government, in conformity with the desire of our people, to immediately sign an agreement on disarmament * * *. I believe that the President also wants this, but apparently he cannot do it because there are still strong quarters in the U.S. that oppose disarmament. We must not be deceived in this respect. Yesterday I read Mr. Nelson Rockefeller's statement * * *. But Messrs. Imperialists, if you try to return to the positions of the cold war, Rockefeller will not save you, just as Dulles could not save you." (Speech to Soviet journalists, November 14, 1959.)

"Even now the enemies of socialism are not abandoning their plans for smashing the socialist camp and are, of course, looking for the weak links in it. They want to rout the socialist countries one by one. We must bear this in mind, because it is real, and we must do everything to deprive our enemies of these hopes, to thwart these hopes." (Speech to Hungarian Party Congress, December 1, 1959.)

"Thirst for profit is pushing some imperialistic circles toward continuing the arms race and maintaining the cold war. These circles are sufficiently influential to harm the cause of easing international tension in certain conditions. Those political leaders who have joined their interests with the policy of the arms race are afraid of the easing of international tension and regard it as unthinkable that this easing could become a fact * * *. It is clear that the imperialists will try again to rally the forces of the advocates of cold war." (Speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960.)

"As to the questions to be discussed at the conference of the heads of governments, I should like to express some reservations. The nearer May 16, the day of the meeting of the heads of government, approaches, the more one-sided becomes the approach of some statesmen of the Western powers to the problems the participants of the conference will have to face. They talk about and fan

those aspects of this or that problem which, if attention is focused on them, cannot further the search for mutually accepted solutions. It goes without saying that such an attitude does not help the search for ways of solving important international issues. On the contrary, it leads to a maintenance of tension and consequently hinders the normalization of relations between states.

"There is no need to look far to find an example. Let us take a speech, recently made by the U.S. under secretary of state, Dillon, and offered as a summary of U.S. policy before the summit conference. This speech positively smelled of the spirit of the cold war. Dillon's speech reminds us, if anything, of a collection of prefabricated arguments, against the USSR and socialist countries, rather than of a responsible political statement. He kicked up a hullabaloo about the constant communist threat to peace, proposed that the conception of peaceful coexistence be thrown overboard, and crassly distorted the Soviet proposals on disarmament, the conclusion of a German peace treaty, and on West Berlin's transformation into a free city.

"Dillon tried to introduce a stream of unfriendliness and mistrust on the very eve of the summit conference, when it is so important to be consistent, to create and support an atmosphere of trust between states. Dillon described the summit conference as a check on the sincerity of the intentions of the USSR. He tried to make out that the outcome of the conference depends entirely on the USSR and not on all the participants. But nobody will succeed in undermining the trust in the good will of the USSR, the policy of which is clear, is permeated by love of peace and has gained the firm sympathy of the peoples.

"In the eyes of the peoples, the summit conference is truly a serious testing of the policies of the states represented at that conference, perhaps, most of all, of the policy of the United States itself. The peoples will judge sincerity of intention on what each of the four powers brings with it to the conference, and what contribution each power is ready to make to the cause of the lessening of international tension.

"But if one goes by the statement of Mr. Dillon, who understandably is not an outsider to government circles in the United States, it turns out that the U.S. Government is ready to come to an agreement on the disarmament question and on the improvement of relations between the states of East and West only if its own viewpoint is accepted on the Berlin question.

"Why did Dillon have to make a statement which is obviously out of harmony with the atmosphere established between the Soviet Union and the United States after my talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David? Maybe this is simply a manifestation of pugnacity by a diplomat who has got it stuck in his head that if one attacks the other side before talks begin, the other side will become more yielding? One would like to say to Mr. Dillon, and to those who may share his opinion, that such methods are most unsuitable in dealing with the Soviet Union." (Speech in Baku, April 25, 1960.)

THE SUMMIT

"Some in the West claim that the Soviet Union has changed its policy and, therefore, it has become easier to talk with us. This is wrong, of course. We were born Communists, we live as Communists, and will not die, but will continue to march onward as Communists." (Khrushchev speech at Soviet journalists' meeting, November 14, 1959 (referring to a de Gaulle statement made at a November 10 press conference).)

"We have recently reached an agreement * * * on convening a conference of heads of government on May 16 in Paris. It is envisaged that this conference will be followed by a number of summit meetings. It would be improvident to try to guess beforehand the possible results of the forthcoming conference * * * (Khrushchev speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960.)

"As for the imminent summit meeting * * * naturally we must not think that all controversial issues can be regulated in one or two meetings between the leaders of Western and Eastern powers." (Khrushchev speech at Paris press luncheon, March 25, 1960.)

NOTE.—For Khrushchev's last public statement on the summit before May 1, see his comments of April 25 in Baku quoted under "U.S. and Western Policy."

COMMENTS ON WEST DURING ASIAN TOUR

"Everyone sees how the plans of the reactionary circles of certain Western powers which pursued a foreign policy 'from positions of strength' are coming to grief. Common sense and the understanding that the policy of 'brinkmanship' is a fatal policy under present conditions are beginning to gain ground.

"It is known that there are circles in the West who are unwilling to reconcile themselves to the beginning of the relaxation of international tension and seek to reverse the march of time and revert the world to cold war times. Especially dangerous in this respect are the activities of the military blocs of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, the holding of military maneuvers in various parts of the world and the establishment of new bases, including those for nuclear-tipped rockets. In this connection it is impossible to overlook the actions of the Japanese ruling circles, which are a danger to the cause of peace.

"The question of peace is the main question of our time. Closely connected with it is the question of the abolition of the colonial system. The sooner the colonial powers are deprived of their colonies—and the colonialists will then be unable to plunder and oppress other nations—the quicker peace on earth will be established * * *.

"In our time, the colonialists cannot act as they did in the past when the destinies of people throughout the world were decided in European capitals. They are casting about for new ways and means of enslaving countries which recently achieved independence * * *

"Especially dangerous to the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America are various forms of collective colonialism. It is impossible not to mention such manifestations of colonialism as military-political blocs.

"Provocations against Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos are but a few of the shameful deeds of the SEATO bloc operating in your area." (Speech to Indonesian Parliament, February 26, 1960.)

"The struggle for strengthening peace is not an easy job, for still active in some countries are influential forces interested in the continued arms race, and in wrecking the prospect now in evidence of a decrease in international tension and in rekindling the cold war.

"Some of the Western countries are advanced just because those of Asia, Africa and Latin America are underdeveloped. It would be only fair for the Western nations to repay at least a portion of the looted wealth to the peoples whom they held in bondage." (Khrushchev speech to Indian Parliament, February 11, 1960.)

"Whereas all the peace-loving peoples want a further relaxation of international tension, the cold and hot war advocates continue galvanizing such aggressive blocs as NATO, SEATO and CENTO." (Khrushchev speech at Civic Reception in Delhi, February 12, 1960.)

"The Soviet Union and the West have two different approaches to aid. The Soviet Union strives to achieve economic aid which promotes economic independence. But some people in the West utilize assistance as a weapon of new colonial policy." (Khrushchev speech at Bhilai, February 15, 1960.)

"I do not think all of you understand when we show bitterness toward colonialists. For some ages you have been oppressed by colonialists, but still you do not feel as strongly as we do, though we have never in the strictest sense been a colony." (Khrushchev speech at a dinner in Calcutta, February 15, 1960.)

"Peace is also sought by the greater part of the peoples of the capitalist states in Europe and North America, even in the United States of America whose people for long have been influenced by the propaganda of those on the side of the cold war, where expressions of agreement with peace are considered almost akin to traitorous acts towards the interest of the state. * * *" (Khrushchev speech at Jogjakarta (State University of Gadjah Mada) February 21, 1960.)

"The European colonialists implanted their so-called civilization in Asia by the sword and the gun and for centuries they held up the development of the countries they enslaved." (Statement at Press Conference, Djakarta, March 1, 1960.)

"However, to be frank, one must say that the Western countries, having pumped out incalculable wealth from the colonies as a result of centuries of plunder and are continuing to pump out wealth in one way or another * * * might be fair enough to allocate at least a portion of this wealth for aid to underdeveloped countries." (Khrushchev speech to Indonesian parliament, February 26, 1960.)

"[Afro-Asian countries] are important suppliers of raw materials for the Western powers. The supporters of aggression understand that when the majority of Afro-Asian countries follow a peace-loving policy, they are unable to count on the use of the rich resources of Afro-Asian countries in their aggressive plans." (Khrushchev speech to Jogjakarta University, February 22, 1960.)

"The capitalist states are guided by the law of their society—no cheating, no sales—in other words help the weak today so that tomorrow the weak will again come to you for assistance. * * * This is not assistance, but striving to hook by the ear and drag into slavery, to make one or another country the object of exploitation by a state or group of persons." (Khrushchev press conference, Djakarta, February 29, 1960.)

ADDITIONAL KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENTS

The following Khrushchev statements all made after his return from the US, do not fit easily into the four categories listed above. They serve, however, to illustrate his interpretation of "peaceful coexistence," "*detente*," "capitalism," "exchange of ideas," etc.

"There were very good things [in the US], but we must not forget the bad things. This little worm, or, rather, giant worm is still alive, and can display its vitality in the future as well." (Moscow Speech on return from US, September 28, 1959.)

"We must realize clearly that the struggle for the consolidation of peace will be a long one. Peaceful coexistence must be understood correctly. Coexistence means the continuation of the struggle between two social systems, but of a struggle by peaceful means, without war, without the interference of one state into the domestic affairs of another state. One should not be afraid. We must struggle resolutely and consistently for our ideas, for our way of life, for our socialist system. The partisans of capitalism too will not, of course, abandon their way of life, their ideology, they will fight. We hold that this struggle must be economic, political, and ideological, but not military." (Novosibirsk speech, October 10, 1959.)

"He who does not recognize peaceful coexistence wittingly or unwittingly slips down into the positions of the cold war and the armaments race, of deciding international problems by force of arms and not by way of peaceful negotiations. Hence it is clear that it is essential to tear off the masks from all those who wish to embellish the policy of the imperialist state who continue the arms race. Things must be called by their names. The aggressive circles of these countries are striving to decide disputed international questions by means of war. All the pacts and alliances set up by the imperialist states are camouflaged by false statements to the effect that they are allegedly defensive, against the threat of communism. But such statements are not new and have been repeatedly exposed by life itself." (Novosibirsk speech, October 10, 1959.)

"The supporters of capitalism are trying to put a new coat on the decrepit capitalist system, but nothing will come of it; just like a horse, you know, that is getting old and is unable to keep its tail up like a young spirited horse. So, the moribund capitalist system will not see a new surge of energy." (Vladivostok speech, October 8, 1959.)

"In the course of these talks [during the Khrushchev US visit] certain American representatives repeatedly spoke about the so-called free dissemination of ideas. They tried to convince me of the need for wider dissemination in our country of books and films especially selected by them, and of the need for free broadcasting. They want to foist upon us all kinds of trash that would poison

the minds of Soviet people. Can we agree to this? Of course not. Our people do not want to consume bad food poisoned with the venom of bourgeois ideas." (Kransoyarsk speech, October 9, 1959.)

In his October 31, 1959 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev assessed the relative relaxation of international tension and gave his interpretation of the causes for it. These remarks were not directly linked to his US trip, but it was clear that this was his intention.

"Only recently, the foreign policy of some Western powers was built on openly aggressive calculations, on the 'positions of strength' policy. The inspirers of this policy wanted to impose their will on the peace-loving peoples"—i.e., the communist bloc countries. "Sometimes this approach to international affairs was styled a 'policy of pushing back' or 'rolling back,' but the essence remained the same * * *" The advocates of this policy "meant direct military intervention in the affairs of the socialist and other peaceable states. From this stemmed the policy of a continuous arms race, illusory hopes of building up 'nuclear supremacy,' etc * * * Now times have changed. Even some of the active exponents of the 'position of strength' policy see its futility * * * At the present time a more sober evaluation of the situation, a more reasonable understanding of the balance of forces on the international scene is gaining ascendancy in the West." This "inevitably leads to the conclusion that plans involving the use of armed forces against the socialist world should be relegated to oblivion. Life itself demands that the states with different social systems should know how to * * * coexist peacefully * * * the main reason [for these recent changes] lies in the growing might and international influence of the Soviet Union, of all countries of the world system of socialism."

Khrushchev's remarks made clear that Moscow regarded the *detente* (and prospective high-level East-West talks) as a consequence, and not a repudiation of its position of strength policy. Furthermore, by claiming that the improved international atmosphere was due mainly to the West's accommodation to growing Soviet power, Khrushchev implied that there would be further improvement only if the West made further concessions.

WHEN WAS DECISION MADE TO SUSPEND OVERFLIGHTS?

The CHAIRMAN. Proceeding, Mr. Secretary, under our agreed regulations, can you tell the committee when the decision to suspend any further flights over Russian territory was taken?

Secretary HERTER. My impression is that it was taken on the Thursday before the President went to Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be Thursday, is that it, the 12th?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the considerations which led to the decision taken on Thursday, the 12th of May, that there should be no further flights over the——

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, I think I answered that in my own statement, in which I said that since the U–2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case.

The CHAIRMAN. It had been compromised sometime before the 12th, hadn't it?

Secretary HERTER. No, sir.

(Subsequently the Department of State informed the Committee that the reporter had misunderstood the Secretary's answer to this question, which had been "Yes, sir.")

QUESTION OF A MORATORIUM ON FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Was a moratorium on flights agreed upon prior to May 1 to be effective at any time after May 1?

Secretary HERTER. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. You would know of it if it had been taken, wouldn't you?

Secretary HERTER. I am sorry? I couldn't hear the question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any moratorium on the flights agreed upon prior to May 1, to be effective at any time after May 1?

Secretary HERTER. I have heard reports to that effect, but of my own knowledge I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Was such a moratorium ever discussed or considered by anyone in the State Department?

Secretary HERTER. Not by Mr. Dillon nor myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Or anyone?

Secretary HERTER. I don't know of anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the CIA considered such a moratorium?

Secretary HERTER. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Dulles or anyone else order a suspension of flights after the loss of the plane on May 1?

Secretary HERTER. That, sir, he will be able to testify to. I can't tell you as of what date he did that.

PREVIOUS U–2 FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Were any other planes lost on these same ventures prior to May 1?

Secretary HERTER. [Deleted.] Not over Soviet territory.

The CHAIRMAN. None had been shot down or lost over Soviet territory?

Secretary HERTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The flight referred to, that Chairman Khrushchev referred to on April 9, you were aware of that, were you?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a successful overflight?

Secretary HERTER. It was.

DELAY IN ANNOUNCING SUSPENSION OF OVERFLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. If the President decided to suspend the flights prior to Monday, May 16, which you stated he did on the 12th, why was this announcement delayed until the meeting with Chairman Khrushchev on the 16th?

Secretary HERTER. Because the President reserved that decision to make the announcement in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the reasoning for doing that?

Secretary HERTER. I cannot give you the answer, sir.

EFFECT OF U–2 INCIDENT ON SOVIET WRECKING OF CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated very convincingly that Chairman Khrushchev came to the conference determined to wreck it. Do you believe that the U–2 incident contributed to this determination on the part of Chairman Khrushchev?

Secretary HERTER. Might I say because I have got a little cold and can't hear too well, can that question be repeated?

The CHAIRMAN. You have said that Chairman Khrushchev came to the conference determined to wreck it. Do you believe the U–2 incident contributed to this determination?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I believe it did. It was one of the factors as I tried to explain in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think——

DELAY IN ANNOUNCING SUSPENSION OF OVERFLIGHTS

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, might I for a moment go back to the previous question you had asked as to the President's delay in announcing the suspension of the flights?

You may recall that he at the summit or at the so-called meeting in Paris coupled that with the offer of bringing into the United Nations a proposal for general overflight program superintended by the United Nations and wanted to couple those two things together.

WHY DIDN'T PRESIDENT DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY FOR U–2 FLIGHT?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, why do you think Chairman Khrushchev left a way out for the President by suggesting in one of his earlier statements that he believed the President did not know about these flights?

Secretary HERTER. I can there, of course, only speculate that he had committed himself very strongly in Russia with regard to his friendship for the President, and wished to in that way continue the possibility of the President disclaiming any responsibility for the flight.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the reason for not accepting this way out on our part? Why didn't we accept that suggestion?

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, that was a question, as you know, of judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what?

Secretary HERTER. It was a question of judgment. As to when the essential facts had been revealed by the capture of the pilot and the plane with all its instrumentation intact, the U.S. Government should admit the fact that this overflight had taken place, that it was an intelligence overflight, and that decision was made, of course, by the President himself.

QUESTION OF WISDOM OF THE HEAD OF A STATE ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESPIONAGE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you are a longtime devotee of international relations and thoroughly familiar with precedents in this field. Is the public assumption of responsibility for espionage by the head of a state the usual and customary practice among nations?

Secretary HERTER. No; the general practice has been, I think, for a long period of time to deny any responsibility whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any precedent in our history or in the history of any great nation in which the head of state has assumed personal responsibility for espionage activities?

Secretary HERTER. No; I do not know of any firsthand. It may be that there have been some. On the other hand, I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that this particular incident was of a very unusual nature.

The CHAIRMAN. As a general policy, do you believe it is wise for the head of state to assume responsibility for espionage activities?

Secretary HERTER. Well, very frankly, I don't think it makes a great deal of difference from the public point of view.

On the other hand I believe in a case of this kind the telling of the truth was the better course than getting deeper into fabricating excuses or disavowing responsibility.

CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESPIONAGE

The CHAIRMAN. What precisely were the reasons that persuaded you to depart from precedent in this case? What were the unusual circumstances you referred to?

Secretary HERTER. The unusual circumstances were the facts that the materiel and the statement of the pilot, not every bit of which was accurate, but a great part of which was accurate, had been revealed, and could have been presented to impartial tribunals for examination.

Under those circumstances, which was very different from the ordinary espionage case I think it would have become extremely evident and was extremely evident that this incident had taken place.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in our spy cases, isn't it a fact that the evidence of the particular person being a spy, of some of those we had, was not in question. The difference is in whether or not the head of state takes responsibility for it, not that it was convincingly evident he was a spy. Isn't that the difference?

Secretary HERTER. That is a difference.

The CHAIRMAN. We often catch a spy. We have ourselves, it has been related, and there is no doubt he is a spy with all the paraphernalia which usually accompanies a spy, but the point I thought that would be very interesting to the committee to know is why in this particular case, in spite of the convincing nature of the evidence that he was a spy, that the President and the head of state should assume responsibility for it.

Secretary HERTER. The first was that it was obvious from the facts as to what had occurred. Second was that the situation which had led to this entire activity was the one which is probably disturbing the peace of the world the most, and leads to the greatest tensions in the world; namely the danger of surprise attack, and the secrecy behind the Soviet Union.

SOVIET DELETION IN MAGAZINE OF REFERENCES TO PRESIDENT'S EXPECTED VISIT TO RUSSIA

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not after the President said that he did know and took full responsibility for these flights that Chairman Khrushchev became completely intransigent and wrecked the conference?

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Secretary HERTER. That is very difficult to determine. If I may, I would like to cite at this point just one piece of evidence that I mentioned yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

On May 6 the Soviet Embassy in Washington, before any statement had been made accepting any degree of responsibility, before the President had made any statement, this was on May 6, canceled from the magazine which is published in the United States similar to the magazine which is published by the United States in Russia, called the U.S.S.R., stopped a press run of that magazine and took out of it all references to the coming visit of the President to Soviet Russia. The magazine had in it a welcome to the President in his visit to Russia, pictures of the places that he was going to, and a good many photographs indicating what a great success his visit was going to be. That was canceled and taken out of the magazine entirely.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Green. I recognize you for 10 minutes.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COORDINATION ON U–2 INCIDENT

Senator GREEN. May I ask a few more questions about the same matter because I do not understand, and perhaps it is my fault, how far the President acted alone and how far the State Department acted alone before they came together and agreed on the situation?

Secretary HERTER. Well, I would say that there was consultation right through this period.

Senator GREEN. I didn't understand.

Secretary HERTER. I would say there was consultation right through in this period. May I make this observation, Mr. Chairman? From the point of view of firsthand knowledge on these matters, I asked Mr. Dillon to come up with me because until May 6, I was out of the United States. He was acting Secretary of State and some of the questions that may be directed to that period when I was out of the country he can answer from firsthand information, whereas I would have to do it only from secondhand information.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to have Mr. Dillon supplement the statement whenever you would like.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Dillon, then will you take up the answer to my question?

Mr. DILLON. All I can say is that in the period that I had responsibility we were in contact regularly with the President with full coordination.

Senator GREEN. Well, the division of authority seems to have resulted in a great many understandings which have been spread well in the press, and the people are anxious to be informed on how it happened; what was the lack in organization or otherwise that was responsible. If you can explain it, I would be glad to have you do so.

ISSUANCE OF COVER STORY ON OVERFLIGHT

Mr. DILLON. If it would be helpful, I will be glad to explain briefly the course of events in the few days after the plane was missing.

We first received news that this plane was missing, was overdue at its home base on Sunday, which was the day that the Soviet Union later said the plane was shot down.

At that time, it was determined that a cover story would be used as was stated by the President the other night, which had been previously prepared for such instance.

There was full coordination on this. I knew that the cover story was to be issued and it was discussed that it would be issued as usual when a plane was lost at the base from which the plane was lost. There would be no statement from Washington, and this information was given to the people who would be in charge of the flight at the base where it flew from in Turkey. [Deleted.] In due course, the statement was put out there that a plane was missing. The general content of that statement by the base commander at Adana at Turkey was that a U–2 aircraft on the weather mission originating at Adana, Turkey, was missing; that the purpose of the plane's flight had been a study of clear air turbulence; that during the flight in southeast Turkey the pilot reported he had oxygen difficulties; that the last word heard from MDB at 7 o'clock Greenwich time; that the aircraft did not land at Adana, as planned; and that it could only be assumed that it was now down.

A search effort, he said, was underway in the Lake Van area and that the pilot's name was being withheld pending notification of the next of kin.

After that statement was made no further action was taken here because we did not know the circumstances of how the plane had been lost, where it had been lost, whether it had been actually lost over Soviet territory or not, although the presumption was that it had been lost over Soviet territory, because that was apparently where it was going to be the greater part of the time in the flight.

EVENTS LEADING TO STATE DEPARTMENT MAY 5 STATEMENT ON MISSING PLANE

The next incident occurred on the morning of Thursday, the 5th of May when we heard of the first speech by Mr. Khrushchev in which it was stated that they had shot down a plane. They didn't say where the plane had been shot down, but they said that an American plane was shot down. This required action and statements on our part. The news of that was received by me during the course of a meeting, a regular meeting of the National Security Council which was being held that day as you will remember, somewhere out of Washington, as a part of a civil defense exercise.

A series of civil defense exercises were underway at that time which had been long scheduled. When we heard that news, it was decided that the State Department would handle all questions regarding it and taking part in the discussion at that time, present at that time were myself, Secretary Gates, and Mr. Allen Dulles. So we were all three aware of this decision.

Meanwhile, back in Washington, members of the State Department were meeting with members of the Central Intelligence Agency to try and work out a proper statement.

As soon as we returned to Washington, that statement was finalized in agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency and the White

House was obviously kept informed of the contents of the statement, and the statement was then put out at 12:45 in the State Department. The text of that statement was this:

The Department has been informed by NASA that as announced May 3 an unarmed plane, a U–2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian has been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having a failure in the oxygen equipment which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

PREPARATION OF GUIDELINES ON MISSING PLANE

Meanwhile, prior to that, in the days immediately before that, there had also been conversations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency regarding information that might be given to NASA in case there were further questions of them in Washington, for confirmation of statements regarding where the plane was down, something of that nature.

General guidelines on this were prepared. This was prior to the 5th, in the period of the 2d and 4th, and these, I understand, were transmitted to NASA by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The State Department at no time worked directly with NASA on any of this publicity or anything regarding these flights.

Senator GORE. Did you say did, or did not?

Mr. DILLON. Did not. This is part of the cover operation.

[Deleted.]

NASA STATEMENT OF MAY 5

So then the next item on this was that shortly after this statement, NASA was asked a lot of questions about the plane and they, following the cover story that had been prepared earlier, put out the statement which appeared in the press that same day. I think that came out about three-quarters of an hour after our statement. They apparently utilized the general guidelines which they had been given, to answer questions and put them together into a statement which was then put out.

Senator HUMPHREY. What was the date of that?

Mr. DILLON. This was done on May 5. This was right after Mr. Khrushchev's first speech in which he said a plane was down somewhere and this was—you will recall also at that time the Soviets printed a photograph of a plane that was supposedly a wreck and we very rapidly learned, I would say within 24 hours, that this photograph was a fraudulent photograph and was not a photograph of the U–2 wreckage, but was a photograph of some Soviet type plane.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, may I get a correction?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the Senator from Rhode Island has expired.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just a technical point. I couldn't follow the sequence. I was wondering about the background documents we have before us and the sequence of relays.

The CHAIRMAN. You will have an opportunity.

Senator GREEN. I would like to have the witness proceed and finish his statement.

Mr. DILLON. Yes; could I finish this statement?

EVENTS LEADING UP TO STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF MAY 7

Almost immediately, I would say on Friday the 6th, we were aware that this was a fraudulent picture, and so that gave us some concern that the Soviets might have a greater knowledge regarding the aircraft than we had previously suspected, and that maybe they had in their possession more of the aircraft and possibly had the pilot in their possession. So this was then followed on Saturday morning, the 7th by Khrushchev's speech in which he stated that they did have the pilot, and gave for the first time actual information as to where it was shot down and so forth.

The Secretary returned to Washington on the afternoon of Friday, May 6, from Istanbul and Greece, and I reported to him on the situation as of that time, and at that time he naturally took over. Therefore, on Saturday morning, we met with him to determine what to do next, and at that moment as we met, we were faced with this new Soviet statement saying that they had the pilot, and a new situation had arisen, and his action at that time the Secretary has explained. But that was when the decision was made to reveal the fact that this was an American plane.

Senator GREEN. If I understand you correctly——

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator has run considerably over his time.

Senator GREEN. May I ask one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. We are under a time limitation.

Senator GREEN. I thank you for what you have said. As I understand it, your explanation is that too many cooks spoil the broth.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Wisconsin.

TIMING OF SOVIET DECISION TO WRECK CONFERENCE

Senator WILEY. I want to congratulate you, gentlemen.

It seems to me that the facts as developed this morning, plus the President's address, give us what we have practically all known from the newspapers as descriptive of this situation. I want to ask just a few questions, Mr. Secretary.

In your opinion, do you think that when Khrushchev went to Paris he had already made up his mind to blow up the conference?

Secretary HERTER. I do, sir, and I think that the bulk of the evidence indicates that he was under instructions to do so.

Senator WILEY. In your opinion, is the matter of using what we have used in the past, the U–2's, for a mere period of years, all in the interest of preserving the integrity of the United States and the integrity of the West?

Secretary HERTER. I do indeed.

Senator WILEY. And, in your opinion, if the U–2 incident hadn't happened—this is sort of a duplication of the question but I want to get to the main question—would Khrushchev have had an adequate excuse or would he have drummed up one?

Secretary HERTER. That can only be a matter of speculation. I think that Mr. Khrushchev, as indicated by his Baku speech, felt

that from his point of view the summit would not turn out satisfactorily, and that the U–2 incident was a convenient handle for him to use to torpedo the conference.

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U–2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator WILEY. Isn't it a fact that from his remarks that he made in his talk in Berlin he knew that we were using what has been called spy planes, and had been using the same for some time?

Secretary HERTER. It certainly does, and that was repeated yesterday by Mr. Gromyko in the statement that he made at the United Nations in which he said they had known of this for some time, that they had known of it at the time that Mr. Khrushchev was at Camp David. [Deleted.]

PRIOR EXPECTATIONS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS AT SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator WILEY. Then because of previous conferences, as you have outlined in your remarks, it is very clear that there was no real reason to think that a conference could have accomplished anything, because isn't it a fact that both parties were adamant?

Secretary HERTER. That is true, sir, insofar as Berlin and the German situation was concerned. It might have been possible to work out some interim agreement for Berlin. I am rather doubtful whether it would have been. There was some hope that in the field of disarmament, the East and the West could have agreed on directives to those who were negotiating in Geneva to get down to specific disarmament measures to make a start, and to break away from the deadlock that had occurred over pure generalities. That is a hope that we had, that something of that kind might come out of the Paris conference. But, as you may recall, in our public statements we had made it very clear that people should not expect, not have too great hopes of what might come out of it. But as the President has himself said, he had hoped perhaps from this and perhaps from succeeding summit conferences there might be some easing of the overall atmosphere, which in time would lead to a solution of some of these problems.

KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENT ON A FUTURE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator WILEY. What do you think is the reason that if Khrushchev was as heated up as he claims he was, that he said in 6 or 8 months there would be another opportunity for a conference?

Secretary HERTER. I think with the admonition that we have been given earlier in the day with regard to not bringing political matters into this discussion, the inference would have to be drawn by each individual for himself on that.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF MAY 25

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take more time except I do believe that into the minutes of this meeting should go the address of the President of May 25, which is already attached to this summation of these background documents. But in view of the

fact that we are asking ourselves certain questions about, let us say, where do we go from here, and that is my last question, I ask that this be incorporated in the minutes of this meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The speech referred to appears on p. 249 of appendix 1.)

FUTURE U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Senator WILEY. Now where do we go from here?

Secretary HERTER. Sir, I tried to indicate that in the last part of my statement. As the President has said, we hope to continue to do business on a businesslike basis with the Soviet Government. We intend to continue with the negotiations that are now underway. We intend to continue with our exchange agreements. One thing I might put in the record at this point. From such information as we have received from our embassies in Moscow, and from our missions in other Soviet bloc countries, the attitude toward our people has remained unchanged. There has been no indication of hostility on a people to people basis that has been evidenced in any way from what happened in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Minnesota.

SOVIET FEAR OF SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO WEST GERMANY

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, on page 4 of your statement, you indicate under the subtitle "Summit Prospects Dimmed," a series of developments that you believe indicated a change in the position or a possibility of a change in the position of the Soviet representatives, particularly Mr. Khrushchev, about the summit.

In the third paragraph you say "But clouds began to gather even then," referring to some developments in the Soviet Union.

If you will recall that period, isn't this about the same time that the United States was considering offering nuclear weapons again to West Germany?

Secretary HERTER. I can't recall that we have ever done that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, there has been considerable talk about the offering of nuclear weapons to our allies.

Secretary HERTER. We have not been offering them to our allies——

Senator HUMPHREY. I know you have not been offering them.

Secretary HERTER. Under the law we cannot do that.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand that. There has been considerable discussion here in the United States of changing the law and offering weapons to our NATO allies.

Secretary HERTER. There may have been discussions on that subject, Senator, but we never made any specific proposal on that point.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you denying there has been any discussion of it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary HERTER. Oh, no; I said there was some discussion.

Senator HUMPHREY. In official circles.

Secretary HERTER. We have never made any specific proposals of any kind.

Senator HUMPHREY. There was enough talk about it so that resolutions have been introduced into the Congress, and the House of Representatives, as you know, to make sure that this didn't happen.

My question relates to this: Is there not a great fear in the Soviet Union of the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons to Western Germany?

Secretary HERTER. I think that is true. I am not sure that it is confined to Western Germany. I think that it applies to the spread of nuclear weapons in other nations and it might well include Communist China.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes; indeed.

PROPAGANDA NATURE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENTS PRECEDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Is it not possible that during this period of the dimming of the summit prospects that you referred to that you are saying here was a little counteroffensive on the propaganda level by the Soviet?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; that is possible. On the other hand, may I say this: The summit conference itself was not agreed upon until December after the President, Messrs. Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer had met in Paris and a note was sent to the Soviet Government suggesting that a summit conference be held and the date was not agreed upon until later than that, the date of May 16.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I want it quite clear I happen to believe, as you indicated, that the Soviets made up their minds to scuttle this conference in light of certain developments, such as the visit of Mr. Khrushchev to President de Gaulle; and when he found out that the Americans, the French, and the British were not going to back out on Berlin, and were not going to agree to a separate settlement in Germany, I think that Mr. Khrushchev did come to the conclusion, as you have indicated, that the summit conference could not be a success and therefore, he wanted to get out of it.

But the point that I am raising in light of your statement is, would we not expect Mr. Khrushchev to blast off, so to speak, on such subjects as Berlin and a separate treaty with Germany? Isn't this and hasn't this been a part of his general line for a considerable period of time?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; it is not confined to Mr. Khrushchev. It has been almost a standard technique, before any conference, to take a very adamant position before the conference.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Well, I only bring this up because while I recognize there was evidence of what you say, possibly a shift of opinion in the Kremlin, there was always a reason for this and there may very well have been the reason that the Soviet leaders constantly want to wage the propaganda war on this nuclear-weapons distribution problem.

STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS AND NEWS BRIEFING OF MAY 5

I want just to correct the record here. I am sorry to have interrupted Senator Green, but Secretary Dillon, when you were discussing for us the sequence of events relating to the U-2 incident, you talked about a press release of the Department of State on May 5; where is it?

Mr. DILLON. I noticed I received this document after I made my statement, and I noticed that it was not included in this document.

I have here a full text of the on-the-record press and radio news briefing by the State Department spokesman on May 5 at 12:45 p.m. I will be glad to submit this record which includes not only the statement but also on-the-record questions and answers which he made, and that should be inserted before the National Aeronautics and Space Administration news release which was given out before that.

(The excerpt from the press and radio news briefing appears on p. 178 of appendix 1.)

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S NEWS RELEASE OF MAY 5

Senator HUMPHREY. Did the Department of Defense give out a release before you did; that is, the State Department?

Mr. DILLON. The Department of Defense's news release was really only confirmation and repetition of the release that had been given out by the airbase commander at Adana, Turkey, and added nothing to that. It merely repeated that that was accurate and that was the one that is in this document.

WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR U–2 FLIGHTS?

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, what agency or who is the person in, the official in, this Government, who is in charge of these flights, such as the U–2 flights?

Secretary HERTER. The Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have constant information, do you have continuing information, in the State Department, as to the number of these flights, the course of these flights, the purpose of these flights?

Secretary HERTER. The general programs had been gone over with the Department. Obviously it is impossible to tell when these flights are going to take place because they are so dependent on the season of the year and on weather conditions.

The Agency has to plan numbers of alternatives so we never know at any particular time or any particular flight. But the general approval of the program had been received from the State Department, of course, as one of the advisers to the President in this matter.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you know of this specific flight ahead of time?

Secretary HERTER. I did not; no. I didn't know it was in the air even when I was overseas nor do I think any of us did until it came down.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that your understanding, Mr. Dillon?

Mr. DILLON. I was not aware that it was in the air until I was informed that it was—it was overdue as I stated previously.

WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR COVER STORY?

Senator HUMPHREY. When something goes wrong on one of these flights, who is responsible for giving the cover story, the coverup story, so to speak?

Mr. DILLON. Central Intelligence Agency, but we are also responsible for agreeing with them that this is a reasonable story, and it is proper in the circumstances, but they have the responsibility for executing it.

[Deleted].

POSSIBILITY OF UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER THE UNITED STATES

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, what do you think would happen in the United States if on our radar screen we should discover a plane flying at high altitude over our territory in this age of the fear of surprise attack?

Secretary HERTER. I think we would do everything we could do to identify it right away.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just identify it?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, identify it. We have the wherewithal, I think to do that.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, would we dispatch interceptors?

Secretary HERTER. I think so.

Senator HUMPHREY. What would be our view of such a flight?

Secretary HERTER. Certainly there is very little that such a flight could ascertain that would worry us much. Every bit of information that we have got in this country seems to be available through public means to anyone who wishes to collect documents. In fact in the whole Russian espionage system they have collected maps, documents, and photographs of every part of the United States.

Senator HUMPHREY. I realize this, but in light of the danger of surprise attack this is what I am getting at. This is a little different, may I say, from a spy working in the railroad yard or taking photographs or even a submarine off our coast even though this gets to be a little serious, too. But in the light of danger of surprise attack by air power, there is some difference, is there not?

Secretary HERTER. There is some difference. On the other hand I think we could identify it very quickly. This is the type of plane that no one could possibly mistake for a bomber when you get close enough to look at it. This is entirely an unarmed glider type of plane.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have we ever shot down any Soviet planes over American territory or over any friendly territory in which we have bases or alliances?

Secretary HERTER. Not that I am aware of.

Senator Humphrey. Have we ever intercepted any Soviet planes, in Korea, for example?

Secretary HERTER. I think we have been able to identify them from time to time. Whether we could say that they were deliberate espionage planes or whether they wandered over the line from the border or not I can't tell you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have we ever shot any down?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U–2 AIRPLANE?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, we hear a great many statements about this plane being shot down. What is the best evidence on that? Was it shot down from its maximum height or did they consider that it had a flameout at that height and then came down to a lower altitude or what?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, there has been a good deal of speculation on that point. I think that we are very skeptical as to whether it was shot down from a very high altitude. [Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think there is considerable difference in a situation where this plane might have been shot down at 60,000 or 70,000 feet, or whether it was shot down or shot at at 5,000 or 7,000 feet.

Secretary HERTER. We are very skeptical and there are certain evidences that it was not shot down from that altitude. [Deleted.]

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U–2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, I think it has been quite well-established from Mr. Khrushchev's statements, that the Russians were aware for some time in the past that flights of this kind had gone over their territory.

I say I think it is quite evident that Mr. Khrushchev was aware or the Russians were aware that flights of this kind had gone on over their territory. At least they claim they were. Did they ever file a protest with the U.S. Government?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, but not with respect to this type of flight.

WILL THE UNITED STATES BE PERMITTED TO INTERVIEW THE PILOT?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that we have requested in Moscow that representatives of this Government be permitted to interview the pilot. Have we had any replies from those requests?

Secretary HERTER. As yet they have not given us that permission. They have said that "When we have finished interrogating him we will give consideration to it."

HEALTH AND PLACE OF IMPRISONMENT OF PILOT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do we have a reasonable idea as to where he is being held?

Secretary HERTER. That I can't tell you. We have been assured that he is in good health, and beyond that I can't tell you whether we know where he is held or not. Perhaps one of my colleagues knows that. I don't think we have any information on that.

DEFENSIVE VALUE TO UNITED STATES OF U–2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you care to give an opinion on the value to this country, in our defensive posture, of these flights, this series of flights which have gone on over Russian territory for the last several years?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir, I will give you this opinion. It is a layman's opinion rather than an expert's opinion, but I think they were of very great value to us.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't it a fact that these flights have enabled us, through the knowledge that we have acquired, to reorient our defensive posture and our equipment and attitudes from time to time because we have been able to find out exactly, in many instances, what the Russians were apparently doing or proposing to do by way of armaments and weapons and installations?

Secretary HERTER. I think that they have been of very great value to us.

EFFECT OF SOVIET INABILITY TO STOP U–2 FLIGHTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, have you had any opportunity to get a reliable cross section reading on what other nations of the world think about the vulnerability of Russian defenses; in other words, on the theory that perhaps a part of Mr. Khrushchev's and the Kremlin's infuriation about this matter is an exposition to the world that they knew about these flights and that they could not stop them from going over the Russian territory with any consistency?

Secretary HERTER. I think that undoubtedly that played a considerable part in his own state of mind with regard to the whole incident, the feeling of frustration that they had not been able to stop these during a period of 4 years.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that that exposure to the Russian people and to many other nations of the world that had been propagandized perhaps into thinking that the Russians were invulnerable may very well have had some effect on the attitudes within the Kremlin?

Secretary HERTER. It may well have had very real effects.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

DOES RUSSIA HAVE A LAND-AIR MISSILE?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do our experts believe that Russia has a land-air missile?

Secretary HERTER. I think you are having both the Secretary of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency that can testify to that better than I could.

Senator MORSE. Have they ever informed you as to what their opinion is as to whether or not Russia has a land-air missile?

Secretary HERTER. We, I think, assume that they do.

Senator MORSE. We assume that they do. Is it on the basis of that assumption that they have been asking Congress for some time for a speedup in our land-air missile program, because of the assumption that Russia may have one?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir. I am being purposely cautious for security reasons as you understand.

Senator MORSE. I understand.

Secretary HERTER. And possibly in executive session when you have talked to Mr. Dulles you could get further information on that point.

Senator MORSE. And yet, I think from the standpoint of our own security, it is rather important that we have some information as to the possibility, on the line of Senator Hickenlooper's question, the possibility of whether or not this was shot down by a land-air missile.

Senator LAUSCHE. A little louder, if the Senator please.

[Deleted].

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U–2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. [Deleted.]

What evidence do we have, Mr. Secretary, that Russia knew of previous American spy plane flights over Russian territory?

Secretary HERTER. Only the statements of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko.

Senator MORSE. When?

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Khrushchev made it a number of times. He did so in his statements in Paris. He did so, I think, in his statements that he made to the Central Committee of the Presidium in Moscow before he left.

Mr. Gromyko made that statement again yesterday.

RIGHTS OVER CAPTURE OF SPIES

Senator MORSE. What international law rights do we have, Mr. Secretary, over capture of American spies by foreign governments?

Secretary HERTER. Excuse me, sir?

Senator MORSE. I repeat it. What international law rights do we have over American spies that have been captured by a foreign government?

Secretary HERTER. We have no rights over them that are in contravention of domestic law. We have no international right.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, Russia is under no international law requirement to make this American spy accessible to American Government officials in Moscow.

Secretary HERTER. I do not think so.

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ON THE U–2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do you think the public knowledge now of these American spy plane flights over Russia has played into the hands of Communist propaganda with the Russian people themselves by increasing the fear, no matter how unfounded we know it is, the fear of the Russian people that our real objective is to make war against Russia?

Secretary HERTER. I think that the Russian Government will do its very best to work along that line in its propaganda.

As I said earlier, the evidence we have so far is that the attitude of the Russian people toward our officials, whether in Moscow or in our missions in the Soviet bloc countries, has shown no change.

[Deleted.]

POSSIBLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF U–2 INCIDENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, what plans, if any, does the administration have of carrying on a peace offensive against Khrushchev now in a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations?

Secretary HERTER. What the situation may be at the time of the General Assembly meeting is a matter of speculation. The fact that, as I indicated in my prepared statement, he had gone through this extraordinary press conference in Paris using very extreme language, but that he did not make any threats of any specific action; that he then went to East Berlin and called off a mass meeting there, and only invited people to a meeting on the following day and then made a statement with regard to the Berlin situation indicating that there would be no action taken for some time, may well indicate that his position on specific things has not changed. However, only time will

tell. What his attitude will be and what the whole attitude will be at the time of the meeting of the Assembly, of course, we can only speculate.

It is very possible that he may want at that time to make a more conciliatory gesture. [Deleted.]

RED CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON SOVIET ACTION

Senator MORSE. To what extent, if any, do you think Red China has put pressure on the Russian leaders to follow this adamant course of action?

Secretary HERTER. That again, sir, is a matter of speculation.

Senator MORSE. You have no evidence?

Secretary HERTER. But the articles which have appeared in the Red Star magazine, which is their official publication, have been of such a highly critical nature of the whole policy of so-called peaceful co-existence, the whole detente policy that Mr. Khrushchev seemed to have been following, that they may well have had a considerable influence.

RED CHINA'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Senator MORSE. Do you have any reason to believe that we may be confronted with a diversionary movement now in Asia by Red China stepping up military activities in Asia seeking to embarrass us?

Secretary HERTER. I think we should be very alert to that.

Senator MORSE. Do we have any late information as to any progress Red China is making in the development of nuclear weapons, either on their own or assisted by Russia?

Secretary HERTER. No, we do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, your time is up.

The Senator from Vermont.

EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW PILOT

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, one of the missing links in that chain of information seems to be the circumstances surrounding the capture of the U–2 or parts of it and the pilot.

Has every effort been made on our part to see the pilot of the U–2 to interview him?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Has the United Nations taken steps to interview him in view of the Russian resolution or demand now being made in the Security Council?

Secretary HERTER. No, not that I know of.

Senator AIKEN. Have they any right to?

Secretary HERTER. Not that I would know of.

HEALTH OF THE PILOT

Senator AIKEN. Have you any information at all regarding the condition of the pilot?

Secretary HERTER. Only what we have been told; he is in good health.

Senator AIKEN. That was Mr. Khrushchev's statement?

Secretary HERTER. That was——

SOVIET PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

Senator AIKEN. But Mr. Khrushchev very evidently, very obviously, undertook to substantiate his first statement with a false photograph, and then, as I understand it, he later showed another fake photograph to the Russians, claiming that was taken from films developed from the camera in the U–2 plane.

Secretary HERTER. I am not quite so sure that second one was a fake.

Senator AIKEN. You are not so sure—well, I am not referring to the supposed remains of the U–2, but to the photograph of the planes lined up on the ground and claimed to be photographs of Russian planes.

Secretary HERTER. Even so, that could have been a genuine development of film from the plane.

Senator AIKEN. All right.

PREVIOUS RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO DOWN A U–2 PLANE

Isn't it a fact that the Russians had previously undertaken to secure a U–2, both by interceptors and rockets?

Secretary HERTER. I can't tell you about that.

Senator AIKEN. Don't you know anything about that, or don't you want to talk?

Secretary HERTER. I can't tell you about rockets. I think there probably have been occasions when they might have tried by interceptor planes, but they couldn't reach that altitude.

UNLIKELIHOOD THAT U–2 WAS BROUGHT DOWN BY A ROCKET

Senator AIKEN. Than you have no comment to make about an undertaking to get one by rockets?

Secretary HERTER. No, I think I can point out one bit of evidence that perhaps will be supplemented when Mr. Dulles testifies here, and that is that the picture of what seemed to be the genuine U–2 plane had bullet holes in the wings and they are not likely to have bullet holes from any rocket.

Senator AIKEN. No.

Does it seem unlikely to you that the U–2 was brought down with a one-shot rocket?

Secretary HERTER. It seems to us very unlikely.

Senator AIKEN. Leaving the pilot and much of the equipment intact as has been claimed?

Secretary HERTER. It seems to us very unlikely.

Senator AIKEN. Wasn't the list of equipment which was given out by Mr. Khrushchev such equipment as would have been naturally carried on any plane that was undertaking to secure information of this type?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. Of any country?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

KHRUSHCHEV'S POSITION ON BERLIN AND EAST GERMANY

Senator AIKEN. Didn't Mr. Khrushchev get himself into a rather untenable position relative to Berlin and East Germany, in fact a

spot so untenable that he found it virtually necessary to scuttle the summit conference one way or the other?

Secretary HERTER. That, of course, again is a matter of speculation. He had committed himself so strongly on these subjects that certainly under circumstances in most free countries, if the chief executive had committed himself to that extent it would have been very hard for him to retreat from that position. Whether or not he has a free enough hand in Soviet Russia to be able to say one thing and act differently the next day or not, I couldn't tell you.

Senator AIKEN. In view of his previous speeches, wasn't he in a position where he was in trouble regardless of what happened at the summit conference?

Secretary HERTER. He had committed himself very firmly.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

VIEWS OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN

Are the United States, France, and Great Britain now in accord with, let's say, the future policy as set forth by the President the night before last?

Secretary HERTER. They have expressed great satisfaction with that.

I beg your pardon. I haven't seen any comment of theirs with regard to his statement the night before last. I am speaking of his statement in Paris.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary HERTER. The position that he took in Paris, they expressed complete accord with that.

Senator AIKEN. Have we received any reprimand or any statement in the nature of a reprimand from Britain or France?

Secretary HERTER. None whatever.

U.S. AND U.S.S.R. SPY SYSTEMS

Senator AIKEN (continuing). Since the incidents of recent weeks.

Yesterday, I got a letter from a lady who I thought was somewhat misinformed, probably not indoctrinated, just misinformed, stating that it was the U.S. spy system that forced Russia to maintain a spy system. Do you go along with that theory? It seems to be shared by a good many people, and seems to be a theory which is quite generally distributed though not believed in certain quarters.

Secretary HERTER. I would think, sir, that going back into history that Russia has had a much longer history than the United States and a spy system has been an integral part of Russia's history. [Deleted.]

Senator AIKEN. It is my impression that Russia had an effective system before we did.

Secretary HERTER. Long before.

Senator AIKEN. And that we were very apologetic about our lack of a system up until now.

Well, that is about all.

EFFECT OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

One other thing that seems to bother some people is this:

Would you agree with anyone who stated that if the United States would disarm unilaterally Russia would promptly follow suit?

Secreary HERTER. If we disarmed unilaterally?

Senator AIKEN. If the United States would disarm unilaterally as an example to the world, Russia would promptly follow suit?

Secretary HERTER. I do not.

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long?

PLANS IN EVENT OF SOVIET DOWNING OF U–2

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, I believe that U–2 flights should have been made. I have said that publicly and I have stayed by that statement.

I wondered if the Department and those responsible had not planned well in advance just what we were going to do when the Soviets ultimately got one of these U–2's. Had there been such plans made?

Secretary HERTER. I believe they had. [Deleted.]

Senator LONG. Yes. But that also involves your responsibility because you would be the one who would give the explanation.

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Senator LONG. While I don't see how the great powers can avoid conducting espionage and military intelligence, as a practical matter as long as it is conducted on the other person's soil, isn't that a violation of international law?

Secretary HERTER. All espionage is a violation of sovereignty, all forms of espionage.

[Deleted.]

However, the Chicago Convention, which is the principal convention dealing with this, has never been accepted by the Russians nor have they accepted any bilateral agreement with regard to airspace over their country.

[Deleted.]

DEVICES CARRIED BY PILOT

Senator LONG. Are these statements about this poison needle and the self-destruction devices correct?

Secretary HERTER. I think so, but there, again, I think that the testimony of Mr. Dulles would be more accurate than anything I could give.

[Deleted.]

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING

Senator LONG. Might I ask this question, also: What is your impression of the present condition of our intelligence behind the Iron

Curtain? Do you believe that we have adequate information, or do you believe it is far from adequate as to what we feel we need to know about a potential opponent?

Secretary HERTER. Well, I think I can answer that in only one way. I think that we are doing the best we can to secure such information as we consider vital. No intelligence service is ever considered perfect. No intelligence service is ever considered completely adequate.

I think we are doing, as I said in connection with this particular operation I felt we were doing, a prudent and efficient job.

ADMISSION OF ESPIONAGE FLIGHT

Senator LONG. Well, I believe I had some information about these U-2 flights prior to this time, not as a member of this committee, but this is information I have run across from time to time as a Senator of the United States. I did not seek to be informed officially and did not want to know directly any more than the hearsay information I had on the subject.

But the thought that occurs to me is this: Would it not be the original plan that this Nation would not under any circumstances admit that it was sending those planes behind the Iron Curtain in the event that one of those planes was captured?

Secretary HERTER. I think that, as Mr. Dillon has explained, a cover story was prepared for that contingency. I think the actual circumstances turned out to be rather different from anything that had been anticipated in the preparatory work that had been done.

Senator LONG. Well, the previous planning had been that we would not admit it; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator LONG. Now, of course, the Russians are in no position to put us on trial. They won't go before the World Court on anything with us, will they?

Secretary HERTER. They have not.

Senator LONG. As a matter of fact, have we not previously tried to get them before the World Court on the shooting down of our planes?

Secretary HERTER. We have tried to get Bulgaria before the World Court and have offered to take one of the cases, the border cases, to court, and they have refused.

Senator LONG. And they have declined?

Secretary HERTER. They have declined.

Senator LONG. In the absence of any admission on the part of this Government, how could they have possibly placed us in a position to force us to admit that that plane was deliberately sent there?

Secretary HERTER. Well, the other cases were all borderline cases of incursions over the edge of the border. This particular case, the plane was shot down in the very center of Russia, some 2,000 kilometers inside of Russia.

Senator LONG. But the point I have in mind, Mr. Secretary, is that I don't see how they can force you to take the fifth amendment because they wouldn't get you before a tribunal to do it because they wouldn't go before it themselves. And I don't see how they could have forced you to concede that that was an authorized mission unless somebody, the President or you, elected to make that admission.

BRINGING INSTANCES OF ESPIONAGE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

But do you see any way that the Soviets could have compelled you to admit that that espionage mission was a calculated plan and deliberately undertaken?

Secretary HERTER. No, sir, the alternative for us was to continue denying any responsibility whatsoever for it. They would undoubtedly as they said they would do, take it before the United Nations, submit all the evidence to the United Nations, and we would have dug ourselves in deeper and deeper in a denial of something which was perfectly self-evident. That was the choice that we were faced with.

Senator LONG. Well, a denial of espionage; but you also would have considerable indication that they would be denying espionage on their part that you are in position to fairly well prove, could you not? Could you not try your espionage cases before the United Nations as well as they could?

Secretary HERTER. We can. But espionage cases we try before our own courts.

Senator LONG. Yes, but if they wanted to try this case before the United Nations, couldn't you just as well have insisted on trying the cases of their espionage in the United Nations simultaneously?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, we could, but in that particular case the issue was a rather different one.

EFFECT OF PLEADING GUILTY OF ESPIONAGE

Senator LONG. Here is the thought that occurs to me. Under the Russian system if the leader admits he made a mistake he has to resign more or less as Malenkov did or more or less throw himself on the mercy of the party. But when we plead guilty to espionage in this case, how can we plead guilty on the one hand and contend that there is no punishment in order when we plead guilty to violating international law?

Secretary HERTER. We have said we admitted it entirely on the ground that for ourselves and for the free world it was essential for us to get information with regard to dangers of surprise attack or aggression.

Senator LONG. The thought that occurs to me is that; and I am not sure that we are in a position to be completely self-righteous about passing judgment on ourselves in our own case; that is what your own people have said, that we judge our own case and do not let the World Court decide these matters. I, for one, have been holding back because I am not sure we have a fair court. But how do you throw yourselves on the mercy of the Court and deny the Court the right more or less to judge what the penalty should be?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, the cases to which you are referring, of which there have been quite a number, have all been border cases where there was no espionage involved, where it was a question of a border patrol or weather patrol or something of that kind where the issue was as to whether or not there was an intentional overflight or not which is entirely different from this particular case.

Senator LONG. Yes, but the thought that occurs to me is that we didn't have to plead guilty to anything. I know lawyers represent guilty clients. Now, as with the lawyer, when you plead guilty,

aren't you more or less in a position that you do have either to apologize or take corrective action, or even under our system of law more or less offer to take your punishment if you are going to plead guilty?

Secretary HERTER. As you may recall, the President had stated that he had taken corrective action. He has characterized this as a regrettable incident. When a demand was made on him, these other demands on him, I don't think you, sir, or anyone else could have accepted those demands.

Senator LONG. I don't require my part of your examination be made a part of the public record, Mr. Secretary. I don't insist on it all, but I don't very well see how we can take the attitude that we are going to plead guilty in the matter and then take the attitude that no apology is forthcoming.

Secretary HERTER. I think this, sir, the circumstances which required our admission are the most important thing of all.

Senator GORE. Would you restate that, please, sir?

Secretary HERTER. That the circumstances which required our taking this action of espionage, namely the tremendous importance to the whole free world and to ourselves of having some knowledge as to whether a sudden surprise attack is going to hit us or what form of aggression was likely to be perpetrated, justified the action.

Senator LONG. [Deleted.] My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas.

INFLUENCE OF KHRUSHCHEV ACTIONS ON FUTURE U.S. INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask questions on two items that I have selected from the mail I have received on the summit conference.

The first is that people that write me are concerned because of the fact that Mr. Khrushchev hurled such epithets at us, our President and the Nation, as they have—a coward, a bandit, and aggressor.

Will that influence our course of action in getting information that is necessary for our security?

Secretary HERTER. I think we will do whatever we feel is essential for our security. I am not saying in that respect that we are going to deliberately utilize the U–2 again. I have never said that.

Senator CARLSON. That is one of the questions that concerns our people at the present time.

I was wondering—can we assure the American people that despite all this tirade, there will be no slackening in our efforts to secure, by any measures or means, the information that is necessary for the security of this Nation?

Secretary HERTER. I think both the President—I think the President in particular, has made that very clear.

QUESTION OF MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO IN BERLIN

Senator CARLSON. I have selected from the mail this question: Can Mr. Khrushchev be counted on to keep his word on maintaining the status quo in Berlin until another summit meeting?

Secretary HERTER. That is one, sir, that I cannot answer.

Senator CARLSON. That is one of the questions that we are getting.

Now, we are treaty-bound to protect Berlin. Furthermore, we have in recent months assured West Berlin that we will never forsake them. Mr. Khrushchev has said plainly that he would meet force with force in Berlin.

Can the American people be assured that the United States has the full cooperation of our allies in maintaining our position on the Berlin status?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, one of the most impressive things that I have ever seen was the meeting of NATO that took place after the aborted, so-called summit conference. I have never seen such unanimity, such firmness, such determination as exhibited at that meeting.

Senator CARLSON. That statement should be at least encouraging to those of us who are concerned about the situation.

CONTINUED EFFORTS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

Another thing that I have picked from my mail is this matter that the people are concerned about.

Will the United States continue to press for controlled disarmament and nuclear test suspension?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir. I have indicated in my prepared statement that we will continue to do this.

As you know, however, the conditions that we have always adhered to is that the controls have got to be controls that one can rely upon. In other words, reliable controls on both sides.

I think that with the very real danger that exists in the world today of accidental events that may lead to a nuclear war, that we should pursue the course of doing whatever we can to minimize that danger, within the bounds that we have stated; namely, that of reciprocal and effective control.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are making any progress on these nuclear test suspensions at the Geneva Conference and other places?

Secretary HERTER. During the last few weeks, really the last few days, they have been meeting in Geneva examining a coordinated program of research for improving instrumentation so that small shots can be detected underground.

Those conferences have moved, I think, pretty satisfactorily. They are halted at this moment, awaiting some instructions from Moscow.

In the next few days we should know better whether or not there has been any radical change of position on the part of the Russians or not. There is some chance of reaching agreement. It will be a limited agreement at best, but that again depends on full agreement with regard to the control mechanisms.

As you know, those talks have been going for a long time. Until they are shown to be hopeless, I think we will continue with them.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.

THREE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that three crucial questions here are these:

One. Was there a failure in policy?

Two. Who, if anyone, was in charge?

Three. Was there a lack of coordination and a breakdown in administrative procedure?

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

Senator GORE. Would you like me to repeat all of them?

I said that there were three questions, it seemed to me, three crucial questions.

One, was there a failure of policy?

Two, who, if anyone, was in charge?

Three, was there a lack of coordination and breakdown in administrative procedure?

I should like to explore these three questions in inverse order.

RECEIPT OF FIRST INFORMATION THAT U–2 PLANE WAS DOWN IN RUSSIA

When did the Department first receive information that the U–2 flight was down in Russia?

Mr. DILLON. Senator, since I was Acting Secretary at that time, I think it is proper for me to answer that.

That information was received in the Department during the day, on Sunday, the 1st of May, at about the middle of the day, our time.

Senator GORE. What was the nature of that information?

Mr. DILLON. The nature of the information as conveyed to me, which had been received in the Department through the Central Intelligence Agency, was that this plane was overdue at its destination, and that the time beyond which its fuel supply would carry it had run out; and so, therefore, it was presumed down somewhere.

Senator GORE. The question I ask is, When did you first have some notice, some information, some hint that the plane was actually down in Russian territory? I was not referring to your presumption that because of its flight pattern and the amount of fuel that it must be down.

When did you actually receive some intelligence, some hint, that the Soviets had the plane?

Mr. DILLON. That the Soviets had the plane—I think the first information we received on that was at the time Mr. Khrushchev made his statement on Thursday morning before the—I think it was the Supreme Soviet—on the 5th day of May.

Senator GORE. Are you sure you received no hint, no information, no report from either your Embassy in Russia or the Central Intelligence Agency that the plane might actually be down in Russia?

Mr. DILLON. Since most of the flight pattern of the plane, its mission, was to spend most of its time over the Soviet Union, it was our assumption, right from the first word, that when the plane did not return that it was most likely that it was down in the Soviet Union. But we did not receive any specific information that it was down in the Soviet Union, that the Russians had either the plane, the pilot, or any parts of it, until Mr. Khrushchev made the statement on Thursday morning.

RECEIPT OF FIRST INFORMATION THAT PILOT HAD BEEN CAPTURED

Senator GORE. When did you first receive some hint, some information, some indication that the Soviets might have the pilot alive?

Mr. DILLON. The first information we received on that was received in the Department in the afternoon of the 5th day of May, after we had put out our first statements.

This was in the form of a report from our Embassy in Moscow saying that various other foreign diplomats had heard at cocktail parties or receptions from various Soviet officials that this plane was down and at one time, to one of these foreign diplomats, a Soviet official said that they had the pilot and that report reached us.

We didn't know whether it was accurate or not, but it gave us pause. That reached us the afternoon of Thursday, and I think it was on Friday that we identified the fact that a photograph of the wreckage as put out by the Soviets was a fraud and so then at that time we assumed, we acted on the assumption from then on, that they probably had the pilot and that they possibly had a good deal of the plane.

Senator GORE. A member of your Department informed me in the offices of the committee on Friday morning of the 6th that the Department did, in fact, have information indicating that the Soviets might have this pilot alive.

Mr. DILLON. That was probably reporting the information which I said was received the afternoon of the 5th regarding that.

BASIS FOR STATEMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT'S NEWS DIRECTOR LINCOLN WHITE

Senator GORE. Yes. Now you say that you knew of the flight, you knew of the flight pattern, and you assumed that the plane was down in Russia.

You say now that on the 5th you received this information that the pilot was probably alive and yet, on the afternoon of the 6th, this Mr. Lincoln White, official spokesman for the Department, said this:

> There was absolutely no—N-O, no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace. There has never been.

Did you authorize that statement?

Mr. DILLON. No, not specifically. Mr. White was not one of those in the Department of State that had any knowledge of these operations.

The statement which we authorized the day before, which is in the record, was not that categoric. But I don't think that there was any reason why he shouldn't have made such a statement. He drew that conclusion from the NASA statement of the day before and when he was asked questions—he didn't volunteer this statement. He was being questioned apparently in a press conference and he made that statement.

We did not authorize a statement, specifically. He did not ask us for it, but he thought he was carrying out the NASA story.

QUESTION OF COORDINATION REGARDING MR. WHITE'S STATEMENT

Senator GORE. Is Mr. White authorized to speak to the U.S. press on behalf of the Department of State?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, he is.

Senator GORE. Are you now saying that he was making statements about this, but that he was not informed on the subject?

Mr. DILLON. I am stating that he was not informed as to the facts of this intelligence operation any more than the people who made the press statements for NASA were informed of the facts of it.

Senator GORE. Do you call that responsible and coordinated performance?

Mr. DILLON. We are getting at this stage, Senator, into another question, the key question of intelligence. When you have something as important and secret as this, it is important to limit the knowledge to the minimum number of people and this was strictly limited throughout the Government and we did limit it in the State Department.

We did not think it was proper to inform our press people. There was a special procedure for people who were informed of this, and the press people were not so informed.

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I am not questioning you about the initial cover statement issue you had in Turkey. I am asking you about an official falsehood on May 6, after you say the Department knew of the flight pattern, assumed the plane was down, a whole day after you received information that the pilot was probably alive and in the afternoon of the day after even I had been informed. I ask you again if you think this is an example of the coordination which you earlier told us the Department had.

Mr. DILLON. Senator, I will answer that. I think it took a major effort which was reached the following day that we were going to abandon our cover story and tell the truth. That decision could not be reached rapidly and quickly. It was reached after long sessions with the Secretary on Saturday and until that was reached, we saw no reason to inform our press officer of anything but the cover story which is what we were standing by up until that time.

BASIS FOR MR. WHITE'S STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I interrupt? I didn't understand why Mr. White wasn't required to clear his statement at this time with you.

Mr. DILLON. I am glad to answer that. Mr. White sees the press every day, and he does not know in advance necessarily the detailed questions that he may be asked.

If a question comes that he thinks he does not know the answer to, he does clear it with us.

Now, the day before, when we put out our statement, it was given to him and he followed exactly what he had been told. He did not make any statement that was quite as categoric as this statement he made the following day.

The CHAIRMAN. Why didn't he stand on the one that had been cleared?

Mr. DILLON. This was just an answer to a question. Why he did it, he thought he was telling the truth. I think he acted perfectly all right. He did not think that this was a new question. He thought he was following the cover story, which he was. So he made this statement. It wasn't a statement; it was in answer to a question. I want to emphasize that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a very categorical statement that went far beyond the other statement. That is what begins to complicate your situation, doesn't it?

Mr. DILLON. Possibly to some extent, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES

Senator LAUSCHE. First of all, I want to pursue this question. Shall we abandon or modify our efforts of gathering intelligence, covering the military activities of potential aggressors?

First, I ask Mr. Herter this question. At any time during the appearance of Mr. Dulles, the Central Intelligence Agency Director, before this committee, do you know of him at any time being challenged or asked about how he acquired intelligence?

Secretary HERTER. That I cannot answer at firsthand. My impression is that there was a very small group in the Senate with whom he conferred. He has got this responsibility under the law, which was written by the Congress.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have answered my question. Have you ever heard of any member of this committee or any member of the Congress asking the Central Intelligence Agency to discontinue acquiring intelligence or to modify its methods?

Secretary HERTER. No, I do not.

May I qualify that to this extent? I think that Senator Mansfield had introduced a measure which would provide for a different method of coordinating with the Congress. That is the only thing I do know of.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would it be right to assume that at this very moment there is great probability that there are Soviet intelligence agents operating in our country?

Secretary HERTER. I would assume so.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know of any member of our Defense Department in a responsible position, or any person in any government who is responsible for security, taking the position that intelligence of a potential enemy's conduct is not essential for the proper development of a nation's own defense?

Secretary HERTER. I do not.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do I understand that you subscribe to the statement made by the President that for the protection of the security of our country it is essential that intelligence of potential enemies' conduct be acquired?

Secretary HERTER. I do.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, this question: Do you feel that it would be wise for our Government in the face of the discussions about peace and disarmament and banning of nuclear tests to discontinue our intelligence activities?

Secretary HERTER. I do not.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would it be a danger to our country if at this moment while we are discussing disarmament and banning of nuclear tests we scuttle the Central Intelligence Agency?

Secretary HERTER. I certainly would not advocate anything of the kind.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is it historically concerning men in a responsible position for the protection of a country, beginning from the earliest days of recorded battles about the use of scouts and intelligence agents, so as to properly guide a country in what it ought to do?

Secretary HERTER. It is a custom, sir, that has grown up, I imagine, ever since warfare began.

KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, the second question: Is it your considered opinion that when Khrushchev came to Paris he had already decided not to participate in the summit conference?

Secretary HERTER. That is our best judgment.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that judgment is formulated not upon what he has said but what he has done; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. It is a combination of both. But it is mostly in what he has said, and the assumption is that he had received his orders before he went to Paris.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it a fact that beginning in December 1959 and going down into April, he has made statements indicating that the probability was that there would never be a conference?

Secretary HERTER. Not the probability that there would never be a conference but that if a conference were held it would not turn out to his satisfaction.

KHRUSHCHEV'S MEETINGS WITH DE GAULLE AND MACMILLAN

Senator LAUSCHE. He was scheduled to arrive in Paris on Sunday, May 15; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. But instead of coming there on Sunday, May 15, he came there on Saturday, May 14.

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And on Sunday morning he, with Malinovsky, at the early hour of 11 o'clock already had made an appointment to see de Gaulle.

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And at that meeting this vigorous statement about what they expected of Eisenhower if Khrushchev were to attend the conference was read.

Secretary HERTER. Yes; that was not only read but a copy of it was given to General de Gaulle.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why do you think that he came there before his scheduled visit of Sunday and made it Saturday?

Secretary HERTER. Why he came to Paris at all is the real question. That is a question that General de Gaulle asked him at the time of the one meeting when the four were present and to which the answer was completely unsatisfactory.

Senator LAUSCHE. So that at 11 o'clock in the morning he met with de Gaulle and laid down these four demands upon Eisenhower.

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then at the hour of 4:30 in the afternoon he went to Macmillan and to Macmillan repeated those demands, that unless they were met he would not attend the conference.

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did anything happen between his arrival on Saturday, his action at 11 o'clock in the morning on Sunday, and 4:30 on Sunday, that would have caused him to change his mind from what he was thinking when he left Moscow?

Secretary HERTER. Not a thing.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S DEMANDS

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, Mr. Secretary, getting down to these demands that he made; that is, he demanded that Eisenhower denounce the overflights; is that correct; and two, that he apologize to the Soviet Union.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. And three, that he punish those directly responsible.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. And four, that Eisenhower promise not to repeat these flights.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, may I add there, sir, that the demand for the apology was added; it was not in the original document. It was one that was added by him while he was in Paris as a fourth condition.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can we assume that Khrushchev honestly expected that these demands that he made upon Eisenhower would be complied with?

Secretary HERTER. He could not have possibly.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is additional proof confirming the assumption that when he left Moscow he never intended to participate in the conference.

Secretary HERTER. You are quite right, sir.

WHY DID KHRUSHCHEV GO TO PARIS?

Senator LAUSCHE. Why couldn't he have issued this statement while he was in Moscow, and why did he go to Paris instead of making the statement in Moscow?

Secretary HERTER. There it is a matter of speculation but I think that the desire to dramatize himself, the fact that there would be 3,000 correspondents in Paris, that he would have a larger audience in that place, led him to take this particular route.

SOVIET MISDEEDS

Senator LAUSCHE. Was anything said anywhere about his train of misdeeds, of the Communist Reds', beginning from the very day that they were established as a country, in breaking treaties, in mass murdering of people, including our American boys——

Secretary HERTER. That was not in the brief meeting of the four. The only statements that were made by the President were the statements which were publicized, plus another statement with regard to the U-2 not being again used for this purpose. That commitment of the President could last, of course, only so long as he was President.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have seen certain questions about which I said I would like to get information. To the extent that it can be done, I would like answers to those questions prepared and put into the record. One, broken treaties. Two, participation—not of Red Russia but Red communism—in the Red Chinese-Soviet provocation of trouble throughout the world, their activities in the Katyn Forest, in Quemoy and Matsu, in South Korea where thousands of our American boys were killed, in Red Hungary, East Germany, and in Poland when the liberty fighters rose to procure liberty for themselves.

Secretary HERTER. Senator, I saw those questions as they are incorporated in the Congressional Record and we will be prepared to answer them.

(The questions and answers referred to above appear in appendix 2.)

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to say I am not prepared to put a halo of honesty and holiness on Khrushchev and one of scorn and disgrace upon my country, not in this hearing or any other place. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the time is a quarter to 1. I think it would be a proper time to adjourn until 2:30.

SELF-PRESERVATION

Senator WILEY. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, the Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for a question.

Senator WILEY. We say that the first law of human nature is the law of self-preservation. You have heard that said, have you not?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. That applies to nations as well as individuals: does it not?

Secretary HERTER. It does.

Senator WILEY. And in wartime we speak of what we have called spying here; it is called spying, but in peacetime it is espionage: is it not?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. But there are different rules that apply, too, are there not? In wartime then it generally means the penalty is death. In peaceful times like we have now, the penalty depends entirely more or less upon the court administering it; is that right?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator WILEY. Is it generally conceded that the Kremlin has been engaging in espionage not only in our own country but in virtually all the countries on earth and is still doing it? That is correct, is it not?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. As demonstrated by Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations the other day, they even tried to pull a stunt on our Embassy in Russia: did you see that?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir. [Deleted].

Senator WILEY. Just this one thing. Now, then, if the first law of human nature is the law of self-preservation, then the best means that we can use to preserve the freedom of America, the CIA has been using when it has been using the overflight, the U–2 means; is that right?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We will return here at 2:30.

Secretary HERTER. 2:30.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. I may say to the committee that the Secretary has very kindly agreed to go on today and, if the questioning is not completed, to come back in the morning. We will determine that at the end of today's session.

I hope we can make progress.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Williams.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, there are one or two statements in your own statement I would like to have developed a bit for clarification.

COURSE FOLLOWED BY PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

On page 12, at the bottom of the page of the mimeographed statement you say as follows:

> Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding international business in a sober and rational manner.

In which of these groups do you include Mr. Khrushchev?

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE—Resumed

Secretary HERTER. That I think would be very difficult to answer categorically.

There have been a good many estimates made as to whether or not he really means some of the things that he has said with regard to peaceful coexistence, with regard to disarmament and other matters. There is another group that feels that this is a front for the same power line that Stalin used to take.

I don't think it is possible yet to answer that categorically.

I think that events are likely to show which of those groups he belongs to.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did you have in mind when you wrote that? Maybe you can't categorically for all time designate him, but what has been your view and the view of the Department as to which group he belongs in? I think that is rather important as to how we treat him. Is it in our interest to discourage him? If he were a member

of the aggressive course group, I suppose it would be. If he is a member of the group who are proponents of the peaceful course, then it would be to our advantage to encourage or be cooperative within limits. I wondered why you put that in there if you didn't have some idea of who does belong to these groups or how they are constituted.

Secretary HERTER. What I was trying to describe here was in effect a middle course. Insofar as Mr. Khrushchev is concerned, I think those who have dealt with him directly were convinced that he was genuinely in favor of a disarmament program, that he genuinely wanted, for the sake of developing the economy of Russia, a reduction both in expense from a monetary point of view and from a human point of view, of the great burden of armaments.

Certainly there I would put him in the second category. His more recent behavior, however, has shaken my belief that this is entirely genuine, and, as I say, I think that only the events of the next few months and possibly even of the next few years can give a final answer to what you have asked.

IDENTIFICATION WITH TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The CHAIRMAN. Can you identify any other members or any people you had in mind in citing these groups?

Secretary HERTER. No. I would rather have those who are real Russian experts do that kind of identification, those who are familiar with the individuals, more familiar than I am.

There is no question but what there are still——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to have Mr. Bohlen comment on this question?

Secretary HERTER. I would be very glad to have him, if you wish to.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be very good to have him comment. He is recognized, is he not, as one of our best Russian experts?

Would you care to comment on this, Mr. Bohlen?

Mr. BOHLEN. Mr. Chairman, my experience has been that it is not always possible to identify a trend in the Soviet Union with individuals. As the Secretary said earlier we literally know nothing of what goes on in the hierarchy. My impression of the statement the Secretary made is that it is possible to detect trends. You cannot identify people with them. My experience with the Soviet officials is that they follow whatever the agreed line is, whether it is hard or whether it is soft, with great consistency, and they just do not reveal sufficiently to any foreigner what their inner thoughts are to identify one individual with one trend or another. But I think the indications are that both trends exist.

COURSE FOLLOWED BY PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

The CHAIRMAN. Well, don't you think we know more about Mr. Khrushchev than any other Soviet leader? More of us have seen him. He has been around more than any other. Don't you have any view as to which of these groups Mr. Khrushchev would be identified with?

Mr. BOHLEN. Well, my acquaintanceship with Mr. Khrushchev was when I was in there as Ambassador when he was not quite as promi-

nent as he is now. I would merely say that he, along with all of them are excellent actors [deleted] and are able to maintain whatever the common line is in their dealings with foreigners. I think also there is a question of time. I think, as the events of Paris showed, that there have been certain shifts of emphasis inside the Soviet Union which were manifested in part by what they did in Paris.

Therefore, it is conceivable that Mr. Khrushchev could have been entirely serious in the line he was pursuing prior to Paris, and be equally serious in pursuing one diametrically opposite to it.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may interpolate, do you mean that prior to the U–2 incident Mr. Khrushchev may have been identified with the second group; that is, proponents of a peaceful course?

Mr. BOHLEN. I would not segregate out the U–2 incident alone, Mr. Chairman. I think, as outlined in the Secretary's statement, there seemed to us to be three elements involved in this matter, and I think it is difficult to assess the value of each. But, certainly, I would say his doubt as to the success from his point of view of the summit conference, that some of the views voiced by the Chinese Communists had probably supporters within the Soviet hierarchy, and the U–2 incident together brought about this change.

I have no difficulty——

IDENTIFICATION WITH TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't wish to make you review all that was said there. I was merely trying to find the inner meaning of this particular statement. I thought that I could elicit some clarification since many of us don't know about these proponents of these courses or about any of these groups of people.

Mr. BOHLEN. The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that I think we don't know. That you cannot tell whether X, Y, or Z in the Soviet hierarchy, what particular line he advocates, because he never reveals any difference, even a shade of difference publicly, with what is the agreed line. It is quite impossible, I believe, for anybody to tell who within the leading group stands for one trend or the other. You can only detect from external evidence that there appear to be certain divergent trends and the individuals may not remain the same.

WAS THERE A DECISION NOT TO SUSPEND FLIGHTS AS SUMMIT MEETING APPROACHED?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. One other statement, Mr. Secretary, on page 5, point 2:

> The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision.

Can you tell us who made that decision, and when, and of the circumstances?

Secretary HERTER. That is a decision that I think has been carried over the whole 4-year period. Here, sir, we get into certain technical aspects of when these flights would properly be conducted and could not be conducted, but I think the technical reasons had better be kept in executive session.

The finding of a good time for a flight of this kind in relation to current events is almost impossible if you had known in advance that it is going to fail.

The real issue was how urgent was the information and is there any one time that is more favorable than another? From a technical point of view the time was more favorable at that time than another. From a diplomatic point of view, it seemed to me that with the President scheduled to go to Russia later, there would have been the same difficulty; when Khrushchev was here there was the same difficulty, in effect one would run into one time after another where diplomatically it would have been a bad time.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think I make myself clear. I understood from your previous statement and others that the program was agreed upon, and it was running along without being suspended. But this statement seems to leave the implication that a specific decision was taken not to suspend them in view of the conference approaching.

Was such a decision taken?

Secretary HERTER. That I can't tell you. I was not a party to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this says:

> The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision.

Was there any decision taken not to suspend it?

Secretary HERTER. I know that when the matter came before me, which was some time previous from the point of view of the continuation of the program, when conditions were appropriate, I did not interpose any objection to it because of any diplomatic event that was coming up.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say then that no specific decision not to suspend them was taken? It was allowed to go along without any decision being taken to suspend them.

Secretary HERTER. I think that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, the other way around is that no positive decision was taken not to suspend them; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That statement, I think, needs clarification. I think, to me, it means that at some point prior to May 1 a specific decision was taken not to suspend them in view of the summit. Isn't that a legitimate interpretation of that sentence?

Secretary HERTER. I think that is correct. May I read what the President said on that subject? He said:

> As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date.

The program went forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Then that decision was made by the President.

Secretary HERTER. Oh, he was certainly consulted with regard to the continuation of the program.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know when that decision was made?

Secretary HERTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it prior to May 1?

Secretary HERTER. I couldn't tell you.

QUESTION OF MORATORIUM ON FLIGHTS DURING CAMP DAVID TALKS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you know whether there was a moratorium on these flights during the meeting at Camp David?

Secretary HERTER. No. As far as I know, that question never arose.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there was not, as far as you know?
Secretary HERTER. As far as I know, there was not.

PRESS SECRETARY HAGERTY'S KNOWLEDGE

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to this matter that Mr. Lincoln White did not know that Powers might be alive, the last question before we recessed. Did Mr. Hagerty know whether or not he was at that point?

Secretary HERTER. That I will have to ask Mr. Dillon to answer. I have no direct information.

Mr. DILLON. I have no way of knowing whether Mr. Hagerty knew or not. In the ordinary course of business, a telegram such as the one which informed us of this rumor—it's only a rumor that we had received through other diplomats in Moscow—such a telegram would have been transmitted for information to the White House staff.

Whether Mr. Hagerty knew about it or not, I don't know.

QUESTION OF SOUNDING OUT PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S FEELINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, was any effort made on the part of our Ambassadors or anyone from the Department, after the incident, to pursue Mr. Khrushchev's feelings?

Was anyone instructed to approach him and express any regret or in any way to reconcile him to forgive or overlook this incident?

Secretary HERTER. No, I don't know of any such thing.

The CHAIRMAN. No approach was made?

Secretary HERTER. No.

IMPLICATION THAT FLIGHTS WOULD CONTINUE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, what were the considerations which led to the decision, not only to assume responsibility for the flight, but to imply that the flights would continue in the future?

Secretary HERTER. I have to take responsibility for the statement that was interpreted and if I may, I would like to read you exactly what was said on that score.

This is a statement that was interpreted that we were going to continue the flights:

> The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

That is the statement that was interpreted that we were going to continue the flights, and it seems to me it was a pretty far-fetched interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do you mean in that statement you did not intend to convey the view or the possibility that the flights would be continued; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. No; what I was saying there was just what I have testified to today; that from the point of view of our own interests and that of the whole free world, it is essential for us to do

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whatever we properly can in order to acquire information to avoid surprise attack or to be prepared for it.

The CHAIRMAN. But in view of that statement, do you think that Mr. Khrushchev could accept it and continue the conference?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I certainly do, if he had wanted to.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think our President would accept such a statement from any other power?

Secretary HERTER. If he wanted to go to a conference? Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator Wiley?

KHRUSHCHEV'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator WILEY. Now in relation to that last question, the President has suggested time and time again an open skies arrangement, hasn't he?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator WILEY. That means that planes would be flying over our country and over every other country where it is necessary. Again, I go to the subject that I think is most important, because some quoted and I quoted on the floor of the Senate the other day the Biblical verse that a little child shall lead them. I had a group of children from Oshkosh, Wis., that I was talking to. After I talked to them, I opened myself to questions. One of these girls said, "Senator, if we stop taking these flights, how are we going to get the information that is going on back of the Iron Curtain?"

Well, I think all America is asking that question, and I am satisfied that if we are realists, as I think we are becoming more and more, that we are not going to go up a lot of blind alleys about this and that, and about what was or what wasn't said. We are going to face the situation head on and simply say we want defensively to be adequately prepared and alert and we want the Kremlin to know the facts as they have been now for, I think, about 3½ years, that we have been sending these planes over. Khrushchev knew it at the time that he was up at Camp David, and certainly having the knowledge then could have interfered with his interest in holding the meeting if he had wanted it to. Do you think my conclusions are correct in that respect?

Secretary HERTER. I do.

SOVIET REFUSAL TO PERMIT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S TRIP

Senator WILEY. I didn't get the import of the questions when I came in that apparently referred to some different groups. What is the name of the young man who defected the other day? I guess that is what you call it. He testified on——

Senator LAUSCHE. Meet the Press.

Senator WILEY. Meet the Press. It is a long, Russian name. I put what he said into the record today. But one of the important things he brought out, and I would like to get the former Ambassador's attention on this, was that there is a group of young people growing up in Russia who have different ideas, and he was about to go into detail on it when time ran out. But among other things, he is the one who said—and this is important—he said some months ago that Khru-

shchev and the powers in being would not permit the President to come to Russia, that they would find some excuse.

Now, that is all in what he said over the radio here a couple of weeks ago. That confirms, I presume, your own idea that when Khrushchev came to Paris, he had already decided that he was going to throw the bombshell, and he would refuse to invite the President, and so forth; is that right?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator WILEY. So this is something that didn't result from the downing of the plane.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U–2 PLANE?

I want to ask you a question. Have you any definite information as to whether or not this young Powers is alive?

Secretary HERTER. No, sir. We have no information other than that which the Russians have furnished to us.

Senator WILEY. If that plane had been shot down, do you think the instruments that he had with him would have remained intact?

Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am not skilled enough in the technique of shooting down planes. But I should think it is very doubtful if he was hit by a rocket whether either he or the plane would have come down intact.

Senator WILEY. Is there any thought that perhaps they have the plane? They claim they have the instruments and they have shown something which wasn't the plane. Do you think they have that intact?

Secretary HERTER. They have shown a later photograph of a plane which those who built the plane feel is the plane itself. They have also shown pieces of the plane in Gorky Park in Moscow when they invited all the diplomats to come and look at it, and I think our people feel that that is a genuine part of the plane.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA

Senator WILEY. I want to ask the former Ambassador if it is true that the youth in Russia, the new class of youth, is growing up like this fellow said. Someone said if he had been privileged to carry on his answer he would have said they are not satisfied with their standard of living, that they are not satisfied with the little opportunity they have to express themselves in the political life of Russia. Do you know whether that would be true or not?

Mr. BOHLEN. I think it is a fair assumption, Senator. Of course, as you know, the possibilities for contacts in there during the period I was there were considerably less than they are now. The country is still totally controlled by the mechanism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They control all modes of expression by press, meetings, or anything else, so it is very difficult to get any overt signs of the feelings of the youth or any other section of the population.

But there are certain indications that the youth are looking forward at some time in the future to considerably different circumstances. They hope for better material conditions and also undoubtedly hope for a period when they will have more freedom of expression and more ability to participate in the political life of their country.

But this is very hard to document because people do not talk openly and freely in the Soviet Union.

Senator WILEY. Well, you know that ferment generally is all over this world. You know that the President of Turkey has been kicked out. You saw that today, and you know what is happening elsewhere. Is there any reason why that yeast or ferment should not be operating in Russia among the youngsters?

Mr. BOHLEN. There is no reason why it should not be and it is a logical assumption it is. But I should also say that the controls in a society like the Soviet Union are very tight indeed and I have seen no sign that those controls are breaking down or weakening to the point where the party is not in complete control of the situation. They are able to stifle, if you will, or hold in check this ferment due to the nature of their system.

Senator WILEY. Out of the 200 million Russians, how many of them do you think belong to the Communist Party?

Mr. BOHLEN. I think the latest figure is somewhere in the neighborhood of 8½ million.

Senator WILEY. Thank you. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Montana?

QUESTION OF INDICATIONS THAT KHRUSHCHEV WOULD SCUTTLE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that at the House hearings, you said there were indications that even before May 6 the Russians planned to scuttle the conference.

Now, it seems to me if we are going to estimate the importance of the U–2 incident in the collapse of the summit, we need to fix the date when these indications in any significant fashion began to appear. I would appreciate, then, in the interest of saving time, yes or no answers to certain questions which I am about to ask unless there is a need of an elaboration.

The first question: Are you aware whether any member of the Cabinet or the President had any reason to believe before May 15 when Khrushchev made his demands for an apology and so forth, that he would come to Paris and leave as he did?

Secretary HERTER. No.

Senator MANSFIELD. Were there any indications that Khrushchev planned to scuttle the conference before the U–2 plane was shot down on May 1?

Secretary HERTER. No.

UNDER SECRETARY DILLON'S SPEECH

Senator MANSFIELD. Did Khrushchev's Baku speech precede or follow Mr. Dillon's speech to the AFL–CIO convention?

Secretary HERTER. It followed it.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would you classify Mr. Dillon's speech as very much in the spirit of Camp David or would you say it was an excellent, forthright and anti-Communist statement somewhat oblivious to the spirit of Camp David, the kind of speech which any official of the State Department might have made before that historic meeting?

Secretary HERTER. That I can't qualify with a yes or no answer, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. You can go into detail there.

Secretary HERTER. I would say this, that Mr. Dillon's speech was almost a requirement as an answer to the allegations that had been made by Mr. Khrushchev against Adenauer and the Germans and his continued repetition which I have given the chronology of, of the fact that they were going to take this unilateral position sooner or later without its being an absolute ultimatum on the subject of Berlin, Germany.

Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, Mr. Secretary, speeches which you and Mr. Dillon made were a counteraction to the gradual hardening of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in the period preceding that?

Secretary HERTER. Entirely.

QUESTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT KNOWLEDGE OF U–2 FLIGHT

Senator MANSFIELD. Did Secretary Dillon propose that a U–2 flight be undertaken prior to the summit conference?

Mr. DILLON. No.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Dillon, as acting Secretary, were you aware beforehand of the scheduling of the U–2 flight over the Soviet Union on May 1?

Mr. DILLON. No, I was not aware of it.

I was aware that there was a program of flights that might take place at some time when the weather was right but I think I was informed of that maybe a month or two before this actual time, and I had nothing to do with it afterward because I didn't in the ordinary course of my duties.

Senator MANSFIELD. Your knowledge was, in effect, general knowledge?

Mr. DILLON. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Herter happening to be out of the country at the time was, I assume, unaware of any specific flight but perhaps had general knowledge that these flights were being undertaken and had been over a period of years.

Secretary HERTER. I didn't know there was a flight underway. The first knowledge I received was when I was in Ankara. All I heard was this same report that a plane was down.

PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FLIGHT

Senator MANSFIELD. Now, both of you have had general knowledge of this: Would it be a fair assumption to say, despite the fact that the President undertook, in a certain sense, personal responsibility for this particular flight, that he, too, likewise, had only general knowledge but that because of his position as the Chief of State, he would be held responsible under any circumstances because of his position of responsibility?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Might I just qualify one thing? When you say he was familiar with this particular flight and his timing, so far as I know all of us were familiar with alternate possibilities of flights but not this particular flight as such.

Senator MANSFIELD. That would apply to the Department of State and the President.

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR FLIGHTS

Senator MANSFIELD. From what legislation or Executive orders, or both, was the authority for these flights of deep penetration derived?

Secretary HERTER. Well, presumably from the fact that I have here before me—I am told that this applied to two specific acts. The one that I am particularly familiar with, that I had a moment ago, is the one creating the Central Intelligence Agency. The other is the National Security Act.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would it be possible to have copies for the record at this point?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I ask that they be included in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The provisions in the National Security Act relating to the Central Intelligence Agency follow:)

EXCERPT FROM NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

(Public Law 253, 80th Cong., July 26, 1947; 61 Stat. 495)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [1]

SEC. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, and with a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability. The Director and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status, or from among individuals in civilian life: *Provided, however*, That at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status.

(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director, or Deputy Director, then—

(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and

(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit, or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director, or Deputy Director, of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving

[1] Section 102 (a) and (b) amended by Public Law 15, 83d Congress (67 Stat. 19, 20).

in the office of Director, or Deputy Director, continue to hold rank and grade not lower than that in which serving at the time of his appointment and to receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be, including personal money allowance) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Central Intelligence Agency. He also shall be paid by the Central Intelligence Agency from such funds an annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which the compensation established for such position exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.[2]

(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer shall, during the period in which such commissioned officer occupies the office of Director of Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, be in addition to the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized and appropriated for the armed service of which he is a member.[3]

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment of any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities: *Provided*, That the Agency shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: *Provided further*, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: *And provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: *Provided, however*, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

[2] Civilian Compensation—Subsections (a) and (b) supplemented by section 4, Public Law 359, 81st Congress, October 15, 1949 (63 Stat. 880), increased annual compensation to $16,000 and $14,000, for the Director and Deputy Director, respectively, per annum; subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) from section 102, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947 (61 Stat. 495). Sections 104(a)(2) and 105(26), Public Law 854, 84th Congress, July 31, 1956, increased the annual compensation to $21,000 and $20,500, respectively, for the Director and Deputy Director.

[3] As amended by Public Law 15, 83d Congress (67 Stat. 20).

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office—

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and

(2) The personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.

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ORAL DIRECTIVE SUSPENDING FLIGHTS

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, by what authority have these flights now been suspended?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, I have now got before me the National Security Act of 1947, and if you wish we to read the pertinent paragraph I will be glad to do so.

Senator MANSFIELD. No; I would just like to have the pertinent parts incorporated in the executive record.

Secretary HERTER. Right.

Senator MANSFIELD. Now the question, to repeat, is by what authority have these flights now been suspended?

Secretary HERTER. By direction of the President.

Senator MANSFIELD. By a Presidential directive. Could we have a copy of that for the record?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I assume so. I don't know whether it was given in writing or whether it was done by word of mouth.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, will you look into it and see what you can do to comply with the request?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

(It was later reported by the Department of State that the directive was oral.)

DURATION OF ORDER SUSPENDING FLIGHTS

Senator MANSFIELD. Will this order suspending the flights automatically remain in force after President Eisenhower leaves office and until it is superseded by another order of some future President?

Secretary HERTER. It could be. The President's responsibility as Commander in Chief which gives him the right to give an order of this kind would, of course, expire with him. It would only be through some treaty obligation that there would be a binding commitment on the part of the United States to carry beyond his term.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do I understand you correctly, then, to state that this order would automatically die with the leaving of office by President Eisenhower, and to become effective again would have to be once again initiated by the next President?

Secretary HERTER. I believe another President would be free to do as he sees fit.

EFFECT OF U–2 INCIDENT ON KHRUSHCHEV'S POSITION IN RUSSIA

Senator MANSFIELD. Have Russian experts in the executive branch suggested the possibility that Khrushchev's position at home may have become seriously undermined?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you believe that the U–2 may have been a contributing factor to this undermining?

Secretary HERTER. It may have been. May I elaborate on that?

It may have been in the sense that it must have been a great shock to both the military and to the civilian leaders in Russia to find that they had been as open as they were for such a long period of time.

Senator MANSFIELD. And to him as well.

Secretary HERTER. To him as well.

POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP

Senator MANSFIELD. If Khrushchev should be forced out of power, is it the thinking of the Russian experts in the Department that his successor is likely to be a man more amenable to friendly and peaceful dealings with the West?

Secretary HERTER. That, sir, I cannot answer categorically. I think that that is a pure matter of guesswork.

Senator MANSFIELD. All right.

What, in the view of our Russian experts, is the most probable coalition of influential forces in the Soviet Union and in world communism that could bring about Khrushchev's downfall?

Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am afraid of my own knowledge I could not answer that. If you would like Mr. Bohlen to answer that, he is as good an authority as we have on the subject.

Senator MANSFIELD. If you will, Mr. Bohlen. But before you do, I would like to throw out indications that perhaps the military, the Chinese Communists and forces of that kind, might be considered.

Mr. BOHLEN. Senator, I honestly in all sincerity think it is not possible to answer that question. I think in dealing with the Soviet Union in view of the general secrecy prevailing in the Communist bloc it is only after the event that you can hope to trace them back and see what particular influences have seemed to have brought about given decisions. There is literally no way in which a foreigner can ascertain what the varying degrees of influence of all factors which go into the making of any particular event. If I might I will give you one illustration of secrecy. I was not there but in June 1957 for 10 days the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Central Committee itself met in a violent inner row which resulted in the expulsion from both of those bodies of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and several others.

This went on for 10 days in Moscow and no foreigner in the capital and mighty few Russians knew anything about it.

We had trained observers there. There was an extremely alert U.S. press corps and not one of them got any inkling of this major development. This I merely cite to show the degree of secrecy and if you are trying to get these things you are in truth looking into a crystal ball and a very cloudy one at that.

Senator MANSFIELD. What you have said, Mr. Bohlen, is a reinforcement of thoughts you have previously stated in response to questions propounded to you by the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. BOHLEN. That's right, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And, once again, that secrecy is so great there that it is impossible for a westerner to find out what goes on in many instances until after the fact is accomplished.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET RETURN TO DEPTHS OF THE COLD WAR

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it the view of the experts in the Department, the Russian experts, that Khrushchev, even if he remains in power, will now take a harder line, a reversion to cold war type tactics in dealing with the Western nations?

Mr. BOHLEN. The indications at present are, and I am speaking at present, that this will not necessarily be so.

I think we can expect a propaganda campaign. The indication from his own statements and from such information as we have received from Moscow, is that there seems to be no determined policy to return to the depths of the cold war at this time.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would you say that if that reversion does take place, taking the opposite tack from what you have just said, and is pushed by the Kremlin or Khrushchev or his successor, that it will make more difficult the maintenance of peace?

Mr. BOHLEN. It would if it returns to a line that we would call the lowest phase of the cold war, it most certainly would, Senator. However, there are degrees in this thing of return to the cold war situation which are impossible to assess and which might not materially increase the danger of war. But if it went all out, sealed off the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc from contact with the outside world, attempted to exert pressures wherever they thought they could do so, I think undoubtedly a much more dangerous world situation would be created.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I don't want to take too much time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't have any questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey, did I overlook you?

Senator HUMPHREY. I came in late, Senator. If any other Senator wants to go ahead, it is all right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse, are you ready?

Senator MORSE. I will yield to Senator Humphrey.

SECRETARY HERTER'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator HUMPHREY. If the question I ask, Mr. Secretary, has already been asked, just brush it aside. I don't want to take any of your time on that.

Did anyone ask as to whether or not you had any personal knowledge of the U–2 flight?

Secretary HERTER. Of the program?

Senator HUMPHREY. No, of the particular flight.

Secretary HERTER. It was included, I said it was included—I am sure it was included in a group of flights that I had been asked whether I had any objections to them.

Senator HUMPHREY. If you wanted to, could you have effectively vetoed such a policy?

Secretary HERTER. No; I could only have given my advice to the President.

VICE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator HUMPHREY. Would the Vice President be aware of these decisions?

Secretary HERTER. I think that as a member of the National Security Council, he was aware of the program in the larger sense. I doubt if he was familiar with any of the individual flights as such, but he may have been.

Senator HUMPHREY. The reason I asked that question was that the Vice President intimated on a television program, I believe the day before the President's announcement in Paris, that the flights should continue. The next day the President announced that he had already canceled them.

The Vice President said they would continue, and the next day the President announced that they had been suspended.

What I am asking is, would the Vice President, as a member of the Security Council, have any opportunity of knowing the decision that had been made by the President?

Secretary HERTER. There, the days followed so quickly one on another that I just couldn't answer that, whether that opportunity would have been offered or not.

Senator HUMPHREY. What I am trying to get at is the policy-making machinery.

We have a subcommittee, as you know, that is studying the policy-making machinery of the Government, the Jackson subcommittee.

I am a member of that subcommittee. We had recently before the subcommittee Mr. Kennan. We have had many of the prominent officials of Government and former officials of Government.

The program of the reconnaisance flights was an established program, and apparently was agreed upon by the Security Council; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. The Security Council was aware of it, yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. The Vice President is a member of the Security Council?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. If the Vice President states on a television program that he understood that the flights would continue, yet the President announced the next day in Paris that as of the previous Thursday they had already been suspended, do you think there was any lack of communication between the responsibile officials of this Government?

Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am trying to think of the dates.

The Thursday on which the President gave that order was the day that I went to Paris. I went to Paris that night.

The President followed 2 nights later and whether or not in that 2-day interval anything had been distributed with regard to that order, I just don't know.

IMPACT ON SUMMIT DIPLOMACY OF RECENT EVENTS

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any changed views, Mr. Secretary, as to the value of the so-called summitry diplomacy as a result of this recent meeting?

Secretary HERTER. I think as a method of carrying out negotiations it has taken a hard knock.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have you any idea as to how we are going to proceed in the months ahead? I heard the President's address. It was a good address. He gave a good accounting. He talked about the necessity of maintaining—I believe the word was businesslike relationships—or at least normal relationships insofar as we can with the Soviet Union.

Is there any projected plan as to how we will proceed with our contacts with the Soviet Union?

For example, we have the Geneva Conference still in session on the nuclear testing. I suppose the Disarmament Conference is still a reality.

Is there to be any adjustment in these conferences, any changes? Are they to proceed according to the past?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, the President, I think, made that very clear in his statement.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are there any plans for any type of a high level Foreign Ministers' conference or conference of sub-Cabinet officers?

Secretary HERTER. As of now, there is not. I may add this with regard to the summit; that the four nations that were involved in the summit were the four nations who, as a result of the decisions and agreements reached after the war, were the four nations that have the responsibility for Berlin and for the final settlement of the whole German question, and that is the reason for those four, essentially, getting together.

It is possible that again they will have to get together. Whether normal diplomatic changes would make progress or Foreign Ministers' meetings in advance would make a program so that it would be worthwhile for them to come together, I just can't tell you. That is always a possibility. But almost any other subject, there are many other nations that are involved beside those four, and it is a great question in my mind whether or not that method of coming together for the resolution of problems would be fruitful in the future.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, what you are indicating is that a summit conference merely ought to be the ratification, essentially the ratification, of decisions that have been tentatively arrived at, at the normal diplomatic levels.

Secretary HERTER. In my opinion, that is the most desirable thing.

CONTRADICTORY SOVIET ACTIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. I agree. How do you explain, or is there any explanation for what appears to be a contradictory bit of evidence of Gromyko's blustering up at the United Nations on the Soviet resolution and, yet, of the apparent conciliatory behavior of the Soviets in recent days with respect to the quick release of our plane and flyers who strayed into East Germany and the recent broadening of Soviet-American exchange projects?

Secretary HERTER. There again, you have got one of those contradictions. As I was saying earlier, the fact that the attitude of the people in Moscow and even the officials with whom our Embassy officials have to deal, have been entirely normal since this incident.

It is very hard to reconcile with the very harsh words that both Khrushchev and Gromyko have uttered.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you lay any credence to the doctrine, or at least an observation that has been made, that while the Soviet tactics may change for awhile, that insofar as their general overall strategy is concerned, it will remain pretty much the same as it has?

Secretary HERTER. Certainly as far as their objectives are concerned. I think it was quite clear from some of this documentation that will be put into the record, that is the speeches that were made by Mr. Khrushchev, that he had laid greater and greater emphasis on the eventual triumph of communism over the world, and that he put particular emphasis on that in recent months before the summit.

PREDICTIONS OF SOVIET ACTIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. I have a letter from a gentleman who is a professor emeritus of a university, up at Bennington College, who has had an uncanny record in my years of acquaintanceship with him in understanding what goes on in the Soviet Union. His name is Dr. Bernard Tauer. He is a former Social Democrat of some 35 years ago from Austria, a professor of political economy, now retired. He monitors Soviet broadcasts, studies Soviet literature, particularly photographs and what-have-you. Just to give you a little background, he predicted to me some 3 weeks, I guess it was, before it happened, the removal of Beria. I have a letter here from him right before me, and it is a letter telling how Mr. Khrushchev was going to scuttle the summit conference, written on April 25, this letter is. And I also have a letter from him here in which he says:

> The Soviet leader will now do everything possible to prove that Eisenhower is a warmonger and an imperialist aggressor and not a man of peace, in action not merely in words. We must, therefore, prepare ourselves for all kinds of provocations all around the world.

His thesis is that Khrushchev had been selling the Soviet people upon the idea that President Eisenhower was a man of peace and a man with whom he could deal. I don't mean deal, in the sense of the crudeness of that word, but one with whom he could conduct reasonably good negotiations, and that when the President accepted the responsibility for the flights and didn't accept the opportunity, at least what some people say was an opportunity of removing himself from that responsibility, that Mr. Khrushchev took this as a very personal matter, since he had staked his reputation in the Kremlin and in the councils of the Communist Party upon the fact that he could work with Eisenhower. Then Mr. Khrushchev felt that Eisenhower had not only upset the diplomatic applecart, but, more importantly, from a subjective point of view—Khrushchev's—put Khrushchev in a very difficult position with the Communist Chinese, with the rightwing Stalinists in the Soviet Union, so that Khrushchev is now making a personal crusade out of attacking the President.

What is your view of this? I am going to give you this letter. I have a whole series of these, and this is a very remarkable man, may I say.

For example, I have a letter from him 2 weeks before the recent shakeup in the Soviet Union which was not too fundamental, but indicating some of the changes that were going to be made, by a very careful analysis of broadcasts and meetings and literature. I had this man down to see the late Senator Walter George, some of you may recall, and he was very helpful at one time. What is your view of Mr. Khrushchev's reactions lately to the President, the personal venom that he seems to exhibit?

Secretary HERTER. I am particularly interested in two things, Senator, in the letter that you have just read; one, the fact that it was written before the U–2 incident.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary HERTER. In which this authority cites the fact that Mr. Khrushchev was going to scuttle the conference.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that substantiates essentially what you were saying this morning, your own observations on this.

Secretary HERTER. Yes. The second has to do with the fact that the President didn't accept the way out which Mr. Khrushchev appeared to offer him. My own feeling with regard to that second matter is that it was very much of a trap. That what Mr. Khrushchev thought might happen is that the President would disclaim personal responsibility and that then Mr. Khrushchev would say, "The situation is even more dangerous than I thought, because this means that that same little frantic group in the Pentagon"—and that is the phrase that he used in his press conference—"is running the Government of the United States without the President knowing about it, and that makes our situation even worse" and he would have inveighed in exactly the same terms and asked the President for exactly the same apologies and punishments which he asked for later.

I think that the element of personal pique certainly played a part in the whole show.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

The Senator from Kansas.

Senator CARLSON. Senator Aiken——

OTHER COUNTRIES' REACTIONS TO SUMMIT CONFERENCE COLLAPSE

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, the Senator from Vermont.

Senator AIKEN. I won't take long.

Speaking of the reaction of the rest of the world, have you made any analysis of the reaction of the other countries of the world relative to the collapse of the summit meeting?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I think we have. It isn't, of course, complete. This will mean a study from a great many nations and bring this altogether in one place.

I think that, perhaps, the best indication has been the attitude among the representatives at the United Nations where you have got a cross section from the rest of the world. From the very outset of the Russian complaint there it was very obvious they weren't going to be able to get any votes from their calling this an aggression, except Soviet bloc votes.

Some of the smaller countries, two of them, abstained in the final vote for reasons that were of a rather different nature.

But, by and large, we have heard no sympathy from the point of view of what you might call the uncommitted nations or the free nations of the world for the attitude that Mr. Khrushchev took.

Senator AIKEN. Are you satisfied we have not lost prestige throughout the world as a result, or lost more than Russia has?

Secretary HERTER. May I say, sir, that in my opinion our alliances are firmer than they have ever been.

SOVIET HIERARCHY

Senator AIKEN. What was the significance of the shakeup in the Russian Government prior to the U–2 incident, I believe last April, was it not, when Mr. Kozlov was promoted; and coupled with that question, why don't we hear anything about Mr. Mikoyan any more? Has he been isolated or just gotten out of the news, or what has happened with him?

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Bohlen, who is our expert, is also the censor of the document, so I am afraid he has gone out of the room at the moment.

With regard to the disappearance of Mr. Mikoyan, we have been told this is just a normal vacation he has taken down to the Black Sea. It is true in years gone by he had taken rather extended vacations there, and whether this is true or not we can't say.

With respect to the shakeup, I think the only significance that it had were that two of the strongest members of the central committee were sent to other responsibilities and this may have been a personal strengthening of Mr. Khrushchev's power within the committee itself. But it was not considered very highly significant.

Senator AIKEN. That is, Mr. Kozlov's promotion is not significant?

Secretary HERTER. I don't think so. I didn't know that he as such had been promoted.

[Deleted.]

A long time ago, I think when Mr. Averill Harriman was visiting in Russia he reported that Mr. Kozlov had been pointed out to him by Mr. Khrushchev as his successor, saying that he and Mikoyan were too old to carry on and that Kozlov was the No. 2 man. But there was no telling whether he was saying that seriously or whether he was being flattering about it because Mr. Kozlov was there at the time.

Senator AIKEN. I thought he made the best impression of any of our Russian visitors last summer. At least when he came before this committee, I thought he did.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

FUNCTION OF NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I think it would be helpful for this record if you made a statement in regard to the functions of NASA, and the part that NASA played in connection with the U–2 flight.

I don't think the record is very clear as to what are the functions of NASA, and what jurisdiction, if any, the State Department has over NASA and what the relationship between NASA and the National Security Council is, and the State Department.

Secretary HERTER. NASA, as you know, is an agency devoted entirely to the peaceful development of satellites and outer space vehicles of one kind or another.

Its operations have now been separated out from what were called purely military operations, although it is always inevitable in the development of boosters that there should be an interrelationship between the two, because the military vehicle and the peaceful vehicle have got the same problems of propulsion to get up into the air. The witnesses of NASA, of course, will be before the committee.

[Deleted.] Most of the U–2's are used by NASA in connection with purely scientific work, meteorological work. Actually, the Japanese Government found them tremendously valuable in tracing the course of tornadoes last year, and I think that NASA put out at least three publications on their findings from the U–2 weather observations.

[Deleted.]

NASA'S ROLE IN THE U–2 INCIDENT

With respect to the actual development of events in relation to NASA, I am sorry to say that I can't give you firsthand information.

Perhaps Mr. Dillon can supplement that as it occurred while I was overseas and when Mr. Dillon was in charge.

Mr. DILLON. All I can say is as far as I know the State Department didn't have any direct relationships with NASA on this matter, and the relationships that there were, were handled by the Central Intelligence Agency [deleted], so either Mr. Dulles or the NASA witnesses themselves will be able to inform you on that.

Senator MORSE. Why would NASA make a statement in regard to this plane if it was under the jurisdiction of CIA?

Mr. DILLON. On the cover story it was in the open, the plane was under the jurisdiction of NASA. Actually for this operation it was under the jurisdiction of CIA. [Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Therefore, NASA, in your opinion, was acting within the proprieties when it issued the statement that it issued.

Mr. DILLON. I think so; yes.

Senator MORSE. You think it had cleared that statement with CIA or had authority from CIA to issue it.

Secretary HERTER. I think so.

Mr. DILLON. They should have; as I understood the matter, these guidelines to answer questions were prepared by CIA. They were gone over with State Department people a day or two before. We had thought that NASA was going to handle this in the way of answering questions, which we knew they would get, because this was a NASA plane, and they apparently chose instead to forestall the questions just by putting it all out in the form of a statement. [Deleted.]

QUESTION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH COORDINATION ON U–2 STATEMENTS

Senator MORSE. I raise the question because I want to do what I can in order to clarify the record in regard to the allegation made that there is not the best of coordination between the State Depart-

ment, CIA, Pentagon Building, and now NASA, and that there may be a need for a centralization in the State Department of the authority to authorize any statement by any of these agencies in regard to a situation such as this, because of some possible reason to believe that if this had been centralized more we would not have been having different statements coming from different agencies.

Mr. DILLON. We were not aware, actually, of the fact that NASA was going to make as formal a statement as this, and it was somewhat of a surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. I could not hear that answer.

Mr. DILLON. I say we were not aware of the fact that NASA was going to make such a formal statement as this, and I am not sure that the Central Intelligence Agency was either.

All the relationships—as I said in my original statement, there was coordination, there was a decision that the statements were going to be made by the State Department.

That decision was taken and made known to the other agencies concerned, which were the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency then on the morning of May 5.

The Central Intelligence Agency had the relationships with NASA and undertook to pass that on. We had no relationships with NASA. They didn't know we were in this thing, and somehow this statement was put out by NASA somewhat more complete than we expected but it was along the lines of the material that they had been furnished.

VICE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. Turning to a question that Senator Humphrey asked—and may I assure you that I am quite nonpolitical in raising that—I am only seeking to find out who had knowledge of what in regard to the matter. I refer to the May 27 issue of the Washington Post, in an article by Mr. Chalmers Roberts in the course of which he said:

> Nowhere in the 3½-hour television program did Nixon refer to any Presidential direction in the U–2 crisis, other than his approval of the flights some years earlier. Nor was there any reference to his own part in the affair. Nixon, of course, sits in the National Security Council. Nixon did say that he was "privy" to the U–2 reconnaissance policy "and I do endorse it." He also said that "I knew about this flight."

Now, my interpretation, Mr. Secretary, of your testimony is that neither you nor the President knew this specific flight was going to be taken at the time that it was taken, but that you did know that there was a general program for such flights and that this flight could be considered as a part of that program.

Now I ask you, do you have any reason to believe that Nixon knew anything that you and the President did not know and that maybe it is just an unfortunate use of language when he says "I knew about this flight," and that he probably means that he knew about the general program of reconnaissance?

Secretary HERTER. I would assume it was about the general program rather than about the particular flight.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. But as far as you know, the National Security Council did not brief its members in regard to any particular flights without also notifying the President in regard to specific flights.

Secretary HERTER. No, I think the National Security Council was only aware of the general program.

Senator MORSE. Are you a member of the National Security Council?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I am.

NUCLEAR ARMAMENT RACE

Senator MORSE. One final question at this round, Mr. Secretary: As you know I, along with everyone else, I think, who has the interest of peace at heart, am very much concerned about long continuation of this nuclear armament race.

Do you think that the United States and the Western Powers on the one hand and Russia on the other can continue this nuclear armament race with its constant increase and acceleration for another 10 years and not create the great probability of war?

Secretary HERTER. I don't know about the great probability of war, Senator, but I would say certainly increase the chances of war.

Senator MORSE. I know we are of one mind but I want the record to show this particular one mind: Do you agree with me that our generation simply has the responsibility in history to find some honorable way to end this nuclear armament race?

Secretary HERTER. I agree with you completely on that.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that we ought to do everything that we can to try to get the United Nations to exercise greater jurisdictional authority in connection with this whole matter of armament race than we have been able to get it to do so far?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, some time ago I made a speech in connection with disarmament in which I stated my views as to the great necessity in the following years to finding some answer to this, and at the same time finding an answer within the framework of the United Nations of an authority which could maintain the peace with law, and I still feel that just as strongly as I did at the time I made that speech.

RECORD OF THE WORLD COURT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, my time is up and I want to make a request for data if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator MORSE. This morning we talked about the cases that we had offered to take to the World Court.

Senator WILEY. A little louder, Senator.

Senator MORSE. This morning you talked about the cases that we were willing to take to the World Court. I wonder if the State Department can compile for the committee the record in regard to the World Court's operation, both on the cases it has handled and the cases that we have offered to have it handle that have been rejected by Russia or any other power.

Secretary HERTER. Yes; we will be very glad to do that.

(The following information was subsequently furnished for the record:)

STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE—CONTENTIOUS CASES PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST SOVIET-BLOC COUNTRIES

1. The United States has proposed to the Soviet Union the adjudication of four separate cases concerning aerial incidents. In each of these cases, the United States has filed with the Registry of the International Court of Justice an application instituting proceedings. These were the following cases: (*a*) Treatment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of United States of America (*United States* v. *U.S.S.R.*); (*b*) aerial incident of October 7, 1952 (*United States* v. *U.S.S.R.*); (*c*) aerial incident of September 4, 1954 (*United States* v. *U.S.S.R.*); and (*d*) aerial incident of November 7, 1954 (*United States* v. *U.S.S.R.*). Each of these four cases has been dismissed by the Court for lack of jurisdiction. The Court lacked jurisdiction because the Soviet Union has never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under article 36(2) of its statute nor agreed to jurisdiction specially in any case.

2. The United States also instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice in cases against Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These were: (*e*) Treatment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of United States of America (*United States* v. *Hungarian People's Republic*); and (*f*) aerial incident of March 10, 1953 (*United States* v. *Czechoslovakia*). Each of these cases was also dismissed by the Court for lack of jurisdiction. Again, the reason was that neither Hungary nor Czechoslovakia has ever accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in any way.

3. The United States also instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice in a case against Bulgaria, the aerial incident of July 27, 1955 (*United States* v. *Bulgaria*). This case differed from those above in that Bulgaria had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the former Permanent Court of International Justice in 1921, and it was the contention of the United States that Bulgaria was subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the present International Court of Justice by virtue of article 36(5) of this Court's statute. Bulgaria challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on several grounds, including a decision of the Court in another case arising out of the same aerial incident that Bulgaria is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, and a reciprocal invocation of the United States domestic jurisdiction reservation. The United States has moved to discontinue the case.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas.

DEVALUATION OF SOVIET CURRENCY

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, recently one of our Nation's financial writers, writing on the conditions in Russia, wrote that Mr. Khrushchev was proposing a devaluation of the currency as of January 1, and he stated that no nation tampers with its currency unless it is in financial difficulty.

What do we know about the financial and economic condition of Russia that would lead us to believe or know that he is planning on devaluating the currency?

Secretary HERTER. This I hadn't heard at all. I hadn't seen that particular statement and I have seen nowhere in any report any indications that they were planning to devalue their currency.

There is no question but that their foreign exchange rate, their official rate, doesn't correspond with reality. They have two rates, one an official rate and one a tourist rate. They are very far apart. One is 4 rubles to the dollar and one is 10 rubles to the dollar. But from the point of view of their internal financial situation, I have heard no reports they were planning to devalue the ruble.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN SOVIET UNION

Senator CARLSON. We have had evidence that there is social unrest among the people, that they are thinking that they are entitled to better living conditions, better homes and housing.

Do we have any evidence of that?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I think there is. But this is a matter that Mr. Bohlen testified to a few moments ago.

Senator CARLSON. That there is?

Secretary HERTER. There is evidence of that. As Mr. Bohlen said, it is impossible to get documentary evidence, as such, because of the secrecy and the discipline in their society, but I think that every visitor to Russia who has had a chance to talk with the workmen or the students at the university and so on, has come back with that feeling.

After all, Mr. Khrushchev has made a good many statements about the necessity of increasing the standard of living of their people.

In their incentives that they offer from the point of view of their workers, better living conditions in these housing projects is one of the principal incentives that they have been offering in the past, giving people priority if their particular sections of a plant do particularly well from the point of view of production, they will be advanced to better living quarters.

I think that the urge for better living quarters and a better standard of living, more consumer goods, is a very real one.

SOVIET REDUCTION IN ARMED FORCES AND LABOR SHORTAGE

Senator CARLSON. Does the State Department have any evidence of a labor shortage in Russia based on a statement that was recently made that Mr. Khrushchev reduced his military strength because it was necessary to get some of the people back into the labor market?

Secretary HERTER. Yes. Very recently there has been a study that I think will be made available to you, made on the whole question of the labor problem in Russia.

(The study referred to appears on p. 283 in appendix 2.)

It is an extremely interesting one from the point of view of the present situation and the relationship of women at work compared with men and the very large excess number of women over men that exists in Russia today.

There is certainly every reason to believe that Mr. Khrushchev's announced reduction of the armed forces was an effort to increase the male labor force by taking the extra men out of the armed services when he said he was planning to reduce from some 3,600,000 down to 2,400,000: that the principal purpose of that was to get a larger working force.

EFFECT ON SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS

Senator CARLSON. Is it not reasonable to assume, then, that Mr. Khrushchev does have some problems, internal problems, and that that may have some effect on his actions and his decision at Paris?

Secretary HERTER. That undoubtedly is true. He has had some other internal difficulty that you undoubtedly know about, Senator, in

connection with the new land that was planted, an area that has not been too successful and this was something on which he had banked very heavily to increase the food supply of Russia and I think he had been rather heavily criticized because it hadn't worked out as planned.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENT'S ORDER SUSPENDING U–2 FLIGHTS

Senator GORE. Returning, Mr. Secretary, to the examination of whether there was a breakdown in coordination and administrative procedure, I would like to inquire when you personally first learned of the President's order that the U–2 flights would be discontinued?

Secretary HERTER. At the time that he gave it.

Senator GORE. When did he give it?

Secretary HERTER. My recollection is that it was immediately after meeting at the White House on Thursday morning at about noon.

Senator GORE. Did he give the order to you?

Secretary HERTER. No, he did not give the order to me. I think it was through General Goodpaster, but I am not quite certain.

Senator GORE. How did you know that it was given?

Secretary HERTER. I heard him.

Senator GORE. You heard him give the order?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator GORE. And this was on Thursday?

Secretary HERTER. This was on Thursday.

Senator GORE. Then you do not know whether this information was communicated to the Vice President?

Secretary HERTER. I have no idea.

Senator GORE. He was not present?

Secretary HERTER. He was not present.

Senator GORE. Was this at a meeting of the Security Council?

Secretary HERTER. No, I don't think it was the Security Council. I think it was at the meeting immediately after the Security Council at which there were three of us present. Allen Dulles was not present and I have forgotten—I think Gates was present—after a Cabinet meeting it was.

Senator GORE. I don't understand.

Secretary HERTER. After the Cabinet meeting.

Senator GORE. After the Cabinet meeting?

Secretary HERTER. Right.

Senator GORE. That settles that. You heard the order issued, and I will have no further question as to where it was issued and to whom. If you heard it issued to Secretary Gates, that settles one question definitely and finally.

But you do not know whether the Vice President was informed about it?

Secretary HERTER. Excuse me——

Senator GORE. Did you wish to add something?

Secretary HERTER. No, no.

Senator GORE. You do not know then whether the Vice President was informed about it?

Secretary HERTER. No, I do not.

QUESTION OF PRESS SECRETARY HAGERTY'S KNOWLEDGE OF SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

Senator GORE. On this question of coordination or lack thereof, in addition to NASA and the State Department, to which Senator Morse referred, there is the State Department, CIA, NASA, Mr. Hagerty, and officials within the Department and perhaps others.

Did Mr. Hagerty operate in this field strictly as press secretary or did he undertake some Executive function?

Secretary HERTER. I know of no Executive function that he assumed.

ISSUANCE OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND NASA STATEMENTS OF MAY 5

Senator GORE. Mr. Dillon, on May 5 Mr. Hagerty, I understand, told a press conference that the State Department and NASA would issue statements. Were you aware of this?

Mr. DILLON. I have very recently learned that he indicated that NASA would issue a statement as such.

It was decided that the State Department would issue a statement. I hadn't been aware that he had said we were. But it had been decided and he knew it had been decided that we were going to do it.

Senator GORE. You say you very recently learned this. How recently?

Mr. DILLON. I think a day ago or 2 days ago that someone from the press said that he had told the press when they were there that NASA would issue a statement, so that they could get their information from NASA.

Senator GORE. Did Mr. Hagerty suggest to you that the State Department issue a statement?

Mr. DILLON. No, it was decided when we first heard of this, this news, as I said earlier this morning, at this National Security Council meeting or right after it that was held outside of Washington, that the State Department would handle the publicity on this, and that we would make any statement that would be made, and it was known at that time that we would make a statement.

Now Mr. Hagerty was not at the Security Council meeting, but he was at that area out there where this exercise was taking place and so he was aware of the fact that the State Department would be making a statement at noon that day at our regular press conference time.

Actually, the statement was delayed 45 minutes. It was made at 12:45 when our regular daily press conference took place.

Senator GORE. Was it decided there that NASA would make a statement also?

Mr. DILLON. It was not to my knowledge, no. It was not decided there that NASA would make a statement.

Senator GORE. Who made that decision?

Mr. DILLON. I think that you have to ask NASA. I don't know who made any such decision.

The fact is, as I have said earlier, I thought that NASA would answer questions.

I didn't know they were going to make a statement until I saw it.

Senator GORE. You don't know whether NASA or whether Mr. Hagerty made that decision?

Mr. DILLON. I have no idea, no. I would assume NASA made it because we did know that NASA would have to answer questions because this was a NASA plane that was lost and the reporters were going to find out how high the plane flew, what kind of a plane it was, anything they knew about it, and we had given them—the Intelligence Agency had given them good answers on how to answer such questions.

Senator GORE. You say you assume this. You did not know it?

Mr. DILLON. I knew they had given them that material. I knew that as a fact, but we did not know that they were going to use that and put in into the form of a statement as it actually came out.

Senator GORE. But Mr. Hagerty did know that a statement by NASA would be made?

Mr. DILLON. I don't know that what he said meant that he knew they were going to make a formal statement or whether he was just using that as a phrase, indicating that they would answer questions.

He may have thought they were going to make a statement. I just don't know that. He may have called them up and asked them. I don't know.

Senator GORE. Did, in fact, both the State Department and NASA make statements subject to Mr. Hagerty's notice to the press that they would do so?

Mr. DILLON. The State Department made its statement and NASA made one about three quarters of an hour later, yes.

[Deleted].

Senator GORE. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams?

Senator WILLIAMS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS

Senator LAUSCHE. When did the Camp David meeting take place with Khrushchev?

Secretary HERTER. I am terribly sorry——

Senator LAUSCHE. When did the Camp David meeting take place with Khrushchev?

Secretary HERTER. That was in September as I recall it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did Khrushchev, before May 1, make any statements indicating that the Soviet had knowledge of American reconnaissance planes over their territory?

Secretary HERTER. None.

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon his statements and upon the knowledge which he claims the Soviet possess, what day was it that he understood the first American plane flew over the Soviet?

Secretary HERTER. I can't identify that. My recollection is that when he was in Paris he made the statement that he knew about these overflights at the time that he was at Camp David and that he thought there was something fishy about President Eisenhower at that time.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, then at Camp David he did state that at that time he knew that our planes were flying over the Soviet.

Secretary HERTER. That is what he said later when he got to Paris.

Senator LAUSCHE. When he got to Paris?

Secretary HERTER. When he got to Paris. He never mentioned it at Camp David or at any time between Camp David and Paris.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, if he knew at Camp David that our reconnaissance planes were flying over the Soviet, and he said nothing about it, can you give any reason for his remaining silent on the subject?

Secretary HERTER. He was asked that question in a press conference in Paris.

I haven't got here the exact words of response but I think we could dig them out for you, and tell you just what he said in answer to that himself, but as I recollect, he said he felt that this was an inappropriate moment to bring it up but that he did think there was something fishy about the President at that time.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then at Camp David, when he knew that our planes were flying over his land, he was discussing what was to be the summit conference; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. What he hoped would be the summit conference.

Senator LAUSCHE. And if we take him at his word, at that time he hoped to have a summit conference although he knew then that we were supposedly committing a flagrant transgression against his rights.

Secretary HERTER. That is correct, from his own later testimony.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can you reconcile those two positions as both being true, one that he honestly intended to attend a summit conference and, two, that he knew our planes were flying over his land?

Secretary HERTER. No, it would be very difficult to reconcile the two. It is very difficult particularly to reconcile the tremendous issue that he made of it later when he knew about it all the time, according to his own statement.

Senator AIKEN. Will the Senator yield? You will find on page 16 of the Background Documents Khrushchev's statement that Twining, the then Chief of Staff, sent a plane over Russia which went over Kiev the day after he left Russia. It is the third paragraph on page 16. (See appendix 1, p. 191.)

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. Your recollection is that the meeting took place last September.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, from September to May 14, was that the day he came to Paris, he said nothing about this knowledge that he had, was supposed to have had while he was at Camp David.

Secretary HERTER. That is my recollection. I would want to check on that. It is possible that he may have said something at the Presidium meeting before he left Moscow. My expert here tells me he did not, and that was my recollection that he had never mentioned it until he got to Paris.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can one rationalize the furor of his resentment in May of 1960 compared to his admitted silence at Camp David about similar flights?

Secretary HERTER. No; one cannot.

INFORMATION GATHERING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE U.S.S.R.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, last January 18, Allen Dulles appeared before our committee, and at that time he merely scratched on the surface what I thought was a very vital question: the comparative ease with which the Soviet gets information in the United States and the impregnable wall that bars us from getting news in the Soviet.

I ask you the question, Mr. Herter, to give your understanding of the facility with which we get information out of the Soviet, and that which they get out of the United States.

Secretary HERTER. Senator, as you know, we have what we call an open society. We are very proud of it in which we have complete freedom of the press, in which, except for matters of highest security, very freely talked about, and a great deal is published.

Our technical magazines publish a great deal from the point of view of vital military information. Our installations in this country, while no direct overflights are permitted, can be photographed with comparative ease from an angle of one side.

Generally speaking we have had no restrictions at all on travel in the United States except for a few very small circumscribed areas, like the Atomic Energy Agency plants, and we have had restrictions on Soviet citizens traveling in this country which have been taken entirely as a retaliatory measure because of the limitations put on the travel of Americans in Russia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

Secretary HERTER. The Soviet society, as you know, is a closed society, where one moves and goes only where they tell you you can go or when they tell you you can go.

Senator LAUSCHE. This morning in answer to a question, assuming that a Soviet plane was over the United States and what we would do about it, you said that there is no need of them sending planes for reconnaissance purposes because they can get the information without going through that effort.

Secretary HERTER. That is quite so.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, they can go to Cape Canaveral and pretty simply see what is going on there.

Secretary HERTER. Well, sir, there are newspaper men down at Cape Canaveral all the time and a good many visitors.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now the fact is that:

> The Soviets still consider that secrecy and the security of everything relating to their military operations is one of their great assets, and they have no intention whatever of changing that. Moreover they have no intention of letting us into areas of miltary importance.

Those are the words of Dulles.

That is, there is a difference between the Soviet getting information here and our getting it in the Soviet.

Secretary HERTER. Oh, a very great difference. It is the whole difference between an open and a closed society.

PROPOSED PASSPORT LEGISLATION

Senator LAUSCHE. You have been asking for this Congress to pass a bill that would give the State Department some limited control over Communists going to the Soviet Union. Is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And why have you asked that?

Secretary HERTER. Because we felt that we ought to have some control—these are American citizens traveling abroad—that we ought to have some control over those who may be going to various parts of the world in interest inimical to those of the United States.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you asked that because you have in mind the grave dangers that lie in the ability of a Communist to distribute information in the Soviet Union when he makes the visit, if he so desires.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. That bill has not been acted upon; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

POWERS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any type of legislation that you feel that we ought to pass with respect to the curtailment of the duties and the powers of the Central Intelligence Agency or the expansion of them. If you have given that subject no thought, you can state it.

Secretary HERTER. I have given it no thought. I hope there would be no change so far as the activities are concerned. [Deleted.]

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all I have.

ALLEGED FRENCH NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT OF OVERFLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there was one statement that I was told when I was in Paris that an account of overflights of the Russian territory had been carried in a French newspaper some 30 to 60 days prior to that.

Have you ever heard of such account?

Secretary HERTER. I think I heard the same reports in Paris but I never saw any documentary proof of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any of your people tried to confirm it?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, but I have not heard it mentioned by anyone except when I was over in Paris, too. I had not heard a word before that.

KHRUSHCHEV'S MAY 5 REFERENCE TO OVERFLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

In his speech of May 5, Mr. Khrushchev referred to the U.S. overflights of July 2, 1956, April 9, 1960, and May 1, 1960. He said that the April 9 flight caused concern within the Soviet Government and resulted in admonishments to the Soviet military not to let it happen again.

[Deleted.]

KHRUSHCHEV'S INTERPRETATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE OF OVERFLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. This, again, raises this point that puzzles me very much. The evidence is quite clear that Mr. Khrushchev, if he didn't know positively, certainly suspected that it was our planes that were going across his territory, didn't he?

Secretary HERTER. That is what I assume.

The CHAIRMAN. And it comes back to this point that he hadn't raised such a terrible fuss about it until this one, that is, the May 1 flight, which was shot down. And, you said you couldn't reconcile the difference in his attitude toward the prior flights to the attitude toward the May 1 flight. But doesn't the reconciliation, if it is explainable at all—I am just asking you if there is one—does it not lie in the fact that our Government did take the position regarding the May 1 flight and this program, that this is a deliberate program which we, the President, takes responsibility for, and which we intend to continue?

Secretary HERTER. Not which we intend to continue. That has never been said.

The CHAIRMAN. He interpreted it as such. Mr. Khrushchev in his statement, which I have a copy of here—this is his language. He says—this is a quote from part of our Background Documents (see p. 204, appendix 1) which says:

> At his press conference, Herter made an outrageous statement. Far from feeling guilty and ashamed of aggressive actions, he justifies them and says that this will continue in the future. Only countries which are in a state of war can act in this way. * * * Herter's statement has made us doubt the correctness of our earlier conclusions that the President, the American Government, did not know about the flights. Herter's statement says that this intelligence plan was endorsed by the Government.

At least that is the way he interpreted it, and, as we said before——

Senator LAUSCHE. Who is "he"? Who interpreted it?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a quote from Mr. Khrushchev's statement. He is interpreting what Mr. Herter said as speaking for the Government. But is this not at least a possible reconciliation of the difference in attitude between the prior flights and the May 1 flight?

Secretary HERTER. It might be if one wanted to interpret the words that I spoke that way. There was no need of his interpreting those words that way. Certainly from what I said, that is a very far-fetched interpretation. I think he was interpreting it for his own purposes that way. I think that the one reconcilable feature between those two things is that in one case he had specific evidence and in the other case he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is your position that neither your statement nor the President's press conference can legitimately be interpreted as an endorsement and justification of the flights and a policy of pursuing them in the future?

Secretary HERTER. Certainly not the policies of pursuing them in the future. The President's statement that was made in Paris said it was perfectly clear from what I had said and from what he had said that there was nothing that allowed that inference.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you in your background news conference in Paris on Sunday, May 15, repeat the same statement that you had made prior thereto in Washington?

Secretary HERTER. I was asked at that background press conference whether or not I had made a statement that we would continue doing this. I repeated the very words that I had used in my statement. I said I stood on those. That did not imply that we would continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to that second statement, Mr. Khrushchev had so interpreted it. Were you aware that he had so interpreted it in his statement to the Presidium?

Secretary HERTER. I think I may have been, but if one took cognizance of every interpretation of his of everything that happens in this country one would be spending all one's time trying to correct his statements.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that it is an unreasonable and far-fetched interpretation of your statement or the President's in his press conference that these would be continued; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it or is it not a fact that the press in this country interpreted it in that same fashion?

Secretary HERTER. I am told that some did and some did not.

The CHAIRMAN. It might have been wise for us to clarify at that time so that we interpreted it properly; don't you think?

Secretary HERTER. That, as I think I have indicated earlier, referred to the cessation of the flights and not resuming the flights. The President had reserved to state in Paris in conjunction with the fact that he was going to offer at the United Nations his plan for aerial supervision of all nations that would be willing to submit to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that any head of state, of any important nation at least, could proceed with negotiations at a conference under the situation, at least as he interpreted it, that is, that we intended to continue such flights?

Secretary HERTER. After all, Mr. Khrushchev arrived in Paris and made an arrival statement there the Saturday before the conference saying that he expected to proceed and have fruitful results.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, in order that it is clear what is involved here, I would like to read one sentence, the one that is referred to by Mr. Khrushchev, which I think you clarified. I quote from the statement that was made by the Department of State on May 7 (see p. 187, appendix 1):

> The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world.

I think that is the statement that led to the interpretation, don't you?

Secretary HERTER. I am sorry, sir, I have got before me now the statement of May 7. Which were those words?

The CHAIRMAN. It appears on page 12 of the background documents prepared by the staff, the first paragraph at the top of page 12.

Secretary HERTER. That does not in any way intimate that they would go on.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe that that could reasonably be interpreted as meaning that they will continue?

Secretary HERTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator Wiley?

KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH AT BAKU

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this examination, and as you brought out, Mr. Chairman, I think that what we had better do is get down to what I think is the basic issue, not what was said or particularly done, but let's see what Khrushchev did.

On April 28, in what has been called the speech at Baku, an examination of that speech shows clearly that the Soviet Government had come to the conclusion that it would get nowhere at the summit conference. Now, listen to this:

Overnight all the Government-controlled radio stations—

and get the date, May 25—

all the controlled radio stations and newspapers in the Soviet Union began to prepare the people for a summit failure, and flatly blamed the West. The same bitter tones which Khrushchev used in Paris is to be noted in what he said at Baku.

And Baku was days before.

In a violent attack in Baku on Secretary Herter and Under Secretary Dillon, on that same day, the Soviet Premier intimated that he planned to use military power to enforce the prospective seizure in the West.

I quote Khrushchev:

If, therefore, the Western Powers should not wish to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, that would not preserve for them the rights on whose preservation they insist. They would then obviously lose the right of access to West Berlin by land, water, or air.

In another portion of his speech, the Soviet Premier practically admitted that he had no hope of reaching any agreement at the summit conference.

He said:

The nearer May 16, the day of the meeting of the heads of Government, approaches, the more one-sided becomes the approach of certain statesmen of the Western Powers to the problems the participants of the conference will have to face.

Then he goes ahead and gives examples attacking Herter and Dillon.

KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION TO SCUTTLE CONFERENCE

Now I want to quote this. This morning I called your attention to this young Russian that stepped out from the intelligence department of the Russian Government, who was heard on the radio. He said, and I quote:

The Soviet Communist regime is in no way interested in allowing so popular a man as the American President to come to the Soviet Union. They are definitely afraid of the impact such a visit can make on the people.

Now if the issue is what caused Khrushchev to shoot his wad, so to speak, I think it is very clear that when he found out, one, that he couldn't make an impression upon his associates who were to be at the conference; two, that Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese were unhappy and Mao Tse-tung laced him up and down about this conference, as the record shows, when he found out that they didn't want it; three, that he was having trouble with his own gang in Russia; and, four, that the youth of Russia were simply getting all fed up—he

decided before he went to Paris that he was going to let the balloon go up.

It wasn't the question of U–2. That may have given him the ostensible opportunity to blow his top, but, as a matter of fact, he was all ready to go days before.

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

Now if that is the fact, and I think it is sustained by the people who weigh the evidence, then there is no need of our inquiring into what some folks feel. They may be a little remiss hither and yon in our own public service. They were laboring under deep pressure. When you put yourself in the President's boots and go over there and see what he took, you have to say, "God bless him. He held his temper and he handled himself so that he made all America and all the world proud," and the result was as suggested, as the record now shows. Look at the U.N., look at Britain, what they say about it. And the answer, I think, is that we should just about stop our investigation and not try to ball up further the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record I will say that the President, yesterday morning, heartily endorsed this inquiry.

Senator WILEY. That what?

The CHAIRMAN. The President himself said in my presence that he heartily endorsed this inquiry, and if the Senator wishes to take issue with the President, why I suggest he talk to him about it.

Senator WILEY. Oh, no. I heard him say that. I am not disputing his saying it. I am just simply saying that where do we go from here now?

Are we going further, are we going to try to ball up the agency that gets the information, that has done such a tremendous job, that for 3½ years has given us information.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator misunderstands the purpose of this meeting. It is not to ball up anything. It is to try to clarify a situation for the benefit of the committee and the Senate and the country. And I know of no one who has the slightest purpose of balling up anything.

Has the Senator completed his questions?

Senator WILEY. Yes, I am sorry that I used that expression. What I meant was "confuse," and if there is going to be further evidence, would you mind telling me who the next witness is?

The CHAIRMAN. There will be no other witnesses this afternoon.

Senator WILEY. Well, do you expect to call some later on?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Dulles is coming on Tuesday.

Senator Mansfield—is the Senator through?

Senator WILEY. No, that is the point I am making. I want to state in all sincerity, gentlemen, it is your responsibility if you want to call this man who has created this agency under the mandate of the Congress, that we have appropriated money for, and have not tied his hands and he is the one who brought about this; let us be frank.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is misinformed if he thinks that type of testimony is going to go in the public record. There was no intention at any time of putting this in the public record.

Senator WILEY. Did you hear yesterday when the distinguished Senator from Ohio very plainly and bluntly talked about the leaks. I belong to a committee where I have seen them go right from the committee room right out in front of the fellows who have the mechanisms for giving the news. This is the first time I have blown my top, but I am simply telling you in the interests of my country, I think you should not call in this other agency. I think that these gentlemen have told what the public knows now, but to bring in this other agency, I think would be a mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator say that he knows Senators who have gone out of executive sessions before the microphone and repeated what has been said here?

Senator WILEY. I am not putting my finger on any Senators. If you want to know what is going on what have they got the television out there for and you are quoted every day as appearing before it.

Let's be frank. This is not the only committee where they spill the beans. But I am talking about the Central Intelligence Agency, gentlemen. I happen to know something about it, and I know what it means, and people over in the House know what it means, and I sincerely hope that you will not bring Dulles before you. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.

JURISDICTION OVER THE AIRSPACE AND THE HIGH SEAS

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, in an attempt to clarify some of the confusion which exists in some of our minds I would like to ask some questions:

What is your present official interpretation of international law as regards the extension of national sovereignty skyward?

Secretary HERTER. I don't think we have any.

Senator MANSFIELD. We have no international law in that field as yet?

Secretary HERTER. That I know of. There is no definition as to what is considered the atmosphere above the air. There is no accepted interpretation or verbiage when they are talking about the atmosphere.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would you think it advisable to have an international conference or conferences to decide the question of sovereignty in the air over a country and also the possibility of regulating the seas in a more orderly fashion?

Secretary HERTER. Well, as you know, we have tried for over a year to get the United Nations to get the outer space committee organized and underway.

Senator MANSFIELD. At our suggestion?

Secretary HERTER. At our urging. We have been urging that this be done. We have been pressing it. We have not been able to make any headway because the Russians refused to go along. There have been further discussions of this proposal but we have been unable to agree on who should carry it out. I think we are making progress but it is still one of those things where there is a constant dispute as to what should be done.

Not only that but we had hoped to get it adjusted in time so that this year there could be a great international scientific congress be-

cause you're dealing with new matters that the scientists are expert in that the layman is not, and the Soviets were unable even to allow the calling of that congress.

Senator MANSFIELD. No. In other words, as yet there is no clarification of this particular matter.

Getting back to my statement concerning regulation of the seas, we, of course, operate under the doctrine of freedom of the seas. But what I have in mind is the fact that it is my understanding that the Soviet Union can launch missiles anywhere it wants to up within, say, three miles of our coastline if it is in our vicinity, and we have the same right under international law to fire missiles up to 3 miles, say of Vladivostok. Is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, and it depends again on what one takes as the territorial waters. Three miles have been the generally accepted territorial limit. The Soviet Government has claimed 12 miles and, as you know, the recent Geneva Conference failed in reaching agreement among the nations as to what should constitute the territorial water of different nations.

Some nations have gone much farther than that, particularly with regard to fishing rights.

Senator MANSFIELD. That's right, but what I have in mind is that times have changed considerably, even in our generation.

Mr. Chairman, may we have order in the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. It is difficult to have order.

Senator MANSFIELD. The fact is that we have these satellites going skyward hundreds of miles and we have these missiles going thousands of miles into the ocean. It was because of these new factors that I offered the suggestion that it might be well to have international conferences to take heed of changed conditions in this modern day.

We have also advocated, as you are aware, peaceful uses of outer space, and we have made no headway.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, the first question I wish to pursue leads to a question of Mr. Bohlen. Since others have asked him questions, I wonder if I might ask that he return.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF U–2 FLIGHTS

Mr. Secretary, Secretary Dillon testified this morning that he did not know of this particular flight, and to the best of my memory you said you were away at the time and did not know of this particular flight.

Secretary HERTER. I knew of the program. I made that clear in which the flight was included but not that particular flight.

Senator GORE. I was specifying this particular flight. Did I correctly understand both of you?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, Senator. I had heard about 6 weeks earlier that a series of flights would be undertaken and I had not heard anything since that time but it was not in my regular order of business.

Senator GORE. Would you repeat what you said? I did not understand it.

Mr. DILLON. I said I was informed about 6 weeks before the date of this flight, I say, that there was a program of particular flights of which this one could have been a part, and I did——

Senator GORE. It could have been but you did not know of this particular one.

Mr. DILLON. No; I did not know any more than that of this particular flight.

QUESTION OF DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF U–2 FLIGHTS

Senator GORE. The President, in his statement to the American people, the other night, said this:

> As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

Now, as I understand your reply to the chairman of the committee, you did not participate in the making of a decision to halt or not to halt this particular flight.

Secretary HERTER. I had approved of it.

Senator GORE. On this particular program.

Secretary HERTER. And approved of it as a part of the program. The question of the halting of it was not in issue at that time although I knew that the summit conference was coming.

Senator GORE. Well, my specific question is this: Did you participate in a conference or were you aware of a decision; did you make a decision? What is the full extent of your knowledge of a decision that the flight would not be discontinued?

Secretary HERTER. I know of no conference at which that matter was discussed.

Senator GORE. Then would it have properly been——

Secretary HERTER. The only matter that came before me was the approval of this program.

Senator GORE. How long ago did you approve the program?

Secretary HERTER. I can't tell you exactly, but it was some time prior to the time I went abroad.

Senator GORE. Is it a matter of weeks?

Secretary HERTER. A matter of weeks.

Senator GORE. Would such a decision have been properly within the province of the State Department?

Secretary HERTER. No. The State Department would not have a final decision in the matter. The State Department would have an advisory position in the matter, and the CIA did consult with us about it.

[Deleted.]

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

Senator GORE. I understood the purpose of this hearing was to develop the facts insofar as we were capable of doing so, and to the extent that security would permit, to make available the facts to the American people.

Do I correctly understand the purpose of the hearing?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee understands it as I understand it in spite of the opinion of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask, is it——

Senator WILEY. You might as well just now.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it confined to what our Government has done or are we concerned about what the Soviet has done?

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly am concerned about what the Soviet has done.

Senator LAUSCHE. It hasn't been manifested here today.

(Procedural discussion.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor.

Senator WILEY. May I just say one thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator yield to the Senator from Wisconsin?

Senator WILEY. I realize when I hit the ceiling before that I was probably not as coherent as I should be. I want to say to you with the conviction of a man who has lived long, that the business of a committee like ours is to develop facts for legislation, facts that are necessary to bring out curative legislation, or if you please, if you want to investigate an individual, that is another thing. We had the McCarthy hearings. We know what that did, but here is another angle.

It is not the business of this committee to expose to the people of this country a mechanism that is so important to preserve the life and integrity of this country, and I mean the CIA, I know what it means. I happen to know something about what it has done [deleted] and to me, at least, and as I say, as a young man of past 70 summers, please remember that when you go into this thing, as you are going into it, you are going to expose a mechanism that is as vital to the life of this country as anything you can think of.

It is that mechanism that made possible this series of three and a half years of exploratory missions over the Soviet Union [deleted].

If that is what you are going into, just count your words.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.

Senator GORE. Dealing with the CIA is not a new experience for me. I happen to have handled in the House of Representatives the appropriation bill for the Atomic Energy Commission for 5 years before I was elected to the U.S. Senate.

I was party to the appropriation for the atomic energy program when the atomic bomb was being built in my State. No one ever heard those secrets from my lips. Every year for the past 14 I have listened to the testimony of the CIA from one to two or three or more times. I don't think that it is necessary that we violate the security of this country in order to hear Mr. Allen Dulles' testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield? Mr. Dulles said to this committee when he was asked if he would appear, that he would be very pleased to appear. He thought it would serve a useful purpose. He had no objection.

Senator GORE. I am aware that I am pursuing very important questions that reflect upon the effectiveness of our country and the prestige of our country. That is all the more reason why they should be pursued.

I thought this was the purpose of the hearing, to develop the facts, and insofar as they could be revealed to the public, to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is quite right.

QUESTION OF DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF U–2 FLIGHTS

Senator GORE. To return to the question, insofar as either of you know, or any official of the Department, no actual decision to proceed with the flight or not to proceed with the flight was made.

If such a decision was made, it was beyond your knowledge. Is that a correct statement?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I think that I ought to say this. When the matter came before me, I had an opportunity of disapproving it and did not do so. Not it, but the program.

Senator GORE. But this particular flight did not come before you?

Secretary HERTER. It came as one of a group.

[Deleted.]

NOTICE TO SECRETARY HERTER OF PLANE'S MISFORTUNE

Senator GORE. When did you first learn of the plane's misfortune?

Secretary HERTER. I received word in Ankara, Turkey, that a plane was down. That is all.

Senator GORE. From whom did you receive it?

Secretary HERTER. It was handed to me from a slip of paper that Mr. Livingston Merchant had. He was sitting behind me at a NATO meeting and he handed me a slip of paper, "word has come that [deleted] a plane is missing."

I don't think he said in Russia. I didn't know which one of the flights it was.

Senator GORE. It is your presumption that this was a communication within the Department?

Secretary HERTER. Oh, yes. I assume it was either in the Department or from CIA sources with whom we are constantly in touch overseas.

Senator GORE. I believe my time is up. I will return to this.

[Deleted.]

PARIS PRESS BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR BOHLEN

The CHAIRMAN. You had one question of Mr. Bohlen. He was called back at your request.

Senator GORE. Yes. If I may digress a moment, I have been told several times, Mr. Bohlen, that in your press briefing at Paris, I believe on this 16th, you expressed the view that except for the U–2 plane, there would have been a summit conference.

Will you relate to us what you said at this briefing in this regard?

Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall, Senator, honestly that I made that statement——

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall that I made that statement. The press briefing that I held on the 16th was an open press conference on the record, and I do not recall any statement of that kind because my view then as now is that the U–2 was one of the factors that may have led to the particular Soviet behavior at Paris.

I really do not recall any such statement of that kind. It's all on the record. This was an open press conference.

Senator GORE. You did not hold an off-the-record background briefing?

Mr. BOHLEN. I held a background later in which I outlined at that conference the three factors that I believed and still do entered into the formulation of the Soviet position.

Senator GORE. Was a transcript made of that background briefing?

Mr. BOHLEN. I would have to check on that, sir. I think there probably was.

Senator GORE. Would you supply it to the committee if there was?

Mr. BOHLEN. If there is one, I would have no views on it.

Secretary HERTER. I would have no objection.

(The transcript referred to was subsequently furnished for the confidential use of the committee.)

Mr. BOHLEN. If there is a transcript of it, but I recall the circumstances very well in this, in that three factors that I mentioned earlier, the Soviet pessimism as regards the outcome of the summit from their point of view; the possible opposition or questioning of its conduct and the U–2 matters were the three factors that appeared to me to have entered into Soviet decision to torpedo the conference.

I might add, Senator, for clarification on this, we have used the words "scuttle the conference" quite often.

There are various ways of scuttling a conference. You can scuttle a conference before it begins or you can sabotage it from within [deleted].

[Subsequently, Mr. Bohlen made available to the Committee the following statement of views he held in Paris at the time the Summit Conference came to an end:]

I would like to just briefly note—this is a personal opinion—that there were three elements in this situation:

One, I think, was the situation in Moscow, whereby there were some people who were a little bit concerned about the manner in which Khrushchev was conducting the foreign relations of the Soviet Union, for reasons already touched on.

The second was that I believe that he came to think—or the Soviet Government came to think—that the prospects for any agreement at the summit, on Berlin particularly, which is one that he had committed himself so deeply to, were very dim indeed. Before the plane incident, they were visibly preparing the usual tactic of placing the onus in advance upon the Western Powers for any expected failure. But had there been no plane incident, I believe the conference would have run its full course. There would have been discussions. There would have been the normal, if you want to call it that, the normal type conference with the Russians, of which we have had many in the last 15 years, but without results.

The plane incident, the whole development connecting with that, moved things into a totally new dimension. And I think that the evidence is conclusive, that he came here to Paris with the idea of either torpedoing the conference or conceivably—because you cannot read their full minds—the hope that somehow or other that the pressure from our Allies would force the United States to capitulate. I think he makes this very plain. And this is where he made his major miscalculation. Our Allies stood with us solidly—wonderfully well.

Of course, it is easier to say that now than it was before.

Mr. DRYDEN. I was told that these statements had been cleared by

Mr. DRYDEN. The CIA people with whom we were dealing, sir.

Senator GORE. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator from Ohio have any further questions?

DUTIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Herter, I have in my hand the National Security Act of 1947, and I have read from page 5 that part of the material which deals with the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Are the duties enumerated in this section complete?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I think those are enumerated in that section.

Senator LAUSCHE. This section didn't place any directions on how intelligence is to be obtained.

Secretary HERTER. No.

[Deleted.]

PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR U–2 FLIGHT

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon the questions that have been asked here today, one set implied that the President should not have told the truth. The next set implied that one of the men lied. And the third set implied that there was an inability to coordinate the views.

Now, my question is—off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Take it off the record.

We will make a special dispensation, whatever the Senator wishes. Does he wish it on or off?

Senator LAUSCHE. Let it be on. Has anyone given any thought about the peculiar position that the President of the United States is placed in in connection with the paradoxical situation that he is supposed to be a man of truth, and moral character, and yet requested to lie about these matters, if they are within his knowledge?

Secretary HERTER. I am not sure whether that is a rhetorical question or whether you are asking me that question.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, take it both ways. [Laughter.]

Senator GORE. Rhetorical or oratorical. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, let's assume that you were the President, Mr. Herter, and you were faced with the dilemma of telling a lie about what happened or telling the truth. In either event you are hooked. What course would you follow?

Secretary HERTER. I can answer that one so far as I myself am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. He followed both.

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't know. I am beginning to wonder if what the Central Intelligence Agency is doing ought not to be a matter left with them and without the knowledge of the President.

I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I just want to make a comment. The Senator from Ohio has put his finger on the very point that perhaps I didn't make clear to him earlier in my inquiry. This is, in my opinion, a central important question about this whole matter, the wisdom of the policy of involving the President in this kind of business, that is, espionage, which traditionally involves lying and cheating and murdering and violating the sovereignty of countries with which a country is not at war and all of this. And what the Senator has said is—perhaps I didn't make it clear—is exactly the point that I was seeking to raise and to elucidate in the first line of questions that I asked. And I agree with him this presents a very difficult

dilemma, and the question is the wisdom of departing from the traditional historical practice of not involving the head of the state in any espionage responsibilities that he is above and apart from. We follow that in the Congress, as you have just stated. [Deleted.] We treat it differently, and I was suggesting and raising the question of whether it is wise to depart from the traditional practice that all important states throughout history, without exception in accordance with the Secretary's testimony, have followed. That is the very point. I don't think the Senator understood what my point was.

Senator LAUSCHE. I knew if I were President——

Senator WILEY. You would tell the truth.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would tell the truth.

Senator WILEY. So did he.

The CHAIRMAN. He did and this is the answer.

Senator LAUSCHE. And could you expect him to do anything else?

Senator WILEY. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the only way you could enable him to perform his duty to his country was not by having him know what was done and if he didn't know the question would be pursued why didn't he know.

Senator WILEY. He taught the world a lesson in 1960, new diplomacy, by telling the truth, and I think that it will echo down through the years.

Senator LAUSCHE. So I don't know which group to follow.

The CHAIRMAN. It is echoing down the years already. This is the principal echo that has arisen from this whole matter.

Senator LAUSCHE. The tragedy is that this is made the principal echo but all of the misdeeds of the Soviet are looked upon as inconsequential.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Senator is entirely incorrect in that statement. He draws conclusions that are not justified by the record or any statement that I have heard before the committee.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, I can——

Senator MANSFIELD. Can I ask a question?

[Deleted.]

USIA'S DIRECTOR'S RADIO PROGRAM APPEARANCE

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand Mr. Allen's statement on the television program was not approved by you or by the Acting Secretary?

Secretary HERTER. No. As I understand it, this was in answer to a question on a TV program.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes. I think we have the program here. But could somebody on the staff find it right away so that I could read it just as it is? (See p. 212, app. 1.)

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, while they are looking for it, is it or is it not the policy of the Department of State that its employees clear public statements with regard to delicate international relations before they make them?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the policy?

Secretary HERTER. It is. Any statement dealing with foreign affairs should be cleared with the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Then when they are made in this fashion without clearance, it is not in accord with your policy; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. Well, as I say, this had not been cleared with us.

The CHAIRMAN. He is an employee——

Secretary HERTER. I think it is very possible that a prepared statement had been cleared, but not an answer to a question. There is no way of clearing that, until one knows what question is asked.

The CHAIRMAN. What I asked this for is because later on it seems to me one of the important things that might come out of this committee hearing is a tightening of the policy which gives the Department of State and the Secretary of State a much closer control over public statements by other agencies. It strikes me that we would get in much less trouble if all these people would clear with you or with whoever is Secretary of State of the Department, we will say. Don't you think that would minimize the chances of inconsistent statements being made by members of the Government?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, that is so. But I think that anything that he may have said in a prepared statement on that TV program at that time had been cleared. Insofar as answers to questions are concerned, there is no way of clearing them without knowing the questions and in that way he was on his own.

The CHAIRMAN. It is his responsibility, then, when he goes beyond anything that had been cleared?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, on page 35 of the Background Documents on the summit conference, about 7 or 8 lines up from the bottom of the page, Mr. Allen, in response to a question from Miss Dodd, states the following:

> There are a lot of different definitions of "spying" and I don't want to try to quibble, but I do think I ought to point this out and that more people ought to recall it: When he went down he told exactly what his mission was and exactly what he was expected to do, and he was under instruction to do that.

Now, the answer to the question, I just thought ought to be in the record, because there was some confusion about this statement in view of information which had been given to a group previously in the Capitol. Again, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am through with my questions of Mr. Herter, but I want to express my thanks to Secretary Herter, to Secretary Dillon and to Ambassador Bohlen for their candor and frankness today and to assure them that I, for one, appreciate what they had to say, and I think they have made a real contribution to clearing up a confused situation which confronted the committee as a whole.

Secretary HERTER. We are very grateful for that, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Of course, on this side of the aisle, I have praised your statement in the beginning and I will praise your conduct in the conclusion. You all did very well.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. I do not wish to unduly tire the Secretary, but I am perfectly willing to come back after dinner or to come back tomorrow. I do have many more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is my understanding the Secretary—he looks very well to me—would prefer to go on tonight. He does not wish to run over to next week.

Secretary HERTER. I prefer to go on, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. I don't think it will take very long tonight.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION TO DISCONTINUE FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator may proceed.

Senator GORE. Fine.

I wish to resume my inquiry with respect to this particular flight. I am perturbed that you say it would not be within the province of the Department of State to make the decision to discontinue these flights; that this would be a decision for Mr. Dulles to make.

Secretary HERTER. No, I never said that at all.

Senator GORE. I beg your pardon?

Secretary HERTER. I never said that at all. I said he was the operational man who had to plan things, and then submit them for approval.

Senator GORE. Well, what would be the proper agency to consider whether these flights should or should not be discontinued?

Secretary HERTER. If the question of discontinuance had come up, if that was a decision to be made, we would have been asked advice on it. We were not asked for advice on it. We gave approval to carry on with the routine planning that had been done from the point of view of flight.

Senator GORE. Some weeks prior?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, and had given that approval.

Senator GORE. Did that approval——

Secretary HERTER. That approval, as I say, is advice.

Senator GORE. Was advice?

Secretary HERTER. Is advice. The President himself took the responsibility for any final decision.

Senator GORE. Did your approval involve continuation of the flight through and during the period of the summit conference?

Secretary HERTER. Not specifically as such. The approval constituted going ahead when conditions were appropriate for carrying them out.

Senator GORE. Did you give no consideration to discontinuance at a time prior to the summit meeting or during the summit conference?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, I answered that question before when I said that there is no good time for a failure, that if the summit conference had debarred carrying out these flights the President's visit to Russia may have been the next thing that might have debarred them.

It may have been debarred when Khrushchev was at Camp David; it may have been debarred when Mr. Khrushchev was visiting in France.

There may have been any number of diplomatic reasons why they shouldn't be conducted at a given period of time.

In my opinion, the value of the information and the necessity of carrying out these flights under given conditions warranted their going ahead.

Senator GORE. I am trying to be specific in my questions, and I am trying to elicit from you whether at the time you gave your approval for the general program some weeks prior to this particular flight, you gave specific consideration to the question of continuance or discontinuance during or near the time of the summit conference.

Secretary HERTER. Certainly. The summit conference was very much on my mind as it was on everybody's mind, at that time.

Senator GORE. And you gave your approval then?

Secretary HERTER. I did.

Senator GORE. To their continuation throughout the summit conference?

Secretary HERTER. That was never specified as such.

Senator GORE. In other words, you are saying, then, that there was no decision to discontinue?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator GORE. Then if any decision to discontinue or if any decision was made not to continue, to use the words, you are not aware of it?

Secretary HERTER. No. The only decision that I know of at any stage of the game was to go ahead.

[Deleted.]

COMPARISON OF STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

Senator GORE. Another statement which the President made, I would like to read:

> Of course we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening peace, there could be no higher obligation than to pursue it.

Now, on page 4 of your statement here today, I would like to read. This is on page 4, beginning "Summit prospects dimmed."

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the second, third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs on page 4 be reprinted at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The paragraphs referred to follow:)

> In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about "detente." There were comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-United States cultural agreement was signed November 21, and on December 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other powers signed the Antarctic treaty.
>
> But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess, and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.
>
> Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal blocwide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation on his speeches available to the committee.
>
> Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight—notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments that he in fact had begun.

Senator GORE. You will see from this statement, Mr. Secretary, that you contradict the President's statement, do you not?

The President says:

We had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about.

From what I have just read, you list one, two, three, four occasions where the Soviet policy had, in fact, changed.

Do you wish to comment?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I would be very glad to comment.

I don't think that there is any essential disagreement in the two points of view.

I am talking primarily in my statement in regard to Berlin and Germany.

The President was talking about a series of things in which he spoke of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control, and then he added Germany and Berlin.

As I testified earlier in the day, I think we all had hopes that there might be a possibility of making some progress, even though not in the German-Berlin situation, but in the disarmament field, and as a corollary possibly in the nuclear testing field where it was not a summit problem, but it would have been a three-power problem that could have been discussed in Paris.

For instance, so long as there was any hope of making any progress, the President was willing to go.

Senator GORE. I didn't question the President being willing to go so long as there was any hope of progress.

What I was asking you to comment on was what appears to me to be a contrast between the President's statement that there is no indication that basic Soviet policies had turned about, and where you give almost a full page indicating that they had turned about. But you have finished your comment on that.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, there was some talk here about basic policy and tactics in connection with the summit. I don't think the President felt events such as I cited necessarily mean that Soviet basic policy had changed.

I think as he said after Camp David, he hoped that there was a mutuality of interest, particularly in the disarmament field, which would allow the great powers getting together in order to make progress in disarmament.

That had always been the area in which he hoped, because of the mutuality of interest, that we might make progress.

I don't think that there is anything fundamentally opposed in these two statements.

EXTENT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S POWER

Senator GORE. Now, I want to ask a few questions which relate to the first of the three questions on which I wish to examine your opinion; that is, whether the diplomatic failure in Paris represented a failure in policy.

You recall that I submitted certain questions to you here on March 22. At that time I asked you:

Do you think it would have been more prudent to have had an understanding

about the subjects to be considered at a summit conference before agreeing to have one, or do you think this is the proper way to keep the store?

Secretary HERTER. It is a gamble. I don't know.

Senator GORE. You are gambling with high stakes, and it seems to me in a reckless manner. I am disturbed to have the Secretary of State make the statements that you have made today about the summit conference; that there is no plan, no purpose, no understanding as to what will be discussed and what we hope to attain there.

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Senator, I view this as essentially a matter of exploration. We have the situation where an individual, Mr. Krushchev, is the man who makes the decisions so far as we know, for the Russians.

Later on, I asked you:

Is there any reason why the Russian dictator could not delegate the same power to his Foreign Minister as President Eisenhower should or does delegate to you?

Senator HERTER. None.

Senator GORE. Then isn't that a fallacious argument?

Secretary HERTER. Not necessarily, because you are dealing with an individual personality who many believe wants to be the negotiator.

Now, I read those things because one of the principal, if not the principal, justifications for going to the summit and for the exchange of visits was that Mr. Khrushchev and he alone spoke for the Russian people, but today you tell us on page 7:

I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the collective decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from Moscow. Any substantive changes in those positions apparently required reference back to Moscow before they could be undertaken.

And then on page 8, you say:

This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his departure from Moscow.

Secretary HERTER. There appears to be an inconsistency in those two statements.

When I was testifying here before, the visits of Mr. Khrushchev in which sometimes he had an important person with him and sometimes he did not——

Senator GORE. In which what, sir?

Secretary HERTER. Sometimes in which he had an important person with him and sometimes he did not, indicated that his situation at home was such that he had a great deal more leeway than had previously been the case.

When he went to Paris, and I think this has been brought out, he had with him Gromyko and Malinovsky, General Malinovsky, Marshal Malinovsky, who never left him for one moment at any time. This was a departure from previous occasions. This is why we said they had gone back to their standard policy of taking directions from home.

Prior to that time I had believed he had greater leeway than was clearly indicated here in Paris.

Senator GORE. So the assumption proved to be erroneous.

Secretary HERTER. It is.

USUAL DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURES VERSUS SUMMIT CONFERENCES

Senator GORE. I believe you testified before the House, according to press reports yesterday, that summitry as a diplomatic method had had some hard knocks.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I did.

In answer to a question from Senator Humphrey, I repeated the same thing today.

Senator GORE. And in recommending, which I certainly endorse, continuing businesslike negotiation with the Soviets, you have in mind the more usual processes and procedures of diplomacy.

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator GORE. Negotiations.

Secretary HERTER. The one thing that I did point out, however, is that with regard to the Berlin situation, Great Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union have responsibility. This is the carryover from the war.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Secretary HERTER. And that there, there must be agreement. This is a thing we have been fighting all the time, that unilateral action by the Russians cannot take away those rights and obligations which they as well as ourselves had acquired as a result of the war.

That it must be done by the consent of the four.

So that whether or not in the future the discussions to reach agreement among the four should take place through diplomatic channels, through ambassadorial level, through foreign minister or not, I would not say which would be the level, but I think that it is much better to see if we cannot, as we did in the foreign ministers' conference, and failed, try to reach a large measure of agreement prior to the meeting of a summit conference so that there might be one or two small unresolved issues that could be resolved there rather than trying to negotiate when you know that you are very far apart at a summit conference.

Senator GORE. Well, I hope that you will persist, and that the President will persist in the businesslike undertakings. I will not ask you to say that summitry apart from diplomacy failed. I am content with your statement in that regard. I am sorry that I think it did fail.

Secretary HERTER. I would differ with you, sir, on the question of personal dipomacy as against summitry. I think that visits are, on the whole, useful things.

I wouldn't say that that was something that should be discarded completely. I think it is particularly true that visits of ministers of foreign affairs, and visits of heads of state from time to time can accomplish a great deal of good. But I believe very strongly that insofar as heads of state are concerned that is not the place to begin negotiations. It is the place perhaps where there should be the culmination of negotiations.

Senator GORE. I will agree with you in that statement. The exchange of visits offers opportunities. But the formalization of a head of state conference, where severe international tensions are involved, without precise planning, without assurance that at least limited

agreements can be reached, is, in my view, a dangerous process, and a policy upon which we should never have embarked.

Of course, it is easier to say that now than it was before.

Hindsight, of course, we learned a long time ago, is better than foresight.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield for a moment? I have one or two questions and then he may come back to it.

Senator GORE. Good.

AUTHORIZATION FOR U–2 FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. These I think have been covered but for clarification, I might ask them again. Was there ever a time when the President authorized each flight in this program; that's never been the practice.

Secretary HERTER. It has never come up to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor of the National Security Council.

Secretary HERTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It has always been under a blanket authority understood?

Secretary HERTER. That is my impression.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this blanket authorization under review, either constant or periodic review?

Secretary HERTER. In my experience the CIA has planned a number of alternate flights at a time. [Deleted.]

BACKGROUND OF NASA STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. When the Department brought Mr. Bohlen back from Manila, and he was well-known as an expert on Soviet behavior, and this was, I thought, in anticipation of these summit meetings which had been discussed a long time, did he or any other of our Russian experts advise you or the President to wait and see what Mr. Khrushchev knew about the U–2 flight before making the NASA statement?

Mr. DILLON. The people in the Department who were familiar with Soviet policy took part in discussions with the CIA which led to the coordination and the agreement on the guidelines which were given to NASA, and those included the people who were familiar with all aspects of our policy.

However, as we said before, we did not know that there was going to be a full statement by NASA.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bohlen was not consulted about the NASA statement.

Mr. DILLON. Nobody in the State Department was consulted about the statement as a statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody.

What puzzles me about this is why was there such compulsion, if there was, to make such an immediate reaction? I have wondered why there was any necessity for immediately reacting to the first Khrushchev statement.

It would seem to me much more normal to wait a while and see what developed.

Was there anything that was compelling you to answer almost immediately?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, I would say so. It was such an unusual and remarkable statement when Mr. Khrushchev said that American plane had been shot down over the Soviet Union, that we were not in the position to not make any comment whatsoever.

As a result we had to make some comment, and we made the very bland statement which was put out on the 5th.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean that. You misunderstood me. I accept the necessity for the cover story, the statement.

Mr. DILLON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the second one that went into such detail. It would seem to me that it would be commonsense not to follow up too quickly in the matter of timing. What was the reason for that?

Mr. DILLON. The State Department's second statement was innocuous too. It didn't go into any detail, any more detail than the original cover story did. There was great—if any detail, that was the statement that was put out by NASA.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that the NASA statement itself is what put you in a position of having to make a further statement?

Is that true?

Mr. DILLON. The further statement, I think, was the next statement in this series, was the one that was put out on Saturday which was made only at the time when we knew that the Soviets probably had the pilot, which was new information, and then the Soviets had already said they had him, and had said where he was shot down, and the probability was that they had certain parts of the airplane because the picture which they had first put out turned out to be a fraudulent picture.

BACKGROUND OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S STATEMENT OF MAY 7

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps I don't understand the timing of it.

It seems to me, if I do understand it, that you could have stood upon the cover story for some time before the necessity of any further statement, awaiting developments.

Mr. DILLON. You mean, your question is why we made the statement on Saturday, May 7, which was the first time we departed from the cover story.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Secretary HERTER. That, as I think I have testified before, was a decision that was made in the light of the very full revelation of Mr. Khrushchev in giving out, both as to the pilot's testimony, and as to the parts and equipment that had been recovered. That was when we had to make the decision were we going to keep on lying about this or were we going to tell the truth?

The CHAIRMAN. Why there wasn't a third alternative is what I am trying to get at?

Why didn't you just be quiet and say nothing? You don't have just the alternatives of either continuing to lie or to tell the truth?

You could have said nothing. I was just curious. Was it ever considered that you didn't have to react?

Secretary HERTER. A good many statements were already being made in Congress, a good many statements were already being made or required of us almost.

The press was hounding everybody, "What do you say now after what Mr. Khrushchev had said," it was a very difficult time in our society, our form of society to have said nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that was the statement in which you said "it has been established that insofar as the authorities are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flights." Is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was not a truthful statement at that point, was it?

Secretary HERTER. No, this was still partly cover.

The CHAIRMAN. Still partly cover?

Secretary HERTER. Still partly cover. It was not until Monday, after the briefing had taken place before the congressional leadership here on the hill that the full statement was made.

The CHAIRMAN. It was after that statement that the full statement was made?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

BACKGROUND OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT OF MAY 9

The CHAIRMAN. That full statement, if I understood it—I think you have testified—was only after complete and thorough consultation with everyone concerned, and had the unanimous support of State and the President; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. It is, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore, go ahead.

Senator GORE. Well, when you made the final statement that the President did approve, he was responsible—I am not undertaking to quote you exactly—you also made it plain that he did not approve specific flights?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

[Deleted.]

BLOW TO UNITED STATES' MORAL POSITION

Senator GORE. I will wait until Mr. Dulles' testimony.

Now, I wish to make my own feelings explicit. I have not intended to suggest, nor do I believe the chairman or anyone else has intended to suggest, that the President or any other official of the U.S. Government tells a falsehood. I don't know of any requirement in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence or any other jurisprudence stemming from Roman law that a citizen is required to incriminate himself. I know of no requirement that a nation is required to incriminate or denigrate or defame itself. I do not claim any sense of morals or sensitivity to moral standards greater than the average American, but I want the record to show that I was humiliated with official falsification, and I think millions of Americans were humiliated. I can agree with you that our alliance stood firm. I am happy that it did, but I think we would be deluding ourselves if we did not realize that this unfortunate incident has dealt a severe blow to the moral position of the United States. I think we should begin to mend it. The way to mend it is to ferret out our errors and our mistakes, correct them, and thereby demonstrate to the world our will and our capacity to survive this kind of blow—and I hope be stronger thereafter.

WAS PRESUMMIT MEETING SUGGESTED?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there was one point that I overlooked. I had heard that Chairman Khrushchev had directly or indirectly made some inquiry about the possibility of meeting Mr. Eisenhower before the summit meeting. Do you know whether or not that is so?

Secretary HERTER. No. I know of no such effort.

The CHAIRMAN. No effort?

Secretary HERTER. Actually, Mr. Khrushchev, when he came to Paris, or just before he came to Paris, sent a note to the British and to the French, I think, largely on a procedural matter; no such note to us. When the President arrived in Paris, there was just as much opportunity for Mr. Khrushchev to seek a meeting with him as with the others; and no such effort was made from any Russian source.

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS OF THE SOVIET UNION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, have you drawn any inferences from this whole event relative to the military preparedness of the Soviet Union?

Secretary HERTER. Of course, my judgment would not be as good as that of experts. And here, again, I wouldn't want to give my judgment as a considered judgment from the point of view of the record. There is no question but what the Russians are very active in certain directions, and that the intelligence that has been gained with regard to that activity has been of very great value to us. And I think that is as far as I should go.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Senator WILEY. Is the cold war still on or is it over?

Secretary HERTER. It remains to be seen.

Senator WILEY. Then, we had better give primary attention to the main issue, instead of quarreling about who is who and what is what in relation to handling situations. It was your judgment; it isn't my judgment. It isn't the business of every little one in the Senate to tell you what you should do. It is your business, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield, do you have any questions?

Senator MANSFIELD. No.

Senator GORE. Off the record, Mr. Chairman.

(Discussion off the record.)

[Deleted.]

LESSON OF THE U–2 INCIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, one last thing. Do you think we have learned—not just we, but all of us, including you and the administration—anything from the U–2 incident?

Secretary HERTER. Not to have accidents.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all we have learned?

Senator GORE. Not what?

Mr. MACOMBER. Not to have accidents.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that is the only lesson we can draw from these events?

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, I think that anyone would be foolish to say that with hindsight one couldn't have done better than

when one is faced with certain events at a given time. I think obviously we should be giving serious consideration to the very best method of the handling of anything of this kind that might happen in the future; and I think from that point of view, as the President said, we welcome this inquiry. We welcome a full disclosure as far as we could from the point of view of responsibilities and coordination. I thank you for your patience here today.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you for your patience and your frankness and candor. I think you and your associates—Secretary Dillon and Mr. Bohlen—have been most cooperative in this whole hearing. I like to think that out of this one—as you know, rather pet project of mine—is that the State Department itself be given greater prestige and authority in controlling and coordinating all matters relating to our foreign relations—as I have tried in the case, for example, with the recent instance of control of the black market in Turkey. I think your Department, the Department of State, ought to have more authority than we have in the past accorded it. I am sure that some of our troubles do not relate to any fault on your part, but to the sort of institutional practices that have grown up—and people assuming authority to make statements without consulting you and the Department. I feel at this stage of the proceedings that this may be one of the good things that will come out of these hearings; that the prestige and authority of the State Department will be enhanced.

Secretary HERTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator GORE. Could I join you in commending the Secretary and his assistants for their candor and their patience and their diligence here today.

Secretary HERTER. Thank you.

Senator WILEY. May I also join you the third time by saying, in my humble opinion the evidence and the statement you made and the statement that Dillon made and the President's speech show conclusively that the breakup of the summit conference was due to Khrushchev and no other cause.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The committee is adjourned until next Tuesday.

(Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, May 31, 1960.)

[As noted in the foreword, Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, appeared before the committee on Tuesday, May 31, at 10 a.m., and testified in executive session. For security reasons, his testimony was not released to the public. The committee recessed on May 31 at 5:10 p.m., to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, June 1, 1960.]

56412—60——8

DRYDEN

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 1960

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Capehart.

Also present: Hon. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency; and Capt. L. P. Gray III, USN, Military Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Our witness this morning is Dr. Hugh Dryden, the Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

I remind members of our committee that today our transcript will be censored and released to the press. Tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. we will meet again in this room in executive session with Secretary Gates.

Dr. Dryden, do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. DRYDEN. I have no prepared statement but if the committee will, I would like to proceed for 10 minutes or so to give you the background of NASA's research with the U–2 aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. HUGH L. DRYDEN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA); ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES P. GLEASON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, NASA

STUDY OF AIR TURBULENCE BY U–2'S

Mr. DRYDEN. There is an extensive program on air turbulence which was begun by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). It is a part of—as far as NASA is concerned, it it a part of the aeronautical activities transferred to NASA in accordance with the National Aeronautics and Space Act.

In this program, which began in 1956, there have been 200 weather flights of U–2 aircraft with NASA and air weather service instrumentation covering flights extended over about 264,000 miles. Ninety percent of this flight time was above an altitude of 40,000 feet, and 40 percent of it, or about 100,000 miles, was above 50,000 feet; and these

flights have been conducted in the Western United States, Western Europe, Turkey, and Japan.

I may recall to your minds that the function of NACA was that of an aeronautical research agency to support the Government's program in the development of civil aircraft and military aircraft.

RESEARCH INFORMATION PRODUCED

We produced only research information used in the design of airplanes.

One important part of this research information which certainly is brought to your mind by some of the recent accidents to aircraft is that of loads on the aircraft due to atmospheric disturbances or gusts. There are two types of problems: one illustrated by the experience of the airplane which recently got caught in thunderstorm activity is that of the maximum load which the airplane may reach which may tear the wings from the body.

The other and more insidious type of loading is the repeated load due to gustiness or rough air that many of you have often encountered in flying. These repeated loads produce a type of brittle failure which we call fatigue failure. This has, as you may recall, been encountered in one or two types of airplanes and remedied at considerable cost.

Now, it has been the function of NACA to carry on a program to furnish the designer information on the magnitude of atmospheric gusts encountered by airplanes, the frequency of occurrence of loads of different magnitudes. We have been engaged in the general type of activity since 1933 and have data on all of the civil transports from that date.

ARRANGEMENTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON AIR TURBULENCE

That, of course, gives you a record of experience with the performance capabilities of present airplanes, but it was our responsibility to try to get this information for airplanes yet to be built. This meant that in practice we were always seeking the highest and fastest airplanes to get information of this kind from, so as to be in advance of the development of the commercial aircraft.

To do this we made arrangements to get information from military airplanes.

For example, at the close of World War II we installed our instruments in the B–36 airplane used then by SAC; and during their training operations these instruments continued to record gusts and the data were sent to us for analysis.

Now the pattern of operation with the commercial airlines and with the military has been the same throughout. We meet with the owners and operators of the airplanes—whether an airline or the military service—come to an agreement with them that our instruments can be installed on their airplanes.

In the early stages we send our instrument technicians to visit and supervise the installation of the instruments. We train employees of the airlines or the GI's in military——

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Dryden, does any of this have any relevance to the inquiry which this committee is concerned with?

Mr. DRYDEN. It does. We will come to this immediately. We train our technicians to change the film and send the information to NASA for analysis. We have no detailed knowledge of the flight plans until after the fact; and as a matter of record, we obtain information needed to analyze the data. Observations extend throughout the world. At the present time we have instruments on Pan American and TWA jets which, of course, go around the world. We have cooperated with foreign governments and airlines by lending instrumentation.

U–2 OPERATION

Now the U–2 operation is in the same general pattern of operation. This project was organized in 1956 when [deleted] the capabilities of this new airplane were brought to our attention. It was able to fly at altitudes very considerably higher than any existing airplane.

The program has been carried on entirely openly. There have been three reports issued, unclassified; there have been press releases on these operations from time to time.

The program was unclassified except that the data which revealed the airplane could go higher than 55,000 feet were classified. They will now be declassified since the potentialities of the airplane have become known.

[Deleted.]

NEED FOR DATA AT HIGHER ALTITUDES

I must take you back to the atmosphere at the time. These were the days when the airlines had had DC–6's and DC–7's, and Constellations. At that time we knew the 707, the DC–8, and the Electra were under design. We were told that the first of these airplanes would be developed early in 1959. All of our previous data with airplanes had been at altitudes generally not too much above 20,000 feet where these airplanes operated. The new airplanes would operate at 35,000 to 40,000 feet, and the military services were interested in supersonic airplanes which traveled at much higher altitudes, so that there was at this time a great pressure on us to find methods of obtaining data, and the presence of the capabilities of the U–2 airplane seemed to us to give the answer. Some of our advisory committees at the time were bringing to our attention the great need for this information. I will simply read one extract, if I can find it quickly for you, and this committee called our attention to the fact that we did not have suitable airplanes available.

There are three basic regions within which data are available, below 25,000 feet, up to 30,000 feet with military vehicles, up to 55,000 where meager data are available from balloons and rockets and inference from meteor trails. Existing research vehicles are reaching to higher altitudes—

and so on.

It is recommended that emphasis be placed on obtaining quantitative information on air turbulence at the highest altitudes reasonably obtainable with existing research vehicles.

[Deleted.]

Now this program was carried on from 1956 through the present time. NASA was established in October, October 1, 1958, and this was one of the programs carried over into NASA.

I might recall to you that NACA was not extensively involved in aeronautical activities, that NASA, at present, is engaged in international space activities. So far we have not had any adverse reactions on the part of people with whom we are cooperating abroad in space programs.

I think this gives the general background and I would be glad to respond to questions or to continue with the NASA chronology of the week of May 1, as you desire, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we ought to proceed with questions.

[Deleted.]

LINE OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM NASA TO THE PRESIDENT

Do you report directly to the President? What is your relationship to the rest of the Government?

Mr. DRYDEN. At that time the NACA was managed by a committee of 17 persons appointed by the President who did report directly to him.

I was the chief executive officer reporting to the committee at the time this project was started.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1956?

Mr. DRYDEN. 1956.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time the agency was known as the NACA?

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. When did it change its name to NASA?

Mr. DRYDEN. On October 1, 1958, it not only changed its name but was collected with other parts of the Government into a completely new agency, the NASA.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it report to the President?

Mr. DRYDEN. It reports directly to the President, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a committee of 17 you say?

Mr. DRYDEN. There is not a committee in NASA. There is an Administrator and Deputy Administrator appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anyone on the staff of the White House who is given the duty of receiving your reports?

Mr. DRYDEN. Doctor Glennan reports and talks very frequently with the President himself. He does keep the Science Adviser fully informed of our activities in space.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the Science Adviser?

Mr. DRYDEN. Dr. Kistiakowsky.

The CHAIRMAN. So if anyone has the direct responsibility within the White House, the office of the Presidency, it is Dr.——

Mr. DRYDEN. Kistiakowsky. He is the President's adviser on science and technology. He has no line responsibility. He is an adviser to the President.

REPORT OF U–2'S LOSS

The CHAIRMAN. The first that you knew of this was the loss of the U–2 plane on May 1?

Mr. DRYDEN. May 1 it was reported to the Administrator and myself that a U–2 had been lost, without further detail.

[Deleted.]

ANTICIPATION OF INQUIRIES ABOUT LOSS

The CHAIRMAN. Did CIA consult with you as to the precise language of the release of May 5?

Mr. DRYDEN. What was——

The CHAIRMAN. Who drew up that language?

Mr. DRYDEN. It was discussed in consultation. The questions the press asked were: who is the pilot, where was the airplane going, what information do you have about it?

So that between CIA and ourselves, a list of these questions which we had received was recorded, and the general nature of the answers to these questions decided upon. Now, let me tell you about the so-called release of the statement. On the morning of Thursday, May 5, was Khrushchev's announcement that the plane was shot down. Somewhere between 11 and 12 o'clock, I believe, the President directed an inquiry and public report on the missing plane, and as reported in the Herald Tribune—I do not have any other stenographic record—in quotes, it says:

> At the White House, Mr. Hagerty announced at the direction of the President a complete inquiry is being made. The results of these inquiries, the facts as developed will be made public by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of State.

BACKGROUND OF THE MAY 5 NASA RELEASE

The reporters who had listened to Mr. Hagerty, many of them, came immediately to our public information office to obtain further information. We ourselves thought it was better to take the agreed-upon answers to the questions, to write them into a statement, and give it to them all at once, rather than engage in a general free-for-all on this subject. I would like to emphasize that the text of that statement as issued was not cleared with CIA or anyone else, although the information in it, the answers to the questions that are contained within it, were cleared with CIA, and I am told by them with State.

The CHAIRMAN. You discussed all of the substantive facts and statements in that with representatives of the CIA?

Mr. DRYDEN. This is correct. It was not intended to give out a statement. We were confronted with a large group of reporters who wanted the facts. We could either engage in a general free-for-all discussion—we thought it preferable to take these facts, put them in a piece of paper and give it to all of them at once.

CLEARANCE OF MAY 5 STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. After consulting with CIA, you prepared this statement, and they knew what the statement was?

Mr. DRYDEN. I tried to say before that the statement itself or the facts that were collected in a statement was not cleared with anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. With anyone?

Mr. DRYDEN. With anyone but ourselves. The substance of it had been cleared. The fact that it was written down in a statement on a piece of paper was not cleared with anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you issued this to the press, did you have anyone from the Department of State look at it and approve it?

Mr. DRYDEN. We had no contact with the Department of State. Our direct contacts were solely with the CIA.

The CHAIRMAN. Has no one ever advised you that the Department of State should be consulted when statements affecting our foreign policy are made?

Mr. DRYDEN. I was told that these statements had been cleared by CIA with State. I did not independently check that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Who told you that?

Mr. DRYDEN. The CIA people with whom we were dealing, sir.

REASON FOR MENTIONING OTHER U–2 BASES IN MAY 5 RELEASE

The CHAIRMAN. What was the reason for saying in your statement that these planes were being used in Japan and Turkey and California. Why were you so specific about Japan and California?

Mr. DRYDEN. We were asked by the press, "How many U–2 planes does NASA have in its weather program? Where are they operating?" Now, much of this had been published in these documents to which I referred which had been publicly released. To take a specific one, one released just a few months ago in June 1959, this has been released generally, you will find in this that these operations——

The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish you to read that memorandum. I only want to know your thinking. You issued this without checking it with the State Department. Why did you state that they were operating out of Turkey?

Mr. DRYDEN. This published report——

The CHAIRMAN. You had already published it?

Mr. DRYDEN (continuing). Had said, "These flights were made from bases at Watertown Strip, Nevada."

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but those were weather flights.

[Deleted.]

Mr. DRYDEN. We had mentioned Adana, Turkey, and Atsugi, Japan, in this free and open publication.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield?

GROUNDING OF U–2'S

Senator MANSFIELD. Dr. Dryden, have all our U–2's been recalled since the President's order of Thursday, a week ago, that there would be no further overflights of the Soviet Union?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not to my knowledge, sir. I believe at the present time the airplanes are grounded. But I think this is a question again that the operating people will have to answer.

INCIDENT IN JAPAN

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you recall the incident which occurred in Japan some months ago when a U–2, I assume, landed at Atsugi and GI's landed from a helicopter and ordered the Japanese civilians in the area to leave?

Mr. DRYDEN. I remember the newspaper accounts of it. I have no personal knowledge of the incident.

[Deleted.]

We made arrangements to put instruments in U–2 airplanes. There comes back to us flight plans of weather flights, and our instrumentation and the data from those instruments, and I do not have in advance knowledge even of the weather flight operations——

Senator MANSFIELD. I am referring to a story which appeared in Time magazine 2 or 3 weeks ago. I was seeking collaboration of that story. But you have no personal knowledge whether it was true or false?

Mr. DRYDEN. I have no personal knowledge of it, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Your responsibility in these U–2 flights is primarily observation and calculation concerning weather conditions?

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct, and in those flights made with U–2's with our instruments, for our purposes.

CHAIN OF COMMAND TO THE WHITE HOUSE

Senator MANSFIELD. What is Dr. Glennan's position? You are the Administrator of NASA.

Mr. DRYDEN. I am the Deputy Administrator. I appear because I was here in 1956 through this program, from the beginning.

Senator MANSFIELD. Dr. Glennan is the Administrator?

Mr. DRYDEN. He is the Administrator.

Senator MANSFIELD. And Dr. Glennan supposedly reports directly to the President?

Mr. DRYDEN. To the President, yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Does he or does he not report directly to Dr. Kistiakowsky?

Mr. DRYDEN. The President on the average sees him two or three times a month.

Senator MANSFIELD. Where does Dr. Kistiakowsky——

Mr. DRYDEN. He is a member of the White House staff.

Senator MANSFIELD. I know that he is the President's scientific adviser.

Mr. DRYDEN. He is not in the line of command.

Senator MANSFIELD. The chain of command is directly from Dr. Glennan to the President?

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

DATE OF COVER STORY

Senator WILEY. What was the date of that cover statement?

Mr. DRYDEN. The Turkish story was put out by the local commander in Istanbul on Tuesday, May 3. The statement which we issued recording the agreed-upon answers to questions was on Thursday, May 5. If I might just continue this, on Friday, May 6, a NASA U–2 airplane was flown at Edwards Air Force Base, exhibited to the press, they saw the instruments that were used. They took movies of the airplane. On Saturday, May 7, Mr. Khrushchev reported that he had the pilot. At 6 p.m. State issued a statement admitting the reconnaissance flight.

At 6:30 NASA directed all further inquiries to the State Department.

Senator WILEY. Let's get back to my question. What was the date of the cover statement that the chairman has been talking about?

Mr. DRYDEN. The 5th, as I understand it, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. NASA is primarily engaged in seeking weather information.

Mr. DRYDEN. We have no intelligence activities either in the development of devices, methods, instruments or operations.

CLEARANCE OF MAY 5 STATEMENT

Senator WILEY. My understanding is that this cover statement was the result of previous interrogation by the press.

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. When you issued it, you did not consult with Central Intelligence?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not on the statement itself but all of the questions had been taken up with them. We had no source of information. We asked how shall we reply to the name of the pilot, to the flight plan of the airplane, and the answers as given us are incorporated in the statement, although the exact text was not read back to CIA.

PUBLIC RELEASES ON U–2 WEATHER FLIGHTS

Senator WILEY. You referred to some publicity that was issued, I think you said, in 1959.

Mr. DRYDEN. Well, the first press release on our U–2 project was released on May 7, 1956.

Senator WILEY. You held up a blue docket referring to 1959.

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, this is some of the results.

Senator WILEY. Has that been made public?

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Senator WILEY. On what pages is the part you referred to, because I want it in the record. I want to try to get this story simple and clear.

Mr. DRYDEN. On page 3 of this NASA memorandum which carries a number, 4–17–59L, the flights were made from bases at Watertown Trip, Nev., Lakenheath, England, Wiesbaden, Germany, Adana, Turkey and at Atsugi, Japan. Two additional flights were made from a base in Alaska and these data have been combined with those from Japan in the statistical treatment.

Senator WILEY. Yes. You agree that that has been public information now for some time?

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Senator WILEY. Since 1959?

Mr. DRYDEN. And even earlier, I think in 1957—57, one of them deals with the western part of the United States only, and I believe that 1959 is the one which gives the list, yes, sir.

June of 1959.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

[Deleted.]

REASON FOR NASA STATEMENT

Senator GORE. In response to a question by me, Secretary Dillon testified as follows:

> No, it was decided when we first heard of this, this news, as I said earlier this morning, at this National Security Council meeting or right after it that was held outside of Washington, that the State Department would handle the publicity on this, and that we would make any statement that would be made, and it was known at that time that we would make a statement.

That leads me to wonder why NASA was making a statement at all.

Mr. DRYDEN. This information, this decision of which you speak was not transmitted to us. I would like to remind you that this is all within a few hours. The information we had was a statement made at the White House which I read to you that the reporters were referred to NASA and the State Department for the facts and this was the extent of my knowledge when the statement was issued.

NASA UNAWARE OF DECISION TO LET STATE DEPARTMENT HANDLE PUBLICITY

Senator GORE. Then you did not know that a high level decision had been made that the State Department would make whatever statement was made with respect to this.

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct. Within the 3 hours or so of this interval, this was not passed to us, and I would again say that so far as we were concerned the cover story was in effect as the result of the collaboration with CIA for the period from May 1 to May 7, and we did nothing, we said nothing contrary to the agreed on facts relating to the cover story.

Senator GORE. When did you first learn of this high level decision that the State Department would make whatever statement was made and would handle the publicity on this matter?

Mr. DRYDEN. I think that after the statement was issued, there were some calls as to—I do not know how to place the time. The only thing I have been able to find in our records is an instruction to our people as of Saturday to refer all inquiries to the State Department. I believe that before that time, there had been some discussions of why the statement had been issued by us, and I have explained the reasons for that.

Senator GORE. I will get to that in a moment. When did you first know that the decision had been made, to which Mr. Dillon referred, that the State Department would make statements and would handle the publicity on this matter? You say you were not informed that the decision had been made at the time you made your statement.

Mr. DRYDEN. It was subsequent to the day of May 5, May 6, or May 7. I have a record of May 7. After the State Department's statement at 6 p.m., that NASA would refer all inquiries to the State Department, I believe we were informed, probably on Friday the 6th, but I have no specific record.

Senator GORE. Who informed you?

Mr. DRYDEN. I think it was a telephone call. I just do not have a specific recollection whether it came as a telephone call or a contact with Dr. Glennan at lunch at the White House. I just do not recall, sir.

We can perhaps clear that up for the record after consultation, sir.

Senator GORE. I think it would be well if you can do so.

(The following information was subsequently furnished:)

STATEMENT BY DR. DRYDEN ON WHEN NASA WAS NOTIFIED OF DECISION TO HAVE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HANDLE PUBLICITY ON U–2

The telephone logs of Dr. Glennan and myself show no calls to or from the State Department on May 6 or 7, but it is my best recollection that we did learn of the decision on May 6.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS PREPARED TO HANDLE INQUIRIES

You have referred several times to questions and answers, or the answers to questions as the case may be, supplied to you by CIA. Do you have a copy of that question and answer series?

Mr. DRYDEN. We may have some rough notation. What we did was record the types of questions that the press was asking us. We then took these types of questions to the CIA and discussed them with them as to the answers.

[Deleted.]

Senator GORE. Was there not a typewritten copy?

Mr. DRYDEN. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Senator GORE. But you do have some notes.

Mr. DRYDEN. The statement itself enables you to reconstruct the questions. They are generally who was the pilot, what was the flight plan, where was the airplane supposed to go, what was the route, how many airplanes does NASA operate on weather missions, from what bases have these airplanes been operating? I think you can reconstruct the questions from the statement itself. I am not sure whether we can find the notes that someone may have written down to refresh his memory in discussing it.

INSTRUCTIONS TO NASA TO MAKE STATEMENT

Senator GORE. Who instructed your Agency to make a statement?

Mr. DRYDEN. We were instructed to answer questions.

Senator GORE. By whom?

Mr. DRYDEN. By the CIA, who said that this had been coordinated with the State Department.

Senator GORE. And the CIA gave you instructions to respond to questions?

Mr. DRYDEN. We asked for information. The operation was not ours. We had no knowledge of the operation itself. We said, "How shall we reply to these questions? You realize the fact that we did not know very much about where this airplane was, whether the Russians have the airplane, whether they have the pilot. What do you want us to say in this interim period? Can we find out more about it?"

Senator GORE. You felt the burden of saying something, did you?

Mr. DRYDEN. We felt the burden of answering questions because for 4 years the existence of this NASA weather flight program had been known.

WHEN WERE COUNTERMANDING INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED?

Senator GORE. And, meanwhile, no one informed you that the decision had been made at the highest levels of Government that the State Department would handle this?

Mr. DRYDEN. The discussions I referred to, the visits of the press, were made within an hour or two of the making of that decision at a place outside of Washington, and it was not communicated to us within that 2-hour period.

Senator GORE. You have told us it wasn't communicated to you at all.

Mr. DRYDEN. Until the following day.

Senator GORE. Until after you had made a statement?

Mr. DRYDEN. A statement. To get the chronology again, this meeting to which you refer, at which the decision was made, was on the morning of May 5, somewhere between 11 and 12 o'clock. A decision was made and Mr. Hagerty informed the press at the direction of the President that the facts would be obtained through NASA and State. The reporters came immediately over to our public information section wanting to know some of these facts.

Senator GORE. Do you know whether either Mr. Hagerty or President Eisenhower had been informed of this decision reached outside Washington?

Mr. DRYDEN. I think the President was outside Washington at the time.

Senator GORE. It seems to me that I recall the President participated in this conference.

Mr. DRYDEN. I just do not know the details of that. I think it was given in the testimony of the Secretary of State.

Senator GORE. Wasn't that a meeting of the National Security Council?

Mr. DRYDEN. I do not know that, to my knowledge. The statement was made that Mr. Eisenhower was at secret Civil Defense Headquarters.

Senator GORE. Will you repeat that?

Mr. DRYDEN. I say the statement says that President Eisenhower was at his secret Civil Defense Headquarters.

REFERENCE TO MR. DILLON'S TESTIMONY REGARDING NASA'S ROLE

Senator GORE. I will read from Mr. Dillon's statement:

Now, Mr. Hagerty was not at the Security Council meeting, but he was at that area out there where this exercise was taking place and so he was aware of the fact that the State Department would be making a statement at noon that day at our regular press conference time. Actually, the statement was delayed 45 minutes. It was made at 12:45 when our regular daily press conference took place.

Senator GORE. Was it decided there that NASA would make a statement also?

Mr. DILLON. It was not, to my knowledge, no. It was not decided there that NASA would make a statement.

Senator GORE. Who made that decision?

Mr. DILLON. I think that you have to ask NASA. I don't know who made any such decision.

So you say you decided upon instructions of CIA?

Mr. DRYDEN. No.

Senator GORE. Just how do you state it?

Mr. DRYDEN. I stated that we had received word of the White House announcement that the facts will be made public by NASA and the Department of State. Now, this means I suppose that within this 2- or 3-hour period this information was not transmitted to us. I do not know the reasons.

Senator GORE. Do you know if Mr. Hagerty called you or Mr. Bonney or anyone in the Department suggesting that a statement be made?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator GORE. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator Hickenlooper?

NASA ACTION BASED ON PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDING WITH CIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Dr. Dryden, when the newsmen came to the Information Department of NASA, did the Information Department act on its own?

Mr. DRYDEN. No, they did not. They acted in consultation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With you?

Mr. DRYDEN. With me; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was it in connection with that consultation, based upon the information which you then had about Mr. Hagerty's statement, that you authorized the issuance of the statement by the Information Service of NASA?

Mr. DRYDEN. It was called a memorandum to the press. I did not attribute sufficient importance to the distinction between answering questions of reporters and giving them the same information on a piece of paper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. After you had made the statement, or your Information Department issued this statement, was this statement sent to the CIA or the State Department?

Mr. DRYDEN. It was sent—I do not know exactly what time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And was the statement which was issued by your Information Department—perhaps you have answered this question—cleared with CIA in its context or with the State Department prior to the issuance by your Information Service?

Mr. DRYDEN. I have answered that. The statement, as written, was not cleared.

The information in the statement had been previously cleared by CIA, with State.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that the statement was based, then, upon the understandings which had previously been had?

Mr. DRYDEN. This is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With CIA?

Mr. DRYDEN. This is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And with the State Department?

Mr. DRYDEN. Nothing—no substantive information was added to it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just to get this cleared up a little bit, after you learned of the statement of Mr. Hagerty—which I believe was the source of your determination to make the May 5 statement—after you had learned of that statement of Mr. Hagerty that NASA and the State Department could give information on this matter, did you

get in touch with the White House, Mr. Hagerty, or any authoritative person there, or with the State Department?

Mr. DRYDEN. I did not. I say I perhaps erroneously did not see the difference between answering questions of a large number of reporters and putting the same thing down on a piece of paper. It is the same information.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wanted to ask you for a copy of that statement.

Mr. DRYDEN. The committee has it already.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand it is in the background documents. That is all right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the background documents.

(See appendix 1, p. 180.)

NO WRITTEN MEMORANDUM OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Senator GORE. Also, I believe you were going to supply to the chairman the question and answer series.

Mr. DRYDEN. I was going to see if there is around, a penciled memorandum of the questions. I am not sure that there is.

Senator GORE. If there is?

Mr. DRYDEN. If there is, I will supply it to the chairman.

(The following information was subsequently furnished:)

No memorandum of questions and answers was made; the discussion was entirely oral.

NASA'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF U–2 FLIGHT

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche, the NASA statement is found on page 4 of the background documents.

[Deleted.]

Senator LAUSCHE. At the time you issued your statement you did not have knowledge of what the Soviet knew about it and what actually happened?

Mr. DRYDEN. We did not.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you have knowledge of the instructions that were given to the pilot?

Mr. DRYDEN. No, sir. No knowledge about the operations.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is——

Mr. DRYDEN. We heard Khrushchev's press announcement, of course, that morning.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all that I have with this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that your position as an international weather gatherer has been compromised by this U–2 incident?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not so far. [Deleted.]

(From this point on all further testimony on this date was classified by order of the committee.)

(At 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 o'clock a.m., June 2, 1960.)

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

GATES

THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1960

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: Brig. Gen. George S. Brown, U.S. Air Force, and Capt. Means Johnston, Jr., U.S. Navy, military assistants to the Secretary of Defense; Capt. L. P. Gray III, U.S. Navy, military assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Hon. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency.

CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have this morning the Honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr., the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Secretary, I think you know about the regulations. Your testimony will be taken down but nothing will be released except that which has been passed by the censors representing the State Department and the CIA, and I assume perhaps you may want to consult with them.

I think you understand that.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you have a statement.

Secretary GATES. A very brief statement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. GATES, JR., SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you.

I have a short statement, if I may read it. It relates to two subjects. First, I am certain that you wish me to cover the role played by the Department of Defense in the U–2 overflight program.

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ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN THE OVERFLIGHT PROGRAM

Elements of the Department of Defense gave technical advice to the U-2 project. No military aircraft were used for these flights nor were the pilots military personnel.

From time to time, the Director of the CIA, after obtaining the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, recommended a series of programs to the President.

More specifically, I reviewed program proposals embracing several priority missions, one or more of which it was proposed to execute in the near future. Responsibility for the operational conduct of the program rested with the CIA.

We obviously were interested in the results of these flights as we are in all of our Nation's intelligence collection results.

FLIGHTS GAVE VITAL INFORMATION

For example, from these flights we got information on airfields, aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons storage, submarine production, atomic production and aircraft deployments, and things like these.

These were all types of vital information. These results were considered in formulating our military programs. We obviously were the prime customer, and ours is the major interest.

TEST OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS

Secondly, on a separate subject:

One incident, and one over which I assume full responsibility, is the calling of a test of the readiness of our military communications from Paris. In view of the fact that my action in this matter has been subject to some speculation, I would like to give you the facts.

First of all, our military forces are always on some degree of alert. So it is merely a matter of moving this degree or condition of alert up or down the scale. On Sunday night, May 15, we were already aware of the sense of the statement which Mr. Khrushchev was going to make the following morning. The conditions which he had set for his participation in the conference made it apparent even at the time that he deliberately intended to wreck the conference.

This communications alert was not an act that was either offensive or defensive in character. It was a sound precautionary measure. It did not recall Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine personnel from leave. There was no movement of forces involved. However, I want to emphasize that it did make certain that, if subsequent developments made necessary a higher state of readiness, such action could be taken promptly and convincingly.

Under the circumstances it seemed most prudent to me to increase the awareness of our unified commanders. Moreover, since the command and individuals concerned in the decision process, including the President, the Secretary of State, and myself, were overseas, it was important to check out our military communications. At about midnight, Paris time, Sunday night, I requested that a quiet increase in command readiness, particularly with respect to communications, be instituted without public notice, if possible.

One phase of our testing is to call no-notice exercises of our command communications. While some commands went further in executing the instructions issued by the JCS as a result of my message than I had anticipated, I consider the order proper and absolutely essential. In similar circumstances I would take exactly the same action.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

PRESUMMIT DISCUSSION REGARDING SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

Mr. Secretary, did you or any of your aides participate in any conference prior to May 1 regarding the U–2 flights?

Secretary GATES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I was some weeks before May 1 briefed on the preliminary results of the April 9 flight. At that time, I was informed of a program of possible flights, one of which would be selected to be flown, and I gave my approval of that program.

The CHAIRMAN. Was anything said at that time about a moratorium in view of the summit conference?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who participated in that conference?

Secretary GATES. That conference was in my office in the Pentagon, and was between myself and a man from CIA.

The CHAIRMAN. Was anyone in the State Department present?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the State Department was advised specifically of the plans for the May 1 flight?

Secretary GATES. I don't know from my own knowledge, but I am perfectly certain that the Secretary of State was advised of the program as I was.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't advise him nor was he represented at that meeting?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And no one raised the question of whether or not there should be a suspension?

Secretary GATES. No, sir. In this conversation, it was a private conversation between the CIA representative and myself, and I was asked for my advice or approval of the program and I gave it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but I merely meant that the question of whether or not there should be a suspension in view of the upcoming summit was not raised; is that correct?

Secretary GATES. Not raised between the two of us, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it raised at any time?

Secretary GATES. I didn't have any other discussions about the flight with anyone, Senator Fulbright.

The CHAIRMAN. Then so far as you know, it was not raised?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

QUESTION OF ANY PRIOR SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge, were any flights prior thereto ever suspended because of political meetings, that is, other than weather or military considerations?

Secretary GATES. I have no knowledge of any suspension of any flights for those purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no suspension to your knowledge when the Camp David meeting took place?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor was there any suspension, so far as you know, during the period in which Khrushchev visited the United States?

Secretary GATES. I don't know of any suspension. I don't know precisely whether during that period we flew any flights, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No, but I mean you didn't discuss the question?

Secretary GATES. I didn't discuss the question of suspension of flights, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Since you never considered it, then you had no position relative to the continuation, did you?

Secretary GATES. I approved this program, so I took a position affirmatively.

SIGNIFICANCE TO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OF SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Were the results of these flights important to the Defense Department?

Secretary GATES. The results were very important to the Defense Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Very useful to you?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you regard it as an important loss that the flights have now been suspended?

Secretary GATES. I think that, through becoming compromised, we have lost an important source of intelligence. It has been a very successful program over the past.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is a great loss from your point of view not to have available any further flights; is that correct?

Secretary GATES. I think if we had been able to continue them without having been caught and therefore compromised the source, it would have been most useful.

RUSSIAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gates, did Khrushchev, or the Russians, know of overflights prior to May 1?

Secretary GATES. He says he did.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what do you think?

Secretary GATES. I believe that he did, Mr. Chairman, but I don't believe anyone could specifically prove it. But I believe that he did. I believe he told the truth.

The CHAIRMAN. If he knew about it, why did the incidents of May 1 compromise the flights; why should they be discontinued?

Secretary GATES. Well, I don't believe he knew the exact type and character of the flights. He probably—all he knew was that they were [deleted] aircraft high in his sky.

KNOWLEDGE OF PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE RE ORDER FOR ALERT

The CHAIRMAN. On your order on May 15, your alert, did you consult the Department of State before ordering it?

Secretary GATES. No. I advised the Secretary of State, who was with the President when it was issued.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise him before you issued it?
Secretary GATES. He was advised before it was released yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was his opinion asked or was he merely advised of it?
Secretary GATES. Well, I told him that I was about to issue a communications alert, and the communication readiness exercise.
The CHAIRMAN. He approved of it.
Secretary GATES. He did not register any disapproval.
The CHAIRMAN. Well then he approved it.
Secretary GATES. I think so, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was that Mr. Herter?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. In Paris.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise the President?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Before it was made?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was the NSC consulted about the alert?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.

MEETING OF MAY 9

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gates, did you participate in any meeting on May 7 to consider the statement which was later issued by the Secretary of State?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Or on May 9?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
On May 9, that is Monday, I believe, I participated in a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State.
On the morning of the 9th.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you approve of the statement made in which the full revelation was made?
Secretary GATES. I approved of the statement that was made on May 9, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was present at that meeting?
Secretary GATES. Well, I know that Mr. Douglas and myself were present from the Department of Defense. Mr. Herter and Mr. Douglas Dillon, and Mr. Kohler were present, I think Mr. Bohlen was present from the State Department, there may have been one or two others.
The CHAIRMAN. Did that meeting go on for some time?
Secretary GATES. I would say about an hour.
The CHAIRMAN. About an hour.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCUSSED

The CHAIRMAN. Was the question of whether or not it was wise for the President to take responsibility discussed at that meeting?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. What was your position?
Secretary GATES. My position was that he should take responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the meeting unanimous?
Secretary GATES. I believe it was.
The CHAIRMAN. They all agreed?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It went on about an hour.
Secretary GATES. Well, I would say at least an hour, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, did it go on more than an hour?
Secretary GATES. Well, I am talking about my recollection. I would think it was at least 1 hour. Perhaps it was longer.

STATEMENT BY NASA

The CHAIRMAN. Was the statement issued by NASA on May 5 cleared with your office?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know anything about it.
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you had any relations with NASA?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, not in this connection.
The CHAIRMAN. I mean in connection with the U–2 flight.
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Were these U–2 flights under your direct control in the field, that is, under the Air Force direct control in the field?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, they were under the control of the CIA. [Deleted.]

INITIAL STATEMENT BY AIR FORCE IN TURKEY

The CHAIRMAN. How did it happen the Air Force made the initial statement of the missing plane?
Secretary GATES. That was a part of the cover story that was decided upon and they issued this statement from the base in Turkey about a plane being missing.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, does that indicate that you had arrived ahead of time in concert with the CIA upon proper procedure to be followed in case of a mishap?
Secretary GATES. I was not familiar with the details of how a cover story would be executed. I was aware of the fact that a cover story existed, and I imagine that when the details of it were put into operation, the Central Intelligence Agency went to work.
The CHAIRMAN. It was not your responsibility to supervise the cover story?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Gore?

MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, MAY 5

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the National Security Council.
Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator.
Senator GORE. Did you attend the meeting of the Council held on May 5?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator GORE. Did the President participate in that conference?
Secretary GATES. At the meeting of the NSC?
Senator GORE. Yes.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Was the cover story discussed there?

Secretary GATES. No [deleted], Senator.

There was a meeting of the small group after the NSC meeting——

Senator GORE. Did you participate?

Secretary GATES. Where we discussed the Khrushchev statement. I participated with the President. It was not at the NSC meeting.

Senator GORE. At this conference in which Mr. Khrushchev's speech was discussed, was the cover story discussed?

STATE DEPARTMENT TO HANDLE RELEASES ON SUBJECT

Secretary GATES. Well, I think it was discussed in a general manner but not in detail. It was decided at that meeting that the responsibility for all releases pertaining to this matter would be handled by the Department of State.

Senator GORE. Was there any discussion at this meeting of the advisability of telling the truth?

Secretary GATES. I think I made a statement in that meeting, something to the effect that the prestige of the Presidency should not be involved in an international lie particularly when it would not stand up with respect to the facts. But that was the extent of the discussion. There was no decision.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S COVER STORY

Senator GORE. After this observation on your part, the State Department did issue a statement that was not true; is that the case?

Secretary GATES. I think——

Senator GORE. Well, the record shows——

Secretary GATES. I think they issued a statement, that is right. I think they issued a part of the cover story statement after that meeting; yes, sir.

Senator GORE. So there was no decision—although the question of involvement of the Presidency in what you call an international lie was discussed, and you expressed your view that it would be an unwise thing to involve the President in the cover story or in an international, an official falsehood?

Secretary GATES. If it turned out that Mr. Khrushchev had all the facts, which we subsequently found out that he had; yes.

QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENT ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY

Senator GORE. How did you think his involvement or his association with this incident in its ramifications could be avoided by an assumption of responsibility by the President for the program?

Secretary GATES. I believe the President did assume responsibility, and I believe he should have assumed responsibility.

Senator GORE. Let me see if I understand you correctly. I certainly do not wish to make any implication at all. I do not wish to impute to you any meaning which you did not intend. Did I correctly understand you to say that this question was discussed at a small meeting following the NSC meeting on the 5th at which you participated as did the President?

Secretary GATES. That is correct, sir.

Senator GORE. Who else participated?

Secretary GATES. Mr. Douglas Dillon, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, and General Goodpaster.

Senator GORE. At this meeting, you expressed the view that it would be unwise for the President to be involved in an international lie, I believe you described it.

Secretary GATES. That is right. This depended on what Mr. Khrushchev knew, when he knew it and if he knew everything that he claimed to know. It turned out later he did. I believe that the President should take the responsibility for the truth, for telling the truth. That is my opinion. I did not know specifically at that time the extent of Mr. Khrushchev's knowledge.

Senator GORE. You have amended your——

Secretary GATES. I didn't mean to be evasive, Senator.

Senator GORE. I understand, but you have now amended, and I would like to clarify, if I may. I know you are not trying to be evasive and I assure you that I am only seeking to develop the facts as they existed. The Government has full leeway, so far as I am concerned, to exercise censorship for security.

Now, when you expressed the view that the Presidency should not be involved in an international lie, did you at that time, on the 5th, suggest the President should assume responsibility, or was this on the 7th or the 9th that you expressed that additional view?

Secretary GATES. It was on the—I had no more meetings on the subject until the 9th, Senator. That meeting was with the Secretary of State.

OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS ON MAY 5

Senator GORE. Did you express the view on the 5th that the President should assume responsibility or did you express that view on the 9th?

Secretary GATES. I expressed the view on the 5th that if Mr. Khrushchev had the complete information and the pilot, that the President should assert the true story.

I expressed it again on the 9th when we knew that he had the plane and the pilot. [Deleted.]

Senator GORE. You were informed that Mr. Khrushchev had made the public speech with respect to the plane, that it was shot down or that it came down in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk?

Secretary GATES. Yes. I am not sure of my timing, Senator. We knew some information on the 5th, but we knew a great deal more a day later. He didn't report the full story until the 7th.

Senator GORE. I understand. I am only trying to develop the background of information——

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. And the decision that was made. Although you expressed these views, and although this information was in the hands of or was discussed in the conference——

Secretary GATES. Some information was in our hands.

Senator GORE. The information which you have described?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator GORE. I am perfectly willing for you to describe it.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. I have no description of it except as you give it to me. The decision was not reached at this meeting?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator GORE. A decision to tell the truth was not reached at this meeting on the 5th?

STATE DEPARTMENT TO HANDLE ALL GOVERNMENT RELEASES ON SUBJECT

Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator. The only decision that was reached at that meeting was that all the statements pertaining to the incident would be handled by the Department of State.

Senator GORE. What information was the State Department to give? Was it specifically understood at the meeting that the cover story would be continued?

Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it was assumed that the cover story would be continued at that time.

Senator GORE. And the cover story was untrue?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. It turned out to be untrue. I mean, yes, because it was untrue. We didn't have the full facts that we had 2 days later.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time has expired.

The Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this interrogation. Now see if you can't tell us the story without questioning, starting in when you first became acquainted with the facts, who was there, what was said, and then go on.

For instance, we have heard so many statements about something not being true. Now this release on May 5 was the cover story, wasn't it?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. When did you first get acquainted with the situation? Start in the beginning and give it consecutively so that it will be clear.

CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

Secretary GATES. I first got involved in the situation when the airplane did not return to base. I knew an airplane was down, presumably because it hadn't come back and it had taken off. That was on May 1.

I had no other relationship with it until the morning of Thursday, which was May 5 when we had a [deleted] meeting of the NSC at a remote location under a civil defense exercise.

On that morning, there was the preliminary statements of Mr. Khrushchev that we had been flying over his territory, and so forth.

After the NSC meeting, there was a small meeting at which I have listed the members present, in which we discussed this matter.

Senator WILEY. Who was there?

Secretary GATES. Mr. Dillon of the State Department, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster, and myself and the President. We discussed this whole matter. We made the decision there that the matter would be handled by the Department of State, and we adjourned.

I had no further participation or discussion concerning the incident until the following Monday morning.

Senator WILEY. What date?

Secretary GATES. Which was the 9th. I at that time participated in a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State, and he issued his complete statement.

Senator WILEY. Have you got one of these pamphlets in front of you?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. See if we can't get into the record that which is on page 4 for the press. That is the cover story up at the top?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. And that is the one that had been said was a lie?

Secretary GATES. This was a cover story; yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. This was issued when you had only part of the facts; isn't that it?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator WILEY. On May 9, if you will turn to page 5, you have the Department of State's release.

Senator WILEY. Was there one issued on May 9?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT PRESENT ONLY AT MAY 5TH MEETING

Senator WILEY. At any of these meetings, was the President there?

Secretary GATES. The only meeting the President attended was the meeting of May 5th, after the NSC meeting.

Senator WILEY. I didn't understand. Was he there on the 5th?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; after the NSC meeting. That is the only meeting at which he was present.

DECISION ON ALERT

Senator WILEY. When it was decided to have the alert, was that the judgment of all that it was in the interest of the national defense?

Secretary GATES. It was my judgment and I was responsible.

Senator WILEY. You had in mind, did you, what the condition of this country was at the time of Pearl Harbor, how we were asleep?

Secretary GATES. I certainly did.

Senator WILEY. During negotiations.

Secretary GATES. I did, indeed.

Senator WILEY. Is it your judgment from the facts that when Khrushchev went to Paris that he had already made up his mind to call off the summit meeting?

Secretary GATES. Yes; it is my judgment, Senator.

MEETING ON MAY 5

Senator WILEY. Something was said by yourself in the cross-examination to the effect that you claimed they should tell the truth. When was that, on the 5th?

Secretary GATES. I said on the 5th, if it proved that Mr. Khrushchev had the pilot, had the equipment, had the full and complete story, it later turned out that he had, that I believed we should tell the truth at that time.

Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.

REFORMS IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, since you have become Secretary of Defense, you have made it a point to sit in on the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and if an agreement could not be reached you make the final decision.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. In that period you have also brought about reforms and increased the efficiency of the centralized purchasing system.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. In that period you have also brought about a centralization of the communications system.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. For all those you are to be most highly commended because I think they were reforms long overdue and it was about time they were put into effect.

REASONS FOR ALERT

Now, at the time you issued your alert of the communications system in Paris did you have any information that Soviet forces were massing or mobilizing?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Did any one person or any group ask you to order the alert?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. You did that entirely on your own responsibility?

Secretary GATES. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. Did the alert order which you issued put the forces of this country at a war readiness level?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. There was no call back of Reserves or cancellation of leave to any extent.

Secretary GATES. No, sir. There were in one or two instances some people who interpreted the JCS order as meaning that they would have a couple of more aircraft on alert, and in that case, they, on their own, recalled, I believe some pilots who were home or off duty to have approximately two more airplanes on an alert status. But this was done on their own, testing their own alert procedures under the broad order that was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It was not the intention of this order to move forces in any way.

Senator MANSFIELD. Now, that JCS order was in response to your order?

Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is there any connection between this communications alert and the recent centralization of the communications system?

Secretary GATES. No, sir, because that will not be in effect in its entirety for approximately 9 months.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT

Senator MANSFIELD. Now, during the course of your responses to Senator Gore, you mentioned the following words, "The prestige of the Presidency should not be involved."

Isn't it true that in almost any undertaking, in a general way the prestige of the Presidency is always involved under our constitutional system of government?

Secretary GATES. Certainly.

Senator MANSFIELD. What I am getting at there is this: That whether or not he had any specific knowledge of this particular flight or of this particular order, which you issued, that nevertheless under our system he is generally responsible for actions undertaken by the head of the CIA and for actions and orders issued by the Secretary of Defense; is that correct?

Secretary GATES. He is the head of the executive branch and he is Commander in Chief, Senator, so of course he is responsible in that sense.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes, he is generally responsible.

Secretary GATES. Certainly.

Senator MANSFIELD. He is Commander in Chief and Chief of State.

Secretary GATES. That is right.

NATURE OF A COVER STORY

Senator MANSFIELD. There has been something said about a cover story and the fact that it is not truthful. Well, isn't a cover story by its very nature almost always a lie?

Secretary GATES. Yes, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is the purpose; to seek protection in some kind of a story under a given circumstance so that for the time being at least the situation could be taken care of.

Secretary GATES. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

SOVIET THREATS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I believe that we have had repeated statements from the Kremlin in the last weeks, months, or even years that contained threats of what the Kremlin is ready to do to the West generally or to the United States under a variety of conditions; isn't that correct?

Secretary GATES. Yes, it is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I believe Mr. Khrushchev has been quoted as saying that he would bury us—whether he meant economically or militarily might be argued—and I believe he stated that they have missiles on the launching pads directed at various countries of Europe as well as the United States?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Those statements have been reported, have they not?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

SOVIET AIR MANEUVERS OVER EAST GERMANY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are the Russians still engaging in scramble operations and massive airflight operations over East Germany; do you know?

Secretary GATES. I don't know of any flights over East Germany recently, but, of course, they have some 20 divisions in East Germany.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know whether this comes within your time or not, but I have heard in one way or another in times past that they have repeatedly had large air forces in the air over East Germany.

Secretary GATES. They have large air forces stationed in East Germany.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean in the air.

Secretary GATES. They have had maneuvers, yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have had maneuvers toward the West German border which come very close to the West German border on occasion?

Secretary GATES. They have had them regularly; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sometimes these are rather massive maneuvers in the air?

Secretary GATES. I believe that is correct; yes, sir.

JUSTIFICATION FOR ALERT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, now, recently we have heard a great deal of discussion and argument about keeping all of our strategic Air Force planes or a great many of them in the air all the time. There have been some that have advocated that and criticized us for not keeping our airplanes in the air more than we have.

Secretary GATES. I am very familiar with this argument, with the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I presume you do not see anything unwarranted about this air alert which you ordered, but I will ask you the question anyway. Do you see any reason for criticism because of a demonstration by your Department of a worldwide air alert of our forces?

Secretary GATES. I stated when I got off the airplane and was asked the question by the press on my return, I said it was incredible to me that anybody would question it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I agree with that statement, but there seems to be some criticism nevertheless.

ADVISABILITY OF OVERFLIGHT BEFORE SUMMIT CONFERENCE A POLITICAL QUESTION

Now, on the question of whether or not, that is from your viewpoint, in your Department, the particular U–2 flight should have been cancelled on the 30th of April, or the 1st of May, or whenever it occurred, isn't that a political question and not a military question?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is in view of the so-called summit conference?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That becomes exclusively a political question as to whether or not it was advisable at that time from the standpoint of the summit conference?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I take it that from the standpoint of primary responsibility you have nothing to say about whether it would be cancelled or not as a political gesture in view of a political conference?

Secretary GATES. Well, I, of course, knew of the date of the summit meeting, and if I had had a strong conviction about it I would have said it even though I didn't have the responsibility for the decision. I was in an advisory capacity, but I believed that there was really no good time to stop the collection of important information. There is always some international conference or something.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I am trying to get at is whether you have any primary responsibility for making political decisions, or is your responsibility military decisions?

Secretary GATES. No, my responsibility is with the Department of Defense.

VALUE OF U–2 FLIGHTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, these U–2 flights have been extremely valuable in the securing of intelligence, have they not?

Secretary GATES. They have indeed, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have also been very valuable in securing weather information, have they not?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. [Deleted.]

ADVISABILITY OF ALERT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you believe that, in view of the general tensions that exist and the rather jingoist statements, let's say, that have been emanating from the Kremlin from time to time, it was a beneficial thing to have this air alert as not only a show of strength but as an assurance to our friends and allies over the world that we had a readiness capability?

Secretary GATES. I do. It was not an air alert, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sir?

Secretary GATES. It was not an air alert. I think you miss—technically, you said air alert. It was a command readiness and communications alert. I agree, however, with what you said that it was a good thing to do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I shall adopt your description for my question, then, on that point.

But anyway, it was a show of ability on our part in connection with our alertness, general alertness, and our ability to put a defensive force into the air in a short time?

Secretary GATES. Yes, and we could go from there to further measures if we needed to, but this was primarily a measure of checking command and checking communications, particularly, as I said in my statement, in view of the fact that the persons involved in important policy decisions were out of the country.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you agree that it either does have, or should have, a certain degree of comforting effect upon not only our own country but upon our allies that we do have these capabilities?

Secretary GATES. I would hope it would, Senator. It seems to me this is our responsibility, to be ready and alert under these circumstances at all times, and we always are.

This was merely a matter of degree. It was a little increase in the degree of alertness. We are in an alert condition at all times.

ANOTHER COMMUNICATIONS ALERT ORDERED

As of midnight last night we are having another communications exercise, starting at 11 o'clock last night, and it is going for several days.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This fact that we may be always alert sometimes is not fully appreciated except on occasional demonstrations of that.

Secretary GATES. That is right, and the Joint Chiefs, as a result of this experience and critique of it have recommended to me that we have these alerts on a no-notice basis more frequently.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

[Deleted.]

QUESTION OF ADVANCE PLANNING FOR ACTION IN EVENT U–2 PLANE DOWNED

Senator LONG. Did you advise or consult as to whether we were to admit that we authorized these flights if and when the Soviets did succeed in bringing one of our planes down?

Secretary GATES. If we should continue them or not?

Senator LONG. No, no. What I meant is this: As a matter of forehandedness—I see a naval officer sitting behind you—they taught me the definition of that word as a midshipman—I am sure that you anticipated that sooner or later they were going to bring one of our planes down.

Secretary GATES. We knew it was a dangerous occupation; yes, Senator.

Senator LONG. You could anticipate that sooner or later one of these planes was going to fall into enemy hands?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. There was a distinct possibility at any moment, and had you advised and consulted as to how this matter should be handled if and when such an event materialized?

Secretary GATES. No; I had not, Senator. I was only aware of the fact that a cover story existed, but I had no part in it.

Senator LONG. And you had not been advised as to what the position of this country was going to be in the event that that happened?

Secretary GATES. No, sir; this was not my responsibility.

Senator LONG. Senator Young passed up two questions he would like for me to ask. I will just ask them on my time since I have no further questions.

He says if it were essential——

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator ought to ask in his own name.

Senator LONG. May I yield the remainder of my time to Senator Young then?

The CHAIRMAN. No, you may not. You may ask any question you, yourself, but on your own responsibility.

EFFECT OF DISCONTINUANCE OF U–2 FLIGHTS

Senator LONG. If it were essential or important that the U–2 flights be made for years, right up to and including May 1, is the defense of the United States adversely effected by an absolute discontinuance on May 13?

Secretary GATES. We have lost, through compromise, an important source of information. [Deleted.]

Senator LONG. In other words, we do badly need the same information that we were gathering with the U–2 flights?

Secretary GATES. We need a continuity of this information, I think, Senator.

Senator LONG. Then if that be the case, in your judgment was it essential or advisable that the flight of May 1 should not have been canceled?

Secretary GATES. In my judgment, it was proper to fly the flight of May 1.

Senator LONG. Thank you. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

The Senator from Vermont?

WAS ALERT RELATED TO SOVIET PLANS?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, at the time you ordered the communications alert on May 15, did you have any apprehension at that time the Communists might be considering or planning surprise action in any part of the world?

Secretary GATES. No, sir, I felt that the situation was one that was at best, not very constructive. We knew the sense of Mr. Khrushchev's remarks, but I did not anticipate a surprise attack.

I didn't order that kind of an alert.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, it seemed like a good thing to do at the time?

Secretary GATES. I think it was, yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Was the response to the order fully satisfactory?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Have you had any similar alerts since?

Secretary GATES. I testified a minute ago, I believe, that we started one at 11 o'clock last night which will run for several days.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, if this has been covered, please tell me.

Secretary GATES. Yes, Senator.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET THREAT AGAINST OVERSEAS BASES

Senator MORSE. I am somewhat concerned about the implications, propagandawise and otherwise, of the alleged threat of the marshal of the air forces of the Soviet Union that if they know that another spy plane is leaving a foreign base the instructions are to shoot a

missile to that base. What is your judgment as to the seriousness of that threat?

Do you think it is a bluff or do you think that he means it?

Secretary GATES. Well, Senator, this is awfully hard to know. He must know that if he did such a thing that we have allied commitments. If it was an allied country, for example, he would be starting a very major problem for himself.

Senator MORSE. That is the point I want to raise.

Secretary GATES. And this would only be done with the assumption that he would take the consequences of an act that would probably start a general war. [Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Doesn't it seem to imply, Mr. Secretary, that if he is not bluffing, that they thereby mean to start a general war over espionage activity on the part of the United States or any other foreign power that sends a spy plane over their territory?

Doesn't that seem to be——

Secretary GATES. If I understand your question, Senator, I think he must take the responsibility for starting a general war or very likely starting a general war if he hits one of our Allied bases for any reason.

Senator MORSE. Could it possibly imply that the Russians are of the opinion that our power of both defense and aggression is such that they are willing to take it on? To put my question a different way——

Secretary GATES. I doubt very much that they are willing to take it now. I think they absolutely know they will commit suicide the moment they try it because I think they are fully informed in every way possible about, practically, the exact defense posture of the United States.

Senator MORSE. If that is true, and I think it is true, that they ought to know that if they get involved in a nuclear war there can't be any victory for them, and I doubt if there could for us, but apparently this type of military mind in Russia possessed by their air marshal is ready to start a nuclear war. Wouldn't that be a fair deduction from this threat unless it is a bluff?

Secretary GATES. Senator Morse, I think it is a part of a stepped-up, cold war aggressive, propaganda campaign. That is what I think it really is, because I don't believe that Mr. Khrushchev wants to start a war which he knows will be the end of his country.

Senator MORSE. I am inclined to think that is probably true of Khrushchev. But the reason I am asking this line of questions is to find out from you if the leaders in our country have reason to believe that Khrushchev is being pushed in Russia by a preventive war group that entertains the point of view that sooner or later they are going to have to fight the United States, and that they think probably now is a better time to do it than later.

Do we have any intelligence information that would justify our believing that a military group in Russia is now taking over and pushing Khrushchev to the side?

Secretary GATES. We do not have. We can at this time only speculate. It might be possible that the military group has come into more power in Russia or that Mr. Khrushchev may have had some of his power diluted. This is, however, just speculation, and

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it is, I suppose, rather dangerous to speculate, but we do not have any hard facts on the subject.

INFLUENCE OF, AND DANGER IN, SOVIET MILITARY HIERARCHY

Senator MORSE. I understand they have some 250,000 military officers, army and naval and air. Could it be possible that within the military in Russia they see the possibility of reaching an agreement on total disarmament which means that they would be moved out of the very favored position in Russian society they now occupy, and that we need to be on the alert to the possibility that a great military change is taking place in Russia in the form of a military hierarchy taking over control from the Communist leadership?

Secretary GATES. Well, I couldn't agree with you more, sir, that we should certainly be on the alert to this possibility and continuously so. I agree that we must consider this as one of the possibilities.

Senator MORSE. What concerns me is that as far as their leadership is concerned and as far as I have any reason to believe, based upon the briefings we have had from our own American leaders, we are dealing with a group of very amoral leaders in Russia. And when you get amoral leaders among the military establishments, such as they have, I think we have cause for concern as to whether or not even in desperation they might not be willing to start a war. And if this is more than propaganda, if this is more than bluff, if this is more than what you suggest might be the case of a new step-up in the cold war to try to frighten our allies, then we have to take a long look, it seems to me, as to our responsibility to history in respect to following an espionage course that might cause these amoral men in desperation to start a war because there is always the hope on our part that we may be able to contain them until we can negotiate through the United Nations a workable and enforceable total disarmament program.

NEED FOR INFORMATION BALANCED AGAINST POTENTIAL DANGER

I have raised this question because I don't think that in terms of history we can completely ignore our responsibility in dealing with a group of desperadoes such as I think the Russian military people are, and so it raises the question how far we can justify going morally, in connection with an espionage system such as the U–2 system, when we know we are dealing with a group of amoral military leaders in Russia who might start a nuclear war because of their complete lack of appreciation for the value of human life.

It puts us in a difficult position, it seems to me. We have our own security to protect, we have our duty to gather information, but the nature of the "beast" with whom we are dealing—in quotation marks I put the word, of course—nevertheless puts upon us some responsibility, it seems to me, to not go too far in our own espionage program if by going a certain distance might indirectly put us in a position where history might record that we knew we were dealing with that kind of a gang and knowing it we nevertheless followed an espionage course of action that they considered so violated their sovereign rights that they were willing then to take that last step into a nuclear war.

Secretary GATES. Well, the Senator can speculate more intelligently, I am sure, than I can on military people.

Senator MORSE. Not at all.

Secretary GATES. But basically military people are conservative, worldwide, and basically they are well informed on military matters, and therefore, the military in the Soviet Union should know better than the political leaders that they will be lost, and slaughtered and devastated in a nuclear war.

On the other question, it seems to me again as a lay person that our survival is at stake. If he threatens us, I have repeatedly testified in Congress, that I didn't think he intended to make any significant concessions at any meeting, that we have not prepared our defense program on that basis, that we had to keep it under continuous review, at all times, and with a completely closed country, and our survival threatened, if he builds up a capability for a surprise attack, it seems to me absolutely vital that we obtain all the information we can from every source.

Senator MORSE. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Indiana.

Senator CAPEHART. I have no questions except I will say I think you did the right thing by ordering the alert.

I hope that you will continue to be on alert. I hope you will continue to get intelligence on Russia in every conceivable way we can.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

The Senator from Ohio.

SECRETARY GATES' SERVICE IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Gates, how long have you been the Secretary of Defense?

Secretary GATES. Only since last December, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were you in the Department prior to that time?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; I have been there since 1953, in the Department.

Senator LAUSCHE. In what capacity?

Secretary GATES. I was Under Secretary of the Navy, then Secretary of the Navy, then Deputy Secretary of Defense.

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon your knowledge, when did the Soviet hierarchy first know of the fact that there were foreign planes flying over the Soviet?

Secretary GATES. I don't think we can confirm, Senator. We just have to take Mr. Khrushchev's statements at face value.

I think that it is debatable how much he knew. I assume he knew that there were planes flying. He said he knew. He says he had known since he was here in the United States. But I don't think we can definitely confirm this.

Senator LAUSCHE. Testimony has been given by some witness that, I think on July 2, 1956, he made a protest that there was a plane overhead in the Soviet.

Secretary GATES. Yes. I have the record of this. I believe this was the time General Twining visited the Soviet Union. They made a public protest of overflights in July of 1956.

Senator LAUSCHE. And since that time U–2's have been making missions over the Soviet?

Secretary GATES. That is correct, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. And Khrushchev, after May 1, made a statement that he knew at the time that he was at Camp David that planes were flying overhead?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then the proof indicates that at the time he was invited to the United States, at the time he went to Camp David, and at the time that he arranged for the summit conference, he knew of these planes being overhead?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. And he did nothing about it? Can a staff member tell?

Secretary GATES. I can't say that we can confirm this, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. I understand.

Secretary GATES. This is his statement.

SOVIET MOTIVATION FOR ATTENDING SUMMIT

Senator LAUSCHE. That is correct. When was Khrushchev in the United States?

Mr. MARCY. September 1959.

Secretary GATES. September 15 through the 27th.

Senator LAUSCHE. He made no statement to the President at that time about planes being overhead?

Secretary GATES. He did not.

Senator LAUSCHE. And he agreed to meet at the summit?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then on May 1 this U–2 was brought down in the Soviet and he then made these declarations that have been reported. That is correct, isn't it?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, what, in your opinion, motivated him in agreeing to have a summit conference, accepting our invitation to come to the United States, meeting with the President, while he knew that this supposed grave transgression of his rights was taking place?

Secretary GATES. I can only hazard again a personal opinion, Senator. My opinion is that he believed that he could not make any progress at the summit meeting, and he made a pre-positioned, he took a pre-position—made a brief on it and came to Paris to wreck the summit quite apart from the U–2 incident.

U.S. AND SOVIET INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING OPPORTUNITIES

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon your opinion or active knowledge, during this period was there espionage practiced by the Soviets in our country?

Secretary GATES. Yes: there was.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that answer based upon your knowledge?

Secretary GATES. Based upon reports that I have read.

Senator LAUSCHE. From the Central Intelligence Agency?

Secretary GATES. Or from the FBI.

Senator LAUSCHE. In the Soviet, all things are hemmed in against an individual getting into proximity of their bases. Am I correct in that?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Does that situation prevail in our country?

Secretary GATES. It certainly does not, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then there is a tremendous difficulty in the ability of obtaining intelligence by our agents in the Soviet as compared to their ability, through their agents in our country?

Secretary GATES. That is correct; and there is obviously no reason for him to overfly the United States.

IMPORTANCE OF U–2 FLIGHTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon the knowledge that you acquired through the U–2's, what would be your opinion about our intellectual ability to pursue properly the development of our national defense?

Secretary GATES. I think we had a responsibility to take every means we could.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is not my question. My question is, If you did not have the knowledge acquired through the U–2's, could you have intelligently developed your national defense to cope with the actual, potential military power of the Soviet?

Secretary GATES. Not as well, Senator; by no means.

Senator LAUSCHE. By no means whatsoever?

Secretary GATES. We have other means.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes?

Secretary GATES. That gives us other information, but this was a very importance piece of information.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you didn't have that information, do you feel that the security of our country in all probability would have been affected because of our inability to develop properly our military strength?

Secretary GATES. I think this was—I want to be careful in my answer because this is one source of several sources of intelligence. It is a very important one. I think it would have been affecting our ability to properly defend the United States if we didn't have this information.

DEMANDS PRESENTED BY KHRUSHCHEV

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, getting down to the matter of the May 16 meeting, have you formulated any opinion as to whether Khrushchev, when he left Moscow, already had prepared these four unacceptable demands that he made upon the President with respect to the U–2 incident?

Secretary GATES. Everyone is entitled to a personal opinion, Senator. I have an opinion, yes, sir, that he had very definitely, because the moment he arrived in Paris he presented these conditions to Mr. de Gaulle along with a copy already in French.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is—the fact is that he was supposed to go to Paris on May 15; Sunday?

Secretary GATES. Yes; he came on Saturday night, I believe.

Senator LAUSCHE. And for some reason that has not been explained, he decided to come there in advance?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. On Saturday?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And early in the morning at 11 o'clock on Sunday, he asked for a conference?

Secretary GATES. Attended by de Gaulle.

Senator LAUSCHE. Attended by Malinovsky, himself, and de Gaulle?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. At that meeting, he set forth these unacceptable demands?

Secretary GATES. That is right, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then in the afternoon at 4:30 he asked for a conference with Macmillan?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And he again set forth those four demands?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. This is merely asking for your opinion.

Do you believe that in self-respect and maintenance of the President's position he could conform to the demands made in that ultimatum?

Secretary GATES. I certainly do not. I certainly believe he could not, I guess, would be a better answer.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am of the opinion that when Khrushchev left Moscow he knew there was not to be a summit conference. He prepared his paper. He had his mode of operation completely outlined.

Secretary GATES. I share that point of view, Senator.

SHOULD U–2 FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED BEFORE SUMMIT CONFERENCE?

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, you have stated that you did not feel that we could, in the face of these discussions about a summit conference, suspend our activities with respect to the security of the country; is that right?

Secretary GATES. That is right, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. If there was to be a temporary suspension of these U–2 flights, when should they have begun? This is speculation. I am just trying to search it out. The discussions for a summit conference preceded by far the September visit in the United States, and then from September to May 16 practically 9 months elapsed. Should we, last September, have discontinued our U–2 flights?

Secretary GATES. Not in my judgment, Senator. I think it would have been most incorrect to have suspended them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you believe the Soviet, because of the arranged summit conference, discontinued its activities?

Secretary GATES. I am sure they didn't, although I don't know, but I am perfectly sure they didn't.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

SOVIET NOTE OF MAY 10

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reporter, the staff overlooked a document which should have been included in the background information. It

is the Soviet note of May 10, which was sent to our Government, as reprinted in the New York Times of May 11, and I ask that it be inserted in the record so that this step in the development from a documentary point of view may be complete.

(The note referred to appears on p. 195 of appendix 1.)

QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVES TO MAY 9 STATEMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, referring just a moment to a previous question, on the May the 9th meeting in which the issuance of the statement by the Department was considered, were there any alternative statements proposed and considered to the one which was issued?

Secretary GATES. Not in principle, Senator Fulbright.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in principle?

Secretary GATES. But there were, of course, various language versions considered.

The CHAIRMAN. Did anyone at that meeting raise the point that for the President, the Chief of State, to assume personal responsibility would be a departure from the historical practice of this country?

Secretary GATES. I think this was understood, Senator, and I believe that we felt the circumstances were different from anything that had prevailed heretofore.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point was raised and discussed?

Secretary GATES. I can't accurately say that it was raised and discussed but it was certainly in my mind and I believe it was obvious to all of us that it was a departure from precedent.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a departure from precedent in this country. Do you know of any other country that has followed this policy?

Secretary GATES. No; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Was anyone concerned that this might have far-reaching implications for the future of our intelligence operations?

Secretary GATES. Well, we knew that it already had marked the end of this particular method of collection of intelligence because of its being compromised [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that to your knowledge there was no time in the last few years, in which you are familiar with our activity, that U–2 flights were suspended for political reasons.

Secretary GATES. Not to my knowledge, Senator; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, were you ever consulted with regard to the wisdom of holding a summit conference?

Secretary GATES. No; I was not, Senator.

POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA ON DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTING

The CHAIRMAN. Do you personally believe there is any reasonable hope for any agreement with the Russians with regard to disarmament?

Secretary GATES. I think it is extremely doubtful, Mr. Chairman. I think that the Soviets are playing off-and-on-again tactics; sometimes cool, sometimes cold, sometimes hot.

I believe that their proposal for disarmament or total disarmament is completely unrealistic. I find it rather difficult to believe they will ever agree to the controls and inspections that we will of necessity insist upon to make progress on disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe the same with regard to nuclear test bans?

Secretary GATES. I am not so definite on that, Mr. Chairman, from a personal point of view. We seem to have made more progress in the negotiations on tests than we have in the other field. But I again worry about the possibility of having valid control and inspection systems for either of these efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say, I believe, in answer to a question by Senator Morse that you did not believe any significant concessions could be expected from the Soviets at the summit meeting.

Secretary GATES. That is right. This has been consistent with my testimony before the committees of Congress all of this year.

QUESTION OF RELOCATION OF SOVIET BASES

The CHAIRMAN. Is it now probable that, as a result of the revelation of the efficiency of the U–2 photography, the Russians will now change the location of many of their strategic bases?

Secretary GATES. This is quite an undertaking. You don't do the construction that is involved in strategic bases easily or quickly, and they don't know precisely how much information we have about them, and I would think that they would perhaps take different means of building new bases or of dispersing bases or something of that character. But I don't believe that it is very practical to assume that they would shift major installations because of the character required to handle the strategic weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. What I meant is, do you feel that the information you now have may become rapidly obsolete because of their knowing you know about them they will change them, so that you will have a great deal of difficulty in keeping up with their location?

Secretary GATES. We will have to augment other methods toward obtaining this information.

[Deleted.]

RELEASE OF SECRETARY GATES' PREPARED STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, was your prepared statement released to the press?

Secretary GATES. Was what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Was the statement which you read initially released to the press?

Secretary GATES. I didn't release it, unless the committee did.

The CHAIRMAN. No, the committee didn't, as far as I know.

Captain JOHNSTON. It has been released by Mr. St. Claire; I believe that he had released it. We didn't release it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it your purpose to release it?

Secretary GATES. It was up to you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, normally, the initial statement made by witnesses is the same as their own testimony. They either censor it or release it. I was just inquiring.

Secretary GATES. It is all right with me if it is all right with you that it be released, Mr. Chairman. I understand it has been released.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been released?

Secretary GATES. That is what I understand.

Captain JOHNSTON. Yes, sir, I was informed by someone from the committee, I believe Mr. St. Claire, that it had been released.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

Captain JOHNSTON. By the committee, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask the staff, did you release it?

Mr. MARCY. No, Mr. Chairman, this will just be released in the normal way. It is put on the tape here. It went through the censors and, unless they took any portion of it out, it went to the public.

The CHAIRMAN. I just was wondering.

Secretary GATES. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I considered it your prerogative. I have no objection one way or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. It usually follows the same procedure. You make the statement and then it goes through the record if the censors wish it. Was this statement cleared with the State Department before you made it?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we find out whether a copy got in the hands of the newspapermen other than through normal sources here.

Mr. MARCY. No, sir, that did not happen, not through the committee. Everything goes through the regular process, through the censors, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I asked the clerk a moment ago if you had released it. He understood you had—I mean that you had given it to the press before.

Secretary GATES. I didn't give it to the press, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You or one of your aides, I don't know.

Secretary GATES. No, we did not release it.

TIMING OF KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION TO WRECK SUMMIT

The CHAIRMAN. You stated very positively that you believed the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, before he came to Paris, had already made up his mind to wreck the summit. Can you tell us how and why you arrived at that opinion?

Secretary GATES. Well, I felt, and again speaking personally, I felt that the fact that he arrived on Saturday night and asked for these appointments with President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan, and he arrived with a position paper translated in French in the case of de Gaulle and given orally by translation in English to Macmillan, a position paper that he used almost verbatim as the first part of his text the following morning, was pretty good indication that he had a preconceived plan at the summit meeting and was planning to, in my judgment again, and used the fact that there were 3,000 newspapermen in Paris and he had a platform to issue all of these statements from. Then I believe there were indications in other speeches that he made prior to the summit that he was going to adopt later on.

The CHAIRMAN. What in your opinion caused him to arrive at this conclusion to wreck the conference?

Secretary GATES. Why, I believe that he found that he had been unsuccessful in creating any disunity among the allies. That he was not going to get any substantive concessions himself, according to his terms, on Berlin and other critical issues that he might consider important, and that he wasn't going to get a blanket disarmament check without controls, and so forth. And I believe he felt that he was not going to make any progress at the summit.

EFFECT OF THE U–2 INCIDENT ON KHRUSHCHEV'S SUMMIT ACTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe the U–2 incident contributed to that belief?

Secretary GATES. I, frankly in my judgment it did not, Senator Fulbright. I believe it gave him, it contributed to his public case, but I don't think it contributed to his position.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think that was a significant element in causing him to arrive at this conclusion?

Secretary GATES. I really do not; no, sir. I believe it was a factor in his, an important factor in helping him make his case, but I don't think it had anything to do with his policy decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think he would be better off and what reasoning leads you to this conclusion? Why is he better off having followed the course he did, than having gone to the conference and having it result in no concessions?

Secretary GATES. Only he can answer that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think he left in his initial statement what is called an "out" for the President, by saying he thought the President didn't know about this?

Secretary GATES. I don't know what his intentions were, whether that was an out or whether that was just a statement that he believed. I really don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. If it was an out, it would be inconsistent with his determination to wreck the conference, would it not?

Secretary GATES. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. If it was an out as it has been alleged, it would be inconsistent with his determination to wreck the conference. He wouldn't want to give the President an out, would he?

Secretary GATES. I never personally considered it was an out. I just thought he was using this as part of his speech—I don't consider it was an out.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he did say that he thought the President didn't know about it, didn't he, in his initial statement?

Secretary GATES. Yes; he did.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator Morse, do you have any further questions?

Senator MORSE. Senator Wiley is next.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

Senator MORSE. I have some more questions.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, we know very well that Khrushchev had canvassed the situation with Macmillan, de Gaulle, with Adenauer and with our President, and they were all agreed and firm on the proposition that Khrushchev wanted, to wit, to divide Germany, and so forth and so on. Now, he was acquainted with that fact from his conversations, was he not?

Secretary GATES. I believe he was, sir.

Senator WILEY. And, in other words, he knew that if he went to the conference and couldn't get his way, which would be very apparent, that wouldn't sit so well with the people of Russia?

Secretary GATES. I think that is a good speculation.

Senator WILEY. So, it seems to be the consensus of those people who claim to know, including yourself, that the U–2 incident would give him something to hang on his previous determination and that he utilized. Do you agree to that?

Secretary GATES. Yes, I think he used the U–2 as a tool rather than as a matter of principle. I think he decided that there was no progress for him at the summit.

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS

Senator WILEY. Well, there is just this one other question. I think you have answered it, but see if I can't get it out into the open and get it so there won't be any question: Is it your opinion that he had known of the U–2 incidents for a long time—I mean the U–2 flights?

Secretary GATES. I think I believed him when he said that he knew we were overflying the Soviet Union. I don't believe he knew their capabilities. But I think he knew that unidentified aircraft were over his territory.

Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

RELATIONSHIP OF U–2 FLIGHTS TO SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I want to pursue a bit further the line of questioning that I was conducting when my time was up because I think you have got to deal also with the problem of where we go from here, in view of Russian attitudes at the present time.

We have the air marshal's statement now which has not been countermanded as far as we know by Khrushchev, that if an American U–2 plane flies from any base, goes over Russia, they will fire a missile against that base.

Your testimony, I think, justifies my concluding that if they fire at that base, that under our commitments under NATO, our obligations to defend our allies, we will meet that force, and that that may very well start general war.

As I understand also your testimony, you share my doubt as to whether or not the air marshal is bluffing, whether or not this is propaganda in the cold war or whether or not this is an announcement of a definite decision as to what they are going to do.

So we have to discuss this hypothetically from this point on. Let's assume that he means exactly what he said, and because of my fear of the type of military mind they have in Russia as contrasted with our own, namely, the difference between amoral military leaders and moral military leaders, I am very fearful that the group in control of the Russian military at the present time means exactly what it says.

They will fire a missile at any base from which an American U–2 plane flies. Doesn't that put squarely up to us then the question as to whether or not we can justify being a party indirectly to the start-

ing of general war by flying any U–2 planes from any foreign base, in view of that announcement by the Russian air marshal?

Secretary GATES. We have announced that the U–2 flights will not be resumed. The President has announced this. This is, of course, known to them and that was announced prior to this Defense Minister's statement that you refer to.

Senator MORSE. That is what I want to clarify for this record because most respectfully, I don't think it is clear in the record that this committee has made to date.

The President announced at Paris that they were suspending them.

Secretary GATES. He made the statement, Senator, that he couldn't commit the next President, but as far as he was concerned, during his administration, the flights were stopped.

Senator MORSE. Then do you wish to express the viewpoint that at the present time the United States does not intend to continue any U–2 flights over Russia?

Secretary GATES. I think we made a commitment not to.

Senator MORSE. There has been a considerable amount of discussion in these hearings and outside of these hearings that in view of that situation that confronts us, it is intended to continue U–2 flights; that the President's statement was a statement made in connection with the summit conference situation.

In other words, the summit conference situation having blown up, it does not follow that that statement of the President now continues in effect.

It is your testimony that it is your understanding it does continue in effect?

NATURE OF PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT NOT TO CONTINUE FLIGHTS

Secretary GATES. I am not a lawyer, Senator, but I think you could take the legal point of view that the President had no commitment because of the blowup of the summit conference, but from a national point of view, prestige and the standpoint of the honorable point of view, I think the United States has made a commitment regardless of the technicality of the timing of the decision, so in my judgment we have made a commitment not to fly U–2 during the administration of this President.

Senator MORSE. I don't care to get into any argument over semantics, but only judging from what I read about the interpretation of the President's speech to the Nation, there are many news comments interpreting the President's speech to the Nation as a speech that does not commit this Nation to a discontinuance of U–2 flights, now that the summit conference has blown up.

I think it is very important that we make clear our position. I am not passing judgment now on what our position should be.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

INTERPRETATION OF PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ABOUT NOT RESUMING OVERFLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. But we have problems, may I say most respectfully, with people in other parts of the world, even including the segments of the population of our allies, raising the question as to whether or

not the President's speech to the Nation the other night means that we may continue U–2 flights.

In view of the statement of the air marshal of Russia as to what they are going to do if they do continue, my question is this: Should not our Government restate its position in regard to the continuation of U–2 flights and give the world assurance at the present time that we do not intend to continue U–2 flights and thus risk the possibility that the Russians may send a missile to the air base from which any U–2 flight might leave?

Secretary GATES. Senator, I have in my hand the President's statement in Paris in which he said:

> In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident, and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue.

That is a categorical statement that they are not to be resumed. This is what I understand our position is.

Senator MORSE. The President didn't say that in his speech to the Nation the other night. There isn't anything in the President's speech to the Nation the other night that categorically and unequivocally assures to the world that we are discontinuing, as a matter of espionage policy, the flying of any U–2 planes over any foreign territory.

All I seek to do at this point in the record, and please let me assure you of this, is to raise this point so that our Government can remove any suspicion or fear in other parts of the world in view of the Russian air marshal's statement, that the world doesn't have to be concerned about a nuclear war being started by us by sending a U–2 plane from any foreign base over Russia.

I think the world is entitled to that assurance at this moment in order to produce the relaxation that I think is necessary for the continuation, through the United Nations I hope, of a good faith, this attempt to reach some understanding with Russia.

Secretary GATES. It may well need clarification, Senator. I didn't think it did. I thought it was perfectly clear to me that we had made a commitment so long as the President is in office, not to fly the U–2 airplane, and everyone understood it. If they don't, perhaps it should be reexamined. However, you are now faced with making another statement in face of a threat, and I don't know whether this is a wise move or not.

Senator MORSE. I think it is a wise move if we honestly believe that this is more than a threat, that this is an announcement of military policy that they intend to deliver on.

WORLD OPINION ON U–2 OVERFLIGHTS

I don't intend to argue the point. I think the judgment of the world will be against us if, in view of what you call this threat, we should continue U–2 flights, because I think we have to share joint responsibility with Russia then for starting a nuclear war, because I seriously question whether world opinion will ever be with us on this kind of espionage conduct.

I think that world opinion is against our sending a U–2 flight over any foreign territory, because I think most people in other parts of the world consider it a form of constructive aggression.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you have any further questions? I think you are next.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the discussion which you have just had with Senator Morse—I think perhaps I only have a comment because my comment will go to a matter of personal opinion—as I understand the line of questioning that has been going on here, and as I think it probably will be interpreted, the United States is required to take the burden for all the ills of the world and take the responsibilities for all the mistakes in the world; that we must do everything, including complete submission to the demands and the threats of the Kremlin; and that the opinion of the world is apt to be slanted against us unless we do this at this time.

I have heard from so many sources over the country that we have to do this or that or the other thing as a gesture that we are not war-minded or that we are not warmongers, or that we really have some interest in our fellow man.

RECORD OF THE UNITED STATES AS A PEACEFUL NATION

Now, if the record of the United States over the last good many years of humanitarian activities, of fantastic expenditures of billions of dollars for peace, of fostering all kinds of conferences, of making all kinds of offers to meet all kinds of reasonable propositions for peace, based only upon reasonable agreements for their assurance of being carried out—if that isn't an assurance to the world, I personally think that to humble ourselves further by yielding to this threat of this military man in Russia would certainly not add to our prestige in the least, and it probably would be of little use in the eyes of the world, at least to those that we would expect to stand by us in an emergency.

I can't follow that line of reasoning, especially in view of the past record of the United States.

We started out at the end of World War II with the sole and exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, the ability to blow any nation off the map and anybody else if we wanted to if we were war-minded. Nobody else had it. We offered to give it up to an international agency to get out of the atomic business, to turn over all fissionable materials to an international agency; all we asked was that reasonable inspection, reasonable assurance, would be given that the international agency would have control and that no nation would cheat on this obligation.

Never in the history of the world, as far as I know, has a nation, possessing the exclusive ability and the exclusive power to destroy any other nation in the world, have they ever given that up or offered to give it up voluntarily.

We go from that step by step with vast amounts of money, with all kinds of humanitarian offers, with all kinds of peaceful offers, with all kinds of peaceful efforts in the world and I just want to make my position clear; we have stated we are not going to overfly Russia, at least so far as President Eisenhower's administration is concerned, with U-2's—that has been stopped. If we did continue it sometime in the future in the interests of the security of this country, I think

the security of this country comes first in our responsibility, and we must take whatever reasonable means we have and whatever calculated risks that may be involved in order to secure essential information and in order to secure and maintain our proper defensive posture.

I feel that very deeply and I am not questioning you about it.

You don't have to agree or disagree. I merely wanted to make that statement in view of the fact that I don't agree that we have continually to humble ourselves in the eyes of the world, because I think it can do nothing but destroy the confidence, in many cases, that other Nations have in us if we continue to bow to the threats that emanate periodically from the Kremlin, and we have had just as bad threats in the past as this one. As I pointed out in my previous questions, where they said they have rockets pointed at our bases, they have rockets on the pads pointed at other countries in Europe; they know how many rockets they are going to put on Paris and that they are going to bury us one way or another, and so on, and I think there comes a time when even the world has to turn and stand fast. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

[Deleted.]

The Senator's time is up.

The Senator from Ohio, any questions?

Senator LAUSCHE. No further questions.

KHRUSHCHEV'S CHANGING VIEWS ON A SUMMIT CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to labor this too long, but I am interested in your reasoning. I didn't get to finish that question. Let me go back. Do you think when Chairman Khrushchev was in the United States last September that at that time he had an intention to have a summit conference?

Secretary GATES. I would only be speculating, Mr. Chairman. I think he did.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know what happened between then and May 15, in your opinion, that caused him to take the firm decision which you stated a moment ago you believe he had.

Secretary GATES. I really don't know the value of my opinion, Mr. Chairman, but my opinion is that he has tried for many years to divide our allies from us. He has tried to divide the NATO membership in particular. He has resented the bases that surround his country, and he has had, I think, as a No. 1 objective the division of our security and collective alliances. I think he found during this intervening period that he couldn't make a dent in the solidarity and unity of these relationships, that he couldn't get anybody to change their position on Berlin. He found the British and the French and the United States stalwartly together on that subject, and that he found the NATO alliance in good shape and strong, and that he was going to run into a position where he would make no progress, and as someone else has remarked, I believe, during this testimony, he would probably lose some face at home if he couldn't make any progress.

U–2 INCIDENT'S EFFECT ON SUMMIT CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think he would have refused to participate if there had been no U–2 incident?

Secretary GATES. I think he would have—again, we must only speculate, Senator—I think he would have probably employed tactics that would have ruined the summit from within.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think he would have participated?

Secretary GATES. I think he would have participated and found some other mechanism of destroying it.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles testified that the Air Force gave CIA weather forecasts that were helpful to the U–2 operation; is that correct?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

[Deleted.]

SOVIET MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

The CHAIRMAN. What inference from Soviet military preparedness can properly be drawn from the U–2 incident?

Secretary GATES. This, pieced together and repeated and associated with other sources of intelligence builds up, unfolds a story that definitely disclosed a military posture.

It builds up a story that gives you a judgment on a capability for a surprise attack. It gives you a judgment on important installations. It gives you some judgment on production. It gives you some judgment on logistic backup and actual military sites, so that I would say it gave you a very definite look-see at their military posture.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it possible for you to give us a judgment? Was this preparation and strength very impressive? Was it greater than you had expected?

Secretary GATES. Coming into two recent jobs I have had, which is the first time I was ever involved in this, I would say that it impressed me, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the result of your overflights and the information you got has given you a better appreciation of their military strength and that appreciation is that they are very well armed—is that correct—better than you expected?

Secretary GATES. In some case, yes. In some case, perhaps less well than they advertised.

EFFECT OF SUMMIT FAILURE ON U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS

The CHAIRMAN. Does this failure of the summit and all that has resulted from it give you any new ideas as to the level of expenditures of programs relating to defense?

Secretary GATES. Not immediately, no, sir. But I believe I have said when I started to testify in January, I repeatedly stated we didn't expect to have any significant or substantive concessions. We believed there was a tactic on the part of the Soviet Union. We didn't know how long it would last and we are not basing our military programs on this premise and I also said that we should keep them under continuous review and as late as April we went back with a major revision in our military programs to the Appropriations Committees.

I believe now we should continue this careful and continuous process, and I have no desire right now to make any further recommendations to the Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee are about to mark up the defense bill I believe next week or this week.

[Deleted.]

POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ALERT

The CHAIRMAN. One inference I wish you would comment on that might have been drawn from the ordering of the test on May 15 is, I believe: Would it be fair to draw the inference that you had any doubt about the readiness of our Armed Forces.

Secretary GATES. No, sir, but it is a very good move and we should do it more frequently to have a no-notice alert communications and command readiness test, and we hope to do this, I say we started one again last night which has been long planned, it is going to be about a 7- or 8-day exercise.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been long planned.

DECISION TO ORDER ALERT

Was the one on the 15th long planned?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first think of doing that?

Secretary GATES. There was another one planned for about that period of time, as a matter of fact, I made the decision to do this myself.

The CHAIRMAN. After you arrived in Paris?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that that might have been construed as a provocative act under the circumstances that then existed in Paris?

Secretary GATES. No, sir, it was made after midnight on Sunday night. It was not intended nor was it worded as a provocative message. The first word in it was "Quiet," and the last words in it were "minimum need to know."

It was not meant as provocative. It was not meant as either an offensive or defensive alert.

In fact it was not issued as such. If we were going to go on that kind of an alert we would have had a higher degree of readiness than the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean you intended it as such. Don't you think reasonable people might have regarded it as a provocative act?

Secretary GATES. I think reasonable people would have regarded it as a prudent act.

The CHAIRMAN. But not as a provocative act?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. We have a member here who has just come in. Would you care to ask any questions, Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Can I follow up on two or three of yours?

The CHAIRMAN. You have 10 minutes to do as you please.

[Deleted.]

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OVERFLIGHTS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think it was essential to have overflights in order to gain the kind of information that is supposed to have been gained in recent months?

Secretary GATES. Yes; this was by all means our best information.

Secretary HUMPHREY. Well, it might be your best information.

Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it was essential; yes; I do.

[Deleted.]

SOVIET AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES

Senator HUMPHREY. Have we ever shot down any Soviet aircraft that have ever been over American territory?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have we shot down any Soviet aircraft that have been over areas where we have some military responsibility?

Secretary GATES. Not to my knowledge.

Senator HUMPHREY. Not over Korea; Japan?

Secretary GATES. You mean in peacetime?

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, in the armistice period.

Secretary GATES. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Senator HUMPHREY. We have not?

Secretary GATES. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I had been informed once that we had, and that is why I had asked the question.

Secretary GATES. Maybe we ought to qualify this. There has been speculation that "volunteers" have flown aircraft that have been shot down. These volunteers may have been Soviet, but, as far as I know, any identified as a Soviet aircraft has not been shot down.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has the Soviet Union protested to the United States because of an attack on our part on Soviet aircraft?

Secretary GATES. I can't answer that question, Senator, because my knowledge is that they have not. I don't think they have. No; I don't think so, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have reason to believe that the so-called volunteers might very well have been a little less than volunteers, possibly engaged actively in Soviet espionage?

Secretary GATES. Well, there has been sort of a technique evolving over a period of time in various places of the world where volunteers have appeared and we have always been a little apprehensive about them.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just a little?

Secretary GATES. No, sir. [Laughter.]

Senator HUMPHREY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. I have a few more, Mr. Secretary, pursuing the same line of questioning I was pursuing before.

The President the other night in his speech to the Nation indicated very clearly that a nuclear war would produce devastation upon all participants.

POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL WAR

Going back to my hypothetical, assuming that we should fly a spy plane out of some foreign base and assuming that the Russian air marshal makes good on his threat and strikes that airbase with Russian missiles and starts a general war, do you think we could win it?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. You think we could destroy Russia and have enough of the United States left so that we could remain a power?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; because in this case he would, by initiating this attack, give considerable warning to our retaliatory forces and with that warning, we would move in.

Senator MORSE. Your view then is that the United States could win a nuclear war?

Secretary GATES. If it is started under those circumstances.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Do you think that the Russian military are aware of the fact that we could win a nuclear war if they started that war by simply sending a missile to one air base from which a spy plane might fly?

Secretary GATES. I think they are well aware of it.

Senator MORSE. Do you think then that if he kept his threat of sending a missile to a foreign air base from which a spy plane might be flown, he probably would go much further than that and send missiles elsewhere and if he knows it is going to lead to a general war, start a complete general war?

Secretary GATES. I think he would have to.

Senator MORSE. In your opinion, could we win that war?

Secretary GATES. Well, we could do what we call in the military, prevail in general war, but there would be great damage to the United States.

Senator MORSE. There would be terrific mutual destruction in a general war?

Secretary GATES. Yes; terrific damage.

Senator MORSE. Therefore——

Secretary GATES. But everything depends, Senator, on a lot of factors. If you vary any part of the equation you vary the answer. In other words, time of warning, reliability of missiles, ability to fire a salvo of missiles worldwide against deployed and U.S. forces at home and abroad. These factors and the accuracies of these weapons—any one piece of this equation varies the answer.

INTERPRETATION OF PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ON SUSPENSION OF U–2 FLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. Therefore, referring most respectfully to Senator Hickenlooper's observation, do you think that we would be showing a sign of weakness, that we would be guilty of appeasement, that we would be surrendering to threats if we removed any doubt in the world at the present moment by notifying the world that we have no intention of using military aircraft espionage tactics henceforth either by CIA, by NASA, by the Defense Establishment or by any other agency of the American Government?

Secretary GATES. Well, I wouldn't know quite how to answer your question, Senator, because maybe some of us that live so close to these things have a different understanding than the public has. It is so clear in my mind that the President has made a commitment not to fly these airplanes during his administration that I believe that the question becomes hypothetical, and I believe if it is clear to other people as it is to me that this is so, then it would be, I believe, stepping up to a threat. But if it is not clear, and I am incorrect in this, then I think we ought to take a look at it.

Senator MORSE. I am so anxious to see to it that we make it crystal clear because I am very much concerned about world reaction to our present position. I think we are living in the moment now where we can stop an adverse world reaction, and I think we are living in a moment where there is great danger that a substantial segment of world opinion is going to go against us, unless we are willing to make crystal clear that we are not going to, through any agency of our Government, resort to aircraft espionage, because we are dealing here when we are dealing with espionage, as you so very well, I think, described it yourself, with a form of activity that is a pretty ugly business.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And we all know that it isn't based on principles of truth. In espionage, you do what is necessary to protect your country, including deception and engaging in immoral acts. [Deleted.]

Now, I don't think we humble ourselves. To the contrary, I think we put them on the defensive in world opinion if we say to the world:

> Listen, we want the Russians to understand that they are going to have to assume full responsibility for any starting of a war. We have said and we repeat to the world that we have no intention of using aircraft in espionage work over foreign territory.

You think it is perfectly clear. I have just come from across the country and I can give you assurance that it isn't in my judgment clear in American public opinion today, and you have really got a segment of public opinion in this country that wants that assurance from the President, because they take note of the fact that in his speech the other night he wasn't even as definite as he was at Paris in regard to this matter.

NEED FOR ASSURANCE OF CESSATION OF AIRCRAFT ESPIONAGE

Secretary GATES. Senator, under the American tradition, I would say that the President says he isn't going to overfly Russia during his administration, any circumvention of that statement would not be in character with either the President or our country. To me, it is completely clear, but I respect your judgment.

Senator MORSE. I may be completely wrong. My only point is that we can afford, it seems to me, as a Nation that does seek peace, to reassure the world as many times as that when assurance might help the cause of peace, and in doing so I don't think we humble ourselves. To the contrary, I think we put Russia on the defensive. It will help us in my judgment to win the so-called battle of propaganda for peace and strengthen us in getting these issues into the United Nations.

Of course I would say this. I think the President is to be commended for making clear in Paris that he is suspending U–2 flights—that is what he said; U–2 flights.

I think he is to be commended for that, and I hope that those who seek to replace him will give the world assurance immediately that when any one of them is elected President that will be their policy, too, because if all this is a moratorium for a few months, it is not going to strengthen America's position in world opinion. They want to know whether or not this is going to be the policy of the United States, because, in my judgment, if you continue espionage work by way of aircraft, you are going to lose the world opinion in southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the opinion of which America has got to win in the decades ahead to survive, because if that part of the world goes against us, it is only a matter of a few decades before we will cease, in my judgment, being a Nation.

You have got to win to the cause of freedom those hundreds of millions of people, and you are not going to do it in my judgment if you let Khrushchev get by with a propaganda drive now that we are the ones that are committing a form of aggression by carrying out an espionage program. We don't like to face up to it but in my judgment that is going to be the verdict of those people.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Gore?

SECRETARY GATES' PARTICIPATION IN ISSUANCE OF STATEMENTS

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say that the decision on the 9th that the President should assume full responsibility was a unanimous decision. Did I correctly understand you?

Secretary GATES. The statement that was issued was a unanimous paper. I think I am answering you yes.

Senator GORE. I wanted to give you an opportunity to affirm that, and you so do now.

You did not participate, I believe you told me, or you told the committee, in any conference between the 5th and the 9th.

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator GORE. So you did not participate in a conference or in a communication between the Department of State, the President at Gettysburg, or otherwise, with anyone regarding the issuance of the statement which was issued on the 7th by Mr. Herter?

Secretary GATES. No, I did not.

Senator GORE. Which partially acknowledged the mission of the plane.

Secretary GATES. That is correct. I had no participation in that in any way.

Senator GORE. I believe that concludes my questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

KHRUSHCHEV'S ATTITUDE FOLLOWING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to explore a bit the course of conduct taken by Khrushchev after his visit to the United States, concerning his attitude especially on West Berlin and West Germany. Isn't it a fact that following his visit to the United States, there was shown

by him a conciliatory attitude for a period of about a month or two? Are you able to answer that?

Secretary GATES. My impression is about the same as yours, Senator, that there was sort of a tone of conciliation in the air.

Senator LAUSCHE. We have had before this committee the Antarctic Treaty that has been recommended.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. That was signed by the Soviet and by the United States.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that, I think, was last December 1. And there was progress made for a period on the matter of banning nuclear tests.

Secretary GATES. Yes: there was progress made.

Senator LAUSCHE. In fact, there was more progress made during that period than there had been at any other time on that subject.

Secretary GATES. I think that would be fair to say, that it looked more hopeful.

Senator LAUSCHE. On November 14 in a speech Khrushchev brutally attacked Adenauer and the German Republic.

Secretary GATES. I remember the speech.

Senator LAUSCHE. You remember that speech?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And there was some speculation in the minds of the people in our Government as to what his purpose was in making that attack when ostensibly there was to be a conference to reach some agreement on West Germany and Berlin.

Now then, on December 1, he began repeating his threats that he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Is it not a fact that his attack upon Adenauer and upon the German Republic and his purpose to sign a separate peace treaty, was confirmation of the immovable position he took before he met at Camp David about West Berlin and East Germany?

Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it was. I think his position was well advertised, and we felt in the Department of Defense that we were living under a threat of a separate peace treaty at that time.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then he has the Baku speech of April 25 in which he gave a harsher version of what he had been saying for months about East Berlin, West Berlin, and the German Republic. That is in April, pretty close to May 16, and then we have those circumstances in which you point out that he had a translated paper originally written in Russian into French translation so that he gave it to——

Secretary GATES. De Gaulle.

Senator LAUSCHE. De Gaulle. How did he present his paper to Macmillan?

Secretary GATES. My understanding, Senator, was that he didn't leave a paper with Macmillan. He talked from the same paper and it was translated through an interpreter to Macmillan verbally. This is my understanding.

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't it also a fact that during all of this time and especially in the several months preceding the conference, the supposed conference, the four powers stated that there would be no yielding on West Berlin, and our rights in West Berlin?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

KHRUSHCHEV'S SUMMIT CONFERENCE AIMS

Senator LAUSCHE. In your opinion, what was the primary thing that he was aiming for in the conference? I am speaking of Khrushchev.

Secretary GATES. You mean when he agreed to go to a summit conference?

Senator LAUSCHE. And down to the end.

Secretary GATES. I testified that I think he thought he would have his way and make some peace treaty in Berlin with some kind of give on the part of our allies and our allies refused to give.

REASONS FOR REVOKING INVITATION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. Now then, have you given any thought to why he revoked the invitation to the President to come to the Soviet land?

Secretary GATES. Well, again we speculate but in my opinion the last thing he wanted was for the President to travel around his country and be acclaimed and received by the population of Russia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you think that he had flashes in his mind about the acclaim that Nixon got in Poland, and in other places?

Secretary GATES. He probably did.

Senator LAUSCHE. And do you think that he kind of thought that there would be demonstrations for the President of the United States by the Russian people unparalleled anywhere?

Secretary GATES. I believe there would have been.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is my honest conviction, that he did not dare have the President meet the Ukrainian people and the normal Russian people, excluding the Communists, in that trip to the Soviet and that is why the invitation was revoked.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LAUSCHE. I yield.

POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ON KHRUSHCHEV'S THINKING

Senator WILEY. I think there are some other facts there that fit into the picture that you have very dramatically given us.

Do you remember after he came to America he went back and he canvassed individually the various heads of the various states, and then he made a trip out east and he met Mao Tse-tung?

It was after that that he made that Baku speech. He made several other speeches, and if you remember, the papers were pretty well filled with the thoughts that the Chinese Communists were telling him, and that at the time that he did go to Paris, that conditions were such that the evidence indicated the Chinese were in Russia. Now all this bolsters the conclusion that the Secretary has made, that it wasn't the U–2 incident. That was just something that he got hold of as an ostensible reason.

The other was that he couldn't get his way and that, I understand, is your position.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have nothing more to ask you. Thank you very much, Mr. Gates.

EFFECT OF DENIAL OF OPPORTUNITY FOR PRESIDENT TO VISIT SOVIET UNION

Senator GORE. If the Senator would yield, I would like to observe that I was in the Far East at the time President Eisenhower made his visit to India and other countries, and there was a tremendous favorable reception. It served the cause of our country magnificently well.

I think it is a great loss to us that the President has been denied the opportunity to visit in the Soviet Union. It would have, in my view, been a great contribution. He is unquestionably a great exemplary influence for America, and I agree with you, Senator Lausche and Senator Wiley, that the denial of the opportunity of this visit is a great loss to us.

I do not know whether Mr. Khrushchev wanted it or did not want it. Everyone can draw his own conclusions there.

I wish now that the exchange visit had been arranged before the summit conference. Perhaps we would have had a different result.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness would like to make a comment.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S DIGNITY AND CHARACTER AT PARIS MEETING

Secretary GATES. I want to make a comment I sort of feel like making, Mr. Chairman. I think you know about this because you were there. I think everyone should be terribly proud of the dignity and character of the President in this Paris meeting.

I happened to be sitting next to him and it was a most remarkable performance of strength of character and dignity of any man I have ever seen.

Senator GORE. You might be interested to know that I immediately took the floor and expressed such views, and I do not believe you will find any member of this committee has criticized the President's conduct while in Paris.

Secretary GATES. I am sure of that. The purpose of my remarks was not intended to do anything but just make a statement. I know he has had remarkable support of not only the Congress and this country, but of all of our allies too, the NATO meeting that followed the Paris meeting was a remarkable meeting.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, gentlemen?

Senator WILEY. I want to express what you usually do, the appreciation of the committee for the fine work of the Secretary here this morning.

Senator LAUSCHE. I did want to go into this speech of Senator Dodd where he points out how Communists took charge in the organizing of the meeting in New York of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. But I am not going to go into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your very frank and candid responses and for the patience that you have shown in bearing with the committee in asking these questions. I think you have made a very useful record for the benefit of the committee, and I think we understand what has gone on much better than we did before you came up here, and I hope that the record, as censored by the proper authorities, will not in any way embarrass you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary GATES. I hope not, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, before concluding the hearing I would wish to express to you my personal appreciation for the dignity, intelligence, and discretion and the courage you have displayed and statesmanship during the course of this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

CHALMERS ROBERTS' CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Senator GORE. Now I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the record a chronology of events which I found exceedingly well done by Mr. Chalmers Roberts.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The chronology referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, May 27, 1960]

CHRONOLOGY OF U–2 INCIDENT TRACED IN TANGLED WEB OF SUMMIT DISPUTE

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

Who was responsible for the incredible assortment of conflicting statements and contradictory assertions when the Eisenhower administration was confronted with the U–2 spy plane crisis?

This is the most immediate question in the tangled web of the U–2 affair and the subsequent collapse of the Summit Conference in Paris. What follows is a detailed examination of the facts about the Administration's handling of the U–2 case.

It should be noted beforehand, however, that there are other important parts to the whole story: The apparent public hardening of American policy toward the Soviet Union prior to the U–2 affair; Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's reaction to that hardening; Khrushchev's reactions to the American accounts of the U–2 case; and the internal Soviet pressures on Khrushchev, before and after the spy plane was downed, because of his year-old policy of trying to do business with President Eisenhower.

Whether or not Khrushchev would have scuttled the Summit, had there been no U–2 incident, is not now clear; there are divided opinions in the Administration on that. A good many diplomats do tend to agree with what President Eisenhower said to the congressional leaders yesterday—that Khrushchev may have scuttled the conference because he was under "pressure by the Stalinists," those in Moscow suspicious of any dealing with the West, "and the Chinese" Communists who have openly disagreed with Khrushchev's policies.

But that question is only indirectly related to the handling of the U–2 affair by the Eisenhower Administration.

The chief figures in the U–2 drama in Washington were President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, Central Intelligence Agency Chief Allen W. Dulles and White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty.

It is evident from the record that much of the confusion sprang from the fact that no one acted in supreme authority in directing the Administration's actions.

Here is the chronological record as far as it is known today:

May 1.—The U–2 flight of pilot Francis G. Powers took place on this date because of a clear weather forecast. That forecast also indicated that such good weather probably would not be repeated for some weeks; that is, until after the Summit Conference, then 2 weeks off. CIA officials say the equipment carried by Powers, including the tiny poison needle, is standard equipment carried by all Strategic Air Command crews. It is designed to help a crewman escape if downed in enemy territory. Powers never was ordered to use the needle to avoid capture; it was for use to avoid torture, if captured, according to CIA officials. The pistol was not for murdering Russians but for shooting small game, it is contended.

Second flight

The day of Powers' flight, there was a second U–2 flight from Turkey. This was a meteorological flight outside the Soviet Union, the kind of flight the National Aeronautics and Space Administration unwittingly thought all U–2's were making. NASA was, of course, the "cover" for the clandestine flights over the Soviet Union.

These penetrations of Soviet air space had been going on for four years with results highly gratifying to American intelligence officials. There had been a great many of these flights and the Powers mission was not the first designed to cross the Soviet Union. Others had succeeded when he failed.

So detailed were the protographs brought back by the U–2s that at one time the State Department's Policy Planning Staff considered a proposal to show them to Khrushchev. The idea was to use them in an effort to break down his resistance to inspection and control for various disarmament schemes.

The proposal was rejected, however, partially on the grounds that Khrushchev already knew of the flights and that such a move might lead him to make such a public row that they would have to be discontinued.

Cutoff planned

CIA officials contend that there was to be a cutoff of U–2 flights before the Summit, that the question was how much time constituted a margin of safety. Nevertheless, the Powers mission was permitted to take place two weeks before the Summit. In his speech on Wednesday the President implied he fully approved of that.

Mr. Eisenhower said that, as to complaints over the timing of the flights so close to the Summit, "there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed." By implication, he meant there was no reason to cancel the flight because of the impending conference with the Russians.

However, this has not always been the President's policy. In September, 1956, in the midst of the Suez crisis negotiations with the Russians as well as the Egyptians—the President did order a halt to the U–2 flights. Then he apparently wanted to avoid an incident which would make negotiation more difficult.

There is no evidence, however, that the President was aware beforehand of this particular flight or that either the State Department or the CIA thought his specific approval necessary. He had delegated authority for the flights, once having approved the entire U–2 scheme following Soviet rejection of his "open skies" plan at the 1955 Geneva Summit conference.

May 1–4.—During this period the CIA and the State Department knew that Powers was missing; they hoped he had crashed and that pilot and plane had left no tell-tale evidence. The initial confusion over the missing plane, as to whether it was Powers or the legitimate meteorological flight in Turkey the same day, was soon cleared up. There is no evidence that the Administration laid out any plan of how to handle the possible disclosures later made by Khrushchev.

May have been misled

The Administration may have been misled into thinking Khrushchev would remain silent because of Soviet action over the expected visit to the United States of the boss of the Soviet Air Force, Air Marshal K. A. Vershinin.

On May 2 the Soviets asked for a 48-hour postponement of the announcement of the visit. But on May 4 they agreed to a joint United States-Soviet announcement and it was made that day. The visit was canceled on May 13 after Khrushchev's U–2 disclosure.

On May 3 it was announced from Istanbul, Turkey that a single-engine Air Force plane was missing near Lake Van, not far from the Soviet border. It was described as a high altitude research plane belonging to NASA.

The report said the plane was one of two which had taken off from the United States base at Incirlik near Adana, Turkey, on a weather reconnaissance mission. The other plane returned safely but the pilot of the missing craft was said to have reported his oxygen equipment was out of order.

Standard story

This was the standard sort of "cover" story for the missing U–2, issued in the hopes that it would suffice. It was not known here whether Powers' U–2 went down or why. To this date, in fact, there is only Khrushchev's word that it was downed near Sverdlovsk, deep inside the Soviet Union.

May 5.—Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow the bare details of the U–2 flight, deliberately (he said later) withholding information

which would have let Washington know that Powers was alive and that much of his equipment had been captured intact. He set a trap into which the Eisenhower Administration fell.

In his Wednesday speech, Mr. Eisenhower contended that the "covering statement," as he called it, was imperative "to protect the pilot, his mission, and our intelligence processes at a time when the true facts were still undetermined."

On May 5 Secretary Herter was in Athens, en route home from a NATO foreign ministers conference in Turkey. In charge of the State Department was Under Secretary Dillon.

Dillon's responsibility

Under the President's delegation of authority, it was Dillon's responsibility for what next occurred until Herter's return late on May 6. It was on May 5 and 6 that the administration allowed itself to be entangled in a series of lies about the U–2.

When newsmen went to Press Secretary Hagerty for comment on Khrushchev's speech, Hagerty was careful to say only that the President did not know of the news story about the speech.

News of the speech arrived here just after the President had left by helicopter for a National Security Council meeting at a secret hideout, part of a civil defense exercise. There is no evidence on whether the President at that meeting discussed what to do about the Khrushchev disclosure. The subsequent record indicates that he left it to Dillon and the State Department.

State Department spokesman Lincoln White, who received his instructions personally from Dillon, said that "it may be" that the plane Khrushchev referred to was the missing so-called NASA aircraft. It was also announced that the President had ordered an immediate inquiry into Khrushchev's accusation.

Trouble compounded

This semi-lie was aggravated by NASA's press chief, Walter T. Bonney. Unaware that NASA was being used as a "cover" for the spy flights, Bonney said at a press conference that the plane was on a wholly peaceful mission. He gave details of the plane's Adana take-off, its route within Turkey and the pilot's alleged report of his oxygen trouble. The Administration's story thus was that a peaceful flight outside Soviet borders might have by accident transgressed the Soviet-Turkish border.

There is no evidence that the President or Dillon, or anyone else in authority in the Administration, took charge of the whole affair and told NASA to say nothing. There have been subsequent hints from the White House, however, that some such order went out to NASA but was overlooked or disregarded. The record here is not clear.

May 6.—In Moscow it was claimed the U–2 was shot down by a rocket on Khrushchev's personal order, but other details still were withheld. However, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko termed the American explanation "nonsense."

"Full facts" asked

The State Department said it was asking the "full facts" in Moscow. White, still acting under Dillon's orders, declared that "there was absolutely no—n-o—deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet airspace." The lie thus was compounded.

Around dinner time Herter arrived home from Greece to take charge of the State Department.

The strongest evidence that the handling of the U–2 affair was left by the President to the State Department—first to Dillon, then to Herter—comes from Vice President Richard M. Nixon. On a May 15 television show Nixon gave this explanation, putting part of the blame for the fumbling on the insistent demand of newsmen for the facts:

"Now, let's look at the problem with which our people in the State Department were confronted when this information developed. They did not know at the outset what the Soviet Union knew. They did not know that the pilot had been recovered and that they had obtained information from him or otherwise which made it imperative we acknowledge that these flights had taken place.

Alternative question

"Now, some would say then, 'well, why then didn't we keep our mouths shut and say nothing and wait until we found out what they knew?'

"And here again we have the problem of the open society. We have newsmen in Washington. The newsmen descended upon the State Department and other

officials in great numbers. They had a right to. And they asked for the information. What about this? And, so under the circumstances, it was felt that the best thing to do was to engage in effect in what usually is engaged in where so-called espionage activities are undertaken, evasive actions—evasive actions, so as to protect the pilot in the event that he had been captured and also evasive actions so as to give the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, for example, an opportunity to accept the consequences of this flight without admitting as he has had to admit that it had been conducted for espionage purposes."

Later in the same program Nixon added that "they had to make a snap decision at the moment and it proved that—it turned out that that decision was wrong and in these kinds of activities, we, of course, want to try to avoid mistakes if we can."

References missing

Nowhere in the three-and-a-half-hour television program did Nixon refer to any presidential direction in the U–2 crisis, other than his approval of the flights some years earlier. Nor was their any reference to his own part in the affair. Nixon, of course, sits in the National Security Council.

Nixon did say that he was "privy" to the U–2 reconnaissance policy "and I do endorse it." He also said that "I knew about this flight * * *."

On Friday afternoon, May 6, the President went to his Gettysburg, Pa., farm for a weekend of rest and golf. He did not return to Washington until Sunday, May 8 but he was in telephone communication with Herter during the weekend. Hagerty, who accompanied the President to Gettysburg, also talked by phone to Herter.

May 7.—Khrushchev, in a second Moscow speech on the U–2, disclosed the pilot was alive and talking and that much of his equipment had been captured intact. Khrushchev showed the Supreme Soviet photos taken from the U–2 of Soviet military installations and he detailed the plane's equipment.

Genuine information

American officials, who received the speech in the morning, Washington time, knew Khrushchev was using information that was genuine and that some of it could have come only from Powers himself.

Khrushchev quoted Hagerty as saying that "the President, in his opinion, knew nothing about the incident involving the American plane. I fully admit (said Khrushchev) that the President did not know that a plane was sent beyond the Soviet frontier and did not return."

The Khrushchev speech resulted in a series of all-day conferences in which the chief figures were Herter, Dillon, Allen Dulles and a number of lesser State Department officials, including Herter's adviser on Soviet affairs, Charles E. Bohlen.

Out of this came a unanimous decision to tell the truth—but not all the truth. The dinner-hour State Department statement said that the flight referred to by Khrushchev "was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U–2 plane * * *."

Flight justified

The flight was justified on the grounds of the need "to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain" to lessen the dangers of a surprise attack on the free world in general and the United States in particular.

On the critical issue of who was responsible for the flight, however, the statement lied. It said that "as a result of the inquiry ordered by the President it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Mr. Khrushchev."

In making this statement, chiefly the decision of Secretary Herter, those involved were guided by a number of considerations. They felt that Khrushchev had the evidence and therefore an admission was essential despite the earlier lies. But they were trapped in a dilemma on the issue of responsibility. They decided it was best to avoid admitting any responsibility by President Eisenhower even at the cost of accepting the resultant impression that Washington's control was so lax that American pilots around the world could go off on their own on a mission that might provoke a war.

Dulles willing

During the State Department deliberations Allen Dulles made it clear that he, as head of CIA, was prepared to take full responsibility for the flight, that if the

Administration wanted to pin the blame on him to avoid blaming the President, he would agree. But this idea was not accepted as being practical in view of Khrushchev's disclosures.

Herter read the draft statement on the phone to the President in Gettysburg. He approved it without changing a word.

In part, at least, Herter's decision to tell the lie that no one in Washington authorized the flight also was based in the slim hope that somehow Khrushchev would accept it. The Secretary and his aides had noted Khrushchev's acceptance of what he had taken as Hagerty's disclaimer of any Eisenhower responsibility.

May 8—While the world assessed the seemingly incredible American admission that the U–2 had indeed been on an espionage flight, President Eisenhower returned to Washington and met with Herter at the White House.

Notes to Britain, France

The same day Khrushchev sent notes to Britain and France about the forthcoming summit conference. In them he complained about the U–2 but gave no indication it would be used to wreck the conference as was to be the case.

By now Hagerty was alarmed at the implications of the admission statement, implications that the President did not know what was going on. He was insistent to Herter that this should somehow be eliminated. It is not clear whether the President said the same thing to Herter directly but if he did there would seem to have been no reason for Hagerty to do so.

May 9—After another State Department conference, Herter put out a statement in his name saying that "penetration" by the U–2s of the Soviet Union had been going on for four years, that this had been done by presidential orders "since the beginning of his Administration" in order to gather intelligence. But Herter added that "specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to presidential authorization." This, at last, appeared to be the truth.

Unaware of implication

This was the statement which left the implication that such U–2 flights would be continued over the Soviet Union. But there is reason to believe that none of those involved at State Department was conscious of any such implication when they drafted the statement. They took the view, shared by the CIA, that the U–2 setup now was "a blown agent" to be discarded, that other intelligence gathering methods would continue, however.

Nonetheless the implication was there and neither State nor the White House did anything to correct it until the President himself told Khrushchev in Paris a full week later that "these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed."

The President said Wednesday he wanted no public announcement until he met Khrushchev in Paris. American officials also claimed the flight suspension was ordered the previous Thursday, May 12, which is at cross-purposes with the claim that no implication of further flights was contained in Herter's May 9 statement.

Nixon unaware

Indeed, Nixon in his May 15 television appearance seemed unaware that the flights had been cancelled. He then said:

"The first responsibility of the President of the United States * * * is to protect the security of this country and of free peoples everywhere from the devastation that would result from a surprise attack. Now, that is why these flights were made in the first place. That is why an indication has been made that such activities may have to continue in the future * * *"

Herter and Dulles appeared on May 9 before a specially arranged closed-door Congressional leadership meeting. To at least some of those present Herter left the clear implication that the flights would continue.

May 10.—The Soviet news agency, Tass, described Herter's statement as "a frank attempt to legalize and justify violation of the state frontiers of other nations for espionage purposes." A Soviet note to the United States avoided blaming President Eisenhower personally but, in referring to the May 7 statement by State, said it did "not correspond to reality." It charged that the U–2 flights "are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the United States of America."

Welcome doubted

May 11.—At an exhibition in Moscow of the U–2 wreckage and equipment, Khrushchev said Herter's May 9 statement made him doubt "Our earlier conclusion" that the President himself did not know of the flights. He said he doubted the President would be welcome in Russia during his scheduled June visit there.

When asked whether the U–2 incident would come up at the Summit Conference, Khrushchev replied: "It is already the subject of worldwide discussion. Therefore I believe there is no need to put it on the discussion schedule at the Summit Conference."

The same day at his press conference here President Eisenhower took full responsibility for the U–2 flights, said nothing to counter the implication that they would continue, remarked that "no one wants another Pearl Harbor."

May 12–14.—During this period Khrushchev went to Paris a day early, arriving on Saturday, May 14. Herter arrived on May 13 but there was no United States-Soviet contact. On the 13th the Soviet Union sent protest notes to Norway, Pakistan and Turkey warning against further use of their territory for such missions as those of the U–2 which Khrushchev had claimed took off from Pakistan with the expectation of landing in Norway.

On the 12th the United States sent a note to Moscow which said the United States had "fully stated its position" about the U–2 incident in the May 9 Herter statement.

By now President Eisenhower's responsibility for the U–2 flights, if not for the specific Powers mission, had been firmly established on the public record.

May 15.—The President arrived in Paris just before Khrushchev's call on French President de Gaulle. The President considered two possible moves in this final day before the Summit Conference was to open: To ask for a bilateral meeting with Khrushchev and to announce publicly that no more flights would be made.

But the President decided against either step. He did so chiefly on the basis of de Gaulle's report of the hard stand taken by Khrushchev in their talk that morning. His aides told him they deduced from Khrushchev's words with de Gaulle that the Soviet leader had come to Paris bound by a prior Moscow decision by the ruling Presidium, that he therefore could not be swayed by either suggested Eisenhower move.

Allen statement

On this same day in Washington George V. Allen, chief of the U. S. Information Agency, said on a television show that Herter "has not said that we are going to continue to fly" U–2 missions, that "he hasn't said one way or another." This statement surprised State Department officials who now say Allen was talking entirely on his own, that he had consulted nobody in advance.

May 16.—At the only Paris confrontation between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev, the Soviet leader said the United States had "torpedoed" the conference. He demanded that the President apologize for the flights, call off further flights and punish those responsible for Powers' mission. These were the same demands of which he had informed de Gaulle the day before. He charged the President with making "treachery" the basis of his policy toward the Soviet Union.

To this the President responded by terming Khrushchev's demands an "ultimatum" which "would never be acceptable to the United States." He also told Khrushchev that U–2 flights had been suspended and would not be resumed. The two men parted in anger. The Summit had collapsed before it had begun.

SPEECH OF SENATOR DODD

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to put into the record a copy of Senator Dodd's speech describing how this meeting in New York, on the phase sponsored by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy but organized by Communists, was conducted.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The speech referred to follows:)

[From the Congressional Record, May 25, 1960, pp. 10234–10237]

THE COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN MOVEMENT

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in his statement of January 22, J. Edgar Hoover warned that Nikita Khrushchev's visit to this country had resulted in the reinvigoration of the American Communist movement and that the FBI was receiving increasing evidence of stepped-up Communist activities at many points.

Among other things, Mr. Hoover warned that non-Communist organizations dedicated to causes that command popular support could expect Communist efforts to infiltrate their ranks.

Evidence that has come into the hands of the Subcommittee on Internal Security indicates that the Communist Party has made the nuclear test ban movement the chief target of its infiltration operations. I think it important that this evidence be placed before Congress and before the public so that we may have a better understanding of the methods by which the Communists operate and of the goals they seek to achieve. I should like to detail to you some of the evidence of this infiltration, and to suggest the outline of a self-defense program for all organizations whose purposes make them particularly vulnerable to Communist infiltration.

I do not accept the thesis that if one happens to hold a position that enjoys the support of the Communist Party on any issue, one is, ipso facto, either a pro-Communist or a fellow traveler. The Communists are opposed to the poll tax: does that make all people who oppose the poll tax Communists? The Communists support the Forand bill. Does that make the many millions of Americans who have endorsed the bill Communist sympathizers? Obviously not. But on a foreign policy issue of overriding importance like the test ban, if a legitimate organization adheres to a policy which coincides with Communist policy, then it must be prepared to expect a concerted effort at infiltration by the Communist termites. The more urgent the issue, the more respectable the organization, the more illustrious the names on its letterhead, the greater the temptation from the Communist standpoint.

The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy is headed by a group of nationally prominent citizens about whose integrity and good faith there is no question. Among them are people like Norman Cousins, of the Saturday Review, Mr. Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee, Mr. Norman Thomas, and so forth. They advocate a point of view which some of us consider unrealistic or utopian, but it is, nevertheless, a significant point of view on an issue of life and death importance. For the personal motivations of most of those associated with the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy I have the most sincere respect. The point of view they represent deserves a hearing—indeed, it must be heard.

Last Thursday evening, May 19, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy held a rally at Madison Square Garden in New York City. Many eminent persons attended this rally. The speakers included Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Mr. Alfred Landon, Mr. Walter Reuther, Gov. G. Mennen Williams, of Michigan, and Dr. Harold Taylor, former President of Sarah Lawrence College. At this meeting, the speakers urged that another summit meeting be convened for the purpose of attempting to arrive at an agreement banning nuclear tests.

Because I esteem the sincerity of the original founders of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and the sincerity of the speakers I have named, it was for me an unpleasant duty to have to notify them that the unpublicized chief organizer of the Madison Square Garden rally, Henry Alroms, was a veteran member of the Communist Party; that there was also evidence of serious Communist infiltration at chapter level throughout the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy; that the Communist Party and its front organizations had done their utmost to promote the meeting; that the Communists provided much of the organizing machinery for the meeting because they planned to use it as a pressure instrument in support of Soviet nuclear diplomacy.

This information was confirmed by the Subcommittee on Internal Security only several days before the Madison Square Garden meeting was scheduled to take place. Because I wished to be fair to all the decent and prominent people who were associated with the meeting as sponsors or as speakers, I had some doubt about the advisability of rushing into print with my information only

48 hours in advance of the rally. Instead, I decided to comunicate the information, or at least certain essential portions of it, to Mr. Norman Cousins, the chairman of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Mr. Cousins came to Washington to see me and we had a long and frank discussion about the problem.

The directors of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, it turned out, had some inkling of the existence of a Communist infiltration and were extremely unhappy about it. When the Communist affiliations of the chief organizer of the Madison Square Garden meeting were brought to Mr. Cousins' attention, he immediately suspended the organizer in question. This was 2 days before the meeting. It is my understanding that the national committee of the organization intends to take some further measures against Communist infiltrators.

If I have any criticism to make, it is that the directors of the organization have moved so slowly to confront the problem and that the measures they have taken have been inadequate. I was, for example, surprised to discover that one of the officers of the committee, Mr. Norman Thomas, had, as early as last January, expressed serious suspicion about the individual who later became organizer of the Madison Square Garden meeting—but that no action had been taken on Mr. Thomas' warning.

To me it is appalling that the Communists should be able to infiltrate and manipulate a movement founded on sincere humanitarian and pacifist motivations, and headed by so many reputable citizens. Perhaps this is a situation in which remedial legislation is indicated, a situation in which private citizens must have the assistance of Government to cope effectively with a movement that operates by stealth and by secrecy.

In accordance with the subcommittee's mandate from the Senate, it was clear that our duty required that we do everything in our power to get at the facts. In presenting the information we have gleaned to the Senate, it is my hope that I will be able to do so in a manner that will avoid injury to the innocent and will point the way to a constructive course of action by Government and private organizations.

The test ban has for several years now been the chief objective of the Communist propaganda apparatus. Of this there is ample documentary evidence.

In his speech before the congress of the Soviet Communist Party on January 27, Nikita Khrushchev, in his most militant rhetoric, called for a permanent ban on nuclear tests.

The main political resolution adopted by the 17th congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., in February 1960 said:

"The demand that the administration end nuclear testing and ban the H-bomb has found a widening response in community meetings, peace talks, petitions, and sermons from the pulpit."

On February 16, 1960, seven Communists foreign language newspapers took a full-page advertisement in the New York Times and called on the President—

"1. To proclaim the achievement of total, universal, and controlled disarmament as the goal of National U.S. policy.

"2. To restore the moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons and to do everything in your power to insure early agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests.

"3. To oppose the sharing of nuclear warheads with NATO allies."

The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has not solicited the praise of the Communist movement, and most of its leaders, I am certain, would be much happier if they received no plaudits from Communist sources. The fact, nevertheless, remains that the committee in recent years has been the recipient of consistent and generous praise from the Communist press. The Communist organ, New World Review, for April of this year, for example, carried these paragraphs under the caption "Peace Groups in the United States":

"No amount of conspiratorial silence can wipe out the forces for disarmament and peace; but it can leave them isolated from each other and ignorant of the efforts their fellows are making.

"It is our purpose to bring to our readers' attention the main groups in our country working toward these ends, beginning in this issue * * * with a description of the main nonsectarian national organization.

"NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A SANE NUCLEAR POLICY

"SANE offers a wide choice of channels for expression of the American people's desire for a world without war. Under the co-chairmanship of Norman

Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, and Clarence Pickett, executive secretary emeritus of the American Friends Service Committee, and with the sponsorship and support of many noted Americans, SANE provides an elastic organization and comprehensive program through which ordinary people can be effective.

"Local committees of SANE exist in many cities, towns, counties, and small communities throughout the United States. Their membership policy is flexible and they generally welcome additions to their forces, whether for one particular campaign or on a long-term basis."

Mr. President, to anyone who is familiar with the language of communism, the paragraphs I have just quoted constitute a clear directive to members of the Communist Party to enter into the ranks of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. These paragraphs, I might point out, were not the haphazard product of a novice or intellectual dilettante. They were written by the editor of the magazine, Jessica Smith, a hardened oldtime Communist.

As for the Madison Square Garden meeting, the Communist organ, the Worker, in a series of its own advertisements, called upon all the Communists faithful to turn out in strength. The masthead of the Worker for May 15 carried a banner headline "For Sanity in Foreign Policy—All Out to Madison Square Garden, Thursday, 7:45 p.m."

Given this background, it was only natural to anticipate that the Communists would attempt to find their way into the organizing mechanism of the meeting.

The name of the Communist Party member who served as chief organizer of the Madison Square Garden meeting is Henry H. Abrams. As I have pointed out, Mr. Norman Cousins suspended Mr. Abrams several days before the meeting, when I brought the matter to his attention. Until the date of his suspension, however, Mr. Abrams devoted virtually full time to the organization of the meeting for many weeks. He did so, moreover, without remuneration.

On March 16, 1960, Mr. Abrams attended a meeting of the executive committee of the Greater New York committee of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Let me read just two sentences from the minutes of that meeting, which clearly illustrates the central role this Communist agent has played:

"Dr. Lear reported that Gov. G. Mennen Williams has accepted our invitation to speak at Madison Square Garden. Henry Abrams then gave the rest of the Madison Square Garden report."

Henry Abrams' residence at 11 Riverside Drive, New York City, and his telephone number of Trafalgar 4-7769, is the address and telephone number used by the headquarters of the Upper Manhattan Sane Nuclear Policy Committee. Abrams has served as an accountant for both the Upper Manhattan Committee and the Greater New York Committee of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. From these facts it emerges that his association with the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy was a long and fairly prominent one.

Now let us look at Henry Abrams' Communist record.

In 1939, he resided at 972 East 14th Street, Brooklyn, N.Y. In that year he signed a Communist Party nominating petition from that address which appeared on page 4091 of the election records.

He was a member of the 11th Assembly District Club of the Communist Party which met at 2744 Broadway, New York City. On Tuesday, February 15, 1944, it was announced at a meeting of this Communist club that Henry Abrams would give a class for Communists on the preparation of income tax forms.

Henry Abrams was a member of the Young Communist League and later of the upper West Side section of the Communist Party of New York City. He has been a consistent financial contributor to the Communist Party, U.S.A.

As recently as September 28, 1958, the official Communist Party newspaper, the Worker, printed a letter from Henry Abrams endorsing the candidacy of Benjamin Davis for State senator in the 21st senatorial district of New York City. Benjamin Davis is national secretary of the Communist Party, and is, in fact, one of the most notorious of native Communists, a fact which is well known to most Americans. He was one of the leading members of the party convicted in the famous Foley Square Smith Act trials of a dozen years ago. He spent several years in jail for advocating the overthrow of the U.S. Government by force and violence.

Mr. Abrams has served as an accountant for the American Communist Party, for the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, and for the late Congressman Vito Marcantonio.

Abrams has carried out Communist policies in many ostensibly non-Communist organizations which have, in fact, served as fronts for the Communist

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Party. Among the organizations promoted by the Communists in which he has played an active role are the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, the Hiroshima Commemorative Committee, the National Committee of the American Forum for Socialist Education, the American Labor Party, the United Independent Socialist Conference Committee.

I state all these things as facts, Mr. President. On Friday, May 13, Henry Abrams was given the opportunity to deny them in a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. He invoked the fifth amendment in reply to all questions regarding his years' long record of service to the Communist conspiracy.

The obvious and declared purpose of the Madison Square Garden meeting was to influence American policy on the nuclear test ban. It is one thing when American citizens come together, in accordance with their rights, for the purpose of urging a specific policy on their Government. It is an altogether different thing when such a meeting is infiltrated by the Communists and when the chief organizing role falls into the hands of a member of the Communist Party, which, as we all know, is a quisling instrument of Soviet policy. Such a situation has an important bearing on American security, because it is axiomatic that all actions of the Communist Party are planned to subserve the ends of Soviet diplomacy.

Let me say here, parenthetically, that this is by no means the only occasion of Communist machinations in the field of nuclear policy. At a previous hearing, we established that Avrahm G. Mezerik, a man with a long Communist record, actually managed a so-called American Nobel Anniversary Forum and Dinner, held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City on January 11, 1958, which concentrated on the theme of an American ban on nuclear testing. It was brought out in this hearing that this gathering while managed by a Communist, was financed by a prominent American capitalist, who was unaware of Mezerik's Communist record.

With all this interest in the subject, the Internal Security Subcommittee summoned Mr. Abrams to appear and testify. Through his attorney, Leonard Boudin, of New York, Mr. Abrams pleaded illness, and asked to be excused from coming to Washington to testify. We then arranged to hear him in New York City. He showed up with a doctor's certificate that he was suffering from heart disease, and moved a further continuance on the ground that his condition was so serious that being questioned might cause him serious harm. Since the committee was aware that Mr. Abrams had continued right up to that day to carry a heavy load as the man in active charge of arrangements for the May 19 meeting at Madison Square Garden, we were not impressed by these claims.

We had a New York City Public Health Service doctor present, and asked Mr. Abrams if he would consent to be examined then and there. He refused, so we denied the request for a continuance and went ahead with the hearing, which was in executive session.

As I have indicated the hearing had been called in the hope that we could learn from Mr. Abrams the full story of Communist infiltration of and participation in this movement for a nuclear test ban, as a basis for determining what, if any, legislation may be indicated in this area.

The subcommittee has received evidence, much of it still of a classified nature, that Henry Abrams is not a lone infiltrator, that there exists in fact a serious Communist infiltration in the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.

What, specifically, are the Communists attempting to achieve by their infiltration of the test ban movement, including their recent all-out support of the Madison Square Garden meeting? The answer to this is, I believe, obvious.

The Communist purpose in supporting the test ban agitation and in going all out to make the Madison Square Garden meeting a success is to exert pressure on the administration to make still further concessions to the Soviet viewpoint in order to arrive at a test ban agreement; to create a climate of public opinion which will make it impossible for the administration to resume small underground tests, even though there may be every reason to believe that the Kremlin is conducting such tests; to enervate the free world so that it becomes incapable of responding with appropriate measures to challenges at Berlin and at other points.

In the test ban negotiations that are now going on there are major differences between the Soviet position and our own. These differences hinge around the question of inspection. In my own opinion, we have already conceded too

much, especially by agreeing in principle to a further voluntary moratorium on undetectable underground tests. But for those tests that are subject to detection, we still take the stand that here should be an inspection system based on an adequate number of fixed stations, with at least 20 or 30 onsite inspections per annum. The Kremlin wants a minimum of inspection. It wants as few stations as possible, and its spokesmen have indicated that they would not be willing to accept more than a few onsite inspections per annum.

The Kremlin apparently attached major importance to the Madison Square Garden meeting as a pressure operation in support of its nuclear objectives. This, I believe, is conclusively demonstrated by the generous and sympathetic coverage of the meeting in the Soviet press. I think this is interesting. According to an AP dispatch of May 21st, Pravda headlined its account of the meeting with the words "We Want To Live in Friendship With the Soviet Union," while the Izvestia headline read "Rebuff to Advocates of War."

I believe that the heads of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy have a serious contribution to make to the great debate on national policy. But they can only make this contribution effectively if they purge their ranks ruthlessly of Communist infiltration and if they clearly demarcate their own position from that of the Communists, first, by stressing the need for adequate inspection, second, by reiterating at every opportunity their opposition to the tyranny of communism

On the basis of the evidence that has come to me, I do not believe that the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has taken the necessary measures to create a climate that is inhospitable to Communist infiltration. At the Madison Square Garden rally, for example, there was much direct and inferential criticism of American policy, but, according to the press accounts and reports from private sources—persons who were present at the meeting—there was almost no criticism of Khrushchev or of his arrogant, insulting, gutter-level behavior in Paris. On the contrary, the speakers called for an immediate effort to renew the summit conference.

Let me digress briefly for a comment on this last proposal, which has, unfortunately, not been confined to the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Perhaps I am old-fashioned, but to me it seems that after the President of the United States has had to endure a barrage of the crudest insults ever leveled at a head of state, a petition to Khrushchev for another summit meeting would constitute a total abandonment of national dignity. The only conceivable political consequences of so craven an action would be to encourage Khrushchev to further arrogance and further demands.

As I have said, I have found no serious evidence that the Madison Square Garden meeting was organized and conducted in a manner which would have discouraged Communist participation. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Communists and their sympathizers turned out in force. Although no Gallup poll or breakdown was possible, I am convinced from reports that the Communists were responsible for a very substantial percentage of the overflow turnout. A number of well-known Communists, including Alexander Trachtenberg, a top party member, were observed in the audience. Outside the meeting, the Communists brazenly distributed literature in their own name.

If decent organizations like the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy wish to protect themselves against the danger of Communist infiltration, I cannot emphasize too strongly the need for an organizational climate that is openly inhospitable to Communists. This is a situation where a tepid declaration of devotion to democracy simply will not suffice, while a neutral silence is an open invitation to disaster.

I can think of other things that can and should be done by the directors of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and of other non-Communist organizations which must contend with the problem of Communist infiltration. At top level, control is relatively easy. One can more or less assume that the people who are elected to a board of directors or to a national committee have enjoyed public visibility over a period of years so that their records are known. At the local level, not even the FBI with all of its resources could offer a 100 percent guarantee against infiltration. However, I think it is possible for organizations to exercise a good deal of control by carefully examining the personal records and bona fides, first, of all those who volunteer to help establish local organizations; second, of those who are elected to office in local organizations; third, of all those assigned to organizing activities.

If any effort had been made to do these things, the Madison Square Garden situation might have been avoided. But for 25 years, Henry Abrams has been a Communist. Without looking up his record, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy allowed him to become the chief organizer of the rally in New York City. That was not taking the necessary precautionary measures.

I think it is not too much to ask that all such committees, which are headed by good people and made up of thousands of good people, ought to give consideration to the question whether Communists like Abrams are taking a part in the running of their meetings. Many of these committees have been doing good work. But it is little wonder that they become infiltrated by Communists if they do not take the pains and the time to ascertain who some of their people are, before they allow them to become officers or chief organizers of mass rallies.

I believe it is not too much to ask our fellow citizens who are organizing committees for the purpose of exerting influence on Congress--as they have every right to do—to make a preliminary, cursory check of the persons who are working in their organizations, especially before they hold such meetings.

This would not be an easy task. But there is much that can be done. It will not always be possible to obtain accurate personal information, because many Communists operate underground as secret party members. But in the case of a man like Abrams, who has a public record of membership, the facts should be available without too much effort.

Perhaps this is a situation in which private organizations can in some way be assisted by Government. This is a problem that the Subcommittee on Internal Security is at present exploring.

Mr. President, in closing my remarks, I wish to pay my personal tribute to Mr. Norman Cousins, the chairman of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, for the manner in which he has reacted to the revelations of the subcommittee. Mr. Cousins has been a neighbor and a friend of mine for many years. I have the highest regard for him. That is why I called him up and told him what I knew about Abrams. He was good enough to come to Washington to see me.

I said, "I don't want to release this material 24 hours before your meeting. You have your plans all made. But many innocent people will be present, and a number of them will be prominent people. Why haven't you checked on people like Abrams? Norman Thomas said in January that he was doubtful about the man's background. Here it is the middle of May, on the eve of your meeting, and you have not yet done anything."

Mr. Cousins was upset about the matter. He immediately suspended Abrams. Not only did he do this, but he told me he was glad we had informed him about Abrams. He offered to open the books of his organization to the subcommittee and to cooperate in every way to rid his organization of Communists.

I assure Mr. Cousins and other persons connected with his committee that the Subcommittee on Internal Security is ready to cooperate with them to help to prevent a repetition of the Madison Square Garden situation.

I think it is not too much to say that the subcommittee is desirous and willing to help any other organization to avoid infiltration by subterranean elements who are not there for any good purpose, and who are certainly not interested, as are the good people who make up the bulk of their membership, in the welfare of the United States.

I yield the floor.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.)

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS ON EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

1. PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS ON U.S. PLANE

[From the New York Times, May 6, 1960]

LONDON, *May 5 (Reuters)—Following, in translation, are excerpts from the section of Premier Khrushchev's address today referring to the shooting down of a United States plane Sunday, as broadcast from Moscow:*

On instructions of the Soviet Government, I am duty bound to report to you on aggressive acts directed in the last few weeks by the United States of America against the Soviet Union.

What form did these aggressive acts take? The United States sent its planes, which violated our state frontier and intruded into the airspace of the Soviet Union.

Its last but one aggressive act was perpetrated by the United States of America on April 9, 1960.

A United States plane intruded into the airspace of our country from the Afghanistan side. Of course, no man in his right senses can think and assume that this violation was done by Afghanistan, a country which is friendly with us.

We are convinced that this plane belonged to the United States of America and obviously was based somewhere on the territory of Turkey, Iran or Pakistan, which are linked with the U.S.A. by obligations under the aggressive CENTO bloc.

[Mr. Khrushchev said the Soviet Government decided against making a protest but ordered military commanders to act if another plane intruded.]

American military men apparently liked this impunity as it happened on April 9, and they decided to repeat the aggressive act.

INCIDENT ON MAY DAY

Selected for this was the most festive day for our people and the workers of the world—the day of May the First—the international holiday of fraternal solidarity of the working class.

That day, early in the morning, at 0536 hours, Moscow time, an American plane flew over our frontier and continued its flight into the interior of the Soviet land. A report on this aggressive act was immediately given to the Government by the Minister of Defense.

The Government had stated this: Since he realizes what he comes up against when intruding into a foreign territory, if he gets away with it he will attempt fresh provocations. Therefore, the plane must be shot down.

This task was fulfilled and the plane was shot down.

According to first information, it has transpired that the plane belongs to the United States of America although it bears no identification signs.

Now an expert commission is studying data that fell in our hands. It has been established that this plane that crossed the state frontier of the Soviet Union was coming either from Turkey, Iran or Pakistan.

After the study of all materials that are now at our disposal, the Soviet Government will lodge with the United States of America a strong protest and will warn it that if similar aggressive acts against our country continue, we reserve the right to respond to them with measures we shall find necessary in order to insure the safety of our country.

We shall also give the most serious warning to those countries that put their territories at the disposal of the United States of America for aggressive acts directed against our country.

The following conclusion comes to mind: Aggressive imperialist forces in the United States in recent times have been taking the most active measures to undermine the summit or at least to hinder any agreement that might be reached.

"WHO SENT THIS AIRCRAFT?"

The question then arises: Who sent this aircraft across the Soviet frontier? Was it the man who is Commander in Chief of the American armed forces who, as everyone knows, is the President? Or was this aggressive act carried out by Pentagon militarists? If such actions are taken by American military men on their own account, it must be of especial concern to world opinion.

Perhaps it was a result of the friendship that is now forming between the United States and Franco that the American militarists decided to act independently, as did the Spanish military junta, which rose up against the legal Spanish Government.

Thus, in the so-called free world, military dictators not seldom set up their regimes using the methods of Franco. But the peoples are beginning to understand where true freedom is and where there is tyranny.

Take, for instance, the events in South Korea. The head of the puppet Syngman Rhee regime, the best friend of the United States and the father of his country as someone or other called him in America, has now been overthrown by the people and is now a political corpse. And it was not the Communists who were behind these events; even American politicial leaders have had to admit.

The sufferings of the Korean people led them to rise up against the bestial yoke, and the peoples understand that it was not only a question of Syngman Rhee himself who was to blame but all those who supported him and hung him round the necks of the South Koreans.

It is no coincidence that the free world sees so many popular demonstrations demanding freedom.

Comrade Deputies, the impression is being formed that the aggressive actions newly undertaken by the United States against the Soviet Union are a foretaste of the summit meeting.

Are they taken in order to exert pressure on us and to attempt to frighten us with their military superiority in order to undermine our determination to work for easing tension, to eliminate the cold war and to put an end to the arms race?

All these missions are sent in order to prevent any agreement on vexing questions, for we cannot say that this aircraft was a harbinger of peace, that it was on a goodwill mission. No, it was a real bandit flight with aggressive intentions.

We can say to those gentlemen who sent the aircraft that if they think they can bend our knees and our backs by means of such pressure, this will have no effect on us. The Soviet Union has every means to give a rebuff to those who want to exert pressure in order to achieve a solution convenient to aggressors.

In the name of the Soviet Government let me express thanks to the men of the military units who carried out with honor the task laid on them in defending the frontiers of our motherland.

Comrades, the Soviet people and Government have always expressed their peaceful intentions and friendly feelings toward the United States, but in answer to this we have black ingratitude.

"FEELINGS OF INDIGNATION"

It is understood that this has aroused feelings of indignation against the activities of the American military men. But we must control this feeling and must be ruled not by our emotions, but by reason.

Government leaders interested in preserving peace must soberly consider the consequences of such actions and think what they might lead to.

Hitler's aircraft before the war used to intrude into our airspace. The Soviet Government would protest, but Hitler refused to pay attention and then attacked us. And where did that all end?

How do we assess the incursion of American aircraft—as a precursor of war or a foreshadow of attack, of the repetition of what Hitler did? The Soviet Government thinks that all the same there is no reason to draw such conclusions.

There is another relationship of power in the world, and in this the people's will to peace plays a great part and this is why we do not conclude that this is a prewar trial of strength or a reconnaissance made to try our nerves, preserve the atmosphere of the cold war so that the imperialists can continue to bind their people with taxation, to carry on the arms race, and to keep their people in a state of fear of war and to continue to impose their will.

The Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions, we do not want the cold war, we want disarmament and our proposals made to the United Nations on this subject remain in force still. Once again, we repeat that disarmament is the right way to preserve peace and in such conditions no country would be able unilaterally to arm and attack another. The Soviet Government once again calls on the Government of the United States to end the cold war. All states must act peaceably so that calm, peace and happiness can prevail.

2. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS RELEASE, MAY 5, 1960

[No. 509–60]

For the Press:

The U.S. Air Force confirmed on May 3, 1960, that a NASA U–2 aircraft is missing in Turkey. It was on a weather mission originating at Adana, Turkey. Purpose was a study of clear air turbulence. During the flight in SE Turkey the pilot reported oxygen difficulty. Last word heard at 9 a.m. 1st of May, Turkish time (3 a.m. 1 May e.d.t.) over emergency frequency. U–2 aircraft did not land at Adana as planned and could only be assumed down. A search effort is underway in Lake Van area.

The missing U–2 is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration aircraft. The pilot is an employee of Lockheed Aircraft Corp., under contract to NASA.

The U–2 program was initiated in 1955 to perform high altitude weather research.

The flight was a joint NASA/AF Air Weather Service Mission.

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3. EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS BRIEFING, MAY 5, 1960

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MR. WHITE. Now, the Department has been informed by NASA that as announced May 3 an unarmed plane, a U–2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian has been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having a failure in the oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

That is the end of the statement.

Q. What was the plane doing, weather reconnaissance?

A. NASA is briefing reporters on the full details of that.

Q. When you say you are taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, do you mean you are asking for information on the pilot, or making a protest about the plane?

A. This matter is being taken up with the Soviet Government, John (Hightower), through our Ambassador in Moscow.

Q. Yes, but it is a protest or an inquiry?

A. I can't say just what form it will take at this stage, I would think, initially, an inquiry.

Q. Is this the report which the White House announced would be made?

A. That is correct.

Q. You say it may be that this was the missing plane?

A. Yes.

Q. There are other planes missing or——
A. Not that I am aware of.
Q. Unaccounted for?
A. No, not that I am aware of.
Q. You say this plane was from Adana, Turkey. Is that the U.S. Air Force Base down there?
A. As I say, you better get this information from NASA. (See NASA Press Release No. 60–193.)
Q. Khrushchev also said an American plane violated the Soviet frontier by flying over the Afghan border on April 9. Do you have anything on that?
A. We have absolutely no—N-O—information on that at all.
Q. Wasn't this plane accompanied by another plane of the same type when it started out on the reconnaissance flight?
A. I am not aware of that, if that is a fact, but I assume NASA can give you that information, Paul (Ward). I have nothing on it.
Q. Link, the area where this plane disappeared is the same as the other plane——
A. This is the Lake Van area.
Q. Is that the same area where the earlier plane disappeared in 1958?
A. In the neighborhood of it.
Q. Link, how do you know the plane was having difficulty?
A. He reported it.
Q. He reported it by radio?
A. That is right.
Q. At the time did he give his position?
A. In the Lake Van area.
Q. Was his course such at that time that if continued it might have taken him over the Soviet Union?
A. John (Hightower), I don't have those details.
Q. Was that the last communication from him, Link?
A. So far as I know.
Q. What was the question?
A. The question was, was that the last communication from the pilot, and to my knowledge it was.
Q. Is the the name of this pilot being released by somebody?
A. Here I would like to go off the record. * * *
Q. Link, has any protest been received from the Soviet Government?
A. No, sir, it has not.
Q. Link, do you have any comment on the rest of Khrushchev's speech, his statement that the Summit looks gloomy now because of his aggressive American action?
A. No.
Q. Is this the first indication we had in Khrushchev's speech that the plane had been shot down? There was no previous communication from the Soviets?
A. Nothing prior to this.
Q. Thank you, very much.
A. Yes, sir.

4. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION NEWS RELEASE, MAY 5, 1960

[NASA Release No. 60–193]

Memo to the Press:

One of NASA's U–2 research airplanes, in use since 1956 in a continuing program to study gust-meteorological conditions found at high altitude, has been missing since about 9 o'clock Sunday morning (local time), when its pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area.

The airplane had taken off from Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The flight plan called for the first check point to be at 37 degrees, 25 minutes, North: 41 degrees, 23 minutes, East, and for a left turn to be made to the Lake Van beacon, thence to the Trabazon beacon, thence to Antalya, and return to Adana. The flight scheduled was estimated at 3 hours, 45 minutes, for a total of 1,400 nautical miles. Takeoff was at 8 a.m. local time.

(The above-given times are the equivalent of 3 a.m. Sunday, and 2 a.m., eastern daylight time.)

About 1 hour after takeoff, the pilot reported difficulties with his oxygen equipment. Using emergency radio frequency, he reported he was heading for the Lake Van beacon to get his bearings, and that he would return to Adana.

As indicated above, his flight plan called for him to make a left turn at the Lake Van beacon. His last report indicated he was attempting to receive that beacon. It is believed he probably was on a northeasterly course, but there was no further word.

An aerial search was begun soon after receipt of the last communication. The Lake Van area is mountainous and very rugged. No evidence has been sighted of the aircraft having crashed.

If the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the airplane from the last reported position would be impossible to determine. If the airplane was on automatic pilot, it is likely it would have continued along its northeasterly course.

The pilot, as are all pilots used on NASA's program of upper atmosphere research with the U–2 airplane, is a civilian employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp., builders of the airplane.

When the research program was begun in 1956 by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (predecessor to NASA), the Federal agency did not have a sufficient number of pilots to operate the program, and so a contract was made with Lockheed to provide the pilots.

Overseas logistic support for NASA's continuing use of the U–2 is provided by Air Weather Service units of the USAF.

NASA has procured a total of 10 U–2 airplanes. The airplane was originally built as a private venture by Lockheed to serve as a "flying test bed." It is powered by a single Pratt & Whitney J–57 turbojet engine, and can maintain flight for as long as 4 hours at altitudes of up to 55,000 feet.

Since inception of the research program in 1956, the U–2 flying weather laboratories have operated from bases in California, New York, Alaska, England, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.

The U–2 airplanes are presently being used in California (Edwards AFB, one), Japan (Atsugi, three) and Turkey (Adana, four).

The instrumentation carried by the U–2 permits obtaining more precise information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, the jet stream, and such widespread weather patterns as typhoons. The airplane also has been used by NASA to obtain information about cosmic rays, and the concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere, including ozone and water vapor.

Instrumentation carried includes: Angular velocity recorder, to measure the airplane's rate of pitch; modified VGH recorder, to measure and record head-on gust components in flight; flight recorder Model BB, continuous recorder of indicated airspeed, pressure altitude and normal acceleration; airspeed and altitude transducer to measure pressure altitude and indicated airspeed; temperature and humidity measuring set AN/AMQ 7, to measure indicated free air temperature and indicated relative humidity; and vortex thermometer system, to measure true free-air temperature within one-half degree centigrade at high speeds.

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5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASE, MAY 6, 1960

[No. 249]

The following is the text of a note delivered today by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

The Embassy of the United States of America by instruction of its Government has the honor to state the following:

The United States Government has noted the statement of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, N. S. Khrushchev, in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5 that a foreign aircraft crossed the border of the Soviet Union on May 1 and that on orders of the Soviet Government, this aircraft was shot down. In this same statement it was said that investigation showed that it was a United States plane.

As already announced on May 3, a United States National Aeronautical Space Agency unarmed weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, and piloted by a civilian American has been missing since May 1. The name of the American civilian pilot is Francis Gary Powers, born on August 17, 1929, at Jenkins, Kentucky.

In the light of the above the United States Government requests the Soviet Government to provide it with full facts of the Soviet investigation of this incident and to inform it of the fate of the pilot.

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6. EXCERPTS FROM PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS ON U.S. PLANE INCIDENT, MAY 7, 1960

[From the New York Times, May 8, 1960]

Following are excerpts from the concluding speech to the meeting of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow yesterday by Premier Khrushchev, as provided in English in New York by Tass, the official Soviet press agency:

The aggressive act committed by the American Air Force against the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed the Deputies and all the

Soviet people. Numerous inquiries and appeals are being received by the session and the Soviet Government. In view of this permit me to dwell on this question once again and to furnish certain new data.

After my report to the Supreme Soviet, in which I dwelt on this fact, the United States Department of State claimed in an official press statement that the point in question was a violation of the Soviet State Frontier by an American aircraft of the "Lockheed U–2" type, which allegedly was studying weather conditions in the upper layers of the atmosphere in the area of the Turkish-Soviet frontier.

This plane had allegedly strayed off its course because the pilot had oxygen trouble. The State Department asserts that the pilot lost consciousness and, steered by its automatic pilot, the plane flew into Soviet territory. According to the Department of State, the pilot only had time to report back about the failure of his oxygen equipment to the Turkish airdrome in Adana, whence it flew, an airdrome which allegedly does not belong to the military but to the National Aeronautics and Space Research Administration.

Soon after that, the National Aeronautics and Space Research Administration issued a statement with a view to confirming the State Department's version.

"MANY SILLY THINGS"

Comrades, I must tell you a secret. When I was making my report I deliberately did not say that the pilot was alive and in good health and that we have got parts of the plane. We did so deliberately because had we told everything at once, the Americans would have invented another version.

And now, just look how many silly things they have said—Van Lake, scientific research and so on and so forth. Now that they know that the pilot is alive they will have to invent something else and they will do it.

[Mr. Khrushchev read from the United States statement issued after his first announcement; it was printed in the New York Times last Friday.]

These are the official versions put into circulation by American officials to mislead the public opinion of their country and the world.

I must declare, comrade Deputies, that these versions are completely untrue and calculated for gullible people.

The authors of these versions supposed that if the plane was shot down, the pilot most probably perished too. So there will be nobody to ask how everything actually happened, there will be no way to check what sort of plane it was and what instruments it carried.

"ALIVE AND IN GOOD HEALTH"

First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of the shot-down American plane is alive and in good health. He is now in Moscow. Brought here also are the remains of this plane and its special instrumentation, discovered during the investigation.

The name of this pilot is Francis Gary Powers. He is 30 years old. He says he is a first lieutenant of the United States Air Force, where he served till 1956, that is, to the day when he went over to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Francis Powers reported, incidentally, that while serving with the American Air Force he used to get $700 a month, but when he went over to the intelligence service and started carrying out spying assignments to glean secret information, he began getting $2,500 a month. That is how capital buys lives, buys people. The flier testified that he had no dizziness, nor had his oxygen apparatus failed. He was flying along the assigned course, accurately executing his chief's orders, switching on and off the equipment over the preselected targets for gleaning intelligence on the Soviet Union's military and industrial establishments, and flew on until the very moment his piratical flight into this country's interior was cut short.

I want to tell something about the results of the examination of the plane that has been shot down and its equipment, as well as of the questioning of the pilot. The inquiry still continues, but the picture is fairly clear already.

PLANE TYPE CONFIRMED

To start with, this was, indeed, a high-altitude, low-speed "Lockheed U–2." They banked on its high altitude and believed that this plane cannot be brought down by any fighter or antiaircraft artillery. That is why they thought it could fly over Soviet territory with immunity. In fact, the plane flew at a great altitude and it was hit by the rocket at an altitude of 20,000 meters [65,000 feet]. And if they fly higher, we will also hit them! The plane was in no way equipped for "upper atmosphere research" or for taking "air samples," as official American spokesmen assert.

Not at all. This was a real military reconnaissance aircraft fitted with various instruments for collecting intelligence and, among other things, for aerial photography.

The competent commission of experts, which examined the wrecked plane, has established from the documentary evidence that this American plane is a specially prepared reconnaissance aircraft. The task of the plane was to cross the entire territory of the Soviet Union from the Pamirs to the Kola Peninsula to get information on our country's military and industrial establishments by means of aerial photography. Besides aerial cameras the plane carried other reconnaissance equipment for spotting radar networks, identifying the location and frequencies of operating radio stations and other special radio engineering equipment.

Not only do we have the equipment of that plane, but we also have the developed film showing a number of areas of our territory. Here are some of these photos. Here are photos of these airfields. Here are two white lines. They are lines of our fighters. Here is another airfield and also planes on it. All these films we developed ourselves.

CAMERA IS PRAISED

Here are photos of petrol stores. It must be said that the camera is not a bad one and the photo is very accurate.

But I must say that our cameras take better pictures, are more accurate, so that we gained little in this respect.

These photos here show industrial enterprises.

There is also a tape recording of the signals of a number of our ground radar stations. These are incontestible evidence of the spying done by the American plane shot down in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk. That is what "air samples" American reconnaissance took, and it took them not over Van Lake in Turkey but quite elsewhere.

The only thing that is true is that this plane was stationed at the American-Turkish air base at Incirlik east of Adana. As Powers, the flier, testified, he was serving with the 10–10 unit, which, for the sake of disguise, is under control of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, but in reality, conducts high-altitude military reconnaissance.

In his depositions, Powers mentioned the names of several officers he had served with at the American military base in Turkey. According to Powers' testimony, the commander of the American 10–10 unit is Col. William Shelton and his deputy is Lieut. Col. Carol Funk.

Before his flight, Powers had long trained himself for flying into the depth of this country and, as he said himself, he had flown along the Soviet frontier many times in order to study the radar system of the Soviet Union.

"POWERS, THE SCOUT"

On April 27, Powers, the scout, flew over from the Turkish city of Adana to the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan on orders from his superiors. And it was, therefore, from Pakistan's territory, that is, from the Peshawar airfield—and not from the Turkish airfield outside Adana, as stated in the United States State Department's version—that Powers took off on May 1 with instruction to fly along the course indicated on his map over the Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk and other points and reach Archangel and Murmansk, before landing at the Bude airfield in Norway.

Now we can say where he was flying to. I must admit that we knew it already when I was reporting this fact. We did not say anything at that time in order to see what the Americans would invent. Now that they have made their invention, we report how everything actually happened.

This is what Powers said when questioned about the task of his flight over Soviet territory.

"I was to take off from the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, cross the national frontier of the U.S.S.R. and fly across Soviet territory to Norway. I was to fly over certain points of the U.S.S.R., of which I remember Murmansk and Archangel. During my flight over Soviet territory I was to switch on and off the equipment over certain points indicated on the map. I believe my flight over Soviet territory was meant for collecting information on Soviet guided missiles and radar stations."

I want to ask the gentlemen from the State Department: Is it such "air samples over Lake Van" that the spy flier Powers was to take?

IRAQI REVOLT RECALLED

I say nothing of the fact that by flying along this course, the American scout plane grossly violated the national sovereignty of Afghan-

istan by having flown across that country's territory without permission. But there is, perhaps, nothing extraordinary in this for the morals of American militarists. Such actions of theirs have long been known.

Suffice it to recall the flight of American military aircraft over the territory of Austria, when the aggression was being prepared against Iraq, where a revolution had just taken place. The Austrian Government protested against the treacherous violation of Austria's sovereignty by American military aircraft and against that blatant act of disrespect for her neutrality sealed by the signatures of the United States, among others.

If one believes the version that the pilot lost consciousness owing to oxygen trouble and that the aircraft was subsequently controlled by the automatic pilot, one must also believe that the aircraft controlled by an automatic pilot flew from Turkey to Pakistan, touched down at Peshewar Airport, stayed there three days, took off early in the morning of May 1, flew over the territory of Afghanistan, crossed the Soviet frontier, flew more than 2,000 kilometers over our territory for a total of some four hours.

All the time of the flight over our territory the aircraft was under observation and was brought down as soon as the order was received.

When our anti-aircraft rocket battery intercepted and brought down the plane, the pilot, it must be believed, soon regained his consciousness because he bailed out by parachute; you just note he was not ejected by the automatic device but left through the upper canopy designed for emplaning. The question arises why did he do this if there are devices for rapid ejection?

He did this possibly because there was an explosive charge in the aircraft which was to have blown up the plane as soon as the pilot was ejected. The pilot knew this and possibly was afraid that he would be killed in the explosion. Clever enough!

"NOT THE ONLY PRECAUTION"

But the installation of the infernal machine was not the only precaution taken. To cover up the tracks of the crime the pilot was told that he must not fall alive in the hands of the Soviet authorities. For this reason he was supplied with a special pin. He was to have pricked himself with this poisoned pin, resulting in instantaneous death.

What a barbarism! Here is this instrument—the latest achievement of American technology for the killing of their own people (a photograph is produced).

But everything alive wants to live and when the plane was brought down the pilot bailed out by parachute. And when he landed he did not follow the advice of those who sent him on his anti-Soviet predatory assignment but remained alive.

It is alleged that the flight was made for scientific purposes to investigate the upper layers of the atmosphere. The question arises why the pilot then had to be armed with a noiseless pistol. He was given it for some emergency, not to take air samples but to blow people's brains out. All this we shall present to the public as material evidence. This is what, so to say, such Christians are like.

He was given this pistol after making low bows as they do in churches. And yet they call us godless atheists. Yet we have never committed such crimes against humanity and never will. If the pilot was given a pistol to defend himself against wild beasts in case of a forced landing, the question arises, why a pistol with a silencer? This also shows what so-called scientific purposes were pursued by the plane.

The pilot who was supposed to explore the atmosphere was given 7,500 rubles in Soviet currency. The question arises, when and where was he to have spent them and for what purposes, for he did not fly to exchange old rubles for new?

GOLD FRANCS, GOLD RINGS

The pilot was also given French gold francs. I have seen these gold francs with my own eyes. And you can see them here in the photograph. They are covered with cellophane on both sides of the coins. Done in a cultured, American way. But what did the pilot need these francs for? He also had West German, Italian, and other currency. Besides his own watch he was also given for his trip another two gold watches and seven gold rings for ladies. Why was all this necessary in the upper layers of the atmosphere? Or, maybe, the pilot was to have flown still higher to Mars and was going to lead astray Martian ladies?

You see how thoroughly American pilots are equipped before setting off on a flight to take samples of air in the upper layers of the atmosphere. Thus, no concocted version can save the reputation of those who bear the responsibility for this perfidious act.

Thus, no concocted version can save the reputation of those who bear the responsibility for this perfidious action. They were caught red-handed as organizers of the incursion in the airspace of the Soviet Union not long before the meeting of the heads of government in Paris, not long before the visit to the Soviet Union of the President of the United States. I believe that this is a bad preparation for serious talks on easing international tension.

I am now reading in the Western press comments on these events and there are some people who accuse us, Khrushchev, of wanting to undermine the summit meeting because otherwise he would not have presented this fact at the session of the Supreme Soviet but raised it through some other channels but what did you expect, gentlemen? You are accustomed to make mischief and some people regard this as all but a good thing and keep silent. No, we are not such kind of people: if you made mischief bear the responsibility for this openly.

WHY SUCH A "RECKLESS STEP"

They live according to the law; if one is rich, one will not be imprisoned. This is true for the capitalist because he always can buy himself off. But there is another country, the country of socialism, where law protects the state, protects society, protects everyone living in this state.

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Comments on True Magazine Version of U-2 Incident

1. Statement: "Other spy planes had penetrated deep into Russia, one sneaking within a few miles of Moscow. But Powers was to be the first to cross the vast Soviet land mass from the Aral to the Barents Seas. His main checkpoints:

"1. Tyura Tam, the great Soviet missile center in the desert east of the Aral Sea.

"2. The Sverdlovsk rocket sites.

"3. The Soviet air and submarine bases at Archangel and Murmansk.

"His touch-down on friendly soil would be at Bodo, Norway."

Comment: The Russians released to the world very shortly after the May 1st incident photographs of the mission route map carried in the cockpit of the aircraft which contained the check points noted in the above quotation. In addition, an enlarged photograph of this map was on display throughout the public exhibition of the aircraft in Moscow at Gorki Park. This was the first planned South-north flight.

2. Statement: "It was known that a monster missile, twice the size of America's 107-foot Atlas, was poised on a launching pad at Tyura Tam. The Central Intelligence Agency desperately wanted photographs of this new missile. They suspected it might be used for a long-hinted May Day space spectacular."

Comment: Tyura Tam was not the primary objective of the 1 May mission. However, it was considered to be a valuable en route bonus target. There was no knowledge of any "monster missile" being in place on the launching pad, although there was some conjecture that the Soviets might attempt a space launching on 1 May for propaganda purposes.

25X1

3. Statement: "The weather on May Day was perfect. . ."

Comment: The weather on May Day was not perfect. The first portion of the route, to a point approximately 150 nautical miles south of Sverdlovsk, and including Tyura Tam, was predicted to be cloud covered. The pilot was instructed to turn his camera on over Tyura Tam just as a precautionary measure in the event that holes in the undercast might permit some coverage of value. The area of primary interest, northwest of Sverdlovsk to the Kola Peninsula, was predicted to be clear and it was on this basis that the decision to go was made. Subsequent analysis of actual weather conditions substantiated the pre-mission forecast.

4. Statement: "Nor would any other flights across Russia have been attempted until President Eisenhower had completed his visit to Russia in mid-June. May 2 had been set as the beginning of a moratorium on such aerial espionage, and for at least six weeks there would be no more."

Comment: It is true that authorization for this particular overflight would have expired after 1 May; however, the six-week moratorium has no basis in fact. While there has been considerable conjecture about "deadlines", the above information was never disclosed, even in Congressional hearings.

5. Statement: "Powers was not piloting the only U-2 in the air that day. Simultaneously, another U-2 had taken off from Incirlik to fly conspicuously along the Soviet border as a decoy. The pilot deliberately sent meaningless messages over his radio to attract attention and to lure Soviet radar and monitoring stations into following him while Powers slipped into Russia unnoticed. The decoy would continue over Pakistan, then return to Incirlik. The Pakistan authorities who knew nothing of Powers' secret mission, would be notified that a U-2 had arrived and they would assume it was Powers."

Comment: The diversionary aircraft maintained radio silence throughout its mission. It was not intended as a decoy but was designed to substantiate the cover story and protect the pre-strike base in the event the mission aircraft was lost, particularly if it were

lost in proximity to the border. The diversionary mission did not go beyond Iran before turning and proceeding back to Turkey.

The only other public reference we find to a second U-2 flight was in an article by Chalmers Roberts in the Washington Post of 27 May 1960, which included the following statement: "The day of Powers' flight, there was a second U-2 flight from Turkey. This was a meteorological flight outside the Soviet Union, the kind of flight the National Aeronautics and Space Administration unwittingly thought all U-2's were making. NASA was, of course, the 'cover' for the clandestine flights over the Soviet Union."

6. Statement: "It soon became clear, however, that the Russians had not been fooled by the decoy. American listening and watching stations picked up the frustrated comments of the Soviet defenders who had discovered Powers but were unable to do anything about him.

"Soviet jets leaped and snarled at the spy plane which hovered high out of their reach. For a tantalizing moment one interceptor managed to reach the intruder's level. Our monitors could hear the Russian screaming like a banshee with the fury of his effort." 25X1

[redacted]

7. Statement: "To those daring young men who flew the U-2s, a flight over Sverdlovsk was pretty much a milk-run. They called the network of domed rocket launchers below the "House of David."

Comment: No overflight of the USSR was ever considered a "milk run" either by the pilots or anyone else associated with the project. The reference to the "House of David" is apparently a corruption of the term "Little Davids" applied to the SAM sites by photo interpreters at PIC because of their geometric resemblance to a Star of David. This descriptive term was adopted by the Intelligence Community but was not supposedly known to the public.

8. Statement: ". . his inertial guidance gear which permitted him to navigate without external radio aids, . . . "

Comment: The U-2 had no inertial guidance gear whatsoever.

9. Statement: "Powers switched off the fuel to keep the engine from flooding, then snapped on his command radio, turned to the emergency "G" channel and barked tersely: "Flameout! Flameout!" These words were heard across the Turkish border 1,200 miles away where a handful of Americans were watching the drama helplessly on radar screens and listening by high-powered radio monitors."

Comment: 25X1

quipment installed in the U-2, even under optimum conditions, has a range of less than 300 nautical miles and even if a transmission had been attempted, which is highly unlikely, could not have been received 1,200 miles away.

10. Statement: "At 37,000 feet the Soviet fighters caught up with him, formed a canopy over his head and began forcing him to the ground."

Comment: There is no evidence available from any source to confirm this.

11. Statement: "For the first penetration of Soviet territory, trusted foreign pilots were used in case the flights should fail."

25X1

12. Statement: "The U-2's special kerosene fuel, refined for high altitude cruising, is particularly difficult to re-ignite in case of flameout."

Comment: The jet fuel used in the U-2 is no more difficult to re-ignite than any of the other jet fuels in normal use.

13. Statement: "One of the first U-2 flights over Russia penetrated as far as Kiev, 200 miles inside the Soviet Union, during the first week of July, 1956. Russian defenders spotted the plane but could not knock it down. Their anti-aircraft rockets fell short at 60,000 feet -- which in itself was valuable information."

Comment: This statement is true, with the exception of that portion referring to anti-aircraft rockets falling short at 60,000 feet. There is no evidence that rockets were fired at the U-2 on any of its overflights prior to 1 May.

A statement by Khrushchev at the Czechoslovak Embassy reception (reported in the New York Times, 10 May 1960) included the following:

> "I shall say further, when Twining, the then Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force, arrived here we welcomed him as a guest and entertained him. He left our country by air and next day sent a plane flying at great altitude to our country. This plane flew as far as Kiev."

The fact that one of the first Russian overflights penetrated deeply into the Soviet Union was widely publicized as a result of the official Soviet protest of 10 July 1956. This note protested overflights on July 4, 5 and 9, 1956 by a "twin engined medium bomber" and cited that in one case a penetration of 320 kilometers had been achieved. The note did not mention Kiev, which was in fact covered on a mission on 9 July.

14. Statement: "Before Powers' fateful flight, there had been at least two missions aimed at Sverdlovsk. The first went only half way, then turned back because the clouds made photography difficult."

Comment: There had been only one mission to Sverdlovsk prior to the 1 May flight. However, there was a mission targeted to the Irkutsk area, flown by Frank Powers, which did turn back prior to reaching the target because of cloud cover.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Copy #3

10 September 1960

Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Staff Secretary
The White House

Dear Andy:

In response to your request, I enclose a memorandum containing comments on the significant statements in the article in True Magazine for September 1960, entitled

> "Exclusive! Inside Story of Pilot Powers and his Secret U-2 Spy Flight. Official Air Force documents and secret reports reveal for the first time the true facts behind the spy-in-the-sky missions. By Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson."

As you will note, the title of the article refers to official Air Force documents and secret reports as a source for the story. In the text of the article itself there is reference to the story being "based on official Air Force reports."

I also enclose a report of the radio interview of Drew Pearson by Patty Cavin on August 23, 1960, bearing on the Pearson-Anderson article in which Pearson claims "that we had access to the Air Force records in this flight". In another portion of the interview Pearson refers to "information that the Air Force has."

I am sending a copy of the enclosed report to General Walsh, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Air Force to ascertain whether he can throw any light on these references to the Air Force which of course may be a blind to divert attention from the real source of the information.

Cy #1 & #2 - Addee w/orig of report
and orig of report of Interview
Pearson-Cavin.

Cy #3 - DDCI w/attch
Cy #4 - DCI w/attch
Cy #5 - DDP via DDP w/attch
Enclosures

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

TOP SECRET

Copy #3

11 September 1960

Major General James H. Walsh
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Jim:

At the request of General Goodpaster I have prepared and sent forward to him an analysis of the Drew Pearson-Anderson article in True Magazine for September. A copy of that report, with a copy of the transmitting letter, is enclosed.

You will note Pearson's repeated allegations that he had access to Air Force files in connection with the preparation of the report. Similar allegations appear in a radio interview which Pearson gave to Patty Cavin on 23 August 1960, a transcript of which is attached.

As I noted in my letter to General Goodpaster, these references may of course be a blind to divert attention from the real source of the information.

While there are a very large number of inaccuracies and false allegations in the Pearson-Anderson article and the Pearson broadcast, they do contain some fairly accurate material that I have not seen before in public print.

I would appreciate it however if you would look into the matter and let me know whether you can find any clue which would help us to ascertain the source for the Pearson statements.

25X1 Copy #1 &2 to Addee w/copy of [redacted] w/attch
and with thermo of Pearson-Cavin interview

#3 - DDCI - no attch.
4 - DCI -no attch.
5 - DPD via DDP =no attch

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Enclosures

TOP SECRET

INTERVIEW WITH DREW PEARSON

Patty Cavin at 12:15 P.M. over WRC (Washington):

Miss Cavin interviewed columnist Drew Pearson, and the following was heard:

CAVIN: "Columnist Pearson and his partner Jack Anderson have the exclusive inside story of what really happened on May D y, 1960, when Lockheed pilot Francis Gary Powers took off in his sleek U-2 on what seemed to be an innocent weather flight. The account is published for the first time in the September issue of True, and seems to be backed up today by statements made last night by CIA Chief Allen Dulles. We'll have words with Drew Pearson first up on our show...

"Page 34 of the September issue of the man's magazine True has a rather startling headline. It says, "Exclusive Inside Story of Pilot Powers and his Secret U-2 Spy Flight." The byline belongs to Drew Pearson and his partner Jack Anderson. We have Mr. Drew Pearson at our NBC microphone now, and, Drew, I was fascinated and somewhat appalled to read this account of what really happened for the first time, because it differs rather considerably from the reports that we have had sine May Day on the Powers flight and what really did happen from the newspapers' standpoint. How come?"

PEARSON: "Well, I don't know, Patty, except that we had access to the Air Force records in this flight, and they very carefully monitored everything that Powers did, both at the time and then they had to reconstruct what happened afterwards, and, for instance, when his plane was displayed at Gorki Park in Moscow, the propeller blades were bent back, which wouldn't mean very much to you and me, but to the Air Force it meant a great deal. It meant his plane had stalled in the air at a flight--at an altitude actually of 70,000 feet, and the plane never crashed. It came down to a landing which didn't break up the plane too much."

CAVIN: "As you and Jack Anderson say in True magazine, to a belly-scraping landing."

PEARSON: "Your words are better than mine. I see that you've really read that article."

CAVIN: "Well, I couldn't put the article down, I must admit. Actually, Drew Pearson, let's go back and start at the findings that you and Jack Anderson began with. You traced the beginning of U-2's."

PEARSON: "Yes, we went back to approximately five years ago, perhaps a little bit before that. These flights have been taking place for a long time, not merely by the U-2 planes, but at first the United States various intelligence forces had attempted to get information by balloon, and had sent balloons at a very high altitude across Russia with photographic equipment.

"Well, this ran into trouble. Later we sent planes across with pilots who were Americans of other origins who could speak Russian very well, and then we switched finally to the U-2 plane after it was developed by Lockheed. We gave orders--there's no secret about any of this now--it's pretty well come out--we'd given orders that we had to have a U-2 plane--it wasn't called U-2 originally--which could fly at a

terrific altitude so that no Russian plane could knock it down.

"Now there's one thing I might point out, that our story differs from the testimony of Francis Gary Powers in one respect, and it's a rather important respect. We say in this article that he--his engine stalled at 70,000 feet. He says he was shot at and hit at 68,000 feet. I'm not quibbling about the 2,000 feet, that doesn't make much difference."

CAVIN: "It's the shot-at area that you are quibbling on."

PEARSON: "That's right. In other words, he testified that the Russians shot him at 68,000 feet. The information that the Air Force has, and it is definitely official information--no, I don't think--and we repeat it there--is that he was not shot at, that the Russians have no missile or plane that could hit or fly that high. And, when, as we recount in this article, at approximately 70,000 feet--it could have been 68,000--he turned on the emergency radio in his cockpit and shouted 'Flame-out', which means stalled--his engine had stalled. And this was picked up in Turkey by one of our monitoring stations. And at that point he coasted down, just as you would your car down a hill to start your engine again."

CAVIN: "You say in your article he spiraled down to 40,000 feet."

PEARSON: "That's right, in order to get his engine started. The atmosphere at 70,000 feet is so rarefied that you can't do anything with it, and down lower you can get started, but at that point he was shot. Now the question is, why is the testimony different from what we believe to be the facts?"

CAVIN: "Well, couldn't that possibly be the effect of the Russians' questioning and whatever they have done to Francis Gary Powers since he's been in their hands?"

PEARSON: "Yes, that is definitely my opinion. I think they treated him with great skill. I don't believe that he was brainwashed, as you and I usually think of the word brain-washed, but his defense attorney, who was an able defense attorney, undoubtedly got in there with him, and quite rightly told him that if he testified along certain lines, he would be dealt with more leniently.

"And the very important thing is that the Russians didn't want anyone to know that they had a plane--that an enemy or a potential enemy rather, or any foreign country is a better way to put it, could fly over their country and not be shot at, and I think that's the reason for his testimony."

CAVIN: "Well, now, Drew, you brought out a very interesting point also, which we have heard some facts on, and I'm interested in your interpretation. You said that May Day dawned perfectly, the weather on May Day was perfect, either for picnicking or for U-2 spying, and that the sky over Russia had to be cloudless to give the cameras a clear view, the upper atmosphere had to be dry so that the plane would not form giveaway (con trails) (?). If the weather had not been ideal, Powers would not have made that May Day flight, nor would any other flights across Russia have been attempted until President Eisenhower would have completed his visit to Russia in mid-June--May 2--had already been set as the day for him--the last day--moratorium--"

PEARSON: "That's right."

CAVIN: "Now, you state that the weather was perfect, Mr. Powers took off, and at the same time in another part of the country another plane, as a decoy, was taking off, supposedly to lure the Russian radar and all the Russian trackers into thinking that this was Powers. Would you give us a few facts on that?"

PEARSON: "Well, the other plane took off from--I think it was Adana--at least it was along the Turkish border--and flew toward Pakistan from Iran, along the Iranian-Pakistan border. The reason for that, as you've indicated, was that the American bases in Turkey could communicate with Powers and the Russians would think--we hoped they would think we were communicating with the weather plane. The weather plane was not violating Russian territory; we fly those all the time.

"However, in this particular case, we did not know that the Russians were wise to what had happened, and they had sighted a previous plane about April 1--"

CAVIN: "A U-2?"

PEARSON: "A U-2."

CAVIN: "Which had also gone deep into the interior of Russia?"

PEARSON: "Which had gone deep into the interior of Russia, and they were completely aware that this plane on May 1 was coming, and they were waiting for it. They were waiting for it for a couple of reasons. One was the reason I just mentioned, that this other plane had come along on the first of April. The other was that they knew that we were worried about these very important bases of theirs in Central Russia, around the Caucasus, where they have their big missile bases, they are manufacturing some of their biggest rocket projects, and obviously that's what we need to see."

CAVIN: "And this all goes right into the story which Allen Dulles, the Director of CIA, made last night when he spoke before members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Mr. Dulles said that the Kremlin is jealously guarding the physical areas of the Soviet Union where it is building up in secrecy its formidable military weapons. Dulles declared that the Russians have repeatedly refused to accept a meaningful form of inspection, the best guarantee that disarmament can be honest, and Dulles then charged that Russia believes it is free to prepare in relative security for its spying on, their bases inside, and that this is our only method of getting pictures --aerial pictures--right?"

PEARSON: "That was the only method we had, and unfortunately the most tragic aftermath of all this is that we now don't know what is going on inside Russia, and we do know--we have pretty good reason to believe that they are transferring these bases to other parts of Russia, and even have some of their missiles on railroad cars so they can be transferred in a hurry."

CAVIN: "Drew, you made another point, when Mr. Powers was actually captured, some of the material that he had with him, including a hypodermic syringe with poison which killed a Russian dog in 30 seconds, was found, and there is a question in my mind after reading your article, written with Jack Anderson, as to why Francis Gary Powers didn't use the hypodemic needle, because, as you point out, anyone who works for Lockheed but reports to CIA, and one is in a position more of a pilot than a spy--didn't necessarily have to pledge that he would dispose of himself if he were caught, but he can't expect government backup if he is caught."

PEARSON: "Quite right. Well, the reason apparently that he didn't use that needle was that, in the first place, he had instructions that if he was caught, he should tell the truth. The reason for those instructions is very simple, that if a man is captured, well, with modern methods of brainwashing and so on, there isn't anything that you can do to prevent some kind of a story coming out, and usually it's a cock and bull story if you're under torture. Now, he probably didn't have time to use that needle and perhaps he never would have used it--I don't know.

"There have been some theories that somebody got to Powers--that the Russians got to him before he left Turkey--I don't believe that. The Air Force doesn't believe it. I think he's--was a guy who was doing his best, he was just an ordinary guy--"

CAVIN: "And he decided he wanted to live."

PEARSON: "And decided he wanted to live, right."

CAVIN: "Well, the final paragraph of the Pearson-Anderson article on what really happened to Francis Gary Powers on this fateful U-2 flight, concludes:
'Whatever the solution, the age of satellite spying will come, but will it come soon enough? The hope is that it will arrive before the U-2 pictures, which we already have in our possession, of Russia, are too far out of date. Otherwise, an even worse tragedy may result from our May Day disaster.'

"Drew, that's food for thought, and we hope that everybody gets TRUE magazine this September and checks through the details which we haven't had time to cover. Congratulations on an awfully good story, and one final question, Mr. Pearson. Any truth to the rumor that you are currently working with NBC on a special film project?"

PEARSON: "Yes, I've been working very, very hard out of the city for that purpose, and doing a one-hour documentary as part of the public service program of NBC on the history and current work of the Quakers, and I hope and believe that it will be a wonderful film."

A

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100020001-1

NSA EMPLOYEES MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE

Reportage on Conference

Moscow, Soviet Home Service, Sept. 6, 1960, 1300 GMT--L (UNCLASSIFIED)

(Report on the press conference given by two former employees of the National Security Agency)

(Text) Long before the beginning of the press conference in the marble hall of the Central House of Journalists numerous representatives of the Soviet and foreign press assembled and also radio and television representatives. What was the topic of the press conference? This question interested everyone without exception.

An answer to the question was given by the head of the press department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Kharlamov, who opened the press conference.

(Kharlamov recorded statement): Gentlemen, comrades. As you know, in the press of the United States, Britain, and other countries at the beginning of August a report was published by the U.S. Defense Department concerning the disappearance of two workers of the U.S. National Security Agency. This report mentioned in particular that the FBI and civil police organizations had begun searching for two employees of the supersecret National Security Agency who disappeared at the end of June. It was also reported that these workers were Bernon Mitchell and William Martin, who for a considerable time worked in the National Security Agency of the United States.

The workers of the National Security Agency who disappeared are now in Moscow and have requested that they be allowed to appear at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists. Mitchell and Martin have decided to break with the United States and for political reasons to ask for political asylum from the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government has granted Mitchell and Martin the right of political asylum. The Soviet Government has complied with the request of Mitchell and Martin concerning the adoption of Soviet citizenship, and they are now Soviet citizens with full rights. Allow me to present to you William Martin and Bernon Mitchell.

Interpreter: Bernon Mitchell wishes to read to those present a joint statement left by them in a bank in the town of Laurel in the United States.

Mitchell: We ought to explain to relatives, friends, and mothers who may be interested why we sought citizenship in the Soviet Union. Since going to work for the National Security agency in the summer of 1957 we have learned that the U.S. Government knowingly makes false and deceptive statements both in defending its own actions and in condemning the actions of other nations.

The witch is really indignant: "I am not a witch. I am Allen Dulles. I am one of you. There is no question of un-American activities. Are you mad then? Why me alone? What about Hoover from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Herter?

But nobody listens to the witch. This witch has served badly. He could not cope with his duties and failed at every step. Therefore, Dulles and his intelligence agency are being held to account by the American authorities.

According to the Washington POST AND TIMES HERALD, Walter told correspondents that in the beginning he intends to investigate the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and intelligence branches of the Defense Department. At the same time, Walter emphasized that the Central Intelligence Agency, headed by the not unknown Allen Dulles, would be the main target of the investigation.

At long last, the above committee has started business. Dulles should have been put in the dock a long time ago, for hardly anyone has undermined U.S. prestige abroad to the extent that the head of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States has.

Interrogate, interrogate Dulles, Mr. Walter. You have something to ask him. Ask him several leading questions: Is it not you Mr. Dulles, who helps hunt and prosecute honest and talented Americans--scientists and artists, writers and painters? Is it not you, Mr. Dulles, who, through your dirty and crude work in Guatemala, Iran, Syria, and Indonesia brought about the wrath and contempt of millions of people toward your policy? Is it not, finally, with your knowledge, Mr. Dulles, that spy planes appear in the Soviet skies only to crash along with the prestige of your country?

Dulles' good luck and the hard luck of the Americans lie in the fact that these questions will not be put to him. Walter will not peck out the eyes of another Walter. In fear two wolves swallowed each other, a fairy tale says. Fear and confusion now guide the activities of the American obfuscaters. Some are compelled by these feelings to plunge straitjacketed from sykscrapers. Others search for their own shadows in order to question them according to the rules of modern criminology lest the shadows lead to subversive activities against those who have given birth to them.

We do not know what Walter and his committee will do with this new big witch. In any case let us give some advice: "Hold him, Mr. Investigators. Hold him tight. If you let him go, then tomorrow he will catch you himself.

(Passage omitted containing Russian summary of the statement and including a short recording of the beginning of Martin's statement--Ed.)

Announcer: Then the head of the press department of the USSR Foreign Ministry invited Soviet and foreign journalists to put questions to Mitchell and Martin.

Question from IZVESTIYA correspondent: You mentioned that (remainder of sentence indistinct).

Reply: Yes, Italy, Turkey, France, Yugoslavia, the UAR, Indonesia, and Uruguay. That's enough to give a general picture I think.

Question from a correspondent of FREIE WELT of the GDR: In your statement, you mentioned that the U.S. intelligence service has a post in the embassy of an ally of the United States. Can you name the embassy in which this American spy works?

Reply: This is Turkey. This was told me by an (analyst?) who worked on the (several words indistinct).

Question by Moscow radio correspondent Sergeyev: Are the radio interception stations situated in countries neighboring the USSR used only against the Soviet Union or also against the countries in which they are situated?

Reply: Well, it is the general policy to intercept the communications of all nations that can be successfully intercepted without discriminating against any nation. (Laughter)

Question by a correspondent of the SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG; What was your job and task in the agency?

Reply: We were mathematicians in the field of crypotanalysis using electronic digital computers as aids.

Question by Mr. Frank of the CANADIAN TRIBUNE: I should like to know some details of your past training and your age. Also, insofar as you mention Canada in your statement, have you any supplementary data concerning the state of U.S.-Canadian relations in this field?

Reply (evidently by Mitchell--Ed.) My age is 31. I have a bachelor's degree in statistics from Stanford University, and then I went to graduate school at George Washington University. Concerning the relationship between the United States and Canada on cooperation in crypotanalysis, well, they cooperate on the communist codebook (work?)--the communist codebook system--they cooperate on this.

Reply (Evidently by Martin--Ed.): I'll answer the first question on biographical data. I am 29 years old, and I received a bachelor's degree from the University of Washington in statistics. I stayed with Mr. Mitchell at the graduate school of George Washington University, and last year I was given leave to attend the University of Illinois, and I received my master's degree in mathematics this June.

Question by a correspondent of the New York NATIONAL GUARDIAN: (Question indistinct)

Reply: The answer to this question is no. However, I consulted with the people who did work on these problems. I read their technical reports. I saw the map of the Soviet Union upon which they plotted the positions of American planes flying around the Soviet Union, and discussed with them freely all the aspects of their work.

Question: What are you doing at the present time?

Reply: Oh, studying the Russian language, preparing to enter a university as soon as possible.

Announcer: The Soviet and foreign correspondents asked some more questions of Mitchell and Martin and received exhaustive answers.

Text of Statements

Moscow, TASS, Radioteletype in English to Europe, Sept. 6, 1960, 1334 GMT--L (UNCLASSIFIED)

(Text) A press conference for Soviet and foreign newsmen was given in Moscow Sept. 6. Press statements were made there by the former employees of the National Security Agency of the United States, Bernon Mitchell and William Martin, who also read a copy of the statement they left behind in Laurel before their departure from the United States. The following are the full texts of these statements.

The parting statement of Martin and Mitchell: June 22, 1960, a parting statement. We hope to explain to our relatives, friends, and others who may be interested, why we have sought citizenship in the Soviet Union.

Since going to work for the National Security Agency in the summer of 1957, we have learned that the U.S. Government knowingly makes false and deceptive statements both in defending its own actions and in condemning the actions of other nations. We also learned that the U.S. Government sometimes secretly manipulates money and military supplies in an effort to bring about the overthrow of governments which are felt to be unfriendly to the United States.

Finally, an instance came to our attention where the U.S. Government gave money to a code clerk working in the Washington embassy of a U.S. ally for supplying information which assisted in the decryption of that ally's coded messages. These activities indicate to us that the U.S. Government is as unscrupulous as it has accused the Soviet Government of being.

Many people working in the Department of Defense and in the intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government know the truth of what we have asserted. However, if anyone were to verify any portion of it without official permission he would be subject to heavy penalties.

The recent U-2 incident had nothing to do with our decision to defect, for this decision was made more than a year ago. The U-2 incident was merely an instance where the truth was too obvious to be permanently suppressed or altered.

In making these revelations we are not seeking excuses for our action. Neither do we wish to discourage the American people. There are individuals of great integrity and resourcefulness in America who, if given a chance, can rectify some of the tragic acts of the U.S. Government in recent years.

Besides the disillusionment and concern which we have voiced over certain U.S. policies, other factors have strongly motivated us to go to the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, our main values and interests appear to be shared by a greater number of people. Consequently, we feel that there we will be better accepted socially, and will be better able to carry out our professional activities. Another motivating factor is that the talents of women are encouraged and utilized to a much greater extent in the Soviet Union than in the United States. We feel that this enriches Soviet society and makes Soviet women more desirable as mates.

What are the important issues which divide the people of the United States and the Soviet Union? One cannot argue convincingly that the Soviets are evil because they have corrupted Christian virtue. If most Soviet citizens do not accept Jesus Christ as their personal savior, that is their business.

The important issues, we believe, concern which economic and political practices best serve the interests of mankind. A disadvantage of capitalist society is that its science and technology cause needless human suffering by contributing to technological unemployment. It is no wonder that so many people in America feel resentful toward intellectual and creative activities.

We hope to become scientific workers in the Soviet Union, and we believe that we will be able to engage in scientific investigations there without fear of contributing to the economic hardships of others.

Some people in the United States who are opposed to communism have advocated a preventive war with the Soviet Union. They seek a kind of security which involves the annihilation of people with views opposed to their own. Such a war would at best leave them emperors over the graveyard of civilization.

Rather than devoting their energies to the development of newer and more powerful means of destruction, we hope that both the United States and the Soviet Union will divert their efforts toward competition in the ideological arena.

One means of achieving this would be to widely publish in both countries, in mutually agreed-upon volume, unedited debates about economic and political theory and practice. It is difficult to appreciate one's own propaganda without having listened to the propaganda of others. As a means of increasing mutual understanding, we feel that the exchanges already under way between the two countries of cultural, scientific, and industrial delegations should be continued and expanded.

This statement has been made without consulting with the government of the Soviet Union. The reasons for this are that we feel that we owe the American people an explanation in such a way that it cannot be construed later as a propaganda statement inspired by the government of the nation in which we have asked to be allowed to make our homes.

William H. Martin.

Bernon F. Mitchell.

The following is the full text of the statement for the press by William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell.

Before leaving the United States of America at the end of June of this year, we left the previously-read statement in safety deposit box number 174 in the State Bank of Laurel in Maryland, rented in the name of Bernon F. Mitchell. We brought with us a photographic copy of this statement.

On the evelope containing this statement, we wrote and signed a request that the contents be made public, because we wished to explain to the American people why we decided to ask the Soviet Union to grant us political asylum.

Reports in the American press indicate that U.S. authorities gained access to the safety deposit box and found our statement. But they did not fulfill our request to publish it. We can explain this only by assuming that the Eisenhower-Nixon administration does not wish certain aspect of its policies to become known to the American people.

At this press conference, which has been arranged at our request, we would like to explain, especially to the American public, our reasons for leaving the United States. We were employees of the highly secret National Security Agency, which gathers communications intelligence from almost all nations of the world for use by the U.S. Government. However, the simple fact that the United States is engaged in delving into the secrets of other nations had little or nothing to do with our decision to defect.

Our main dissatisfaction concerned some of the practices the United States uses in gathering intelligence information. We were worried about the U.S. policy of deliberately violating the airspace of other nations, and the U.S. government's practice of lying about such violations in a manner intended to mislead public opinion. Furthermore, we were disenchanted by the U.S. Government's practice of intercepting and deciphering the secret communications of its own allies. Finally, we objected to the fact that the U.S. Government was willing to go so far as to recruit agents from among the personnel of its allies. An instance of this practice, involving payment to a code clerk of a U.S. ally, was mentioned in our first statement.

At this time we would like to make some general comments relative to our reasons for leaving the United States. Before joining the National Security Agency, we had a high degree of confidence in the honesty of the U.S. Government, and we considered ourselves to be loyal supporters of the American way of life. But the policies mentioned above, which have been carried out by the U.S. Government in recent years, raised serious doubts in our minds as to whether the causes these policies are intended to support are actually worthwhile. It was a difficult and painful experience to leave our native country, families, and friends. Yet, we felt that the U.S. Government, in carrying out policies dangerous to World peace, should not be allowed to rely upon these emotional attachments to guarantee the loyalty of its citizens.

In the statement which we left in the United States, we expressed the opinion that a preventive war would be futile. It should be evident that those who contemplate unleashing wars constitute a grave threat to humanity. Should another world war occur, there would probably be no further opportunity to build communism, capitalism, or any other form of society.

However, some people in the United States disagree on this matter. For instance, Gen. Thomas Power, commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, made the following statement, which was published in the United States in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on appropriations during debate on the 1959-1960 military budget. He said: I would like to leave the deterrent role for a moment and talk about the philosophy of initiation of a war and the tremendous advantages that accrue to the man who starts a war... (TASS ellipsis). You always have a capability to strike first, because obviously if these people thought we never could start a war, why, then they could just take this world away from us by piece, because they would know that as long as they do not strike us, we could never do anything about it.

General Power's statement involves the dangerous presumption that the United States owns the world, and implies that emulation of the Soviet Union represents taking something away from the United States. His proposal to strike first in an attempt to prevent the trend toward socialism sounds to us like a more suicidal than effective policy.

Senator Barry Goldwater, chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, made a speech in Chicago on the eve of the Republican National Convention, in which he said, we must not agree to a further ban on nuclear testing, nor disarmament in the near future. In this same speech he also said: To our undying national shame, there are among us those who would prefer to crawl on their bellies to Moscow, rather than to face the possibility of an atomic war.

We do not hesitate to include ourselves in the company mentioned by Senator Goldwater. In fact, we would attempt to crawl to the moon if we thought it would lessen the threat of an atomic war. General Power and Senator Goldwater occupy important posts in American society, but we do not believe that they reflect the attitude of the majority of the American people.

After the U-2 incident, the U.S. Government admitted its policy of deliberately violating the airspace of the Soviet Union. U.S. officials, particularly Vice President Nixon, tried to justify this policy by claiming that it was the only way to forestall a surprise attack by the USSR. Vice President Nixon did not mention that much of the information gathered on these flights could be useful only in an attempt to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet Union. In connection with this, the statements of General Power take on ominous meaning. They could forestall a surprise attack by the Soviet Union by striking first. It is very difficult for the Soviet Union and other nations to assume that General Power was only expressing his private opinion in his official testimony before congress.

Besides its attempts to contain communism in the eastern hemisphere, the United States recently declared that it would not tolerate communist influence in the western hemisphere. Perhaps U.S. hostility toward communism arises out of a feeling of insecurity engendered by communist achievements in science, culture, and industry. If this is so, such feelings of insecurity are a poor excuse for endangering world peace. The ring of U.S. military bases surrounding the Soviet Union seems to indicate that the U.S. Government thinks it can effectively combat the ideas of communism by military means. If the United States and the Soviet Union were to improve communications between their peoples, perhaps there would not be so much antagonism, and conditions might be created which would make possible a large-scale diversion of military funds to peaceful purposes.

Let us now consider the aerial intelligence policies of the U.S. Government. Our first acquaintance with these policies was during the time that we served with the U.S. Navy, from 1951 to 1954. We both served as communications technicians at several U.S. Naval radio intercept stations during this period. The U.S. Government has recently admitted carrying out intelligence flights around and over the borders of communist nations, but only during the last four years. However, we would like to state that these flights were also being conducted in the period 1952-1954 when we were serving at a U.S. Naval radio intercept station at Kami-seya, Japan, near Yokohama. In advance of a reconnaissance flight of a U.S. military plane along the Chinese or Soviet far eastern borders, a top secret message would be sent to Kami-seya and other communications intelligence stations, informing them as to the flight time and the course of the plane.

At the designated flight time, monitors at these stations would tune in on the frequencies used by radar reporting stations of the target country, that is the Soviet Union or Communist China. At the same time, radio direction-finders would tune in on these frequencies to seek out the locations of the radar reporting stations. Information gathered in this manner would then be forwarded to the National Security Agency. There, analysts study the communications and code systems used by the radar stations. The National Security Agency is then able to estimate the degree of alertness, accuracy, and efficiency of the radar defenses of the target nation, and it is also able to collect information about the organization of command within the target nation's internal defense system.

After going to work for the National Security Agency, we learned about another type of aerial intelligence mission which involves incursion into the airspace of the target nation. These missions, known as elint missions (electronics intelligence--TASS) consist of flights in the

immediate proximity of radar installations of the Soviet Union and other countries to obtain data about the physical nature of radiations from radar transmitters. This information is used in an attempt to find ways to render the radar defense system ineffective, for instance through the use of radar-jamming devices operating from bases close to the Soviet borders. Flights of U.S. planes along and over the borders of the Soviet Union are routine operations and the number of such flights is far greater than is generally supposed by the U.S. public. In order to clarify the nature of such flights, we would like to discuss one of them in detail.

In September, 1958, a U.S. C-130 plane flew over the Turkish border into Soviet Armenia. This plane never returned. The U.S. Government, as it invariably does in such cases, issued a cover story claiming that the plane was engaged only in gathering scientific information and that the crossing of the Soviet border was accidental. The United States claimed that the C-130 had been shot down over Soviet territory without provocation. The Soviets confined itself to a statement that the plane had crashed.

In February, 1959 the State Department relased a recording in Russian which it claimed substantiated its contention that the C-130 had been shot down inside the Soviet Union. However, the State Department said nothing about the actual reason that this plane was flying over the Soviet Union.

In connection with this incident, we would like to make the following comments.

Late in the afternoon of the same day that the State Department released the above recording, Lt. Gen. Johm Samford, director of the National Security Agency, speaking on the NSA internal broadcasting system, suggested that NSA personnel refrain from discussion of any questions pertaining to the C-130 flight. It is clear that if the C-130 had really flown with the sole intent of gathering scientific information NSA would have had nothing to conceal.

Despite General Samford's suggestion, NSA employees did discuss among themselves the possible far-reaching consequences of the C-130 incident for the United States. A high official of NSA told William Martin that this particular C-130 plane was carrying electronics specialists and special equipment for receiving at close range the signals of Soviet radar transmitters. This official added that the Turkish-Armenian border had been deliberately crossed in order to get into the immediate proximity of Soviet radar installations.

It should be clear even to a layman that information about radar defenses has no bearing whatsoever on the problem of ascertaining whether or not the Soviet Union is preparing for a surprise attack. This information can be utilized only for the purpose of determining the defense potential of the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, various U.S. officials condemned the Soviet Union for allegedly shooting down the C-130 without sufficient reason. Hubert Humphrey said in effect that the Soviet Union should not have shot down the C-130 and should refrain from molesting U.S. planes in the future. His arguments assumed that the State Department's statements regarding the incident were truthful and that the United States was the injured and innocent party.

Thinking that Senator Humphrey and perhaps most members of Congress were ignorant of the facts, we decided to speak privately with a congressman and see if this was the case. In February, 1959, we obtained an appointment with a congressman who had publicly expressed concern over the State Department's concealing from congress pertinent facts about the C-130 incident. During this appointment, we discussed the statements of Hubert Humphrey and commented on the failure of the executive branch to keep Congress correctly informed. We explained to him the nature of the C-130 intelligence mission, and indicated that we felt such violations of the airspace of other nations were dangerous to world peace.

Our conversation was interrupted when the congressman received a telephone call from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Mr. William Macomber, who requested him to refrain from further public discussion of the C-130 incident. Again, it is clear that if this plane had been engaged solely in gathering scientific information, the State Department would have had no reason to be concerned.

Further corroboration that the United States has a policy of conducting overflights was obtained when a high official of NSA told Bernon Mitchell that the United States had intentionally violated the Chinese communist borders on aerial intelligence missions.

We hope that the American public will bring pressure to bear against the U.S. Government's policy of violating the airspace of other nations. A single incident or misinterpretation concerning the purpose of planes involved in these flights could be the cause of war.

It is difficult to understand how U.S. officials can maintain an attitude of indignation when the Soviet Union takes defensive action against U.S. planes flying over its territory.

The Soviet Government has shown great forbearance with respect to these flights, and has repeatedly called upon the U.S. Government to cease them. Moreover, so far as we know, the Soviet Government has refrained from making any retaliatory flights around and over the United States.

We have purposefully stressed in detail the intelligence flights of American planes over the territory of the Soviet Union and other countries because this practice might be the cause of a great catastrophe.

The connection of the National Security Agency with aerial intelligence missions has already been described. Now, in order to give a better perspective of NSA, we would like to add the following details.

Some information concerning NSA's activities is given in the book "Central Intelligence and National Security" (Harvard University Press, 1958--TASS). The author correctly states: The NSA specializes in communications intelligence. It operates as a semiautonomous agency of the Department of Defense, under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense's Office of Special Operations. In addition to maintaining its own professional staff for technical operations, NSA exercises broad supervision over, and coordination of, the Army Security Agency and similar communications intelligence groups within the Navy and Air Force. Further, Ransom states: ...(TASS ellipsis) NSA plays a major, if unobtrusive, role in the national intelligence community...(TASS ellipsis) at any rate, through the National Security Agency and related units, the American Government is again engaged in communications intelligence on a world-wide scale.

NSA headquarters is located at Fort George G. Meade in Maryland, about 25 miles north of Washington, D.C. The NSA building at Fort Meade is second in size only to the Pentagon among U.S. Government buildings. Approximately 10,000 people work there, under the direction of Air Force Lt. Gen. John A. Samford. About 100 million dollars a year are spent to maintain the NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, the basement of which contains a large number of electronic computers. The network of radio intercept stations which supply information to NSA extends throughout the world and keeps in continuous operation more than 2,000 manual intercept positions, which are staffed by more than 8,000 armed forces intercept operators. A smaller number of additional personnel operate equipment for the interception of radioteletype transmissions.

Some intercept units are located on ships and planes, but most of the intercept activity is carried out at U.S. military radio stations located in foreign countries. Both enciphered and plain-text communications are monitored from almost every nation in the world, including the nations on whose soil these intercept bases are located.

To maintain this extensive network of intercept stations and to forward intercept material to NSA headquarters costs about 380 million dollars a year. Thus, including the cost of operating NSA headquarters, the United States spends almost half a billion dollars a year for communications intelligence.

NSA headquarters is subdivided into four main offices: 1) the office of production (PROD), 2) the office of research and development (R/D), 3) the office of communications security (COMSEC), and 4) the office of security (SEC). The major functions of PROD are to receive intercept material from the stations, to perform cryptoanalysis and traffic analysis, and to analyze the resulting information. R/D carries out research in the fields of cryptoanalysis, digital computing and radio propagation, and carries out the development of new communications equipment. COMSEC is responsible for the production and security of U.S. cipher systems. SEC conducts investigations of NSA personnel, gives lie detector tests, and passes on the loyalty and integrity of NSA personnel.

Major subdivisions within PROD and R/D are as follows:

PROD

1--ADVA: Studies high level Soviet cipher systems and diplomatic codes.

2--GENS: Studies Soviet military code systems and medium level cipher system.

3--ACOM: Studies the code and cipher systems of Asian communist nations.

4--ALLO: Studies the code and cipher systems of U.S. allies, neutral nations, and some communist nations.

5--MPRO: Provides electronic digital computing and data processing services to other divisions of NSA.

R/D

1--REMP: Conducts cryptoanalytical research and works on applied cryptoanalytic problems without restriction as to country, provides consulting services to other divisions of NSA, and carries out research in computer componentry.

2--RADE: Designs radio receiving and transmitting devices, radio direction finders, radio fingerprint apparatus, and studies unknown communications systems.

3--STED: Studies possible weakness of cipher machines in general, assists COMSEC in the design of cipher machines for U.S. use, and studies the process of enciphering speech.

Successes obtained by the National Security Agency in reading the code and cipher systems of other nations are due primarily to the skillfulness of cryptoanalysts, frequently aided by electronic digital computers. However, success in at least one case has also been facilitated by the fact that the U.S. supplied to other nations cipher machines for which it knew the construction and wiring of the motors. As we have said before, the success, concerning one of the U.S. allies, was aided by the fact that the United States paid money to a code clerk of that country for his information.

The National Security Agency includes a special group, the United Kingdom Liason Office (UKLO), which is staffed by British citizens. Likewise, in the British communications intelligence organization called GCHQ, there is a corresponding NSA liason group. Britain and the United States exchange information as to cryptoanalytic methods and results in reading the code systems of other nations, and their respective networks of radio intercept stations supplement one another. Besides the United Kingdom, the United States maintains close cooperation with Canada in the field of communications intelligence. As we know from our previous experience in working at NSA, the United States successfully reads the secret communications of more than forty nations, including its own allies. Besides what we have said above, other factors in our decision to defect were the suppression of information, restraints on the freedom of expression and political activity, and the discrimination against people who are not theists which exists in the United States.

For instance, according to U.S. press reports, the federal government each year confiscates 50 million pieces of mail entering the United States, frequently without notifying the addressees that any seizure has taken place. In the State of Maryland, where we lived, in order to hold any post whatsoever with the state government, it is necessary to take an oath to the effect that one is a theist. People whose political convictions are unpopular with those who determine U.S. policy are frequently called before investigating committees, harassed, fined, imprisoned, and denied jobs.

By means of withholding passports, the U.S. State Department attempts to keep within U.S. borders citizens whose political views are not in favor. Victims of this practice have won some court battles, but the State Department is constantly pressing congress for new legislation to tighten up the issuance of passports.

Are these practices in keeping with the free and open society which U.S. officials so often proclaim exists in the United States? We do not think so.

Finally, we would like to say a few words about our personal situations. We have, of course, renounced our American citizenship. We have asked the Soviet Government to grant us Soviet citizenship and assistance in learning the Russian language. Both of these requests have been met, and in addition the Soviet Government has offered us the choice of living wherever we choose. Moreover, we have been offered the opportunity of continuing our education and assistance in finding jobs in our capacities as mathematicians, providing approximately the same salaries as we received in the United States. Recently we made a tour of the Soviet Union, visiting a number of cities, plants, collective farms, universities, exhibitions, cultural centers, and sanatoriums. We have familiarized ourselves with the way the Soviet people live, the progress they have made, and the problems they now face.

We will be glad to hear from relatives or friends who wish to correspond with us or visit us and we will give them a good reception.

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ZHUKOV LEAVES ETHIOPIA--G.A. Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, who stayed in Addis Ababa as a guest of the Soviet Embassy, left on Sept. 2 for the USSR via Cairo after a short stay in the Ethiopian capital. (Moscow, TASS, English, Sept. 2, 1960, 1910 GMT--L) (UNCLASSIFIED)

SOVIET-FINNISH PACT--A contract for supplying eight Finnish tankers to the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1965 was signed Sept. 2 between the Soviet Sudoimport organization and the Finnish company Rauma Repola. The new order is an addition to the contract drawn up in May 1960 during the fourth Finnish industrial exhibition in Moscow. Then agreement was reached for 15 Finnish tankers during the period 1961 to 1963. The contract comes within the scope of the third five-year agreement which was signed in the autumn of 1959 in Helsinki. (Moscow, TASS, Russian, Sept. 2, 1960, 1645 GMT--L) (UNCLASSIFIED)

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Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100020001-1

WILL DESTROY

September 12, 1960

Honorable Francis E. Walter
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Francis:

I have given a great deal of thought to your letter of 2 September 1960.

One purpose of my telephone call to you on 2 September, was to thank you for inserting in the Congressional Record the full text of my address before the Veterans of Foreign Wars at Detroit on 22 August 1960.

Another purpose was to call attention to an AP report of a statement which you made to the press on 1 September, and which was widely circulated throughout the country, that "The FBI gave the CIA certain information which certainly should have deterred the hiring of at least one of those two men," referring to the two NSA defectors. The AP added "He declined to amplify."

I feel sure that this statement was made on the basis of a misunderstanding since it has no basis in fact. No such information was given to the CIA by the FBI, or by anyone else, and there was no particular reason why it should have been so given since the question of the screening of these two men for employment by NSA was not a matter over which the CIA had jurisdiction or responsibility.

DDCI

Subsequently on September 7, 1960, the Department of Justice gave out the following statement:

> "Reports that the FBI had furnished unfavorable information to the Department of Defense of Mitchell and Martin prior to its employment of them are erroneous. The pre-employment investigation of these men was conducted by the Department of Defense and not by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In response to the normal inquiry made by the Department of Defense in the course of its investigation, the FBI reported that it had no information in its files concerning these men."

In my telephone call to you, I also expressed regret that your statement was tied in closely to another statement attributed to you by the Associated Press that "The CIA will be the first target of inquiry."

I sincerely hope that you will find occasion to correct the record as regards the prior furnishing of information to this Agency about the NSA defectors.

I should welcome an opportunity to discuss with you certain other comments in your letter, rather than attempt to deal with them by correspondence. You and I have had many good talks together, and since we have both spent many years of our lives in trying to expose and defeat the subversive communist menace, it is unfortunate there should be the misunderstanding which your letter indicates.

There is one further point, however, that I would wish to clarify. This relates to the statement in your letter regarding CIA "reluctance to convey to the Congress any information regarding its personnel, as well as its activities in the field of national security. . . ."

The Congress itself has set up, in the Senate and the House, subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees and of the Armed Services Committees, for CIA matters. We have appeared many times before these committees and certain other committees to which we have responsibilities, such as the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. In 1959

there were 28 such appearances and so far in 1960 16 appearances. We have uniformly responded to requests from these committees, and several times I have taken the initiative in asking the committees to hear me. I do not recall a single instance during appearances before these committees when we have failed to answer fully and frankly their questions with respect to CIA activities. I feel sure that if you would inquire of Representative Cannon or Representative Kilday, the respective chairmen of the two subcommittees I have mentioned, they would bear out what I have said.

Certainly I agree with you that there can be no monopoly whatsoever in the mobilization and deployment of the resources of the country in meeting the Communist menace. In my speech at Detroit, which I gather you viewed favorably, I tried to emphasize this viewpoint and the need for a far broader understanding by the country of the grave issues which face us.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) ALLEN W. DULLES

Allen W. Dulles
Director

AWD:at
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - DCI w/basic
1 cc - DDCI ✓
1 cc - ER
1 cc - Legis. Counsel
1 cc - IG

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. WALTER:

H. Res. 642. Resolution to authorize the Committee on Un-American Activities to conduct a full and complete study of each intelligence agency of the United States; to the Committee on Rules.

AUTHORIZING COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES TO CONDUCT A FULL AND COMPLETE STUDY OF EACH INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES

(Mr. WALTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a resolution calling for a full and complete study of each intelligence agency of the United States.

I have long felt that the Congress of the United States should be more fully informed respecting the several intelligence agencies of the Government which are vital in the life-and-death struggle in which we are engaged with the international Communist conspiracy.

While I believe that the Committee on Un-American Activities presently has jurisdiction and the authority to conduct the study which I propose, because of the nature of the subject matter and also to avoid any questions of possible partial overlapping in jurisdiction with other committees, I feel that it is sound practice for me to submit a resolution to the House in which the Committee on Un-American Activities is specifically directed to make this study.

I want to point out that the resolution requires that extreme caution be taken in order to avoid any possible disclosure of confidential information or of techniques employed by our intelligence agencies.

Is there duplication or conflict in the powers, jurisdictions, and functioning of our intelligence agencies? Are there areas in which there should be either an extended activity or a withdrawal of activity by these agencies? How can their efficiency be improved? Is the information acquired adequately safeguarded from unauthorized disclosures? Is this information made available for maximum practicable utilization by policymaking agencies of the Government?

These and other questions ought to be carefully and judiciously explored by the representatives of the people. In my judgment, the Committee on Un-American Activities is specially equipped to make this study and I accordingly expect to press for early approval by the House of my resolution.

HOLD FOR RELEASE UPON INTRODUCTION OF RESOLUTION

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Congressman Francis E. Walter (D-Pa.), Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities today introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives calling for a full and complete study of each intelligence agency of the United States.

Commenting on his resolution, Congressman Walter stated, "I have long felt that the Congress of the United States should be more fully informed respecting the several intelligence agencies of the Government which are vital in the life-and-death struggle in which we are engaged with the international Communist conspiracy.

"While I believe that the Committee on Un-American Activities presently has jurisdiction and the authority to conduct the study which I propose, because of the nature of the subject matter and also to avoid any questions of possible partial overlapping in jurisdiction with other committees, I feel that it is sound practice for me to submit a resolution to the House in which the Committee on Un-American Activities is specifically directed to make this study.

"I want to point out that the resolution requires that extreme caution be taken in order to avoid any possible disclosure of confidential information or of techniques employed by our intelligence agencies.

"Is there duplication or conflict in the powers, jurisdictions and functioning of our intelligence agencies? Are there areas in which there should be either an extended activity or a withdrawal of activity by these agencies? How can their efficiency be improved? Is the information acquired adequately safeguarded from unauthorized disclosures? Is this information made available for maximum practicable utilization by policy-making agencies of the Government?

"These and other questions ought to be carefully and judiciously explored by the representatives of the people. In my judgment, the Committee on Un-American Activities is specially equipped to make this study and I accordingly expect to press for early approval by the House of my resolution."

The resolution reads as follows:

RESOLUTION

"To authorize the Committee on Un-American Activities to conduct a full and complete study of each intelligence agency of the United States.

Resolved, That the Committee on Un-American Activities, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized and directed to conduct a full

and complete study of each intelligence agency of the United States in order to analyze the organization and operation of each such agency for the purpose of determining the efficiency of such organization and operation and to determine whether such efficiency can be improved through elimination of duplicate activities and functions, or in any other manner. As used in this resolution, the term 'intelligence agency of the United States' means any executive department or agency of the United States conducting intelligence activities and any unit within any executive department or agency of the United States conducting intelligence activities.

"In the conduct of the study authorized by this resolution, the committee or subcommittee shall exercise extreme caution so as not to reveal any information with respect to the organization or methods of operation of any intelligence agency of the United States, or any other information, the revelation of which may impair the continued effectiveness of the operations of such agency or may be detrimental to the security of the United States.

"For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the committee or subcommittee is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places within the United States, including any Commonwealth or possession thereof, or elsewhere, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as it deems necessary; except that neither the committee nor any subcommittee thereof may sit while the House is meeting unless special leave to sit shall have been obtained from the House. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any member of the committee designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or member.

"The committee shall submit a progress report to the House as soon as practicable during the present Congress, together with such conclusions and recommendations as it deems advisable. Any such report which is made when the House is not in session shall be filed with the Clerk of the House."

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WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD

SEP 2 1960

Rep. Walter Asks Probe Of Intelligence Agencies

Associated Press

Rep. Francis E. Walter (D-Pa.) asked the House yesterday for authority to investigate all United States intelligence agencies.

Walter, chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, introduced a resolution to authorize "a full and complete study" of each agency.

The move apparently was prompted by the disappearance of two mathematicians employed by the National Security Agency. Both are believed to have defected to the Communists.

Walter said yesterday that their disappearance showed weaknesses in the Nation's security system. Earlier this week, House Majority Leader John W. McCormack (D-Mass.) asked Walter to investigate the disappearance of the two NSA men.

House approval of the Walter resolution, almost certain to be granted, would permit an investigation to start at any time.

In submitting the resolution, Walter said he felt that Congress should have more information about activities of intelligence agencies "which are vital in the life-and-death struggle in which we are engaged with the international Communist conspiracy."

Walter said the resolution sets up safeguards against any disclosure of confidential information or techniques of intelligence agencies. It would authorize the Committee to go into these questions:

"Is there duplication or conflict in the powers, jurisdictions and functioning of our intelligence agencies? Are there areas in which there should be either an extended activity or a withdrawal of activity by these agencies? How can their efficiency be improved? Is the information made available for maximum practicable utilization by policy-making agencies of the Government?"

Walter told newsmen he specifically has in mind at the outset of the probe to look into the Central Intelligence Agency, along with the National Security Agency and intelligence arms of the military services.

He indicated that the CIA will be the chief target of the inquiry.

The FBI, Walter declared, was not called in to make a pre-employment investigation of the two NSA employes who disappeared.

"The FBI," Walter added, "gave the CIA certain information which certainly should have deterred the hiring of at least one of those two men." He declined to amplify.

SPY PROBE

WASHINGTON (AP)--REP. WALTER (D-PA) ASKED CONGRESS TODAY TO INVESTIGATE ALL U. S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

WALTER, CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, INTRODUCED A RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE "A FULL AND COMPLETE STUDY" OF EACH AGENCY.

THE MOVE APPARENTLY WAS PROMPTED BY THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO MATHEMATICIANS EMPLOYED BY THE SUPER SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. BOTH ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE DEFECTED TO THE COMMUNISTS.

WALTER SAID YESTERDAY THEIR DISAPPEARANCE SHOWED WEAKNESSES IN THE NATION'S SECURITY SYSTEM. EARLIER THIS WEEK, HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER MCCORMACK (D-MASS) ASKED WALTER TO INVESTIGATE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE TWO NAS MEN.

HOUSE APPROVAL OF THE WALTER RESOLUTION, ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE GRANTED, WOULD PERMIT AN INVESTIGATION TO START AT ANY TIME.

IN SUBMITTING THE RESOLUTION, WALTER SAID HE FELT THAT CONGRESS SHOULD HAVE MORE INFORMATION ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES "WHICH ARE VITAL IN THE LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY."

HE ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED THE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE HAS AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION. BUT, HE SAID, BECAUSE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER HE WANTED TO OBTAIN SPECIFIC AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE TO MAKE THE STUDY.

WALTER SAID THE RESOLUTION SETS UP SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ANY DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OR TECHNIQUES OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. IT WOULD AUTHORIZE THE COMMITTEE TO GO INTO THESE QUESTIONS:

"IS THERE DUPLICATION OR CONFLICT IN THE POWERS, JURISDICTIONS AND FUNCTIONING OF OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES? ARE THERE AREAS IN WHICH THERE SHOULD BE EITHER AN EXTENDED ACTIVITY OR A WITHDRAWAL OF ACTIVITY BY THESE AGENCIES? HOW CAN THEIR EFFICIENCY BE IMPROVED? IS THE INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE FOR MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE UTILIZATION BY POLICY-MAKING AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT?"

WASHINGTON -- ADD SPY PROBE (99)

IN AN INTERVIEW, WALTER SAID HE SPECIFICALLY HAS IN MIND AT THE OUTSET OF THE PROBE TO LOOK INTO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ALONG WITH THE NSA, PLUS THE INTELLIGENCE ARMS OF THE VARIOUS MILITARY SERVICES.

HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SCOPE OF THE RESOLUTION IS SUFFICIENTLY BROAD TO PERMIT THE COMMITTEE TO LOOK INTO ANY AGENCY DEALING WITH INTELLIGENCE.

HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE CIA WILL BE THE CHIEF TARGET OF THE INQUIRY.

THE FBI, WALTER DECLARED, WAS NOT CALLED IN TO MAKE THE CLEARANCE INVESTIGATION OF THE TWO NSA EMPLOYES WHO DISAPPEARED.

"THE FBI," WALTER ADDED, "GAVE THE CIA CERTAIN INFORMATION WHICH CERTAINLY SHOULD HAVE DETERRED THE HIRING OF AT LEAST ONE OF THOSE TWO MEN." HE DECLINED TO AMPLIFY.

EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THIS, WALTER SAID "IT MAY WELL BE THAT CONGRESS SHOULD REQUIRE THROUGH LEGISLATION THAT ANYONE EMPLOYED BY THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FIRST BE INVESTIGATED AND CLEARED BY THE FBI."

ER226P 9/1

(SECURITY)

REP. FRANCIS E. WALTER,ID-PA., SAID TODAY THAT TWO MISSING EMPLOYES OF THE SUPER-SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY HAD N O T BEEN CLEARED BY THE FBI BEFORE THEY WERE HIRED.

WALTER ASKED THE HOUSE TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, WHICH HE HEADS, TO INVESTIGATE ALL GOVERNMENO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, INCGUDING THE NSA.

HE INORODUCED A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE TO MAKE A "FULL AND COMPLETE STUDY" OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. HE SAID HE EXPECTED THE HOUSE TO ACT UPON IT BEFORE ADJOURNING.

THE COMMITTEE LAUNCHED A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY THIS WEEK INTO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF NSA MATHEMATICIANS BERNON F. MITCHELL AND WILLIAM H. MARTIN.

WALTER TOLD UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL HE WAS "ASTOUNDED TO FIND" THAT NEITHER MAN HAD BEEN CLEARED BY THE FBI. HE SAID THE FBI HAD A FILE ON ONE OF THEM

9/1--DP245PED

UPI-111

ADD 1 SECURITY (UPI-107)

THE INQUIRY INTO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MITCHELL AND MARTIN WAS REQUESTED BY HOUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADER JOHN W. MCCORMACK WHO SAID HE HAD INFORMATION WHICH "LEAVES N O DOUBT" THAT THEY HAD FLED TO RUSSIA WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. CODES.

IN INTRODUCING THE RESOLUTION FOR A BRAOD INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, WALTER SAID HE HAD FELT FOR A LONG TIME THAT CONGRESS "SHOULD BE MORE FULLY INFORMED" ABOUT THEM.

HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE COMMITTEE ALREADY HAD AUTHORITY TO MAKE AN INVESTIGATION, BUT ASKED FOR A SPECIFIC DEIRECTIVE TO AVOID ANY QUESTION OF OVERLAPPING THE JURISDICTION OF ACOTHER HOUSE COMMITTEE.

WALTER SAID THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION WOULD COVER THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AS WELL AS THE NSA.

THE RESOLUTION DIRECTS THE COMMITTEE TO ANALYZE THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF EACH AGENCY. IT REQUIRES THAT "EXTREME CAUTION" BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES USED.

9/1--DP252PED

Statement given out by the Justice Department - September7, 1960

Reports that the FBI had furnished unfavorable information to the Department of Defense of Mitchell and Martin prior to its employment of them are erroneous. The pre-employment investigation of these men was conducted by the Department of Defense and not by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In response to the normal inquiry made by the Department of Defense in the course of its investigation, the FBI reported that it had no information in its files concerning these men.

Intelligence Agencies Inquiry Set

Vinson Committee Acts as Walter Schedules Hearing

By John G. Norris
Sports Reporter

Chairman Carl Vinson (D-Ga.) of the House Armed Services Committee named a three-man special subcommittee yesterday to conduct a "complete investigation" of Government intelligence agencies.

Stressing that his Committee has jurisdiction over the Pentagon's intelligence units and the Central Intelligence Agency, Vinson seemed to be suggesting to the House Un-American Activities Committee that it stay out of the case of the two National Security Agency defectors.

Chairman Francis E. Walter (D-Pa.) of the Un-American Activities group, already has announced plans to call NSA officials Sept. 16 for questioning about the defectors.

President Eisenhower, commenting on the incident, said it means that the Administration must review its "entire" security procedures "to see if there is any one way we could better it." "We must be always on the alert, very alert," he told a news conference.

Congressman Walter, however, told newsmen that the President "has made it abundantly clear he doesn't want to cooperate" with his group in trying to eliminate subversives from Government. He cited a White House refusal to furnish the names of many Federal "security risks," holding non-sensitive, non-policy-making jobs, who were fired earlier but reinstated as the result of a Supreme Court decision.

Administration officials privately have expressed concern over the possibility of a free-wheeling House Un-American Activities Committee probe into the defection of NSA code clerks Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. They fear that a renewal of a McCarthy-type loyalty investigation—involving top secret intelligence agencies this time instead of the State Department—could do untold harm.

Vinson's announcement that three veteran members of the House Armed Services Committee who already are privy to many defense secrets and procedures will investigate the case was viewed as a move to conduct a "more [illegible] and pertinent" inquiry into the whole situation, without compromising vital military secrets.

Meanwhile, it developed that the Rep. Wayne L. Hays (D-Ohio) may have been the Congressman Mitchell and Martin said they visited 18 months ago to warn that the United States "was sending planes over Russia."

Hays, interviewed by telephone at his home in Flushing, Ohio, said two men visited his Capitol office then with such a story. He said they represented themselves as CIA employes and complained about the American flights, but urged that their identity not be revealed lest they lose their jobs "and their families would suffer."

To the best of his recollection and that of Mrs. Hays, the Congressman said, neither of the men looked like the published photographs of Mitchell and Martin. He said he had their names "somewhere in his desk in Washington" but didn't recall them.

Hays said he reported the incident to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which he is a member and a subcommittee chairman. He said that because of his position, Government employes often bring complaints to him. Because of this—and to keep from discouraging such informants—he said he didn't report the matter to the CIA.

In their Moscow press conference, Mitchell and Martin said they had gone to a Congressman who had publicly expressed concern over the State Department concealing from his Committee some later revealed facts about the American C-130 plane shot down over Russia in September, 1958. They did not [illegible] the name of the Congressman but clippings in The Washington Post files showed that Hays had made a protest at the time.

The two defectors said in Moscow that while they were in Hays' office, Assistant Secretary of State William Macomber had phoned the Congressman and asked him to "refrain from further public discussion of the C-130 incident." Hays said he didn't recall any such call from Macomber and "certainly wouldn't have discussed it with two strangers." The Mitchell-Martin statement did not indicate that Macomber—if he made such a call—knew about their presence in Hays office.

Vinson said his Committee already has gathered considerable data in the NSA case "without publicity," and that to make the "thorough" probe that is warranted, he has ordered a special subcommittee to get to work "without delay."

"The Committee on Armed Services has jurisdiction over these matters," Vinson said in a statement. "And the Committee will exercise its jurisdiction. This is the Committee charged by the Congress with the responsibility for looking into matters of this nature."

Rep. Paul J. Kilday (Tex.), ranking Democratic member of Vinson's Committee, was named chairman of the special subcommittee, along with Rep. Leslie J. Arends (Ill.), ranking Republican, and Rep. Porter Hardy Jr. (D-Va.). Kilday said he had not yet set a date for a first meeting.

On the final day of the special session last week, Walter introduced a resolution authorizing his group to investigate the NSA defection case. It was not passed. Subsequently, the Un-American Activities Committee announced it was subpoenaing the NSA personnel chief and his records for closed door testimony Sept. 16, after the Pentagon had refused its investigators access to the records of the case.

Yesterday, Walter asserted

that more than 1000 "security risks" now hold Government jobs, and that President Eisenhower has refused since last January to supply their names.

He showed newsmen correspondence he has had with the White House, in which he has tried to obtain the names of all employes who were separated from the service under the loyalty program but rehired after a 1956 Supreme Court decision which permitted the restoring of employes fired from non-sensitive jobs.

Walter revealed his fruitless correspondence after President Eisenhower told a news conference that no problem has engaged his attention over the years more than making airtight the Nation's security proceedings.

Walter said that on Feb. 19, 1960, David W. Kendall, special counsel to the President, refused his request for the names of those rehired after the 1956 decision, declaring that the President "has concluded that it would not be in the national interest."

Again on April 19, Walter said, the White House again refused to furnish the names on the same ground as before. He said that many of those rehired hold what he considered sensitive jobs, some in the Pentagon.

In calling the persons involved "security risks," Walter defined the term as covering members of Communist or Communist front organizations, homosexuals, alcoholics and persons who associate with known Communists.

Kendall, in declining to release the names, said the disclosure of adverse information often includes allegations that are unfounded or rebuttable. Walter declared in a letter to the White House that his Committee investigators have collected data from which he concludes that the rehiring of the persons is "a danger to the security of the Nation." He said he wants to question the individuals behind closed doors to help prepare legislation preventing Communist infiltration of the Government.

In another development, the Justice Department declared in a formal statement that reports that the FBI had furnished the Pentagon unfavorable information on Mitchell and Martin prior to their employment was erroneous. It said the pre-employment investigation on the two was conducted by the Defense Department, not the FBI.

Walter has been quoted as saying that the FBI had informed the Pentagon before they were hired that one was a homosexual. A Defense spokesman said that "I am informed there is not" anything in the personnel record of either Mitchell or Martin indicating homosexuality. The Justice Department declined to say whether [illegible] subsequent to their [illegible] indicated such [illegible] information.

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 September 1960

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the letter from Congressman Francis E. Walter to Mr. Gates, dated August 31st. Late last evening we received a wire advising us that the hearing had been postponed until September 16th. A copy of this wire is also enclosed herewith.

Sincerely,

J. VINCENT BURKE, JR.

Enclosures

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

C

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100020001-1

WASHINGTON
AND TIMES HERALD

SEP 12 1960

Harnessing Intelligence

Intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies of the Government necessarily do much of their work in secrecy. Nevertheless, they must be subjected to a reasonable measure of democratic control. They need the whip of criticism if they are to function at full efficiency; and they need the reins of congressional regulation to keep them on the route they are supposed to travel. Left altogether undirected, they could become a menace to freedom.

A thorough study of intelligence activities is urgently needed, therefore—along with an equally thorough study of counter-intelligence activities. It seems altogether unlikely, however, that such a study—conducted with the requisite detachment, nonpartisanship and penetration—can be expected in the midst of a presidential election campaign from any committee of Congress.

Of the 20 standing committees of the House of Representatives, the House Committee on Un-American Activities seems, by all odds, the least apt for such an undertaking; and of all the 437 members of the House, Rep. Francis Walter seems to be the least qualified to direct the study. For one thing, this committee is a partisan in the cold war waged by the FBI against the CIA. For another, too often it has been a hunter of heresy, not a student of security in the broad sense. Fresh evidence of this was offered by Mr. Walter's assertion the other day that more than 1000 security risks now hold Government jobs.

The House Armed Services Committee headed by Rep. Carl Vinson is, of course, much more rational and responsible, and has much more claim to jurisdiction. But something more is required today than a mere examination of personnel clearance procedures and operating methods. What is wanted is an over-all evaluation of the effects of the intelligence agencies on national security and on national freedom.

Nothing ought to be curtained from this evaluation, although much will have to be kept in confidence—kept, this is to say, from publication. But the evaluators will need to find out what, for example, the CIA is doing undercover, how resourcefully and accurately it is garnering the information for policy decisions, how effectively it presents what it learns.

The evaluators will have to judge the extent to which the counter-intelligence activities of the FBI, as distinguished from its law-enforcement activities, have served security or impaired freedom. They also will need to find out what has not been known for 35 years—the extent to which the FBI in the name of counter-intelligence, has compiled dossiers on law-abiding citizens simply because they expressed heterodox opinions or joined organizations of which the FBI disapproved.

This evaluation ought to be made by a commission of outstanding Americans whose judgment would command universal respect. Perhaps they ought to be selected, as in some past instances, jointly by the President and congressional leaders. They should be men of such stature that they can be trusted no less than Mr. Dulles and Mr. Hoover with access to all manner of classified information. And they should be outside the pull of political partisanship.

Such a commission ought to be recreated periodically—at least once a decade—to pass judgment on the performance of those agencies which, by reason of their duties, must function without the congressional scrutiny and public criticism which serve so usefully to keep the rest of the Government on a proper course. Such a commission could do its work without the hampering influence of a permanent watchdog committee of Congress. Reporting periodically to Congress and the country, it could strengthen security and strengthen public confidence in the indispensable instruments of security.

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Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100020001-1



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With Ltr to DDCI

K- * WS C/C 60-2060/a

13 September 1960

Honorable J. W. Fulbright
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Fulbright:

Thank you for forwarding a copy of the letter of 26 August 1960, which you received from Mr. Wallace Taft Berry, complaining of an approach made to him by a representative of this Agency prior to his visit to the Soviet Union this summer. I have ascertained that Mr. Berry was indeed visited in May of this year by a CIA representative, but that he was not requested to make observations in our behalf nor to secure information of any kind.

One of the directives under which we operate includes the duty of obtaining within the United States from institutions and from private individuals who are potential sources of foreign intelligence, information which might be of value to our national security. Accordingly, on a selective basis, our representatives do occasionally call upon travellers to certain areas of the world with a view to determining their itineraries and capacity for observation as a basis for possible interview upon their return. Information of this kind obtained in the normal course of travel has provided data of substantial value, particularly in areas where access is occasional or limited.

In the case of Mr. Berry, our records are clear that the brief initial interview, which I have mentioned, disclosed that neither his qualifications nor his itinerary were such as to make

any follow-up desirable and therefore there is no intention to contact him upon his return. There are certain additional facts in this case which I should be glad to furnish you orally.

Faithfully yours,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/I
1 - IG
1 - Legis. Counsel
1 - OO

25X1 [redacted]:mg (12 Sept. 60)
Retyped: AWD/ji

WASHINGTON STAR AUG 3 1960

CIA Asked Him to Spy In Russia, Tourist Says

CHICAGO, Aug. 31 (AP).—A young business executive says the Central Intelligence Agency asked him to spy during a tour of Russia.

Robert Berlin, 28-year-old vice president of a sales company, said in an interview in the Chicago American that the CIA approached him in June, 1958, as he prepared for a trip which included 10 days in Russia.

He refused because of the risk involved, he said, and because he did not think it was right for a tourist to spy.

Mr. Berlin said he has just now revealed the CIA's contact with him because the United States Government has protested that some American tourists in Russia have been called spies and ejected from the country.

Mr. Berlin said a CIA agent visited him and "asked me if I would consider making certain mental observations while I was traveling in Russia and he asked if I would submit a copy of my itinerary for the trip."

He was not offered money, Mr. Berlin said, but "that probably would have come up if I would have accepted the job."

"I found out later that someone who identified himself as being from the CIA questioned my neighbors about my background and reputation."

"I also heard they tried to check my high school record."

Mr. Berlin said he considered the CIA request for two days and then refused to submit a report on his trip. He heard nothing further from the CIA, he said.

The American said CIA headquarters in Washington had no comment to make on Mr. Berlin's story, although a CIA spokesman said, "It's our business to seek information wherever we can get it, just as the Russians try to get information. And it is a lot easier for them to get it."

CIA Should Do Its Own Work

THE STATEMENT OF Robert Berlin, a Chicago sales company executive, that he was asked by a representative of the central intelligence agency to serve as an espionage agent on a tour of Russia two years ago, suggests that there is considerable stupidity in the operations of the CIA.

Making espionage agents of tourists would be the surest possible way to defeat the administration's hopes of improving understanding between the Russian and American peoples by having Americans flock to Russia as sightseers and get acquainted with individual Russians.

★

AMATEUR SPIES CAN BE depended on to blunder and get caught, and whenever this happened, the Russian government would make loud propaganda of it. In fact, the soviet government was busy yesterday trying to make important propaganda out of its own unsubstantiated charge that American tourists have been spies.

If it actually caught a few American visitors spying, its case would be greatly strengthened. So we hope the CIA has not succeeded in converting any American business travelers or vacationists into temporary agents.

★

THE CHICAGO EXECUTIVE, Berlin, says he based his refusal to work for the CIA largely on the ground that he doesn't think it is right for tourists to spy.

This is a valid moral scruple. Applying it to Russia seems a little quixotic, tho, because every Russian who visits this country, or any other, as a diplomat, a journalist, a commercial agent, an entertainer, or a tourist, actually comes as a spy for his government.

Individual Russians don't take trips abroad on their own initiative. If they go abroad, it is because their government expects to get something out of the trip. Americans can go on tours representing nobobdy but themselves, and let's keep it that way. Let the CIA do its own work, using its own professional help.

WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD

SEP 1 1960

CIA Asked Him to Spy, Tourist Says

CHICAGO, Aug. 31 (AP)—A young business executive says he was asked by the Central Intelligence Agency to spy during a trip to Russia but refused.

The CIA approached Robert Berlin, 28, vice president of a sales company, in June 1958 as he prepared for a trip, which included 10 days in Russia, Berlin said yesterday.

Berlin said he refused because of the risk involved and because he does not think it right for a tourist to spy.

In an interview with Chicago's American, Berlin said he revealed the request because the U. S. Government has protested that some American tourists in Russia have been called spies and expelled.

Berlin said a CIA agent visited him and asked if he would consider making "certain mental observations" while he was traveling in Russia and also requested a copy of his itinerary.

In Washington the CIA had no comment on Berlin's story, Chicago's American said. The newspaper, however, quoted a spokesman as saying that "it's our business to seek information wherever we can get it, just as the Russians try to get information. And it is a lot easier for them to get it."

TIMES

Circ.: m 38 295

Front Page | Edit Page | Other Page

Date:

Questionable Timing

THE REVELATION of Robert Berlin, a young Chicago business executive, that two years ago he rejected a Central Intelligence Agency request to spy during a tour of Russia leaves at least one pertinent question unanswered.

From the evidence at hand it does not appear that he was asked to do anything very sneaking or complicated but only to make certain mental observations and submit a written report. But if he considered the activity spying, his refusal cannot be criticized—it was a matter between him and his conscience.

Entirely another matter, however, was his timing in disclosing the incident. Why it was necessary, or even advisable, for him to mention it at all isn't clear, since he had refused the request—one, incidentally, which the CIA was quite as justified in making as he was in declining. He could have closed the case without the fanfare, and the puzzle is why he didn't.

Mr. Berlin explained he revealed the contact just now because the U.S. Government has protested that some American tourists in Russia have been called spies and ejected. It seems inconceivable that he intended to aid the Soviet Union in any way. Yet, since his statement tends to uphold the Red contention, it seems equally inconceivable that he should not have recognized that the principal effect of his belated announcement would be to support Premier Khrushchev's hand.

BALTIMORE SUN AUG 31 1960

REFUSED TO SPY, AMERICAN SAYS

He Links CIA Request To Tour Of Russia

Two missing U.S. experts said to have taken data more important than first believed..... Page 2

Chicago, Aug. 30 (AP)—A young business executive said today the Central Intelligence Agency asked him to spy during a tour of Russia.

Robert Berlin, 28-year-old vice president of a sales company, said in an interview in the Chicago *American* that the CIA approached him in June, 1958, as he prepared for a trip which included ten days in Russia.

He refused because of the risk involved, Berlin said, and because he did not think it was right for a tourist to spy.

Visit Recalled

Berlin said he has just now revealed the CIA's contact with him because the United States Government has protested that some American tourists in Russia have been called spies and ejected from the country.

Berlin said a CIA agent visited him and "asked me if I would consider making certain mental observations while I was traveling in Russia and he asked if I would submit a copy of my itinerary for the trip."

He was not offered money, Berlin said, but "that probably would have come up if I would have accepted the job."

"I found out later that someone who identified himself as being from the CIA questioned my neighbors about my background and reputation.

Report Refused

"I also heard they tried to check my high-school record."

Berlin said he considered the CIA request for two days and then refused to submit a report on his trip. He heard nothing further from the CIA, he said.

The *American* said CIA headquarters in Washington had no comment to make on Berlin's story although a CIA spokesman said, "It's our business to seek information wherever we can get it, just as the Russian try to get information. And it is a lot easier for them to get it."

To Spy or Not to Spy?

I read the story of Robert Berlin's refusal to spy for the CIA in Russia and got the feeling he considers himself a hero for declining to aid his country.

I can't understand his explanation. He said many American travelers are being embarrassed by the questions of Russian authorities. His blurting out the request to spy will serve to strengthen Moscow suspicion and there will be much more questioning in the future.

The request of the CIA, "looked too dangerous," he said. Other people placed in his position probably would have agreed to help since they might realize the job is necessary. Berlin's "confession" will aggravate the chances these others will take.

Our President's decisions frequently are based on information he gets from the CIA. Berlin inadvertently did Russia a big favor because he likely has closed off the source of this information.

I hope no one is so naive he can't see the importance of counter intelligence. It is not a pleasant chore but is essential.

I believe the real motive for Berlin's action was to see his name and picture in the newspapers. I am reminded of an old saying:

"If you could have been silent, you would have been a wise man."

JOSEF HIPPELE

(Editor's note—This is one of many letters received on Mr. Berlin's refusal of a request by a CIA officer to report certain of his observations on a tour of Russia. All writers resent Berlin's exposal of the CIA action.)

CIA-Tourist Incident

I am amazed that a citizen of the United States feels he is above doing something for his country during these times. Robert Berlin reported that he was asked by the CIA to "keep his eyes open" while on a tour in Russia. He knows the record of Russians entering our country. The Russian feels honored to so serve his country. But apparently Mr. Berlin feels his citizenship does not and should not make any demands on him. We are at war—the most vicious type ever devised by a group of men little if any above animals. It is time every citizen feels it is an honor and a duty to help his country in every way he can by "keeping his eyes open" everywhere he goes, and pass any helpful bits along to the right authorities. Some great man has said—"When we are at peace we have privileges and responsibilities; when we are at war we have only responsibilities." According to Mr. Berlin, he was not asked to spy in the real meaning of that word, but to "keep his eyes open." In other words he was asked to observe life in the USSR.

M.E.W.

Prof and Business Man Help Ease World Tension

CHICAGO. — Taking public stands in letters to the press here, two Illinoisans recently showed how to contribute to the easing of tensions between the U. S. and the Soviet Union.

In answer to a Daily News editorial on Soviet "stage-managing" the Powers spy trial, Robert Berlin, young Chicago executive, stated that when in 1958 he planned a tour to Europe, including 10 days in the Soviet Union, he was approached by the CIA to act as an agent for the U.S. while in the USSR. He was told that tourists can sometimes do a better job than official agents. At that time he refused, but realized later, as he said in his letter, that there must have been "more daring tourists — who have been in the Soviet Union, and helped, to use your words, "Soviet stage managing."

Robert Eisner, Professor of Economics at Northwestern University, wrote from Paris, France to answer an editorial in the N. Y. Times that any American tourist to the USSR lays himself open to spy charges there if he so much as discusses economics with a Soviet Citizen takes pictures, etc.

The professor and his wife who were in Moscow during the trial, found such statements absolutely untrue. They, as well as other tourists they met in Moscow, were met with friendliness and courtesy, he said. He ended his letter as follows:

"It would certainly be most unfortunate if the influential voices of the American press were to be used, unjustifiably, to frighten or discourage Americans from participating in peaceful and mutually enlightening contacts with citizens of the Soviet Union."

CINCINNATI (O.) ENQUIRER

Circ.: m. 203,960
S. 277,547

Front Page | Edit Page | Other Page

Date: SEP 1 1960

Was 'CIA' Worker Bonafide? Tourist Spy Plan.

CHICAGO, Aug. 31 (UPI) — Robert Berlin, 28, vice president of a sales company, told Chicago's American that in 1958 a man who identified himself as a Central Intelligence Agency worker asked him to spy for this country on a trip to Russia.

Berlin said he received a telephone call about a week before his departure on a two-month tour of Europe and Asia, and the caller met him in his Chicago office. He showed credentials stating he was a CIA agent.

Berlin said that the caller "asked me if I would consider making certain mental observations while I was traveling in Russia, and he asked if I would submit a copy of my itinerary for the trip." Tourists, the man told him, often were better at acquiring "information than trained agents.

After a day to think it over, Berlin said, he decided against accepting the assignment for several reasons, the main one being the risk involved. He said he told the agent that he did not feel it was right for a tourist to spy.

Berlin said the matter was not pressed and he never heard from the man again. He said he disccvered later that someone who identified himself as being from the CIA "questioned my neighbors about my background and reputation."

No money offer was made, Berlin said, but he said "that probably would have come up if I would have accepted the job."

The American said that in Washington, CIA headquarters had no comment to make on the story, but a spokesman said it was "our business to seek information wherever we can get it, just as the Russians try to get information. And it is a lot easier for them to get it."

DES MOINES (Iowa)
TRIBUNE

Circ.: e. 127,523

Front Page | Edit Page | Other Page

Date:

Snubs CIA: 'No Tourist Should Spy'

CHICAGO, ILL. (AP) — A young business executive says he was asked by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to spy during a trip to Russia but refused.

BERLIN

The CIA approached Robert Berlin, 28, vice-president of a sales company, in June, 1958, as he prepared for an overseas trip that included 10 days in Russia, Berlin said Tuesday.

Berlin said he refused because of the risk involved and because he does not think it's right for a tourist to spy.

"A lot of people have told me I would get in trouble telling this story, but I believe in expressing what I think," Berlin said.

Protests

In an interview with the Chicago American, Berlin said he disclosed the request because the U. S. government has protested that some American tourists in Russia have been called spies and expelled from the country.

Berlin said a CIA agent visited him and asked if he would consider making "certain mental observations" while he was traveling in Russia and also requested a copy of his itinerary.

The agent told him that tourists often are better at acquiring information than trained agents, Berlin said.

No Money Offer

He said he was not offered money but "that probably would have come up if I would have accepted the job."

"I found out later that someone who identified himself as being from the CIA questioned my neighbors about my background and reputation."

After considering the CIA request two days, Berlin said, he turned it down and heard nothing further from the agency.

In Washington, D. C., the CIA had no comment on Berlin's story, the Chicago American said. The newspaper, however, quoted a spokesman as saying:

"It's our business to seek information wherever we can get it, just as the Russians try to get information. And it is a lot easier for them to get it."

ROSS DISCUSSES BERLIN CASE

Norman Ross at 6:45 P.M. over WLS (Chicago):

"I should like to direct what I have to say tonight to a Chicagoan I've never met. His name is Robert Berlin. He's 28. He lives in a near north side bachelor apartment. He's vice president of a sales company at 200 West Menominee here in Chicago.

"I'd like, too, to direct these remarks to the many friends I have on the Chicago AMERICAN, a newspaper that last night headlined on the front page Mr. Berlin's story.

"I believe that his story, if true, is one he should not have revealed and which they should not have printed. Yes, I know about freedom of the press. Mr. Berlin says in a big headline before his trip to the USSR he was approached by a man claiming to be an agent of our super secret and incredibly valuable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. After proper credentials were shown he was asked if he would use his good memory to make certain mental observations while he was in the USSR and report them on his return.

"Tourists, he says he was told, are often better at acquiring information than our trained agents. After thinking over this request from his government Berlin decided to refuse. And why did he run out of it? The main reason was the risk involved. He also said he didn't think it was right that a tourist should spy.

"He said he was offered no money but probably that would have come if he had accepted the job, something I rather question. Herbert Hoover, for one, never accepted a penny for being President of the United States, because he felt this was one way he could repay the country that had done so much for him.

"Herbert Philbrick makes a special point of saying that the FBI not only paid him nothing except expenses but specifically said to him, if you do this for your country you do so at your own risk. If you are caught by the reds or are exposed as a red by your own fellow Americans, what you do you do at your own risk, and just because you love your country.

"Why is Mr. Berlin telling his story now? Now at the very moment it can be used most effectively by Soviet propagandists around the globe and especially inside the USSR where they are engaged in a spy scare that is getting to ridiculous proportions. According to the American again they're doing so, quote, because the government has complained recently of American tourists being harassed while traveling in Russia, end of quote.

"He admits that he's never heard of any other tourist being approached by an officer from the CIA. A lot of people, he said, told me I would get into trouble telling this story. But I believe in expressing what I think.

"There's a question, a direct question from him, that I'd like to tear apart a bit, because I'm afraid it shows an irresponsible and reckless [illegible] on the part of Mr. Robert Berlin and the press. He won't get into trouble. The CIA

[illegible] night, thanks to Mr. [illegible] this country will get into trouble, because he's fed grist into the Soviet propaganda mill.

"Of course, it's grist. Can't [illegible] the headline reproduced in PRAVDA, which we saw in the AMERICAN last night, '[illegible] to spy for the U.S.: Executive.' A banner headline, 'CIA asks me to spy for the USA,' a banner across the front page of IZVESTIA or trumpeted to the world via Radio Moscow.

"I believe in expressing what I think, says this near north side bachelor. He thinks about the personal risk involved in accepting a very simple assignment, one to keep his eyes and ears open and to report back bits of information which might fit somehow into a gigantic and vitally important jigsaw puzzle.

"But I can't think he thought very deeply about Soviet propaganda. We just heard Paul Harvey talk about the headlines in tomorrow's newspaper, about the ex-officer from the OSS, the former professor who is behind the Iron Curtain working on Latin American affairs."

Mr. Ross then discussed the [illegible] case and about the young tourists asked to leave Russia.

"Tourists have been approached by these young people for several years. Nothing has been done about them by the Soviets and suddenly two of them have been picked up and made examples of, even accused of being agents of the CIA. Again our tourists, like Mr. Berlin, come into the situation, came to Moscow as members of tourist groups and youth delegations.

"Here again the Robert Berlin case can be made grist for the Soviet propaganda mill. (Indistinguishable name of Russian newspaper) said that other American tourists were indignant, quote, when they learned that, quote, next to them were spies during their tour (?), end of quote. With Mr. Berlin's uncalled for admission to bolster their claims, according to his remarks, it not only discredits our intelligence efforts but also makes it more difficult for ordinary Russian citizens to talk to American tourists, make it far more difficult, too, for our tourists to find any Russians who would dare talk to them.

"By shooting off his mouth — and that's what he was — Mr. Berlin, it seems to me, has done a disservice he probably doesn't dream of. I wonder if his getting his picture in the paper was worth it. I doubt it, if he really thinks this thing through."

Mr. Ross talked about the two missing employees of the National Security Agency.

"I've ranged very far from my announced topic tonight. I'll have to come back to it tomorrow night. But I have a purpose. I don't believe in finding communists under every bed. I don't believe in wrapping ourselves in the American flag and getting hysterical about our Americanism.

"I do believe we are living in a most [illegible] world and our enemy is the most dangerous and the most implacable. And when [illegible] like [illegible] of Chicago [illegible] Robert Berlin has a chance [illegible] he should [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] newspapers. [illegible]

"[illegible] final judgment [illegible] account is accurate, I would be forced to say, and it's only one man's opinion, that Robert Berlin, Chicagoan, is wrong."