

Demand Plane Probe

Ask on Hill: Why Didn't Ike Know?

By STEWART HENSLEY

WASHINGTON, May 8 (UPI).—Angry Congressional leaders of both parties today demanded a full investigation into the flight of an American plane over Soviet territory for the purpose of obtaining intelligence information.

Several were particularly irked that such a flight would be made, as the State Department said, without the knowledge of President Eisenhower—and just a week before the President goes to Paris for the summit conference with Soviet Premier Khrushchev and British and French leaders.

One important Republican member of Congress, who insisted his remarks be "off the Record," exploded when asked about the incident. "Dumb" and "stupid" were some of the milder expletives he used to describe the State Department's handling of the affair.

AT THE SAME TIME, high Administration officials said the incident, while embarrassing to this country, would not deter the President from going to the Paris conference.

There was a possibility the President would make a nationwide radio and television address this week as is his custom before attending foreign conferences. If he does, he could scarcely ignore the plane incident.

Among those calling for a Congressional investigation were Senate Democratic Whip Mansfield (Mont.) and chairman Bridges (R.N. H.), of the Senate GOP committee.

They said in separate interviews that they expect the appropriate Senate committees to call

in Administration officials for a detailed explanation.

THE CONGRESSIONAL anger was prompted by the State Department's Frank admission yesterday that the plane downed over Soviet territory a week ago "probably" was seeking intelligence information. It said such flights were designed to protect the West against a surprise Russian military attack.

But the department denied Khrushchev's charge that the captured American pilot, Francis B. Powers, made his flight on orders from Washington officials. It also cited as a mitigating factor the Russians' vast espionage efforts against the West.

Bridges said the Russians are constantly spying on this country through their far-flung network

of agents. But he said the plane incident "certainly weakened our position" at the summit meeting.

The White House declined all comment on the flights which prompted Khrushchev to unleash a new barrage.

Among other things, Press Secretary Hagerly refused to say whether the flights would in any way affect the President's plans to visit the Soviet Union in June.

OTHER HIGH officials said the President has no intentions of canceling the summit meeting. Mansfield, a key Democratic spokesman on foreign affairs, agreed Eisenhower must abide by his decision to meet with the leaders of Russia, France, and Britain.

But administration officials said Khrushchev can determine the fate of the summit conference within the next few days:

If he turns the plane incident into a public circus by staging a pre-summit trial of the captured pilot, they said, it will dash any hopes of narrowing the East-West gap on such major issues as Berlin, Germany, and disarmament.

Washington officials made no immediate effort to salvage their propaganda position. But by insisting that Eisenhower and other Washington officials knew nothing of this particular flight, they hoped to keep the way clear for the President and Khrushchev to meet in apparent friendliness at the summit.

Symington Deplores Strife

Regrets Intraparty Personal Attacks

By ISABELLE SHELTON
Star Staff Writer

Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri last night deplored the "seeds of disunity" which he said are being sown in some Democratic primaries.

In an obvious reference to the West Virginia primary, where his fellow-Democratic candidates for the presidency, Senators Hubert Humphrey and John F. Kennedy, have been slugging it out, Senator Symington told the 1960 Campaign Conference for Democratic Women at the Sheraton Park Hotel:

"It saddens me—and I am sure it saddens you—to read where good Democrats question the patriotism or personal integrity of other good Democrats.

"I know my colleagues Jack Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey well," the Missourian continued. "They are fine, loyal Americans. And they are great Democrats. Anything that has been said or done which might soil the good reputation of these good men should be retracted and corrected.

'Bind Up the Wounds'

"Once these popularity contests are over," urged the Senator, who has refused to enter any primaries, "let us move swiftly to bind up the party's wounds and close ranks for the fall election.

"After all, the election that you and I want to win—the big one that must be won—is a great Democratic victory in November," he said. That includes every level of government, local, State and national, he added.

The West Virginia primary, where ballots are being cast today, will not settle the Democratic presidential nomination "any more than it was determined in Wisconsin."

Senator Symington said. "All 50 States must have a vote in the selection. The place to pick our nominees is the national convention."

Several other Democratic hopefuls—"announced, unannounced, favorite sons, avowed and unavowed," in the words of Mrs. Katie Louchheim, Democratic vice chairman and chairman of the conference — also were parading their wares at the three-day conference which 3,000 women are attending from all 50 States.

Senators Humphrey and Kennedy were to fly from West Virginia today long enough to address the final luncheon of the conference, sharing billing with Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. The two Senators will be back in West Virginia when the votes are counted tonight.

'Democrats Care'

The dinner also marked the launching of the Democrats' campaign slogan for 1960. It is: "Democrats Care."

Gov. Robert S. Meyner of New Jersey, who will get his State's votes as a favorite son, charged that this Nation's conduct of foreign affairs has been "liberally peck-marked" with "disheartening, dangerous blunders."

Events of the last several days involving the United States plane shot down over Russia "might be labeled, 'How to fail miserably at the summit conference,' or 'How to lose friends among the nations,'" the Governor declared.

"It is clear the administration, through the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the State Department, had violated the territorial integrity of

the Soviet Union; and we have suffered a formidable loss of prestige just before the start of the Summit Conference," Gov. Meyner asserted.

"What had been a sorry state of affairs one week before the Summit Conference has now been made even more bleak," he complained.

"We knew the conference was coming (and) its importance." Yet "there has been no planning at all. It almost seems as if we have gone out of our way to undermine our cause; to force the nations of the world to question critically our motives and our aims."

Williams Echoes

Gov. G. Mennen Williams of Michigan voiced similar criticism of the administration's handling of the plane incident in a press conference before the dinner.

"It is wholly indefensible that we should have been mousetrapped into a lie which destroyed the faith and credibility of the American people in the government before the whole world," he declared.

The governor, who will have much to say about how Michigan's votes will be cast at the Democratic convention, repeated his insistence that he is "completely neutral" between the various Democratic candidates, with the exception of Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas.

The Texan, said Gov. Williams, "is not the type of Democrat that conforms to the thinking of Michigan. He has something less than the bold approach necessary to meet the challenge of our times."

Senator Johnson "could not carry" Michigan in November, while every other presently mentioned Democratic

Presidential nominee could, the Governor maintained.

Available for Veep

Gov. Williams acknowledged his own availability for the vice presidential nomination, but said he is not a "working candidate."

In his speech, the Michigan governor said his party's job is "to wake America up." He urged adoption of a "solid, tough, fighting liberal platform" at the convention.

Senator Johnson confined his remarks at the dinner to warm praise of Speaker Rayburn, whom he called "one of the most beloved figures in the Democratic party."

In a new twist for such a gathering, Senator Johnson himself was introduced by his wife, "Lady Bird," the wives of other speakers also introduced their spouses.

Senator Johnson, said his wife, is "an exciting man to

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Date:

MAY 10 1960

Being Barred From Hearing Irks Capehart

By DAN KIDNEY

Press Washington Correspondent

WASHINGTON — Hodsiers have every right to know exactly what went on in the Soviet shoot-down of that U.S. spy-plane Senator Homer E. Capehart (R-Ind.) told his Senate colleagues, in a colloquy with Senator Frank H. Lausche (D-O.) on the Senate floor.

Both senators were taking the position that, as members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, they should have been invited, when committee chairman, J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), and ranking committee members were given a "fill-in" on the matter by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and CIA Director Allan Dulles yesterday.

"The people of Indiana are entitled to know what is going on in this case," Senator Capehart said. "As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I am charged with finding out and telling them."

Senator Lausche backed up this stand and said that if members of the committee are to perform their duties properly, they must be informed fully on the case.

Showing that he was angry at not being asked to attend the briefing, Senator Capehart said:

"The Eisenhower administration should take Congress into its confidence. Perhaps we could be of some help. God knows they need help, if I can read the record and the times correctly."

Lausche explained that he went to the briefing room, supposing all committeemen were invited, but he was told it was a "closed meeting for the leaders."

"To my embarrassment, I had to leave," he concluded.

Senator Capehart contended that this was a violation of "the right to know."

CINCINNATI (O.)

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Date:

MAY 10 1960

'Thrown Out'

Embarrassed Lausche Leaves U2 Briefing

Enquirer Bureau Special

WASHINGTON, May 9—Sen. Frank J. Lausche (D. Ohio) was, in his own words, "thrown out" of the briefing for congressional leaders this afternoon on the spy-plane crisis.

Lausche was told by a fellow Senator that Secretary of State Christian Herter and Allan Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, were about to brief members of the Foreign Relations Committee on the incident.

Lausche, a member of the committee, rushed down to the meeting room in the Capitol, but was informed it was a "closed" meeting, for House and Senate leaders only, not for the Foreign Relations Committee.

"To my embarrassment," the Ohioan declared on the Senate floor, "I had to leave."

He then disclosed that a newsman, curious of his leaving, asked him why.

"I told him I was thrown out," Lausche said.

The Senator said he made a suggestion at this morning's session of the Foreign Relations Committee they should get the background of the crisis. Senators having the responsibilities of foreign relations "ought to know to the fullest degree possible what is happening," he said.

"I AM DISAPPOINTED not being given the right to attend this meeting," Lausche stated.

He said he knew the Soviet Union was active in espionage in this country but "that does not mean I condone what has happened . . . I'd like to know." He concluded by saying he hoped he still would be given the right to know.

Ohio's other Democratic Senator, Stephen M. Young, also took the floor on the U2 crisis, but his remarks were aimed more at closing-the-ranks rather than opening-the-doors.

"I am neither surprised nor shocked . . . that . . . those who have the defense of this nation as their responsibility should be compelled to penetrate the Iron Curtain in any manner possible . . ." Young declared.

He then pointed out the extent of Russia's espionage activity, including "submarines off our shores" and the fact that it is comparatively easy for them to get information about our military efforts just by asking, reading or observing.

"In the United States, we are confronted with a different situation," he said. The Senator declared we wouldn't have any way of knowing what the Russian threat amounts to "except by the enterprise and courage of the men in our CIA and armed forces."

YOUNG also gave Herter, with whom he once served in the House, a resounding endorsement. He said Herter was a "good" Secretary and that he would give "no thought whatever to appeasement and compromise" at the summit meeting.

The Senator said "of course" the summit conference should go forward, that Congress and the nation should "close our ranks and back up with determination our leaders who participate . . ." He also predicted the U2 pilot, Francis Powers, would be released by the Russians.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

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A Question of Control

If it is really true that Secretary Herter and CIA Director Allen Dulles still do not know who authorized the spy plane's flight over Russia, then the need for a responsible congressional investigation is reinforced.

Some Congressmen who were "briefed" by the two officials told reporters the responsibility for the flight still had not been pinpointed. Yet it is nine days since the flight was made and five days since Khrushchev announced the plane was shot down. If in that period Mr. Dulles cannot find out who decided to launch an espionage flight two weeks before the summit conference, then there is something very wrong with the top policy control over intelligence activities capable of plunging the world into war.

We believe Congress ought not to be content with a briefing. It ought to investigate. The inquiry should be thoroughly nonpartisan and objective for the purpose not of embarrassing the Eisenhower Administration but of determining whether military intelligence activities are subject to adequate policy control.

It is not enough to know that President Eisenhower did not personally authorize this particular flight. Congress should find out who did, and why. It should find out what safeguards exist against irresponsible action at lower levels of command that may have the gravest international consequences.

Secretary Herter's statement, in which he tried to make the best of a bad situation, leaves much to be desired. While it is true that our Government has a responsibility to protect itself from surprise attack, Mr. Herter did not offer any evidence to show that this was in fact the purpose of the U-2 flight.

Of course it is true that the Soviet Union engages in espionage. If it does not fly comparable missions over the United States, that may be because it can get the desired information without doing so. Yet the fact remains that the same flight which one country regards as a safeguard against surprise attack can be regarded by the other country as a preparation for it.

Naturally, the existence of an international agreement providing safeguards against surprise attack would make it unnecessary to conduct espionage for that purpose. We are all for such an agreement. But it will never be attained so long as its purpose is to legalize the observation which we now try to carry out illegally. The principle of "open skies" is splendid, but we cannot expect the Russians, with their national and doctrinal addiction to secrecy, to accept the kind of reciprocal national surveillance which President Eisenhower proposed at the 1955 summit conference. The surveillance would have to be genuinely international, probably operated entirely by neutrals, and accompanied by real disarmament.

As for the particular adventure of the U-2, the main question is not whether military reasons justify such flights, but whether they are subject to control by responsible policy-making officials. There is no dissent to the proposition that this flight was disastrously timed. Congress should find out who timed it and why.

MAY 14 1960

Morse Talks To Collegians; 2,000 Here Cheer Kennedy

Morse

By ERNEST B. FERGUSON
(Sun Staff Correspondent)

Chestertown, Md., May 13—
Senator Wayne L. Morse con-
tinued his attack on what he calls
Senator John F. Kennedy's "re-
actionary record" today by nee-
ding his opponent on foreign pol-
icy, tax issues, public power and
aid to education.

Mr. Morse got warm response
from about 300 students at Wash-
ington College, where Senator
Kennedy began his Maryland pri-
mary campaign two days ago.

The Massachusetts Senator
crowd reached nearly 1,000 with
the advantage of being held at
night. Senator Morse's talk was
this afternoon, and arranged on
short notice.

The two are the principal con-
tenders for Maryland's support in
Tuesday's Democratic Presidential
preference primary.

The Oregon Senator also said
he wanted to clarify his statement
yesterday that he was in a "stop-
Kennedy movement." This is a
one-man movement, neither on
behalf of nor in alliance with any
one else, he stated.

He repeated, too, that he was
"no stalking horse" for Adlai E.
Stevenson, whom he has desig-
nated as his choice for President
after himself.

Mr. Morse elaborated on this in
a Baltimore television talk to-
night, saying he would favor any
of the major Democratic candi-
dates—even Lyndon Johnson—to
Senator Kennedy. All are more
liberal, he said.

He previously has said it would
be a "mistake" for the party to
nominate Senator Johnson.

In his evening talk, he also said
"the only thing that's ganged up
on Jack Kennedy is his own voting
record."

Senator Morse also strongly
condemned this country's "spy-
plane" reconnaissance flights
over Russia, as well as the Soviet
Premier's reaction in the inci-
dent.

Russian fighter planes could
have "encircled it and forced it
down," he said, but instead it was
shot down for propaganda pur-
poses.

"Neither can we justify having
the plane there. . . . Sooner or
later we are going to have incident
or accident that will release the
first bomb, and the holocaust will
be on," he said.

On foreign policy, he said Mr.
Kennedy had voted for "bank-
manship and near-war every-
time the issues had arisen,"
pointing out the ballot on the
GOP Administration's request for
"a predated declaration of war,"
in the Formosa Straits and the
Middle East.

His opponent also differed with
him by approving military aid to
General Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, he stated.

Public Power Critic

Mr. Morse also said Mr. Ken-
nedy had voted in favor of tax
changes benefiting big business
but says he opposes increased in-
come tax exemptions because of
the loss of revenue it would in-
volve.

"His concern for revenue, as
to the Treasury only shows up
when we are considering better
tax treatment for low and mid-
dle income taxpayers," he
charged.

He also said Mr. Kennedy
agreed with the Republicans by
voting against amendments
"whereby the friends of public
power were trying to beat back
the Budget Bureau and the ad-
ministration on the crippling of
these great agencies."

Finally, he declared, his op-
ponent worked against including
grants to service men under the
GI education bill and took the
position that Federal aid to
schools should cover only school
construction help. Mr. Kennedy
did vote for the entire education
bill, including teachers' pay pro-
visions, he added.

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Date: MAY 10 1960

Tell All About Spy: Capehart

Times Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, May 10—Hoosiers have every right to know exactly what went on in the Soviet shoot-down of that U. S. spy-plane Sen. Homer E. Capehart (R., Ind.) told his Senate colleagues, in a colloquy with Sen. Frank H. Lausche (D. O.) on the Senate floor.

Both senators were taking the position that, as members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, they should have been invited, when Committee Chairman Fulbright (D. Ark.) and ranking committee members were given a "fill-in" on the matter by Secretary of State Herter and CIA Director Dulles yesterday.

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"The Eisenhower administration should take Congress into its confidence. Perhaps we could be of some help. God knows they need help, if I can read the record and the times correctly."

Lausche explained that he went to the briefing room, supposing all committeemen were invited, but he was told it was a "closed meeting for the leaders."

"TO MY embarrassment, I had to leave," he concluded.

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REMARKS OF CONG. ASHLEY

Today in Congress at 6:45 P.M. over WMAL (Washington):

JOSEPH McCAFFERY: "Again the question today: what really happened to the U.S. plane over Russia, and should the President now go to Russia?--were the questions most often asked at the Capitol as elsewhere. It was revealed that CIA Chief Allen Dulles came to the Capitol again yesterday to outline the situation before a special House Armed Services Subcommittee. According to one who was present, the latest Dulles briefing, the plane apparently suffered what's called a flame-out(?) at about 70,000 feet, forcing the pilot to come down to a level where he was then forced to the ground. This source reports also that CIA officials have complete confidence in the integrity of the pilot, Francis C. Powers, and they do not know what was involved in his apparent decision to admit that he was a spy.

"Members of the subcommittee voted unanimously to commend Dulles and the CIA for their handling of the whole affair.

"Today too the House Rules Committee put on the shelf several proposals to subject the CIA to closer Congressional scrutiny. Rules Chairman Howard Smith of Virginia said the committee feels this is not the time to conduct public hearings on the subject. Although no vote was taken, this decision too was apparently unanimous. However, some committee members indicated that they favored a closer look at this question at some future time.

"One of several members of Congress I talked to today about the spy incident was Toledo, Ohio's congressman, Thomas Ashley. I asked him if, in view of the situation that has developed, whether the President should go to Russia next month."

ASHLEY: "Well, I think if he has an opportunity to do so, it will be fine. I hardly think that the Russians will have any reason to welcome him, however."

McCAFFERY: "Do you think that our sky spy incident has ruined any chance of anything happening positively at the coming summit meeting which starts on Monday?"

ASHLEY: "I think that it is certainly--casts a very dark shadow over the summit conference. It's perfectly clear, of course, that the position of the United States at this time is far worse than it's been--well, in years, as far as world opinion is concerned. We have lost the initiative as far as world public relations is concerned--it's obvious--and I think that this recent U-2 plane incident has really given them a tremendous initiative that is very very unfortunate and will be for a long time to come."

McCAFFERY: "There seems to have been some kind of a coalition cohesing (SIC) behind the administration on this incident. I noticed that in the news today, for example, there's not going to be any effort to press for a joint committee to keep an eye on our intelligence because the feeling seems to be on the Hill, according to the stories, that the less said, the better, about our intelligence service at this time. Looking a little ahead to November, do you think that this

will still be a political issue, even though there seems to be some unity on the part of the Democrats behind the administration on their off-again, on-again/^{spy} policy?"

ASHLEY: "Well, I think very definitely it will be an issue. You're quite right when you say that as far as intelligence work is concerned, the less said the better--this is true. Now this is what makes totally outrageous the statements of the administration with respect to the plane incident. They wasted no time whatever with respect to the plane incident. They wasted no time whatever in first denying, then admitting, and finally revealing all as far as this activity is concerned, and the opinion, both in this country--the measure of opinion in this country, and world-wide too, is that this is totally unnecessary and uncalled for."

McCAFFERY: "It's not the incident so much, it's the handling of the incident after it happened?"

ASHLEY: "Absolutely so. We're talking about intelligence work and intelligence activity does require a certain amount of secrecy, but this is true when things go wrong as well as when things are going right."

Various radio stations
in Louisiana:

MAY 15, 1960

SENATOR LONG COMMENTS ON SPY PLANE INCIDENT

Senator Russell B. Long, by tape recording, over various radio stations
in Louisiana:

COMMENTATOR: "Senator, this past week, probably the most important subject on the national scene was the supposedly shooting down of an American plane by the Russians. May we have your comments on that, sir?"

SEN. LONG: "I don't know whether they shot it down or brought it down with a missile or whether the plane just ran out of oxygen in the high altitudes and had to come down, but, in any event, they have an American pilot there and they have the remains of an American plane that this boy was flying. The fact of the matter is that a lot of us have reason to believe, not by virtue of it having been given to us officially but by having heard informally or having heard rumors about it, that this country was sending planes behind the Iron Curtain. Those planes were unarmed and the purpose was to get information that we would need in the event that the Soviet Union decided to attack the United States.

"Now, as you know, this country is so wide open and so are most of the free world countries that it is very easy for Russia or anybody else to get all the information they need to know about where our defense installations are and where our Army bases are, where our cities are, where our major industries are. For the most part, they can get it just by request, write the Chamber of Commerce and get the information; but, in their country, they maintain that iron curtain and try to maintain such excessive secrecy that we have not been able to find out for certain about a great number of things we would have to know about the Soviet Union in the event that we were forced to go to war with them. Now, you know and I know that we are not planning to start a war with anybody, but if war is forced upon us and all these long-range missiles are exploded upon our country and our people are killed by the tens of millions, perhaps half of them killed in a single day, we would have to know how to go about striking back. Now if we couldn't get the information any better way, than I suppose the only thing to do was to do what we have been doing and, while it is too bad that they shot this boy down and we would just as soon that they didn't have the proof of it that we had been getting the information in the way that we have been getting it, I would a lot rather have done that than not to have the information. Now, there will be some problems about that in the future.

"I think the biggest asset about it is that we have been getting away with it for four years and I think we have Russia pretty well photographed from the air and we know where most of their things are right now. They tell me that in a year or so we ought to have a space satellite developed which will circle in outer space and give us the same information we are looking for without coming quite as close to the Soviet Union. But, as a practical matter, what real difference does it make whether you are taking the pictures from a space satellite a hundred miles up or from an airplane that is 12 miles up?--it's still the same principle. You need to know what is behind that Iron Curtain and we are finding it out the best way that we can,"

COMMENTATOR: "Do you think at this time that it will do any harm to the summit conference getting under way at this time?"

"SEN. LONG: "I don't think it makes any difference. It certainly shouldn't make any difference. It's all according to the state of mind that the people go in there with. I certainly don't think that President Eisenhower is going to let that prejudice him--he shouldn't. As a matter of fact, Mr. Khrushchev knew we were doing this for the last four or five years and so did we, and the only difference is that while he would say it, at a summit conference perhaps, or in a conversation with President Eisenhower, and President Eisenhower would say, 'Well, I don't know anything about it. I haven't been informed of anything of that sort. It must be somebody else's airplane that you are complaining about.' Well now, he knows it, but the fact of the matter is that both sides know to begin with that those were American planes flying behind Russia and getting those photographs and that information, and, incidentally, although we haven't had the good fortune of shooting one of theirs down--and didn't particularly try--they have been flying over our advanced bases, they have been over Alaska, they have been over our bases at Thule, which is on Greenland, many times, repeatedly, and these bases which we have on foreign soil have been flown over many times by Soviet planes. How do we know it? Well, we see the vapor trails up there that are left in the sky after one of these fast jet planes go through, if there is a fair amount of vapor in the sky, so both sides have been doing some of this and my only objection is that, frankly, the Soviet spy system knows a lot more about us than we know about them even as it stands now."

COMMENTATOR: "Another news making event this past week, Senator Long, was the Democratic primary--"

SEN. LONG: "Before that, I said 'my only objection'--let me say this. I have great sympathy for that young man who is back there. He didn't go over there on his own mission. He went over there because we wanted that work done and he risked his life. If we paid him \$2500 a month, which works out to about 30 thousand dollars a year, I still don't think that's any big pay for what he was doing for this country, and, to the best of our information there are several of our pilots that we were using on the same type of mission. They were not working directly for the Department of Defense. They were working, as I understand it, for some other agency of the government, perhaps the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY but I don't regard those people as being anything other than patriots. That was their job and I would regard them in somewhat the same sense as I look upon Nathan Hale, whose statue is right down on Constitution Avenue here in Washington by the Department of Justice of the government. His famous last words were, 'My only regret is that I have but one life to give for my country.' You know, he was an American spy. He was a school teacher and he was trying to get information as to where the British troops were for the aid of General Washington's troops, and we don't regard him as anything other than a great American who was trying to help his country, and the same thing is true of this young man. It takes a lot of patriotism far and beyond the pay, in order for a boy to do that kind of work. You know, a pilot who is that well qualified could get himself a good job at 15 thousand dollars or 18 thousand dollars a year for an airline anyway, so those young men who have been doing that work, just as this young man was doing, have been performing a great service to this country and the fact that they have been doing it, I think, is just one more reason why the Soviet Union will think a long time before they attack this country."

TAB

"Unauthorized" Spy Plane Is Poorest Kind of Alibi

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. J. CARLTON LOSER

OF TENNESSEE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 11, 1960

Mr. LOSER. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, I call to the attention of the House an editorial appearing in the Nashville Tennessean, one of our great newspapers, pointing up a major cold war blunder.

The editorial follows:

"UNAUTHORIZED" SPY PLANE IS POOREST KIND OF ALIBI

Now that the real story of the spy-plane disaster over Soviet Russia is coming to light, the American public is entitled to know who was responsible for this major cold-war blunder.

The fact that we have been trying to find out what was going on behind the Iron Curtain has been well known. And we may be sure that our efforts have been matched by

Soviet Russia in seeking out American secrets.

But it will be hard to explain why the United States undertook this latest venture in Russian air just before the May 16 summit meeting without properly weighing the chances of detection and exposure.

To say that this was an unauthorized exploit by a civilian flier is just another way of muddling the picture. For it has been made clear that the supersecret U-2 single-engine jet was chartered from the Lockheed Aircraft Co. by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which in turn was being serviced by the Air Force.

One point that has been carefully skirted is the part played by Mr. Allen Dulles' Central Intelligence Agency, and this also involves the part played by the National Security Council and President Eisenhower himself.

There was a good deal of cunning in the way Nikita Khrushchev misled the United States in his first announcement of the plane's destruction over the Ural Mountains, far from the nearest free-world border, for that led the State Department into a trap and brought forth excuses which later proved to be without merit.

The solar plexus blow came when it was revealed that the U-2 pilot has survived and, according to the Soviets, confessed his spy role.

Never has Mr. Khrushchev had a better chance to denounce the United States as an aggressor, and he is making the most of it. His threat of a public trial for the unfortunate pilot may never be carried out, but it is something for Washington to worry about. Coming at the same time as the summit session, it could have a devastating effect.

Spying between the United States and Russia is old stuff indeed. For our part, there is a need to guard against surprise attack, but the Russians can say that they have reason to react strongly when shadow planes, traveling at great height, cross into their territory.

They are saying this now with a vengeance, and the facts make it almost impossible for our best friends to defend our course. The photographing of military installations, which seems to have been substantiated, cannot lightly be brushed aside.

What, it may be asked, was the great emergency that caused this information-gathering flight? We know of none.

But we do know that its embarrassing failure has damaged the position of the United States and its allies before the summit, and may make any kind of agreement harder to reach.

From Russia's standpoint, the opportunity is given to make further boast of its rocketry, though this is the point on which their story falls down. For if the spy plane had been hit by the first shot from a ground-to-air rocket, it cannot be believed that the pilot would have had the chance to bail out.

Such an inaccuracy, however, does not carry too much weight in view of the rash of errors attributed to the State Department in trying to confuse the issue.

Information gathering, as it is termed in Washington, is a necessary part of the cold war, and it may last for years to come. But it is not something which should be left in the hands of people whose actions, at times, seem to be on the irresponsible.

I am sure that the talk of unauthorized espionage is a rights when it is all too plain that such a hazardous venture would never be undertaken by an individual unless someone in the higher echelons had given the word.

**Former Congressman Phillips Declared
U-2 Case Shows Need for Return of
American Ideals**

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. FRANK KOWALSKI

OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 11, 1960

Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, a distinguished former Member of this body, Hon. Alfred N. Phillips, has sent me a telegram on the U-2 case which I bring to the attention of my colleagues.

Former Congressman Phillips points out how the honor of the United States has been sullied by the mishandling of this situation and pleads eloquently for a return to high ethics and lofty ideals.

Here is the text of Mr. Phillips' telegram to me:

Hon. FRANK KOWALSKI,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Many people including the writer are utterly shocked at the photograph on the New York Daily News front page of Secretary of State Herter and Director of Intelligence Dulles laughing over the plight they have gotten us into. Was this by the orders of the President of the United States of America? How can these men or any American laugh when they have sent possibly to his doom an out-of-uniform American held as spy, who can justly be shot under international law as a spy? Furthermore it is certainly no laughing matter when the foreign

policy of our Government has been proved to be based on falsehood, misstatements, and chicanery. It is hard to believe that anyone directing the destinies of our country could guide it any way except through truthful honesty and integrity and that goes for everyone from the President down. I trust that in the House of Representatives of the United States you will do your part to see that those responsible for the low estate into which our country has fallen will be brought to account for it and relieved of their responsibilities no matter who they are and that the historic high standing and honor and ideals of the United States of America will be put back again as standards by which all of us can live best.

Personal regards,

ALFRED N. PHILLIPS

MAY 11 1960

Under unanimous consent, I bring the texts of these two editorials to the attention of my colleagues in the House. [From the Hartford Courant, May 11, 1960]

UNCLE SAM, SPY—AND STUMBLEBUM

Apparently the official Soviet line is that the American spy-plane mission was a piece of deliberate provocation designed to prevent agreement at the summit. But surely responsible statesmen on both sides of the iron curtain know that this is nonsense. There may be some doctrinaire Communists who still repeat the Marxian ritual statement that all capitalists are warmakers. But for the most part this unhappy incident shows Uncle Sam up not so much as a warmonger as inept.

Why all the fuss? Every government knows that every other government is engaged in spying. Soviet Russia presumably more than most. After all, we have Russian spies sitting in U.S. prisons right now. Probably the incident sent tremors around the world not only because of its unhappy timing just before the summit, but for other reasons too. First, it was a particularly spectacular kind of spying. Second and more important, it caught the U.S. Government in a lie. And third and most important, it has raised still unanswered questions as to whether Uncle Sam's left hand lets his right hand know what it is doing.

After all, what would we and the world have thought if some Soviet high altitude plane had flown, say, from Cuba across the continent of the United States, hoping to land in Kansas, only to be shot down in the middle of Kansas, where no one who lived to tell tales? Then again, it has been downright humiliating that the U.S. Government, leader of the free world, made through its State Department an official statement that it was able to show up as a lie. Let us hope that the Administration has now learned what it should have learned long ago: First, if you say anything at all, tell the truth. And second, if you can't tell the truth, don't say anything at all.

Even more disturbing is the hint of a lack of discipline and control in our Government. The President and Secretary of State should certainly be aware of any such intelligence activities, though not necessarily of the details. But the CIA and Pentagon should not only know the details, but should be sensitive enough to political and diplomatic overtones never to risk such a mission at such a delicate time.

It is distressing to hear that an Air Force manual claims the privilege of flying information missions without specific authority from the President or his civilian advisers. This reflects an appalling lack of discipline. The prospect of thermonuclear war is so frightening that no responsible government would allow one to start. But what if the armed services or intelligence services of any nation, let alone the United States, feel free to play with dangerous military hardware over another nation's territory? The risk of an unintended, accidental launching of pushbutton war is already too great without our adding to it.

It might be well if President and Congress were quietly and carefully to study the whole subject afresh. The first necessity is to make certain that nobody goes off half cocked. The second is to make certain that whatever is said on behalf of the U.S. Government is the truth.

[From the Waterbury Republican, May 10, 1960]

SHOCK

The spy in the sky fiasco has shaken and embarrassed the American public.

The timing of the reconnaissance episode splashed over the front pages of newspapers throughout the world could hardly be of better advantage to the Soviet Union near the eve of the summit parley in Paris. One can understand Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev's glee in announcing and denouncing the American attempt to probe the internal activity of his country.

At first, America was slightly enraged that a U.S. plane, supposedly under the supervision of the National Space and Aeronautics Administration and engaged in weather observation, should be downed for wandering, for whatever reason, across the border into Soviet air space. The State Department and administration officials misinformed the U.S. public inadvertently, for the information given them, and the cause of much of our discomfiture emanates from that hush-hush agency headed by Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence.

It now seems the flight was ordered by that department with an eye for ferreting out just what the Russians were preparing for a presummit spurge, similar to the Soviet target practice at the moonberry space prior to Khrushchev's U.S. visit. The gamble taken was immense, and the world now knows, boomeranged.

The Kremlin, as might be expected, handled the incident with the best of its propaganda prowess, sharpening a razor edge to pare Western prestige and purpose at the coming heads of state meeting. The principal hope of the world's peoples, the relaxation of global tensions, has been somewhat dashed.

Khrushchev will doubtless use this windfall to pressure the Western Allies on a stand on Berlin and only a full summoning of Western moral and military authority will deter a session of reckless and relentless bargaining by the Moscow agents.

Americans were not only disturbed at the spy story; they were surprised. They seldom realize that not only do we conduct highly secret intelligence and counterintelligence operations, but we maintain a lethal ring of airbases around the Soviet Union. In times of military or civil chagrin these installations and agencies are given inordinate and ominous publicity without the proper perspective and understanding of their purpose and necessity.

The cold war is now being run in a sudden flash by the hands of one of our chief agencies. And they are taken back. "Spy," by consensus, is a nasty word. Intelligence is preferable. Therefore, we operate an intelligence network the world over, glean, as best we can, information and knowledge otherwise unobtainable from behind the Iron Curtain or the Bamboo Curtain or any official opaqueness.

This data is demanded of a government competing for the leadership of the free world and the survival of democratic and capitalist institutions in other areas of the globe. Communist spies in the United States have been caught in number. Their espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities make mandatory counterintelligence. Such systems are realities in international affairs, however unpalatable they may seem.

The unfortunate error of judgment, and the consequences it may have, should in no way impugn the cardinal need of intelligence work in assuring the security of the Nation. But it should prompt an examination of the lines of authority in such matters and guarantee that similar action will not be taken at so crucial a time without the consent of the President and the readiness to answer to the public conscience.

Hartford Courant and Waterbury Republican Comment on U-2 Fiasco

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

FRANK KOWALSKI

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 11, 1960

Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, the shock and embarrassment felt by the American people in our Government's handling of the U-2 incident are reflected in editorials carried yesterday by two of our leading Connecticut newspapers, the Hartford Courant and the Waterbury Republican.

The Courant editorial is summarized in its title, "Uncle Sam, Spy—and Stumblebum."

The Waterbury Republican editorial points out that "The spy in the sky fiasco has shaken and embarrassed the American public."

**Meriden (Conn.) Record Comments on
"Bad Blunder" in U-2 Case**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**

HON. FRANK KOWALSKI

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 12, 1960

Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I present the text of an editorial carried by the Meriden Record in my home State of Connecticut on the U-2 incident and the handling of it by our Government.

This editorial is another indication of the extent to which the American people are disturbed by the inept way in which this entire matter has been handled.

Following is the text of the Meriden Record editorial of May 11:

EXCUSES, UNLIMITED

The United States has been caught in a bad blunder in the case of the plane and pilot shot down over Russian territory and the Reds are making the most of it. At a time and in a place where the greatest circumspection were indicated, we have been

unbelievably awkward and heavyhanded. Caught in the act, we have handled our responses to the Russian roars with all the finesse of a kid caught with jam on his face.

There is nothing very remarkable about the Russians having caught somebody spying on them; it goes on all the time, on both sides of the fence. There are plenty of Red agents in this country and in Canada, and every so often one of them is uncovered amid a big flurry of publicity, tried, and usually sentenced to prison. We may safely assume that their counterparts exist among our people on assignment in Russia.

But sending somebody in to investigate the weather or anything else over Russian territory in a jet plane, however unarmed, is another and much riskier matter, and one which we would certainly protest if it were to happen against us. Sending a plane across this particular bit of border, about which the Soviets have been notoriously touchy, makes the violation gratuitous. And engaging in this sort of spying in the stratosphere at this particular time, when chances of summit agreement deserve all the odds they can get, is timing so bad as to be unbelievable.

All of which wouldn't matter very much if the Russians were determined, as they seem to have been earlier, that the Big Four meeting be conducted in amity. Premier Khrushchev has his own way of manipulating history and if his calculations had called for warm winds at the summit he would have held off on the cold blast here.

Unhappily, the incident seems to have coincided with Red realization that no real concessions were planned by the West on Berlin and the general German situation, for which Khrushchev was stubbornly hoping. It gives him just the excuse he needs to charge bad faith, stir up public opinion against us, and generally sabotage the summit chances while putting the blame on us. And while he probably could have found his own excuses anyway, there's no need for us to supply them for free.

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summer, in July 1959. Until that date there were three different inches in use in the world. By international agreement, we shortened our inch by two-millionths of a measurement, and the British Commonwealth increased its inch almost by the same amount.

These accuracies are all the more important in an age of scientific accomplishment such as ours. In the handling of atomic energy, in the making of guided missiles, we often demand accuracies to five- or ten-millionths of an inch. Albert M. Dexter of Pratt and Whitney says this requires an accuracy on the part of gages, therefore, to one-millionth of an inch. Not long ago, Pratt and Whitney participated with the National Bureau of Standards in pushing the frontier of precise measurement to one-tenth of a millionth of an inch. From Mr. Dexter's computations, that is the thickness of one sheet of newspaper sliced into 30,000 separate sheets.

I should not pass this by without noting that Pratt and Whitney is familiarly called in the Hartford area by the name and by the suffix—West Hartford—to differentiate it from another firm of the same name—the Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corp. Each descends from the New England craftsmanship of Francis Pratt and Amos Whitney, the pioneers in metal working, but some time ago went separate business ways to become parts of a different corporate family. Pratt & Whitney Co. of West Hartford is a subsidiary of the Fairbanks Whitney Corp.

To provide further information, I submit an editorial from the Hartford Times of Saturday, May 7, which traces the industrial fame of the organization:

PRATT & WHITNEY, 100 YEARS OF INDUSTRIAL FAME

Many a manufacturing company points with pride to some outstanding contribution it has made to industrial progress or for the advancement of the general economy. At its 100th anniversary, Pratt & Whitney Co., Inc., would find it difficult to choose as its top achievement any one success among its long list of outstanding industrial triumphs.

Much of the time of generations of Pratt & Whitney craftsmen has been devoted to the establishment of uniform standards for manufacturing precision. Fineness is taken for granted in an age used to measuring and working to a millionth of an inch. Before P. & W. took up the challenge there was no reliable standard measure of anything. There was no machine tool that could maintain uniform quality in operation.

Would the leading P. & W. contribution therefore be its devotion to precision and refinement of the international inch? But one must not forget that the company also brought out the means to make possible the introduction of standard threads on nuts and bolts. Much of the modern world is literally held together on the basis of this accomplishment.

Jokingly, ours has been called a tin-can civilization. Yet, except for a P. & W. innovation, a special micrometer to measure and help control the thickness of moving ribbons of strip steel, the making of cans would have been a wasteful and makeshift business.

The establishment of precision aids and the making of measuring devices was inci-

dental to the main work of the shop. That has been the manufacture of machine tools used to produce other manufactured products.

During the great industrial period of creativity 1900-1920, Pratt & Whitney contributed more new machine development than all other machine-tool manufacturers in the world combined. The company was the leader in design of entirely new types of machine tools and gages.

Out of its shops came the jig borer, thread miller, spline miller, vertical shaper, vertical surface grinder and reamers with right-hand cut and left-hand spiral, all of them representing major advances.

Pratt & Whitney still is unexcelled in the field of design and innovation. It has automated many of its machines with use of taped controls for their operation. Thursday the company will dedicate its Centennial Hall at the West Hartford plant with a permanent exhibit of the latest P. & W. products as well as of early products and mementos.

It was no easy thing for Francis A. Pratt, the salesman and promoter, and Amos Whitney, the machinist and shop manager, to start this business 100 years ago. They did it in their own spare time after working a full day at other regular jobs.

Their first large order was for production of Spencer's automatic silk winders for use in the Cheney Bros. mills in Manchester, and by the Willimantic Linen Co. Manufacturing had just been stepped up when Pratt & Whitney were burned out. They started again, and soon were producing arms for use in the Civil War. This led to making the machines by which armaments were produced.

Pratt & Whitney made the first silent typewriter model, put together the Paige typesetter in which Mark Twain invested a profitless fortune, and produced tabulating machines and envelope machinery among more than 2,000 items for the worldwide market.

It would be impossible to sum up completely the economic benefits that Pratt & Whitney, Inc., has brought to Hartford and all of this region in its 100-year history. Certainly it has helped to make central Connecticut a famous leader in the machine tool industry.

Gathered here as an experienced labor force in its factory were some of the world's best craftsmen. Of Pratt & Whitney's nearly 3,000 present employees there are 597 who are members of its Quarter Century Club. They grew to proficiency under outstanding conditions of production, excellence, and attention to detail.

And although the company has its vast plant in West Hartford, employees come from 97 Connecticut communities and more than a dozen towns in nearby States, an indication of the widespread economic importance of the enterprise. The company's annual payroll is some \$16 million, its purchase of supplies amounts to about \$12 million, it pays annual town and State taxes of \$558,000, and the company's gifts to charity and education are on the order of \$50,000 annually. Such figures count heavily in the support of Connecticut prosperity.

Governor Ribicoff rightly has called the company one of the foundation stones of this State's industry. Importantly, the Pratt & Whitney story and its success should serve as inspiration to the scores of struggling small new industries in Connecticut. Some of them, too, will become giants in their fields.

To Pratt & Whitney Inc., industrially famous for 100 years, we pay our respects and look for the company to increase its fame in the years to come.

Soviet Deception Demands Drastic Surveillance Steps

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. STROM THURMOND

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, May 12, 1960

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on May 10, 1960, the State of Columbia, S.C., published an editorial on the world famous spy plane incident which merits the attention of the Congress and all Americans interested in our national security. It is entitled "Soviet Deception Demands Drastic Surveillance Steps."

I ask unanimous consent that this excellent editorial from this outstanding newspaper be printed in the Appendix of the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SOVIET DECEPTION DEMANDS DRASTIC SURVEILLANCE STEPS

Nikita Khrushchev's timely, propaganda-charged report to the Supreme Soviet is a reminder that global war has not ended.

He told a shouting, applauding Parliament that a U.S. jet plane had been shot down and that the American pilot had confessed that he was on a spying mission, photographing Soviet military bases and industrial installations.

The Soviets have resisted all efforts to establish effective disarmament controls. Even President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal has been flatly rejected. It would merely permit international aerial inspection to assure against a buildup for surprise attack.

The United States and her allies cannot take a chance on the secret mounting of a Soviet sneak offensive. To avoid this possibility the United States has developed, from a weak beginning early in World War II, what is said to be the world's best intelligence system.

State Department spokesmen admitted that planes have been making reconnaissance flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past 4 years. It is a reasonable guess that these forays might extend into possible Soviet staging areas.

In order to defend ourselves intelligently, we must know what our potential aggressor is doing. That involves certain risks, such as those faced when Francis G. Powers set out from Pakistan on a flight across the breadth of Soviet Russia.

Even the fact that the Soviets had emplacements in the mountainous heart of the U.S.S.R. equipped to shoot him down from an altitude of 12 miles is valuable military information.

Unless the pattern has changed recently, the Soviets are making almost daily feints by squadrons of planes against our Alaskan defenses. It is likely that they are carrying on similar probing operations all around the free-world perimeter. Soviet warplanes are flagrantly invading the airspace over Japan. Soviet submarines prowl off our Atlantic shores. One of their spy trawlers recently watched our submarine rocket tests 60 miles off the coast of Rhode Island. A pretty good indication of the effectiveness of Soviet spying activities in this country is the fact that the Reds stole most of our hush-hush atomic secrets.

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On the other hand, there are strong indications that we know what is going on behind the Iron Curtain. We are aware of many Soviet military strengths and weaknesses. We know that certain of their rocket claims are hoaxes. We have made some mistakes in intelligence that have cost billions of dollars, such as the Arctic dew line that was erected to stop a Soviet bomber armada that did not exist. Proper intelligence avoids such expensive blunders in defense.

The United States has been criticized because the ill-fated Powers expedition came just before the summit meeting, taking an unusually big propaganda risk. But we know from experience that Khrushchev uses his major peace gestures to cover up some big political or military excursions. While waving an olive branch over the upcoming meeting, he has been able to establish an ideological beachhead in Guinea on the west tip of Africa. He could also use the conference to cover up military preparations inside Russia.

The worst Khrushchev can say about the incident of the unarmed U.S. photographic plane over the Urals is that he caught us trying to find out what mischief his regime might be concocting.

Petition

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. THOMAS J. LANE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 21, 1960

Mr. LANE. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following petition from the Anti-Communist Confederation of Polish Freedom Fighters in U.S.A., Salem, Mass., April 11, 1960:

PETITION TO THE HONORABLE STATESMEN, DIPLOMATS, AND MAKERS OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

In a few weeks, in Paris, there will be held the so-called summit conference. The leaders of great nations will meet. The reason for the conference is, naturally, to talk over peace terms, especially the elimination of fear for the new methods of warfare which may arise in a modern war situation.

At the conference both sides will speak of peace but words are also a means and an effort of bringing about a realization of the fact. President Eisenhower, for instance, a leader of the Western Nation with true apostolic and missionary zeal will speak in favor of a just peace based upon friendship, justice, freedom and respect of human rights. Khrushchev on the other hand thinks only of peace in the terms of possessing the world, thus making it impossible to hinder any communistic activities.

Khrushchev's peace is the enslavement of millions of people through communistic oppression, it's the desire to possess the entire world.

There is then no reason for useless optimism.

Secondly: Not long ago, an average American thought that all American problems may be solved through the help of money and technique, since with money and modern technique we won the war?—That is true. But what is worse, we lost the peace.

Therefore it is evident, that peace cannot be bought! Neither with gold nor the enslavement and captivity of nations. Peace is based on moral laws, justice, trustworthiness and respect. The moral laws are as realistic and unchangeable as the

laws of physics and economy and without true moral aspects we can build only moral and political chaos.

Looking at the 40 years of the history of communism, at its conquests and robbery, at its murderous and bloody march, not heeding any laws of God and morality and taking under consideration the false communistic philosophy, we must sound the alarm and call upon the conscience of the leaders of the United States to change their tactics and politics because the false communistic philosophy must be fought with a philosophy based on moral assets. Therefore all agreements made with the Communists must come to an end and their false promises must be ignored. Conferences with Bloody Khrushchev must stop. Murder and communistic tyranny will remain forever a murder and an enslavement, an outrage against moral laws.

Communism based on material and Marxist ideas for 40 years has not changed or altered its ideas, seldom does it change its strategy but very easily and according to need and necessity, it changes its tactics. This is the reason for the latest travels, visits and revisits of Khrushchev. That is the reason for calling of the summit conference, for behind all this undercover is the political policy of Khrushchev; namely, to deaden the opinion of the world in regard to their communistic oppression.

Therefore in writing this petition to the leaders of the United States, guiding myself not only with a feeling of loyalty to my native land, and with a fear of the future of Poland, but also taking under consideration the fate of the entire world, I plead with you leaders of the Nation.

America, in protecting and defending the freedom of the enslaved nations, is protecting and safeguarding at the same time its own freedom and happiness as well as that of the whole world. We call today for an alarm; for tomorrow may be too late. We must put an end to communistic action and to its leader Khrushchev. We must destroy the diabolical plans of this Red Nero and this Bloody Butcher of Budapest.

It must be done today—for tomorrow may be too late.

Besides the danger of communism, there arises in the world today another reviving power, Germany, which destroyed and now again rebuilt by America, begins to voice its opinion and perhaps tomorrow in unity with communism may endanger the peace of the world.

The Germans, with specialized officers, falsify facts and they take every opportunity to portray the American way of thinking and outlook for their own benefit.

The result—that along with the communistic danger there appears another, that of Germany.

Against these two dangers we must arouse public opinion and make realistic plans for a world peace.

The fate of the enslaved nations is a steppingstone and a key to peace in Europe and in the entire world. The matter of freedom for Poland is precisely linked with the problem of peace. If today I permit myself to petition the leaders of the West, I do it out of duty and love for my country and those to whom I am indebted; namely, those who still remain on the fighting front and to those who work in the underground.

I am informed that the most tragic decisions about Poland in the last years were made without the consent of the Polish people and outside of Poland. * * * "Therefore, let decisions of hope and peace come and arise today in the West. * * * Let the voice of the Polish people reach the conscience of the American leaders through the efforts of our friend, Jozef Mlot-Mroz. * * * This is the plea I receive from my friends: "We know of your protests through hunger strikes and if you are able and strong

enough to perform another such a hunger strike to protest against inhuman treatment, Poland once again pleads for it. * * * Poland, with hopeful eyes, looks toward America and pleads for help."

This appeal had been made by the leaders of the Polish fighting nation; therefore, their plea I will certainly realize and as my strength permits, I will carry out.

This is the reason of my new decision: a protest and hunger march to Washington, which a month before the summit conference in Paris I will put into action. April 17, Easter Sunday, on foot I leave from Boston to Washington which I hope to reach within a span of 2 weeks. Then in Washington for a number of days preceding the summit conference, I will continue my hunger strike, calling forth in this manner for freedom of Poland and the other enslaved nations, protesting against any negotiations with communism and with its bloody leader, Khrushchev.

My decision is the result of my great love for my mother country, Poland, my loyalty to American happiness which my brethren in Poland do not possess. My decision is also a command of underground benefiting from the welfare and happiness of America. I take this step to remind the West of the Polish right to freedom and to arouse Americans to the near and grave danger of communism.

West awaken. Today's S O S of Poland and the enslaved nations is a warning for you today and tomorrow. West, awaken today. Tomorrow may be too late.

With respect,
JOZEF MLOT-MROZ,
President, Anti-Communist Confederation of Polish Freedom Fighters in U.S.A.

The Problems of Africa

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. EDMUND S. MUSKIE

OF MAINE

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, May 12, 1960

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on February 20, 22, and 26, 1960, Mrs. May Craig's column "Inside in Washington," which appears in several newspapers in my State, contained material of general interest to any thoughtful American who has an interest in foreign affairs.

In the column which appeared on February 20, Mrs. Craig explained the importance of the foreign-aid program, as it might apply on the Continent of Africa. At this time, Mrs. Craig was about to embark on an extended visit to that great continent.

On February 22, she shared with her readers the many practical problems which face a reporter about to undertake such a journey, and she was also able to communicate the sense of excitement that one feels in approaching such a journey.

On February 26, she summarized the briefing given by State Department personnel who are experienced in African affairs.

I ask unanimous consent that these three articles be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

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itself up 60 percent over last season with 116,500 people on the slopes. Nearly 14,000 people have used the ice rink, not counting the thousands upon thousands of spectators.

"An old standby in the winter sports field is Yosemite's Badger Pass. Superintendent John Preston writes that there have been 126,718 visitors by early April and they still were coming. An average of 500 persons use the facilities on a weekday and 1,800 to 2,600 on a typical Saturday or Sunday. This does not include 6,232 visitors who ice skated on the valley floor. Badger Pass opened in 1933 and the use has been growing constantly.

"Stanley R. Zeger, acting supervisor at Eldorado National Forest, says the year there was substandard as far as snow conditions were concerned, but that did not slow down the skiing enthusiasts. About 95 percent of the approximately 106,000 people using the Highway 50 and South Tahoe snowfields are skiers. The use was up about 7 percent. "The last two snow seasons have been poor," says Supervisor Zeger, "but the trend is steadily increasing."

"The people on the east side of the mountains are sharing in this activity and Mammoth Mountain of the Inyo National Forest is one of the fastest growing snow regions in California. Supervisor Joe Radel reports a 32 percent gain with more than 100,000 snow visits to the Inyo.

"Although skiing is a major sport at Lassen National Forest and Volcanic Park, Forest Supervisor V. A. Parker and Park Superintendent Edward Freeland say heavy family fun use attracts groups from all over northern California, including the San Francisco Bay region.

"About 22,000 traveled to Lassen Forest, half of them going just to romp in the snow with the rest doing the skiing. Another 15,000 toured Lassen Park's snowfields.

"There is a tremendous potential for future development in both the Lassen and Inyo regions as well as some of the lesser used forest lands.

"Plumas National Forest's La Porte was one of the first ski areas to develop in northern California many, many winters ago. With that facility and the new Johnsville State Park coming in, the potential winter sports development is considerable.

"I look for development of the Plumas, Cedar Pass, Union Valley, and many other regions similar to Mount Shasta's Ski Bowl in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest. Observing its second year of winter sports, Forest Supervisor Paul Stathem says Shasta Bowl use is up 25 to 50 percent this year over the initial season there and Snowman's Hill continues to provide an excellent community place to play in the snow, which means most of the increase consists of visitors from outside the immediate region.

"The reputation was spread this year to the benefit of all the Sierra Nevada, and everyone concerned must continue to work together to provide the facilities to meet this demand. The investment will be repaid many times."

Medical Care for the Aged

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. RAY J. MADDEN

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 16, 1960

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, one of the major issues which this Congress must act upon before adjournment, is the problem of practical legislation which will provide hospitalization and medical

care for millions of folks in the upper age bracket.

The following letter from Benjamin Saks, president of the Northwest Indiana Jewish Welfare Federation, 708 Broadway, Gary, Ind., reflects practical thoughts concerning this problem which involves so many millions of our elderly citizens throughout the Nation:

NORTHWEST INDIANA JEWISH
WELFARE FEDERATION,
Gary, Ind., May 2, 1960.

Representative RAY MADDEN,
House Ways and Means Committee,
House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE MADDEN: At a meeting of its board of directors held on the evening of April 27, 1960, the following resolution was passed by this organization, with the instruction that it be submitted for your attention and study:

"Whereas medical care for the part of our population 65 years and over is a major concern of the Nation and of this welfare federation; and

"Whereas the admission rate to hospitals is twice as large as for persons who are younger; and whereas they stay longer after admission; and

"Whereas many of them have incomes of \$3,000 or less; and

"Whereas one-half of the residents of homes for the aged require medical care in residence; and

"Whereas 80 percent of residents of homes for the aged are partially supported by public assistance funds; and

"Whereas less than 40 percent of the persons over 65 are covered by private medical insurance; Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That we favor the use of the mechanism of the old-age and survivors program of the Social Security Act to provide an expanded program of health services for persons 65 and over."

We earnestly hope that you will give this resolution and the sentiment that it expresses your very earnest consideration in the debate on this issue in the current Congress.

Sincerely yours,

BENJAMIN SAKS, President.

Reflections on the U-2 Plane Incident

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS

OF DELAWARE

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, May 16, 1960

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD a very timely editorial entitled "Reflections on an Incident," which was published today in the Wall Street Journal.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REFLECTIONS ON AN INCIDENT

The psychologists say that toward the major affairs of life we all have moments of ambivalence, that we can suffer all at once the mixed feelings of joy and anxiety.

If we can judge by the samplings of public opinion, and by our own feelings Americans have had something of this same ambivalence in their reaction to the spy-plane incident. Pride, relief, uneasiness of mind, and even dismay, have been inter-

mingled. Each of these emotions is understandable, and it is not easy to strike a balance among them.

The causes of pride are simply stated. Ever since sputnik the American people have had a vague but strong uneasiness that somehow we were falling behind the Russians in the struggle. There was not merely the concern over the scientific competition and basic military capabilities; there was also worry about intangibles, that we were soft, bungling, lacking in initiative, energy and alertness when compared with the ruthless, monolithic Communist empire.

Then suddenly we learned that our defense forces were not so listless after all. Hearts were bound to leap with pride at the knowledge that an American reconnaissance plane had penetrated deep into Russian territory, and that furthermore this was but one of many. Here is tangible evidence that our Government is not "asleep at the switch," that our intelligence forces have diligence and the equipment and skills to apply it.

And not the least of our pleasure at events is the way in which this incident has shaken the Russians. For make no mistake about it, the fact that their vaunted defenses can be so readily penetrated is not something that Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues can blithely dismiss.

Reflect for a moment on the dismay, and the fear, we would feel if we discovered that Russian planes had been flying over the United States for months undetected. This country would suffer a psychological trauma of major proportions; it would be a national scandal and heads would roll all over the place.

Something like this may be happening in Russia now. Because of that, Mr. Khrushchev's anguished outcries are not all tears and flappdoodle. His military men have a lot of explaining to do to him, and he has a lot of explaining to do to the Politburo and to the Russian people. Whatever posture Mr. Khrushchev puts to the world, his arrogance has been humbled.

That, in turn, is bound to have an effect on the affairs of the summit conference which begins this morning. For all that the spy plane incident has given Mr. Khrushchev something to scream about, he cannot now be so cocksure. The repercussions of this affair are by no means all to Mr. Khrushchev's advantage in the realms of diplomacy.

In a world that everyone knows is perilous, there is comfort and reassurance in all this. Not only has our side scored on their side, but when this incident is added to our recent successes in space and under the sea we can feel less intimidated by Russian prowess and more confident in our state of preparedness.

As President Eisenhower put it, "no one wants another Pearl Harbor" and so we rejoice at anything that increases our knowledge of military forces that might launch a massive surprise attack in which survival would be the prize.

This being so, then, why should there be any cause for uneasiness over the events of the past 10 days?

It is not simply stated. For it stems from less readily apparent consequences, and in some cases not so much from immediate consequences as from anxieties about the future which have here been sowed.

Part of it, perhaps, comes from the performance put on by the State Department that famous weekend. Either the State Department was ignorant of what was going on, which is quite possible, or else it had given no thought to anticipating that a plane might be caught and planning what it should do then. In either case, the Government of the United States was caught not only spying but lying. It did not make a pretty spectacle.

Part comes, perhaps, from the fact that the confusion extended all the way to the

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May 16

White House. It's very clear that although President Eisenhower had authorized the CIA to do "whatever is necessary" to obtain information, he was as surprised by this particular plane incident as everyone else. But bureaucratic bungling is something to which, sadly, we have grown accustomed. The anxiety strikes much deeper. It comes precisely because we do all know this is a perilous world and that the prize in the next war will not be victory but survival. And for some of the older among us, because we do indeed remember Pearl Harbor.

Whatever mystery lies behind that naval disaster, it was no fault of military intelligence. We had the Japanese code; we knew what they were doing, even unto the hour. Besides, Pearl Harbor was no moment's inspiration of the Japanese; it came as the culmination of events in which our own mistakes played some small part.

The next world war, if it comes, can come as well from bungling as from design. An adventurous American, a trigger-happy Russian, a moment of panic—these can easily be the seeds of holocaust. And just because we can understand the panic that would come from Russian planes over Kansas City, we need have anxiety about American planes over Sverdlovsk.

It is all very true when we say we have no aggressive intent but it wholly misses the mark. For fate depends on some Russian with his hand on a button believing that that plane overhead is not on a warlike mission. It also misses the mark, though true enough, to see the hypocrisy of Mr. Khrushchev crying out against spies. We ourselves would see a difference between a Colonel Abel, spying in Brooklyn, and those planes over Kansas City.

So the uneasiness of mind has nothing to do with spying; we all accept the necessity for it and desire that it be done diligently. Mr. Khrushchev's self-righteous screams on that score can be dismissed for what they are. The concern is over an adventure which, by its very nature, risks bringing on the very thing against which it is supposed to be guarding.

Yet even all this, we think, might be accepted as a hazard under different circumstances, anxiety has become a daily habit which we have learned to wear patiently. But it would be one thing to know that these risks were recognized, measured, and accepted by the highest elective officers of the State into whose judgment we have put ourselves. It is quite another thing to feel that things are done by subordinates left free to do "whatever is necessary."

Here is the Government of the United States engaging in an act that by its very nature must carry always the sparks of an explosion, and yet so far as anyone can see it was an act thought up, initiated, and carried out in secret not only from the enemy but from ourselves.

Their zeal is commendable; perhaps even their judgment in this case may be right. But if they have done this, unknown, what else is unknown? And if subordinate officers, not responsible to the people, are to have in the future a blank check to fill in as they please, who can know what demands their zeal may put upon the world tomorrow?

And there is one other matter. The strength of this country in the free world has always been that, unlike the Russians, we could be trusted not to do provocative things and that whatever our Government said was true. We hope that image is too strong to be shattered by any one incident, but we think it too precious to risk having it sullied.

So for our own part, we share the pride in discovering that here, in one more area, we are not being outdone by the Russians,

and we do not hide our human satisfaction at the consternation that must now be wide among them.

And yet for all of that, we confess that in this incident we, too, have anxieties that will not down.

Health and Medical Care for the Aged

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN W. McCORMACK

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 16, 1960

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, in my remarks I include an informative letter sent to me by the Honorable Patrick A. Tompkins, Commissioner of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in connection with the administration's plan to provide health and medical care for the aged. The letter of Commissioner Tompkins to me points out the weaknesses in the administration's proposal. The views of Commissioner Tompkins are worthy of profound consideration because he is one of the best-qualified persons in the field of public welfare throughout the United States:

THE COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
Boston, May 11, 1960.

Hon. JOHN W. McCORMACK,
House Majority Leader,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN McCORMACK: Thank you for the copies of the statement by Mr. Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on presentation of the administration's plan to provide health and medical care for the aged. I have, up to this point, only been able to devote my observations, as to the impact of these proposals upon the aged of the Commonwealth and upon the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the constituent cities and towns, in a limited manner, as no data seems to be available on the premium costs that would be charged by either commercial or nonprofit insurance carriers for the coverage proposed in Mr. Flemming's statement.

We do, however, have some facts as to potential eligibility that we can draw from Mr. Flemming's statement on page 4, under item 1, "Eligibility for Participation in Program." Apparently, all persons receiving social security benefits over the age of 65 would be eligible, plus others on whom I cannot secure up-to-date data. This would mean at least 350,000 persons over 65 currently receiving old-age insurance benefits, either primary, or dependency, or survivor benefits, would be eligible.

We also know that the standard monthly budget of an aged person living alone is \$127.80 under our old age assistance program. We also know that the means test to be applied for participation in this program is to be rather liberally interpreted and applied. If not so applied, it would mean that these 350,000-plus persons, if given the opportunity by State legislation and if desiring to participate in the administration's insurance health program, would, in fact, have to apply for and be subjected to the indignities of the old-age assistance means test. Moreover, I think that, in view of our old-age assistance standard, all such persons

applying for old age insurance under the administration's proposal would have to have their personal portion of the premium paid for by the State governmental agency without any matching fund from the Federal Government. As this involves 350,000 persons, it would amount to a new unmatched expenditure of \$8,400,000. For the current 80,000 recipients of old-age assistance, it would amount to an additional cost of \$1,920,000, or a total of \$10,320,000 as the individual's share of the premium at \$24 per person per year.

Since Mr. Flemming suggests on page 2 of his statement under paragraph 4 that less catastrophic policies on major medical expenses available to persons over the age of 65 called for annual premium payments ranging from \$60 to \$130 a year, it would appear obvious that, since most major medical expense insurance policies are limited to 60 days of hospital care, the full coverage for nursing home care for the entire year and for one-half year of hospital care plus the other itemized benefits for surgery, drugs, X-rays, home care, etc., would result in a prohibitive premium and certainly one at \$250 per year per person upward. If the premium were \$300 a year and under the financial formula that the State government was to pay \$200 or two-thirds in Massachusetts—one of the wealthier States according to the Hill-Burton formula employed in this insurance plan—the State's share of the premium matched by the Federal Government would be \$75 million. This, added to the absorption of the individual's premiums, represents a total of \$85,320,000. I have checked with both the Blue Cross and one commercial carrier, and there are no rates available for year-round nursing home care for persons over 65 or under 65 in operation or even contemplated at this point. There are no policies available for 6 months' care in a hospital for persons over 65.

However, to apply this proposal to the typical expensive hospitalization of a person over 65, as we know it in Massachusetts, the hospital costs for the acute illness or accident will run about \$1,000. To have this bill paid in accordance with the administration's formula, the breakdown would be as follows for the sick patient over 65:

- (a) Initial premium, \$24.
 - (b) Initial payment for sick patient, \$250.
 - (c) Twenty percent of the remaining balance, \$150.
 - (d) Paid by the insurance company, \$600.
- Therefore, for the privilege of electing to be insured for the usual catastrophic hospital bill under the administration's proposal, the individual over 65 must pay \$424, and the insurance company pays only \$600—pretty expensive insurance.

It should be pointed out that, under the Forand bill, the entire \$1,000 hospital bill would be paid at no premium, deductible payment, or coinsurance obligation on the part of the sick elderly person over the age of 65.

In short, the cost to the individual and the cost to the individual States and their municipalities becomes prohibitive.

(a) No individual, dependent solely upon old-age and survivors insurance, can find in free money the initial \$24 premium and the initial \$250 to be paid against a hospital bill—a total of \$274 plus 20 percent of the cost of the illness.

(b) No State can afford to spend \$85 million to save \$31,600,000, the present old-age assistance expenditure for hospital care and nursing home care on an annual basis; and, also note, that not all of the hospital bills of \$11,250,000 would be paid, as \$2½ million for annual chronic hospital care would not be paid, as only 180 days of hospital care are included in the administration's proposal.

In short, the proposal is not a health insurance plan for the aged as its costs are so

**Congress Must Reassert Its Right
To Know**

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. FRANK KOWALSKI

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 16, 1960

Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, I know that no Member of Congress wishes to say or do anything that might interfere with the President's freedom of action at the summit meeting.

However, once the summit conclave has been concluded, I believe that the Congress must move quickly and decisively to reassert and reaffirm its right to know what goes on in the executive branch of the Government.

Specifically, the legislative branch must insist that its constitutional powers are not infringed upon by any department or agency including the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Congress should further insist that foreign policy be conducted by the Department of State, under the supervision of the President, and that extreme care be taken to prevent the making of decisions in this critical field by the military.

The dangers of the present situation are pointed out in an editorial printed Friday, May 13, in the Wall Street Journal.

I commend this editorial to the careful perusal of all Members of the House. The text follows:

A NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE

In all its recent statements, the State Department has been careful to note that President Eisenhower had not "authorized" the particular flight of the U-2 plane that penetrated more than 1,200 miles into Russia before it fell into Russian hands.

At his press conference the other day Mr. Eisenhower made plain that this was a mere quibble; the gathering of any information that will protect the United States was "authorized" by him long ago. Intelligence operatives are to use "whatever means necessary short of the use of force" to learn what Russia may be up to. Implicit in his statement was that while he had not "authorized" the specific flight of May 1, he had "authorized" any and all such steps.

His statement clearly backed up Secretary of State Herter's announcement that the United States would continue to do what it had been doing for some time past about aerial reconnaissance of Russia. But it did nothing to clear up his own statement of just a year and three months ago that "the orders were very strict" about flying near Russia's borders.

In answer to a question in 1959 whether a missing Air Force research plane had been lost testing Russian preparedness procedures, the President then said: "Actually now, I have forgotten the limit, but I established it personally some time back a couple of years ago, and I am sure this happening is accidental." It is hard to see how anyone can infer from that statement anything except that U.S. planes were under orders not to cross Russian borders.

Perhaps the President means to make a distinction between using Air Force planes, which could be considered as the "use of force" he has said will not be employed, and using National Aeronautics and Space Administration planes engaged only in intelligence. It is a distinction, however, that will escape the Russians.

And it is a distinction that certainly will continue to escape some Members of Congress. The other day Speaker RAYBURN demanded that the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency tell Congress who ordered that pilot into the air over Russia. Senator WILLIS ROBERTSON said he had attended many meetings of the Appropriations Committee, but nobody had ever said anything about flying planes over Russia; certainly the CIA Chief, Mr. Allen Dulles, hadn't. Senator STYLES BRIDGES demanded that the State Department and CIA explain the whole story to Congress. A day or so later Representative CLAYTON CHRISTIAN, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, said right out that the aborted flight over Russia was one of a series planned by the CIA, approved by the White House, and known to a few Members of Congress as well.

So to say that Congress is somewhat confused over the operations, as well as the role, of the CIA is to note the obvious. Even though Mr. Herter now says that our "extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft" was apparently not a secret to the Soviet leadership, it was obviously a secret to many Members of the House and Senate.

But if the President's orders of 15 months ago never applied to the CIA, if the limits have been lifted, and if flights into Russia are no longer accidental happenings and only a handful of Congressmen knew about the changes, Congress is in poor position to complain about the matter.

For Congress has consistently declined to keep itself—or even its leaders—responsible for knowing what goes on in the CIA. Senators and Representatives have acted as though this Agency, whose farflung operations are answerable only to one man, is somehow not only beyond an accounting but also above the errors that are common to all men.

What Congress learns of CIA's activities Congress learns only if and when Mr. Dulles is inclined to disclose some information, and then only what he wishes to tell.

The sole mission of the CIA is to gather intelligence and assess it, and it may very well be doing this job in an able manner. The point is that Congress does not know whether CIA is or not.

Therefore Congress should require that Mr. Dulles give an accounting of his stewardship so that it will know whether CIA is soundly manned and directed or whether it is perhaps more adventurous than it ought to be to serve the Nation best. In a word, Congress ought to choose a committee of responsible men to whom CIA is made responsible by statute. And Congress should waste no time doing so.

It is not our purpose here to pillory Mr. Dulles individually, for his responsibilities are very great. But the fact is that in a country where, by the words of the Constitution, only Congress has the power to declare war, Mr. Dulles' responsibilities seem to us to be far greater than they ought to be and his power of decision far broader than it ought to be.

We are not suggesting that Mr. Dulles should be forced to expose his espionage apparatus to the full gaze of the American public and thus to its enemies. But clearly an agency whose enthusiasm for gathering intelligence and whose lack of judgment in doing so can actually endanger our overseas bases, our alliances and our reputation for candor and truth shall no longer be permitted to remain almost a law unto itself.

The editorial is as follows:

The spy plane incident brings home to Americans as never before what the cold war is really like.

It shows how difficult it is for a free and open society to operate openly and honorably against the secretive, monolithic Communist empire.

It shows how badly coordinated our national leadership is, with the peace-seeking right hand knowing little or nothing about what the war-detering left hand is up to.

It shows how a calculated risk can backfire when the risk is not properly weighed.

For the tragedy of this incident goes beyond the fact that we got caught.

The tragedy is that we lost much more, at this delicate moment in history, than we stood to gain by not canceling the spy-plane flights some time ago until the summit meeting and other negotiations were over.

There is a military argument that reconnaissance flights around and over Soviet territory give us data that makes it easier for us to deter or repel aggression. It is a valid argument.

The flights tell us about the buildup of Soviet missile potential, where the pads are, which are combat-ready, etc.

They also serve as part of the free world's warning line against a surprise missile strike.

This information would help us strike back quickly and accurately at Soviet missile bases, to knock them out before a second strike could be launched.

From a strictly military standpoint, this information, so essential both to defense planning and striking ability, is worth risking the loss of a few planes.

But as a contribution to deterring world war III, this spy-plane technique has grave disadvantages, too.

In this era of pushbutton war, the necessity of split-second decisionmaking to avoid annihilation, a misinterpreted spy-plane invasion of Russian airspace could touch off an ever-widening exchange of missiles.

Even more likely, if the United States continues to probe the Soviet periphery, would be constant clashes of American aircraft and Soviet air defenses, with possible Soviet reprisals against American air bases in nearby nations. This in turn could spread into general war.

WAR BY ACCIDENT?

Finally, the spy-plane flights could lead to ever-increasing tensions, and just when some relaxation seemed possible.

The more tense American-Soviet relations become, the more likely one side or the other might, by design or accident, pass the point of no return.

It is precisely because of this danger that the United States—or at least part of our Government—has been trying to bring about a relaxation of tensions.

It was why the President had Khrushchev visit him, and why he is planning to return the visit.

It was the reason for the 1955 summit conference, and for the disarmament conferences now in progress.

It is the reason for this month's summit conference, too.

Though there may be military justification for the spy-plane flights, it would have been merely prudent to suspend them just before the summit meeting, and act as the little boy, who "jes" before Christmas" was as good as he could be.

In short, the military objectives should have been put aside because of the threat they posed to more important political objectives.

This lack of commonsense precaution, together with the evidence from Washington that the President had not specifically reviewed such a dangerous technique in this

presummit period, suggests that the store needs closer minding.

Our right hand has obviously been working against our left hand, and the result has been confusion over what our strategy priorities really are as we head for the summit.

Nor is this the only recent occurrence that creates this impression.

Two others are the announcement this past weekend that we shall resume underground nuclear testing, despite the Geneva conference now dealing with the problem; and the President's recent announcement that Vice President Nixon might assume his summit seat if the meeting lasts more than 7 days.

Both showed not only a lack of faith in international negotiation, but also a willingness to take action that could make that negotiation even less likely to bear fruit.

The spy-plane incident shows the same attitude.

What about the effect of the exposure of these flights on our cold war position?

When the long-range effect is considered, this is clear: In preparing for the war we hope never to fight, we have injured ourselves seriously in the political, economic, and moral war we are already fighting.

SUMMIT POSITION HURT

We have put ourselves on the defensive just as we are about to step into an important cold war encounter—that is, the summit conference.

We have lost the solid ground of fairness and openness from which we could have negotiated.

We have given Khrushchev a solid issue against us, in which international law is all on his side.

We have opened the way for him to reap a propaganda coup bigger than anything he has yet accomplished.

But perhaps even more important is the damage done to the U.S. ultimate cold war position.

Until this past weekend, we could still say that we operated aboveboard, in contrast to undercover Soviet activities. We could claim that we tell the truth and the Soviets lie.

Now we can no longer assume that pose, and the consequent damage to our moral leadership of the free world has suffered, especially from the point of view of the uncommitted new nations of Asia and Africa.

This shows how shortsighted is the argument that we can justifiably engage in spy-plane flights because the Soviets engage in much more farflung spying activities.

UNITED STRATEGY NEEDED

If we, like the Marxists, argue that the end justifies the means, it makes the war of ideas—which the uncommitted nations take very seriously—all the harder to fight.

If we adopt techniques similar to those of our enemies, how are bystanders to appreciate the vast difference between us?

For all these reasons, the game turns out to be not worth the candle.

We must now take all precautions possible to keep from threatening our summit position more than we already have, lest world opinion blame us for the failure of the meeting.

We must also insist that our leaders define cold war priorities, and make sure that the pursuit of one does not endanger the pursuit of others.

This incident suggests that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon, which favor a hard line and a minimum of international negotiation, rule our foreign policy more than does the State Department.

It also suggests that the White House has been unable to reconcile the objectives of these two camps.

If American public opinion can now force a new effort to unify national strategy, then we may have salvaged something out of this colossal blunder.

**Spy Flight on the Eve of the Summit Was
a Colossal American Blunder**

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. BYRON G. ROGERS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 16, 1960

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the Appendix of the Record an editorial "Spy Flight on the Eve of the Summit Was a Colossal American Blunder" that appeared in the Denver Post, Denver, Colo., on Tuesday, May 10, 1960. I know this will be of great interest to all the Members.

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of a talk I made to the Clinton (S.C.) Kiwanis Club's annual farmers night program, April 14, 1960:

FARM PROGRAM

(Address of Congressman WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN DORN at Kiwanis Club's annual farmers night, April 14, at Clinton, S.C.)

The most serious domestic problem facing the people of the United States is the farm situation. Farm population in the United States has dropped to 11 percent of the total, the lowest percentage in the history of the United States and the lowest of any major world power in the history of the world. This is a dangerously low percentage.

The United States was founded by men with a rural philosophy. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights were largely written by rural men. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were all outstanding farmers. The fact that Washington and Jefferson were great farmers made them good Presidents. Nearly all of the Presidents in the history of the United States were born and reared on a farm or associated with a farm. The membership of the Congress for 130 years was overwhelmingly rural. Farmers have initiative. They are independent. They think for themselves. They cannot be herded or coerced to the polls by goons and ward bosses. It is difficult to get up a mob or overthrow the Government with busy, contented landowning farmers. A man who is busy milking cows and tilling the soil is not going to lead a march on the Nation's Capitol to overthrow representative government.

We do not find Communists and Socialists engaged in the pursuit of agriculture. Our rural areas are no breeding ground for juvenile delinquency. Rural people go to church and support good schools. The rural home is the bedrock of a democratic society.

Under the price-support and acreage-control programs, the American family-size farmer has been reduced to a state of peonage. One-half of the burley-tobacco growers in the United States, under this Government program, are permitted only one-half acre or less—in a nation that originated the culture of tobacco. Under these Government programs, cotton acreage has fallen off in the United States 60 percent since 1930. We have lost cotton markets at home and abroad. One-third of the cotton farmers in the United States grow 5 acres or less. The percentage is even greater in the Southeast. It is impossible for a farmer to clothe, support, and send his children to college with less than 5 acres of cotton or one-half acre of tobacco.

What opportunity is there for a young man with an ambition to be a farmer? He cannot possibly become a farmer unless he inherits a farm or marries into one with allotted acres. Farming is the only business in this so-called free nation that a young man cannot go into—he is not permitted to do so by a government of free people. Under these Government programs, the situation gets worse and worse. Surpluses mount and the rural population decreases, with more and more people on the welfare rolls and more looking to Washington paternalism.

These farm programs could not have served Russia's purpose more if they had been written by the Kremlin's planners of world conquest. America's population is being concentrated in the great cities, easy to annihilate with the atomic bomb, easy to herd into political machines, and easily subjected to propaganda and agitation. In fact, the first farm program inaugurated in the United States was written by questionable characters—one of whom has since served a term in the penitentiary. The farm program was written by Alger Hiss, Nathan Witt, Frank Shea, Rex Tugwell, Lee Pressman, Henry A. Wallace, and Felix Frankfurter, presently a Justice of this notorious U.S. Supreme Court.

These were principally bright young attorneys, most of whom knew nothing whatever about agriculture.

Under the programs these men inaugurated, we grow less and less, our farm population shrinks, while Russia grows more and more and every nation in the world increases her farm acreage. Soviet Russia since 1955 has added over 100 million new acres to agricultural production. Rhodesia exempts her farmers from land taxes to grow more and more. Turkey exempts her farmers from income taxes to grow more and more. In this country we passed a soil bank to get our farmers to grow less and less. Incidentally, the average farmer in Rhodesia plants 65 acres of tobacco; in Canada, 30 acres; and in the United States, may I repeat, half of the tobacco farmers are permitted to plant only one-half acre or less. The same is true with cotton and wheat. Foreign nations grow more, with American foreign aid, while we grow less. We send them marketing experts, fertilizer experts, and the net result is to put our own people out of business.

Under the cotton price-support loan program, in the year 1958 358 farmers in the State of California received \$50,000 or more; Arizona, 194; Mississippi, 237; South Carolina, 1; Georgia, none; North Carolina, 2; Alabama, none. Here in the Southeast we are not only being forced and tricked off the land, but we are paying the bill for others to become bigger and bigger. The atmosphere is being carefully created so that someday a campaign of land reform will explode in the United States along the lines of China's and Cuba's agrarian reform. The only segments of our farm economy holding its own, growing, free, and with hope, are those outside of Government control and price supports—for example, livestock, pine trees, citrus fruits, and vegetables.

On my farm I grow beef, pine trees, and grass, because I can do so without Government regulation.

The pressure was put on Congress to put price supports on livestock, but I am so glad today we resisted these pressure groups. The beef surplus simply vanished through increased consumption. Livestock today accounts for 54 percent of the farm income.

Yes, we need a farm program, a new farm program, a positive program, one that looks to the future, one that will offer hope to the youth of this country, one that will beckon to the teeming millions in the crowded cities, one that can assure us food and part-time employment for the unemployed during times of depression.

1. The No. 1 plank in this farm program should be gradual elimination of price supports and all acreage controls. Our free Nation cannot long survive as long as its farm population is regimented, controlled, and paid to do less and become weaker.

2. The Government subsidizes certain business operations to stay in business, to expand, grow, and to employ more people. On the other hand, we subsidize the farmer to plant less and less, to employ fewer people and to buy less fertilizer, machinery, and supplies. We are simply paying him directly to go out of business. It would be much better for the Nation if we paid the farmer to grow more, not less, and if we paid him directly to stay on the farm instead of moving toward the overcrowded cities.

3. Get rid of the surplus by promoting markets abroad and expanding our markets at home.

4. Develop new crops and new uses through expanded research and advertising. Dr. Herty kept thousands of farmers in business by research on the pine tree.

5. Expand the rural development program.

6. Give the farmer more Federal tax advantages so he can compete with the tax exempt farmers of foreign nations. Give him a break with local taxes by making him pay less for improved rural property. The

policy now is to tax a farmer if he paints his house and improves the appearance of his farm. The local taxes of many farmers have doubled since improving his place by sheer initiative and effort.

7. Imports—the farm problem could be solved in one stroke by prohibiting imports of livestock, cotton goods, and other farm commodities we already have in surplus. Over 100 million new acres could be used in the United States to produce the beef, wool, sugar, cotton, tobacco, grain, and other farm commodities now imported from foreign countries.

South Carolina needs new industry, but more than anything else we need to save our old industry which consumes cotton from our farms. We need new industry, but we also need a South Carolina Planning and Development Board for Agriculture. South Carolina's agriculture development must keep pace with its industrial development. It will be tragic for the future political and social welfare of our State if we become all industrial. We must have a balanced economy. We must preserve our South Carolina rural heritage, traditions, and philosophy.

We have a great agricultural college at Clemson. Clemson's agricultural program needs the full support and backing of all of our citizens, both urban and rural.

Through research and planning, South Carolina was able to switch from indigo to rice, to cotton, and now to livestock and pine trees. South Carolina must and can continue to be largely agricultural.

Congress Should Take a Look at CIA

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOE L. EVINS

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 16, 1960

Mr. EVINS. Mr. Speaker, the events of the past week on the international scene are highly disturbing. They point out dramatically that in the delicate state of relations between the nations of the world it is necessary to maintain the highest degree of responsibility in all actions we take that might affect our international relations.

Mr. Speaker, in view of these recent developments I want to join with others in expressing the hope that Congress will take a look at the CIA and its operations in the public interest as suggested in the editorial of the Nashville Tennessean of May 11 which I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Appendix of the RECORD. The editorial follows:

IF CIA CHIEF IS ON HIS OWN CONGRESS

Days after the spy plane debacle in Russia, the truth is beginning to come out in Washington, and to that extent the United States position is being improved.

Having been mouse-trapped by Mr. Khrushchev, Secretary Herter has clarified the question of authority for the gathering mission which came to such a calamitous end.

The broad policy of aerial espionage, we are told, came from President Eisenhower, acting in accord with the National Security Act of 1947. Since the beginning of his administration, Mr. Herter said, the President has put into effect directives "to gather by every means possible the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to

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enable them to make effective preparations for their defense."

Under the President's directives, therefore, various programs have been carried out, including "extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed aircraft," it is revealed. In a burst of candor, it is emphasized that flights over and near Russia will continue as needed.

The earlier claim that there was no responsibility for the U-2 flight as far as Washington was concerned, thus is revealed as double-talk and subterfuge of a kind that has impaired the administration's claim to open dealing in international matters.

We can believe that the President did not press the button, as it were, for this particular flight, and that brings up the question of how uncontrolled the Central Intelligence Agency may be just before the summit.

If Mr. Allen Dulles, head of CIA, has not been called on the carpet for his part in the colossal blunder, it would be surprising. For it is obvious that even if he had not been told to cease his activities lest the summit be wrecked, he should have acted to this end on his own.

Yet there is a good deal of evidence that when Mr. Dulles acts on his own judgment, he is very apt to be wrong. Along with General MacArthur, he is charged with having goofed on the Chinese Communist participation in Korea, and his organization allegedly was taken by surprise when Nasser seized the Suez Canal. Other instances of missed signals could be listed.

Regardless, therefore, of whether Mr. Dulles becomes the goat of this particular blunder, there is ample reason for Congress to revive the proposal that a permanent joint committee be established to make continuing studies of the CIA's secret activities, for which it is not accountable to the body which created it and appropriates operating funds estimated at from \$100 million to \$1 billion annually.

While there is general fear lest mistakes lead to nuclear war, a free-wheeling intelligence agency calls for some sort of scrutiny and direction.

Confidence in White House direction has been hard hit by the latest turn of events. And for this development Columist James Reston of the New York Times has a simple explanation:

"He [the President] is not even managing his own departments preliminary to the summit, and this, of course, is precisely the trouble."

Insofar as it can help correct this strange situation, the Congress has every right and reason for investigating to the fullest.

Washington Report

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BRUCE ALGER

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 2, 1960

Mr. ALGER. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following newsletter of May 14, 1960:

WASHINGTON REPORT

(By BRUCE ALGER, Fifth District, Texas, May 14, 1960)

The Department of Agriculture appropriation bill, just enacted, presented the contradictory though not too unusual spectacle of Congressmen debating and agreeing to the expenditure of public money for a program that practically everyone, for varying reasons, thought wrong, yet the bill passed

handily without a record vote. The bill called for approximately \$4 billion in various agriculture subsidies. The Appropriation Committee's own report on the bill highlights the inconsistencies. Here are some quotes: "The Federal Government is now spending far more in the name of agriculture than ever before in history * * * yet farm income in 1959 was at the lowest level since World War II. * * * Since 1953 the following 'cures' have been offered, tried, and from the record found wanting, so far as solving the problem is concerned." Then are listed reduced price supports (lower assured prices), soil bank (to pay farmers for acreage left untilled), Public Law 480 (to give surpluses away at home and abroad), Agriculture Department personnel increase of 28 percent, appropriations increase of 300 percent, and production controls lowered (reduced acreage control). And still the problem remains unsolved. "The cost to the Federal Treasury since 1952 now totals \$25.8 billion. * * * Farmers tend to increase their production as farm prices are reduced."

The soil bank failed, according to the report, because we paid farmers for land that already lay idle; further, that if 56 percent of all farms were retired at \$10 per acre per year, costing us \$2.75 billion, we could cut production only 9 percent. The problem, as the report states, "will never be solved until Congress attacks the problem at its base, which is overproduction." The report then shows that the \$13.5 billion in food given away at home and abroad under Public Law 480 since 1954 has not eliminated the surpluses, but rather "has contributed to a constantly deteriorating situation for American agriculture by getting these huge surpluses out of sight abroad and thereby postponing action to prevent the increase in the surplus problem." Also, the report states that Public Law 480 "should be considered a foreign aid program and should be paid for in the mutual security bill." Speaking of acreage controls, the report states, "while efforts to control production through acreage controls have not been effective, it appears unwise to eliminate them." Under the heading, "Corrective Action Urgently Needed", we find, "the situation becomes progressively worse. * * * It is imperative the present approaches to this problem be reversed if the agricultural industry of this country is to survive and if we are to prevent a bankrupt agriculture from pulling down the rest of our economy." Yet the bill passed perpetuates the present programs.

The forthright report stopped just short of the truth. The truth is that Federal subsidy (Federal money and Federal control) will kill private enterprise ultimately. True, to a degree, industry can live on, through accumulated productive strength, against the debilitating Federal regulation, much as a ship moves despite barnacles. True, taxpayers can survive economically despite the weight of taxation much as a strong man can carry a heavy burden and still do other tasks. But in either case or in combination of the two, subsidy and taxation, free enterprise, private initiative, and individual freedom go down the drain. We are now witnessing the struggle of a dying, free industry, originally a free industry—agriculture—because of the Federal Government. The solution? Get the Federal Government out entirely. Only then can normal market supply and demand react and result in the right prices, which in turn will result in a good income to the farmer, balanced against the costs of other commodities. So the effort of Congress should be directed toward freeing the farmer, not regulating and subsidizing him deeper into trouble. The bill passed without a record vote. I voted against it and desire to be so recorded. I predict that if Congress will not take the statesmanlike position, then the people will force action,

just as happened in the labor reform bill, passed despite House leadership opposition. It would be better, and hurt the farmers less, it seems to me, if the Congress and the farm industry effected the changes voluntarily than to have it forced on them.

Russia's propagandistic blustering concerning the American "spy" was answered forthrightly by the chairman of the Appropriations Committee in a floor speech. Mr. CANNON pointed out our failure to anticipate the Communists' Korean attack which cost our own unready troops dearly. So it is that for 4 years CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) by design has been sending planes over Russia to observe in order to protect ourselves, so far as possible, against buildups for surprise attacks. He likened the appropriation of funds for this work to the secret atomic work at Oak Ridge which preceded the atom bomb, unknown to all but a few of the Members of Congress. Espionage is a part of modern warfare and survival. Ours is hardly comparable to Russia's infiltration and subversive efforts. It was a refreshing statement. Russia needs to be told once and for all that we are deadly serious in our intention to protect freedom-loving nations, and if they don't like it, that's just too bad. Tough and direct action is all that blusterers understand. Only as we are strong, tough-minded, and tough-talking, will we prevent war and strengthen and attract the only kind of allies we want, specifically those equally dedicated to preserving freedom for mankind against the godless, slave-state alternative of communism.

Pensions for World War I Veterans

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. AL ULLMAN

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 16, 1960

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that the time has now come when Congress must take action to fulfill its obligations to the veterans of World War I. A most important step toward obtaining a World War I pension is support from the major veterans' organizations. It will therefore be of great interest to the Members of Congress that Willamette Heights Post No. 102 and Ontario Post 67 of the American Legion and Willard Anderson Post 2471 of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, have endorsed the passage of a separate pension program for World War I veterans. Their resolutions follow:

RESOLUTION ASKING THAT THE AMERICAN LEGION GO ON RECORD AS SUPPORTING A SEPARATE PENSION FOR THE VETERANS OF WORLD WAR I

Whereas veterans of the First World War did not participate in the generous postwar benefits afforded veterans of World War II and Korea, nor comparably in social security or retirement, health and insurance plans which were not generally available prior to World War II; and

Whereas it does not seem fair to such veterans of World War I now of an average age level of 65 years, that they be lumped together with the younger veterans of later wars in a single pension program that does not take into consideration their particular needs as is the case with the War Pension Act of 1959; and

Whereas the veterans of First World War now number only a small segment of the

**Bridgeport (Conn.) Sunday Herald Calls
Announced Spying Policy Provocative
and Dangerous**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**

HON. FRANK KOWALSKI
OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 16, 1960

Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, I bring to the attention of my colleagues, under unanimous consent, an editorial published yesterday in the Sunday Herald, of Bridgeport, Conn.

The Sunday Herald has one of the largest circulations in New England, and its editorial on this critical subject is worthy of close attention.

Following is the text of the Sunday Herald's editorial:

UNITED STATES PURSUES A DANGEROUS POLICY

President Eisenhower's defensive and/or aggressive explanation of the "whys" and "wherefores" of our spy plane, which was brought down over Russia, makes our announced future policy both provocative and dangerous.

Walter Lippmann, in analyzing "The Spy Business" writes that "our position now seems to be that because it's so difficult to collect information inside the Soviet Union, it will be our avowed policy to fly over Soviet territory, using the territory of our allies as bases.

"Although the intention here is to be candid and honest and also to make the best of a piece of very bad luck," he continues, "the new policy, which seems to have been improvised between Saturday and Monday is quite unworkable.

"To avow that we intend to violate Soviet sovereignty is to put everybody on the spot. It makes it impossible for the Soviet Government to play down this particular incident because now it is challenged openly in the face of the whole world.

"It is compelled to react because no nation can remain passive when it is the avowed policy of another nation to intrude upon its territory."

An American broadcaster, repeating what an English commentator said, summed up the lessons which we should have learned long before the American spy plane crashed inside Russia.

The Englishman dwelt on two rules of espionage of which the first is never to be caught, and the second—in an unfortunate eventuality—is never to admit anything.

Because the Eisenhower administration seems to have been amateurish in its approach to the intrigue of espionage, to our national and international embarrassment, we hadn't learned either lesson.

And the unforgivable third mistake was to permit the night on the eve of the summit meetings.

The summit meetings might as well be cancelled because the only dubious advantage they will give us is to answer Mr. K's propaganda.

And as for President Eisenhower's visit to Russia, he can only invite national humiliation by going after he's been told to stay away.

Finding ourselves trapped, we are trying to extricate ourselves by improvising a new and unprecedented policy of openly declared secret spying on Russia. Can it work?

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phere of cooperation and mutual understanding.

I am pleased by these recent developments and am hopeful that major labor-management "explosions" over increased automation can be avoided through concerted and sincere efforts along these lines.

I want today to call attention to a forthcoming top-level conference on automation to be held in Cooperstown, N.Y., from June 1 through June 3. It is sponsored by the State of New York and actively championed by Governor Rockefeller. The program for this conference is indeed impressive. Those chosen to address the delegates are among the top people in their respective fields. They include educators, labor leaders, and business executives.

I am certain that all who are able to attend will benefit greatly and that those who are in a position to read and study the various conference reports will find them valuable and enlightening. To this end, I hope in the next few weeks to bring to the attention of the Members various papers and addresses printed in conjunction with the New York State Conference on Automation.

Mr. President, I should like today to ask unanimous consent that an announcement containing the schedule of events to take place at the Cooperstown Conference on Automation be printed in the Appendix of the Record.

There being no objection, the program was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE CHAMBER,
ALBANY, MAY 10, 1960

Details of the conference on automation which Governor Rockefeller has called in Cooperstown June 1-3 were announced today by the Governor's office. More than 50 leaders in business, labor, education, and government will participate in the discussions. The conference will open with a dinner Wednesday evening, which Governor Rockefeller will address. Three sessions will follow, at which four major aspects of automation will be examined in depth. Paper on each of these aspects will be circulated to the participants in advance of the conference, and will be summarized by the authors at the Thursday and Friday sessions.

The program follows:

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1

Reception and dinner, address by Governor Rockefeller.

THURSDAY, JUNE 2

Morning session: "Automation, Its Meaning and Dimensions," prepared and summarized by John T. Dunlop, professor of economics, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. Discussion leader, Dr. Thomas Hale Hamilton, president of the State University of New York.

Afternoon session: "Basic Economics of Automation," prepared and summarized by John Diebold, John Diebold & Associates, Inc., management consultants, New York City. Discussion leader, Charles Stauffacher, executive vice president, Continental Can Co.

"Manpower for Automation," prepared and summarized by Eli Ginzberg, professor of economics, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. Discussion leader, Arthur J. Goldberg, general counsel, United Steel Workers of America.

Dinner: speaker, Lt. Gov. Malcolm Wilson.

FRIDAY, JUNE 3

Morning session: "The Community and Automation," prepared and summarized by Solomon Barkin, director of research, Textile Workers Union of America. Discussion leader, Prof. Frederick Harblson, director, industrial relations section, Princeton University.

Summation: Dr. William J. Ronan, secretary to the Governor.

The conference will conclude with a luncheon Friday noon.

Arrangements for the conference are being handled by a committee composed of Industrial Commissioner M. P. Catherwood, Commerce Commissioner Keith McHugh, and Dr. Ronan.

Primary Boost for Nixon Election

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 17, 1960

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following article from the Evening Star, May 13, 1960:

PRIMARY BOOST FOR NIXON ELECTION—KENNEDY SEEN WINNING NOMINATION AND DEFEAT BY VICE PRESIDENT

(By David Lawrence)

Analysis of traditional habits in politics and the habits of thought of organization leaders tells far more about who is going to be nominated at a political convention than do polls or primary elections.

Based on just such an analysis this correspondent wrote on March 7, just before the New Hampshire primary, that Senator KENNEDY "is likely to win the Democratic nomination" and that, "if he is blocked, the compromise candidate will be Adlai Stevenson."

On April 7, after the Wisconsin primary, this writer said in these dispatches:

"The Wisconsin primary, by all the rules of politics, should mean that Senator KENNEDY will be regarded as the front-runner from now on. This means that the other candidates will tend to combine against him. There are other primary contests, to be sure, but Senator KENNEDY will gain ground in all of them, as he has the organization and the finances back of him to win the necessary delegate strength.

What is really meant by "the organization and the finances"? Certainly there is not the slightest basis for any implication that votes are bought. Nor is it to be assumed that the word "organization" means the regular party machinery. In preconvention campaigns, each candidate develops his own organization and, if he has money enough, he will engage precinct workers everywhere to get voters to the polls, transporting them in autos when necessary. More important still, the organization will know where to find the indifferent voters who can be persuaded by friends to vote for the candidate such friends favor.

These "organization" workers carry sample ballots printed in advance, and in a State like West Virginia, where there are few precincts with voting machines, it means that the citizen takes the sample ballot into the voting booth and is not bewildered when confronted with a long list of State and local candidates. He is enabled to go right to the spot on the ballot and put his mark down.

This is an old pattern in American politics, and it takes a lot of money to pay for a big organization that really gets out the vote. The total Kennedy vote in West Virginia was about 220,000, which is less than half the Democratic vote cast for Adlai Stevenson in 1952, when he carried the State against General Eisenhower. It isn't difficult to line up a minority bloc in any State primary if you have the money and the organization. The Kennedy forces can do it hereafter in every primary, and they will confront the Democratic National Convention with the legitimate query: "Since we have won most of the primaries, how can you turn us down?"

This correspondent believes the West Virginia primary result not only has helped Senator KENNEDY toward the Democratic nomination but actually has helped toward the election of Vice President Nixon, who is certain to be the Republican nominee.

Once the so-called religious issue is out of the way—and it now will be so viewed by many politicians because West Virginia has a relatively small number of Catholics in its voting population—the tendency will be to appraise the Massachusetts Senator on his merits.

The Republican strategists, for instance, don't want to see the religious issue raised, either. They would rather go before the country with the argument that, in these fateful times, "You don't elect a boy to be President of the United States."

The biggest point the Republicans think they will have in their favor is that Vice President Nixon is trained in and intimately familiar with the tasks of the White House and that Senator KENNEDY would have to start from scratch to learn how to function in the Presidency.

But doesn't the voting in the primaries, it will be asked, indicate that Senator KENNEDY is popular and a good vote-getter? As against a less colorful and less known candidate, such as Senator HUMPHREY, it has not been difficult for Senator KENNEDY to win the primaries thus far. But the real reason the Massachusetts Senator upset so many observers who were forecasting the outcome of the West Virginia primaries is that they paid more attention to hit-or-miss polls than to two key factors—"the organization and the finances."

In a national election, "the organization and the finances" tend to be balanced as between the parties. As of today, it seems very likely that the Nation's voters will have to choose between Senator KENNEDY and Mr. Nixon next November. This writer believes that—on the basis of, first, satisfactory economic conditions in the major part of the country next autumn, and, second, the argument as to the executive experience that the Republican nominee will offer to the public, and, third, the active support of President Eisenhower—the Republicans will win a decisive victory.

Statement of Hon. Robert Lovett to National Policy Machinery Subcommittee

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JACOB K. JAVITS

OF NEW YORK

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, May 17, 1960

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, earlier in this session, Robert A. Lovett testified before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, of which Senator

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JACKSON is chairman, and of which I have the honor to be a member. This testimony attracted widespread interest and comment when it was subsequently released, but a number of articles published subsequently interpreted certain comments of Mr. Lovett as being critical of President Eisenhower. In order to make clear that Mr. Lovett's testimony was both in word and intent directed at the institution of the Presidency and not at President Eisenhower personally, Senator MUNDT, ranking Republican member of the subcommittee, wrote Mr. Lovett and received a reply making this intent completely clear.

I ask unanimous consent that the exchange of correspondence between Senator MUNDT and Mr. Lovett, and an article on the subject by Arthur Krock printed in the New York Times of April 14, 1960, may be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MARCH 30, 1960.

MR. ROBERT LOVETT,
Brown Bros., Harriman & Co.,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. LOVETT: During March you graciously appeared as the leadoff witness before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, of which I am a member. At the close of your appearance, the subcommittee went into executive session to receive your comments on the operations of the National Security Council.

Throughout your discussion of the NSC you referred to "the President." At the time, it was my impression that you were analyzing the position of president. Subsequent published articles have been based on the assumption that you described the activities of the present incumbent of the Presidency, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

One of these articles was a column by Mr. Walter Lippmann on March 1. Several days later I attempted to clarify the matter through a statement for the RECORD. Attached is a copy.

Unfortunately my clarification statement seems to have clarified nothing. Your testimony still is being interpreted as applying to President Eisenhower. I would appreciate very much having a short note from you as to the meaning you intended to give the phrase "the President" in your executive testimony. I hope to insert it in the committee record.

Again may I say that your basic statement before our subcommittee was most interesting and pertinent. With kindest regards, I am,
Cordially yours,

KARL E. MUNDT,
U.S. Senator.

ROBERT A. LOVETT,
New York, N.Y., April 4, 1960.

Senator KARL E. MUNDT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MUNDT: On my return to the office today from the Pacific coast, I found awaiting me your letter of March 31 requesting clarification of the meaning of certain language in my comments on the National Security Council given in executive session before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.

You are correct in your understanding that my use of the expression "the President" meant "a President," or "any President," and not specifically the present incumbent. I have made this same answer to Gordon Gray, special assistant to the President, who made

the same inquiry of me by telephone while I was in California.

You will recall that, in my opening statement, I said (last sentence, p. 12, of the subcommittee printed record, pt. 1) that "It should be clear, therefore, that none of these observations is intended to be critical of any individuals or of operational decisions." The few paragraphs I had written dealing with NSC were excised from my public statement and were given in executive session in accordance, I am informed, with the terms of an understanding reached at the request of the White House regarding the handling in executive session of questions on NSC matters. The sentence quoted above naturally applies, as you rightly understood, to all my testimony in both open and executive sessions.

In view of the public interest shown in the subcommittee's hearings, it is not surprising to find some agencies or individuals who feel that the shoe might fit. I know of no way to keep them from trying it on for size.

With my thanks for your kind letter and cordial personal regards, I am,
Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT.

How To MAKE A SHOE FIT ANY FOOT (By Arthur Krock)

WASHINGTON, April 13.—Since Robert A. Lovett testified before Senator JACKSON's subcommittee several weeks ago, the impression has been growing that he definitely subscribed to some of the harshest criticisms of President Eisenhower and the National Security Council in their mutual relationship. Some news dispatches and analyses of Lovett's testimony, and a Senate speech by Senator FULBRIGHT, are important sources of this public understanding.

The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee concluded that the former Secretary of Defense "indicated that the President (meaning Eisenhower) leads a dangerously sheltered life as Chief Executive." Also, that Lovett "said . . . the NSC protects Mr. Eisenhower from the debates that precede policy decisions."

The transcript of Lovett's testimony, both in open and executive session, does not establish either of these conclusions, or the assumptions in the press that when Lovett referred to "the" President, he always meant Eisenhower. What the transcript does establish is this:

1. At the outset of his testimony Lovett stated a caveat. It was that his remarks would be "based for the most part on notes made" during the Truman administration, and that he intended "no direct reference to any individuals or specific decisions."

2. But he did not regularly repeat this caveat. Therefore, when he answered, and agreed with, questions about "NSC procedures" and "the President," so phrased they could have been taken to apply to the Eisenhower tenure, it was possible to assume that the witness replied in kind.

3. But close inspection of the transcript shows that the former Secretary of Defense conceived he was discussing "a" President and the National Security Council as an institution, and he has since said as much. Apparently he relied on his opening caveat to prevent hypothetical exchanges in executive session from being interpreted as applying specifically to Eisenhower and the current procedures of the National Security Council.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

The following are such exchanges:

Mr. JACKSON. Do you think the Security Council can operate effectively, as it was designed originally, if you have a large number of participants?

Mr. LOVETT. I would have very great doubts about its ability to operate in a mass atmosphere. I think it would inhibit fair discussion . . . [and] be an embarrassment as regards the vigor with which a man might want to defend his position. I think it would limit the quality of the debate which the President ought to hear.

Mr. JACKSON. You do not necessarily lighten the load of the President by bringing to him agreed-upon papers where no decision is involved other than to say, "We will go ahead with this." Don't you think there is confusion on the point that there is a tendency to help the President, to lighten his load, by trying to do his constitutional work for him?

Mr. LOVETT. I think the President in his own protection must insist on being informed and not merely protected by his aides, [it being] a tendency of younger assistant . . . to try to keep the bothersome problems away from the senior's desk.

Probably it was because the witness did not steadily invoke his caveat, like takers of the fifth amendment before racket inquiries, that many concluded Lovett had conceded the points of criticism involved as currently applicable. But if he fears that President Eisenhower's temperament, his military preference for having issues intensely screened for him, and his awesome renown, inevitably have diluted the essential concept and function of the National Security Council in this administration, Lovett neither "said" nor "indicated" this. And the National Security Council's statistical record—of the President in the chair at 90 percent of the National Security Council meetings, sharp debates in his presence over fundamental differences in policy papers—refutes many assumptions on which major criticisms are founded.

Tribute to the Eagle Rock Sentinel

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 17, 1960

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, the 24th Congressional District of California, which it is my privilege to represent in Congress, possesses a number of top quality local newspapers which make an important contribution to the district in reporting news of special interest to the community, expressing area views on matters affecting it, undertaking crusades in behalf of the community where its interest is concerned, and generally performing many other valuable services in behalf of the residents of the community. The 24th district is very fortunate to have these public-spirited institutions.

One of the fine community newspapers serving the 24th District, the Eagle Rock Sentinel, is celebrating its 50th anniversary this year. The Sentinel is a source of pride to the district and I wish to add my heartiest congratulations on this important occasion.

There was no doubt as to what kind of newspaper the Sentinel was to be from the very beginning. When it first appeared, in March 1910, the Sentinel announced that it would defy the then existing trend toward journalistic sen-

Addresses of Congressman John Brademas, of Indiana, and Martin B. McKneally, National Commander of the American Legion, at Dedication of New Post Home of James Lowell Corey Post 68, American Legion, Argos, Ind., May 15, 1960

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. JOHN BRADEMAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 13, 1960

Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Speaker, on Sunday, May 15, in Argos, Ind., members of the James Lowell Corey Post 68 of the American Legion took part in ceremonies marking the dedication of a new post home to replace one that burned in 1958.

Among the persons participating in this event were the distinguished former Governor of the State of Indiana, the Honorable Henry F. Schricker; the Indiana department commander of the American Legion, Donald Hynes; and the commander of the James Lowell Corey Post, Bruce Van Der Weele.

Of particular interest to the Legionnaires and their families was the moving address of the national commander of the American Legion, Martin B. McKneally, of New York, who dedicated the new post home.

CONGRESSMAN BRADEMAS PRESENTS AMERICAN FLAG

It was my honor on this occasion to to present to the members of the James Lowell Corey Post a 49-star flag which had flown over the Capitol of the United States on July 4, 1959, the day when the 49-star flag became the official flag of our country. I was also pleased to present the post with four pencil drawings of the "Four Fortresses of Freedom," the White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court, and the Declaration of Independence.

Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include my own remarks on this occasion and those of National American Legion Commander McKneally:

REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN BRADEMAS ON MAY 15, 1960, ARGOS, IND.

Governor Schricker, Commander McKneally, Commander Hynes, Commander Van Der Weele, fellow Legionnaires and friends, today is a great day not only for members of the James Lowell Corey Post of the American Legion but for all Hoosier Legionnaires. Not often do we have an opportunity to have our distinguished national commander, Martin McKneally, in our midst and we welcome him here today.

I want to congratulate Commander Van Der Weele and all the members of James Lowell Corey Post 68 of Argos for their dedicated efforts which have made possible the construction of this fine new home.

ARMED FORCES WEEK SLOGAN: POWER FOR PEACE

It is fitting and proper that we should dedicate this new home on the eve of Armed Forces Week, which begins tomorrow and runs through May 22. Commander McKneally has asked all Legionnaires to support the 11th observance of this week and Comman-

der Hynes has been named by the Governor of Indiana to serve as Indiana State chairman of the observance.

The recognition of Armed Forces Week is therefore a splendid symbol of the continuing devotion of the American Legion to the security and defense of our country and to the cause of freedom.

The slogan of Armed Forces Week is "Power for Peace." All Americans want peace. Democrats want peace. Republicans want peace. You want peace and I want peace. Yet you and I know that today the world is standing on a tightrope, with peace depending on large measures on the capacity of a divided world to maintain its balance and not fall into the volcano of nuclear war.

REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL

It is encouraging to see that political leaders of both our great political parties are now discussing the problem of arms control more seriously than it has ever been discussed before. For as Secretary of State Christian Herter made clear in February in his famous speech to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., the only sure longrun way to defend ourselves in this troubled world is to work out an effective disarmament agreement with our adversaries in the Soviet Union, an agreement which, I hasten to add, will of course require effective inspection guarantees.

WE MUST BE MILITARILY STRONG IN ORDER TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT

But I am sure Commander McKneally would agree with me that we in America must be strong militarily if we are to have bargaining power in dealing with the Soviet Union, even on the subject of disarmament.

We cannot lead effectively from a position of military weakness.

That is the meaning of the slogan, "Power for Peace."

We must be strong not only militarily but economically and diplomatically as well, for our Communist adversaries do not fight the cold war on one front alone. We have already seen, for example, how Khrushchev has been exploiting the unhappy blunder of the United States for all the anti-American propaganda he can make of it.

I have no wish to exploit this matter for partisan gain for we want our President to enjoy the united support of the American people as he goes into talks at the summit which may directly affect the destiny and peace of the entire world. We nonetheless must recognize how our Government has been placed on the defensive by this incident and by the way in which Khrushchev has been using it.

AMERICA FACED WITH POWERFUL CHALLENGE IN SOVIET UNION

We must realize more than ever by the events of recent days and by the trip which Khrushchev made across our country last year that in him and in the Soviet people whom he leads we are confronted with the most powerful challenge to our survival as a free society in all the history of the American Republic. We must be prepared to understand the nature of the challenge we face.

We believe in a free society. The Communists believe in a slave society.

We believe in an open society. The Communists believe in a closed society.

If we are effectively to meet the challenge of the Communist world, we must be prepared to sacrifice. We must understand why we must be strong if we are to continue to be free.

WE MUST HAVE POWER IF WE ARE TO HAVE PEACE

Better than most organizations in our country, the American Legion understands the dangers of the Communist challenge to freedom, understands why we must have power if we are to have peace.

I therefore deem it a high honor and a privilege, as your Representative in Congress, in the presence of our national and State commanders and of Commander Van Der Weele and all my fellow Legionnaires to present to the members of the James Lowell Corey Post 68 of the American Legion this American flag which was flown over the Capitol of the United States on July 4, 1959, the day the 49-star flag became the official flag of our country.

I have another gift which I am pleased at this time to present to you, four pencil drawings of the Four Fortresses of American Freedom: The White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court Building and the Declaration of Independence.

May these drawings and may this flag serve as an ever constant reminder to all members of the American Legion of the greatness of our country and the freedom which is the birthright of the American people.

REMARKS OF NATIONAL COMMANDER MARTIN B. MCKNEALLY, THE AMERICAN LEGION, AT THE DEDICATION OF THE NEW HOME OF THE JAMES LOWELL COREY POST, ARGOS, IND., MAY 15, 1960

I am delighted to be in Argos and to assist in the dedication of this beautiful new building wherein will be housed not only the men and women of James Lowell Corey Post but their ideals as well. This new post home is a fulfillment of the hopes and labors of the men and women of Argos for 40 years. It is a monument and at once a milestone of progress in the history of the American Legion.

The American Legion stands solely as the architect of the rehabilitation program with its network of hospitals across the land which is monument enough for any group of founders, but what of the millions of hours spent in hospital visitations? What of the millions of dollars spent in child welfare? What of the original thinking that chartered the course of the country in ways of preparedness or national security? What of the GI bill, written by the American Legion and sponsored over the protest of professional educators? What of the development of a strong, authentic voice in the field of Americanism? What of the multifarious arts of charity that have become a legend in the land? What a heritage—what a perfect description of this heritage of charity was written by the immortal Shakespeare when he penned the lines which read: "How far that little candle throws its beams so shines a good deed in a naughty world."

THE PURPOSE OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

I have said on previous occasions that the American Legion purpose in our day was the sustaining of the doctrine of belief upon which this Nation was founded and without which it must perish, and that is the belief in the existence of God and in the dignity of human personality. I need not point out to you that today it is those twin beliefs which are under the most relentless and the most powerful attack in the history of mankind.

CALLS FOR CONTINUED ATTENTION TO U.S. GRAVES ABROAD

The American Legion holds in high esteem the profession and the office of the soldier. If it were not for the soldier there would be no America and there would be no hope for men who love freedom. In that ceaseless struggle to be free, he must be willing to pay the enormous costs of war. It is the melancholy record of fallen men that his motivations conflict and collide. His will to do evil and his baseness must be reckoned with and the reckoning sometimes enslaves and it very frequently kills. I commend to your most reverent attention the thousands of graves abroad in cemeteries cared for by the American Govern-

ment and I direct you to the fact that five new cemeteries are to be dedicated this year. Hardly a word is written, a picture published concerning this subject and I am informed that this is so because the present-day rationale of the American people is not to be reminded of the ugliness of the cost of freedom. Freedom and the cause of America we say to you, must never be computed in the terms of dollars and cents. The only item to be considered is the cost of men's lives. Reminiscence and reminders of this fact must be the No. 1 item on the agenda of our daily lives, depression, and sadness to the contrary notwithstanding.

"WE ARE EITHER FOR FREEDOM OR WE ARE AGAINST IT"

For we have an enemy, an enemy that opposes everything that we hold dear and that ~~enemy~~ makes our age one of tremendous risks. And in this age there is no neutrality, we are either for freedom or we are against it. Fear of atomic destruction does not provide us with the solution of the dilemma. There is a considerable body of intellectuals whom the fear of atomic war has obsessed. They have made their objective in life only the preserving of existence. ~~One~~ reads of their thinking with a certain horrifying fascination. Phillip Toynbee states as follows: "In the terrible contest of nuclear war even the vital differences between communism and western freedom become almost unimportant."

The West he declares should, "negotiate at once with the Russians and get the best terms that are available." Since Russia in his estimation is now and will continue to remain stronger there is nothing to do for the West "but to negotiate from comparative weakness." He admits that this may well set up the total domination of the world by Russia in a few years. The Soviets would impose on us a regime which most of us detest but this is better than allowing the human race to destroy itself. And one of Toynbee's conferees observes, "I might not much mind living under Soviet domination."

These men are not Communists but they have lost their will; they have lost it to fear and to despair, in the pursuit of existence. They have lost sight of the truth which is simple enough and that is that we in our day are faced with two destructive forces of incredible dimensions. The bomb represents material devastation, the Communist party political destruction.

THE SOLEMN DILEMMA OF OUR TIME

This is the solemn dilemma of our time and this is the foremost consideration of our people this afternoon. The administration in Washington has chosen by its continuation of nuclear testing, by the flight of the U-2 over the secret territory of the Soviets to pursue the ideal of political freedom. What kind of a nation with the holy mission of preserving its sovereignty, its people, and its freedom, would do less in the face of the gigantic dilemma? To sit by knowing what we know, facing what we face, and do nothing, would make the cemeteries of Europe where our honored dead are entombed, and the whole history of this Republic a gargantuan jest. The administration is charged through its intelligence service with the responsibility of providing for the safety of its people; its duty is plain and it is to gather the facts with which it may discharge that duty. Must we act as if its duty were less? Must we act as if the obtaining of information necessary to our own defense against a secretive and threatening power was to commit a sin? Are we to assume the abasing role of the boy caught with his hand in the cookie jar when we know the food there obtained is the only means of sustaining freedom and hope? I for one American, suffer no embarrassment and highly praise all those in authority who

see clearly the bitter dilemma of these days. We of the American Legion do not seek to impose our views but we do propose to all that there is no flight from the serious business of our days and that is the survival of free man.

MEN OF COURAGE, FAITH, IDEALS NEEDED

The late Albert Camus tells us, "with every dawn an assassin slips into some cell, murder is the question before us." This is the solemn keynote of our time, the murder of men and the murder of ideals. As Americans, let us conduct ourselves as men. Men of courage, men of faith, and men of ideals. There is no other way open to us, for Americans may not be craven, they may not be pacifistic, they may not be men of despair.

In the world there is but one city in which we can dwell, it is the city of the halt, the blind, the maimed, but it is the city of charity, and it is the city of courage, the city of freedom. It is the City of God. Outside it is the night.

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This is in line with what the local council now proposes to do.

The strength of this campaign to bring a transformation to La Crosse lies in its appeal to everyone—those able to buy one share and those able to purchase multiple shares of stock.

Labor significantly is taking an active part, joining with all forces in the community to see this investment plan through to ultimate success.

Making industrial park sites available has been under consideration by the council for many months, yet it has been unable to move for lack of a corporation financed and authorized to act. Such a corporation now is in existence.

It is to be hoped that support for its efforts may be readily enlisted, and that the hopes we have envisioned for years may take a turning toward realization.

Soil Stewardship Week in Colorado

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. BYRON L. JOHNSON

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 18, 1960

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, the conservation of topsoil is essential. We who live with aridity and wind erosion know this. Those who live with abundant rainfall also know the erosive power of water.

Next week is Soil Stewardship Week in Colorado. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to those who more than 25 years ago saw the great need for action to conserve the Nation's soil. As a result of their vision, some 1½ million farmers and ranchers have united to form 2,822 soil conservation districts. These districts include 1.7 billion acres of land, or a major portion of the United States. These soil conservation districts represent groups of landowners who have joined together to protect our land so that future generations may enjoy its blessings. All America owes them a debt. We are not really the owners of the land—we are but trustees for this generation, and we should view our obligation as involving stewardship.

The work is not finished. It may never be finished. But it is going forward. This Congress or the next one should establish a soil moisture conservation laboratory to help advance this work. The soil moisture conservation laboratory would study the principles involved in increasing the intake of water from the soil, improving the moisture retention characteristics of the soil and increasing the efficiency of soil moisture use by plants. In the great plains area, holding 8 percent of the moisture that now evaporates back in the soil until it can be put to work growing crops is equivalent to adding 3 inches to the scarce rainfall.

Such a laboratory could well be located at Fort Collins, Colo., but wherever located, it is needed.

Similarly, research in weather modification can contribute toward improving the productivity of our soil. The soil

conservation program represents the finest kind of cooperation in research, education, publication and constructive action between Federal, State and local units of government. But even as we commend the soil conservation districts of Colorado, let us press forward to further the cause that they have thus far so nobly advanced.

The Quest for Safeguarded Disarmament

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, May 18, 1960

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD an address entitled "The Quest for Safeguarded Disarmament Must Be at the Heart of U.S. Foreign Policy," which I delivered in Washington, D.C., April 27, 1960.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE QUEST FOR SAFEGUARDED DISARMAMENT
MUST BE AT THE HEART OF U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY

(Address delivered by Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Democrat, of Minnesota, at Washington, D.C., April 27, 1960.)

It may seem a long way from the real mountains of West Virginia to the metaphorical summit of next month—but it is not. Like the people of Arizona and Alabama, Wyoming and Wisconsin, like people everywhere, the men and women I have been talking with in West Virginia are deeply concerned with peace.

I have no crystal ball, and I will not attempt to predict what the outcome of the summit meeting will be. I do earnestly hope, however, that the four leaders will give serious and thoughtful consideration to the problems of arms control and disarmament, and will be able to achieve real, even if limited, progress.

I recognize that the armament race and the lack of political settlements are as closely related as, for example, racial prejudice and racial discrimination. Both are vicious circles, and it would be easy to sit down and give up trying on the theory that you can't eliminate one unless you eliminate the other.

As a practical and optimistic people, however, we Americans like to break in on these vicious circles somewhere. For example, in recent years we have been enacting laws against racial discrimination. That does not mean that we fail to recognize the need to banish prejudice by education; it does mean that we recognize that education alone would take a long, long time to achieve results, and that having to cease some acts of discrimination by law has in itself an educational effect.

So it is with disarmament and political settlements. The Soviet leaders have given little ground for hope that they are ready to consider a practical political settlement for Berlin, let alone Germany as a whole. The same is true of other political problems which clutter the international agenda.

OUR MAJOR EFFORT SHOULD BE IN DISARMAMENT

That does not mean that we should forget them, or cease trying. It does mean in my view, however, that our major effort should

be in the field of disarmament—a field in which, during recent years, the Soviet leaders have done rather less propaganda and rather more serious negotiation than over political questions. If we do manage to achieve some real progress in disarmament, we can return to the political questions with greater hope of success.

There are obvious reasons for this. Unfortunately as it is that there are—for example—two Germanies, two Koreas, two Vietnams, peace can conceivably survive this division. We can live with it for the time being, even if we do not condone it. But the armaments race threatens both sides with the imminence of mutual annihilation. Furthermore—as the recent news of strikes and riots among Soviet workers emphasizes—the Soviet leaders have urgent domestic reasons for seeking to beat some of their swords into ploughshares.

SOVIET UNION NEEDS PEACE

Over a year ago, on returning from my visit to the Soviet Union, I noted Chairman Khrushchev's urgent need for peace, and predicted that he would launch a big push for disarmament. We should have been prepared—but we weren't.

The four leaders at the summit might well take their text from Shakespeare—who, I understand, is in Boris Pasternak's excellent translations as popular in the Soviet Union as in the Western World. He might have been speaking directly to the summit when he wrote:

"There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the full, leads on to
fortune;

Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries."

Such a tide is running now for disarmament—and I profoundly hope that the summit leaders will take it at the full.

TWO STEPS AT THE SUMMIT

There are two major steps that they can and should take. One of these is to resolve the most difficult obstacle standing in the way of a nuclear weapons test ban agreement—namely, the number of onsite inspections. The second is to give directions for the future course of the 10-nation disarmament negotiations.

DEFINITE POSSIBILITY OF TEST BAN AGREEMENT

There is a very definite possibility that a test ban agreement—the first real breakthrough toward peace—may be achieved this year, even if it is not concluded in time to be submitted to this session of Congress.

Most of you in this well-informed audience are familiar with the broad features of the proposed test ban treaty. I shall review them briefly:

1. The treaty would ban permanently all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. It would ban underground tests down to a certain level—the level suggested by the United States being 4.75 on the earthquake scale, that is 19 kilotons of TNT in magnitude, roughly the size of the Hiroshima bomb.

2. A minimum of 180 control posts would be erected around the world to monitor shocks to the earth's surface, and to identify them as earthquakes or as nuclear explosions.

3. Up to a certain number of times each year, a mobile inspection team could make an on-site investigation of an event registered at the control posts which could not be identified as being natural in origin or an earthquake.

4. A coordinated program of research would be conducted by the three nuclear powers to improve the techniques of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions.

There is also the possibility of a separate agreement that, while this research is going on—and at least for a 2-year period—the

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Mr. McCORMACK. The only bill I was going to put down for Tuesday was the reclamation project in Oklahoma.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. JONES of Missouri). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

PROGRAM FOR WEEK OF MAY 31

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 minute in order to ascertain the program for next week.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa? There was no objection.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield.

Mr. McCORMACK. On Tuesday next I have calendared the bill S. 1892, dealing with the Norman reclamation project in Oklahoma.

Let me say, frankly, that if the proponents of the bill would prefer that it not be brought up Tuesday I will accommodate them. I have been trying to get in touch with the author of the bill to have a talk with him so I could have definite information about Tuesday.

I talked with him yesterday, and my impression is he was agreeable to it coming up on Tuesday. I want to get rid of these bills as fast as we can because I know what is going to happen on the other end 4 or 5 weeks from now. I want the Members to have their day in court. I am putting consideration of that bill down for Tuesday with the qualification I have stated.

Wednesday is District day, and there is one bill to be considered, H.R. 12036, relating to sewage disposal in the Dulles International Airport. It involves authority to connect up with the District of Columbia system.

Then there is House Resolution 530, giving the Committee on the Judiciary power to investigate certain compacts. That is out of the Rules Committee.

Mr. HOEVEN. That will come up on Wednesday?

Mr. McCORMACK. I am setting that bill down for Wednesday. If the proponents of S. 1892 for any reason prefer not to take advantage of my assignment of that bill for Tuesday I cannot guarantee that the bill will come up on Wednesday because the District bill has been agreed to by unanimous consent and I am putting the Committee on the Judiciary bill, House Resolution 530, down for that day.

Mr. AVERY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. AVERY. The majority leader said he would want to confer with the sponsor of S. 1892 as to whether or not it would come up on Tuesday. If that does not come up on Tuesday will there be any business scheduled before the House on that day?

Mr. McCORMACK. No. I am glad the gentleman asked that question.

For the remainder of the week, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Sat-

urday, and of course I do not expect there will be any Saturday meeting, but in case anything arises I mention Saturday, the following bills will be considered:

H.R. 10572 relating to forests out of the Committee on Agriculture. That was on the program this week but we did not reach it.

H.R. 11761, Farmers Home Administration.

House Concurrent Resolution 661, Joint Committee on National Fuels Policy.

House Joint Resolution 402, transit regulation compact for the Washington metropolitan area.

The consideration of some of these bills is dependent on whether or not a rule is reported out. As far as I can see at this time there is no major bill to come up next week, that is, of a national nature. These are important bills, of course. I do not want to downgrade them.

There is the usual reservation that any further program will be announced later and conference reports may be brought up at any time. There was one reported yesterday on the Post Office and Treasury Department's appropriation bill. When the gentleman in charge will want to bring that up I am unable to state now.

Mr. HOEVEN. Can the majority leader tell us what progress we are making with appropriation bills?

Mr. McCORMACK. There is one bill, the military construction bill, that is still pending. The gentleman will remember that last week when that came up consideration was postponed because authorization had not been finally passed. I understand the conferees on that bill have agreed. However, even if the conference report is agreed to and the President signs the bill, which it is reasonable to assume he will, and I refer to the authorization bill, my understanding is that the desire of the Member handling the bill is that the bill not come up until week after next, June 9, or thereabouts. That bill will not come up next week. It will be week after next.

The other appropriation bill, of course, is the bill referred to by my friend from Iowa, the mutual security appropriation bill. Or, as my friend, says, the foreign handout bill.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. HOEVEN. I thank the gentleman.

SUMMIT CONFERENCE COLLAPSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PUCINSKI] is recognized for 15 minutes.

(Mr. PUCINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, the other body today has launched an investigation into the collapse of the summit conference and what effect this collapse will have on international relations.

The wire stories this morning carried this item as to the purpose of this investigation and the four points or the four areas that the other body will con-

centrate its direction or attention on: First, the events and decisions resulting from the U-2 incident; second, the effect of these events and decision upon the summit; third, the policy of our Government regarding the summit meeting; fourth, the policy of the United States in the future and possible improvement in the execution thereof.

Now, I think a great deal can be learned from these hearings and this investigation, and certainly I am very happy to learn that the other body has undertaken this type of investigation. However, I am disappointed, in reading from this agenda, that apparently no investigation is going to be made of the incidents leading up to this disastrous moment when the U-2 fell into Communist hands on the eve of the summit conference.

I would like to make clear one thing: I do not support the criticism being hurled against our Government for sending these flights over the Soviet Union at a time so close to the summit meeting. I would say, on the contrary, I think that our Government would have been derelict if it had not sent these flights over the Soviet Union as it has been doing for the last 4 years. I believe that we are living under great tension and at this time, more so than any other time, we should know what the Soviets are up to.

We know that Mr. Khrushchev did not expect any success at the summit meeting. We know that Mr. Khrushchev realized that he was going to have to leave the summit a defeated man since the Western Powers had agreed on any number of occasions previous to the summit meeting that they would not yield on Berlin because the people of their respective nations did not want the Western Powers to yield to Khrushchev.

Mr. Speaker, I myself had written the President a letter on the eve of the summit conference, on the eve of his departure for Paris, in which I told him that in a survey made in my own district, 90 percent of my constituents replied "No" when I asked "Should the United States yield to Soviet Russia's demand that we abandon our position in West Berlin?" And also I wrote the President pointing out that 85 percent of my constituents answered "Yes" when I asked them if they believed that the President ought to take a firm stand in demanding freedom and liberation of the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain when he met with Khrushchev at the summit. I sent President Eisenhower this letter to let him know that the people of my district will support him in a firm stand against the Communists.

Certainly, prior to the summit meeting, the Western Powers unequivocally agreed that they were going to remain firm in their position. Khrushchev knew this, and there is no question but what Khrushchev needed a provocation to torpedo the summit conference before it got started.

I think it behooves us, all of us, as Americans, to go beyond the scope of normal assumption in evaluating all aspects of the events that preceded the summit collapse.

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special requirements of any one group within the framework of our citizenry must take second place. They must fully understand the nature of the total threat to their security and to their freedom and that this threat is by no means limited to the military sphere. Selfishness, softness, lack of understanding and disinterest can be just as deadly to America's future as any lack of military power. The crises of these times demand patriotism of the highest order. If our people understand this fact, I have no doubt that they will rise fully to the occasion and demonstrate that the strength of free men is far superior to that of any system based on human subjugation and slavery.

ESPIONAGE IN EMBASSIES

(Mr. PELLY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PELLY. Mr. Speaker, yesterday Ambassador Lodge revealed to the Security Council of the United Nations a Soviet gift to our Moscow Ambassador which had contained a clandestine listening device to enable the Soviet intelligence agents from outside of our Embassy to listen in to the U.S. Ambassador's conversations. Unless one is very naive, it is conceivable that this Russian "Trojan Horse" is only one of hundreds of similar acts of espionage being practiced in our American Embassies in Iron Curtain countries.

All of which, Mr. Speaker, leads me to refer to remarks I made on the floor of the House on May 25, 1959. At that time I criticized the personnel procurement policy of the State Department in employing nationals of Iron Curtain countries in our Embassies in those countries. In view of recent events I should like to again urge that the State Department divest itself of any nationals of Communist countries in their employ in Iron Curtain country Embassies.

A year ago when I took this matter up with the State Department it defended its personnel policy, but I felt the arguments advanced to me were extremely weak. In the first place, I was told that the employing of Communist nationals in these sensitive spots created no risk to national security. I was also told that from a budgetary standpoint it was not possible to employ American citizens in the positions presently occupied by foreign nationals, and finally I was told that Americans would not be willing to accept many of these positions now filled by aliens either by reason of inadequate pay or because of the character of the employment.

I said then and I say now such arguments do not hold water. Certainly, with our national security involved, Congress would furnish whatever funds were necessary to support employment of American citizens in these spots, and furthermore, I am sure that there is an abundant supply of American youth who upon graduation from the colleges and universities of this country—especially language students—would jump at the chance to spend a year or so working in our Embassies, regardless of the so-called menial character of the positions that are available.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I state again this policy presents a real risk to the security of the United States and I suggest in light of recent events that the State Department reexamine its personnel policy with reference to the employment of these aliens in our Embassies behind the Iron Curtain.

THREAT OF SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION

(Mr. BATES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I am confident that the events of the past week have given many Members of the House cause to reflect on the position of the United States and its role as a bulwark against the threat of Soviet political and economic expansion.

Many of us I am sure shared the hope that perhaps we were on the threshold of a new era. Some called this new era one of peaceful coexistence—others referred to it as a nuclear stalemate. But common to all was the hope that Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States was prompted by a burning desire to live at peace with the rest of the world.

Now we know that beneath the smile and the pat on the back was a cynical contempt for the peaceful yearnings of the American people and their allies throughout the world.

In a few days the world will have an opportunity to gauge the reaction of the American people and their Representatives in the House to these events which may prove to be a turning point in our relations with the Soviet Union.

I refer to the coming debate on appropriations for the mutual security program. This program looms in these troubled times as a most powerful weapon in arming, militarily and economically, the free world whose hopes were summarily torn asunder by the actions of Mr. Khrushchev and the cynical power-hungry group in the Kremlin for whom he speaks.

I hope that the debate will be one which will hearten rather than dismay the nations which today stand athwart the Soviet Union's approach to the free world.

I pray that the results of this coming debate will reflect a determination by the House to support the President, his able Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their estimates of the minimum needs of this vital adjunct to our national defense—the mutual security program. Let not the pruning knife weaken the tie that binds us to the rest of the free world.

ADJOURNMENT TO TUESDAY MAY 31

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Tuesday next.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, could the gentleman give us any information as to when the

foreign handout bill is going to come before the House?

Mr. McCORMACK. I do not know anything about the handout. The gentleman means the mutual security bill?

Mr. GROSS. That is what President Eisenhower calls it, the handout bill.

Mr. McCORMACK. You can call it the handout bill if you want to, but I cannot go along with that designation.

Mr. GROSS. I want the gentleman to understand that is not original with me; that comes from President Eisenhower, the handout.

Mr. McCORMACK. That was when he was running for the Presidency.

Mr. GROSS. That is right.

Mr. McCORMACK. But now that he is in the Office of President, responsibility has caused him to change his mind.

Mr. GROSS. But they are still his words.

Mr. McCORMACK. But he said it; JOHN McCORMACK did not say it; he said it when he was a candidate for the Presidency.

Mr. GROSS. Yes.

Mr. McCORMACK. But not now that he is President.

Mr. GROSS. Yes; well, I will not accept that amendment.

I am still waiting to find out when the handout bill is going to come up.

Mr. McCORMACK. As to the mutual security appropriation bill, from the best information I have it looks as though it would be ready for floor action about June 13. I cannot give the date specifically but I had inquiry made within a day or two because I wanted to get information myself, and the best information I have is that it will probably be ready for floor action about June 13.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman and withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Tuesday next?

There was no objection.

POSTPONEMENT OF ROLLCALLS TO WEDNESDAY

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in the event of a rollcall on Tuesday next in connection with the passage of a bill, a motion to recommit, or any amendment, such rollcall be postponed to the following day, Wednesday, because there is a primary in Alabama.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, what is the legislation to be called up on Tuesday next?

Mr. McCORMACK. The only bill I have on Tuesday that might be called up in the event of a rule being reported by the Rules Committee, is S. 1892, the Norman Federal reclamation project in Oklahoma.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, the gentleman, I understand, expects nothing of any great importance on Tuesday?

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real meaning in life to many of our hard-of-hearing citizens.

Anyone who has studied this problem is aware of the great need for specialists to help the deaf. The national shortage of trained personnel in this field has been critical in recent years. It will become desperate if steps are not taken soon to overcome it.

It is my understanding that it is estimated there will be a shortage of some 350 classroom teachers at the start of the 1959-60 school year if additional help is not provided. Fortunately, the proposal before us provides the means to cut into this backlog of needs.

It is important, in evaluating the need for this legislation, to note that teachers of the deaf are probably more difficult to obtain than are teachers in any other field of special education. In addition, the training and preparation of teachers in this complex field is an expensive undertaking, thus bolstering the case for providing special scholarship help for those who enter this profession.

The grants-in-aid authorized by Senate Joint Resolution 127 will serve as a powerful incentive for more young people to enter this great field of humanitarian endeavor. It is hoped that the financial assistance made possible by this legislation will result in the establishment of much needed regional training centers geared to the special requirements of each particular area.

The authority contained in this measure will certainly go a long way toward providing the trained personnel so desperately needed to assist our deaf citizens. It represents a unique opportunity for the Congress to approve an investment in human resources of incalculable worth.

The reduction in the severity of the handicaps with which the deaf are afflicted through expert therapy, the acquisition of special skills such as lip-reading, or through the miracle of learning to talk—these are some of the fruits which can follow enactment of this measure. There are literally millions of Americans who can benefit from Senate Joint Resolution 127 and who can therefore become more happy and useful members of our society.

Surely the tremendous human problems involved in this field, combined with the demonstrated inadequacy of present training facilities, and the inability of States and localities to meet the need, argues eloquently for sound Federal assistance. This measure has the backing of leading organizations which deal with the deaf and its enactment is strongly recommended by the various institutions which are now plagued with a shortage of trained personnel to provide help.

It is my hope the Senate will approve with a will this measure, so that the Federal Government can play its part by making a lasting investment in the human resources of our deaf citizens. The encouragement of the recruiting and training of teachers of the deaf, speech pathologists, and audiologists is a vital step in minimizing these tragic handi-

caps and better preparing those afflicted with the means to contribute more fully and more happily to our society.

Mr. President, I have received a great many communications from my constituents about this resolution. They have come from private individuals, from parents and friends of deaf people, and from leaders in the field. They argue most persuasively for the pressing need to enact this measure. I ask unanimous consent to have a few of these many fine communications printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the communications were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEW YORK SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF,
White Plains, N.Y., May 9, 1960.

Senator KENNETH B. KEATING,
U.S. Senate, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I am writing to ask your support for the Senate Joint Resolution 127, which we hope will come up for the consideration of the Congress during its present session.

This bill deals with the problem of preparing desirable young people to become teachers of the deaf. Like all schools for the deaf in this country, we, too, have been deeply concerned by our inability to obtain teaching personnel. The parents of the children enrolled in this school are likewise concerned. All of us hope that when presented for consideration, the bill will meet with approval.

Thanking you for your consideration of this important piece of legislation, I am,

Sincerely yours,
DANIEL T. CLOUD,
Superintendent.

ROCHESTER SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF,
Rochester, N.Y., November 28, 1959.

Senator KENNETH B. KEATING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR KEATING: Thank you again for seeing me in your office in Rochester on Friday, November 27, and giving me opportunity to bring to your attention S.J. Resolution 127, sponsored by Senator HILL and companion resolutions introduced in the House by Senators ELLIOTT and FOGARTY, which would alleviate the critical shortage of trained teachers of the deaf, speech, and hearing pathologists and audiologists.

I am particularly interested in title I of S.J. 127 which relates to teachers of the deaf.

For over a decade it has been impossible to get more than 150 trainees into our accredited training centers in the United States, when our annual need for trained teachers has been at least 500. This has resulted in a deterioration of programs in schools for the deaf to a point that is actually alarming. Something must be done to motivate young people to come into this field. The U.S. Department of Education has stated that it is harder to obtain teachers for deaf children than for any other kind of handicapped child except the deaf-blind child.

S.J. 127 and its companion resolutions are heartily endorsed by the Conference of Executives of American Schools for the Deaf, the Convention of American Instructors of the Deaf, the Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf, the American Hearing and Speech Association, the American Hearing Society as well as parent organizations. After 2 years of hard work on a national level, it is finally in a form satisfactory to everyone.

I would very much appreciate your studying this bill, as I am very sure that you will

find it worthy of your wholehearted support
Very truly yours,

J. H. GALLOWAY,
Superintendent.

ST. MARY'S SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF,
Buffalo, N.Y., May 14, 1959.

The Honorable KENNETH B. KEATING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR KEATING: A proposed resolution is being prepared to alleviate the shortage of teachers of the deaf through Federal legislation. Senator HILL is expected to introduce the bill this month, we hope, with the names of Senator KENNEDY, Senator SALTONSTALL, and Senator CLARK on it as cosponsors.

We wanted you to be familiar with this problem—to realize the great need for teachers of the deaf. The nationwide shortage of trained classroom teachers of the deaf has been critical over a period of years, but has now become desperate. A shortage of 350 classroom teachers faces this profession at the start of the 1959-60 school year.

The problem is national in scope, so the solution must be approached from a national level, since training centers for the preparation of classroom teachers of the deaf must be regional. At present there are 22 approved training centers equipped to train at least 300 teachers of the deaf per year, should this incentive legislation be enacted and the expected flow of applicants materialize.

May we solicit your valued support in this endeavor? It would be most helpful if you would go on record as being in favor of this bill when it is introduced. We shall contact you again when we receive a copy of the bill.

Your help in this problem that seriously affects children afflicted with deafness will be deeply appreciated.

Most respectfully yours,
SISTER ROSE GERTRUDE,
Principal.

BUFFALO, N.Y., April 20, 1960.

Senator KENNETH KEATING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:

Shortage qualified personnel in field dictates we urge your support of speech pathology and audiology graduate program described in title 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 127.

ELMO KNIGHT,
President, Speech and Hearing Association of Western New York.

PARENTS' ASSOCIATION OF
LEXINGTON SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF,
New York, N.Y., September 9, 1959.

HON. KENNETH B. KEATING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Our organization, which represents 220 sets of parents of deaf children, is writing to ask your help in securing the passage of Senate Joint Resolution 127.

This legislation is designed to help alleviate the national shortage of classroom teachers of deaf children, speech pathologists and audiologists through scholarships and grants to training centers.

As parents of deaf children, we are particularly concerned with the teacher shortage. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare states that the greatest teacher shortage exists in this area of exceptionality. Approximately 500 additional teachers are needed for next fall, and training centers have turned out only 125 this year.

As parents, we are vitally concerned that our children not be denied educational opportunity because of the teacher shortage. There are some 30,000 deaf children of school

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age whose parents are anxiously concerned about the increasingly desperate teacher shortage. With proper education we can expect that our children will grow up to be useful, productive citizens. Over the past 10 years enrollment of deaf children in schools for the deaf has increased about 400 per year. Last year the increase was 900.

Providing trained teachers of the deaf must become a Federal concern because individual States have no training facilities. There are 20 accredited training centers in this country. With additional funds they could provide a substantially greater number of teachers.

Organizations which have united to secure the passage of the proposed legislation are the Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf, the Conference of Executives of American Schools for the Deaf, the Convention of American Instructors of the Deaf, and the Parents' Section of the Alexander Graham Bell Association.

We would appreciate your support of this legislation.

Sincerely yours,

MILDRED T. SHAROFF,
President.

THE CENTRAL NEW YORK
SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF,
Rome, N.Y., January 18, 1960.

HON. KENNETH KEATING,
U. S. Senate,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

Sr.: May I respectfully suggest that House Joint Resolution 494 (S.J. Res. 127) is of vital importance.

I have joined with parents, teachers, and the deaf of America in presenting information before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Education and Labor at the public hearing in New York on October 28, 1959.

The stated purpose of the legislation is "to help make available to those children in our country who are handicapped by deafness the specially trained teachers of the deaf needed to develop their abilities and to help make available to individuals suffering speech and hearing impairments those specially trained speech pathologists and audiologists needed to help them overcome their handicaps."

While I speak on my own behalf, I am confident that what I say essentially expresses the views of the following groups and organizations working in the interests of the deaf: The Conference of Executives of American Schools for the Deaf; the Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf; the Convention of American Instructors of the Deaf; the Empire State Association of the Deaf; and the National Association of the Deaf.

These bills would provide grants-in-aid to training centers which would enable them to recruit and train professional workers for the presently seriously understaffed area of special education, the speech handicapped and hearing handicapped. Grants-in-aid would be a powerful recruitment boost in interesting young people to enter this special field. The main factor that keeps them out is money, for special training programs means an extra college year, so the easy alternative is to enter the regular teaching field immediately after graduation.

Believe me, please, this has had considerable study, and to my way of thinking there is considerable merit to the bills. Those for whom I speak strongly support the bill introduced by Mr. ELLIOTT, House Joint Resolution 494, and its counterparts House Joint Resolutions 488, 503, 507, 512, 516, and 526 introduced respectively by Congressmen FOGARTY, BOLAND, THORNBERRY, LOSER, BAKER, and MOORHEAD.

The degree of effectiveness with which one is able to communicate with one's fellow man has a profound influence on one's whole social and economic life. The reduction of the severity of a speech handicap through expert therapy, the acquisition of skill in lipreading by one who is hard of hearing or the miracle of learning to speak by one born deaf who, because he cannot hear, would never learn to speak unless specially taught, makes it possible for those so helped to meet more equally the challenge of our competitive society, and broadens the base of their contributions as citizens. There are millions of Americans and children with varying degrees of speech and hearing difficulties who need the services of specially trained people to help them reach this higher level of performance. Many of these are denied this help because of the very serious shortage of trained workers in this field.

Financial assistance would definitely improve a most undesirable condition—the great teacher shortage that exists in the area of the deaf—and would undoubtedly make possible the establishment of regional training centers in the different sections of the country which could more effectively meet the needs of each particular area.

Only trained speech pathologists can properly serve this vast group. A serious shortage of trained personnel exists in this field of exceptionalism, and detailed studies of the conditions were presented to Mr. ELLIOTT and members of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Education and Labor at the public hearing; this detailed statistics and studies will be furnished you if you wish it.

I wish to thank you for giving me the opportunity to bring to your attention the critical nature of the shortage of trained personnel in the field of the speech impaired and hearing impaired, and express the hope that our combined efforts to relieve this condition will be successful.

Sincerely,

FRED L. SPARKS, Jr.,
Superintendent.

BUFFALO, N.Y.,
April 20, 1960.

Senator K. KEATING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Strongly urge your support of Senate Joint Resolution 127. Title 2 in that resolution should amend materially in training more speech pathologists and audiologists who are in much too short supply.

Dr. KATHERINE F. THORN,
Director, University of Buffalo Speech
Clinic.

OVERALL LIMITATION ON FOREIGN TAX CREDIT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1456, H.R. 10087.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 10087) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to permit taxpayers to elect an overall limitation on the foreign tax credit.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Finance with amendments.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the bill will be the pending business.

WE LEARN FROM TORPEDOING OF SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the complete collapse of the vaunted summit conference before it took place is now a matter of history. It has shaken the free people of the world as nothing has since the dark days preceding the Second World War.

Nobody is against expressions of sympathy for President Eisenhower on this unfortunate conclusion to his efforts. The cruel fact is that our humiliation and diminished prestige left in the wake of the breakup in Paris are such that little can be gained by closing our eyes to the true situation and wishing it had never happened. To do so would only prove to the world that our mistakes are not to be corrected and that Americans are satisfied with slipshod leadership. It is evident there should be a demand for better administration, both domestically and in the conduct of foreign relations.

This is not likely to take place if we indulge in self-pity or, even worse, self-deception.

What is required is, not divisive partisanship, but a rational, free, and open discussion of the situation and of what can be done to correct it.

It is our duty, as Senators of the United States, to clarify the issues, clear the air, and take steps toward restoring the damage that has been done to the prestige of our country and to hopes for world peace.

I commend the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and our distinguished majority leader [Mr. JOHNSON of Texas] for the statesmanlike course they are following in connection with this matter.

The occurrences and statements just before the summit conference was to be held and the series of sensational events that followed point out—as nothing else has done—the inherent weaknesses in President Eisenhower's concept of the Presidency. Despite the fact the President conducted himself with dignity and restraint, quite in contrast to the bullying tactics of Khrushchev, we know now that at this critical time, important and often vital decisions cannot be delegated to subordinates. At a time when President Eisenhower needed them most, some appointive officials let him down.

Mr. President, our citizens generally are questioning the series of incredible blunders and the almost unbelievable administrative confusion that both preceded and followed the disastrous U-2 flight. What excuse is there for the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency did not coordinate the timing of those flights with the summit plans of the State Department?

Why is it that the President ordered that U-2 flights stop, after the downing of one of our planes? If the flight was so necessary 2 weeks before the summit conference, it seems peculiar that there is no need for such aerial reconnaissance from now on.

The President went on to say that he directed the flights be stopped because,

with the downing of the U-2, their usefulness was impaired. Why? The Soviets had known of these flights all along. No secret was involved. If the flights were useful 2 weeks before the summit, why are they not useful today?

The truth is, Mr. President, that the administration's alibis do not hold water. Appointive officials erred in risking the U-2 flight so near to the date of the summit conference. What justification can there be for considering the U-2 flights unnecessary after May, but for considering them advisable on May 1?

Khrushchev eagerly seized upon the panic of Eisenhower administration officials and their ineptness and sought to diminish the esteem with which our country is held by the heads of state of friendly nations. Let us hope Khrushchev failed. He humiliated our President, who apparently had not been informed by appointive officials in the State Department in the Central Intelligence Agency, and in the NASA.

State Department officials admitted the spying, and further indicated that the policy of aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Soviet Union would continue, as it was, so they stated, the only way by which we could secure information to expose any Soviet buildup at missile bases and airfields for a nuclear attack. Even the Vice President made a public statement along the same line. He was justified in doing so on the basis of declarations which came from State Department officials.

Then, too late, officials of the State Department backtracked; and the President, while in Paris, announced that such a policy would not be continued. Unfortunately, that development came after Premier Khrushchev's blustering and demands for apology and punishment. Due to the lateness of President Eisenhower's statement, it even appeared that America quailed before Khrushchev's shouting, which was not a fact.

The confusion has been unequalled. One wonders whether leaders of our allies had not every reason to lose respect for us and confidence in us. We gave the Kremlin dictators a propaganda victory of great magnitude. The adverse effect on our prestige throughout the world is great, and is due almost entirely to the confused efforts to explain the U-2 incident. Even a 14-year-old boy would have known enough to remain silent. The apparent panic of officials in Washington and the issuance of conflicting statements impaired President Eisenhower's usefulness in Paris. That situation was made to order for Premier Khrushchev, and he took maximum advantage of it.

Now that President Eisenhower has returned, we may well consider the policy questions involved in aerial reconnaissance, the resultant differences of opinion among the leaders of our allies, and the possibility that hereafter the leaders of neutral nations may be less inclined to trust us. Who can blame them if their faith and their confidence in a strong America are diminished?

In reality, there probably is no increased danger of war between this Na-

tion and the Soviet Union. But, in truth, the tension of the cold war has been aggravated, at least temporarily.

Unfortunately, also, here in our own country the very small minority who, in reality, favor preventive war against the Soviet Union, and who are so opposed to the Communist system of Russia that they abhor face-to-face conferences in an endeavor to work out disarmament and permanent peace, have been heartened by our failure. This is a tragic aftermath; but President Eisenhower personally cannot be blamed. He delegated authority which other Presidents have customarily retained; and the officials he appointed proved unable to cope with a sudden mischance.

We would like to forget, if we could, the U-2 plane incident, and, in particular, the utterly untruthful statement issued by a high administration official—that the plane was in the air, investigating weather conditions, and mechanical trouble developed. In many parts of the world, we are on the defensive, among officials of friendly and neutral nations, largely because of that statement. This is much to our regret. Our President must have seethed inside over the ineptness of officials he had caused to be placed in positions of responsibility.

Mr. President, although awkward handling in that emergency gave the Soviet dictator an opportunity to scuttle the conference, and to rant and rave, as if he had no knowledge of our spying, and as if the Soviets had no spies of their own, there is still the hope that we shall pick up the pieces and shall resume peaceful negotiations.

Our ship of state has plowed along undamaged through heavier seas. We, in America, will ride out this storm. In fact, it will abate with time; and it is certain that beginning in January, there will be in the White House, a strong leader, a President who will not delegate much of his authority. Above all, we shall then have a Chief Executive who will devote full time to his duties as President, and will have personal knowledge and direction of the conduct of all parts of the executive branch of the Government.

The Paris fiasco of a summit conference that failed to "get off the ground" proves that it is essential that there be complete coordination of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of State. Above all, it proves that the demands of the time call for a vigorous, strong President who will devote full time to his duties as Chief Executive.

It seems to many that if it was safe to discontinue the U-2 flights on May 13, it surely would have been safe to cancel the U-2 flight on May 1. But that was not done, and the hope that face-to-face conferences with Khrushchev might result in steps toward ending the armaments race, plus adequate safeguards, plummeted downward with the U-2.

Perhaps a great lesson for us to learn from this setback is that there must be strong leadership in the White House, instead of too much delegation of authority to underlings, and that we must proceed with the greatest speed to close the missile gap between this Nation and the So-

viet Union. Then we should easily regain respect and confidence of the leaders of the free world.

SEISMIC WAVE DAMAGES

Mr. LONG of Hawaii. Mr. President, the seismic waves which rolled across the Pacific, following the earthquakes in Chile during the past week caused enormous loss of life and property damage in South America, Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines, and Okinawa, and lesser damage in California, Alaska, Mexico, Tahiti, Australia, New Zealand, and Formosa. The death and destruction caused by the fearfully powerful waves were spread around virtually half of the earth's surface.

In 1946, a series of seismic waves coming down from the Aleutians also hit Hawaii with catastrophic force, killing 159 persons and causing some \$25 million of property damage. Since that time, there have been smaller tidal waves, or warnings of possible wave assaults, every few years in the central Pacific and along our western shores.

I call the attention of the Congress to the following editorial from the Hilo Tribune-Herald, printed the day after Hilo was crushed by the recent seismic waves. Managing Editor A. E. P. Wall raised the question of how adequate is the present system of tidal wave warnings. Without gainsaying the wonderful work which our scientists have been doing in detecting the earth movements which cause these waves, he asks whether if a more extensive international warning service might be developed.

I ask the same question. I also ask why the Congress has not appropriated the funds necessary to implement the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956. That act sits on the statute books as a piece of deadwood. Had the Congress appropriated the money required to activate the program, the people of Hilo and the people of other communities of Hawaii, California, and Alaska which suffered damage from the recent seismic wave would have received some funds with which to restore their homes and business properties.

As it is, in Hilo alone property losses are estimated at more than \$25 million. Since it is impossible to obtain regular insurance against tidal wave damage, only a tiny portion of the destroyed property is covered by insurance. We must appropriate the funds necessary to put the Flood Insurance Act to work.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from the Hilo Tribune-Herald be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Hilo Tribune-Herald, May 23, 1960]

IT'S A SMALL ISLAND
(By A. E. P. Wall)

I walked down Kamehameha Avenue this morning, and what I saw looked like a city on its knees.

I looked for Waiakae Town and it wasn't there. I looked for the handsome New Cafe 100, where Sally and I enjoyed lunch Saturday, and all I could find was broken dishes and broken hearts.

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The manager of the Hilo Theater invited me in for a look at the swampy desolation of his auditorium. He was looking for the organ but couldn't find it.

The theater and the street on both sides of it looked like something out of a nuclear war film that might have shown there.

The damage, desolation and death raise important questions of State and Federal aid to meet immediate needs of the people who have suffered—although everyone who lives in Hilo and loves it has suffered.

It raises another important question, and perhaps an international one.

It was nearly lunchtime yesterday when I first heard that a tsunami might be headed for Hawaii.

I drove at once to the Volcano Observatory to see what Dr. Jerry Eaton's seismographs had to say about it.

The story traced in thin lines on long sheets of paper was a startling one. The paper wasn't big enough to tell it.

There were three quakes in Chile. The third one registered at the Volcano Observatory at 8:56 yesterday morning. It was recorded with such violence that the seismograph needles bounced back and forth in arcs wider than the cylinder on which they write.

The Volcano Observatory doesn't track seismic waves and doesn't have the responsibility of forecasting them. That is the job of the Coast and Geodetic Survey at Barber's Point on Oahu.

It does keep track of earthquakes. It found that yesterday's Chilean quake registered 8.25 on the Richter Scale.

I asked Dr. Eaton how high the scale goes.

He said all newspapermen ask that question—but there's no answer. He said the largest ever recorded was 8.6 and that the Sunday morning quake was about as strong as the one that shook San Francisco to pieces in 1906.

Can a plane observe a wave in action and give warnings of its strength?

No, Dr. Eaton said, because it doesn't show that clearly on the ocean's surface.

He said it is something like dropping a pebble into a pan of water. There's a great train of ripples spreading out from the point of disturbance. The strength of the ripples or waves depends on the depth of the water.

When a wave approaches an island with a sloping ridge drifting down into the water it gains force.

So it might be only 5 feet high in the broad open sea, but 50 feet high in shallow water.

Waves from Chile have caused trouble in the past.

Hawaii was hit hard by tsunamis originating there in 1837 and 1877. Chilean waves struck here but caused no damage in 1906, 1922, and 1943.

Nobody really knew whether to expect a wave, even after examining seismograph reports and checking the gages in Chile and the Canal Zone.

In view of the fact that several waves have headed this way from Chile, including severe ones in the last century, it seems that the time has come to set up an international warning service to cover the area.

The lack of such a system may have contributed to an incredible loss of lives and money.

Will it happen again?

ATTITUDE OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, on the "Meet the Press" program of May 22, produced by Lawrence E. Spivak, the guest was Alexander Kaznacheyev, a former Soviet intelligence agent. I hold in my hand the questions which were asked and the answers which were given. Those who questioned him were Ernest K. Lindley, of Newsweek magazine;

Harry Schwartz, of the New York Times; Fletcher Knebel, of the Cowles Publications; and Herb Kaplow, of NBC News. I wish to call attention to some significant information which the former Soviet intelligence agent supplied.

Mr. Knebel asked:

Mr. Kaznacheyev, I understand that last fall after the Khrushchev and Eisenhower exchange of visits was settled upon, you predicted then that you doubted that Ike would ever go to Russia, because Khrushchev would find some reason to cancel the visit.

Is that true; and, if so, what is your reasoning?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Well, yes. It is a completely logical doubt. Definitely the Soviet government and the Communist Party—in other words, the Soviet Communist regime—are in no way interested in allowing so popular a man as the American President to come to the Soviet Union.

He continued to say:

I am going to say that there are several factors which constitute the stability and strength of the Communist regime inside the Soviet Union. The first factor is cold war, the international tension and the armaments race. The second factor is successes of international communism abroad, and the success of Soviet foreign policy. And the third factor, and I think primarily and above all is the ignorance of the entire Soviet people of reality, of life abroad, of the real reasons of the international tension, cold war and the armaments race.

This ignorance is created by two kinds of Iron Curtain. The first Iron Curtain is the physical which all of you know about, and the second Iron Curtain I am going to say is inside the brains of the majority of the Soviet people, created by constant propaganda and ideological indoctrination.

I continue to read:

The Soviet government in any way can be interested in allowing foreign guests, especially one so prominent as an American President, to bring some light into this ignorance and in this way undermine it.

They are definitely afraid of the impact such a visit can make on the Soviet people.

The other day, when I was speaking on the floor of the Senate, before I had this particular matter brought to my attention, I said that Khrushchev was afraid of the statesmanship of the President of the United States, that that was why he canceled the visit.

At the conclusion of this particular "Meet the Press" session, this young man was, in answer to a question, about to give some very important information; but the time for the broadcast was up.

He said:

My mental processes were very complicated and long. I was abroad. At the last of this. But I think I will reply to the question in another way. I am going to bring to your attention the fact that there is very little known in the West, that is the new Soviet generation, the new generation of Soviet youth. This is people born in the thirties. They are strikingly different from elder generations of our fathers and the generation of our brothers.

Mr. Rash said:

I am sorry to interrupt.

I asked someone what he was driving at. That person said just this: The new generation is not satisfied with the standard of living, with the wages. They are not satisfied with their opportunities to have something to say about

government. They are feeling the ferment that is evident all over the world. That undoubtedly was what the young man was about to say.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire "Meet the Press" broadcast be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

There being no objection, the broadcast was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEET THE PRESS

(Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak, May 22, 1960)

Moderator: Bryson Rash.

Guest: Alexander Kaznacheyev, (or Kaznacheev), former Soviet intelligence agent.

Panel: Ernest K. Lindley, Newsweek magazine; Harry Schwartz, New York Times; Fletcher Knebel, Cowles Publications; Herb Kaplow, NBC News.

The ANNOUNCER. Ladies and gentlemen, we invite you to "Meet the Press," the unrehearsed program, which has won every major award in its field.

Our guest today is a former Soviet intelligence agent, Alexander Kaznacheyev, who is now living in this country. In just a moment, Mr. Kaznacheyev will meet the press.

Remember that the questions asked by the members of the panel do not necessarily reflect their point of view. It is their way of getting the story for you.

And now here is today's moderator of Meet the Press, Mr. Bryson Rash.

Mr. RASH. Welcome once again to "Meet the Press." Three weeks ago today an American U-2 jet plane was brought down deep inside the Soviet Union. Premier Khrushchev made the startling announcement in a few days that this plane was on a spy mission. The U.S. Government some days later finally admitted the charge.

Now in a complete, or feigned, or real rage, Khrushchev seized upon this particular incident to insult and also humiliate the President of the United States. The Paris summit conference was wrecked in the process, the background and practice of espionage became a subject of intense discussion.

Our guest today is thoroughly familiar with espionage from the Soviet Union's side of the Iron Curtain. He is Alexander Kaznacheyev, born in Moscow 28 years ago. He became a specialist in Eastern affairs and was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, Burma. He was recruited as an agent of the Soviet Intelligence Service and worked in the Communist espionage system in southeast Asia.

Eight years of hostility to the Communist regime in Moscow culminated in June of 1959 when Mr. Kaznacheyev defected to the West and sought asylum in the United States, where he now makes his home as a private citizen.

Seated around the press table to question our guest today are Mr. Ernest K. Lindley of Newsweek magazine, Mr. Harry Schwartz of the New York Times, Mr. Fletcher Knebel of the Cowles Publications, Mr. Herb Kaplow of NBC News.

Mr. Lawrence Spivak, a regular member of the "Meet the Press" panel, will be back with us 2 weeks from today.

And now we will start the questions with Mr. Kaplow.

Mr. KAPLOW. Mr. Kaznacheyev, in describing the activities of Soviet intelligence agents in Rangoon, Burma, you said or wrote somewhere rather recently that one of the main functions was to penetrate and find out precisely what was going on in the foreign embassies in Rangoon, especially the American Embassy.

Did the Soviet agents find much out?

Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. In Rangoon, no. At the time when I was working in the Soviet Embassy as a diplomat and as an agent of

OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE U-2 AND THE "SUMMIT" BREAKUP

The Record as Told to a Senate Committee

Behind closed doors, a powerful Senate committee now is getting the full story of U. S. spy flights over Russia and of events leading up to the wreck at the "summit."

What really happened in the U-2 flights? Did U. S. walk into a Khrushchev trap at the Paris conference?

Is Russia plotting new surprises to try to knock the U. S. and Allies off balance?

It was answers to such questions that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sought.

So sensitive was much of the testimony that it was screened and censored for security reasons before it was made public.

Details of the U-2 episode and its aftermath were produced in the questioning of Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and his Under Secretary, Douglas Dillon, as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee started its inquiry on May 27, 1960.

The Committee chairman, Senator Fulbright (Dem.), of Arkansas, opened the questioning of Mr. Herter by asking when the decision was made to halt the U-2 flights. Following is from the official transcript of the testimony before the Committee:

Secretary Herter: My impression is that it was taken on the Thursday before the President went to Paris.

Senator Fulbright: That would be Thursday, is that it, the twelfth?

Mr. Herter: Yes.

Senator Fulbright: What were the considerations which led to this decision?

Mr. Herter: Mr. Chairman, I think I answered that in my own statement, in which I said that, since the U-2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued—as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case.

Senator Fulbright: It had been compromised some time before the twelfth, wasn't it?

Mr. Herter: No, sir.

The examination then turned to whether or not it had been agreed some time earlier to halt the flights in May. Senator Fulbright continued the questioning:

Q: Was any moratorium on the flights agreed upon prior to May 1, to be effective at any time after May 1?

Mr. Herter: I have heard reports to that effect, but, of my own knowledge, I do not know.

Q: Was such a moratorium ever discussed or considered by anyone in the State Department?

Mr. Herter: Not by Mr. Dillon nor myself.

Q: Or anyone?

Mr. Herter: I don't know of anyone.

Q: Do you know whether the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] considered such a moratorium?

Mr. Herter: I do not, sir.

Q: Did Mr. Dulles [Allen Dulles, head of CIA] or anyone else order a suspension of flights after the loss of the plane on May 1?

Mr. Herter: That, sir, he will be able to testify to. I can't tell you as of what date he did that.

Q: Were any other planes lost on these same ventures prior to May 1?

Mr. Herter: Not over Soviet territory.

Q: None had been shot down or lost over Soviet territory?

Mr. Herter: No.

Q: The flight referred to, that Chairman Khrushchev referred to on April 9—you were aware of that, were you?

Mr. Herter: Yes.

Q: It was a successful fly-over?

Mr. Herter: It was.

Q: If the President decided to suspend the flights prior to Monday, May 16, which you stated he did on the twelfth, why was this announcement delayed until the meeting with Chairman Khrushchev on the sixteenth?

Mr. Herter: Because the President reserved that decision to make the announcement in Paris.

Q: What was the reasoning for doing that?

Mr. Herter: I cannot give you the answer, sir.

In an opening statement to the Committee, Secretary Herter said he was convinced Nikita Khrushchev went to the Paris conference determined, in advance, to wreck it. Senator Fulbright asked the Secretary if the U-2 episode contributed to Khrushchev's decision.

Mr. Herter: Yes, I believe it did. It was one of the factors, as I tried to explain in my statement.

Q: Mr. Secretary, why do you think Chairman Khrushchev left a way out for the President by suggesting in one of his earlier statements that he believed the President did not know about these flights?

Mr. Herter: I can there, of course, only speculate that he had himself committed himself very strongly in Russia with regard to his friendship for the President, and wished to,

idea of what to expect from costs noted at this time in key resorts.

Bahamas and Cuba. Nassau, in the Bahama Islands, is one of the resorts especially attractive to Americans. Seven-day cruises from New York start at \$170 a person. The ship is your hotel while you are on the island.

By air, a night-coach flight costs \$135, round trip. You can count on spending about \$15 a day per person for a first-class hotel room, with breakfast and dinner provided. A rental car will cost you \$10 a day, or \$60 a week, but you must supply the gasoline.

Cuba, once a favorite vacation spot for Americans, is offering inducements to lure back tourists who have been frightened away by the anti-American attitudes of Fidel Castro's Government.

A double room in one of Havana's luxury hotels now costs \$12 to \$15 a day, and in first-class hotels, with air conditioning, such a room can be found for \$9. On request, the luxury hotels will provide you with free tickets to the horse races. Costs of lodgings and food outside the capital are considerably lower.

In the best night clubs of Havana, minimum charges for food and drinks range from \$3 to \$5.50, depending on whether you prefer an early or late show.

Puerto Rico, Haiti. From now to December, the cost of a comfortable hotel room in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is shaved by as much as 45 per cent. You can expect to spend about \$25 a day for first-class accommodations, including all meals. A fashionable hotel at Dorado Beach, 20 miles west of San Juan, has lowered its rates for a double room, with breakfast and dinner, to \$28 a day. The same accommodations cost up to \$60 during the winter months.

Puerto Rico has about 3,000 miles of good roads, many of them offering unusual scenic attractions. You can rent a car for \$8 a day, or \$40 a week, plus 10 cents a mile.

Haiti's distinctive music, art and atmosphere combine to provide a big drawing card for American tourists. A car can be rented for \$10 a day, plus 10 cents a mile. You can fly from place to place on Haiti at low fares.

Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital, is a free

port. Such items as watches, china, Irish linens, gloves, sweaters, French perfumes and liqueurs can be purchased at bargain prices.

About hurricanes: These occur in the Caribbean most frequently between August and October. About four or five hurricanes a year is the average, but new warning systems now in effect help ships and planes to avoid the big blows and reduce the dangers.

SOUTH AMERICA

Americans who elect to visit South America in 1960 will find that hotels are improved as a result of a modernization program. Prices in most places—Venezuela being the gold-plated exception—are lower than in the U. S., Canada, Europe and the leading resort areas of the Caribbean.

As a tourist, you need have no real worry over getting caught in political unrest, although some revolutionary excitement is a possibility this year in Bolivia and Ecuador.

Hotel prices vary from country to country and from city to city, but the average cost for a double room in a first-class hotel is \$13 to \$16 a day.

Meals are inexpensive in most parts of South America. In Buenos Aires, for example, a steak two inches thick and nine inches long is served in the best restaurants for \$1.25 to \$1.75. A complete dinner can be obtained for \$3 to \$4.

The average daily expense for hotel, meals and use of a car with driver runs between \$25 and \$30 a day per person, including taxes and tips. For top luxury accommodations, figure on \$50.

Leave auto home. Travel by car on a drive-yourself basis is not recommended in South America. Local drivers have a dangerous propensity for weaving in and out of lanes and speeding through intersections. Also, unless the visitor can speak Spanish or Portuguese, he can easily get lost for some time.

Hiring a car with a driver is relatively inexpensive. In Brazil, for instance, you can arrange with the hotel doorkeeper to get a car for as little as \$1.25 an hour. However, if you want an English-speaking driver, it will cost more.

For sportsmen, South America abounds in good fishing and hunting of all kinds. Skiing in the Andes is at its peak when it's summer in the U. S.

One precautionary note: Summer ended in March in the lower half of the continent, and a cold, wet winter is due in June. For those who are looking for sun and beaches, plan to stop in a place like Rio de Janeiro, where the weather is balmy the year around.


Latest on U. S. and Canadian dollars, page 109.



SOUTH AMERICA—For the most part, visitors will find modest prices and political calm and modernized hotel facilities. Above: view of Rio de Janeiro Harbor, Brazil.

THE CARIBBEAN—Improved air and sea transportation makes "island hopping" increasingly easy for U. S. tourists. Below: Caneel Bay Plantation, St. John, V. I.

Photos: Monkmeier, Canadian National Railways, USN&WR



... "Telling truth was better than fabricating excuses"

in that way, continue the possibility of the President disclaiming any responsibility for the flight.

Q: What was the reason for not accepting this way out on our part? Why didn't we accept that suggestion?

Mr. Herter: Mr. Chairman, that was a question, as you know, of judgment.

Q: That was what?

Mr. Herter: It was a question of judgment. As to when the essential facts had been revealed by the capture of the pilot and the plane with all its instrumentation intact, the United States Government should admit the fact that this overflight had taken place, that it was an intelligence overflight, and that decision was made, of course, by the President himself.

Senator Fulbright noted that President Eisenhower had assumed personal responsibility for the U-2 flights, and asked Secretary Herter if there was any precedent in history for a head of state to assume "personal responsibility for espionage activities."

Mr. Herter: No, I do not know of any firsthand. It may be that there have been some. On the other hand, I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that this particular incident was of a very unusual nature.

Q: As a general policy, do you believe it is wise for the head of state to assume responsibility for espionage activities?

Mr. Herter: Well, very frankly, I don't think it makes a great deal of difference from the point of view of what the public believes.

On the other hand, I believe in a case of this kind the telling of the truth was the better course than getting deeper into fabricating excuses or disavowing responsibility.

"The Unusual Circumstances"

Q: What precisely were the reasons that persuaded you to depart from precedent in this case? What were the unusual circumstances you referred to?

Mr. Herter: The unusual circumstances were the facts that the matériel and the statement of the pilot—not every bit of which was accurate, but a great part of which was accurate—had been revealed, and were being presented to impartial tribunals for examination.

Under those circumstances, which was very different from the ordinary espionage case, I think it would have become extremely evident, and was extremely evident, that this incident had taken place.

Senator Green (Dem.), of Rhode Island, said that division of authority within the Government appeared to have created "a great many misunderstandings" at the time the U-2 flight was exposed by Russia. He asked: "How far did the President act alone and how far the State Department acted alone before they came together and agreed on the situation?"

Mr. Herter: I would say there was consultation right through in this period.

May I make this observation, Mr. Chairman: From the point of view of firsthand knowledge on these matters, I asked Mr. Dillon to come up with me because for the—until May 6, I was out of the United States, he was Acting Secretary of State, and some of the questions that may be directed to that period when I was out of the country.

answer from firsthand information, whereas I would have to do it only from secondhand information.

Senator Green: Mr. Dillon, then will you take up the answer to my question?

Mr. Dillon: All I can say is that, in the period that I had responsibility, we were in contact regularly with the President with full co-ordination.

Senator Humphrey (Dem.), of Minnesota, opened up a new line of questioning by asking the Secretary of State what agency of the Government was in charge of such things as the U-2 flights.

Mr. Herter: The Central Intelligence Agency.

Q: Do you have constant information—do you have continuing information as to the number of these flights, the course of these flights, the purpose of these flights, in the State Department?

Mr. Herter: The general programs had been gone over with the Department. Obviously, it is impossible to tell when these flights are going to take place because they are so dependent on the season of the year and on weather conditions.

The agency has to plan numbers of alternatives, so we never know at any particular time of any particular flight. But the general approval of the program has been received from the State Department, of course, as one of the advisers to the President in this matter.

Q: Did you know of this specific flight ahead of time?

Mr. Herter: I did not. No, I didn't know it was in the air even when I was overseas, nor do I think any of us did until it came down.

Q: Is that your understanding, Mr. Dillon?

Mr. Dillon: I was not aware that it was in the air until I was informed that it was—it was overdue, as I stated previously.

Q: When something goes wrong on one of these flights, who is responsible to give the cover story, the cover-up story, so to speak?

Mr. Dillon: Central Intelligence Agency. But we are also responsible for agreeing with them that this is a reasonable story, and it is proper in the circumstances. But they have the responsibility for executing it.

If Red Plane Flew Over U.S.—

Q: Mr. Secretary, what do you think would happen in the United States if, on our radar screen, we should discover a plane flying at high altitude in this age of the fear of surprise attack, over our territory?

Mr. Herter: I think we would do everything we could do to identify it right away.

Q: Just identify it?

Mr. Herter: Yes, identify it. We have the wherewithal, I think, to do that.

Q: In other words we—would we dispatch interceptors?

Mr. Herter: I think so.

Q: What would be our view of such a flight?

Mr. Herter: Certainly there is very little that such a flight could ascertain that would worry us much. Every bit of information that we have got in this country seems to be available through public means to anyone who wishes to collect documents. In fact, in the whole Russian espionage system they have collected maps, documents, and photographs of every part of the United States.

. . . Flights over Russia "were of very great value to us"

[continued from page 69]

Q: I realize this, but, in light of the danger of surprise attack, this is what I am getting at: This is a little different, may I say, from a spy working the railroad yard or taking photographs or even a submarine off our coast, even though this gets to be a little serious, too. But, in the light of danger of surprise attack by air power, there is some difference, is there not?

Mr. Herter: There is some difference. On the other hand, I think we could identify it very quickly. This is the type of plane that no one could possibly mistake for a bomber when you get close enough to look at it. This is entirely an unarmed glider type of plane.

Q: Have we ever shot down any Soviet planes over American territory or over any friendly territory in which we have bases or alliances?

Mr. Herter: Not that I am aware of.

Q: Have we ever intercepted any Soviet planes—in Korea, for example?

Mr. Herter: I think we have been able to identify them from time to time. Whether we could say that they were deliberate espionage planes or whether they wandered over the line from the border or not, I can't tell you.

Senator Hickenlooper (Rep.), of Iowa, asked whether the high-flying U-2 was shot down from its maximum altitude, as Khrushchev claimed, or developed engine trouble that dropped it down to the point where it became an easy target for the Russians.

Mr. Herter: Senator, there has been a good deal of speculation on that point. I think that we are very skeptical as to whether it was shot down from a very high altitude.

Q: Well, I think there is considerable difference in a situation where this plane might have been shot down at 60,000 or 70,000 feet, or whether it was shot down or shot at at 5,000 or 7,000 feet.

Mr. Herter: We are very skeptical and there are certain evidences that it was not shot down from that altitude.

* * *

Requests to See U-2 Pilot

Q: I understand that we have requested in Moscow that representatives of this Government be permitted to interview the pilot. Have we had any replies from those requests?

Mr. Herter: As yet they have not given us that permission. They have said that when "we have finished interrogating him we will give consideration to it."

Q: Do we have a reasonable idea as to where he is held—he is being held?

Mr. Herter: That I can't tell you. We have been assured that he is in good health, and beyond that I can't tell you whether we know where he is held or not. Perhaps one of my colleagues knows that. I don't think we have any information on that.

Q: Would you care to give an opinion on the value to this country, in our defensive posture, of these flights, this series of flights which have gone on over Russian territory for the last several years?

Mr. Herter: Yes, sir, I will give you this opinion. It is a layman's opinion rather than an expert's opinion, but I think they were of very great value to us.

Senator Morse (Dem.), of Oregon, turned the inquiry to a line of questioning about what knowledge the U. S. has of

Soviet missiles, and the censored transcript as released showed that the hearing had moved into highly sensitive territory.

Senator Morse: Mr. Secretary, do our experts believe that Russia has a land-air missile?

Mr. Herter: I think you are having both the Secretary of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency that can testify to that better than I could.

Q: Have they ever informed you as to what their opinion is as to whether or not Russia has a land-air missile?

Mr. Herter: We, I think, assume that they do.

"For Security Reasons"

Q: We assume that they do. Is it on the basis of that assumption that they have been asking Congress for some time for a speed-up in our land-air-missile program—because of the assumption that Russia may have one?

Mr. Herter: Yes, sir. I am being purposely cautious for security reasons, as you understand.

Q: I understand. And yet, I think, from the standpoint of our own security, it is rather important that we have some information as to the possibility, on the line of Senator Hickenlooper's question, the possibility of whether or not this was shot down by a land-air missile.

[Whatever the reply was to this observation, it was deleted in its entirety for security reasons.]

Q: What international-law rights do we have, Mr. Secretary, over capture of American spies captured by foreign governments?

Mr. Herter: We have no rights over them that are in contravention of domestic law. We have no international right.

Senator Carlson (Rep.), of Kansas, asked whether, despite Khrushchev's tactics at Paris, the U. S. would continue negotiations on disarmament and a nuclear-test ban.

Mr. Herter: Yes, sir. I have indicated in my prepared statement that we will continue to do this.

As you know, however, the condition that we have always adhered to is that the controls have got to be controls that one can rely upon. In other words, reliable controls on both sides.

I think that with the very real danger that exists in the world today of accidental events that may lead to a nuclear war, that we should pursue the course of doing whatever we can to minimize within the bounds that we have stated; namely, that of reciprocal and effective control.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are making any progress on these nuclear-test suspensions at the Geneva Conference and other places?

Mr. Herter: During the last few weeks, really the last few days, they have been meeting in Geneva examining a co-ordinated program of research for improving instrumentation so that small shots can be detected underground.

Those conferences have moved, I think, pretty satisfactorily. They are halted at this moment, awaiting some instructions from Moscow.

In the next few days, we should know better whether or not there has been any radical change of position on the part of the Russians or not. There is some chance of reaching agreement. It will be a limited agreement at best, but that again depends on full agreement with regard to the control mechanisms. As you know, those talks have been going for a long time. Until they are shown to be hopeless, I think we will continue with them.

NEW YORK
HERALD TRIBUNE

Allen Dulles Is Cleared By Senate in U-2 Case



HUSH-HUSH—Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, arriving at U-2 probe yesterday accompanied by an unidentified aide.

Associated Press Wirephoto

His 5½ Hrs. At Inquiry Kept Secret

Silent on Reason For the Flight

By Rowland Evans Jr.

WASHINGTON, May 31. — The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee cleared the Central Intelligence Agency today of all responsibility for controversial policy decisions in the U-2 spy-flight affair.

Sen. J. William Fulbright, D., Ark., talked to reporters after one of the most secrecy-shrouded briefings in congressional history. The witness was Allen W. Dulles, director of the C. I. A.

All Is Secret

Not a single word uttered in the five-and-a-half hours of Mr. Dulles' testimony will be released to the public. Sealed and bound, it will be locked up in committee files, and the stenotype tapes and duplicating master sheets will be burned.

Sen. Fulbright, while refusing to give reporters a shred of hard information on the all-day testimony, said:

1. That Mr. Dulles "was as candid as a man in his position could be" and gave the committee "a much clearer understanding of the agency's role in this whole matter."

Gave Flight Details

2. That Mr. Dulles declined to say precisely why the flight of pilot Francis Gary Powers was ordered, although "he volunteered quite thorough details about the May 1 flight."

Soviet Explains Preservation Of U-2 Wreckage Despite Fall

***Survival of Fragments Is Laid to Light
Weight of Germanium Metal—Parts
Are Said to Have 'Floated' Down***

By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times.

MOSCOW, May 27—The surprising survival of so much of the American U-2 reconnaissance plane that was forced down in the Urals on May 1 is being explained in some detail at an exhibition of the wreckage here.

The question how the plane's wings and tail assembly and much of its equipment could be preserved after it had been hit by a rocket at an altitude of more than 60,000 feet, as reported here, has puzzled many who have seen the exhibition in Gorky Park. Some visitors have now received the following explanation:

The high-flying single-engine plane was not hit directly by a rocket but by fragments from a rocket that exploded in the air near by. As a result the U-2 rapidly lost altitude and began to "disintegrate." This apparently meant that it began to fall apart.

Because most of the plane's parts were made with extremely lightweight germanium, the wings and other sections did not hurtle to the ground, but floated down and were not smashed on impact. Parts of the plane were retrieved in an area of about eight square miles near the city of Sverdlovsk.

Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the U-2, is presumed to have found that his automatic ejector mechanism had been damaged beyond use. He therefore worked to free himself from the descending fuselage and bailed out from an altitude of about 30,000 feet. "He was very lucky," visitors are told at the exhibition.

Only pieces of the fuselage of the U-2 are shown in the

Gorky Park display, presumably because it was weighted down by the Pratt Whitney J-75 engine and suffered most in the crash. The jet engine remains in recognizable shape. So do other parts of the plane's equipment.

A tape recorder that the plane carried to pick up Soviet radar signals was still usable when it fell into Soviet hands. The plane's high-altitude camera was badly smashed but is usable. The Russians say the equipment was built to withstand a crash.

Holes in the wings that hang in the Gorky Park display had led laymen to believe from the start that projectiles tore through the plane's skin. The new explanation supplements but does not contradict official accounts of the incident given by Premier Khrushchev on May 7.

The Premier said the plane had been brought down by a single rocket, and it was presumed he had meant a rocket fired from the ground. A group of Soviet artillery officers and enlisted men were decorated for their part in bringing the plane down.

Mr. Khrushchev said the pilot had been brought to Moscow "alive and kicking," but no foreigners have been permitted to see him so far. He is said to have confessed to espionage and an early trial is expected. Mr. Khrushchev said Mr. Powers would be tried "severely."

The Gorky Park display, whose opening on May 11 was attended by the Premier and other Soviet officials, is said to be attracting 8,000 to 9,000 persons daily.

MAY 27 1960

WASHINGTON STAR

Herter's Analysis of Summit and Appraisal of Future

Following is the text of Secretary of State Herter's analysis of the Soviet actions at the Paris summit conference and his comments on the outlook for the future delivered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning:

We have naturally given a great deal of thought to the reasons for this extraordinary action by the Soviets in coming all the way from Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose of sabotaging the conference.

I should like to say right off that there are many obscure aspects of this Soviet behavior and that we do not know all the considerations and factors which went into its determination. We probably never shall. I hardly need to emphasize here to the members of this Committee the complete secrecy in which decisions are arrived at in the Soviet Government and in the hierarchy of the Communist Party, which is the effective ruler of that country.

It is only possible to try to deduce from Soviet actions, after they are taken, the considerations which brought them about. What I give you now, therefore, is at best a tentative estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an estimate which may have to be revised in the light of further information and future events.

Decided in Moscow

There is one thing, however, that can be regarded as certain: This is that the decision to wreck the conference was made prior to Khrushchev's departure from Moscow.

At no point during his stay in Paris—neither when he disclosed his true intentions to Gen. de Gaulle at 11 a.m. on Sunday, the 15th, nor subsequently—did Khrushchev deviate 1 inch from his demands that the United States: (1) Denounce the overflights; (2) Apologize to the Soviet Union; (3) Punish those "directly responsible," and (4) Promise not to repeat these flights.

Neither the statement made by the President at the one meeting held on Monday nor the serious and responsible efforts of Gen. de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr. Khrushchev before and after the President's announcement of suspension of flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his behavior in Paris that he had no authority to modify his position to any significant degree.

The fact that he was accompanied everywhere, and literally everywhere, by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky is an interesting sidelight on this point. There is much speculation as to this change from his previous attitude during his visits both to the United States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings alone with the Presi-

dent and with President de Gaulle, with only interpreters present.

The best guess as to the significance of this new factor is that (1) in view of the brutal and threatening attitude he adopted at Paris it was considered desirable to have some tangible evidence of Soviet armed strength in the person of Marshal Malinovsky. Secondly, Gromyko and Malinovsky would be able to testify upon return to Moscow that he had stuck strictly to the agreed position.

Factors in Decision

It also seems certain that the decision to cancel the invitation to the summit meeting was made before Khrushchev left Moscow.

As to what led the Soviets to this extreme position, in regard to the summit meeting which had previously appeared so much desired by Mr. Khrushchev, we enter into the realm of pure speculation, as I indicated earlier. The most we can hope to do in the absence of reliable information is to evaluate the elements and factors which appear to have entered into this decision. I shall try to list them briefly.

1. There was considerable incident, particularly during April, that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was little likelihood of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the summit. Evidence of Western determination and unity on this point in speeches and statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him to this conclusion. Thus in his Baku speech on April 23, he not only reiterated with the utmost finality his position on Berlin, including his intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German regime, but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success of the summit. By this, of course, he meant success on Soviet terms.

2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive, there are a number of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy, particularly his over-personalization and in Communist eyes over-commitment through personal visits to the United States and France, was arousing at least serious questioning if not opposition in the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the opposition to his conduct of foreign relations which was openly voiced by the Chinese Communists found a sympathetic response among some of

his associates, and very probably among the Soviet military.

3. It was against this background that the U-2 incident occurred.

Basic Miscalculation

A combination of these three factors in our judgment is what resulted in the definite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris conference. To determine how each of these factors should be weighed is, for the moment, beyond our reach.

The U-2 incident was most certainly seized upon and magnified beyond its true proportions as a justification for this decision. It is debatable whether it would have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise another pretext for so radical and violent a position.

It might well be that a lack of success at the summit would have confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult choice, from his point of view, than no conference at all. He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing the conference.

It may seem incredible to you that responsible leaders of a great power should have come all the way to Paris merely for the purpose of wrecking the conference, thereby incurring worldwide condemnation of the Soviet Union and enhancing the sense of unity and purpose among not only the Western Powers represented there but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere.

I believe the answer lies in a basic miscalculation in Mr. Khrushchev's and the Soviet's thinking.

Hoped to Divide West

Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped—and this explains his early arrival in Paris—to divide the allies and isolate the United States. He anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands he had set forth and that the conference would then collapse, with the United States bearing responsibility for the rupture before world opinion.

His plan miscarried because our two allies stood solidly and loyally with the United States and refused to be partners to Mr. Khrushchev's scheme. The result, as the whole world knows, was that the position which Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted in the complete isolation of the Soviet Union rather than the United States and in placing the responsibility for the disruption of the conference squarely where it belongs—on his own shoulders.

This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior is strongly supported by the attack which he made at his press conference on Gen. de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan for what he termed their lack of objectivity, lack

of will and subservience to the allied relationships—in other words, in plain English, for their solidarity with the United States, their loyalty to our common purposes and their refusal to play the Soviet game.

The Future

What conclusions should we draw for the future?

I believe the signs are that there has been as yet no radical alterations in Soviet policy, so we can expect the continuance of a propaganda effort designed to split off the United States from its allies. This conclusion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris statements, including those at his press conference. It is supported, somewhat more specifically and definitely, by the statements which he made in Berlin on his way home.

We must remember, however, that given the nature of the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason that any statement about a phase of Soviet policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain valid in the future.

Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disappointed by the fact that the summit conference was not held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depends, as I have indicated, on actions of the leading Communist countries.

Main Policy Sound

Provisionally, however, I concluded that the implication for United States policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be continued. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines with renewed effort. Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding international business in a sober and rational manner.

We must remain prepared to withstand aggressive pressures not only in Berlin but also elsewhere. I trust that our evident readiness will deter such pressures.

Stresses Aid Programs

Among the lessons of Paris, the most important for the free world including ourselves, it seems to me, is fresh realization of the dangers we face and consequent need for closing of ranks and moving ahead with our own and our allies' programs for strengthening the free world. We came back from Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have allies and I am sure that our atti-

ances will take new life from this experience.

At the same time I would stress equally the need to expand imaginatively and generously our collaboration with the newly developing countries.

On both accounts I hope the Congress will give wholehearted support to our mutual security programs as authorized by this committee, which are now more important than ever.

We must continue, as the President has said, to seek in a businesslike way to make progress on outstanding problems with the Soviet Union. We intend to go ahead with existing negotiations, to stand by our commitments, and to foster open communication and peaceful exchanges. Above all, we shall not cease from the most determined, patient, resourceful endeavor to find ways to bring the arms race under control and thus to meet the nuclear menace that hangs over mankind.

I believe in this period it is incumbent upon us, all of us, to keep a calm and steady gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions, statements and attitudes which might tend unnecessarily to increase international tension. If such an increase is to occur, it should be clearly the fault of the Soviets and we should not do them the favor of providing pretext for action by them which would have this effect.

Cites Constructive Goals

We should not define as "hard" or "soft" our attitude or policy toward the Soviet

Union. To do so is not only to deflect our gaze from the grim reality that confronts us, but even more to plunge us inevitably into fruitless and damaging domestic recrimination. We must now, as in the future, maintain a vigilant, calm and resolute posture and, insofar as it lies in our power, to do so, be accurate in our estimates and effective in our actions.

I would close in expressing the hope that we will not become so fixed in preoccupation with the Soviet challenge as to lose sight of our own constructive purposes—which are larger and more important than merely resisting or reacting to external threats. We have our own vision of the future toward which we want to see the world evolve.

We have our own program for helping to bring that future about—for holding high light of freedom, for sharing its message and rewards with emerging nations, for trying to create an international community in which the rule of law will replace the rule of force. It is to these programs that our talents and energies should be rededicated in uncertain times that lie

SPORT CENTER & PLAZA SPORT SHOP

You, Too

You, too, you, too, whoever you are,
Wherever you are, now must decide —
Dare we let these anti-human mechanisms,
Brains wired to bank accounts,
Trembling with every tremor of stock rise,
The procreating of generations of paper profit
Their ecstasy, orgasm, osmotic absorption,
The tegument, tissue, cartilage of their being;
Dare we let these ex-human univacs,
Make their October, 1929 decisioh?
Tumble themselves (and us)
Out their 20th story window?

U-2, U-2, is their symbol and cry
Dealing from the top and bottom of the deck,
The supreme, perfect, triumphant gamble:
Heads you win a gesture for peace,
(Withdrawn at their whim and convenience)
Tails they win a cold war manouver,
Prices rising, ticker racing, business as usual,
While, swag over shoulder, they run
Shouting through the streets, "Stop, thief!"

You, too, you, too, now must decide:
Will our united voice and actions
Atomize, in a puff, their U-2's and outlawry,
Or silence and acquiescence push us
One step nearer that 20th story window?

U-2 or you, too, you, too?

Saul Gross

MAY 29 1960

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U-2 Case Perils Project For Higher-Flying Plane

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The future of a new reconnaissance aircraft capable of cruising at an altitude of more than 100,000 feet has been jeopardized by the U-2 incident, in the opinion of Washington experts. The loss in a flight over the Soviet Union in doubt.

May 1 of a Lockheed U-2 plane had led to indefinite stoppage of intelligence gathering "overflights," which had been going on without a major incident for four years.

The U-2 planes, capable of an altitude of about 70,000 feet, have not penetrated beyond Communist frontiers since May 1. President Eisenhower has publicly promised that these photographic flights will not be resumed during his Administration.

Soviet Aim Accomplished

Senator John F. Kennedy, a leading candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, has said he will not approve their resumption if he becomes President.

During repeated flights in the last four years the U-2's have photographed Moscow, Peiping, Soviet nuclear explosions, Soviet missile-launching sites, airfields and some of the areas supposedly most heavily defended in the Soviet Union, China and the satellite countries.

Washington experts feel that Premier Khrushchev's exploitation of the U-2 incident prior to and during his visit to Paris has thus accomplished one of its objectives—the halting of an air intelligence operation that had provided the United States with information of tremendous value that could be acquired in no other way.

Moreover, the public "compromising" of the air intelligence program leaves the future

The Lockheed U-2, which had been flying over the Soviet Union at high altitudes for four years, faced increasing risks as time went on. Anticipated advances in the capabilities of Soviet air defense weapons would mean in time that the U-2 would be vulnerable even at 70,000 feet.

Therefore a successor to the U-2, described by some writers as the U-3, had been designed and was being built. It was expected to cruise at altitudes higher than 100,000 feet. The future of this plane, and in fact of the entire air reconnaissance program, is now in doubt.

From the military intelligence point of view the halting of the "overflights" is viewed as of incalculable importance, all the more so since it will be at least two or three years before reconnaissance satellites are available to replace piloted planes.

The U-2 program of reconnaissance was the most important secret source of information about the Soviet Union available to the Central Intelligence Agency. The data it provided vied in importance with that collected by the National Security Agency, a separate intelligence-gathering organization, which intercepts, analyzes and, if possible, decodes Soviet communications.

The U-2's were flying over Moscow within two years after they were ordered from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, a record of engineering design and production skill that demonstrated what ample funds, full support and elimination of red tape could mean.

U-2 Defied Interceptors

The Communists had detected by radar some, but by no means all, of these flights, but had not been able to stop them. U-2 pilots had seen Soviet interceptors rise to attack them, only to crash their ceilings and "mush-

out" or fall off thousands of feet below them. Some of the interception attempts were photographed.

Washington authorities are debating the advisability of releasing for publication some of the photographs taken over the Soviet Union. Their clarity, detail and accuracy are said to be so striking that the photographs might serve as powerful arguments for President Eisenhower's "open skies" plan for safeguarding against surprise attack.

They would also serve another purpose. Revelation of the successful and long-continued U-2 flights over the Soviet Union has increased American military, technical and scientific standing in some countries that at the same time were distressed about Washington's handling of the U-2 incident.

Soviet Power in Question

In these countries, according to Washington reports, the impression is growing that the vaunted power of the Soviet Army has been tried and found wanting. Release of the photographs, it is believed, would provide proof of United States ingenuity and power and might compensate somewhat in psychological gains for the halting of the flights.

On the other hand, those who are arguing against publication contend that release of the photographs would compound the internal effect of the U-2 incident already evident in the Soviet Union, since it would strike another blow at the prestige of both Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet Army.

In striking a balance sheet of U-2 gains and losses, Washington experts, though disturbed at the Government's handling of the case after May 1, are beginning to think that in the long view of history the President's frankness in assuming personal responsibility for the flights may pay dividends. They add, too, that Allied unity has been strengthened.

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U. S. Timed Flight of U-2 To Weather, Not Summit

Aides Say Information Sought by Plane Was Worth the Dangers

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Favorable weather and the advent of long periods of daylight over northern Russia were important factors in the decision to send a U-2 reconnaissance plane over the Soviet Union May 1, just prior to the projected summit conference.

Washington experts explained to this reporter last week the significance of these two factors and described the management system that carefully controlled the reconnaissance flights.

Any scheduled flight could be stopped before the take-off by a simple order from Washington to halt all flights. In the case of the May 1 flight, the imminence of the summit conference had not been overlooked, these experts said. It was believed that the information to be gained was so important that it outweighed the political risks involved.

Secretary of State Christian A. Herter indicated last Friday that there had been no Administration policy review on the wisdom of continuing U-2



Associated Press

Allen W. Dulles

flights over Soviet territory as the summit conference approached.

Mr. Herter, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he had not known personally of the flight on May 1 until he subsequently heard news that the plane had been downed, but he defended the continuation of the flights in the pre-summit period as a "sound" policy.

Much criticism has been leveled at the Administration because the Lockheed U-2 that was lost was permitted to fly over Soviet territory so short a time before the scheduled Big Four meeting in Paris.

The policy decision to continue the flights despite the scheduled conference was taken weeks before May 1, it was explained. The U-2 overflights, which had been going on for four years, were temporarily suspended just prior to, during and after Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States, last September.

Summit Meeting Delayed

But with the subsequent delay of the summit meeting and of President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to the Soviet Union, it was felt that the flights should be resumed. An indefinite suspension, it was held, would close off to Washington a source of major information during a vital period.

"Anyway, what would be a satisfactory cut-off date?" one observer asked last week. "One month, one week, one day before the summit?"

The U-2 reconnaissance program was under the direction and control of the Central Intelligence Agency. Allen W. Dulles, director of the agency, suggested after the May 1 incident that he should take full responsibility for the program, it was disclosed. However, the President decided to assume full responsibility after various inaccurate statements had been made by minor officials who had no knowledge of the program.

Actually, it was learned, the policy responsibility was widely distributed. Every U-2 flight was scheduled in Washington. The scheduling was done by a careful determination—in which the Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies joined—of the objectives to be photographed by the high-flying planes.

Each flight was listed on a priority list, with specific routing and objectives shown. This list, constantly revised, was approved not only by Mr. Dulles but by top officials in the Air Force and the Pentagon and, as Secretary of State Herter indicated in his testimony last week, by senior officials in the State Department and by the President.

This priority targeting list was closely held, however. Paperwork was reduced to a minimum in the interests of security. Few subordinate officials knew that the U-2 reconnaissance program existed.

Dulles in Charge

Thus, in this sense, every U-2 mission received the policy approval of top officials of the Government before the flight was authorized. Once a flight was placed on the priority list, however, the management and direction of the program necessarily was, to a large extent decentralized.

In Washington, Mr. Dulles was the over-all manager and director. A group of Air Force technicians was assigned to his

office and there was close liaison between him and the Air Force.

In the field, the operational part of the program was the responsibility of the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency. The pilots who flew over the Soviet Union, working on these flights in rotation, were civilians, though most or all of them were former members of the Air Force. The supporting organization was largely drawn from the Air Force.

Once the list of target priorities, which was constantly under revision, reached the various bases where U-2's were stationed, the local commander had a certain amount of latitude about the timing of the flights.

He could, for instance, undertake any one of the top two or three flights listed on the priority list, it was explained. His decision as to which flight to undertake, and when, was dictated in large part by weather reports, the availability of daylight over the areas to be photographed and by other intelligence information.

The advent of long spring and summer days in the northern latitudes after a winter of darkness was an important element influencing a resumption of flights over such areas.

In the case of the May 1 flight that ended with the loss of the first U-2 destroyed over any Communist country, there had been indications that the Russians were preparing a spectacular space shot for May Day. There were specific targets to be photographed, ranging from the borders of Afghanistan to the Arctic Ocean.

Clear Skies Important

The U-2's cameras, which take pictures of great precision and clarity from 70,000 feet up, require daylight and freedom from cloud cover for effective results. Good weather—a prediction of either clear skies or scattered clouds over the route to be taken—was therefore always a major factor in timing. This was a factor that could not possibly be controlled from Washington.

The local commander's decision on precise scheduling of a flight was accompanied by a report to Mr. Dulles and to top

Air Force officials whenever an overflight started, it was explained. However, neither the President nor the Secretary of State would necessarily be informed of the start of each flight.

Washington authorities thoroughly familiar with the U-2 operation feel there can be no justifiable criticism of the program on technical and intelligence grounds, though some of them observe that the Government "talked too much" after May 1.

Trial Plans Not Known

Major interest in Washington continues to be focused on Francis Gary Powers, pilot of the downed U-2. Up to last Friday United States Embassy officials in Moscow had no response to their request to see Mr. Powers. Washington does not even know where the pilot is being held, although he is presumably in Moscow.

Whether he will be brought to public trial is not known. If he is tried publicly, Washington believes, the Soviet Government may attempt to stage a propaganda circus.

The pilot, already probably brainwashed and subjected to psychological and perhaps physical torture may be expected to answer questions exactly as

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the Russians wish. It is believed that he will probably be presented as a typical representative of "decadent capitalism."

Though this Communist caricature of the truth will be discounted, the question of motivation, or why Mr. Powers acted as he did when his plane was downed, continues to trouble some Washington observers.

Mr. Powers is a new kind of spy, if indeed he can be defined as a spy at all. He wore no uniform and was not in active military service. He did not penetrate the territory of the Soviet Union, as such.

He did fly at high altitude over the Soviet Union and by his own admission, as reported by the Russians, he operated cameras and electronic recording instruments. But no definition of sovereignty as far as air space is concerned has ever been agreed upon. Pragmatically, sovereignty extends upward as far as a nation can enforce it—in other words, to the limit of the range of its anti-aircraft rockets.

Pilot a Skilled Technician

Nevertheless, Mr. Powers was a kind of modern spy, a skilled technician trained to operate technological instruments of espionage.

The embarrassment to which the United States was subjected when the U-2 was downed arose from the fact that the Russians recovered irrefutable evidence of Mr. Powers' espionage mission. Large parts of his plane, cameras, films, equipment, and the pilot himself attested to what normally are clandestine activities. Mr. Powers, apparently has told the Russians about his assignment and thus has added to the physical evidence they collected.

Yet the downed U-2 was

fitted with a self-destruction mechanism, and Mr. Powers himself carried with him means of killing himself—a way out for many espionage agents in the past.

The main questions being asked in Washington and elsewhere are:

Why did the plane and equipment escape destruction and the pilot survive?

Were Mr. Powers and his fellow "spies in the sky" carefully selected and well trained?

What are the qualifications of a good intelligence agent?

The inadequacy of evidence available to Washington and the inability of men to predict the reactions of other men makes complete answers to these questions impossible today. But some suggestive information is available.

No Communication With Bases

On the question of why the U-2 plane and its equipment were not destroyed in the air, Washington has no answer. Contrary to published reports, the U-2's never communicated with their bases while over Soviet territory, since to do so would reveal their presence to the Russians.

There is official skepticism, bolstered by the visual evidence of what appear to be bullet holes in the wings of the U-2 on display in Moscow, that the plane was struck by a rocket at a 65,000-foot altitude. Officials believe a "flame-out," or engine failure, common in rarefied altitudes, may have occurred and that the pilot may have been forced to descend to lower altitudes where the U-2 could easily have been brought down by interceptors or ground missiles.

In any case, the "destruct" button, which would have blown up the plane in the air after the pilot had escaped, either

was never pressed or was inoperative.

The pilot's subsequent actions, insofar as they are known, are defended by Washington officials. George V. Allen, director of the United States Information Agency, defended the pilot when he said on a television program:

"When he went down, he told exactly what his mission was and exactly what he was expected to do, and he was under instruction to do that."

Other sources in Washington more or less verified the gist of Mr. Allen's statement. As the authorities explained it, if circumstances were such that the pilot had to tell the truth, American,

he was to tell it. "By and large, as far as we know, he hasn't said anything they don't know," a spokesman said.

What about the hypodermic needle with deadly poison that the pilot carried?

This, Washington authorities indicated, was intended to be used only in a last resort—to escape torture. But how the pilot could have used it, once he was captured and searched, was unexplained.

The pilot had no hard and fast instructions to commit suicide to avoid capture, an authoritative spokesman declared. "You tell a Japanese to do it; maybe a Russian, but not an American," was one observation.

Some Thoughts on the Summit

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PAUL B. DAGUE

OF PENNSYLVANIA (R-Pa.)

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 18, 1960

Mr. DAGUE. Mr. Speaker, like every patriotic American I am incensed over the treatment accorded our President at the now wrecked Paris Conference and herewith set down my reactions, point by point, to the news reports as they have reached us by press and radio.

First, President Eisenhower, under the firm counsel of the late John Foster Dulles, steadfastly resisted the idea of a summit meeting until he was finally pressured into it by Macmillan.

Second, The British are criticizing Ike not because we spied on Russia but because we got caught at it.

Third, Walter Lippmann, the Olympian oracle, criticizes Ike not because we got caught at spying but rather because he refused to lie about it.

Fourth, Debate on our "right" to make reconnaissance flights over another nation is academic in the light of the Russian space vehicle presently passing over most of the countries of the world every 90 minutes, plus the obvious fact that in a few short months we will have in orbit observer satellites that can collect all the information, to be gleaned by a U-2 plane and no one will be able to do a thing about it.

Fifth, Mr. Khrushchev came to the summit with his own hands red with bloody repression of free people and with a record of infiltration and espionage not matched by any nation in history. And speaking of aerial surveillance, how do Russian observer planes find their

way over our Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean without violating the air corridors of other powers?

Sixth, It is reassuring to have confirmed by most editorial writers my firm conviction that Mr. K. is not the unfettered dictator some believe him to be. The wily Russian elite evidently has been brought to book by the military and political hierarchy in back of him and told by them to back away from the summit.

Seventh, Khrushchev, in my opinion, never intended that anything constructive toward peace should come out of the Paris conference. He lives on controversy and unrest and he would stifle in a peaceful world. The U-2 plane incident gave him an easy way out.

Eighth, The effect of the summitiasco should be the enhancement of the stature of RICHARD NIXON as the next President since he has already demonstrated his ability to slug it out with Khrushchev toe-to-toe. That the Democrat front runner is equipped either by temperament or experience for such a slugging contest is quite obvious. As for former Governor Stevenson, this one conference with Mr. K. has come back to him physically shaken down to his shoes on many points.

Ninth, In conclusion, let us never forget that the Russian leaders are not reasonable men. They are completely ruthless in the full meaning of that term. They are amenable only to force and as a result it behooves us to keep our defenses intact and our bombers and missiles on the alert. And then as reasonable people let us abandon this fiction of international comity and let's forthwith sever diplomatic relations that we should never have entered into in the first instance.

Tenth, And as a final thought, it is gratifying to see the alacrity with which the American people are uniting in back of their President, that Democrats and Republicans have closed ranks, if not in back of Ike then in opposition to a demagogue who insults our intelligence and casts aspersions on our integrity and national honor.

MAY 19 1960

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A4273

Comparison of area redevelopment bills

Subject	S. 722 as passed and vetoed	H.R. 4878, original form	H.R. 12290, H.R. 12291, and H.R. 12298
1. Organization.....	Separate Area Redevelopment Administration.	Department of Commerce.....	Department of Commerce.
2. Division of redevelopment areas.....	Administrator to designate industrial and rural areas.	Only industrial and public facility loans in areas of persistent and substantial unemployment.	Same; removed reference to rural. Note technical assistance can cover.
3. Revolving fund loans.....	75.....		
Industrial.....	\$100,000,000.....	\$100,000,000.....	\$75,000,000.
Rural.....	\$75,000,000.....	None.....	None.
Public facilities.....	\$50,000,000.....	\$25,000,000.....	\$25,000,000; reference to machinery removed.
4. Federal participation in loans.....	65 percent.....	33 1/2 percent class I areas, 50 percent class II areas, and 75 percent class III areas.	35 percent; area classifications removed.
5. Maximum loan period.....	40 years; 10 percent State contribution.	25 years; not less than 15 percent State contribution.	Same.
6. Grants for public facilities.....	\$35,000,000.....	\$25,000,000; Federal participation 33 1/2 percent class II areas, 75 percent class III areas.	None.
7. Retraining subsistence payments.....	\$10,000,000.....	\$5,000,000.....	\$5,000,000.
8. Vocational training grants.....	\$1,500,000.....	Secretary of Labor to determine needs; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to provide through existing facilities.	Same.
9. Technical assistance.....	\$4,500,000.....	\$3,000,000.....	\$3,000,000.
10. Criteria of unemployment.....	At least 6 percent at time of application and 12 percent for 12 months preceding, or 9 percent for 15 of 18 months preceding, or 6 percent for 18 of 24 months preceding.	An average of 6 percent, excluding seasonal, throughout qualifying period, and 50 percent above national average for 2 out of 5 years preceding in class I areas, or 75 percent above national average for 3 out of 4 years preceding in class II areas, or 100 percent above national average for 2 out of 3 years preceding in class III areas.	Same; area classifications removed.
11. Interest on loans.....	Maximum permitted, 2 to 7 percent.....	To be determined by Secretary based on going rates.	Same.
12. Cost.....	\$251,000,000.....	\$158,000,000.....	\$108,000,000.

The Nation's Agriculture

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ARCH A. MOORE, JR.

OF WEST VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 19, 1960

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, there is increasing evidence that this Nation's agriculture is being more severely hit by politically inspired adverse publicity about the farming business than by the recognized economic pressures which the present administration is striving to ease.

One of the Nation's leading farm magazines, the Farm Journal, is currently conducting an admirable campaign of advertising promotion.

The Farm Journal is attempting to put farm economics into a reasonable perspective by refuting some of the distortions.

Taking note of this was the Charleston (W. Va.) Mail which treated the subject editorially in its issue of April 11. Under unanimous consent I insert the editorial in the RECORD:

THE MYTHS OF THE FARM PROBLEM DO A GREAT INJUSTICE TO MOST FARMERS

The farm situation, as it is called, is bad enough as it is, but it is not so bad as it is generally misrepresented. So says Carroll P. Streeter, editor of the Farm Journal in its current issue.

Take, for example, the myth that all farmers are living on a generous handout from the Government. Livestock farmers, who account for more than all farm income, have never accepted Government supports. And to clarify the picture a little more, less than one-fourth of all agricultural produce gets so much as a cent of 1 cent of price supports.

Well, then, what is all this talk about farm subsidies costing the United States billions of dollars every year? That figure, says Mr. Streeter, is the amount in the Federal Government set aside for all agriculture, including research and education, food grading and inspection, soil conservation, market report-

ing, and the Forestry Service. Of this total, says Mr. Streeter, "probably not more than one-half can be charged to farmers alone, and not all of that to subsidies."

Twice in recent years 55 percent of the farmers polled by the Farm Journal have voted to eliminate subsidies entirely. Who, then, is responsible for maintaining a system which most farmers regard as both unfair and unsuccessful? "Three groups," says Mr. Streeter: "a substantial minority of farmers, politicians who come from subsidy crop area and—surprise—businessmen in the wheat and cotton belts who sell farm supplies, process the crop and market it. This is the combination which makes it so hard for the will of the majority to prevail."

There are other myths which Mr. Streeter disposes of just as factually, but these are a fair sampling and enough to make his point:

Sure there is a farm problem, but at its worst it does not arise with or seriously affect the great majority of American farmers. Most of them, with no subsidy from the Government, go right ahead making their maximum economic and social contribution to the Nation's welfare.

Khrushchev's Behavior at the Summit Does Not Create the World Cleavage; It Only Makes It More Apparent to All—His Tirades Came From His Weaknesses Which U-2 Flights Had Revealed

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WALTER H. JUDD

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 19, 1960

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following article by Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer:

SUMMIT FAILURE WAS VICTORY FOR WEST

(By Edgar Ansel Mowrer)

PARIS.—Essentially the summit conference that died aborning was great victory for the

West and particularly for Eisenhower. Admittedly he should never have admitted any knowledge of the fateful U-2 whose detection by Moscow started trouble. But since then the President, so irritable in small matters, has revealed statesmanlike dignity and patience that won him the fullest admiration and support of De Gaulle and Macmillan as well as the French people.

The meeting fulfilled my prediction that thanks to the downed plane, this conference would be concerned with situations and not with verbal cobwebs labeled relaxing tension. By torpedoing the conference, once he became sure that he would get no substantial concessions on Berlin or any American scalps, the Soviet boss in an excess of sustained vituperation and insult, simply created the stink behind which he backed out altogether.

But with a bloody nose Mr. K. now knows he can neither blackmail nor intimidate the United States. It was high time he learned it. The lesson won't be lost at the next summit conference after the American election—if there is such summit.

For Khrushchev's policy of political pressure through public tantrums reveals not strength but weakness. The best observers here are convinced that what hurt Nikita most in the Powers affair was the shrieking revelation of Soviet vulnerability. Ever since the first sputnik and the threats to destroy Paris and London by missiles, Nikita has built up a legend of an invincible U.S.S.R. It could—according to the legend—crush any enemies while remaining impervious to their counterattacks. Such a story, endlessly repeated, found credence throughout the world. People accepted Soviet claims, first of parity with, then of superiority over the United States. Such boasts were the basis for Soviet threats against Berlin.

Then what happened? The downed American plane revealed that far from being invulnerable, the U.S.S.R. could be penetrated and overflown at any spot away from chief centers. Not only could it be overflown but such flights had been undetected for 4 years. This meant that militarily the Iron Curtain was a myth—that American leaders undoubtedly have the fullest possible list of all necessary Soviet targets in case they were compelled to reply to Soviet sneak attack. Far from being stronger than the United States, the U.S.S.R. was weaker since airplanes and nearby bases would more than cancel out Soviet superiority—if any—in bal-

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istic missiles. Moscow's ability to terrorize the world was henceforth severely limited. This explains the consternation of the Soviet people, officially doped with illusion of superiority. It also explains why other Bolsheviks, especially military, must have become extremely critical of Nikita's management of Soviet affairs. What else could Nikita do but bluster and threaten? But the master spy and liar overplayed his hand. His weakness was not lost upon America's allies.

His threats and his intolerable attempt to humiliate Eisenhower created full allied unity. For if the West yielded to Khrushchev on such points it would never again be able to resist his ultimatums. For the first time since he succeeded Stalin, the wily Mr. K. was caught in his own noose.

Whatever politicians at home say about the failure of the "conference that never happened," officials here, both American and allied, agree that responsibility for failure rests upon Khrushchev. Rather than face a meeting where he could win nothing, he sought to mobilize public opinion against the United States and talk himself out of his embarrassment by insulting Eisenhower. The attempt has completely backfired. Even the eager British who arrived sure that the U.S.S.R. was ready for conciliation are now convinced that Russian Communists are enemies of both the West and real peace. In this sense the Paris summit has been a real success for the West.

Medical Care for the Aged

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 18, 1960

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I ran across an article appearing in the newspaper Labor, dated May 14, 1960, headlined "Says United States Lags in Medical Care." This article purports to quote our colleague Congressman Moss as follows:

The United States is the only large industrialized country in the world where the Government does not, in some form or other, provide medical care for most of its citizens.

All European countries, with the exception of Finland, operate some type of government health and maternity program, and most of the 59 countries of the globe which have such programs provide medical care benefits under some sort of a social insurance program.

I think this article lets the cat out of the bag, just as similar statements made by other proponents of the Forand bill call attention to what these people really have in their bag of wonders.

Our society has the finest health program, and this includes health care for the aged, of any society in history. These other systems have the Government in some form or other provide medical care for most of its citizens. This results in a system of inferior health care for the citizens, as a study of the health programs of these other industrialized societies reveals.

Should that not suggest to these other societies that socialism is the wrong way to achieve success in this area, even if it does not convince some of our own political theorists?

I must add a further statement to try to forestall what the Forand bill pro-

ponents usually fall back on to answer their critics. Their critics, they say, are standpaters and want no progress. This is false. Any program, no matter how good it may be, can be improved. There is plenty of room for improvement in the health program our society has, even though it is the best program ever set up. However, to improve it and not damage it, we must first understand what it is. The Forand bill supporters imply that there is no program even though the Federal Government today is spending over \$12 billion a year on care for the aged. Let us first lay the facts of our present program for health care out on the table, then debate the issue of how we can improve it. Is this such an illogical suggestion?

The article follows:

SAYS UNITED STATES LAGS IN MEDICAL CARE

"The United States is the only large industrialized country in the world where the Government does not, in some form or other, provide medical care for most of its citizens," Congressman JOHN E. MOSS, Democrat, of California, noted last week.

"All European countries, with the exception of Finland, operate some type of government health and maternity program," he said. "And most of the 59 countries of the globe which have such programs provide medical care benefits under some sort of a social insurance program."

Moss predicted that Congress this year will also enact medical insurance legislation for those over 65 years of age.

Descendants of Israel Surmount Overwhelming Odds

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 19, 1960

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Speaker, the 12th anniversary of the rebirth of Israel, May 2, recalls a saga of a suffering people as potent, fraught with drama as a movie spectacular, and as intensely historic as the journey of Moses and his followers to the Promised Land.

Fiction writers would not dare the literary license of depicting the trials and tribulations of the wandering tribes of Israel. It is unbelievable to conceive the perpetuity of the dream of independence for Israel as it has coursed through generations of exiles without loss of one spark of its original fire.

Descendants of Israel, surmounting overwhelming odds in pursuit of their dream of a homeland, have worked to build Jewish pride and world respect, and clung tenaciously to the idea of rebuilding a Jewish commonwealth in the face of international manifestations of anti-Semitism and Nazi cruelty. For 2,000 years the vision of a new Zion has spurred a decimated people, tottering under the yoke of bloodthirsty attacks, yet faithful to the vow that "their hands would lose their cunning and their tongues cleave to the roofs of their mouths" if they forgot Jerusalem.

In the pilgrimage to Israel exiles came from 4 continents and 70 countries—singly, in single family groups, and in

patriarchal clans; from behind the Iron Curtain; from behind store counters in the United States and Canada; from the remote Atlas Mountains and the bazaars of Casablanca; from the foggy grotesquerie of England and the parched deserts of the east. They came to pool their skills, their knowledge, and their finances, to be the forerunners in the creation of a great country, culled out of barren, acrid land; the earth to be tilled and cajoled into verdancy with loving hands and willing, if not strong, backs.

Exiles seeking the promise of this new frontier taxed the sparse resources to the bursting point.

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, on the 10th anniversary of the rebirth of Israel, commended the Jews of the world for embodying the sole ally of infant Israel, "when the United Nations and all the nations of the world failed to come to Israel's aid." They sent money, and arms, and fighters, from 60 different countries to suckle and nurture the nestling state.

Israel has met in 12 years every threat to national security and integrity—communism, economic struggle, domestic strife, and the necessity for living within its narrow borders and absorbing all who wanted to come to Israel.

The people of Israel and the Jews of the world have the right to flex their muscles with pride of accomplishment and tenacity of purpose.

It is our hope that Israel in its struggle will serve as a criterion for African nations, now straining at the leash of colonialism and near to breaking the yoke of servitude.

In a century when man has mastered his physical hospice, and his struggle is pointed toward the human barriers of prejudice, hatred and poverty, ignorance and intolerance, Israel represents a touchstone to the United States from which it may renew its standard of justice, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all its citizens.

American Mining Congress Convention

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN P. SAYLOR

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 18, 1960

Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, last week I had the honor of accompanying the Secretary of Interior on a visit to a coal mine. At the instance of our mutual friend, Stephen F. Dunn, president of the National Coal Association, the Secretary's party toured the Thomas Portal area of Mathies Mine, which is operated by the Pittsburgh Coal Division of Consolidation Coal Co. Other members of the group included Michael J. Widman, assistant to the president, United Mine Workers of America; Marling J. Ankeny, Director of the Bureau of Mines; Royce A. Hardy, Assistant Secretary of the Interior; Consolidation Coal executives George A. Shoemaker, Walter F. Schulden, S. M. Cassidy, and D. L. McElroy; and G. Don Sullivan and Mr. Dunn, of National Coal.

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by this afternoon, he was as hard as Vyacheslav M. Molotov and as vivid and vituperative as Andrei Y. Vishinsky.

The last time Mr. Khrushchev saw Paris he was the benign and jovial Mr. K. He made a special point then with President de Gaulle that their conversations should be held without anyone present except the interpreters.

JOVIALITY IS PUT ASIDE

This week all was changed. The jovial Mr. K became the arm-waving naughty Nik, and Marshal Malinovsky was there as a witness of his every word and move, even when Mr. Khrushchev said goodbye to President de Gaulle.

None of this was missed by the press of the world or the diplomatic corps of Paris, and the inevitable reaction was not only that the giants were quarreling—which always terrifies the world—but that they were blundering in a most extraordinary way.

This was particularly true of Mr. Khrushchev after he got well into his new role. He overplayed every card he had. He was rude and primitive. He was not only a boor, but what is worse in Paris, he was a bore. And instead of splitting the allies, he even drove the press of London and Paris to the President's support, which is not easy to do.

There are the things that have spread the feeling of uneasiness about the leadership of the great powers. The two men who started out to reduce tensions ended up by increasing them here in Paris, and the question now is how far the present "dukes-up" attitude will go.

About this, no one really knows, probably not even Mr. Khrushchev. For until he gets back to Moscow and reports to the Central Committee, there is no way of knowing what will happen to Berlin, or for that matter what will happen to Mr. Khrushchev.

[From the Washington Post, May 19, 1960]
IKE'S HOPES CRASHED WITH U-2

(By Drew Pearson)

It is apparent that a lot more than a former Air Force officer and some photos of Soviet airplanes came down with that U-2 plane May 1 flying 1,300 miles inside Russian borders. With it came down Ike's greatest ambition and, more important, mankind's hopes for better understanding and eventual world peace. Also gone aglimmering may be the Republican chances of electing a President in November.

Mr. Eisenhower's greatest ambition after 40 years as a military man was to go down in history as a builder of peace.

This became more and more apparent to those who talked to the President weekly at his legislative conferences in Washington and to Republican Party leaders. One of them confided shortly before the summit conference here that it was difficult to get the President to concentrate on domestic problems any more. When the subjects of water pollution, education, and taxes were raised in conferences Ike would listen impatiently and then change the subject to foreign aid or international problems.

When THURSTON MORTON, Republican national chairman, tried to persuade Mr. Eisenhower to take Vice President Nixon to the summit, he urged that Nixon go from its start to the finish. Ike flatly refused, finally compromised that Nixon come as a standby, all of which caused the frank GOP chairman to exclaim to friends: "This guy doesn't seem to know that we've got to win an election. All he's interested in is peace!"

HOPES GO GLIMMERING

All this of course has now gone glimmering—both political hopes and personal peace hopes—gone with the flights of Pilot Francis Gary Powers over Russia.

Regardless of the considerable fumbling of the Eisenhower administration there are

two great things Ike has had as a salesman for peace. One is his background as a military man which made it possible for him to sell better relations with Russia to the isolationists and the GOP doubters as could few other American leaders.

Second, Ike has had the smile, the personality, the gestures that won millions of people to his support. The Spaniards have a word for this contagious charm: *sympatico*. Ike had it and used it effectively to win friends for the United States all over the world. Recently he confided to GOP leaders that he planned two more trips abroad following the scheduled, now canceled, trip through Russia before his term ended. He loved this type of international salesmanship and wanted to devote to it the rest of his months as President.

However, big dreams are sometimes upset by small details. And bad administration shows also that no man can serve as President of the United States on a part-time basis.

LOOSE ADMINISTRATION

For 7 years extremely efficient Press Secretary Jim Hagerty plus a sympathetic American press have been glossing over the fact that President Eisenhower doesn't know what is going on in a large part of his administration and that it is impossible for any man to be an effective President yet spend several days every week away relaxing at golf and almost every evening relaxing over a bridge table.

Franklin Roosevelt spent almost every night until 1 a.m. in private study. Mr. Truman knew the intimate details of government as few others in his administration. On the eve of such an important conference as the summit here, with great hopes for permanent peace at stake, they would have required that all flights over the Soviet Union be cleared with the White House. But the looseness of the Eisenhower administration permitted the left hand to do what the right hand knew not.

The tragedy of this great anticlimax to President Eisenhower's fine work for peace is that we have been posing as moral leaders of the world and as custodian of honesty and righteousness. We have caught many Soviet spies, but catching spies doesn't absolve us from getting caught spying. And once we were caught, all the Madison Avenue techniques which had been so effective in selling Mr. Eisenhower in election campaigns seemed to evaporate.

We have let the Russians outpropagandize us at every turn. Even here in Paris the Russians got the first headlines Monday by issuing their ultimatum before Hagerty, supposedly trained in the best newspaper and Madison Avenue techniques, could get his statement to the American press.

THE DEPARTMENT OF MODERN AND CLASSICAL LANGUAGES, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I have in my hand a summation of the record of a very outstanding department of the University of Wyoming, the department of modern and classical languages. The dynamic head of this department of the university is Dr. A. J. Dickman.

This summation records the participation of the special students in the Fulbright exchange program during recent years. Considering the relatively limited numbers of students coming under Dr. Dickman's tutelage at the university, one is at once impressed by the high percentage who have met the severe requirements of the Fulbright program and who have represented both our University of

Wyoming and the United States very effectively overseas.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the summation be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the summation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WYOMING FOREIGN LANGUAGE BULLETIN

(Editor, Adolphe J. Dickman)

(Published by the Department of Modern and Classical Languages, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyo., spring 1960)

GOOD NEWS: FULBRIGHT AWARDS OF LANGUAGE STUDENTS FOR 1960-61

The department of modern and classical languages is happy to announce that three of our students have been granted Fulbright scholarships for the year 1960-61.

Miss Kay Kepler, from Laramie, Wyo., major in zoology and minor in French, will study at the University of Melbourne in Melbourne, Australia.

Miss Katherine Ann Wells, from Kansas City, Mo., major in art and minor in Spanish, will study at the Central University in Caracas, Venezuela.

Miss Patricia O'Melia, from Rawlins, Wyo., major in French and minor in Spanish, will study at the University of Besançon, France.

These students are proof that the University of Wyoming graduates continue to receive excellent preparation in their studies and are able to compete with the best in the country.

We are listing below those University of Wyoming graduates who have received previous Fulbright awards in foreign lands:

Byrl D. Carey, Jr., University of Glasgow, Scotland, 1950-51.

Michel Hoch, University of Paris, France, 1952-53.

Beverly Rogers, University of Nancy, France, 1952-53.

Elizabeth Beresford, University of Rennes, France, 1952-53.

Virginia Evans, University of Bordeaux, France, 1953-54.

Stanley Brooks, University of Rennes, France, 1954-55. Appointed lecturer, 1955-56.

Sally Jackson, University of Bordeaux, France, 1955-56.

Robert J. Hall, University of London, London, England, 1955-56.

Larry S. Slotta, Delft Technical University, Delft, Holland, 1956-57.

Thomas L. Hanks, University of Paris, France, 1956-57.

Robert Mahoney, University of Oslo, Norway, 1957-58.

Donald Erickson, New South Wales University of Technology, Sydney, Australia, 1957-58.

Mary Lee Herman, University of Durham, England, 1958-59.

John B. Morgan, Delft Technical University, Delft, Holland, 1958-59.

Barbara Smith, University of Clermont-Ferrand, France, 1958-59. Appointed lecturer, University of Grenoble, France, 1959-60.

Don M. Ricks, Bristol University, Bristol, England, 1959-60.

Joan Anderson, University of Oslo, Norway, 1959-60.

Robert Sullins, Ecole des Beaux-Arts, Paris, France, 1959-60.

We should like also to mention that Darlene Huhtala, graduated in 1950, won a French Government award as assistante d'Anglais at the Collège de Jeunes Filles at Amiens, France, for 1951-52. Charles Sargent, Jr., graduated in 1958, received a Rotary scholarship for the year 1959-60 to study economics at the University of Lyons, France; his major was economics, his minor, French. Hjalma Person, graduated in 1958, won a Scandinavian seminar scholarship for 1959-60 to study in the Scandinavian coun-

tries; her major was art, her minor, French. James Couch, who graduated in 1947, won a Mexican Government award for 2 years of study at the National University of Mexico after obtaining in 1948 his master of arts degree in Spanish at the University of Wyoming.

HOW TO TUNE IN ON THE WORLD

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the importance of an informed public opinion in all the countries of the free world is emphasized by the recent collapse of summit talks in Paris. In this process of getting the facts to the people of all the countries, including those behind the Iron Curtain, radio is an indispensable instrument. Shortwave radio particularly makes possible intercontinental communication. By this means there is an exchange between our people and those of the rest of the world on points of view, approaches to international problems and also their cultures and characters.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article which emphasizes the importance of listening to worldwide shortwave broadcasts, entitled "How To Tune in on the World," by Arthur Settel, which appeared in Pageant magazine for May 1960.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

HOW TO TUNE IN ON THE WORLD

(By Arthur Settel)

If you'd like intelligence reports direct from behind the Iron Curtain—

Or the inside information explaining those incomprehensible headlines from Laos and the Chinese-Indian border—

If you enjoy live entertainment from such exotic spots as Nyasaland, Quito or Cairo, a ringside seat at a real-life drama of rescue at sea, a listening post in the war of nerves as the great powers hammer away at one another—

All you need are:

1. A shortwave radio set.
2. The patience of Job.
3. The stamina to go without sleep indefinitely.
4. An ever-loving wife willing to go visiting alone, sleep alone, virtually live alone.
5. A soundproof den where you can fiddle with static-laden frequencies without bringing the house down on your head.

These are the requirements of the bona fide shortwave radio listener who seriously undertakes to become an eavesdropper. You will not need:

1. Knowledge of any language except your own—English.
2. A skyscraping antenna built at staggering cost on the roof of your home.
3. An intimate knowledge of electronics.

The rewards for the conscientious listener to shortwave are varied. Whether it's tomtom music from Ng'oma, hot jazz from Moscow, or the chimes of London's Big Ben—it's all for free, available in unlimited volume. There are analyses of political problems from sources of every hue in the spectrum; commentaries on architecture, religion, rock 'n' roll; folksy chatter and bantering tidbits; anniversary celebrations, interviews and book reviews—from every corner of the globe. You can eavesdrop on fatuous chit-chat among radio hams, ship-to-shore telephone calls, exchanges between commercial airline pilots and their control towers.

Shortwave listening has been compared to photography: you get as much out of it as you put into it. You can buy a shortwave receiver for as little as \$25 (RCA), or a shortwave transistor portable for as much as \$275 (Zenith). Shortwave listening combines the features of travel without motion, rubber-necking without fear of detection.

But perhaps its greatest dividend is the power it gives you to ransack the world's most elaborate and expensive storehouse of ideas—elaborate because virtually every culture known to man is ceaselessly airing its views there days; expensive because sending shortwave—as opposed to receiving—costs a very pretty penny.

The United States, for instance—one of the smaller spenders—has appropriated \$22.3 million this year to operate the Voice of America 84 hours a day in all languages. The Soviet Union and its satellites are on the airwaves 387 hours a day in all languages, at an estimated annual cost of \$170 million. European, Latin American, African and Asian Governments have lower time and money budgets, but all consider shortwave broadcasts vitally important to their information, propaganda and communications programs.

So within the span of a single-evening's monitoring, your shortwave will bring you the following typical mishmash of programming: German language lessons; a Bible lesson from the Andes; a biography of Nikita Khrushchev from Moscow; a discussion of country houses from London; yodelling from Switzerland; a talk on astrology from Madrid, and a police call from your own neighborhood.

The most important listening usually comes after dark, when the air is suddenly shot through with verbal fireworks. The not-so-cold war warms up perceptibly as words and ideas rather than bullets and bombs fly crazily in the great artillery duel between East and West. With your dials twirling, you hear the most dramatic struggle in history for the minds of men.

Although there are no nerve-rasping commercials on international shortwave, there is hardly a broadcast without a hard or soft sell behind it—sometimes shyly peeping out from under a thin veil of kultur. At other times, the propaganda is so obvious that it will send your blood pressure soaring.

Radio Moscow's gems, for instance, are particularly maddening. Broadcasting on 17 to 24 frequencies simultaneously, Radio Moscow can perform breathtaking acrobatics in its policy postures. Take, for instance, the case of RICHARD NIXON.

Until his visit last year to the Soviet Union, where he officially opened the U.S. exhibition, the Vice President was among the top 10 on Moscow's hate parade, second only to J. Edgar Hoover in the number of times he was denounced for his views on Soviet expansionist aims and communism in general. But when it served the Kremlin's purpose, Nixon's name was dropped from anti-American broadcasts, and his statements paying tribute to Russian industrial progress and the people's desire for peace were freely quoted. For the time being, Nixon was no longer included among the ruling circles bent on atomic war. The erstwhile "missile rattler" was now "well informed," "a believer in coexistence."

But once he had returned home, Nixon again—on Russian radio—resumed his role as provocateur, supporter of the policy of encirclement, and a member in good standing of the ruling circles driving America toward the brink. Moscow Radio was back in form.

While others heard about it secondhand, the shortwave listener was treated directly to Moscow Radio's best example of the sell when Premier Nikita Khrushchev toured

the United States last September. American shortwave listeners were told of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions, but every broadcast included a clear threat that the Kremlin was ready to fight to have its way, and had the means to do so.

And what did the programs beamed to Russia say? (This is an advantage of shortwave listening—not even the Kremlin can prevent eavesdropping.)

"America is a rich, capitalist country," said a Captain Vasiliev over Radio Volga early in September in a program intended for Russians. "But it is a paradise only for a small number of imperialist magnates. The billionaires use the money they make from sucking the blood of the workers for golden bathtubs, swimming pools filled with champagne, and carousing."

Such statements were somewhat different from those Premier Khrushchev was delivering in New York, Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Detroit.

What are the short-wave broadcasts—most of them government-sponsored—trying to sell us that we don't already have? The Russians, the Red Chinese, the Czechs, the Rumanians are all, of course, trying to sell us communism. But what about the naughty songs coming to us over the airwaves from Paris; the opera from Rome; the symphonies from West Germany; the folk songs from Mexico; the travel talks from Montreal? Chiefly, they are designed to acquaint listeners with the broadcasting country; perhaps entice us to go there one day and spend a vacation—and some dollars.

With all this mass persuasion going on, language is no clue to the identity of the country whose broadcast you're hearing. A Russian-language newscast is usually the Voice of America trying to catch some ears in the Soviet Union. Polish-language broadcasts come from London, Greek-language broadcasts from Warsaw, discussions in Turkish from Bucharest in Rumania.

Radio Nacional de Espana in Madrid broadcasts in Chinese; Radio Luxembourg in Hungarian. Radiotelevision Italiana transmits in 24 European languages, plus Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, and Esperanto. The Vatican City Radio—perhaps most logically of all—programs in Latin. Radio Cairo broadcasts in Hebrew to Israel, although the Egyptian Government, which owns the station, doesn't officially recognize Israel's existence.

But you can't twirl the dial without bumping into a program that is perfectly understandable to you, because nearly every country in the shortwave business broadcasts part of the time in English.

So, if the corny comedy and the contrived drama of domestic television begins to pall, if you become weary of giant, economy-size, commercial commercials—get a shortwave radio set. You'll find uncontrived drama, unconscious comedy, and a wide, wide world ready to entertain you, confound you, or invite you to visit lovely Tanganyika and exotic Singapore.

A GARDEN

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, why do people put a geranium, or a lily, in the window instead of a book, or a photograph, or an article of clothing? Why do people plant morning glories and lilac bushes and rose bushes in their meager yards? Why do men who have achieved a degree of independence and a competence buy a place in the country? What is there about the country which draws the majority of mankind like a magnet, when if all their days have been spent in the roar and dust and smoke of a great city?

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Nobody can be sure in any industry that a competitive fight will be won. But you can be pretty certain that no industry will win the fight for world markets hiding behind a domestic barricade.

Memorandum Decision—Khrushchev Versus Powers

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. THOMAS M. PELLY

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 18, 1960

Mr. PELLY. Mr. Speaker, last night as I watched television and listened to the irresponsible and unstable ravings of the egomaniac, Khrushchev, during his unbelievable press conference in Paris, I was carried back 20 years into the past to the height of Adolph Hitler's bid for world domination. Only the physical appearance of the two speakers was different.

I witnessed the same hysterical and vitriolic name calling and saber rattling and I said to myself, Here again the peace of the world and the very future of mankind is at the mercy of a psychopathic dictator.

His repeated references to the U-2 flight as a spy mission and his announced intention of trying its courageous pilot, Lieutenant Powers, as a spy prompts me to include with my remarks the following legal opinion prepared by Judge Raymond Royal of the Superior Court of the State of Washington.

Judge Royal is one of the most highly regarded jurists in my State and is an authority on international law. He tells me that this memorandum decision is a joint effort of the entire class of international law which he teaches at the Naval Reserve Officers School at Sand Point Naval Air Station in Seattle, Wash.:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WORLD OPINION
FOR KING COUNTY—KHRUSHCHEV v. POWERS—No. 1—MEMORANDUM DECISION—MAY 13, 1960

Raymond Royal, Judge:

"The headline writers and the columnists, together with the man on the street, seem to assume without equivocation or question that we were caught redhanded in acts which make us guilty of the crime of spying. The small voices of the wife and the father of the pilot who flew the plane cry out that 'our husband and son is not guilty of being a spy.' Has no one thought to look up the law and to see what is the law with regard to spying?

"As a lawyer and judge trained and experienced in the common law approach, and also as a student and teacher of international law, I have researched this question. My ultimate conclusions follow in a form typical of a trial judge's informal memorandum decision."

It is contended by the Russian Communists that the free independent and sovereign people of the United States have committed the offense of spying and have also broken international law because one of its citizens flew in the stratosphere above the surface of the sovereign nation without the consent of its government. Let us take

a look at what the law of nations says about espionage and about the law of territory.

There is no simple clear-cut document codifying international law such as one would find with reference to the ordinances of a city or the statutes of a State. International law arises out of custom and usage over a long period of time or by mutual agreement and consent, and has been defined in various ways by the legal scholars throughout the ages. Among the definitions which have been generally and widely accepted by the persons dealing with international law is that of Sir Henry Maine:

"The law of nations is a complex system, composed of various ingredients. It consists of general principles of right and justice, equally suited to the conduct of individuals in a state of natural equity, and to the relations and conduct of nations; of a collection of usages, customs and opinions, the growth of civilization and commerce; and a code of positive law" (International Law, 1883, p. 33).

Another is Black's definition of the term, as follows:

"International law. The law which regulates the intercourse of nations; the law of nations. The customary law which determines the rights and regulates the intercourse of independent states in peace and war.

"The system of rules and principles, founded on treaty, custom, precedent, and the consensus of opinion as to justice and moral obligation, which civilized nations recognize as binding upon them in their mutual dealings and relations."

As a corollary to the definition itself, Commander Brittin, in his book "International Law for Seagoing Officers," at page 48, makes this statement with regard to the process of international law:

"As is so often the case in the development of international law, the insistence of so many nations upon a similar right and their vigorous measures to enforce the claimed right evolve into a rule of customary international law."

There are many authorities who have commented upon the rule of law among the nations with regard to spying. There has been a general agreement and concurrence among the family of nations and the scholars in this field that The Hague regulations of 1899 expresses the customary law in this regard. The essence of article 29 which deals with this subject is that spying consists in acting "clandestinely or on false pretenses", having the objective of obtaining information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, and of communicating it to the enemy. It is a further part of this customary law that soldiers not in disguise, properly known as "scouts", might penetrate the enemy lines to obtain information without being considered spies. Dispatch bearers, whether soldiers or civilians, have not been considered spies if they carried out their missions openly. The occupants of balloons who might find themselves over enemy territory for the purpose of delivering dispatches or maintaining communications came within the same class.

Where is the cloak and dagger? The clear undisputed facts are outside the definition of a spy. It is clear that the wife and father of this American pilot are correct when they contend that Pilot Powers has not engaged in the crime of being a spy.

The evaluation of whether or not we have offended the territorial rights of a nation is more complex. We cannot dismiss this latter charge by simply citing the definition. The rule of law regarding the extraterritorial rights of nations is far more complex and currently in a state of flux. There is no clear-cut agreement among the experts as to where it is or where it is finally going to develop.

There had been a general concurrence among the nations that the air space above a nation's territory is subject to the exclusive sovereignty of that nation. This general and uniform insistence upon such a right by the various nations, of course, was in light of the facts with regard to the use of the air in existence at the time of the general concurrence. It also took into account the hard, cold, practical fact of international life that the nation over which the airspace lies had an effective method of controlling those who might desire to use that airspace. The antiaircraft defenses generally had been able to give some substantial enforcement in that the range of aircraft did not exceed the range of antiaircraft defense. Undoubtedly this contributed to fixing of the rule just as the 3-mile rule of territorial extension into the high seas grew out of the range of a cannon ball. Prior to the 3-mile rule evolving, many nations asserted sovereign rights offshore without limit. Due to lack of agreement or uniform acquiescence by custom and usage, these claims ultimately failed.

However, in the past few years the space above a nation's territory has been invaded by manmade objects at a far greater altitude than can be controlled by the nations whose territory is under the particular airspace. We know today that there is a concurrence among the nations of the world that nations have the right to put satellites into space. Various nations have done so, thereby asserting their rights in that regard. There has been no voice raised against the assertion of this right. While this use of outer space cannot be said to be a custom of long standing, it nevertheless has all the earmarks of a custom except antiquity.

The law with regard to extension of territorial sovereign rights into airspace must be limited to the actual use and ability to control which existed at the time the customary rule evolved. This generally follows the practice employed in the development of the extension of territorial rights which infringe upon the freedom of the seas. The nations of the world for a number of years have been whittling away at the long-established customary 3-mile rule to the point now where the rule is regarded as uncertain. But this does not mean that none of the seas are free and open. Similarly at some height above a nation's territory, the exclusive territorial sovereign right over space ends. The fact that the nations have not agreed as to where it ends does not mean that the rule of law is that the nations below have the right to airspace ad infinitum. Nor do they have it above that which they can control and is currently used by all nations.

Even though there exists no concurrence as to the boundary between free airspace and territorial airspace, there in fact is a portion which is free and open to all. It is clear that the altitude at which this American plane was flying was above that which was current practice when custom and usage established the present rule of the sovereignty of airspace. It is also clear that the altitude at which this plane was flying was above the practical ability of every nation to effect significant control. Therefore, because of the vacuum of positive law prohibiting the flying at this altitude, the freedom of the airspace applies to the altitude at which this plane was being flown before it was either forced to seek a lower level by reason of either being shot down or suffering mechanical difficulty. The United States and the pilot of this plane were no more violating a rule of international law than do the Russian submarines when they lie outside of the 3-mile limit of the coast of continental United States and engage in peacetime reconnaissance and scouting. We had the right to use the freedom of the airspace above that which was fixed by positive

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custom and usage in international law just as we have the right to exercise freedom of the seas. The general concurrence about the use and projection of satellites clearly indicates that there is a limit to this doctrine of absolute sovereignty of the space above the territory. Where that limit lies we do not know, but we can safely say that it is somewhere lower than the elevation at which this plane was flying. The legal ceiling to the airspace subject to territorial control was fixed by (1) the then current usage and (2) ability to control the occupancy of airspace.

There is another area in which the rules of international law relative to airspace rapidly are being modified. Even within the recognized territorial sovereignty control upon airspace, virtually all of the major nations of the world involved in air travel have by treaty agreed to a limit. There exists by treaty among these major nations the privilege of flying across territory of the country without landing. There also is the privilege of landing for nontraffic purposes. The International Air Service Transit Agreement arising out of the 1944 Chicago conference so provides.

While this cannot be considered a rule of law it does give evidence of a substantial and growing dissatisfaction with the rule. It is such dissatisfaction and resultant treaties which give rise to new customary law and define areas of uncertainties in the old.

In summary, it is clear that the flight of the U-2 single-engine jet piloted by Francis Powers was not spying. The undisputed facts cry out against bringing the case within the definition of a spy as customarily fixed by international law.

There was no illegal invasion of the customary sovereign territorial rights because the territorial airspace could only be established by custom and usage under international law:

1. The scheduled operating altitude was above the air customarily used.
2. The scheduled operating altitude was beyond the ability of the sovereign territory to effect any semblance of control.
3. The rule relating to exclusive sovereign territorial rights of airspace related only to the airspace to which a continued used could establish a custom, and of necessity this customary rule of law had to fix the exclusive airspace at an altitude below that intended to be maintained by this plane.

If Khrushchev Wants It That Way

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. ALBERT H. BOSCH

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 17, 1960

Mr. BOSCH. Mr. Speaker, the spectacle in Paris this week put on by Nikita Khrushchev has appalled all self-respecting Americans. I think that anyone who had confidence in the good faith of this man has now seen his true colors—people of good faith cannot deal with him.

The United States must be ever vigilant so that another Pearl Harbor cannot happen. We must remember that at the very moment of Pearl Harbor negotiations were allegedly going on in this country supposedly to iron out the differences between Japan and the United States—negotiations are no assurance against aggression.

This is indeed a dangerous period in the history of our country and the world and every precaution should be taken to see that we are prepared for all eventualities. No appeasement, please—appeasement wherever and whenever practiced holds for the world only a catastrophic nightmare.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I include an editorial from the New York Daily News of May 19, 1960, which gives a good summation of the situation:

IF KHRUSHCHEV WANTS IT THAT WAY

For reasons best known to himself, N. S. Khrushchev this week renewed the East-West cold war by torpedoing the Paris summit conference which had been set up chiefly because Khrushchev had insisted on it.

Speculation as to why he wrecked the parley is interesting but not overly useful, it seems to us.

What matters in this ugly situation is that the cold war is on again at full blast, and that Khrushchev wants it that way.

Since that is the Red czar's wish, the Western Allies can choose one of two courses.

They can knuckle under to this tyrant, beg him for another summit, hand him some more concessions, and thereby push communism a long way toward the world conquest which the Communists never have ceased to intend.

Or the West can stand up to Khrushchev, as it did at Paris this week, go on calling his bluffs, and defy him to do his worst. Such a position, of course, calls for intensified Western preparation to fight in case Khrushchev, by accident or design, triggers a war.

Judging from the disgust and indignation Khrushchev's wrecking of the summit has kicked up all over the free world, the West—except perhaps for a few weak-kneed neutral nations—will accept Khrushchev's challenge and take up the cold war with renewed vigor and determination.

Khrushchev's obvious effort to divide Americans has flopped on its face, at least for the time being. Yesterday four leading Democrats cabled to President Eisenhower in Paris a message for the Red Czar, snubbing his demand that the summit conference be postponed until after our 1960 Presidential election.

The four were Adlai Stevenson, Senators Lyndon B. Johnson, of Texas, and J. William Fulbright, of Arkansas, and House Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas.

PATRIOTIC CABLEGRAM

These gentlemen thus made it clear that U.S. political differences, as always, stop at our shorelines whenever we are threatened by outsiders. We think they deserve nationwide applause for a patriotic and realistic gesture.

As for various smaller-minded Democrats who hope to make political capital by a Congressional investigation of the spy-plane incident, we think Vice President RICHARD M. NIXON answered them adequately at a news conference yesterday in Syracuse, N.Y.

Go ahead and investigate, Nixon told these politicians in effect—if they think Eisenhower should have yielded to Khrushchev's insulting demand for an apology for the spy-plane affair, and if they think the administration should have left a gap in our intelligence operations. We'll be interested in hearing what these would-be investigators have to answer to that Nixon challenge.

Now that the cold war is on again, let's make our next move at Geneva by pulling out of the long palaver with the Russians about stopping nuclear weapon tests.

Khrushchev is willing to keep this conference going—and for an obvious reason. He hopes to stop our nuclear weapon development while his goes right on, and

eventually to trick the West into scrapping all its nuclear arms under an agreement containing no safeguards against Red cheating.

We've been suckered at Geneva these 18 months. That's 18 months too long. Now that Khrushchev has renewed the cold war, we should call off this particular sucker operation of his as fast as we can get our Geneva representatives back home. What with jet planes cruising at just under 600 miles per hour, that can be a fast pull-out indeed.

Central American Economic Integration

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHESTER E. MERROW

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 18, 1960

Mr. MERROW. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and as one who feels that Central American peace and security is a crucial link in the chain of an effective inter-American system, I have for some time followed developments in that area with great interest.

The movement toward Central American economic integration, which is taking place under the leadership of Guatemala's courageous and forward-looking President, Gen. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, is most encouraging and worthy of our support. The recent consolidation of anti-Communist forces in that country has strengthened free forces not only in Guatemala but in the other Central American countries as well at a critical time in Latin American history.

Another great and enlightened Latin American leader is Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales, President of Honduras. Dr. Villeda previously served as his country's Ambassador to the United States, during which assignment he gained many friends in the United States. As President of Honduras, he is working hard for his people. Much progress has been made, but much remains to be done.

The progress and problems of Honduras are described in the following article by Virginia Frewell entitled "Honduras New Regime Progresses," which appeared in the April 11, 1960, issue of the Washington Daily News:

A young democracy now getting underway in Honduras is a hemispheric bright spot.

In a little over 2 years, a hard-working constitutional regime there has cleared away a great deal of the underbrush that has hindered national growth for generations, and has taken concrete steps toward Central American economic union.

Honduras is a mountainous country that lives by exporting tropical products grown on narrow coastal plains.

The size of Pennsylvania, it has about 1.7 million inhabitants, mostly of mixed Spanish and Indian descent. In the decade 1947-57, Honduras made the stormy passage from dictatorship to constitutional government.

President Ramon Villeda Morales, the Honduran physician who took office in late 1957 with moderate liberal backing, had to start building from the constitution up.

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ganization and ours are interested in a common cause."

Jesse Clark, president, Brotherhood of Railway Signalmen of America: "You may be assured that we are in full sympathy with the Eagles in your actions regarding the practice of many employers in invoking job discriminations against men and women over 40 years of age."

Ray Ross, president, Ohio CIO Council: "We are very much interested and highly elated that the Fraternal Order of Eagles is turning its attention toward eliminating job discrimination in the hiring of men and women over 40."

T. C. Carroll, president, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees: "You are to be complimented on this endeavor—an all-out Eagle campaign to enact State and Federal legislation barring discrimination against men and women over 40 years of age. We will be glad to cooperate in any way we can to make the campaign a success."

Mitchell Sviridoff, president, Connecticut State Labor Council: "It is most gratifying to learn of the Eagle concern with the problem of discrimination in hiring against men and women over 40. Our State organization will cooperate with your local chapters with respect to this program."

Ed S. Miller, president, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union: "I am familiar with the long history of support on the part of the Eagles for social security. The order is certainly to be congratulated for its present campaign on behalf of workers over 40."

Statement of the Honorable James F. Byrnes on Summit Conference

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. STROM THURMOND

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, May 23, 1960

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on May 19, one of the most outstanding South Carolinians of all times, the Honorable James F. Byrnes, delivered an address before the annual South Carolina Medical Association Convention at Myrtle Beach, S.C. Governor Byrnes' record of exemplary public service is proudly remembered, not only by South Carolinians, but by Americans everywhere. His dedicated service to our Nation includes top positions in all three branches of our Federal Government and to his beloved State.

With his background in every branch of our National Government and in the position as chief executive of his beloved State of South Carolina, the observations of Governor Byrnes command the attention of all Americans. In his role as Secretary of State, James Byrnes' contributions to the cause of peace will always be remembered by grateful Americans. He has had great opportunity to observe the sincerity of the Russians as to their alleged desire to effectuate a genuine and lasting peace. He is, therefore, well qualified to speak on the subject which he chose as the text of his speech to the convention to which I have previously referred. His comments on the recent disastrous summit conference should be read by all and should serve

as the basis for sober reflection for everyone who desires a lasting peace with honor and dignity.

I ask unanimous consent that this speech be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the State, May 20, 1960]

TEXT OF BYRNES SPEECH BEFORE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION MAY 19

(Following is the text of an address which Gov. James F. Byrnes, formerly Secretary of State, Supreme Court Justice, and Assistant President during World War II delivered before the South Carolina Medical Association convention at Myrtle Beach Thursday night.)

Nikita Khrushchev sabotaged the summit meeting. In doing so he brought sorrow and fear to millions of people who are more interested in having war tensions lessened than any other question.

For 5 years Khrushchev expressed the desire for a summit meeting. The President doubled his sincerity and showed little interest. About 2 years ago the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, became an enthusiastic advocate of a meeting at the summit to lessen tensions, and other European allies expressed the hope we would agree. Because we have bases within the territory of our European allies and they are on the firing line, we finally agreed to go along with them.

My personal opinion was that even though we had little hope that any good would be accomplished, we should confer. We could not refuse even to talk with the Soviets and it would do no harm provided we stood firm and realized that they would not keep their promises and provided we maintained and increased our military defenses.

Khrushchev after his visit to this country stopped jamming our radio broadcasts to Russia in the Russian language, and gave other evidence of a conciliatory attitude toward the Western powers. But a few months ago there was a change of attitude. Khrushchev for the first time in many months repeated his threat that if the Western Powers adhered to their position of not withdrawing from West Berlin, the Soviets would make a separate treaty with East Germany and would insist upon the withdrawal of our troops.

He threatened that if we failed to withdraw, war would follow. We cannot be sure of what caused this change of attitude. We do know in a general way, that Red China was bringing pressure upon Khrushchev fearing he had become too friendly with the West. There was evidence of unrest among his people and also evidence of some dissension in the Soviet high command. The recent removal of several men holding important positions in the Government, gave proof of this.

Then Khrushchev learned that recently there had been complete agreement among the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany, that there would be no modification of our position as to West Berlin. In view of his continued threats, this unanimity of the West as to Berlin posed a serious problem for him. He did not know how to retreat gracefully, and was not prepared for the consequences of carrying out his threat. He saw little evidence of accomplishing anything at the summit and feared that if the President made his promised visit to Russia and in his sincere and earnest manner assured the Russian people that we want only to live in peace, they might be convinced and that might cause trouble for Mr. Khrushchev.

Unfortunately for us, the Powers Incident occurred just at this time, and it gave Khrushchev an excuse to sabotage the summit meeting. Having thousands of Soviet spies all over the world, it was certainly not the reason for his action. It was only his excuse.

If Mr. Khrushchev did not intend to confer with the Western leaders unless the United States apologized for the Powers mission, why did he go to Paris?

He was the first to arrive in Paris. He asked to call on President deGaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan. He deliberately refrained from asking to see President Eisenhower.

For propaganda purposes, he wished in a formal meeting to demand a formal apology from the United States. He knew full well—or he should have known—he would receive no apology, but decided it would give him an excuse to blast the meeting. If, to his surprise, the President should have apologized, then Khrushchev would have made no agreement as to West Berlin or disarmament, but would return to Moscow with the prestige of having humiliated the United States.

In his mind and heart there is no gratitude for the \$11 billion loaned them during the last war and they have not repaid. There is only the hatred born of the knowledge that our economic and military strength prevents them from dominating the world.

Because the work of our Intelligence Service necessarily has not been made public, it is understandable that many were unaware of our spying, and it accounts for some of the criticisms of our Government. However, I have been surprised at the criticisms by some Members of Congress. If any Senator or Congressman did not know for what purpose he was appropriating vast sums of money for intelligence, he could have learned by making inquiry of the chairman of the Appropriations Committee.

A few days after Khrushchev announced the capture of Powers, when some petty partisans criticized the President for permitting a plane to fly over Soviet territory without the knowledge or authority of Congress, Congressman CANNON of Missouri, a Democrat, and chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told the House that Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had kept the proper appropriations subcommittee advised of the spy program. He said that program met with the approval of both Democrats and Republicans on the committee, who at times had prodded Dulles to make even greater efforts to secure information on military installations in the Soviet Republic. He said they knew of the reconnaissance missions of the U-2 planes over Soviet territory and felt the information obtained would be effective in deterring the Soviets from making a surprise attack against the United States or its allies in Europe. The House gave him a hearty ovation. His statement was candid and courageous, but CLARENCE CANNON always places the welfare of his country above political partisanship.

Unfortunately, all politicians are not like Congressman CANNON. Some think only of the coming election. They say we must do some spying and the reconnaissance program is justified by the secrecy of the Soviets, but the timing was bad.

The only thing wrong about the Powers mission was that Powers was caught. For 4 years we have sent similar planes over Soviet territory. If Powers had not been caught, there would now be no criticism of the timing. It was just our misfortune that he should have been caught. That was bad timing.

We have had only limited experience in spying, but during World War II we came to realize the extent to which governments engaged in spying and we resorted to it ourselves. I recall accompanying Gen. Bill Donovan, who was in charge of the Office of

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Strategic Services, to a camp where recruits were being trained by a former chief of police of Shanghai. It was an amazing show. It was referred to as the "Cloak and Dagger" service. Men volunteered for the work, not for the compensation, but for love of country, and sometimes for love of adventure.

Later when President Roosevelt advised me of our efforts to develop the atomic bomb, he told me that Germany was engaged in a similar effort and through our intelligence service we were employing people to spy upon the German project and had information as to their progress. They had started first. The race was close, and our fear was that if Germany won the race, we would lose the war.

Now it is difficult to recall conditions existing at the close of the war. Most of us thought the peoples of the world would be so weary of war that no government would take steps calculated to bring about another world conflict and we could look forward to a half century of peace.

Three months after the surrender of Japan we joined Great Britain and Canada in announcing to the world that we would voluntarily surrender the military advantage of our exclusive possession of the "know-how" to produce atomic weapons. We agreed to ask that the United Nations establish an International Commission having the power to see that the atomic bombs in existence were destroyed; that all nations renounced the right to produce bombs and that atomic energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes under the supervision of the International Commission.

At the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Moscow, in December 1945, I introduced a resolution asking for the appointment of such a Commission and providing that the use of atomic energy should be subject to inspection by the International Commission, with safeguards to guarantee there would be no violation by any government. The Soviets agreed to this resolution. The Commission was appointed but when it met a few months later, the Soviet objected to the provision for international inspection.

Between December 1945 when they had agreed to the resolution and the meeting of the Commission in early 1946, Soviet ambitions had changed. This change probably was due to information gained through their spies in the United States and Great Britain, which would enable them to produce atomic bombs. They decided international inspection would interfere with their policy of secrecy.

Early in 1946 several Soviet spies were arrested in Canada. From that time on, in this country and in Britain, there have been thousands of Soviet spies. We do not forget Judith Coplon, who was tried for spying, nor Klaus Fuchs, who was sentenced to prison for giving atomic secrets to Russia, and is now in East Germany, after being released from prison. Later Harry Gold was arrested as a Soviet spy. In June 1950 David Greenglass confessed to giving certain military secrets to Russia. Pontecorvo secured atomic secrets from the British and then disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. So did Burgess and Maclean. The Soviet spies, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, were sentenced to death for spying in the United States. Several employees of the Soviet Embassy in Washington who were found to be spies, were forced to leave this country. Another Soviet spy, Col. Rudolph Abel, was sentenced to 30 years for espionage. Only a few weeks ago that sentence was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.

All Soviet spying was not done in the long ago. Just a few weeks ago a Soviet trawler was off the coast of Connecticut spying on the experimental tests of a new submarine. And on the very day Khrushchev was criti-

cizing the United States about the Powers case, two Russian officials were expelled from Switzerland for spying on Swiss military activities and rocket bases in West Germany.

SOVIET THREATS

Stalin first, and later Khrushchev, have continuously threatened to make war upon the United States, while erecting an iron curtain around the Soviet Republic and her satellites. They have made progress in the development of new weapons of war and have succeeded in keeping secret, detailed knowledge of those weapons. With their secret weapons and bellicose threats, they menace the peace of the world.

In spying, the Soviets have an advantage. They do not have to spend much time or money spying on the United States. Their agents in Washington can learn from official maps the location of our military installations and from the daily press can read even the confidential statements made to congressional committees.

Because of Soviet secrecy, President Eisenhower at Geneva in 1955, pleaded for what was called an "open skies" agreement. He offered to grant permission for Russian planes to fly over the United States, taking pictures wherever they wished, if the Soviets would grant the same privilege to the United States. The Soviets refused and have continued to refuse. In the light of this history, what is the duty of our Government to its people? Should we sit idly by and await a surprise attack that would destroy our lives and our freedom?

We can never forget December 7, 1941, when the Japanese by a surprise attack destroyed our fleet at Pearl Harbor and caused the death of hundreds of American boys. Thereafter we succeeded in breaking the Japanese code and by intercepting naval messages, were able to destroy most of the Japanese fleet. It was retaliation for that surprise attack.

Nor can we forget the surprise attack in Korea directed by the Soviets, which caused the death of thousands of Americans. We know that if the Soviets ever carry out their threats to make war on us, they will do it by surprise.

There was a time when by ordinary espionage, a government could learn of the mobilization of an army in the territory of a government threatening war. But in this day of atomic weapons, missiles and rockets, the situation is different. A missile fired from Soviet territory, in less than 30 minutes, can hit a target in the United States and utterly destroy that target and the inhabitants of the area. The only thing that deters the Soviets is the fear of immediate and massive retaliation.

To retaliate successfully, we not only must have bases in Europe, but we must know the location of Soviet military installations. We cannot wait until a missile has devastated a great area and then make a reconnaissance to locate military installations. That would be too late. Because of this, our intelligence service for 4 years has been sending unarmed planes over Soviet territory, solely for the purpose of securing information.

Regardless of the information we secure, the Soviets are in no danger of attack from us. But Khrushchev now howls with rage because he learns that in his Iron Curtain there is some glass, and 65,000 feet in the air a pilot has taken pictures which he believes has lessened the secrecy with which he has surrounded the Soviet Republic.

Khrushchev makes no apology for sending to the United States countless Soviet spies. But in Paris he demanded that the President apologize and promise to punish those responsible for the Powers mission. That would include the Republican President and the Democratic congressional leaders, who

provided the money, knowing how it was to be used.

President Eisenhower refused even to discuss the demand. I am proud of the manner in which he represented our country, with dignity and courage under trying circumstances. He was subjected to intolerable insults by the bragging bully from Moscow. A man of less stature might have lost his temper and walked out of the conference room. The President preferred to suffer the insults rather than give excuse for the charge that he had broken up the conference. Time and again he agreed to return to the conference to discuss with Khrushchev the subjects that had been agreed upon prior to the meeting. He thus prevented Khrushchev from shifting to the United States the responsibility for failure of the meeting.

He left unnoticed and unanswered Khrushchev's contemptible insult that he would be willing to confer only when there was a new President. Every loyal American resents that insult. It was an inexcusable effort to interfere in our election. It was stupid of Khrushchev to think the American people will elect as President any man approved by him. His crude insults in Paris Wednesday only serve to unite our people. He will learn as did the Kaiser and Hitler, that while we divide politically on domestic affairs, we are truly united in foreign affairs.

Heartening indeed was the news report this morning that several influential Democratic leaders wired President Eisenhower assurance of their support.

While that was comforting, I hope the President and the Democratic congressional leaders, in a practical way, can prove our unity by diverting to our defense programs some of the billions of dollars now earmarked or recommended for controversial social programs. In this crisis we can postpone even meritorious social reforms but we should not postpone even for a day, any expenditure that will contribute to the defense of our lives and liberties.

The Times of Havana—A Brave Newspaper Cries Out

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. CHARLES O. PORTER

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 19, 1960

MR. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, freedom of the press is essential in a democracy, as is the freedom to elect those we wish to govern us and the freedom to worship and speak as we please.

Today in Cuba the essential freedoms of a democracy are being stifled. We who are friends of the people of Cuba regret these confiscations of democracy, because they leave only fear, confusion, and oppression.

There is today in Havana a brave newspaper publisher who twice weekly prints his English-language tabloid, the Times of Havana. Publisher Clarence "Pappy" Moore is a friend of mine. His courage in printing the truth gives hope to those Cubans who see too well what can happen when democracy gets sidetracked.

An article describing Pappy Moore's work appeared in the Wednesday, May 18, 1960, issue of the Washington Daily

**An Educator Says Now Is the Time To Ask
Searching Questions**

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES O. PORTER

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 19, 1960

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, my able friend, Lucian C. Marquis, political science professor at the University of Oregon, asserts that now is the time for criticism and that now is the time for Congress to ask searching questions about administration policy. A number of us have just addressed such questions to the President. We await his replies.

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Under a previous unanimous consent, I am including the entire text of the letter written to me by Professor Marquis on May 13, 1960:

EUGENE, OREG., May 13, 1960.

Representative CHARLES O. PORTER,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE PORTER: I am writing to you out of deep concern because of the U-2 plane incident and because of the administration's announcement of the proposed resumption of underground nuclear testing.

As a teacher of political science I realize that intelligence activities are one of the hard facts of life. At the same time I wonder whether we can afford the luxury of this type of intelligence. General Powers of SAC tells us that the Russians have the capacity to strike at American targets and to destroy them. What assurance do we have that the Russians do not misread the incursion of a single plane? Are the gains of such an intelligence mission worth the risk of nuclear war?

When some years ago a Soviet spy was apprehended in Brooklyn, the Russian Government could and did completely dissociate itself from his activities. Aerial intelligence, on the other hand, directly and immediately implicates the sponsoring government.

Equally disturbing is the question of responsibility. While the administration in Washington acknowledges its general policy decisions on this kind of flight, it was not aware of the particular timing. The disturbing implication is that immediate decisions which could be of the most far-reaching consequences, viz the unleashing of nuclear war, are made at some lower echelon. Quite apart from this irresponsible delegation of power what might be the tactical consequences? Were our SAC bases alerted to the possibility of a Soviet reprisal to the U-2 incursion? Would President Eisenhower have been available to make an urgent decision? On the basis of the evidence (including the unpreparedness of the administration to give any decent explanation of the incident) we were in no way prepared. This in the face of the administration's argument that through these flights we wish to avoid another Pearl Harbor.

As to the ramifications of this incident—the impact on world opinion prior to the summit, the ace it places into the hands of Soviet negotiators, the distrust it engenders among allies who have not been consulted (witness Norway's protest to our State Department)—are these to be subordinated to the possible gains to intelligence?

The administration's justification of its policy is couched in the most fanciful doubletalk. It is saying to the Russians in effect—If you weren't such bad boys, ringing down your Iron Curtain, we wouldn't have to fly over your territory. What would be the administration's reaction after a Soviet plane had been shot down over Kansas and the Russians were to reply that they were compelled to such illegal flights because we barred their diplomats from large parts of the United States?

And finally, in a kind of postscript to this sad affair, the administration announces the resumption of underground nuclear testing at a moment when some slight but hopeful progress had been made at Geneva—the Russians having agreed to holding joint technical tests. What justification can be given for this decision? May this not appear to the rest of the world as a desperately spiteful act?

It has been argued that this is no time for criticism. But if we do not criticize now, if the Congress does not now ask searching questions about administration policy then when else is the time? Are we blindly to accept administration decision to continue such flights? Are we entitled to

know who makes immediate policy decisions which can have such far-reaching consequences for us and for the world? What justifications are there for the resumption of nuclear testing? These are not carping questions. Unless they are asked now it may be too late. I should like respectfully to urge you to further bring these sentiments, which are not merely confined to myself, to your colleagues in Congress and to continue to exercise to your fullest power your constitutional prerogative of checking the executive branch.

Truly yours,

LUCIAN C. MARQUIS.

Iowa Citizen Praises Birmingham

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GEORGE HUDDLESTON, JR.

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 10, 1960

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Speaker, recently there appeared in one of Birmingham's two daily newspapers a letter to the editor which was, in effect, a thank you note to the citizens of our fine community and a refutation of a widely publicized false impression of the city emanating from a New York newspaper. This letter was from a citizen of Waterloo, Iowa, Mr. Edward J. Jacobson, who in a time of crisis and in a strange city, found in Birmingham and her people what he calls a needed "warmth and comfort."

In addition to his eloquent expression of commendation and appreciation of the people of Birmingham, Mr. Jacobson, in his letter, praises the facilities and personnel of an institution in which we in Birmingham and Alabama take great pride, the University Hospital & Hillman Clinic of the University of Alabama Medical Center.

I am pleased to insert a copy of Mr. Jacobson's letter in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, under leave heretofore granted, and earnestly commend it to the attention of my colleagues:

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE—IOWA MAN TELLS
STORY OF BIRMINGHAM'S HELP

I read the article in the Birmingham News which appeared in the New York Times. If that reporter had come to Birmingham under the circumstances Mrs. Jacobson and I did, I am sure his version of Birmingham and the very good people there would be entirely different.

On Saturday, April 9, my wife, our daughter Jean and I were having our lunch when we were interrupted by a phone call. It was a long distance call from University Hospital in your city to inform us that our older daughter Joan was there and had been involved in an auto accident. She was thrown out of an overturning car and seriously injured. She was en route to Florida with friends for Easter vacation from Rockford College at Rockford, Ill.

Several of your kind citizens who were passers-by made it possible for her to be assisted and brought to the hospital. The doctor requested we come, and plane connections being poor, we started driving. I stayed behind the wheel for 20 hours while my wife studied road maps and signs. Three cups of coffee and one piece of pie was our limit on food, only to reach Bir-

mingham, a place we had never been or even had any idea of what it was like.

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We were strangers in this big city but yet we felt like this was a sort of home. We knew our daughter would be well again. Later, we rented an apartment and our landlady was just like a mother to us. The minister called on our daughter, and we attended the church of our faith on Easter Sunday. It was wonderful to be in church a thousand miles from home and feel the warmth and comfort that we so needed at that time.

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Can this be Birmingham? It sure can.
EDWARD J. JACOBSON.

WATERLOO, IOWA.

Being Intelligent About Intelligence

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. EMILIO Q. DADDARIO

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 2, 1960

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, a good many words have been spoken in recent days about this Nation's intelligence operations and their efficiency and effectiveness. When policy decisions may be made on the basis of secret intelligence material, there is a conflict which can be settled only by full and frank discussion of these policy matters by the responsible political authorities without disclosure of agencies, sources, or methods. When political authorities allow the impression to gain currency that they are not in full command of their decisions, or that their information may have been faulty, they encourage speculation and comment which is not in the national interest.

In that connection, I would like to submit for the Record an editorial which appeared in the Hartford Courant and which contains an authoritative understanding of the intelligence cycle. The editorial states that one reason why intelligence activities of this Nation often appear to be both inept and amateurish is that there has seldom been an adequate appreciation of the importance of

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intelligence on the part of responsible persons in the Government.

It seems to me that the recent events, when coupled with incidents that have occurred over more than a decade now, indicate a need for a continuing review and supervision of the national intelligence machinery. The article which is cited in the editorial, and which I have not included at this point, believes that CIA is far too large and the responsibilities assigned its Director are too great to permit effective control. These are technical matters which deserve congressional study and decision. The entire field, it is apparent, deserves continuing congressional supervision by a committee which might well be organized along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The editorial follows:

BEING INTELLIGENT ABOUT INTELLIGENCE

Elsewhere on this page today appear some penetrating comments on the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency, and perhaps more important, on our whole approach to the subject of military intelligence. The article, which appeared in the London Daily Telegraph, was written by Donald McLachlan, himself a British intelligence officer during World War II.

Although Mr. McLachlan's article is reasonably comprehensive, it fails to mention the principal reason why our intelligence activities are often both inept and amateurish. That reason is that there is not now nor has there ever been an adequate appreciation of the importance of intelligence on the part of responsible persons in the government, whether in the armed forces or in high elective positions. During the entire period between World War I and World War II, aside from such routine tasks as were performed by the attachés, military intelligence received little attention from anyone. And the intelligence commanders of the various corps area commands, the G-2 assistant chiefs of staff, were principally public relations officers and nothing more. Even today, in the Department of the Army, all of the top General Staff officers but one have the title of Deputy Chief of Staff and the rank of lieutenant general. The one officer who does not have this rank is the director of intelligence, who is only an Assistant Chief of Staff, with the grade of major general.

Perhaps Washington's failure really to understand and appreciate the importance of military intelligence is a reflection of the attitude of the American people who, generally, look with disfavor upon espionage of any kind. But in this world in which we live our national existence demands that we make every effort to learn all we can of what our potential enemies are up to. Whether we like it or not, we must have well-trained and efficient intelligence agencies, and the sooner we realize that fact the better it will be for all of us.

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That should be our policy, too.

Chances for Milk Sanitation Legislation Have Become Brighter

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. LESTER R. JOHNSON

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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Mr. JOHNSON of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, the Dairy Record, one of the Nation's leading publications in the dairy field, has commented editorially on the ever-increasing support for my national milk sanitation legislation. Under leave to extend by remarks, I would like to include this editorial from the May 4, 1960, issue of this magazine in the RECORD:

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A major victory was won by backers of the bill when Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in a letter to Representative ORREN HARRIS, chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, reported favorably on the bill and Assistant Surgeon General, David E. Price of the HEW, at a commerce subcommittee meeting of the House endorsed the measure.

Secretary Flemming stated that the objections of the Department to previous sanitation bills had been eliminated in the Johnson measure and he pointed out that HEW has consistently held that health regulations should not be used as domestic trade barriers to the interstate shipment of milk and milk products of high sanitary quality.

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All presented strong arguments why the bill should be passed and one of the strongest offered was that in actuality the measure is for the protection of the consumer. It was pointed out that in many areas when there is a period of shortage, milk is purchased from outside sources and it is in many cases of dubious quality.

Appearing in opposition to the Johnson bill were for the most part representatives of producer groups, principally from the East,

South, and Southwest. Philip Alampi, New Jersey Secretary of Agriculture, stated in his brief that the milk markets in the Northeast have very adequate milk sanitation regulations and that health standards can best be determined at the local or area level. He declared that enactment of the bill would tend to lower the quality of milk shipped into receiving States and that lowering of quality standards would be detrimental to the promotion and expansion of market outlets for milk. He also argued that the purpose of the bill is to permit the shipment of milk for fluid use from States of surplus production into distant markets but that goal would not be accomplished because the price differential between surplus States such as Wisconsin and Minnesota and northeastern importing States is not sufficient to induce the movement of a permanent supply of milk from the surplus producing areas.

Also appearing in opposition to the measure was Paul R. Jackson, executive officer, Milk Inspection Association of the Oranges and Maplewood, N.J., who represented the New Jersey Health Officer Association. He argued that the bill will give authority to the Surgeon General to promulgate and amend the Federal Milk Sanitation Code and that this would be an unwarranted delegation of authority. He also declared that the bill would abrogate the home rule of local agencies.

Libraries, Education, and Society

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JOHN E. FOGARTY

OF RHODE ISLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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Mr. FOGARTY. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks I include an address which I delivered at the Drexel Institute of Technology, Philadelphia, Pa., on May 17, 1960:

LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY

(Remarks made by Representative JOHN E. FOGARTY at Drexel Institute of Technology on May 17, 1960, on occasion of his receiving the Distinguished Achievement Award from the Graduate School of Library Science and the Library Alumni Association)

Today I saw for the first time the impressive new quarters of the library school here at Drexel.¹ I am sure they bring to you a deep sense of pride and gratification—much as your Distinguished Achievement Award, and this opportunity to meet with you have given me. It is a fine thing to feel that one's efforts have played some part in strengthening the American heritage.

A library school—or legislation to aid libraries—can do just that: It can enrich society and strengthen the Nation. It does this mainly through the enduring contribution of libraries to education.

America's strength was once felt to lie predominantly in her agricultural and geographic advantages. Since the turn of the century, industry and natural resources have been paramount. Both, of course, remain essential to our country's strength and her

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Under a previous unanimous consent, I am including the entire text of the letter written to me by Professor Marquis on May 13, 1960:

EUGENE, OREG., May 13, 1960.

Representative CHARLES O. PORTER,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE PORTER: I am writing to you out of deep concern because of the U-2 plane incident and because of the administration's announcement of the proposed resumption of underground nuclear testing.

As a teacher of political science I realize that intelligence activities are one of the hard facts of life. At the same time I wonder whether we can afford the luxury of this type of intelligence. General Powers of SAC tells us that the Russians have the capacity to strike at American targets and to destroy them. What assurance do we have that the Russians do not misread the incursion of a single plane? Are the gains of such an intelligence mission worth the risk of nuclear war?

When some years ago a Soviet spy was apprehended in Brooklyn, the Russian Government could and did completely dissociate itself from his activities. Aerial intelligence, on the other hand, directly and immediately implicates the sponsoring government.

Equally disturbing is the question of responsibility. While the administration in Washington acknowledges its general policy decisions on this kind of flight, it was not aware of the particular timing. The disturbing implication is that immediate decisions which could be of the most far-reaching consequences, viz the unleashing of nuclear war, are made at some lower echelon. Quite apart from this irresponsible delegation of power what might be the tactical consequences? Were our SAC bases alerted to the possibility of a Soviet reprisal to the U-2 incursion? Would President Eisenhower have been available to make an urgent decision? On the basis of the evidence (including the unpreparedness of the administration to give any decent explanation of the incident) we were in no way prepared. This in the face of the administration's argument that through these flights we wish to avoid another Pearl Harbor.

As to the ramifications of this incident—the impact on world opinion prior to the summit, the ace it places into the hands of Soviet negotiators, the distrust is engenders among allies who have not been consulted (witness Norway's protest to our State Department)—are these to be subordinated to the possible gains to intelligence?

The administration's justification of its policy is couched in the most fanciful doubletalk. It is saying to the Russians in effect—If you weren't such bad boys, ringing down your Iron Curtain, we wouldn't have to fly over your territory. What would be the administration's reaction after a Soviet plane had been shot down over Kansas and the Russians were to reply that they were compelled to such illegal flights because we barred their diplomats from large parts of the United States?

And finally, in a kind of postscript to this sad affair, the administration announces the resumption of underground nuclear testing at a moment when some slight but hopeful progress had been made at Geneva—the Russians having agreed to holding joint technical tests. What justification can be given for this decision? May this not appear to the rest of the world as a desperately spiteful act?

It has been argued that this is no time for criticism. But if we do not criticize now, if the Congress does not now ask searching questions about administration policy then when else is the time? Are we blindly to accept administration decision to continue such flights? Are we entitled to

know who makes immediate policy decisions which can have such far-reaching consequences for us and for the world? What justifications are there for the resumption of nuclear testing? These are not carping questions. Unless they are asked now it may be too late. I should like respectfully to urge you to further bring these sentiments, which are not merely confined to myself, to your colleagues in Congress and to continue to exercise to your fullest power your constitutional prerogative of checking the executive branch.

Truly yours,

LUCIAN C. MARQUIS.

Iowa Citizen Praises Birmingham

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GEORGE HUDDLESTON, JR.

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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Being Intelligent About Intelligence

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OF CONNECTICUT

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Libraries, Education, and Society

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

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1960

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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Unfortunately, the study was started; when progress was interrupted and postponed.

Today, I was pleased to receive from Marvin Fast, Executive Director of the Great Lakes Commission, a resolution urging that the study of water level problems of the lakes be resumed, and that adequate appropriations be provided for carrying out the study.

Representing the thinking of this fine organization on a major problem of interest to the Great Lakes region and the country—the resolution, I believe, deserves the consideration of Congress. I ask unanimous consent to have the resolution printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GREAT LAKES WATER LEVEL STUDY—RESOLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES COMMISSION
May 11, 1960

Whereas the water levels of the Great Lakes fluctuate in irregular long-range cycles in a range of approximately 5 feet; and

Whereas extreme high levels result in inundation of shore lands and beach erosion, difficulties in the docking and loading of vessels and damage to dock facilities, interference with land drainage, and aggravation of floods on tributary streams to the Great Lakes; and

Whereas extreme low levels reduce the cargo-carrying capacity of vessels on the lakes, require extensive harbor and dock improvements, expose unsightly flats, decrease the area of waterfowl nesting grounds, and cause excessive shoaling; and

Whereas following extensive damage from high water levels to Great Lakes shoreline properties officially estimated by the U.S. Corps of Engineers at \$61 million in the single year 1951-52, the Committee on Public Works of the House of Representatives on June 26, 1952, directed the U.S. Corps of Engineers to make a comprehensive study of survey scope to determine:

1. The feasibility of a plan of regulation of the levels of the Great Lakes which would best serve the interests of all water uses, including the reduction of damages to shore properties, the use of the Great Lakes for navigation, and the use of the storage and outflow from the Great Lakes for power development;

2. The advisability of adopting local protection flood control projects for areas along the shores of the Great Lakes and tributary streams that are subject to inundation as a result of fluctuations in the levels of the lakes where such projects are found to be feasible and economically justified; and

Whereas the report on this survey, originally scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1957, still has not been completed because of lack of funds; and

Whereas the great significance and importance of the report and its findings to the further development and optimum utilization of the waters of the Great Lakes underscore the desirability of its completion at the earliest possible date: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Great Lakes Commission at its semiannual meeting in Detroit, Mich. on May 11, 1960. That it strongly urge the Congress, the President, and the Bureau of the Budget to provide sufficient funds to meet the capabilities of the U.S. Corps of Engineers in fiscal year 1961, stated to be \$65,000; for furthering work on this survey; and be it further

Resolved, That the Commission urge the President, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Congress to provide the additional funds

which will be required after June 30, 1961, in order that the report will be completed without further delays; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President, the Bureau of the Budget and the Great Lakes States' delegations in the Congress.

GREAT LAKES COMMISSION.
ANN ARBOR, MICH.

America Could Use More Patriotism

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN DOWDY

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 23, 1960

Mr. DOWDY. Mr. Speaker, Charles Walton Evans, son of Dr. and Mrs. C. W. Evans, of Lufkin, Tex., is the owner of a large U.S. flag, a gift to him last year from his grandmother. Since becoming the flag's owner, he has flown it each national holiday during the year. This young American is living proof that patriotism is not dead in the United States by any means.

The Lufkin (Tex.) News, for May 17, 1960, had a story about this young Texan who is proud to fly his U.S. flag, and the next day an editorial, each of which I request be incorporated in the Appendix of the RECORD:

YOUTH FLIES FLAG, AND PROUDLY, TOO

(By John W. Moody)

"It's the Star-Spangled Banner. Long may it wave, o'er the land of the free and the home of the brave."

These words are part of our national anthem. The man who penned them would be mighty proud today of a Lufkin lad on Southwood Drive.

The lad is Charles Walton Evans. He is the son of Dr. and Mrs. C. W. Evans of 101 Southwood Drive.

He is also one living example that patriotism in the United States is not dead—yet.

For the last year, he has been the owner of an Old Glory almost as big as he is. And he hasn't missed a chance to display it.

He has seen to it personally the Nation's symbol flies proudly from a staff in his front yard each national holiday.

"Well, I did miss San Jacinto Day," he said. "But that is a State holiday instead of a national one." Federally, he hasn't missed once.

In Lufkin, you may be certain of seeing the U.S. flag on Veteran's Day, Abraham Lincoln's birthday, Armed Forces Day, George Washington's birthday and other national holidays.

"The day that everyone forgets is Mother's Day," he said. "The flag is supposed to fly that day, too."

Young Evans is particularly proud of the flag he flies. It is large and looks like one owned by a school, government or large corporation rather than a private individual. However, it is easily handled.

The staff is about 10 to 12 feet long, about 2 feet of which is stuck in the ground, according to young Evans.

"The flag is a gift from my grandmother in Apple Springs," he said. "She gave it to me about a year ago."

NATION COULD USE MORE PATRIOTISM, FLAG FLYING

Heart-warming indeed was the story published on the front page of the Lufkin News

Tuesday about the youth who is proud to fly the U.S. flag.

Charles Walton Evans, son of Dr. and Mrs. C. W. Evans of Lufkin, places the U.S. flag in the front yard of his home on every national holiday.

Sometimes the very young show the way. With each passing year it seems that Americans have become less aware for the need of proudly displaying Old Glory, the symbol of freedom in the world.

Such organizations as the DAR have conducted drives in recent years in Lufkin in an endeavor to get business firms and individuals to fly their flags on designated national holidays. Only scattered response is usually obtained.

Certain elements in this Nation have continually pooh-poohed anything that smacks of patriotism. Perhaps this attitude by many people who live off the fat of the land, yet condemn it with word and action, has had some effect on a dying patriotism. Apathy among American citizens has been another factor.

There is no doubt that what this Nation needs and needs badly is a resurgence of patriotic spirit—the kind of spirit which brought pioneers to this country in the face of dangers, the kind of patriotism that the early colony settlers exhibited in fighting for this country's freedom from England.

We face one of the most crucial periods in the long and storied history of the United States at this moment. Khrushchev has sabotaged the summit meeting and insulted our President. There is now no doubt that compromise with the Communists is virtually impossible, and Americans must be prepared to back the principles which they hold to be true and upon which this Nation was founded.

Patriotism, which is just another word for love of country, is an element we need more of in this day and time. We need more people like the Evans youth who are proud of his Nation and proudly displays the U.S. flag at every opportunity.

Let's Trade Quemoy and Matsu for Bishop Walsh

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. J. CLENN BEALL

OF MARYLAND

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, May 23, 1960

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD an article appearing in the May 13, 1960, issue of Labor Herald, a weekly labor union paper published in Baltimore, the article being entitled, "Let's Trade Quemoy and Matsu for Bishop Walsh," and written by Charles S. Bernstein.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LET'S TRADE QUEMOY AND MATSU FOR BISHOP WALSH

(By Charles S. Bernstein)

President Eisenhower at Wednesday's press conference was asked by Holmes Alexander of the McNaughton Syndicate—"Mr. President, Sir, this is a question about Quemoy and Matsu; and two of the Democratic candidates have said that if elected they would try to get rid of that responsibility."

The President's answer is open to all who want to read it. But the issue this writer

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wishes to point to is that of humanity. Even a lowly scribe can understand such an elementary subject, although he may not understand the military importance of the two islands.

One should be willing to sacrifice political prestige for human values. If by giving the Communists in China an opportunity to get satisfaction in having the two islands returned to them, we can secure the release of Americans from torture and life imprisonment, it is worth our try. If the United States could accomplish this exchange of a little real estate for human beings, we will have done an act of mercy and justice.

According to the New York Times of March 19, 1960, there are in Red China prisons, besides our own Marylander, Bishop James Edward Walsh, a group of other Americans. This is the account:

The charge against Bishop Walsh, Hong Kong, reported March 18 was: Bishop James Edward Walsh, of Cumberland, Md., was convicted today in Shanghai having directed a group of Chinese Roman Catholic priests in plots, espionage, and other counterrevolutionary activities against Communist China. Of course, there is not a man, woman, or child in America, other than a Commie or fellow traveler who believes this charge. Yet Bishop Walsh and other Americans are kept in prison.

Since the Communists took control of China in 1949, they have imprisoned or held 158 Americans under arrest.

Five died in prison from maltreatment. The rest have been released, except for Bishop Walsh and the following four:

Robert Ezra McCann, of Pasadena, Calif., arrested in 1951 and sentenced to 15 years; John Thomas Downey, of New Britain, Conn., arrested in 1954 and given a 20-year sentence; Richard George Fecteau, of Lynn, Mass., arrested in 1954, and sentenced to life imprisonment; and Hugh Francis Redmond, Jr., of Yonkers, N. Y., arrested in 1951 and given a life sentence.

All were charged with espionage.

Therefore, we Americans have all to gain and nothing to lose, by trading some real estate for these lives mentioned above. Not only that, but, if we are forced to defend these islands, with our fleet and our Air Force, it will mean many thousands more lives of Americans. All that can be avoided by a graceful offer by the President to exchange a little real estate for human beings.

Right now, when there is a lull in the international situation in the Far East, let us try to test our scheme of trade. Surely we will get the best of the bargain.—Labor Herald.

Inactivation of 449th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, at Ladd Field

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RALPH J. RIVERS

OF ALASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 23, 1960

Mr. RIVERS of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I consider it my duty to call to the attention of my colleagues in the House an alarming development with regard to our national defense. I refer to the incredible decision of the Air Force, recently announced, that it will inactivate and phase out the 449th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron at Ladd Field, near Fairbanks, Alaska, in August 1960. This unit, which is the only one of its kind in

Alaska north of the Brooks Range—the only other fighter-interceptor squadron in Alaska being at Elmendorf Air Force Field near Anchorage, Alaska—has for many years been regarded by the highest military authorities as an indispensable shield against potential aggression by the Russians. Ladd Field, only 600 miles from Siberia, is a part of our northwest bastion of defense; a vital link in our perimeter of national defense, which includes Alaska as the corridor between Asia and North America, being an area once characterized by the late great Army officer, William "Billy" Mitchell, as "the most important strategic place in the world."

As recently as last March the Air Force programmed replacement of its 25 F-89 aircraft at Ladd AFB for F-101Bs, in line with strengthening the defensive power of the 449th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron. This occurred at a time when international tensions appeared to be relaxing. Now in the midst of a worsened world situation stemming from our U-2 observation flights over Russia, we are confronted with the Air Force's sudden plan to withdraw from Ladd Field, soundly established on American soil in the shadow of the Iron Curtain, as contrasted with many of our foreign airbases which are built on political quicksand.

On July 4th last, at Auburn, N.Y., I had the privilege of speaking at a ceremony honoring our 49th State, in which I extolled the foresight and wisdom of former Secretary of State, William Henry Seward, in effectuating the purchase of Alaska from Russia, and noted the disadvantage the rest of North America would now be suffering if Alaska were yet in the hands of the Russians. Both the audience and I visualized the idea of Russian bombers and missiles being located in Alaska pointed toward the great industrial centers of the older States and Canada, and we did not like what we saw, which lent enhanced meaning to the memory of William Henry Seward.

Now we are told by Gen. Curtis LeMay, who requested the construction of Eielson AFB a decade ago as a launching ground for SAC bombers just 26 miles from Fairbanks, that Alaska is now of subordinate strategic importance and that for economy reasons the risk of phasing out the 449th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron may be taken. This, in the face of the fact that said squadron has been on the alert for years to defend not only Ladd Field and environs against the possibility of a Russian paratrooper attack or destructive bombing mission, but to likewise defend the great SAC installation and runway at Eielson AFB with resultant protection of our whole country.

Since long-range missiles presently under development are presumably not yet operational, the Russian airpower according to Gen. Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is still Russia's most dangerous weapon. To my mind this makes the problem elementary and the answer apparent—this is no time to inactivate any part of

our manned fighter-interceptor force. Comes the day when East and West will have each other thoroughly pinpointed with adequate arrays of ICBM's, there may be no further use for Air Force bases as we know them today, but the time is not now, any more than it is time to phase out the Air Force itself.

I realize that the Air Force is hurting because of the recent congressional appropriation cutback on Bomarc widely regarded as an extravagant fifth wheel in our overall missile program, but do not think this justifies the economy reaction displayed in the plan to chop down our manned fighter strength. This reaction is equivalent to saying to the Congress, "You want economy so we will give it to you—where it hurts." Instead, the money saved on Bomarc should be made available to strengthen our manned fighter defenses. Such approach would be consistent with the fact that the top stratum of the Air Force has turned down the request of Lt. Gen. Frank A. Armstrong, Jr., Commanding General of the Alaskan Command, for intermediate range missile installations in Alaska to offset the 27 Russian missile installations in Siberia across the Bering Strait. If Alaska is not an area usable for exchanging missile blows with the Russians, it must be regarded as an area vulnerable to attack and attempted occupancy by the Russians for use against the rest of our country as a nearby launching platform.

An excellent and more complete treatment of this whole subject is found in the remarks of Senators BARTLETT and GRUENING of Alaska set forth in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of May 17, 1960, beginning on page 9665 with the speech of Senator GRUENING. I invite all of you to read the able presentations of the two Senators, for the vital interest of all the people of the United States is at stake.

World Refugee Year—Resolution of National Council of Protestant Episcopal Church

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PHILIP A. HART

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, May 23, 1960

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD a resolution on World Refugee Year, adopted at the Greenwich, Conn., meeting of the National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WORLD REFUGEE YEAR—RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH APRIL 26-28, 1960

Whereas World Refugee Year, as established by the United Nations and cosponsored by the United States of America, comes to an end on June 30, 1960; and

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know no freedom from want, can know no freedom from fear, so long as the grim specter of sudden and costly illness hovers over them.

We in the Senate, faced with the realities of the international situation, acknowledge the need for economic aid to the peoples of other lands, but how can we expect the older people of our own land to understand why, in the same breath, we deny millions of them any real opportunity for medical care in their old age? This is especially shocking in view of the far greater sacrifice other countries of the free world make to assure adequate medical care for their elderly people.

This is the question posed in many of the letters we receive. I ask unanimous consent to have one letter of this sort printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEAR SIR: Was wondering if and when you fellows are going to do something about giving those on social security hospitalization and doctors care. Maybe you can tell me what we are supposed to do when we're sick. The hospitals charge from \$15 to \$25 a day and that's only for board and room and the doctors bills are extra. I had my wife in the hospital last year one afternoon and overnight and the hospital charged \$49. Do something to get hospitalization added to our social security. They raise the taxes on gas and parcel post and everything else and give to the foreign countries but never anything here at home.

Sincerely,

EDGAR E. WITT, OF TEXAS, HAS OUTSTANDING RECORD OF DEVOTED PUBLIC SERVICE

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, a dedicated, able, faithful public official is soon to leave the Washington scene.

Edgar E. Witt, of Waco, Tex., Chief of the Indian Claims Commission, has written a record of fairness, of diligence, and of successful service with that Commission which could serve as a model for any public official serving on any commission in Washington.

Governor Witt—as a former Lieutenant Governor of Texas, he is called “Governor” in his native State—was a leading public official of the State of Texas before he came to Washington. After having served on other Government commissions, he became Chief of the Indian Claims Commission at the age of 68, an age at which most men have retired.

In the 13 years he has served as Chief of the Indian Claims Commission, he has written as many opinions as have all the other justices of the Commission combined. In every case in which he has dissented, his dissent has been upheld on appeal.

When Edgar E. Witt retires to Texas, he should take with him the thanks of officialdom of Washington and the appreciation of the citizenry of this Nation for a job well done.

In the Dallas Morning News for Monday, May 16, Mr. Walter C. Hornaday, the able chief of the Dallas News Washington Bureau, has written a very fine

article entitled “Retirement Due for Claims Chief.” As a long-time friend of Edgar E. Witt, I am glad to see him receive this recognition, and I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in full in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Dallas Morning News, May 16, 1960]

RETIREMENT DUE FOR CLAIMS CHIEF

(By Walter C. Hornaday)

WASHINGTON.—When Edgar E. Witt of Waco was named Chief Commissioner of the Indian Claims Commission in 1947, he had reached an age when most men are taking it easy in retirement.

Witt, a former Lieutenant Governor of Texas and a learned and skilled lawyer, assumed his duties at the age of 68.

He has been the Commission's only head during its 13 years of existence. He and his two colleagues on the Commission have wrestled with some tough questions involving Indian tribes who claimed they were cheated and otherwise financially abused in years gone by.

Witt is retiring from his job on June 30 at the age of 81. It was time and the rules of bureaucracy, not ill health or lack of physical and mental vigor, that is causing him to step down.

Under the regulations, Chief Witt should have been moved out some years ago, but no one noticed his calendar age as the Commission continued to function as well, perhaps even better, than it ever had.

The Indian Claims Commission, under Witt's direction, charted new courses in the law as it handled the cases brought before the agency.

The act creating the Commission gave it authority to settle claims in law and equity and on other bases and then added: “Claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity.”

“This means applying the yardstick of fair and honorable dealings by our Government with the Indians,” Witt said. “No other act I know of writes that into law.”

The Indian tribes had 5 years in which to file claims. The cutoff date was in August 1951. Through 1959, the Commission allowed claims involving 20,602,341 acres of former Indian land and final judgments of \$17,656,606 out of claims amounting to \$123,824,395.

Some of the cases go back more than 100 years and are steeped in history at the time the white man, frequently backed by the Federal Government, was seizing Indian lands and paying the tribes little, even threatening them with disaster if they refused to accept the offers.

Edgar Witt was born near Salado, Bell County. He received his academic and law education at the University of Texas and began practicing law in Waco in 1906. He served as a State senator 12 years and was elected Lieutenant Governor in 1930 and 1932, serving under Ross Sterling and Mrs. Miriam Ferguson. In seeking his second term without opposition, he received at that time what was the largest vote any person seeking State office had ever piled up.

Witt made an unsuccessful bid for Governor in 1934.

Shortly after leaving the Lieutenant Governor's office, Witt was employed by the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and other interests to work for a \$8 million legislative appropriation to help finance the Texas Centennial. Witt's efforts were successful and Congress followed with a similar appropriation.

Witt's long-time friend, Senator Tom Connally, told then President Franklin D. Roose-

velt about Witt, and the Waco man was named chairman of a special Mexican Claims Commission to distribute \$5,500,000 the Mexican Government had offered to make available to settle claims resulting from destruction of American property during revolutions. The Commission finished its work ahead of time. When Witt asked Roosevelt to terminate the agency, a shocked President said:

“I never heard of a Democrat quitting office before his job terminated.”

Witt returned to Waco to resume the practice of law but was recalled to Washington in 1943 as chairman of the American-Mexican Claims Commission. This was another agency to settle claims of American citizens against Mexico due principally to expropriation of American-owned land. This job ended in 1947.

Senator CONNALLY and President Truman decided Witt was the perfect man for the job of heading the Indian Claims Commission when it was created. Witt knew little if anything about Indians, and a mild objection was raised against his Senate confirmation on that score. One group thought an Indian should be picked but the Senate believed otherwise.

Connally, with a twinkle in his eye, told Witt at the time that he thought, when he had urged his appointment to the Mexican claims agencies, that he was lining him up with a job that didn't require any work.

“But a lot of lawyers who have seen you operate are urging me to recommend you for this new job,” Connally added.

Lawyers and others having contact with Witt on the Indian Claims Commission during the last 13 years want him to remain in spite of his 81 years.

They have pointed out that during the last 2 years he has rendered almost as many opinions and findings of fact as have been rendered by his two colleagues. They also refer to the fact that when the Chief Commissioner dissented from his colleagues, the U.S. Court of Claims has agreed with Witt's viewpoint in every instance.

Chief Judge Marvin Jones of the Court of Claims, a Texan, has indicated he would tell President Eisenhower that Witt shouldn't be allowed to retire if the White House asked his opinion.

Witt and his wife, the former Gwyn Johnstone of San Antonio, plan to live in either Austin or Corpus Christi when they return to Texas. Witt said almost all of his friends in Waco are dead.

BREAKUP OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Mr. HART. Mr. President, many comments have been made about the breakup of the summit conference, and we can expect many more comments to be made. I doubt whether we can expect any more reasoned or more moving comment than that made in an editorial published on yesterday in the Detroit News. The title of the editorial is “Requiem for a Summit—Innocence Age Ended.”

I hope the editorial will receive very wide reading, and I ask that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Detroit News, May 22, 1960]

REQUIEM FOR A SUMMIT—INNOCENCE AGE ENDED

Man must always look up, but today we look up to a summit that no longer is there. It is lost in a sky red with abuse. Yet the angry storm clouds that have made a mockery of our hopes do not have to be the shroud for our good intent.

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The forecast is for more storms. But in the winter of our discontent and demolished hopes we cannot retreat to the foothills. We must go on, persevering for peace. We have failed, but we must still look upward.

We learn from failure. What have we learned this time?

We have learned something about ourselves.

We have learned that we have spy planes. We learned that we had violated another nation's aerial sovereignty and that because of equipment and men and luck we had been doing so unscathed for some time. We have been engaged in a dirty business which is made no more clean by the fact that neutrals who plan no war are engaged in it, too. Our age of innocence is past.

We were glad to think that the men who lead us had taken this elementary precaution to give us somewhere near an even break in a nuclear world where surprise attack and evil are concomitant. We were sorry we had been caught. But also we were dismayed by the Washington bungling that followed the de nouement.

We had shot our U-2 arrow in the sky and when it fell we were not sly. We were just plain stupid. Never in the field of human handouts have so many owed so little to the few in authority who confused ourselves, our allies, and the uncommitted world by saying what they did not mean and meaning what they did not say.

We and the world have learned about Nikita Khrushchev and what he represents.

The last few yards to the summit for us were the toughest. Yet when we got there it was the bully boy who had baited the propaganda trap for us, who saved us from a fate worse than obloquy.

He who professed to want a world with no arms threatened to unleash his. He whose protestations of peace had given hope to the smaller NATO nations so near his frontier shattered his own loving cup. In fact, the only spirit of Camp David left in him was a raging hangover. He tore off his own mask. He was revealed as a Santa Claus with horns and an empty sleigh when the world had been led to expect from him the priceless gift of peace.

If we had bungled with a U-2, he fell flat on his face in exploring our error. Some of our allies, nervous at being involved in our spying, were fortified in their will to maintain the Western alliance. We didn't get them back into line. Khrushchev clubbed them back.

He had won neutral goodwill by being a prime organizer of a meeting to reduce world tensions. He lost it by breaking up the meeting. He had nothing to offer but tears and blood.

Where do we stand now?

It is the tragedy of a generation that can split an atom that it cannot splice a divided world. We have created a nuclear terror and now are scared at living with it. And we know that if our ring finger was not on the pushbutton marked "retaliation" we might not even be living to be scared.

We and the Communists talk of uncommitted nations in the cold war, forgetting that in a hot one we commit all mankind because radioactive fallout knows no frontier of neutrality. We must, therefore, still press on to try to save ourselves, the neutrals and the Russian people themselves.

All this we know as the requiem for a summit begins. Yet it is not a time for morticians. We may beat our breasts, but we need not bury our hopes. Man never has, and that is why he can still look up even when no summit is there.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THE 1960 SITUATION

Mr. HART. Mr. President, American political history reflects periods when

the role of the trade-union movement in political action, and the role of business in political action, have been hotly debated. Because ours is a society which requires the broadest possible understanding and participation in developing the answers to our public questions, I have always felt that participation by both groups was proper and to be encouraged. In recent months, a great American corporation, the Ford Motor Co., has planned, and has now put into action, an imaginative and responsible program which will encourage political action and participation by all of its employees. It is my hope the program will prove most effective. The management of the Ford Motor Co. must have devoted much time and effort in the creation of this program, which is known as Ford effective citizenship program.

I ask that a speech which Thomas R. Reid, of the Ford Motor Co., gave at Detroit, Mich., on May 2, outlining the program be printed in the RECORD following my remarks. I ask this in the hope the speech may come to the attention of others who share the concern of Ford, and who may be moved to undertake a comparable effort. Since politics is the housekeeping job of a democracy, it is imperative that this free people pay close attention to this housekeeping job, lest we fail the test which is ours in this 20th century.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THE 1960 SITUATION—MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION

(Remarks of Thomas R. Reid, of Ford Motor Co., at Industrial Relations Research Association, Detroit, Mich., May 6, 1960)

The great game of politics in America has become a spectator sport. It is like baseball—everybody loves to read about it and talk about it, but only a few of our millions of people participate actively for the full season in the two major leagues of either politics or baseball.

I have no plea to offer today for more sandlot baseball players, desirable as that may be, but I do urge that factory workers, farmers, housewives, businessmen, and other citizens of whatever occupation play a more active role in public affairs and politics.

The encouragement of political participation is not a union-management matter. This is something which clearly should be outside the realm of labor-business controversy and just as clearly is a matter of transcendent importance to all of the American people.

Anyone who approaches this subject in the context of business versus labor reflects an attitude already far too prevalent in America that practically everything in the public domain, including even the American system of representative government itself, has a labor side and a management side.

I say these things so bluntly at the outset of my remarks because I have been concerned from the time I first was invited to appear on this program about the wisdom of scheduling separate treatments of the labor point of view and the management point of view on this subject. The format itself suggests a debate or a disagreement.

In spite of this concern, I wanted to accept the invitation to participate in your program today because:

1. The subject of encouraging political participation is of such vast importance to the American people that free and open discus-

sion of it should take place wherever the opportunity is presented.

2. There is active participation of the academic profession in the association. The widespread influence of what professors and teachers will be saying on this subject in our schools and colleges is so vital to a clear understanding of the topic for years to come that every opportunity to present the facts to the academic world should be welcomed.

The course of public affairs customarily has been shaped by the professional politicians and a relative few interested individuals. This has come about not only because they have had so much to say on the subject while others have remained apathetic and silent, but because the politicians and these individuals too, oftentimes have taken the trouble to inform themselves and work at this business of government while others have not. I would be the last to criticize those who are active and articulate in public affairs. My contention is simply that there should be more activity, more participation, more voices raised from all segments of American society, if we are to retain government of, by, and for the people.

Government in this country cannot be the private preserve of the professional elite, the political elite, the financial elite, or the organized elite of any category. In this age of specialization, it is interesting that two of the most fundamental responsibilities we have in a democracy—parenthood and political participation—are largely entrusted to amateurs. Parents have no choice. Once the offspring arrives he has to be taken care of—and parents learn by doing. It is different with our political responsibilities, however. No one really is forced to assume them. We can always let George do it—let him and Sam and Bill make the decisions and run our town, or our country, for us.

It seems far less important to me who does the encouraging of citizenship participation than that there be a great deal of encouragement from all quarters. I don't think of this as a question at all of whether unions or business should encourage participation—I simply think that everybody who loves his country should encourage participation.

This movement toward greater interest in political affairs that we have seen just in the past year or so should not be confined to business people. Everybody belongs in the act. It is every bit as desirable that lawyers, doctors, housewives, bricklayers, and bankers be encouraged toward more active citizenship participation by the organized groups to which they belong.

In short, there is absolutely nothing wrong in any group in our society with organizational influence over any category of citizens encouraging more active participation by such citizen. There is everything right about it.

Now, I recognize full well that exhortation alone will not produce wholesale citizen participation in public affairs. We are not going to see the great mass of the American people battering down the doors of their political clubhouses seeking admission. Apathy will always be with us so long as men retain their human shortcomings.

But I am not too discouraged by this. I hold to the optimistic view that a meaningful measure of new participation can be achieved by:

1. Creating a climate of positive encouragement;
2. Repairing the unfavorable public image of politics and politicians; and
3. Making politics familiar, acceptable, and convenient for people.

Business, and in particular the public relations and advertising fraternity, likes to think it knows something about shaping public images. Probably no group in America is in a better position than business to do something to correct the unfavorable public image of politics. One reason is that business is itself partly responsible for creating

QUESTIONS ON NATIONAL POLICY

(Mr. KOWALSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, speaking on behalf of a large number of Members of this body who last Friday asked the President to answer a series of questions on the U-2 incident and related subjects, I deplore and resent the remarks made by the chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.

The questions which we raised are questions which the American people have been asking. They are questions of national policy which affect every American.

When the chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee accuses us of "following closely the Khrushchev line," he is impugning our patriotism and casting an unwarranted reflection on us as individuals and as elected representatives of the American people.

I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that an apology is in order.

I suggest further, Mr. Speaker, that the answers to our questions should come from the President of the United States. The Congress and the people have a right to know.

Farley Critical of Stevenson's
"Crowbar" Talk

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES B. HOEVEN

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 23, 1960

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Appendix of the Record, I include the following news story which appeared in the Washington Sunday Star on May 23, 1960:

FARLEY CRITICAL OF STEVENSON'S
"CROWBAR" TALK

NEW YORK, May 21.—James A. Farley today called upon the forthcoming Democratic Nation Convention to condemn and repudiate Adlai E. Stevenson's criticism of the Eisenhower administration over the U-2 spy plane incident.

Mr. Farley, former Democratic national chairman, accused Mr. Stevenson of "attempting to use the incident to 'sledgehammer and crowbar' another disastrous nomination for himself as the apostle of appeasement out of the Democratic Party."

Mr. Farley supported and campaigned for Mr. Stevenson in both the 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns.

Mr. Stevenson had said that Premier Khrushchev of Russia wrecked the summit conference but that the United States gave him the sledgehammer and crowbar to do it.

UNWARRANTED ATTACK

Mr. Farley said, the unwarranted attack by Mr. Stevenson "on the President's conduct of the summit negotiations, in my opinion, in no way represents the thinking of the Democratic Party."

He called on Democrats "to keep the symbol of our party, the Democratic mule and not Mr. Stevenson's umbrella," and added:

"For Mr. Stevenson to state that the administration gave the Soviet a sledgehammer and a crowbar to wreck the summit conference indicates to me that Mr. Stevenson continues to be as misinformed on the facts as he is infatuated with his own writing style."

The Postmaster General in the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Cabinet said, "It has been my experience that adroit phrasemaking does not necessarily indicate sound policymaking, a view which I find fortified by the rejection of Mr. Stevenson on two occasions by the American electorate."

Mr. Farley continued:

"It is a pity that the course of history cannot be reversed by a well-turned phrase, in which case hundreds of millions of enslaved people and at least 13 captive countries, liberated by Mr. Stevenson's apt phrases, would have occasion to think profusely about this overpolished literary combination of Don Quixote, Pagliacci and Rip Van Winkle."

On U-2 and Its Summit Collapse Aftermath Let's Have the Inside Facts

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**

HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 23, 1960

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, today at United Nations Headquarters in New York there opens another chapter in the U-2 incident and its summit collapse aftermath.

Again, for propaganda purposes, the American people and the American President are likely to be attacked by spokesmen for that same nation which came to the summit with the now all too apparent purpose of wrecking it.

Against such propaganda attacks and against efforts to intimidate the American people by fanatical saber rattling, we should demonstrate our unity as a nation.

For the past week this spirit of unity has prevailed as it should have. Very soon, however, Congress and the American people must take a critical look at events leading up to the summit collapse to determine why and how it was that the administration apparently gave Khrushchev the tools for his summit wrecking job.

Yesterday, the Pittsburgh Press, an influential newspaper in my district, said editorially: "Congress is entitled to know the 'inside baseball' of the events leading up to the Paris debacle and of all the incidents and policies which figure in the story."

Under leave heretofore granted to insert my remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, I include a copy of the editorial for I also believe that the "inside baseball" of this grim affair should be made known:

LET'S NOT FLIP A LID

Ike came home from his dismal experience in Paris to a warm and cheering welcome by thousands who turned out for his arrival in Washington, plus flag flying and other demonstrations around the country. All this was highly appropriate as evidence of American unity.

The country shortly will hear a TV talk by Ike, centered on the summit collapse. We hope he will lay it on the line, as to just where we stand, and that his audience will be the biggest ever.

And then let us go about our business in dead earnestness—the everlasting business of staying strong. If Khrushchev pipes down temporarily, that is no excuse for another spasm of dreamy thinking that the cold war is over. No more than his explosive rantings should set us off on reckless and feverish crash programs.

This is a continuing problem and there is only way to deal with it—on a steady, continuing basis.

This is an election year, always a time for partisan excesses. There is no cause for muffling any issue, or gagging any platform orator.

But there is such a thing as reasonable restraint, and our politicians can get across their messages and achieve their purposes by making use of it.

Congress is entitled to know the "inside baseball" of the events leading up to the

Paris debacle and of all the incidents and policies which figure in the story.

If there are differences in judgment, let's hear them. But let's not merely indulge in the old political game of all brag or all blame.

And let's not forget whose side we are on. The cold war has been taxing our resources for 13 years. It will be with us for an indefinite time to come. We will best live with it if we manage our strength consistently and with alert responsibility.

There is nothing like a level head, and a sensible tongue in it.

1960

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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Luckily for the citizens of New York State, and for all Americans because of the precedent it may have set, the Rockefeller hideaway project is now in a state of innocuous desuetude.

It appears to me it is our duty, Mr. President, to put an end to the superannuated, boondoggling national civil defense agency.

The entire character of warfare has been drastically changed since the end of World War II—since 1945. We are now living in the jet-missile-space age, a new age of challenge. Civil defense as it is now conducted in this country is as outmoded as tallow dips, mustache cups, and the flintlock musket and the cannonball of the Civil War period.

It is a fact that since the end of World War II civil defense in this country has cost the taxpayers of the United States over \$1 billion; and yet today our civil defense program is a myth. This billion dollar waste of taxpayers' money should be stopped.

Mr. President, the only sensible course of action is to abolish the entire present setup. In its place we should depend upon leaders of our Armed Forces to defend our civilians in any war waged against us. Finally, Mr. President, we should initiate a vigorous and continuing campaign of first-aid education on self-protection in the event of any attack upon this Nation, using all media of communication at our command—television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and our schools.

Hundreds of thousands of patriotic Americans have volunteered their time and efforts, often at great risk to themselves, in times of floods, fires, and other natural disasters. I pay tribute to these people, who performed valuable service while paid Civil Defense officials directed them from behind safe desks. These fine men and women can, and will, render equally fine services as auxiliary firemen, policemen, and special deputy sheriffs. In time of disaster by fire or flood, our citizens have always come to the aid of their neighbors. That is our American way.

Mr. President, a proposed appropriation for the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization will be before us shortly. I urge that every Senator scrutinizing such request with utmost care. Here is a place where we can really save taxpayers' money by forcibly wielding a meat ax.

The Administrator of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, ex-Governor Hoegh, of Iowa, served one term at a \$12,000-a-year salary. We do not need to feel sorry because he was defeated at the end of his first term, when the people of his State evidently were not satisfied with his administration. Following his defeat, the President immediately appointed him Administrator of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, at a salary of \$22,500. He is now serving as the head of an utterly useless organization with many thousands of men and women feeding at the public trough, but rendering no useful service.

Finally, Mr. President, I urge that each of my colleagues individually scruti-

nize the request of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for additional appropriations of millions of dollars. This organization always seeks increased appropriations. Here is one place where we can really save the taxpayers' money, without doing any harm whatever to the public and without doing any harm whatever to the safety and welfare of our country. Now is the time to put an end to this waste of money for an inept, utterly worthless, outmoded boondoggle.

All of us know that in a time of grave national emergency, the Armed Forces of our country will defend the citizens of the United States as they always have. Surely the defense of our citizens is too important to be left to anyone other than the trained and experienced men of the armed services—the men of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force of this Nation.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO THE SUMMIT MEETING

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, the other day I expressed some misgivings about the inquiry by the Committee on Foreign Relations into the summit meeting. Of course, I meant no aspersions on the competence of that committee. But I felt, and feel, that most of the hidden facts of the U-2 episode are of a military or an intelligence character, and therefore ought to remain hidden. More important, I felt—and feel—that great mischief will be done by any investigation which proceeds under the assumption that there was an American "failure" at Paris, and that those "responsible" must be brought to book. Now that the inquiry has begun, I think all of us are obliged to try to put into proper perspective the events of recent weeks, so to keep the mischief to a minimum.

The decision to investigate flowed directly out of the contention that the American Government bears a large part of the blame for the collapse of the Paris talks. This contention was based, in turn, on the theory that two American acts—the President's assumption of responsibility for the U-2 flights, and the statements by him and Mr. Herter, implying that the flights would continue—left Khrushchev no choice but to break up the summit. This theory, in its essentials, has been adopted by several authorities: by Khrushchev himself, of course; by Governor Stevenson; and by a number of lesser American personalities. The copyright, however—at least in virtue of first usage—belongs to Mr. Walter Lippmann, who spelled it out in his column 5 days before the summit blew up. By that token, if Mr. Lippmann is not the architect of a policy criticism, he is at least its American prophet and continuing counselor.

It is not my habit to take public issue with newspaper columnists; but this is not an ordinary occasion, and Mr. Lippmann is not an ordinary columnist. He is, in addition to being a columnist, a political force. I have never quite understood why this should be so, but I

have been around long enough to know that it is. Some people seem to be impressed by the solemnity of his writing, and heaven knows it has that. Others say that he is "wise." Whatever the reason, he is quoted all over the place with a deference one ordinarily reserves for one's superiors. His words carry undoubted weight in strategic quarters, including strategic corners of this Chamber. I do not say these things in criticism of Mr. Lippmann, or to suggest that there is anything sinister about his activities or influence; but I say them by way of explaining why I am discussing his theory.

Mr. Lippmann's campaign to picture the United States as the offending party in presummit diplomacy began on May 12. That was the day after the weekly Presidential news conference at which the President confirmed his own responsibility for the flights, and implied that they would continue. The President's policy, Lippmann advised, "is quite unworkable." He continued—and this is the key passage, the kernel of the Lippmann theory:

To avow that we intend to violate Soviet sovereignty is to put everybody on the spot. It makes it impossible for the Soviet Government to play down this particular incident because now it is challenged openly in the face of the whole world. It is compelled to react because no nation can remain passive when it is the avowed policy of another nation to intrude upon its territory.

Mr. Lippmann has repeated this argument, in one form or another, each time he has written since that day. Last Thursday, for example, he again belabored the President for not having taken what he called "the conventional way out which Mr. K. offered." The "conventional" response, Mr. Lippmann explained, would have been to disclaim responsibility for the U-2 flight, and to accompany the disclaimer "as Senator KENNEDY has quite properly suggested, by a formal and perfunctory expression of regret." The President's failure so to lie and so to apologize was, Mr. Lippmann concluded, "a fatal error—an irreparable mistake."

Note closely these assertions, for if they are correct—and if the Stevensons and Kennedys were correct in endorsing them—then Khrushchev was fully justified in blowing up the summit. If it is true, that is to say, that it was "impossible" for K. to play down the incident, and that the Kremlin was "compelled" to react violently in order to preserve its self-respect, then it is also true that we, not the Soviet Union, bear the responsibility for the collapse of the Paris talks.

Note, too, that Khrushchev himself fully appreciates the value of this argument. It has been his central propaganda theme for 2 weeks. He used it in Moscow before he left for the summit meeting. He used it in his opening statement at the Elysee Palace. He used it again in the course of his vile tirade against the President during the Paris press conference. As late as last Saturday, the argument was the cornerstone of Khrushchev's official report to the

Soviet Union. Here are Khrushchev's words:

We . . . resolved [after the Soviet disclosure of the U-2 flights] to do nothing that would prevent the United States President from getting out of this embarrassing predicament. We even declared that the United States President hardly knew or approved of such actions and that evidently the botheads from the Pentagon and Allen Dulles, this professional spy, they are to blame. But Eisenhower did not take advantage of the opportunity granted him. He declared that the spy flights had been approved by him and made with his knowledge. . . . That is when it became obvious that the purpose of the aggressive actions by the United States was to torpedo the summit meeting.

Now, it does not follow that because the Lippmann line corresponds with the official propaganda line of the Soviet Union, it is the wrong line. All of the presumptions, however, run strongly in that direction. Especially is this so when, as we shall see, the line is incompatible with some of the major facts of the case.

The first fact on which the Lippmann theory runs aground is that it was not the United States, but the Soviet Union that made an international incident out of the U-2 episode. The subsequent breakdown of the Paris talks will never be understood unless this initial event is kept clearly in mind: that Khrushchev deliberately chose, in a flamboyant speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5, to publicize the American spy flights, and the fact that one of our planes had been shot down. Now let us be sure that we understand the magnitude of this decision to draw public attention to the flights; that we appreciate the great risks Khrushchev was running and therefore the high stakes for which he was playing.

For many months Soviet propaganda had traded heavily on the claim of Soviet military invincibility. The claim that the U.S.S.R. was as strong, or stronger, than the United States, was a key propaganda tool in Soviet attempts to intimidate the uncommitted nations, our allies, and ourselves. The Kremlin knew, of course, that the claim was false. Soviet leaders knew, among other things, that for 4 years American intelligence aircraft had roamed at will through Communist airspace—over China as well as over Russia. The Kremlin knew that it had neither the rockets nor the aircraft to prevent this activity. During these 4 years, however, Khrushchev did not make a public issue of the flights—for the obvious reason that to do so would be to expose and acknowledge the astonishing weakness of the Soviet air defenses.

On May 5 the Kremlin decided to abandon this policy. When one of our planes crashed—and I am convinced it was definitely not shot down from cruising altitude, as Khrushchev claimed—Khrushchev chose to blow up the matter into a full-scale international incident, thereby admitting to the world that Soviet air frontiers were indefensible.

Let us postpone the question of what Khrushchev hoped to accomplish by creating this incident, and note, simply, that it was he not we, who created it.

It was "impossible," Mr. Lippmann wrote, "for the Soviet Government to play down this particular incident." How absurd. Having created the incident, Khrushchev quite obviously had no desire to "play it down" until he had achieved the purpose for which he had originally played it up. Khrushchev, above all, is not a frivolous man. We may be sure he did not create an international crisis that involved great damage to his country's prestige and the possible loss of his own power, only to let it die—as Lippmann suggests he would have—by accepting President Eisenhower's disclaimer of responsibility and regrets. Khrushchev had other fish to fry, as his conduct in Paris was soon to make clear.

The second fact that makes trouble for Lippmann's theory is that Khrushchev refused to go ahead with the summit—even after President Eisenhower announced the U-2 flights would be discontinued and would not be resumed. Before the Paris meeting Lippmann had written that his only criticism was that the President had made spying our "avowed" policy. The further recommendation—that the President should have apologized—did not find its way into the Lippmann doctrine until after Khrushchev had demanded an apology in Paris. It was the avowal that had made it "impossible" for Khrushchev to play down the incident. Well, the President disavowed the policy: I cannot imagine a plainer disavowal than a promise to discontinue a past policy. And still Khrushchev blew up the summit. My personal judgment is that it was unwise to have disavowed the policy once it had been avowed. The point, however, is that once it was disavowed, there as no further excuse, under the Lippmann theory, for Khrushchev to refuse to hold the summit talks.

Let us now approach the problem along a somewhat different route. Suppose the President had done exactly what his leftist critics wanted him to do—that he had carried out the Lippmann theory to a "T." Suppose he had taken "the conventional way out which Mr. Khrushchev offered," and had made some such statement as this:

The U-2 flight was conducted without my knowledge or permission, and the U.S. Government regrets that it took place.

And I emphasize that this is only a hypothetical statement.

Does anyone seriously think—in the light of what had already happened and of what was to follow—that Khrushchev would have let the matter drop at that? Having persuaded the President to eat that much crow, he would surely have tried to force him to eat the whole bird. It is not difficult to imagine Khrushchev's rejoinder to such a statement by Eisenhower, if he had made such a statement—which he did not; and this is a hypothetical rejoinder that I ascribe to Khrushchev:

We are delighted to learn that President Eisenhower had no part in the infamous spy mission, and that he has not known anything about these aggressions against Soviet territory that have been carried on for 4 years by his subordinates. Moreover, we are pleased that he regrets he has been unable

to prevent these flights. It is therefore with great sorrow that the Soviet Government finds itself unable to accept the U.S. statement. How is it possible for a self-respecting power to do so? If the President is not master of his own house, what are we to have that these flights will stop? Surely it is intolerable that these international bandits should remain at large. The Soviet Government cannot be satisfied with anything less than public exposure, trial, and punishment of those who perpetrated these outrageous crimes. We know in the interest of peace the U.S. President will take steps to assert his constitutional authority, and so forth.

Would not Khrushchev have replied in this vein had Eisenhower followed Lippmann's advice? The logic of the situation demanded it. Having deliberately created the incident, Khrushchev was bound to squeeze out the last drop of ridicule and scorn. Thank goodness our President and his advisers had the good sense to stand where they did instead of allowing the situation to deteriorate further.

I repeat: Once it was clear that Khrushchev was determined to exploit the plane incident as far as he could, and once it was clear that he was in possession of physical proof that the spy flight took place, nothing could have been more foolhardy than for the President to have tried to deny it, or to have pretended he did not know what was going on, or to have apologized for it.

This brings us to a point which has disturbed many people—many who reject the appeasement aspects of the Lippmann thesis. Would it not have been better, it is asked, for the United States simply to have remained silent during Khrushchev's tirades in Moscow? Could we not, by that course, have avoided compromising the CIA operation, and also have avoided the embarrassing public acknowledgment that we were violating international law? Was there not something unprecedented and unusual in our behavior when we decided to talk openly about our spy policy?

I believe the answer to these questions is to be found—once again—in Khrushchev's original decision to blow up the U-2 incident. Mr. Lippmann writes grandly about the "conventional" way of handling such incidents and indicts the U.S. Government for being unconventional. But was it really the United States which broke the conventions? Mr. Lippmann writes knowingly of the "double life" nations lead—the hidden life of spy operations, and the open life of normal diplomacy—and he accuses the U.S. Government of ripping off the veil from the hidden life. But was it really the United States which tore off the veil?

Look at it this way. Can anyone remember a previous instance in modern history in which the chief of state of a major power has gone before his country's parliament to make a public exposure of another great power's spy activities, and has coupled that exposure with a demand for public satisfaction? Spy incidents, to be sure, have been publicized before. When a Colonel Abel—or any one of scores of Soviet spies—is apprehended, our Justice Department announces it to the press,

speeches commenting on the arrest may be made in Congress; he is tried by the courts, and he may be convicted. But does the President of the United States, in an instance, go before Congress and wave documents in the air purporting to prove Abel's guilt, and demand before the world that Khrushchev explain whether he was personally involved in sending Abel here? Such a performance would, indeed, break the conventions. For chiefs of state do not publicly address one another about spy operations—not unless one of them deliberately intends to kick over the traces. But this is precisely what Khrushchev did. It was he who broke the conventions by insisting that the American Government make a public accounting for a spy operation, the proof of which was already in Soviet hands.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am happy to yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the Senator have any doubt in his mind that it is a violation of international law to overfly another country's territory and to systematically photograph for intelligence purposes?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I have no question in the world as to that fact. In fact, I have not expressed myself on that point.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I assume it is the Senator's answer that he would agree it is a violation of international law to conduct spy flights over another nation's territory.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I must assume it. I do not recall having seen that written down. That is not the point to which I am addressing myself.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The point I am getting at follows in a second question. Does the Senator know of any instance in history where any major power has conceded and admitted it was engaging in espionage activities either in or over another country's airspace?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I cannot recall, from my limited knowledge of history—and particularly with respect to modern history, where aircraft have been used—that a similar instance has ever occurred before. Anticipating the Senator's next question, I believe that had such an incident occurred, and had the situation been as I have been describing it, we would probably have found the same type of incidents occurring.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the Senator believe that any agent for espionage purposes can be successful if he proceeds to admit things and tell the truth when he is asked any particular given question under all circumstances?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I would say we would not expect them to have any success. If another fellow knows someone is spying on him, he is going to take steps to see that the person does not spy the way it is reported he is spying at the time. I would suggest that the Senator is correct in his assumption that this would lead to a disruption of that particular spy technique.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The point I had in mind is that in espionage activi-

ties the agent who is operating can never afford to admit he is a spy. The moment he does so, if he is in another country's territory, he will be apprehended, and his usefulness will be ended.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Yes.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Regrettably, spying is against international law, and spying also is an activity which requires that the agent must lie, certainly so long as he is operating where he can be apprehended in some foreign country.

Most major powers do conduct such procedures, but so far as I know, when agents are caught they never admit and never confess what they have been doing. At times an agent might be tortured into confessing, but any confession as a result of torturing, according to our system of law, is not a valid confession. The Senator knows that, does he not?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I think the recent incident was a little bit different from the usual Mata Hari type of spy who might be picked up in a saloon or a hotel as a result of suspicion.

In my State we say that when something has feathers like a duck, flies like a duck, and makes a noise like a duck, it is a duck.

If a U-2 plane came down because of engine trouble and landed on Russian soil, any aerodynamic expert who looked at it would pretty well know the purpose for which it was built. If the cameras were intact—and we must assume they were—I would assume the Russians would have brains enough to say, "This is an espionage plane. It is certainly not a plane engaged in pleasure flying over Russia. It is in the air to spy on us."

Having the evidence on hand, which is very unusual, as the Senator must admit, I think Khrushchev took advantage of this, as I have related, and as I shall further relate, to accomplish a certain purpose, which I am afraid he has almost accomplished and will accomplish if we allow ourselves to be carried away much further.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The thought which occurs to me is that we did an unprecedented thing. In fact, so far as I know, no major power which was sovereign at the time, without enemy troops on its territory to compel a confession, has ever confessed or admitted it has engaged in espionage activities. Perhaps Khrushchev thought his case was so strong that we could not get out from under, but the impression I have gained is that we would have been a lot better off if we had continued to insist this was a flight not authorized by anyone, not even by the man's immediate superior, and if we had taken the attitude that, if the Soviets wanted to investigate spying activities, we have knowledge of some events of that sort on their part we want to present, to be investigated also, so that we could both go to trial together.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I think the Senator may have heard my earlier remarks in which I took a similar stand.

The incident has happened. Because it has happened, I am afraid the American people are being "wishy-washed" in-

to a position of operating from fear rather than pride in what has been accomplished. As I have said, this is a most unusual case of espionage being found out. Usually the spy disposes of himself. For some reason, that was not done in this instance, and the aircraft was not destroyed.

We know for certainty that the radar capabilities of Russia are such that for 4 years the Russians must have been tracking these planes across the skies. I imagine the Russian air forces and air defenses were about ready to tear out what hair they had, when they realized they did not have defensive capabilities of getting these planes down.

They must have known from observation that it was not a B-52 or a B-47, the only aircraft that we have capable of approaching a height slightly exceeding 50,000 feet. The Russians knew it was not either of those two aircraft because those planes do not have the necessary speed. I believe they knew all along what we were up to.

I have never believed in the efficacy of summit conferences, but the incident came at an unfortunate time for those who believe in them. The U-2 plane came down. The Russians knew precisely what our country was doing. We admitted it. There is a question as to what the Senator from Louisiana would have done had he been in the place of the President, but, as I have recited, this is the first time in history that I recall in which the Chief of State considered such a question. How improper it would have seemed to the world for any of our Presidents at the time of the detection of any of the numerous Russian spies whom we have detected, to come to a joint session of the Congress, waving papers around and demanding a full investigation by the other country.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I suspect, and I believe I could support my suspicion if need be, that there have been other occasions on which agents of this country have been apprehended, and this country denied any knowledge of them. That is the manner in which every major power operates. We do not like to operate in that way, but we are compelled by circumstances to do so, I assume. When the executive of our Nation says, "Yes, this was spying; I knew about it; I authorized it," it seems to me that he leaves us in no position to be self-righteous when we plead guilty.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am not attempting to be self-righteous. I have had enough experience in the military to realize that a nation cannot carry on day-to-day peaceful military operations without as full a knowledge of the enemy as we can possibly get. There is no question in my mind that the Russians have as good information on our military capabilities as we have, if not better. This action was merely an effort during the 4 years in which the activities were carried on to give us an even break.

I am proud of this incident. My opinion of the CIA went skyrocketing when I heard about it. My great respect for American ingenuity skyrocketed even higher when I realized that we were able

to produce an airplane to accomplish this objective.

As one who knows a little about aerodynamics, I say that if anybody had told me the U-2 airplane was doing what we now know it accomplished, I would have said, "I doubt it. I do not think it is possible." Now we know it is possible.

I am addressing my remarks today to those who wish to make out of this incident either a political issue—and I am sure the Senator is not one of those—or an issue that can bring weakness to the American people instead of the pride that should be in their hearts. I speak not necessarily of the pride of spying, because all of us dislike the word. But the fact that we have been able to keep up with the military capabilities of the Soviet and keep ahead of them militarily is a great source of reassurance to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. So far as I am concerned, I regret we do not have more information with respect to what is going on behind the Iron Curtain. I wish we had more. But I feel that when the decision was made in advance that if and when one of the U-2 planes came down over enemy territory it would not be admitted to be a spy mission, having made that decision, it would have been better to have stayed with it.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Once Khrushchev had decided on this extraordinary course, the United States had no choice but to react in kind. Once Khrushchev decided to make spy operations a factor in international diplomacy, the United States had to assume that his real purpose in creating the incident was diplomatic in nature; that the decision to publicize the U-2 flight and the summit meeting were, in other words, inextricably intertwined.

What, then, was Khrushchev's purpose? What were the high stakes for which he was willing to sacrifice the myth of Soviet air invulnerability? Paradoxically, the fact this question must still be asked is evidence that Khrushchev has partially achieved his purpose. What is the mystery here? Why do we fumble for an answer that fairly leaps out at us? We are witness, surely, to a classic case of a failure to see the forest for the trees.

Khrushchev wanted Berlin.

Khrushchev told the world that if Berlin were not given to him, he would take it.

Khrushchev became convinced, as the summit meeting drew near, that Berlin was not going to be given to him—that the United States had decided to call his bluff.

Khrushchev thereupon decided—should the United States remain adamant—to torpedo the conference under circumstances that would conceal the fact his bluff had been called.

The U-2 mishap was seized upon as a weapon with which to blackmail the United States into making last-minute concessions on Berlin or, if that failed, to be used as an excuse for blowing up the conference.

In other words, because of the West's firmness on Berlin the Soviet Union was

on the threshold of a major diplomatic defeat. It was Khrushchev's last-minute strategy to prevent that defeat, or, if it could not be prevented, to throw sand in the world's eyes so that the defeat would not be recognized or appreciated. Thanks to the steady nerves of our Government at the critical moment, Khrushchev failed in his efforts to pry loose concessions on Berlin.

But Khrushchev's alternate objective—that of diverting attention from the fact his bluff was called—is today close to realization. For far from celebrating our victory, we are cringing before the criticism and are haunted by the doubts of those spiritless creatures in our midst who ask, plaintively, whether we should have dared to win. Instead of taking to heart the lesson of the past few weeks, and proclaiming it to the world, we are—ourselves—trembling before it. We cannot quite accept, even now, the moral of the recent ordeal—that firmness pays off.

Is it not time to say that the summit has come and gone, and that there is no shooting, nor any danger of it, and that Berlin remains free?

I do not mean to suggest that victories will always come so easily for the West—that we can always avoid shooting. But when the happy event occurs, and we are vouchsafed such a triumph, let us, for heaven's sake, recognize what has happened. Let us not fall under the spell of our American Hamlets. Let us not collapse of shock for having made a right decision.

I have steadily opposed summit meetings on the grounds that the only progress they can produce is progress toward Communist domination of the world. Either summit meetings must fail for having achieved nothing, or they must fail for having yielded to communism something of value to the West. The only summit meeting that can succeed is one that does not take place. Let us not forget that either.

Mr. Lippmann has hinted broadly that the Nation is obliged next November to turn out of office its present leadership, and to replace it with men more talented in the art of accommodation. He implies that the major issue between the two parties may be precisely this: Whether the administration was correct in having refused to appease Khrushchev. I feel sure he is wrong. I feel sure that both parties will nominate candidates who will support the minimum requirements of firmness that were demonstrated in recent weeks by the Eisenhower administration. But if I am proved wrong, then to the extent I can make it so, I promise the coming political campaign will be immersed in foreign policy right up to its ears.

Mr. President, in connection with my remarks, I ask that there be printed at this point in the Record an excellent editorial entitled "Thanks, Mr. Khrushchev," written by Mr. David Lawrence and published in the U.S. News & World Report of June 6, 1960.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THANKS, MR. KHRUSHCHEV

(By David Lawrence)

Sometimes from unexpected quarters we are handed a benefit. Hence we often say that "it is an ill wind that blows no good."

Nikita Khrushchev may be surprised to learn the true consequences of his reckless action in Paris recently as he torpedoed the summit conference and publicly insulted the President of the United States.

We are, indeed, indebted to the Soviet Premier for the following consequences:

1. The credulous, naive attitudes adopted by various groups among us in their advocacy of summit conferences were revealed as hopelessly impractical. No longer will we listen to the argument that these meetings can override the historic ways of diplomacy, supersede the United Nations, and leave it to four men to settle the disputes which threaten the world with nuclear war.

2. The appeasers, who have thought that the way to get peace is by making concession after concession to the enemy, now have been proved illogical, misguided, and without persuasive influence.

3. The leaders of thought who have urged that America maintain its strong defenses and place its reliance on the maintenance of deterrent strength have been vindicated and will now have an increasing influence with American public opinion.

4. The tactics of the Soviet Government, as it has sought to divide the Western allies, weaken NATO, and cause a crumbling of morale in the West, have been successfully thwarted. The Western alliance today has a redoubled strength—it has faith in the rightness of its cause and in its military power to deter war.

5. The world has at last been told many unpublished facts in the story of Soviet espionage. The opportunity to do this might never have been forthcoming if a counter-measure, undertaken by the United States, had not been detected and exploited by Mr. Khrushchev when the U-2 was forced down.

6. The knowledge of what really is going on in the cold war may have come as a shock at first to the peoples of the West, but slowly they are beginning to understand the realistic truth. They now will read and be influenced by the facts revealed about Communist infiltration as well as aggression.

7. Publication by the United States of the list of Soviet spies arrested within our own territory as they sought military information has exposed the hypocrisy of the Soviet protestations concerning the plane piloted by Francis Powers. For Powers was merely taking pictures. His plane was unarmed and clearly marked with the initials of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, well known as a civilian agency of our Government. Is flying 12 miles or more above any country really a violation of international law? If so, then why have the Soviets launched space vehicles which can take photographs of U.S. territory?

8. Attention has been dramatically focused on picture-taking from the skies. In 1955 President Eisenhower made his open skies proposal to the Soviet Union as a means of providing "against the possibility of great surprise attack." He proposed that the two countries give each other a complete blueprint of their military establishments "from one end of our countries to the other," and then provide ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance and picture-taking of each other's territory. This plan was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Government and generally attracted little interest. Now, however, the world has been made aware of the importance of the plan and of the satellites already in orbit which can take pictures at great heights.

9. Emphasis has been placed on the "surprise attack" issue. It has been difficult

the Western governments to arouse world opinion on this contingency even though everyone knows the West would not strike the first blow. The world now has had brought forcibly to its attention the vital necessity of preventing or intercepting "surprise attack." The House of Representatives, through one of its appropriation committees, has given formal sanction to such a policy.

10. The outcry of the Soviet Government about "aggression" and "spying" must inevitably cause the world to ask when the Soviets will withdraw their agents from Cuba and other Latin-American countries, as well as from Europe, Asia and Africa, and really cease their "aggression."

11. Last but not least, the Soviet chieftain has asserted a right to tell the American people the kind of administration he wants to see elected in this country in November. Let's grant him that privilege on the condition that free elections be held in the Soviet Union and that our radio messages no longer be jammed as we exercise a similar right to tell the Soviet people whom they shall choose as their ruler.

Yes, we can say, "Thanks, Mr. Khrushchev" for having opened not only our eyes but the eyes of free peoples everywhere to the simple fact that there can be no safety for any country as long as an arbitrary, autocratic regime, with the power to make sudden war, rules in Moscow.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am happy to yield.

Mr. KEATING. Unfortunately I was absent from the Senate during the early part of the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], and heard only a part of what he said. Certainly, as he pointed out, the only way to deal with the men in the Kremlin is by a policy of firmness and strength. In this regard, I find myself in complete accord with the views expressed by the Senator from Arizona. One does not deal with tyrants and dictators in the same manner that he deals with normal human beings. To deal successfully with tyrants and dictators, it is often necessary that we deny to them what they want and instead give them what they do not. That is the only language they understand.

President Eisenhower recognizes this fact. I share the view expressed by the Senator from Arizona that President Eisenhower's successor, be he Republican or Democrat, must also recognize this fact, and I am quite certain that he will. Woe betide us if he does not.

Certainly the issue of who best can deal with this problem and who best can deal with the men in the Kremlin—Khrushchev or his successor—is bound to be uppermost in the minds of the American people as they approach the forthcoming election.

The Senator from Arizona has made a great contribution to our thinking on this subject by his address. He and I sometimes find ourselves in disagreement on this, that, or the other issue; but insofar as the distinguished Senator from Arizona takes the position that our Government must continue its policy, and must, if anything, in the light of recent events, be still firmer and still stronger in this respect, I fully share his views.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I listened to the speech of the able Senator from New York yesterday on this

same subject. While he and I are occasionally—but only rarely, I might say—in disagreement, there is no issue on which we are more in agreement than the matter of the defense of the United States.

My remarks today were addressed not only to the necessity of American leaders recognizing this fact, which I believe they do—and I agree with the Senator from New York when he says that regardless of who the next President may be, he will lead from strength—I am concerned in these remarks today about the efforts being made by some people in this country—not purposely—to mislead the American people into thinking that we can deal with these tyrants—we would call them hoodlums in this country—by being nice to them, in the belief that they will treat us as they would want us to treat them. At the recent summit meeting—even though I do not agree with the idea of summit meetings—the heads of the American Government and all the agencies connected with that incident displayed admirable courage, and their performance made me a little prouder of being an American.

JUN 1 1960

The Tribune Lists Chronology of Events in Collapse at the Summit

Gives Details of Events in Web

BY WALTER TROHAN
(Chicago Tribune Staff Writer)

Washington, May 28—With the congressional investigation under way in the U-2 spy plane incident and the heads of state, this Tribune presents a chronology of the tangled web of events.

Members of the House foreign relations committee and the Senate foreign affairs committee are trying to unravel the incredible array of conflicting and contradictory statements.

The editor of this Tribune asked for a detailed examination of the facts, available to date, without speculation about whether or not the conference would have been scuttled by Russia regardless of the spy plane incident or about the justification of the spy policy.

Here is the Record

The day by day record, as far as it is known to date, is as follows:

MAY 1—Pilot Francis G. Powers took off from an unnamed field bound for an un-revealed destination. The flight was ordered because clear weather was forecast, good weather which might not come again for several weeks. President Eisenhower has indicated there was an immediate photographic mission in view—probably the site of the 5 tented buildings launched on the eve of the summit conference.

The same day there was a second U-2 meteorological flight from Turkey, gathering weather data for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It has not been made clear whether the weather flights were made to "cover" the spy flights.

He Approved Flight

Central intelligence agency officials say there was to have been an end to U-2 flights before the summit conference. Just how soon before the summit the cut-off was to come was not made clear. President Eisenhower said he fully approved the Powers flight.

MAY 1MAY 4—The CIA and the state department knew Powers and his plane were missing. Powers carried a poison needle and a pistol, which is standard equipment for all strategic air command crews. It was said here that the pilot was under no instructions to use the needle if captured, but he could elect to use it, if he were being tortured on capture. The pistol was said to be for shooting small game if brought down in wild areas.

Confusion on Planes

At first there was some confusion as to whether the weather plane or the Powers plane was missing. This was soon cleared up when the weather plane was located. There is no evidence that the administration made any plans on how to handle possible capture of the pilot. It appeared that it was assumed here the plane had crashed and that no evidence of spying was left.

MAY 2—Russia asked for a 48 hour postponement of the projected visit to the United States of Russian Air Force Marshal K. A. Verzhin. This was not connected to the missing plane. On May 4 the visit was formally announced, but it was canceled May 13 after the U-2 plane disclosure.

Tell Plane Missing

MAY 2—It was announced from Istanbul, Turkey, that a single engine air force plane was missing near Lake Van, not far from the Russian border. The report described the plane as one of two which had taken off from the United States base at Incirlik, near Adana, Turkey, on a weather reconnaissance mission. It was said the second plane returned safely but the pilot of the first plane had reported his oxygen mask was not functioning properly.

To date there is no evidence that the U-2 was downed near Sverdlovsk, Russia, except Khrushchev's word.

MAY 4—Khrushchev announced to a cheering supreme soviet parliament that an American plane had been shot down over Russia. He deliberately withheld the fact that the pilot and spy films had been captured.

President in Conference

President Eisenhower had left for a national security council meeting in a secret hideout when news of Khrushchev's speech reached Washington. White House Press Secretary James C.



Francis G. Powers

did not know about the speech.

Secretary of State Christian A. Herter was in Athens en route home from a NATO foreign ministers conference in Turkey. Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon was acting head of the department here.

A state department spokesman, Lincoln White, who received his instructions personally from Dillon, said that "it may be" the plane Khrushchev referred to was the missing NASA weather plane. At this time it was known that the missing plane was not the weather plane.

NASA Press Chief Walter T. Bonney said the plane was on a wholly peaceful mission, as state department knew of the spy flights has not been revealed.

Calls Story Nonsense

MAY 6—In Moscow it was said the U-2 was shot down by a single rocket on Khrushchev's personal orders, but no further details were revealed. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko said the American explanation was "nonsense."

The state department said it was asking Moscow for "the full facts." White said "there was absolutely no N-O—deliberate attempt to violate the soviet airspace." He repeated the May 3 report that the pilot was having difficulty with his oxygen mask.

Herter returned home to assume state department direction of the incident. It was evident that the affair was left in state department hands by the White House.

Tells of Capture

MAY 7—Khrushchev, in a second speech, disclosed the pilot had been captured and had confessed. He displayed spy photographs. Washington officials went into a series of huddles. The chief participants in the huddles were Herter, Dillon, Hagerty, White and Charles E. Bohlen, former ambassador to Russia and now top adviser on Russian affairs. It was decided to issue a statement telling some, but not all of the truth.

The state department said: "As previously announced, it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President, it has been established that, insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev."

"Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the iron curtain a flight over soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U2 plane."

Forced by Secrecy

"Necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the soviet union in contrast to the free world."

"It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type or unarmed civilian U2 aircraft have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past four years."

Hagerty, when asked about a report that President Eisenhower had ordered a halt to all further spy flights over Russia, said:

"I know of no such order."


In this issue's Traveler's Guide—

* William Yates takes you along on a springtime visit to the Left Bank of Paris and tells the one best way to see this idyllic city.

* Carl Rogers describes a trip to the beautiful Puerto Rico a wonderful vacation choice for both the fisherman and his non-fishing wife.

* Estelle Atwell tells how you can buy a go-everywhere wardrobe that enables you to travel abroad in style and comfort.

See Part 6 for these and other features of the Traveler's Guide in this issue



Nikita Khrushchev

Herter, in another state national, said:

"In accordance with the national security act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense."

"Under these directives, programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral nature but on occasion by penetration."

"Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization."

Allen Dulles, as head of CIA, made it clear that he was prepared to take full responsibility for the flight.

MAY 8—President Eisenhower returned from Gettysburg to Washington and met with Herter. The conference reported was concerned with removing the impression the President did not know what was going on in spying.

Khrushchev sent notes to Britain and France complaining about the U-2 incident but gave no indication of intention to wreck the summit conference.

Going on 3 Years

MAY 9—In another state department statement, Herter said that "Penetration of the Soviet Union had been going on" by U-2s for four years. He said that this had been done on Presidential orders to gather intelligence, but added that specific missions had not been subject to Presidential authorization.

White was asked whether the Herter statement meant that the flights were to be continued. He said he would leave that to the interpretation of newsmen.

MAY 10—The Russian press described the Herter statement as "a frank attempt to legalize and justify violation of state frontiers of other nations for espionage."

A Russian note to the United States charged the flights were carried on with the sanction of the United States government but did not blame President Eisenhower personally.

Rejects Like Visit

MAY 11—At a Moscow ex-



Nikita Khrushchev

hibition of U-2 wreckage and equipment, Khrushchev expressed doubt of the earlier conclusion that President Eisenhower did not know of the flights. He said the President would not be welcome as a visitor in Russia in June.

MAY 12—In Washington, President Eisenhower took full responsibility for the flights at a press conference. He said nothing to counter the implication that they would continue.

The United States replied to the Russian protest note, saying:

"In its note, the soviet government has stated that the collection of intelligence about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a 'calculated policy' of the United States."

"The United States government does not deny that it has pursued such a policy for purely defensive purposes. What it emphatically does deny is that this policy has any aggressive intent or that it is a U-2 flight, of May 4 was undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting of the heads of government in Paris or to return the state of American-Soviet Union relation to the worst times of the cold war."

Puts Blame on Reds

"Indeed, it is the Soviet government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intention in respect to these matters."

President Eisenhower ordered flights over Russia stopped. This was not announced at the time but disclosed May 16.

MAY 13—Herter arrived in Paris. He denied that he had given any intimation the flights would continue.

Russia sent protest notes to Norway, Pakistan and Turkey.

warning against further use of their territory for spy flights. The Russians said the Powers flight originated in Pakistan and was to have ended in Norway. This has not been confirmed in Washington.

MAY 14—Khrushchev arrived in Paris.

MAY 15—President Eisenhower arrived in Paris. Khrushchev called on French President de Gaulle and British Prime Minister Macmillan, signaling his intention to torpedo the conference. He refused to join in a meeting with President Eisenhower, as suggested by de Gaulle and Macmillan, at which the U-2 situation could be explored. Khrushchev was also uninterested in suggestions he be satisfied with a promise that no more spy flights would be made.

In Washington, George V. Allen, director of the United States information agency, tried to clear up some of the misunderstandings on the flights. He told a television quiz show:

"I will say that I know that the spokesman of the state department who gave out the information was acting in entirely good faith when he said it was a weather plane."

"There has been a great misunderstanding that I would like to correct today. Mr. Herter, the secretary of state, has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He said that there is an obligation and a responsibility on the part of the government of the United States and of the free world to try to obtain information to guard against surprise attack, but he has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He hasn't said one way or another."

Nixon Traces Blame

The same day Vice President Nixon, on another television question and answer program, traced some of the blame for the erroneous statements to persistent demands of newspaper men for facts.

He said the state department leaders were confronted with a situation in which they did not know what the Russians knew. He said it was decided to engage in evasive actions when news paper men descended on the department, in order to protect the pilot and not to inform Russia about the nature of the flight, if that nature was unknown to Russia.

Nixon said officials here had to "make a snap decision at the moment and it proved that—it turned out that the decision was wrong."

"There is never a right time to make one of these flights if you're going to get caught."

"The plus is this. You realize that his flight clearly demonstrates the feasibility of the 'open skies' proposal of the President."

Won't Cause Harm

"This flight demonstrates that unarmed planes can take photographs without causing any damage, any harm at all to commercial aviation or the national security of the country over which the flights are made."

MAY 16—At the only meeting of the big four in Paris Khrushchev charged that the United States had torpedoed the conference. He demanded an abject apology for the flights, punishment of those responsible and an end to the flights.

President Eisenhower responded by branding Khrushchev's demands as an ultimatum which could not be accepted.

Only for Protection

He continued:

"We pointed out that these activities (plane flights) had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads."

"There is in the soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges that the United States has, thru official statements, threatened continued overflights. . . . In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed."

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Herter and Dillon Are Questioned by Members of the Foreign Relations Committee

Continued from Preceding Page

happened, what was the lack of organization or otherwise that was responsible. If you can explain it, I would be glad to hear you.

MR. DILLON—If it would be helpful, I will be glad to explain briefly the course of events in the few days after the plane was missing.

We first received news that this plane was missing, was overdue, at its home base on Sunday, which was the day that the Soviet Union later said the plane was shot down.

At that time, it was determined that a cover story would be used as was stated by the President the other night, which had been previously prepared for such instance.

There was full coordination in this. I knew that the cover story was to be issued and it was discussed that it would be issued as usual when a plane was lost at the base from which the plane was lost. There would be no statement from Washington, and this statement, this information was given to the people who would be in charge of the flight at the base where it flew from in Turkey. *

In due course, the statement was put out there that a plane was missing. *

Circumstances Unknown

After that statement was made no further action was taken here because we did not know the circumstances of how the plane had been lost. It had been lost, whether it had been actually lost over Soviet territory or not, although the presumption was that it had been lost over Soviet territory because that was apparently where it was going to be the greater part of the time in the flight.

The next incident occurred on the morning of Thursday, May 5, when we heard of the first speech by Mr. Khrushchev in which it was stated that they had shot down a plane. They didn't say where the plane had been shot down, but they said that an American plane was shot down.

This required action and statements on our part. The news of that was received by me at last, during the course of a meeting, a regular meeting of the Security Council, National Security Council, which was being held that day as you will remember, somewhere out of Washington, as a part of a civil defense exercise.

When we heard that news, it was decided that the State Department would handle all questions regarding it and taking part in the discussion at that time, present at that time were myself, Secretary Gates (Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr.) and Mr. Allen Dulles.

So we were all three aware of this decision.

Meanwhile, back in Washington, members of the State Department were meeting with members of the Central Intelligence Agency to try and work out a proper statement.

When we returned to Washington, as soon as we returned to Washington, that statement was finalized in agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House were obviously kept informed of the contents of the statement, and the statement was then put out at 12:45 in the State Department. *

Questions on N. A. S. A. Data

Meanwhile, prior to that, in the days immediately before that, there had been a number of variations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency regarding information that might be given to N. A. S. A. (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) in case there were questions of them in Washington, for confirmation of statements regarding where the plane was down, something of that nature.

General guidelines on this were prepared. This was prior to the 2d, in the period of the 2d and 4th, and then the statement, were transmitted to N. A. S. A. by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The State Department at no time worked directly with N. A. S. A. on any of this publicity or anything regarding these flights.

SENATOR GORE, Democrat of Tennessee—Did you say did, or did not?

MR. DILLON—Did not. This is part of the cover operation.

So then the next item on this was that shortly after this statement, N. A. S. A. was asked a lot of questions about the plane and they following the statement while happened in the press that same day. I think that came out about three quarters of an hour after our statement. They apparently utilized the general guidelines which they had been given, to answer questions and put them together into a statement which was then put out.

SENATOR HUMPHREY, Democrat of Minnesota—What was the date of that?

MR. DILLON—This was done on May 5. This was right after Mr. Khrushchev's first speech in which he said a plane was shot down and this was— you will recall and this was—the Soviets printed a photograph of a plane that was supposedly a wreck and we very rapidly learned, I would say within twenty-four hours, that this photograph was a fraudulent photograph and was not a photograph of the U-2 wreckage, but was a photograph of some Soviet-type plane.

Aware of Fraudulence

Almost immediately, I would say on Friday the 6th, we were aware that this was a fraudulent picture, and so that gave us some concern that the Soviets might have some knowledge regarding the aircraft than we had previously suspected, and that maybe they had in their possession more of

the aircraft and possibly had the pilot in their possession.

So this was then followed on Saturday morning, the 7th, by Khrushchev's speech in which he stated that they had the pilot, and gave for the first time actual information as to where it was shot down and so forth.

The Secretary returned to Washington on Friday, May 6, from Istanbul and Greece, and I reported to him on the situation as of that time, and at that time he naturally took the Secretary's statement.

Therefore, on Saturday morning, we met with him to determine what to do next, and at that moment as we met, we were faced with this new Soviet statement saying that they had the pilot, and a new situation had arisen, and his action at that time the Secretary will answer for. But that was when the decision was made to tell, to reveal the fact that this was an American plane.

SENATOR WILEY, Republican of Wisconsin—In your opinion, is the U-2 incident a duplication of the question that we have in the past, the U-2 incident of several years, all in the interest of preserving the integrity of the United States and the integrity of the West?

SENATOR HERTER—It is indeed. SENATOR WILEY—And, in your opinion, if the U-2 incident hadn't happened—this is sort of a duplication of the question but I want to get to the main question—would Khrushchev have had an adequate excuse or would we have drummed up one?

SENATOR HERTER—That can only be a matter of speculation. I think that Mr. Khrushchev has indicated by his Baku speech, felt that from his point of view the summit would not turn out satisfactorily, and that the U-2 incident was a convenient handle for him to use to torpedo the conference.

SENATOR WILEY—Isn't it a fact that from his remarks that he made in his talk in Berlin that he knew that we were using what has been called spy planes, had been using the same for some time?

SENATOR HERTER—It certainly does. That was repeated yesterday by Mr. [Andrei A.] Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister] in the statement that he made at the United Nations in which he said they had known of this for some time, that they had known of it at the time that Mr. Khrushchev was at Camp David [Md.].

Both Called Adamant

SENATOR WILEY—Then because of previous conferences, as you have outlined in your remarks, it is very clear that there was no real reason to think that a conference could have accomplished anything, because isn't it a fact that both parties were adamant?

SENATOR HERTER—That is true, sir, insofar as Berlin and the German situation concerned.

SENATOR HUMPHREY—Mr. Secretary, what agency or who is the person in the official in this Government, who is in charge of these flights, such as the U-2 flights?

SENATOR HERTER—The Central Intelligence Agency.

SENATOR HUMPHREY—Do you have continuing information as to the number of these flights, the purpose of these flights in the State Department?

SENATOR HERTER—The general programs had been gone over with the department. Obviously it is impossible to tell when these flights are going to take place because they are so dependent on the season of the year and on weather conditions. The agency has to plan numbers of alternatives so we never know at any particular time any particular flight. But the general approval of the program had been received from the State Department, or course, as one of the advisers to the President in this matter.

SENATOR HUMPHREY—Did you know of this specific flight ahead of time?

SENATOR HERTER—I did not, no, I didn't know it was in the air even when I was over it.

SENATOR HUMPHREY—Is that your understanding, Mr. Herter, we would do everything that Mr. Dillon—I was not aware that it was the air.

SENATOR HUMPHREY—Until I was informed that I just identify it. I was wrong, as I stated previously.

SENATOR HUMPHREY—Within a minute, I think, to do that. When something goes wrong on one of these flights who would we be responsible to give the cover story, the cover-up story, so to speak?

SENATOR HERTER—I speak?

MR. DILLON—Central Intelligence Agency, but we are also responsible for agreeing with flight?

SENATOR HERTER—That is a reasonable story, and it is proper in the circumstances, but they have a very little that such a flight would be a cover-up story.

SENATOR HUMPHREY—In this country seems to be available through public means to the States or on our radar screen. In fact, in the whole world, we should discover a plane flying at high altitude in this area, we should have collected maps, documents, and photographs of every plane that flew over the area.

SENATOR HERTER—I SENATOR HUMPHREY—



A BRIEFING FOR REPORTERS: Senator J. W. Fulbright, Arkansas Democrat who heads Foreign Relations Committee, tells newsmen about developments at the closed hearing on the U-2 plane and other recent matters.

Herter Denies Pre-Summit Review of U-2 Flights

Associated Press Wirephoto

SENATOR HERTER—That is correct.

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do? When a country declares war on you again, and again for over 40 years and the philosophy has done the same for nearly a hundred years do you love them and forget their names as Judas?

Communism must be defeated to have civilization, religion, and mankind for none of them exist in a true and honorable form under communism. There is an old saying fight fire with fire and how can we serve liberty by placing it upon the chopping block and giving the enemy a slip up ax?

Patrick Henry once said, "Peace, peace when there is no peace," and also, "Give me liberty or give me death."

I am a conscientious objector to everything that sells our free Republic short.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM BERNARD.

The Summit Meeting

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ALEXANDER WILEY

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Friday, May 27, 1960

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, this morning, the Secretary of State, the Honorable Christian A. Herter, appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee and gave a very illuminating statement. I understand the statement was first re-read to the press.

I believe this statement by the Secretary of State and the President's remarks of the other evening, over the radio and television, give the complete story. From these two statements, the people of America can obtain all the facts necessary to be had in connection with the so-called fiasco at the summit which was caused by Khrushchev.

I ask unanimous consent that the statement by the Secretary of State be printed in the Appendix of the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, MAY 27, 1960

I. THE GENESIS OF THE SUMMIT

A. The threat to Berlin

In order to understand what happened in Paris we need to look back over the preceding 18 months.

In November 1958, the U.S.S.R. began a new strategy directed toward altering the situation in Berlin and East Germany in its favor. If the Western Powers refused to give up their present position in Berlin and make West Berlin a so-called free city, the Soviet Union stated its intention to proceed unilaterally at the end of 6 months, turning over full sovereignty to the so-called G.D.R. and thereby confronting the Allies with the alternative of capitulation or resort to force which would be met by Communist force. Though the strategy as it unfolded proved to be more flexible than its original statement, it is still the official policy of the U.S.S.R. Its force lies in the Soviet ability to threaten Berlin, where we are morally committed but physically exposed.

The Western Powers, of course, promptly rejected the Soviet proposal and reaffirmed their determination to stand by Berlin.

In the months that followed, while the U.S.S.R. elaborated and pressed its strategy, the Western Powers concerted their plans to meet it. They sought to engage the U.S.S.R. in negotiation, thereby clarifying its intentions and either attaining solutions acceptable to the West or, as a minimum, convincing it that unilateral action against Berlin would not be sound.

B. Engaging the U.S.S.R. negotiation

It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the U.S.S.R. would negotiate on an acceptable basis. In January 1959 the U.S.S.R. proposed a conference to adopt a peace treaty with the two parts of an indefinitely divided Germany. The Western Powers continued to maintain that a peace treaty could be negotiated and signed only with a unified Germany, hence that the reunification of Germany must be settled first. They also maintained that the only proper solution for Berlin lay in its becoming the capital of a unified Germany, and therefore they were unwilling to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue. But the U.S.S.R. had held for some time that reunification was solely the business of the Germans and therefore refused to discuss it.

The West persisted during February and March in its efforts to get the Russians talking somehow. It proposed a meeting of Foreign Ministers, with the prospect of a possible summit meeting when due preparations had been made. The U.S.S.R. had repeatedly indicated a desire for one since 1958. Finally a compromise agenda, which did not prejudice the substantive views of either side, was adopted for a foreign ministers' meeting and a date was set in May, shortly before the expiration of the original Soviet deadline for meeting their arbitrary demands on Berlin.

C. Foreign ministers' deadlock

During the intensive preparations for the meeting the Western Powers developed a new version of their basic position regarding Germany, which was submitted at Geneva as the Western peace plan. It consisted in approaching the unification of Germany through a series of stages, thereby offering the U.S.S.R. a chance to adjust its position gradually to the eventual loss of its hold on East Germany which free elections would presumably bring. The plan showed flexibility and imagination; it appealed to world opinion, but its rejection by the U.S.S.R. was nonetheless flat. The U.S.S.R. stuck adamantly to its previously announced proposals for a peace treaty with a divided Germany. Thus the basic positions remained totally unreconciled.

Finding no progress possible on Germany, the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. explored the possibility of an interim agreement on Berlin which, without contemplating a basic solution of Berlin as a separate issue, would do something to mitigate difficulties which the U.S.S.R. professed to find there. Though some progress was made in this direction, the U.S.S.R. insisted on language which would have implied the eventual erosion of the Western position in Berlin. Accordingly, despite the labor of 3 months with only one short adjournment, the Foreign Ministers' meeting ended in deadlock.

D. High-level trips

The failure of the Foreign Ministers' meeting did not result in a war crisis, however, because a parallel train of events had meanwhile brought hope in a different direction. We took the opportunity of Mikoyan's visit to the Soviet Embassy here in January to arrange informal exchanges of views between the Soviet leader and top U.S. officials. This was followed in June and July by further visits and exchanges of Kozlov to this country and the Vice President to the U.S.S.R.

The fact that these visits took place without public incident and made possible somewhat more realistic communication than usual with the Soviet leadership seemed to offer a possibility—only a possibility, of course—that means of avoiding war and eventually getting Soviet-Western relations into somewhat less dangerous shape might be found by developing these informal contacts.

Accordingly, the President decided to go ahead with a move which he and his advisers had long had in mind when the time seemed right. He invited Chairman Khrushchev to visit this country, and the visit was announced before the Foreign Ministers ended their Geneva meeting.

During that visit no progress was made, or indeed expected, on resolving outstanding problems, but a somewhat greater degree of mutual understanding was seemingly attained, particularly on the need to settle international questions by peaceful means rather than by force. There was also a suspension, later publicly acknowledged, of whatever was left of the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin.

E. Preparation for the summit

After the Khrushchev visit it was judged feasible and desirable by the Western Powers to move toward renewed discussion, this time at the summit. Some flicker of hope for progress on Berlin had appeared at Camp David, whereas Geneva had ended in deadlock. During his American visit Khrushchev had also evinced an interest in the equally vital field of disarmament, and even though disarmament talks were to start in the Committee of Ten at Geneva it was felt that Khrushchev might reserve his constructive moves, if any, for the summit.

Accordingly, after due consultations among the Western heads of government an invitation to a summit was sent to Khrushchev and accepted by him, and after some difficulty over earlier dates the time was finally set for May 16. This move found broad support in Western public opinion.

There ensued an intensive and protracted series of preparations on the Western side, involving repeated meetings not only of the Foreign Ministers and of NATO but even of the heads of government. Within our own Government we also studied most carefully the possibilities of making progress not only on Berlin and Germany but most particularly in disarmament, as well as other aspects of general Soviet-Western relations.

At the December meeting of Western heads of Government a consensus emerged that the May summit might be only one of a series of such meetings, and that it would be largely exploratory. Some modest progress was hoped for, but no major solutions on any front. But if a beginning could be made, the series of talks, possibly in a gradually improving atmosphere over the years, might do substantially more.

F. Summit prospects dimmed

In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about "detente." There were comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-United States cultural agreement was signed November 21, and on December 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other powers signed the Antarctic Treaty.

But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess, and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal

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Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presumptive tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.

Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal blocwide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation on his speeches available to the committee.

Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight—notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments that he in fact had begun.

The unity of the four Western Powers on Berlin meanwhile presumably signaled to the U.S.S.R. that prospects for eroding the Western position or obtaining Soviet terms on Berlin remained slight. President de Gaulle and other leaders were quite firm in discouraging expectations on this front. The NATO Council in Istanbul May 2-4 also reaffirmed the Western position on German reunification and regretted Soviet refusal to discuss specific practical measures of disarmament. Thus as the summit drew near the prospects for important agreement seemed slender, so long as the U.S.S.R. remained committed to driving the Western Powers out of Berlin and to discussing disarmament in terms of general principles rather than concrete steps.

The Western outlook consistently remained, however, that the summit would be worthwhile. It would afford an opportunity for an exchange of views which would clarify each side's position; it might contribute to some reduction of tensions over Berlin and narrow some of our differences on disarmament. It could be at least a small first step in a long process of improving Soviet-Western relations.

II. THE U-2 INCIDENT

On May 1 occurred the unfortunate failure of an intelligence mission. The U.S.S.R. at once seized on it to complicate the approach to the summit. With regard to the role of the U.S. Government in this matter, I cannot hope to improve on the lucid and straightforward account which the President gave to the Nation Wednesday night. I will, therefore, not attempt to go into detail, although I am of course ready to answer questions concerning my responsibilities.

Here I would only like to reemphasize four central points which stood out in the President's account:

1. The U-2 program was an important and efficient intelligence effort. We knew that failure of any mission under this program would have serious consequences but we considered that the great benefit derived justified the risks involved.

2. The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision. Conditions at a later season would have prevented obtaining very important information. There is never a "good time" for a failure of an intelligence mission. We believe it unwise to lower our vigilance because of these political negotiations.

3. Initial statements by the U.S. Government properly sought first of all to protect the pilot, his intelligence mission, and everything connected with it that might still be kept secret. But when it became clear that plane and pilot were in Soviet hands we believed the Congress and the American people should be given the facts. Thus up to May 7 U.S. statements followed the general line of the cover story, and thereafter were adjusted to the situation as it developed.

4. Since the U-2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case. Announcement of its discontinuance was withheld until the President could convey the fact personally in Paris.

Based on these four points, I believe most Americans will agree that the main course of our actions, given what we knew at any particular time, was sound. In particular, I have doubts that any alteration in the language of U.S. statements would have made any difference in the arbitrary Soviet demands which followed.

III. THE EVENTS IN PARIS

A. Narrative

I should like to give you an account of the major developments at Paris. I shall be as brief as possible, since the details have been widely publicized. But I would like to tell you of those events which in my opinion had a detrimental effect there, and particularly those which influenced the decisions of the President.

On my arrival in Paris on Friday, May 13, there was already considerable speculation at the news that Mr. Khrushchev was arriving in Paris on Saturday rather than on Sunday, the day on which the President and Mr. Macmillan were due to arrive.

Mr. Khrushchev's statement on arrival at Orly Airport gave no indication of his subsequent position. It was mild in character and conveyed the distinct impression that he would proceed with the summit conference despite the U-2 incident. Subsequent events showed that this was deliberately designed to conceal his real purpose.

On Sunday at 11 a.m., at his request, Mr. Khrushchev, accompanied by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky—which is in itself an unusual procedure which I shall revert to later—called on President de Gaulle at the Elysée Palace. During this meeting he left with President de Gaulle a memorandum setting forth the conditions which would have to be met by the United States before Khrushchev would be prepared to attend a summit conference. The French delegation provided a copy of this memorandum to the American delegation early that afternoon. The memorandum was subsequently presented by Mr. Khrushchev, without change, as the opening part of his statement to the four-power meeting on Monday morning, May 16.

After visiting President de Gaulle Sunday morning, Khrushchev called on Prime Minister Macmillan at 4:30 p.m. on the same day and read the same statement of position to him.

The copy of the statement received from the French delegation was, of course, the subject of immediate consultation with the President and with members of the American delegation as to its significance and meaning.

It was our general conclusion, subsequently borne out by the facts, that the position and totally unacceptable demands set forth in this document had been drawn up in Moscow prior to Mr. Khrushchev's departure. In this sense it represented a fixed Soviet governmental position from which even Mr. Khrushchev would not have the authority to depart while in Paris.

I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of

Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the collective decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from Moscow. Any substantive changes in these positions apparently required reference back to Moscow before they could be undertaken.

I should like to emphasize the opinion which was thus unanimously arrived at in the American delegation, since it bore directly upon the position which the President took at the meeting on Monday morning.

It was out of the question, of course, that there should be any acceptance by the President of the humiliating and arrogant conditions of Mr. Khrushchev. We had very much in mind, however, the importance of showing the world that it was Mr. Khrushchev, and no one else, who was placing this summit conference in peril.

The President, therefore, decided before the Monday meeting that the proper course of action, consonant with the great responsibility which he bore and the seriousness of the issues which were to have been discussed at the conference, was for him not to engage in vituperation with Mr. Khrushchev but to demonstrate the restraint and dignity which was incumbent upon the office he holds and which befitted the leader of a great country.

In connection with this decision, the President resolved to announce to the conference his previously taken decision to suspend further flights of U-2 aircraft over the Soviet Union.

Although the original intention had been to restrict the first meeting of the conference at the summit to the chiefs of state and heads of government and their interpreters, the President, on learning that Mr. Khrushchev wished to bring Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky, asked Secretary Gates and me to accompany him to this meeting.

I do not need to describe this meeting in detail beyond saying that Mr. Khrushchev read a statement which, with interpretation, took fully an hour. He read this entire statement from a prepared text before him. The first part of this statement was the memorandum which he had left with President de Gaulle, plus certain additions which were in the same vein as regards the United States and which referred to Soviet willingness to hold a summit conference within 6 to 8 months. The major addition was the cancellation of the invitation to the President to visit the Soviet Union.

Apart from his statement, which was made public, the President only once joined in the ensuing discussion—in order to make clear to Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues that the suspension of the U-2 flights was not merely for the duration of the conference but for as long as he was in office.

The balance of the discussion at this meeting, which I should point out was the only one during the entire period in Paris at which the Soviets were present, was largely devoted to attempts by President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan to dissuade Mr. Khrushchev from the irrevocable step of publishing his abusive statement, whose unacceptable conditions would render impossible any conference at the summit, and to Khrushchev's adamant insistence that he would publish this statement and do so at a time of his own choosing. The meeting broke up on the basis of a suggestion by President de Gaulle that the conferees should reflect on this matter for 24 hours and then examine the situation.

This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his departure from Moscow. It is significant in this connection that the statement he issued later that day, Monday, May 16, which was identical with the one he had made at the Con-

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ference, took no cognizance whatsoever of the discussion at the conference, and in particular of the President's statement concerning the suspension of U-2 overflights.

The rest of the proceedings in Paris were anticlimactic. It was apparent to all the Western representatives that there was no possibility of a summit conference short of a changed position on Mr. Khrushchev's part. On Monday Mr. Macmillan visited Mr. Khrushchev in a fruitless effort to persuade him to withdraw his impossible demands.

On that same day President de Gaulle decided, with the agreement of the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, to call a session of the summit conference for 3 p.m. on Tuesday, May 17, which was after the 24-hour recess which he had proposed on Monday. He sent invitations in writing to the three other participants.

The President, in accepting, made clear his view that acceptance by the Soviet representative would mean that the Soviets had abandoned the demands which the President had previously found completely unacceptable.

Mr. Khrushchev did not show up at the appointed time for the Tuesday meeting. After a great deal of telephoning between the Soviet Embassy and the French Foreign Office it became clear that he was refusing to attend a summit conference and would only join in what he termed a preliminary meeting to ascertain if conditions could be created for a summit conference. By this reference to "conditions" he obviously meant the acceptance by the United States of all of the conditions he had set forth previously, and indeed he so stated in a written communication to President de Gaulle later that same day.

In the light of Mr. Khrushchev's refusal to attend the summit conference, except on terms which all three Western representatives deemed unacceptable, the three Western heads of government met briefly at 9:30 p.m., on May 17 to approve the final tripartite communique, a copy of which I should like to insert in the record.

Thus the summit conference was ended by Soviet intransigence before it began, without addressing the great international issues with which it was supposed to deal.

The following day, Wednesday, May 18, was marked by tripartite meetings of the Western heads of government and their Foreign Ministers to consider the situation. In these meetings we sought to analyze the reasons for the Soviet attitude, prospects for the future, and the measures that the three Western Powers might adopt.

This day was also marked by Mr. Khrushchev's press conference, which was fully reported by press, television, and radio. It was apparently an unparalleled performance of vituperation, abuse, and loss of temper. It should be noted, however, that despite the apparently uncontrolled nature of his remarks and actions at this press conference, Mr. Khrushchev was very careful not to commit himself to any specific course of action in the international field.

B. Analysis

We have naturally given a great deal of thought to the reasons for this extraordinary action by the Soviets in coming all the way from Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose of sabotaging the conference.

I should like to say right off that there are many obscure aspects of this Soviet behavior and that we do not know all considerations and factors which went into its determination. We probably never shall. I hardly need to emphasize here to the members of this committee the complete secrecy in which decisions are arrived at in the Soviet Government and in the hierarchy of the Communist Party, which is the effective ruler of that country. It is only possible to try to deduce from Soviet actions, after they are taken, the considerations which

brought them about. What I give you now, therefore, is at best a tentative estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an estimate which may have to be revised in the light of further information and future events.

There is one thing, however, that can be regarded as certain: This is that the decision to wreck the conference was made prior to Khrushchev's departure from Moscow. At no point during his stay in Paris—neither when he disclosed his true intentions to General de Gaulle at 11 a.m. on Sunday the 15th nor subsequently—did Khrushchev deviate 1 inch from his demands that the United States (1) denounce the overflights, (2) apologize to the Soviet Union, (3) punish those "directly responsible," and (4) promise not to repeat these flights. Neither the statement made by the President at the one meeting held on Monday nor the serious and responsible efforts of General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr. Khrushchev before and after the President's announcement of suspension of flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his behavior in Paris that he had no authority to modify his position to any significant degree.

The fact that he was accompanied everywhere, and literally everywhere, by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky is an interesting sidelight on this point. There is much speculation as to this change from his previous attitude during his visits both to the United States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings alone with the President and with President de Gaulle, with only interpreters present. The best guess as to the significance of this new factor is that (1) in view of the brutal and threatening attitude he adopted at Paris it was considered desirable to have some tangible evidence of Soviet armed strength in the person of Marshal Malinovsky. Secondly, Gromyko and Malinovsky would be able to testify upon return to Moscow that he had stuck strictly to the agreed position.

It also seems certain that the decision to cancel the invitation to the President was made before Khrushchev left Moscow.

As to what led the Soviets to this extreme position, in regard to the summit meeting which had previously appeared so much desired by Mr. Khrushchev, we enter into the realm of pure speculation, as I indicated earlier. The most we can hope to do in the absence of reliable information is to evaluate the elements and factors which appear to have entered into this decision. I shall try to list them briefly.

1. There was considerable indication, particularly during April, that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was little likelihood of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the summit. Evidence of Western determination and unity on this point in speeches and statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him to this conclusion. Thus in his Baku speech on April 25, he not only reiterated with the utmost finality his position on Berlin, including his intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German regime, but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success of the summit. By this, of course, he meant success on Soviet terms.

2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive, there are a number of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy, particularly his overpersonalization and in Communist eyes overcommitment through personal visits to the United States and France, was arousing at least serious questioning if not opposition in the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the opposition to his conduct of foreign relations which was openly voiced by the Chinese

Communists found a sympathetic response among some of his associates, and very probably among the Soviet military.

3. It was against this background that the U-2 incident occurred.

A combination of these three factors in our judgment is what resulted in the definite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris Conference. To determine how each of these factors should be weighed is, for the moment, beyond our reach.

The U-2 incident was most certainly seized upon and magnified beyond its true proportions as a justification for this decision. It is debatable whether it would have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise another pretext for so radical and violent a position.

It might well be that a lack of success at the summit would have confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult choice, from his point of view, than no conference at all. He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing the conference.

It may seem incredible to you that responsible leaders of a great power should have come all the way to Paris merely for the purpose of wrecking the conference, thereby incurring worldwide condemnation of the Soviet Union and enhancing the sense of unity and purpose among not only the Western Powers represented there but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere.

I believe the answer lies in a basic miscalculation in Mr. Khrushchev's and the Soviet's thinking.

Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped—and this explains his early arrival in Paris—to divide the allies and isolate the United States. He anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands he had set forth and that the conference would then collapse, with the United States bearing the responsibility for the rupture before world opinion.

His plans miscarried because our two allies stood solidly and loyally with the United States and refused to be parties to Mr. Khrushchev's scheme. The result, as the whole world knows, was that the position which Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted in the complete isolation of the Soviet Union rather than the United States and in placing the responsibility for the disruption of the conference squarely where it belongs—on his own shoulders.

This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior is strongly supported by the attack which he made at his press conference on General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan for what he termed their lack of objectivity, lack of will, and subservience to the allied relationships—in other words, in plain English, for their solidarity with the United States, their loyalty to our common purpose, and their refusal to play the Soviet game.

IV. THE FUTURE

What conclusions should we draw for the future?

I believe the signs are that there has been as yet no radical alteration in Soviet policy, though we can expect the continuance of a propaganda effort designed to split off the United States from its allies. This conclusion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris statements, including those at his press conference. It is supported, somewhat more specifically and definitely, by the statements which he made in Berlin on his way home.

We must remember, however, that, given the nature of the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason that any state-

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ment about a phase of Soviet policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain valid in the future.

Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disappointed by the fact that the summit conference was not held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depends, as I have indicated, on actions of the leading Communist countries.

Provisionally, however, I conclude that the implication for U.S. policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be continued. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines with renewed effort. Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding international business in a sober and rational manner.

We must remain prepared to withstand aggressive pressures, not only in Berlin but also elsewhere. I trust that our evident readiness will deter such pressures.

Among the lessons of Paris, the most important for the free world including ourselves, it seems to me, is fresh realization of the dangers we face and consequent need for closing of ranks and moving ahead with our own and our allies' programs for strengthening the free world. We came back from Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have allies, and I am sure that our alliances will take new life from this experience.

At the same time I would stress equally the need to expand imaginatively and generously our collaboration with the newly developing countries.

On both accounts I hope the Congress will give wholehearted support to our mutual security programs as authorized by this committee, which are now more important than ever.

We must continue, as the President has said, to seek in a businesslike way to make progress on outstanding problems with the Soviet Union. We intend to go ahead with existing negotiations, to stand by our commitments, and to foster open communication and peaceful exchanges. Above all, we shall not cease from the most determined, patient, resourceful endeavor to find ways to bring the arms race under control and thus to meet the nuclear menace that hangs over mankind.

I believe in this period it is incumbent upon us, all of us, to keep a calm and steady gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions, statements, and attitudes which might tend unnecessarily to increase international tension. If such an increase is to occur, it should be clearly the fault of the Soviets and we should not do them the favor of providing pretext for action by them which would have this effect.

We should not define as hard or soft our attitude or policy toward the Soviet Union. To do so is not only to deflect our gaze from the grim reality that confronts us, but even more to plunge us inevitably into fruitless and damaging domestic recrimination. We must now, as in the future, maintain a vigilant, calm, and resolute posture and, insofar as it lies in our power to do so, be accurate in our estimates and effective in our actions.

I would close in expressing the hope that we will not become so fixed in preoccupation with the Soviet challenge as to lose sight of our own constructive purposes—which are larger and more important than merely resisting or reacting to external threats. We have our own vision of the future toward which we want to see the world evolve. We have our own programs for helping to bring that future about—for holding high the light of freedom, for sharing its message and rewards with emerging

nations, for trying to create an international community in which the rule of law will replace the rule of force. It is to these programs that our talents and energies should be rededicated in the uncertain times that lie ahead.

What Is Communism?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JOEL T. BROYHILL

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 4, 1960

Mr. BROYHILL. Mr. Speaker, I should like to call the attention of the Members of this House to an editorial that appeared in the Alexandria (Va.) Gazette on May 23, 1960. It seems to me that this editorial presents a particularly well-reasoned statement of the issues and problems involved in the important question of increasing the knowledge of our citizens, and particularly our children, of Communist propaganda and policies. The editorial reads as follows:

WHAT IS COMMUNISM?

At its meeting last week the Fairfax County School Board went on record to have instituted in the county high schools, a course of study that would instruct as to the meaning of communism. Col. Waldron Leonard, a member of the board, made the suggestion. For some time he has been disturbed by the effect that communistic propaganda has been having upon the minds of some of the youth of our land. He feels that in order to combat the evil effects of the political, social, economic and nonspiritual aspects of communism, it is most important that its true meaning be taught and understood.

The admonition "to seek the truth and the truth shall make you free" led to Colonel Leonard's suggestion and the action of the county school board. So often are we misled by labels that misrepresent products, objectives, ideas, and ideals.

We cannot ignore the great conflict in the world today between a society that recognizes the dignity of man and his relationship with his God, and a godless, materialistic society that makes of the individual a servant and instrument of the state. To some, communism is made to appear as a perfect social order. To others, it evidences a political philosophy that is used by would be tyrants to destroy the rights, responsibilities, hopes, and aspirations of the individuals.

It must be recognized that some risk attaches to the teaching of the meaning of communism in our public schools. The subject to be taught is one thing—the method employed in the teaching of the subject is something else. A responsibility will rest upon the school board and the superintendent of schools to make sure that well qualified instructors are chosen for such classes. As it is imperative that the real meaning of communism be understood, the risk of having the course slanted must be assumed and guarded against. The personality, thinking and the understanding of a teacher becomes, in varying degree, a part of a course of instruction and give to it color as well as substance.

In our daily lives we are being continuously confronted with the facts of life. Our problem is to discern the facts—distinguish them from fiction—and to properly interpret them in their relations, one to another. Every individual hopes that society will permit and afford him a better way of life. This being a common aspiration of man, some of those

who would give direction to the development of a better social order will emphasize objectives and make reckless promises for their realization. We note little disagreement between political leaders, whether on the local, State, National or world levels, as to objectives. Who can publicly be opposed to the ideals of peace and prosperity—to freedom, justice, and the opportunity for the individual to develop his or her full potential? It is when we come to the means and methods to be employed to attain these objectives that wide differences of opinion appear and are advanced.

A few years ago we heard much about the Four Freedoms. Only the idealist and the optimist can hope that these freedoms will ever be realized. Their attainment presupposes a complete transformation of the nature of man—the elimination of selfishness and his ambition for power. Is there any evidence today that a communistic social order has or can cause to be made such a miraculous change in man?

In recorded history, the nature of man has not changed materially. What changes that have taken place in different forms of society, have been occasioned primarily by self-interest. Wars, with their destruction of life and property, show how easy it is for us to revert to the laws of the jungle if self-interest so dictates. Our search for a utopian social order, whether called communism or by some other name, should not lead us to accept false promises—promises of a way of life that will not and cannot be realized.

There are more aspects to the Communist philosophy of society than just the promise of a better economic social order. Assuming that a Communist society could provide better for the economic wants of man, what price does the individual pay in order to accomplish such an end? What happens to the dignity and meaning of the individual in such a society? One who teaches the meaning of communism in our public schools must know the subject and be well prepared to answer all of the questions of an awakened and inquiring student mind. Much good can come from such a course if the teaching differentiates between what communism promises in theory and what it provides in performance. Those interested in our schools and what is being taught, should be concerned with how the new course of study will be presented.

Neighborhood Center of Philadelphia

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HERMAN TOLL

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 26, 1960

Mr. TOLL. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, May 23, I had the pleasure of attending the dinner celebrating the 75th anniversary of the Neighborhood Center of Philadelphia at the Sheraton Hotel. The main speaker on this occasion was Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was also celebrating her 75th year.

The Neighborhood Center today gives guidance to the young and old of all races and creeds, and provides them with the facilities which will contribute to their enjoyment of wholesome leisure. The aim of this great organization has changed from the original concern with the economically and socially underprivileged to helping people of all ages

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more information through reconnaissance.

To supplement these views, Mr. Speaker, I submit, herewith, my radio speech of May 22, 1960, over station WGAN of Portland, Maine, through the courtesy of the Gannett Publishing Co. and its able and alert Washington correspondent, May Craig:

BROADCAST OVER STATION WGAN RADIO, PORTLAND, MAINE, MAY 22, 1960, BY HON. JAMES C. OLIVER

Ladies and gentlemen, in the light of the world-shaking events of the past week at Paris, there can be only one subject to discuss with you today, my friends. That subject, of course, is the torpedoing by Khrushchev of the long-publicized and, in most quarters, the desperately desired summit conference of the Big Four.

I have used the words "in most quarters" advisedly, because the people of the world had been sold on the hope that this meeting of the leaders of the four big powers of the world could, and would, in some magical manner, pull a rabbit out of the hat and irreconcilable, as it seems to me, issues would be amicably settled. At the least, the people of the world had been brainwashed with the illusion that a summit meeting could result in a relaxing of tensions between the free and the regimented worlds.

Inviting Khrushchev to visit America, without first obtaining from him some promise, for what it may have been worth, was the first mistake that our policymakers made. Then, after his arrogant and contemptuous attitude had been completely displayed, and we had been influenced to overlook his boasting and his insulting conduct while he was a guest of the President, the Madison Avenue soap-selling technique came into full tempo. Remember the hogwash which sounded the theme song of the spirit of Camp David. The beautiful dove of peace was flying at the masthead of practically every newspaper in America. The summit conference was to be the culmination of the dedicated efforts for settlement of these issues which have continued to bedevil the world in the form of the cold war. The irreconcilable ideologies of the socialistic-communistic and the capitalistic camps were to be submerged in compromise. Everybody was to save face. Nobody would be an appeaser. In short, the wonderful rabbit was to jump out of the hat.

But the leopard never had changed his spots. Khrushchev never did have any intention of yielding by one inch. His intentions, in my opinion, were as always to play the Western World for suckers. He intended and did use the sounding board of the still-born summit conference for the purpose of throwing his weight around. He merely repeated in a more vigorous and a more insulting technique the same attitude which he expressed while on his visit to America as the guest of our President.

I took the position, then, that we were making a mistake in our invitation to him to visit this country. We now find our gullibility being paid off with insults such as no head of a great power would ever have thrown at another great power, unless he was prepared for the showdown of war.

The Russia of today has not changed one iota from the Russia of Stalin, so far as its basic objectives are concerned. We never learn a lesson from being kicked around. When Stalin was as truculent, as demanding, and as doublecrossing as Khrushchev is today, we swallowed his insults in our efforts to get along with him.

These butchers in the Kremlin remain butchers and compromise is practiced by them in only one way, and that is down a one-way street in which they are determined to control the right-of-way. Our yielding and mild policy for the hope of cooperation only results in continued yielding. Peace-

ful coexistence in the language of the Soviets means only one thing, and that is on terms to be established by the Soviets in their own best interests.

We cannot placate an attitude of implacability except by yielding our own self-respect. They are hard and we have been soft. They know where they are going and use every devious and calculating means to get there. We indulge in wishful thinking and fail to evaluate the hard, uncompromising determination of these ruthless despots. They are surging ahead with everincreasing momentum while we are beguiled along the primrose path of complacency and ill-advised optimism.

It is no surprise to those of us who evaluate the Soviet leadership as unscrupulous, cunning, crafty, and tough dedicated men without any consciences whatsoever that Khrushchev would act like a Hitler. Any man, drunk with power, is certain to throw his weight around when he believes that he is serving his purpose in so doing. We should blame ourselves for allowing ourselves to be such dupes, as we have been.

Khrushchev is still feeling his first sputnik, which our present leaders did their best to downgrade. The Soviet shot at the moon; their photographing of the back side of the moon; their latest space vehicle which could mark another first in the very near future; their progress in the sciences, including oceanography with which I have some familiarity, and their drive with purpose to goals which we had estimated as unattainable for them for many years have combined to develop the arrogance which Mr. K. threw without restraint at our President and at us at the Paris debacle.

Once again, let me refer to the kind of peaceful coexistence which the Soviets envision by citing these words of Lenin: "The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialistic states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And, before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable." Khrushchev has openly stated that Soviet Russia will never abandon its goal of world conquest. It is true that he may not have used those exact words; but, he did state at the National Press Club, last September, while he was the guest of the President that "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is founded on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems." In the light of this stated philosophy which dominates the Soviet consecration to its goal and objective, is there any further need to beat our brains out, trying to find some other hidden or farfetched motivation for Khrushchev's brutal and barbarous treatment of the United States at the Paris fiasco? It satisfies me to take him as he is and not get all confused by trying to think of him as something different. He represents an economic and governmental system which is directly and completely the antithesis of America. As the leader and spokesman of this system he has boasted that "we will bury you." This is reason enough for me to be convinced that we should not fool ourselves any longer with wishful thinking that we only need to close our eyes to the realities of the world in which we now live and the big bad wolf will go away.

We have been badly shaken by this episode; but, we asked for it. We probably will be shaken again and again and again during these next few days, weeks and months. To me, this means that we must be tough without being truculent. We must be resolute without being rabid. We must be persistent without being punitive. Khrushchev is rattling his rockets. To me, this means that we must transform our complacency of dream world thinking into an attitude of action. We are in a race for survival whether we like it or not. The

true face of the Kremlin was displayed at Paris.

In short, the United States and our allies, as well, must heed these storm warnings. Mr. K. has been acting, under instructions from the Kremlin, like a hurricane and if we have the commonsense to meet this challenge, we must batten down the hatches. It will be wise, in lieu of speculating why "Khrush" blew his top to check ourselves, for the purpose of urgent correction, and examine: (1) the reasons why we have slipped in prestige during the last 5 years among them being psychological negativism, loss of dynamism, the obvious subordination of defense needs to the sacred cow of the budget and refusal to acknowledge that we are in a contest in space as well as in every other phase of our national being.

Crying national crocodile tears over the U-2 affair in my opinion, only helps Khrushchev to inflate this cause celebre to a manifest absurdity. One has only to know that the Soviets are making regular reconnaissance flights over England every day in order to place this defense activity of ours in its proper perspective. This is not the most sordid crime of the century. If we were not using every logical and possible means of gaining information concerning the activities of this avowed enemy of America, we would, indeed, be derelict in our responsibility even to the point of treason. Why do we think that we should have a guilt complex because of this effort to protect our own country against a communistic dictatorship which has looted and murdered across half of Europe? Have we forgotten Budapest? Have we forgotten the murder of East Berliners who were fighting for freedom? Do we have to apologize to ourselves or to the world which knows from firsthand experience in practically every corner of the globe of the operation by the Soviets of the most massive and, yes, the most malignant espionage system ever known in the history of the world? I think that we should not be beating ourselves over the head for acting in our own self-defense which is, by the same token, the defense of the free world. These cries of Khrushchev are just so much public relations fakerism and we certainly are ridiculous if we continue to upgrade them to anything different by our own breast-beating.

Khrushchev, in my opinion, never did have any intention of making the summit conference a success in causing international tensions to relax, except upon his own terms. If this could not be done, then, he intended to do just what he did: Namely, use it as a sounding board for world attention and propaganda by telling off the three leaders of the Western World.

The U-2 episode only served to make his objective, more attainable and in his viewpoint, more justifiable.

The real issue is where do we go from here? How do we pick up the pieces? Agreement on the halting of nuclear and thermonuclear testing, moves toward sincere mutual disarmament, and relaxing of cold war tensions are still on our agenda. But, I fear, that Khrushchev and the Kremlin will, and as a matter of fact, already have, planned more moves of brinkmanship. The free world must be prepared to withstand more shocks of psychological warfare.

It could be that, within the next few days, the Soviet space vehicle will reenter the earth's atmosphere and make a landing with the first spaceman of all time as we know it. If this is accomplished, the impact on the world and, upon us, will be catastrophic. How will we protect and harden ourselves against this further softening technique of the Communists?

What happens when, as, and if these possible and even probable acts of brinkmanship develop, namely:

1. The signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany and the subsequent acts

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of harassing and closing off the Berlin highway and air corridor?

2. The march of North Koreans into South Korea?

3. The military aggression against Quemoy and the Matsu Islands?

4. Increased over acts by Castro?

5. Further agitation and overt acts in Panama?

6. Stepping-up tensions in Turkey and in strategic areas of the Near East?

Are we prepared, psychologically and militarily to stand up resolutely against these acts of aggression, directed toward softening us up for the kill?

The communistic art of disarming an opponent with smiles and tokens of good will and then, at the proper psychological moment of withdrawing, scowling and threatening have been well demonstrated by the visit of Khrushchev to our land, followed by the phony talk about disarmament and world peace in the spirit of Camp David, then, concluding in the fiasco of the Paris summit conference.

This should be sufficient indoctrination for us in communistic cunning to prepare us when more of the same treatment falls on our collective head.

The only answer for us is to get the biggest possible stick at the earliest possible date, speak softly but resolutely, say what we mean and mean what we say, fully realizing that further appeasement can only mean living on our knees for generations to come.

The Soviets respect nothing except power and strength, both mental and physical. Our leaders must measure up to this yardstick or else.

This, my friends, is what the U-2 incident and the collapse of the summit mean to me.

School Construction Assistance Act of 1960

SPEECH
OF

HON. HAROLD D. DONOHUE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 26, 1960

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 10128) to authorize Federal financial assistance to the States to be used for constructing school facilities.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, because of the overwhelming evidence on record showing the urgent need of improving school facilities throughout the Nation, I rise in support of this bill granting reasonable Federal assistance to the States for such purpose.

In the development of a legislative proposal toward law enactment, it is our democratic custom to afford opportunities for advocates and antagonists to submit their evidence and views through congressional committee hearings. There is no need for me to recount the convincing mass of statistical, and other objective evidence, presented by the foremost educational authority in the country and contained in the record of committee hearings, over the past several years. Their concrete facts and figures leave no question about the great deficiency of educational facilities around the country.

There is also no need for me to reiterate the testimony of the multitudinous officials of States and municipalities demonstrating that their various States are wholly unable to provide, from their own drained resources, the urgently required improvements in school facilities.

The two basic factors involved are the need for school improvements and the inability of the States to construct them. Since these two factors have been proved beyond question, it appears to me that there should be no reasonable doubt that this measure should be approved.

With full realization of the consequences that may follow from the collapse of the Paris summit meeting, there ought to be no uncertainty about the imperative necessity of accelerating our preparations to meet the Russian Communist on every front, including the educational front. Realistically admitting our past mistakes and factually facing the import of a long, continuing cold war atmosphere, let us wisely now take the steps to guarantee that our youth will be adequately trained to meet and beat the Communist challenges in the future.

There can be no better or wiser economic planning for the future security of America than a reasonable investment for the superior schooling of the country's children. Let us endorse and approve that practical investment today.

If we can afford to generously grant, in Christian concern, many billions of dollars for the advancement and training of people in undeveloped countries throughout the world then surely we can afford to provide reasonable assistance for the training and development of the children of the burdened American taxpayers.

Today, the "Edmonds"—Tomorrow, World Trade

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. AL ULLMAN

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, May 27, 1960

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, last week the destroyer U.S.S. *Edmonds* made its way up the Columbia River to the inland port city of The Dalles, Ore. My colleagues will be interested in the following editorial from the Dalles Optimist, which points out that this historic visit of an American fighting ship some 185 miles upstream from the mouth of the Columbia marks the creation of a new ocean waterway of great importance to the future of the Northwest and the Nation:

[From the Dalles (Oreg.) Optimist, May 19, 1960]

TODAY, THE "EDMONDS"—TOMORROW, WORLD TRADE

Arrival of the U.S.S. *Edmonds*, a destroyer escort of the U.S. Navy, in The Dalles this Friday for a 3-day stay, with open house aboard the vessel on Saturday—Armed Forces Day—marks a definite milestone in the long and varied history of this century old city.

For one thing, it marks acceptance by the Navy of the existence of a usable channel from Vancouver upriver to The Dalles for vessels of this size—in the case of the *Edmonds*, more than 300 feet in length with a draft of 16 feet.

With completion of the deep-draft (27 feet) channel next month, port of The Dalles will technically be in position to serve the commerce of the inland empire region. Actually, this is not the case since it will first be necessary to construct suitable facilities before the potential commerce of the region can be moved from The Dalles into world markets.

However, potential commerce is already here since savings can be achieved by Harvey Aluminum by the movement of alumina to The Dalles by ship and shipment of other cargoes to their plant in the Los Angeles area.

Outbound cargoes of wheat for the Orient also are potentially available for return cargo on alumina ships since savings are possible. In industry and commerce, that's reason enough.

As the potential of these two basic cargoes is realized, commerce will be expanded to a wide range of export commodities produced in the interior.

Thus, the arrival of a naval vessel here is symbolic of future commercial use of this new seaway which will be of vast importance to the economy of the region, largely dependent upon marketing of wheat.

Strangers to Portland, no doubt, are always somewhat amazed to find ocean-going vessels in the snug harbor provided by the Willamette River, and during rose festival time, to note the presence of destroyers and cruisers. But Portland is truly a maritime city, and the same some day can be said of The Dalles, 86 miles farther up the Columbia—great river of the West.

Flags will be flying on the U.S.S. *Edmonds* in The Dalles harbor as that vessel on Friday afternoon becomes the symbol of a new age of waterborne commerce for the city and region. All of us should join in welcoming the officers and crew of the *Edmonds*, and we're sure the reception, both official and public, will be a rousing one. This is an auspicious occasion, not unlike the arrival of the first trains a half century or more ago over highways of iron.

In the wake of the *Edmonds* will move the commerce of an empire over the waterway afforded by Bonneville Pool.

This week bids were called by the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, for modification of the channel just below Bonneville Dam to permit the easy passage of large vessels through this area now made difficult of passage by strong crosscurrents.

This project of the engineers is solidly based on the economics of the situation, promising numerous benefits to those of us who live and work in the area east of the Cascade Mountains.

The Dalles for more than a century has been a crossroads of commerce, first as the point of contact between stagelines into the interior and the river boats which first plied the Columbia.

Now railroad and truck and buslines serve the commercial and transportation needs of the area on land, and barge fleets handled by diesel-powered tugs, move waterborne commerce up the river as far inland as Pasco, and out of The Dalles to all parts of the west coast and even to Hawaii.

The potential for development of port of The Dalles as a world port clearly is here. How soon that time is coming will depend upon the vision and energy of the port commissioners and their staff, and of the foresight of the people of the port district.

Opportunity is knocking. The development of suitable deep-draft facilities must not be long postponed.

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bringing to the devastated areas of Chile food, clothing, blankets, medicines—in fact, entire field hospitals and hundreds of doctors, nurses, and technicians to staff them.

Many private American agencies are carrying out nationwide fundraising drives to aid our southern neighbors. They include the Red Cross, the Church World Service, Catholic Relief Services, Lutheran World Service, Seventh-day Adventists, and the Church of the Latter-day Saints, to name just some of them.

I urge every American to consider the plight of his neighbors in Chile and to respond generously and swiftly to these fund appeals.

The first needs, of course, are to take care of the sick and injured, to bind up their wounds, to feed them, and to house them in some sort of temporary shelters. But after that, Chile will have to rebuild.

It is estimated that 2 million Chileans were made homeless as a result of this enormous catastrophe, and the Southern Hemisphere's winter is just beginning. Property damage amounts to at least a billion dollars—maybe much more.

I feel confident that the U.S. Government and its people will offer the brave and resolute people of Chile generous help in rebuilding their devastated communities. We will help them to rebuild their homes, churches, and shops, and to restore their means of livelihood—in a word, to make it possible for millions of sufferers to resume a pattern of everyday living once more.

It may be that such help could not be forthcoming from the United States within the framework of our present aid programs to Latin America. Special consideration may have to be given to the problem and a solution worked out. That we should do.

I think that one thing could be learned from America's response to the Chilean disaster. Help from our Government and people-to-people assistance have poured forth abundantly to the disaster victims of Chile—certainly not in the hope that we would reap gratitude or appreciation, but because it was the natural thing for one good neighbor to do for another.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, on last Friday it was announced that the President had ordered a halt to further technical assistance from the United States to Cuba.

I thought that the President's action was sensible and realistic. It has never made sense to me to have our Government giving aid and comfort to a government which is openly vilifying us and our way of life.

Furthermore, I am certain that the President's statement will clear the air of the confusion which exists in this hemisphere about our position toward antidemocratic governments. Everyone in Latin America will now know that the United States is not soft on communism nor on dictatorships of the left or right.

I believe the people of the Western Hemisphere and all of the world out-

side the Soviet orbit will hail and approve the President's action. It reaffirms America's role as the leader in the many-faceted war against communism and all it stands for.

There is one more point. I hope that those who have up to now sought a continuation of the very partial and preferential sugar legislation as it pertained to Cuba will be willing to reevaluate their position and permit the Congress to revise the legislation in a realistic and up-to-date manner.

The Washington Evening Star of yesterday published a significant editorial, clearly setting forth our illogical position in granting Cuba a favored-nation status in our sugar purchasing. The Star points out that our technical aid to Cuba was halted because it was not in our national interest to continue such aid. Then it asks, Is it in our national interest to continue the heavy subsidization of the Cuban sugar industry?

I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Star, May 30, 1960]
CONTEMPTUOUS MR. CASTRO

Cuba's Prime Minister Castro has shrugged off the announced ending of our technical assistance to his country as "insignificant," and has added some contemptuous remarks about what we may do with our aid money.

It is correct, of course, that the two programs involved—one in agriculture and the other in civil aviation—are not of major importance to the Cuban economy. Their annual cost is estimated at about \$200,000, and less than a dozen U.S. specialists are engaged in their operation in Cuba. But while emphasizing that termination of the programs within 180 days should not be interpreted as retaliation for Mr. Castro's anti-United States words and policies, administration spokesmen pointedly explained that the programs no longer are considered in the national or hemispheric interest of the United States.

On this ground, it seems fitting to question whether continued heavy subsidization of the Cuban sugar industry likewise is in our national interest. Under existing law, expiring this year, Cuban sugar has a favored position in the big U.S. market—both in volume and in price. By far, sugar is Cuba's most important cash crop and a guaranteed market at a premium price is not insignificant to the Cuban economy.

The administration has recommended that the new sugar act give discretionary authority to the President of the United States to revise quotas and prices on sugar imports. We believe that the President should have this authority, and that it should be exercised in national and hemispheric interests.

MUTUAL SECURITY: THE MEASURE OF LEADERSHIP

A NEW STAGE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, we may be entering—and I think it apparent that we are—a new stage in East-West relations. Our determination and our leadership of the free world will undergo new tests. Our allies will be searching our actions anxiously. Their resolution to stand inflexible against communism will depend in great part on the maturity and wisdom of our actions.

The Communists are doing more than hurling brutal and arrogant threats at us. The Communists are hard at work building military strength. They are applying their scientific resources to new weapons. They are looking for opportunities to penetrate the uncommitted areas of the world with tantalizing and spurious offers of economic and military aid. They are hoping to bully and bludgeon our friends, particularly the smaller ones bordering on the Soviet bloc, into abandoning their defensive alliances and their friendly relations with the United States and our allies.

The Soviet Union has long recognized the importance of the underdeveloped areas of the world in relation both to the spread of Communist ideology and to the augmentation of Soviet world power. As early as 1920, Lenin changed the direction of Communist Party International policy from direct attack on European capitalism to an undermining of the economic strength of Europe through activity in the colonial areas. Thus, the revolutionary and nationalistic tendencies in Asia were to receive the fullest possible support. With the subsequent emergence and growth of nationalism and the establishment of new States born out of the colonial areas in the Middle East and in Africa, this policy was expanded into these areas. A Soviet pattern of economic penetration for political purposes began to emerge. Today the U.S.S.R. offensive continues against the uncommitted nations on the Asian, Middle Eastern, and African fronts, and in this hemisphere as well.

In the years since Stalin's death, Soviet policy has emphasized what it terms, euphemistically or otherwise, peaceful coexistence. Development of trade and the export of technical assistance, Russian style, have been fashioned into new policy tools. As a corollary, the tactical objectives of communism have emerged as exploitation of new nations' laudable and logical desires to achieve technological and social maturity. Russia undertakes the exploitation of neutralist atmosphere to achieve a pro-Soviet attitude. She seeks substitution of Soviet for Western influences throughout the underdeveloped areas. By a combination of propaganda, technical, and economic aid, plus espionage and subversion, the Soviets work almost fanatically to establish and extend their influence and power.

Soviet intelligence services and the International Communist movement play a major role in their activities. The senior Soviet intelligence apparatus, composed of the State Security Service, and the military intelligence organization, controls a vast interlocking network of foreign agents and operations directed at subversion, terror, assassination, and sabotage. In addition to attempted penetration of all levels of official and nonofficial groups in each country, where they have been singularly successful, this apparatus infiltrates agents whose identity papers, passports, and the like are often stolen or falsified, in direct violation of the sovereignty of the host nations. As a result of the secret support and direction supplied by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the local

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identified ambiguous events, a percentage sufficiently high to discourage evasion. This identification capability depends on only one method of distinguishing the signals produced by earthquakes from those produced by explosions. It is expected that other methods of discrimination will be developed to reduce the number of unidentified events and thereby increase the percentage of suspicious events that may need to be inspected on-site. For instance, the estimates of the capability of the Geneva network have been based on observations of the differing characteristics of only the first part of the low frequency signal emitted by an earthquake and an explosion. Use of other parts of the low frequency signal is expected to improve the capability of the Geneva network as already agreed upon (testimony of Dr. Oliver). In addition, study of characteristic differences of high frequency signals produced by earthquakes and explosions may provide additional techniques of discrimination and identification (testimony of Dr. Roberts).

TESTING IN SPACE

By monitoring blasts in space from the earth's surface, it appears possible that the Geneva network may be able to detect explosions out to 300,000 to 500,000 miles. Beyond that distance monitoring by a system of surveillance satellites may be possible. In addition, test vehicles going into space may be detected by other means at the time of launching. Techniques of shielding blasts in space to reduce the possibility of detection have been suggested. No tests in space are known to have occurred.

SUMMARY

The Geneva network as planned, with 21 well-equipped seismic stations in the U.S.S.R. supplemented by 20 on-site inspections per year, is capable of effectively monitoring tests of 20 kilotons (Nevada conditions) and above. A more favorable arrangement of the 21 stations would bring the limit down considerably below that level. If secret preparation of an extremely big underground hole were possible without risk of discovery by other than seismic means, tests in such a hole up to over 100 kilotons could be sufficiently muffled to escape detection by this system. Construction of big holes appears to be practicable only in salt formations, which occur in regions constituting less than one percent of the U.S.S.R. and in these regions earthquakes are very rare. It is sufficient for control to be able to detect and locate a blast in such a region, without distinguishing it from an earthquake. The Geneva network can do this for a 30-kiloton blast partially muffled in a 200-foot-diameter hole. Such holes exist, filled with brine or petroleum products. The Geneva network is thus capable of controlling tests above 20 kilotons without big holes or above 30 kilotons with such existing holes if pumped out. It would also partially monitor unmuffled tests considerably below 30 kilotons.

Future improvements are definitely expected in detection techniques and may be anticipated also in techniques of evasion. Among the several promising improvements expected in detection techniques is more knowledge of the characteristic differences between blasts and earthquakes, observed through the same geologic formations. If necessary, a suspicious event can thus be checked by detonating a blast near it. This method can also be used to locate the event more accurately, and to reduce greatly the area to be searched by an onsite inspection. If such improvements should fail to make the Geneva network capable of distinguishing sufficiently very small blasts from earthquakes, greatly increased capabilities may be obtained by adding more stations to the system. Even with present techniques, 30 well-equipped stations instead of 21 in the U.S.S.R. would take the limit down below 5 kilotons. The addition of a somewhat

greater number of very simple robot stations, with future techniques, may take the limit for dependable identification well below 1 kiloton. This would have the additional advantage of reducing substantially the area to be searched by onsite inspections.

In short, the Geneva Network has the capability of adequately monitoring underground tests of a power down to about the size of the Hiroshima A-bomb; namely, one-tenth of 1 percent of the power of a large H-bomb; or two-tenths of 1 percent if a program of evasion were undertaken with the handicap of testing in big holes such as now exist in the limited salt-dome regions of Russia; or one-half of 1 percent if the construction of much bigger holes were contemplated. The capability of the monitoring system may be expected to improve markedly with future research and development.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the New York Times, on May 28, carried a detailed summary of the reopening of the Geneva talks which some of us may have missed. I ask consent that it also be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ATOM TEST TALKS RESUME IN GENEVA—SOVIET ASKS ASSURANCE U.S. PLAN WILL NOT AID ARMS—SILENT ON U-2 CASE

GENEVA, May 27.—The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union resumed today the negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapons testing.

No reference was made to the U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane shot down May 1 over the Soviet Union as the delegates reconvened after a 2-week recess for the summit meeting in Paris.

However, Semyon K. Tsarapkin, the Soviet delegate, asked for guarantees that underground nuclear explosions planned by the United States under its project Vela would not serve in weapons development in addition to helping to find effective controls for a ban on tests.

The Soviet negotiator put the request in such a way, however, that he seemed to be asking for no more than the normal guarantees that both sides would expect of each other to assure that all undertakings were observed.

As a result, Sir Michael Wright, of Britain, the conference's chairman for the day, was able to describe the 206th session of the 19-month-old negotiations as a businesslike meeting in a noncontroversial atmosphere.

James J. Wadsworth, the U.S. delegate, confirmed the chairman's remarks. "There was no recrimination—not even one echo from Paris," he commented after the 80-minute session.

"As usual," was the way Mr. Tsarapkin described the atmosphere in the conference room.

The Soviet delegate made a long statement to the conference emphasizing that the Soviet Union had no intention of holding nuclear explosions as part of the projected coordinated program for developing controls on underground tests.

Mr. Tsarapkin also emphasized that the Soviet Union had agreed to the idea of the research program only because the West wanted it. The Soviet Union remains perfectly satisfied with the control system devised by the East-West experts who met here in the summer of 1958, he said.

It was to remove the "obstacle" raised by the U.S. doubts over the effectiveness of the 1958 control system that the Soviet Union accepted the research program now being drafted here by the scientists of the three countries, Mr. Tsarapkin added.

The Soviet Union will insist that any nuclear explosions held by the United States under the research project be surrounded by

"adequate safeguards," the Soviet delegate said. Mr. Tsarapkin said that this meant that the Soviet Union should be able to see for itself that none of the U.S. nuclear tests had military value.

President Eisenhower announced on May 7 the Vela project for a series of underground nuclear explosions to develop controls for hard-to-detect tests. He emphasized later at a news conference that the blasts would have nothing to do with weapons development.

Mr. Tsarapkin said that assurances of this kind were all very well but he thought that the nuclear tests for research purposes should also have technical safeguards. It is up to the United States to make proposals on this, he added.

WE MUST GRANT OUR SENIOR CITIZENS FREEDOM FROM FEAR

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, is it the will and intent of the Senate that the vast majority of our senior citizens face retirement with dread? I think not; but how else can history record our attitude if we continue to allow our elders to fear each passing day that brings them closer to mounting medical costs and little or no way to meet them? A letter from a Wisconsin constituent describes the plight of a man approaching this grim trap, and with nowhere to turn but to us. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATOR PROXMIRE: I am writing to request your wholehearted support of the Forand bill. I am a victim of varicose veins, which, as you probably know, can cause recurrent trouble. I am nearly 64 years old and have hospital insurance, which covers my present expenses when hospitalized, and these cost about \$15 per day. On retirement I will no longer be able to qualify for insurance. Myself and other senior citizens are in need of such a measure of medical and hospital care as the Forand bill provides.

It is my hope that you will give this bill your wholehearted support and help large numbers of senior citizens who are gravely concerned. Thank you in advance.

Yours truly,

THE DISASTER IN CHILE

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, an unmerciful disaster has devastated a huge area of Chile. Thousands of Chileans have died in a series of violent earthquakes, tidal waves, and volcanic explosions. More thousands are missing or injured.

Whole villages have been wiped out and great sections of cities destroyed. The scourge of disaster has been felt along a line of distress 2,600 miles in length. Even now, the extent of suffering and horror is not yet fully known.

The United States, I am proud to say, has acted as a good neighbor should act, opening its heart to the people of Chile, and offering its hand to help them overcome their suffering and their wants. The magnitude of this calamity is appalling, but our Government and our people are responding with a great outpouring of help.

Sixty huge U.S. Air Force planes are carrying out a wonderful mercy airlift,

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party, or one or more of its front organizations, carries out all political action within its means to promote Soviet ends.

The embassies established by the U.S.S.R. may be described—accurately, I think—as command posts for Soviet espionage, subversion, propaganda, and Communist Party efforts. Among the personnel assigned to such installations are many staff members of the intelligence services sent abroad to operate under the guise of diplomats. The groups of Soviets assigned to technical aid missions, hospitals, and the like also usually include a high percentage of intelligence personnel. The U.S.S.R. also exploits the acceptance in these areas of the official Soviet embassies and trade delegations designed to achieve on-the-spot manipulation of the newspapers and other information media of the host countries.

THE OVERALL SOVIET PROGRAM FOR UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

The overall Red program for underdeveloped areas has been focused around three major campaigns:

First, Opposition to what is called "economic neocolonialism," including promotion of the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises, combined action to discourage Afro-Asian trade links with the West, encouragement of opposition to the European Common Market and the Eurafrika plan, and resistance to new foreign capital investment in private enterprise.

Second, Support for national liberation of colonies and recovery of so-called "alienated" territories.

Third, Encouragement of that version of Afro-Asian unity in which Soviet bloc countries of Asia would be accepted as full and equal partners, entitled to preferential political, cultural and economic treatment.

In developing these campaigns the international fronts have engaged in several kinds of organized effort:

First, Expanding the international role and activities of their Afro-Asian affiliates and leaders through organizing special gatherings, assigning major organizational tasks to them, and holding broad meetings in which maximum Afro-Asian participation is invited and publicized;

Second, Inspiring, supporting, and participating as much as possible in joint activities sponsored by unaffiliated Afro-Asian bodies of a similar character; and

Third, Publicizing and supporting Afro-Asian aims and aspirations in Western areas and in such bodies as the United Nations Specialized Agencies, where such support is most likely to influence Afro-Asian peoples, and to suck them into the Red orbit.

AFRICA: THE OVERALL RED PROGRAM IN ACTION

The enormous effort being expended in Africa by the U.S.S.R. clearly illustrates the significance of the Soviets' total worldwide program.

One of the most important centers for Soviet espionage and subversion directed against the entire African continent is found in Cairo, Egypt. Activities emanate from both the Soviet Embassy and the Communist-dominated Afro-Asian

Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The signing of an agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Tunisia this month established diplomatic relations; this action was accompanied by the U.S.S.R. usual offers of aid and favorable trade agreements. The Soviets established diplomatic representations in both Morocco and Libya shortly after these countries attained their independence. In these countries, Soviet diplomatic representatives have been attempting to obtain strategic intelligence on U.S. Air Force bases there and to acquire the information which would allow the Soviets to formulate plans for future sabotage or worse.

The Soviets have also been active among the Communist parties of these areas, especially in Libya, where they have concentrated not only on Libyan Communists but also on the local Italian Communist group. Although the Soviets have not yet recognized the Provisional Algerian Government in exile, the Chinese Communists have extended official recognition and offered arms and monetary aid as well. Members of Algerian nationalist groups have, however, consulted with Soviet officials in other countries, and it will probably not be long before Soviet recognition becomes official here as well.

Soviet permanent installations in Ethiopia are the focal point for Soviet activity for the entire horn of Africa. There is a permanent cultural exhibition in Addis Ababa which disseminates Communist propaganda, offers courses in Russian language, and generally attempts to indoctrinate its visitors, mainly young Ethiopians and students from East Africa. A strong indication of the active Soviet interest in Africa and the heavy selling job the U.S.S.R.'s offers of aid without strings—Russian style—has done may be seen in the visit of Emperor Haile Selassie to the U.S.S.R. last summer. An aid agreement of \$100 million was signed with the Soviets, and an oil refinery and technical school staffed by Soviet officials are planned. In June, a Soviet industrial exhibition will be held in Addis Ababa, and it is reported that the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade will travel there to officially open it.

In West Africa, the Soviets are planning to build a polytechnical institute at Guinea, which will accommodate from 1,500 to 2,500 Guinean students. The institute will be staffed by Soviet personnel—the method consistently used by the U.S.S.R. to infiltrate their officials into positions of influencing long-range economic development and planning. These agreements are used to place Soviet intelligence officers in strategic countries in underdeveloped areas, in technical projects, hospitals, and similar recipients of Red aid programs. It is characteristic that such projects are established only on agreement that the entire staffs are supplied by the Soviets.

A significant aspect of Soviet assistance in this field may be seen in the willingness of the Soviet Government to sponsor and subsidize the study of the Russian language. Under a teacher exchange agreement, Russian language instruction at the university level is al-

ready underway in such countries as Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, India, and Indonesia. In the newly independent state of Guinea, Russian has been selected as the second language of the country—French being the first—and 40 secondary schoolteachers will arrive from the Soviet Union in the fall to initiate this instruction. English had originally been selected as the country's second language, but this plan was abandoned when the U.S. Government was able to offer only one teacher.

TWO CASE HISTORIES: PANYUSHKIN AND OGANESYAN

A meshing of the activities of various Soviet Communist Party, espionage, and governmental organs, in these areas is illustrated by such interesting items as the presence of Aleksander Semenovitch Panyushkin in the CPSU—that is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—delegation to the conference last September of the Democratic Party of Guinea. In November 1959, Panyushkin was described in Pravda as a "member of the Council of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries." He will be best remembered in the United States as Soviet Ambassador from 1947 to 1952, and sometime member of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations during that time. This same Panyushkin was identified by at least four very knowledgeable defectors from the Soviet intelligence services as a longtime career officer of the Soviet intelligence organizations, and the chief of Soviet intelligence activities in the United States during his official tour here. In the summer of 1953 he was chief of all the foreign intelligence activities of the Soviet state security service throughout the world. The presence of such a man as a friendly party representative in Guinea clearly indicates, I think, the importance of these areas to the Soviet intelligence services and to the Soviet Government as a whole.

Soviet "friendship" to these areas of the world is also revealed in a more accurate light by the policy of sending as diplomats to these countries highly experienced intelligence officers whose real aim is to promote the supremacy of the Soviet Union and the theory of International communism by any means. The recent assignment to Iran of Khachik Gevorgovich Oganessian as First Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R. is a glaring example. The nature of Oganessian's true assignment in Iran can safely be predicted on the basis of his past career: From 1946 to 1950, he was the chief intelligence resident in Iran, ostensibly assigned as second secretary of the Soviet Embassy; from 1949 or 1950 to May of 1953, he was chief of the section for deep-cover agents of the state security service in Vienna, Austria, during which time he maintained contracts with Boris Morros, of note as a coconspirator with the Sobells in spying in the United States.

This is a part of the Soviet record.

SOVIET MILITARY FORCES

The Soviet Union is prepared to fight wars ranging in scope from small brush-

fire conflicts, including limited nuclear encounters, to all-out nuclear war, in the words of their leaders.

The Soviet Union's ground force, with about 170 divisions, is continuously engaged in a comprehensive training program designed to maintain peak combat efficiency. Soviet units in East Germany, which are considered to be the elite force of the Soviet Army, are known to be training in tactics reflecting new concepts of the nuclear age, and it is believed that such training is being conducted throughout the Red army. Equipment designed to increased mobility and firepower is being introduced regularly. In fact, practically all Soviet units have been reequipped with military materiel of postwar design and manufacture.

The Soviet Navy is rated as second only to the U.S. Navy in offensive and defensive power. Although the U.S.S.R. has no aircraft carriers, it has the largest submarine force in all the world. This force consists of over 400 units, nearly 75 percent of which are of the long range, ocean patrol type. There is some evidence that a few of these submarines have also been converted so as to be able to fire ballistic missiles. Submarines based along the Murmansk coast and in the Soviet Far East have continuous access to the open seas, and in recent years Soviet submarine activity in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans has increased, occasionally extending as far as the U.S. coasts.

The U.S.S.R. continues to build new submarines. It is quite probable that some of the units under construction are nuclear powered. The Soviet Navy also has strong surface forces consisting of cruisers, destroyers, mine vessels and numerous patrol craft.

I observed just a few days ago that a Communist nuclear-powered icebreaker is now in commission.

For the past several years, the overall strength of Soviet air forces has remained at somewhat less than 20,000 aircraft, supported by a complex of modern air facilities and a realistic training program. Khrushchev's statements regarding the obsolescence of manned aircraft appear to be supported by cutbacks in their production. Some high performance aircraft are being produced, however, and research and development continues in the air weapons field.

At the present time, the major Soviet strategic delivery force is still long range aviation, which is composed of more than 1,000 medium and heavy bombers. But it is clear from Soviet statements and programs that the U.S.S.R.'s current emphasis is in the field of missiles and rocketry.

Soviet research and development in missiles began immediately after World War II. For nearly 15 years the U.S.S.R. has conducted a thorough and well-planned effort. The Soviets now have operational missiles both for defense against aircraft, and for offensive use, including types which can be launched from ground-based units, aircraft, and naval vessels. Their major ground-launched delivery systems include mobile missiles with ranges measured in hundreds of miles, capable of reaching most significant Western targets in Europe

and Asia. Soviet space launchings and firings into the Pacific Ocean show that the U.S.S.R. has some capability to direct ICBM's at targets as distant as the United States. The importance of ballistic missiles in Soviet planning is amply illustrated by the U.S.S.R.'s recent announcement of the creation of a special rocket force.

In the light of these sobering facts, our future course of action with our friends and allies throughout the world must and will be made clear for all to understand:

We shall continue to search for means of advancing an honorable peace, by patient urging of genuine negotiation for sound first-step progress.

We shall maintain and make more effective our own defenses—our nuclear arsenal, our missile development, and our limited war capability, all designed to deter aggression or, if necessary, to combat it.

We shall reinvigorate our collective security alliances by demonstrating a willingness to contribute our full and fair share in manpower and modern arms to the defensive strength of the free nations of the globe.

We do not intend, by neglect or disinterest, to allow the Soviet bloc successfully to infiltrate the emerging nations of Asia and Africa. We shall continue the world's confidence in America's moral leadership by extending an honest hand of friendship and of assistance to the underdeveloped nations in their fight for progress and freedom.

THE COMING TEST

We are all painfully aware of what happened in Paris. We have seen and been shocked by the arrogance of the Soviet Prime Minister, by his unrestrained vituperation, and by his callous destruction of the summit conference. These events have jolted every one of us into a fuller realization of what survival costs. The free world is once again faced with the naked threat of Communist power, and with the more transparent efforts to frighten our allies and friends and to split the free world apart.

In the coming months our courage, strength, and resolution will be sorely tried. The crisis over Berlin could come to a head. Communist violence in other parts of the world may erupt again: bellicosity in the Formosa Straits, terrorism in Laos and Cambodia, pressure on Afghanistan or India or elsewhere, incitement in South America and greater penetration in Africa.

But we are not alone in the struggle to preserve freedom. Through the mutual security programs of economic and military assistance abroad, we are able to strengthen ourselves and the free world in deterring Communist aggression whether Soviet or Red Chinese.

MSP—ITS HISTORIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Let us look backward for a moment to see how the mutual security program came into being and what it has accomplished.

It is no exaggeration to say that this great program, initiated by a Democratic President and a Republican Congress and continued by a Republican President and Democratic Congresses, has been one of

the tremendous successes of our national history. In its very first years, it saved two highly strategic and important nations, Greece and Turkey, from Communist domination. It made possible the recovery of war-torn Western Europe with its civilization, love of freedom, its culture, its splendid people, and its great resources. Without doubt, it saved at least three nations—probably more—from Communist takeover at the polls. It preserved Iran on the edge of Soviet power. It helped to save southeast Asia from total Communist domination. It has preserved and reinvigorated all that remains of free China. It made possible the creation of our great NATO alliance and gave it its initial strength.

It is the program which makes possible the availability of 250 forward bases essential to the full meaning and effectiveness of our military strategy of deterrence.

It is this program which contributes to the strength among our allies abroad, so essential to the success of any necessary effort to wage a limited or other kind of war against aggression.

It is this program which holds out to the people of the less developed nations of the world the friendly assistance they need in their tremendous effort to fight their way up from age-old poverty, ignorance, and disease.

It is this program, joined in by other free nations, which provides the free world's answer to the Communist bloc's attempt to woo and win the newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa with lavishly proffered military and economic aid.

It is this program which, in a most significant degree, is the symbol of American leadership in world affairs. In short, this program is the strongest, most flexible instrument available to our Nation and our Government in the conduct of our foreign relations in this most critical period in our history.

If this program did not exist, we would have to invent it.

What would have happened if we had not had this program? What would happen if we did not have it now? Our whole forward strategy of defense would be weakened to the point of collapse. The sources of raw materials essential to our defense and our prosperity would be threatened. Our allies and other free countries would be left at the mercy of Communist threats and subversion; their confidence in and hope for a free world would be shattered.

We would find ourselves more and more isolated in a narrowing world swamped by the widening and engulfing Red tide.

We would be confined to a policy of fortress America—a policy we long ago examined and long ago realistically rejected in this era of nuclear power in which we are now well entered.

Under this strategy, we recognize that the maximum potential military theater of operations today is the entire globe. That underscores the importance of the 250 bases we now maintain abroad.

An important segment of our defensive arrangements is dependent on the contribution by our allies in military forces, in land for missile and naval bases, in

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military facilities of all kinds, in economic sacrifices by diversion of resources from consumption to military purposes. The constancy of our allies in making their contributions and in refusing to knuckle under to a Communist neighbor is directly proportional to our own unyielding purpose and to our contribution to the joint free-world defense.

The day is near when we will be called upon to vote funds for the mutual security program. By approving the President's program, both the Communist and the free world will clearly see our iron purpose in meeting full-on the Soviet threat.

THE MSP FOR FISCAL YEAR 1961

I turn now to the program the President has proposed for fiscal year 1961. It includes three major elements: the economic programs which we authorized recently; the Development Loan Fund for which the Congress authorized appropriations last year; and the military assistance program for which we have provided an open-ended authorization of funds for 2 years.

Military assistance: Under this military assistance authorization, the President has asked for \$2 billion for fiscal year 1961.

This is the sum recommended by a committee of distinguished experts headed by William H. Draper and designated by the President to make the most searching study of the needs of our military assistance program in the context of our overall military security program. This is the sum recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have said in the most categorical terms that this represents the most economical and efficient use of funds to bolster America's security, and that they would not want one dollar transferred from this use to our regular Defense Department budget.

What is this \$2 billion needed for? About \$1.2 billion is simply to maintain the present strength of forces on the Communist frontiers in Korea, the Republic of China, Vietnam, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Greece, and others of our NATO allies. But an essential part of this program is for the modernization and strengthening of the weapons available to our allied forces; and the tragedy of any cut would be that it would necessarily cut into—indeed, could prevent—this very strengthening and modernization.

I have heard it said as to our European allies that with their improved economies they should carry a greater part of the load; that we should be able to reduce our aid. I agree; and this is, in fact, being done. The percentage of U.S. contribution to NATO defense has declined from 20 percent to 4 percent since 1952. Last year alone the European NATO countries increased defense spending by 11 percent.

This is the first solid accomplishment I want to point to—a greatly improved NATO defense without increase in cost to the American taxpayer. In specific terms, this means:

Thirty missile battalions under General Norstad's command in Europe;

The Thor missile with nuclear capability deployed in the United Kingdom;

Jupiter missiles being installed in Turkey and Italy;

Joint production of Sidewinder and Hawk missiles by European countries;

Modern anti-submarine-warfare capability covering the limited sea outlets of the Russian submarine fleet; and

Greatly increased firepower of integrated NATO land forces which face the 40 Russian divisions in East Germany and Poland.

About one-third of our military assistance money goes to the Far East. The forces we are helping in this theater are nearly all directly confronting superior Communist manpower. In some areas, our weapons and ammunition are used by allied forces in sporadic outbursts of fighting. Taiwan and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu have been reinforced with strong retaliatory firepower. In Vietnam and Laos, we have provided equipment and training against guerrilla warfare which now, thanks to our joint efforts, has been greatly diminished and which presents no immediate threat.

Eighteen Korean divisions defend South Korea against a new invasion from the North, allowing U.S. troops to be reduced to two divisions. These vital land forces are reinforced by a modern Korean air force, naval units, and missile battalions supplied by the United States.

There are a few examples of what military assistance, under Mutual Security, has accomplished. Without it, our collective security agreements would be little more than contracts of good intentions. Without the forces which we help to arm, either the security of the United States would today be in grave danger, or we would have a defense budget increased many times over the \$2 billion we are asked to provide for military assistance.

ECONOMIC AID FOR MILITARY STRENGTH

It would be worse than useless to provide an ally with equipment for military forces if its economy broke under the burdens of supporting such forces. To prevent this, we help 12 of our allies with economic aid in the form of defense support.

The need for such defense support as a supplement to military assistance is self-evident. A war-ruined and underdeveloped country like Korea cannot alone maintain an army of well over half a million men in the free world interest. Small countries like Greece and Turkey cannot bear the whole economic burden of large armies for land defense on the flank of NATO and on the frontiers of the Communist bloc. It would mean economic chaos for these countries to try to meet the whole cost of troop pay and other expenses of outside military forces. We fill the gap through our defense support program. It has a twofold effect. On the one hand, our dollar aid is used to import commodities and capital goods which, wherever possible, contribute directly to economic development. On the other hand, these goods are sold on local markets and the proceeds are used by the local government to meet a part of the costs of their own military establishment.

In countries like Pakistan, Korea, and Cambodia, defense support may be the margin between extinction and progress. In Turkey, largely due to defense support, the gross national product has nearly doubled since 1948. Spain, where vital strategic air bases are now located, with defense support, has shown great economic gains in the past few years.

Mr. President, at a luncheon in the White House today, I had the honor to sit in the presence of representatives of the SEATO countries. I met a number of them. Many of them—perhaps most of them—have skin whose color is different from yours and mine. They represent diverse religions, cultures, and economies. But they are all united in their fierce desires to advance the cause of freedom for themselves and for their people. They stand shoulder to shoulder by the Government and the people of the United States in an effort to deter aggression—and I mean, essentially, potential Communist aggression against the free way of life. They, like Americans, decline to accept the complete regimentation of international communism.

I considered it a great honor to be present. It will be one of my moving recollections of my years in the Senate that I met gallant and proud and able representatives of countries which are members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, all meeting together in this free Capital of ours, to determine the best means by which the security of Southeast Asia may be preserved—indeed, may be strengthened.

MUTUAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS

I think that we are all keenly aware that the strength of the free world rests not alone on military power but on the economic progress of its peoples. This is particularly true in the less developed and the newly independent nations where there is a surging demand for a better way of life.

The United States has been responsive to the aspirations of these peoples. We are providing assistance to them through our mutual security program.

Our chief means for moving skills and investment capital to the underdeveloped countries are the mutual security programs of technical assistance and the Development Loan Fund. The President has asked appropriations of \$181 million for technical cooperation, together with \$34.5 million for international technical cooperation programs. He has asked \$700 million for the development Loan Fund. These programs are our response to the people of the world struggling for a better life. They make up our frontline defense against Soviet economic warfare. Through them, we heed the urgent pleas of the new nations of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa for help in meeting the enormous problems of their first months and years of existence. Six more countries will become independent in the coming months alone. They need encouragement in their efforts to move forward in freedom.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION—WORKING WITH PEOPLE

Our technical cooperation program—point 4, we call it—is undoubtedly the

best known of all our efforts. I shall not dwell on it. Let me assert, however, that the need to build skills, to educate, to train is still fundamental to everything else. In the new countries of Africa, for example, the shortage of trained people is very great. In the Belgian Congo, there are said to be eight college graduates who are not Europeans—and many of the Europeans are leaving as the Congo becomes independent.

Yet we have many solid accomplishments to point to, and together with the United Nations technical assistance programs and efforts of other countries, we are beginning to fill the vacuum in skills, training, and literacy. For example, when the U.S.-financed Agricultural Technical School in Ethiopia opened, 690 applications were received for 68 openings. Each year, 120,000 Turkish Army recruits are learning to read and write under programs developed by American language experts.

THE DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND

This recently created Fund is the ultimate source of capital for the underdeveloped nations to turn to. In a little over 2 years of operation, the Loan Fund has financed large-scale projects in the basic development fields of transport and communications, power, large industry, and mining. Of special importance, I think, is its success in lending to local development banks in other countries which in turn lend sums of less than \$10,000 to small investors. These small loans stimulate private enterprise, create jobs, and help meet the demand for consumption goods in underdeveloped countries. I emphasize that this is a loan program, not a grant program. For example, a single one of these loans, to assist rubber growing in Guatemala, will help employ 17,000 workers, supply rubber for a new tire factory, produce \$30 million worth of exports a year, and open to the United States a nearby supply of strategic natural rubber.

The President has asked \$700 million for the Development Loan Fund for next year. This is far less than the \$1,100 million the Congress has authorized. It is, I think, a logical and laudable request for funds that are desperately needed for the development of nations whose future is important to us. Certainly it should be provided in full.

SPECIAL ASSISTANCE

There are several nations with which we do not have military assistance arrangements, but in whose stability and progress we have the greatest interest. Several of these nations, such as Libya and Morocco, provide us with base rights of the greatest importance. The democracy of Israel receives added strength from this program. Others, such as Jordan, could collapse, leaving the gravest danger of chaos or worse, were it not for our help which we provide through special assistance.

I might mention Tunisia as an example of one country where our special assistance has borne fruit. Three years ago, this small Arab country cut its ties with France, and embarked on an attempt to steer a democratic course against the tides of Arab nationalism

and the subverting currents of communism. With the help of special assistance from the United States, Tunisia has recovered from the economic shock that accompanied independence, and has established itself as a dynamic and progressive force in the Arab world. Tunisia's success in reaching its goals through cooperation with the West is carefully watched by the emerging African and neighboring Arab States.

CONTINGENCY FUND

Past experience has taught us that each year there will arise emergencies and contingencies we cannot foresee. Under these circumstances it is wise to have available to the President a contingency fund. The President requested for that fund for next year \$175 million, and the Foreign Relations Committee recommended the authorization of that amount. I deeply regret that this fund was cut to \$155 million on the Senate floor. The final conference action was \$150 million. To my mind, it is only too obvious, under present circumstances, that at least this full sum should be provided for the coming difficult year.

Who knows what the coming year may bring? Why should the hand of any President of our country be shackled in such a way that he cannot have the means by which to meet unforeseen contingencies which might endanger the security of the people of the United States?

ERRORS IN MUTUAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

We have heard much this year, as in the past, of individual mistakes in the conduct of the mutual security program. There will probably be mistakes in the future. This is bound to occur when we build complex projects in backward areas and within primitive economic systems. In my comments, I have deliberately stressed individual instances where we have succeeded. Almost none of these success stories have received attention in Congress or in the American press. For every publicized mistake in this program, for every disappointing project, there are thousands of cases where, because of our efforts, people are eating better, have jobs, are free of disease, are protected against Communist guerrilla tactics or worse, have new land to till, can read and write, have new hope for their children, and have hopes for freedom for themselves, for their families, and for their countries. In the perspective of history, this may become the most important thing the people of America do today as a nation.

CONCLUSION

I do not believe that anyone can honestly doubt the urgency of our need to bind together the nations of the world, still able to make a choice between tyranny and freedom. United in our common purpose, if we act with resolution and determination, in responding to the needs of our free world friends and allies, we will prevent the aggressive plans of the Communist bloc from reaching fruition. If history teaches us anything, it is the tragedy of failing to stand together in times of crisis. In one of his most memorable speeches to the House of Commons, which occurred after the

fall of France, Britain's great leader, Winston Churchill, said:

If we can stand up to him (Hitler), all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted by the lights of perverted science.

While the 1960's are not identical with the years of World War II, we may be sure that if we fail to stand up to international communism, if we fail to make the exertions which providence requires of us, our failure will draw us closer to the abyss of which Churchill spoke.

But we need not fail. We are on the eve of achieving complete mastery over the fallen forces of nature, on the seas, on the land, and in the air, reaching out toward the stars. It is within our power, as the leader of the free world, to bring a new birth of freedom to men everywhere.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

OVERALL LIMITATION OF FOREIGN TAX CREDIT

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 10087) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to permit taxpayers to elect an overall limitation on the foreign tax credit.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the bill now before the Senate, H.R. 10087, should not be considered in isolation, nor can it be taken at face value. This bill would provide a privileged minority of American taxpayers with tax concessions not available to very many. The problem here involved is part and parcel of the larger problem of the proper method of taxing the income earned abroad by U.S. corporations. At the present time, certain foreign taxes are allowed as credits against the U.S. income tax; and, furthermore, the incidence of the U.S. tax varies, both as to rate and as to time levied, with the organization of the foreign operating arm of the U.S. corporation.

Specifically, the bill would allow a U.S. corporation, in taking credit for foreign income, war profits, and excess profit taxes against U.S. income taxes, to apply either the per-country limitation, now in effect, or the overall limitation, at the option of the corporation. This bill was originally section 5 of House bill 5, the so-called Boggs bill. For some reason, this part of H.R. 5 was singled out for special treatment. The Treasury opposed the provisions of this bill when such provisions were embodied in section 5 of the Boggs bill, in hearing before the Ways and Means Committee.

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the nomination on the first ballot, we can be sure that powerful influences are now at work to undermine and destroy him. The internationalists and the Red appeasers cannot forget that he is the man who, more than anyone else, was responsible for the exposure of Alger Hiss. Accordingly, we can expect to see a fight made on Nixon by the same old Nixon dumping crowd.

Already Adlai Stevenson, Paul Butler, Senator Kennedy, Chester Bowles, and Senator Fulbright, all of whom are able to qualify as internationalists, extraordinary, and appeasers plenipotentiary are busy making trouble and intimating that they can qualify in the Roosevelt tradition of Communist appeasement. This is not a pretty picture, but it is the ugly shape of things as they exist.

Here are Mr. Walsh's observations. I commend them most highly because it proves that citizens of the high plains of mid-America can see the international pitfalls even clearer than international experts who are inclined to look too often through the rose tinted glasses on the one-world aspect:

U-2 AND KHRUSHCHEV NONSENSE

It now seems clear that the U-2 incident which was seized upon by Khrushchev as a cause celebra was in fact only a trifling incident in the world struggle now in progress. The incident was deliberately blown up by Soviet propaganda into a great mountain of evil and wrong on the part of the United States. It was used as a handy instrument to insult the President, humiliate the American people, and kick over the keg of moonshine diplomacy, called the Summit Conference. The whole Khrushchev tantrum at the summit reminds one of the town bully publicly insulting the mayor, setting all the dogs barking, and breaking up the town picnic because the mayor would not apologize for stepping on the cat's tail.

The trifling character of the U-2 incident has been publicly disclosed by Khrushchev himself. Khrushchev knew of the photographic missions of our Air Force over Soviet territory for a long period of time. When he visited the President at Camp David last fall, he was tempted to speak to Eisenhower about the matter. He disclosed this at his news conference in Paris. He said that he finally decided after considering it, not to bring the matter up. He said that he and the President were on friendly terms, so he decided that the matter could wait. He was then busy practicing the Camp David spirit. He said that the President was addressing him as friend in the Russian language, and that he was returning the salutation in English. Only one conclusion can be drawn from this remarkable acknowledgment, and that is that while Khrushchev was irked and annoyed because our photographic planes were flying over Russian territory almost at will; and he was also further annoyed, because Russian defenses were not equal to the task of bringing them down. However, he then needed to promote a friendly understanding. While Khrushchev was visiting at Camp David, he did not need a peg upon which to hang a series of insults. He had no occasion then to smash the dishes, break the furniture, or blow the house off of the foundation. Instead, he was anxiously endeavoring to bring about a summit conference. He was purring like a Communist kitten in capitalistic sunshine, and hoping that the President could be coaxed into another diplomatic corner.

We must bear in mind that Khrushchev and the First Minister of Britain were, during those months, brusting at the seams, so to speak, organizing another high-hat go, at personal diplomacy, with our President and the President of France. In view of all these circumstances and the pattern of other

events, something more than the flight of an Air Force photographic plane over Russian territory is needed to make a sensible appraisal of the Khrushchev reasons for wrecking the conference.

"The spirit of Camp David" was touted throughout the world as a new era in the cold war; but the "spirit" lost a great deal of its appeal long before the scheduled meeting at Paris. For some weeks before May 18 there were a great number of symptoms evidencing Soviet displeasure with the prospects of the projected summit meeting. While it is true that the British Prime Minister continued until the last to "doze" appeasement from all his diplomatic pores; but the German Chancellor, President de Gaulle, and to a lesser extent, our President gave every appearance of standing firm and standing for no further Communist appeasement. Khrushchev and his advisers certainly did not like the looks of the situation. They reacted in typical Communist fashion. They incited their stooges and dupes into a general pattern of rioting. The fomented riots in South Africa, Korea, Turkey, and San Francisco. Everywhere the pattern was the same. Students were incited and inflamed against wrongs or supposed wrongs of constituted authority. Khrushchev was showing Communist teeth everywhere. Those events were staged for the purpose of letting the people of the world know the capacity of the Kremlin for making trouble.

Then the U-2 incident came upon the scene. The plane came down on Russian territory on May 1; however, it was substantially a week before the incident began to take shape as an important event. It was about 5 days later before Khrushchev even mentioned the incident. It was then seized upon by the Red rulers as a suitable means with which to damn America and the President of the United States.

There are all sorts of speculations concerning Khrushchev's motives for breaking up the conference. Khrushchev himself worked assiduously for months to bring about the meeting which he himself destroyed. Why was this done? It was done because at one time it suited the Kremlin's purpose to hold the conference and at the time appointed for the meeting, it no longer suited the plans of the Kremlin. Since Khrushchev knew about our photographic planes flying over Russia for some 4 years, the flight of the U-2 over Russia on May 1 was only a pretext for the performance of Khrushchev at Paris in May. Khrushchev is certainly not the person to be howling about spying since tens of thousands of his subjects are pursuing that as a vocation. He might be likened to the man who murdered his parents and then asked for sympathy because he was an orphan.

In view of these considerations, the U-2 incident at most is a trifling matter; and to consider it of special importance, is to take Russian propaganda at face value. No adult should be fooled by this thing. And no one should be fooled by the breastbeating of Adlai Stevenson and Walter Lippmann. They easily qualify as internationalists and appeasers in the first magnitude.

It is sufficient explanation for Khrushchev's conduct to remember that he needed some sort of an ass to beat, someone to insult, and some pretended outrage to upset the conference. In this connection, the U-2 incident was a convenient diplomatic windfall which served his purpose.

The rulers of the Kremlin knew that they had nothing to gain by the Paris Conference. A delay was needed and a hope was entertained that the next tenant of the White House will have more inclination to appeasement than its present inhabitant. Khrushchev, in fact, said this at his "press conference." He not only blamed the President, he insulted and abused him in the worst fashion imaginable. Never in the history of the country has our Chief Executive been

U-2 and Khrushchev Nonsense

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. WINT SMITH

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 31, 1960

Mr. SMITH of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, much comment has been heard and a great deal written about the recent incident in Paris—most generally labeled "The Summit Conference That Failed." It is well known that the men supposed to ascend to the summit never got off the banks of the lazy flowing Seine through the city of Paris. Recently I received a letter from an attorney, Charles A. Walsh of Concordia, Kans. Mr. Walsh has set forth some very pertinent ideas in regard to this Paris conference. In the "letter accompanying this article he says this:

The wild reactions now visible indicate very clearly that Khrushchev's direction to his helpers in this country have already had effect. "Dump Nixon" is again a part of the plan now in operation. Of course, every effort will be made to forestall his nomination, and to get internationalist, Rockefeller, to head the Republican ticket. GOLDWATER is even less acceptable to the appeasers than Nixon. Already the propaganda hounds of the press and radio are baying for Nixon's hide.

It is apparent to me that the political propaganda of the Communist Party is already active in an endeavor to influence both political conventions. Those who are grown up politically, know that the Communist Party works very effectively inside of the Democratic and Republican Parties. It occurred to me in the course of the preparation of the material I am sending, that the leftist elements of the Republicans would try to make another "dump Nixon" attempt. The first intimation to that effort came yesterday when Rockefeller announced that he would accept a draft by the Republican National Convention. Although Nixon seems to have more than enough votes to secure

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subjected to insults such as were heaped upon him by the Kremlin boss. Khrushchev also made it clear that he despises the Vice President. A week or 10 days before the Paris Conference, the President mentioned that Vice President Nixon might be asked to sit in at the Conference in case the President was called away. Khrushchev took note of this, and stated that to allow the Vice President to participate in the Conference would be like "sending a goat to take care of the cabbage."

Whatever Khrushchev's attitude toward Eisenhower may have been in Camp David, he decided to throw him out of his diplomatic baggage like he might dispose of a ragged shirt. He made it very clear that he hopes for a later summit meeting, and that the presidential election is a matter of vital concern to him and to the Communist Party.

Among the major purposes Khrushchev achieved in Paris last week was to notify the world and the Communist Party of the United States, in particular, that the new Hitler in Communist demonology is President Eisenhower and the new Himmler is Vice President Nixon. Thus, Khrushchev added two names to the Communist litany of demons. This was his way of taking part in American politics. It was his way of telling the Communist world and the Communist Party of the United States, its fellow travelers, dupes, and fringe adherents, that they are to effect a change in the political climate of the United States. It was his way of telling them that the President is a discard and the Vice President unacceptable. Likewise, it was his way of saying that political talks and summit meetings, must be held on the terms of the Kremlin. It ought to be clear by this time that diplomatic intercourse with political crocodiles like the Communists, is nonsense. Those who remain addicted to the belief that headhunters and cannibals will give up their first principles if you talk to them in a friendly fashion, are still convinced by their own propaganda.

Khrushchev did a masterful job of telling all and sundry that talks at the summit cannot be resumed until there is a change of political climate in the United States. In effect, he told his stooges here to go to work and elect a respectable President of the United States, who can be invited to confer with Communists. He made it clear that Franklin Roosevelt was acceptable as a U.S. President. By implication, it was clear to his adherents in the United States, that they must work for the election of a President who follows the Roosevelt tradition.

It is abundantly clear that Khrushchev's hand is in our political pottage; and it will be well for us to keep that in mind. It would also be well, to watch the propaganda and comments of the leftist section of the press. You may rest assured that the Kremlin will make no further public statements about the presidential election in the United States. In fact, the Kremlin will deny that it is even interested. That is surely a part of the plan. That will be the best way of furthering the fortunes of Moscow's candidate. Certainly no further public directions to Communist adherents in the United States are necessary. They know what they are expected to do. If future orders from the Kremlin are necessary, they will not be made public.

In connection with this, it will be interesting to see how the Kremlin job is done. This year in America, Walter Lippmann can be counted on to set the pattern. Joseph Alsop, Drew Pearson, and Doris Fleeson may be relied upon to carry the political torch for candidates with liberal leftist orientation.

Those who have been the public apologists and supporters of Alger Hiss, William Remington, Owen Lattimore, and Dr. Oppenheimer can be counted upon to make clear by their writings which of the candidates for the presidential nomination are acceptable

to Khrushchev, and which of the nominees can be sure of an invitation to Moscow, and accepted as a participant at another summit conference.

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The Chicago Tribune has been writing a series of stories during the debate in the United Nations, pointing out the type of espionage carried on by the Soviet agents right here in our own country. This is an excellent series because it demonstrates the hypocrisy of Khrushchev's anguished outcries against our planes flying over the Soviet Union.

I am also glad to see our own Government start releasing hitherto secret information about the extent of Communist espionage in our own country. I hope the CIA will make more of this information available to the American people so they can see how tirelessly the Communists are working to destroy us. I hope in bringing forth the information, the CIA will surface Col. Jan Monat, the former head of intelligence for the Communist regime in Poland, who defected to our side last year. I am sure Colonel Monat can give us much details about the Communist conspiracy.

The gentleman from Washington, just a few minutes earlier today, related how a microphone had been planted in the American Embassy in Moscow.

Certainly, as I said at the outset of my remarks, while the present investigation being conducted by the other body is laudable indeed, I do hope and feel that some investigation should be made as to why at this particular time, at this crucial moment, when the summit conference was being arranged, this particular U-2 plane should have fallen into Soviet hands, thus giving Mr. Khrushchev this wonderful plum that he needed to break up; to torpedo, the summit conference.

I feel that these things do not just conveniently happen; and while I am not prepared to make any accusations, I think that the American people would be a great deal more comfortable—I know I, myself, would be more comfortable—if I knew that an investigation had been made, a thorough top-to-bottom investigation, of all the incidents preceding this plane flight to ascertain whether in fact this was just an unfortunate coincidence. It may be reasonable to believe that it might have been just a coincidence that the U-2 plane went down at this particular time. We had been making these flights for 4 years and the Soviet Union had not been able to knock down any of these airplanes. It is quite possible the law of averages finally caught up with us. But I have been asked by many of my constituents whether or not anything is being done to find out whether possibly there had been some collusion somewhere along the line in order to give Mr. Khrushchev this plum and I do not believe we should completely ignore this possibility in view of the Soviet's long and despicable history of espionage in our country.

Since there is a tremendous overlapping of jurisdictions in any investigation of this type, with various committees of Congress having jurisdiction over certain segments of this investigation, if it would be in order, I would suggest that perhaps the chairmen and the ranking minority members of the standing committees which have jurisdiction over some phases of all this activity conduct

a joint investigation. I believe this joint committee should include the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the chairman of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the chairman of the Legislative Oversight Committee, the chairman of the Committee on Government Operations and finally the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, and of course, the ranking minority member of each. I am wondering if, perhaps, they could not get together and lay out some course of action, some plan of investigation to get all the facts of this ill-fated but historic flight.

I believe that since the Camp David meeting, since we made the tragic mistake of inviting Khrushchev to this country—and I said on the floor of this House at that time that it was a mistake to dignify Mr. Mikoyan, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Kozlov, and all these other Soviet leaders who were brought to this country and welcomed in this country and shown the traditional American hospitality; I said then that it was a mistake to invite these men—I believe that since the Camp David meeting, there appears to have been a sort of lessening of the realization of the fact that if ever we needed security mindfulness in this country, we need it now.

I would like to have the chairmen of these committees get together and see if among themselves they could lay out a course of action to have an investigation of our entire internal security structure in a manner that would not in any way jeopardize our national security.

I am thinking of the many Americans who have been asking the question: Has this airplane really fallen into Soviet hands at this very critical time by pure accident or were there other factors that contributed to it? These people are entitled to an answer.

I am perplexed by one thing in this entire U-2 spy plane affair. The President, in his statement the other day said—and I think the President is to be congratulated for his firmness at the summit, for not yielding to Khrushchev's scandalous demands of an apology; I am in complete agreement with the President on this—but I am a little perplexed in hearing the President say that the initial American reports regarding this U-2 incident were designed as a "cover story" and were purposely distorted to protect the U-2 pilot. The thing that confuses me is that while the President now explains the original mix-up in handling the affair was the result of efforts to protect the pilot, the head of the CIA had earlier told a committee of Congress that the pilot of this airplane had been instructed, if he should fall into enemy hands, to make a clean, full confession of his activities.

I wonder who gave such instructions to this American pilot a spy mission? Certainly such complete disclosure would jeopardize our entire intelligence structure.

This is one of the aspects into which I would like to have this joint committee go more deeply. Why was Pilot

Powers told that if he were caught, he should make a full, clean sweep of things? I know that during the war, when our own American soldiers were captured by the enemy—of course, Mr. Powers was not a member of the military, he was a civilian—but during the war, when our American soldiers fell into enemy hands, we had been instructed to give only our name, rank, and serial number, and that is all.

I am perplexed and disturbed as to why these instructions, if they were in fact given to Powers, were given, and who was responsible for these instructions for Mr. Powers to go out, when he is caught, and tell his captors just exactly what he is doing; why he is doing it; how long he has been doing it, and everything else. This type of instruction, I believe, could jeopardize our American security system as much as anything else. There are many other aspects of this disastrous flight, which could effect the future of the world, that need to be studied by competent authority.

So, while I am in full agreement that our American Government that it should have continued these flights over the Soviet Union—and I do not share the criticism of those who say that these flights should have been stopped—while I am in full agreement with the position that the President has taken, one of firmness at the summit, one of not yielding an inch to Khrushchev, I am disturbed that now when the smoke is beginning to clear apparently no investigation is going to be made as to the incidents precedent to the capture of this aircraft.

I renew my request that, if it is in order, the chairmen of the standing committees of the House get together and sit either as a joint committee or work out some sort of a formula so that investigation of our entire security program in America could be made.

I emphasize again that we would make a tragic mistake if we as Americans did not go beyond the scope of normal assumption. The normal assumption quite properly is that there was nothing wrong, that this was an unfortunate incident where the airplane flamed out and came down to an altitude at which the Soviet Union could then force it down to the ground. That would be the normal assumption, and perhaps that normal assumption is completely justified. But today, when we are dealing with an enemy that is more brutal than the world has ever seen before; an enemy that will resort to any methods of sabotage or espionage; any tactics—and we know this from 15 years of experience in dealing with the Communists and we have ample evidence that they will stop at nothing to destroy us—it then behooves us as Americans to go beyond the normal scope of assumption and find out why these things happened at this particularly convenient time for Mr. Khrushchev to torpedo the summit conference.

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. HOEVEN. It is my understanding that there are two committees in the Senate, one under the leadership of the dis-

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tinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and the other under the chairmanship of the distinguished Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] that are going to conduct full hearings on all matters relating to the failure of the summit conference.

It is my understanding that this investigation will cover all angles, both prior and subsequent to the landing of the U-2 plane, that these investigations will be held at a very high level on a nonpartisan basis, and with the concurrence of the White House, so that the facts may be fully developed.

As to the gentleman's suggestion that the chairmen of several committees of the House conduct an investigation, let me say I am sorry the gentleman has not had the benefit of some of the discussions I have had with relation to that very matter. In the meeting which I attended it seemed to be the general consensus that it would be a mistake to have the committees of Congress go into matters which involve such a delicate situation as our intelligence. I think we will get the information that the public should have from these committees that are already functioning in the Senate, and that full disclosure will be made not only to the Congress but to the American people.

Mr. PUCINSKI. If the gentleman will permit me, it rather intrigues me why so many of the people who are in charge of our intelligence setup in this country take upon themselves the attitude that they are beyond the scope of Congress. I know from experience—I, myself, in 1952 was an investigator for a congressional committee which investigated a very serious crime committed by the Communists against some 15,000 allied army officers—I must say I was completely unsatisfied, as I delved into these various aspects of American intelligence, with the slipshod operations of our intelligence agencies. I do not see anything wrong, and I do not see anything inconsistent with a suggestion that responsible chairmen of standing committees in Congress conduct such an inquiry. I have complete confidence in these men.

We stood here on the floor of the House of Representatives recently and applauded the speech delivered on the floor of this House by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations [Mr. CANNON] when he told us he had known of these flights for 4 years. I was very happy to hear that the chairman of this committee had been taken into the confidence of the military. The fact remains that our intelligence people can take into their confidence the chairmen of these standing committees who set up the appropriations and who set up the policies and the various other aspects of our national security. I am not, as a Member of the Congress, ready to surrender those rights to the bureaucracy of any agency.

Mr. HOEVEN. I can understand the gentleman's concern about having the information which he desires.

Mr. PUCINSKI. If the gentleman will permit me, I do not necessarily desire it

for myself, but certainly I do want an appropriate committee of Congress to have it so that we can be certain that there was no collusion or just plain carelessness in giving Khrushchev the tools with which to wreck the summit conference. The gentleman will agree that plain carelessness, when you are dealing in this complicated field of espionage, is just as disastrous to our Nation as outright treason. I think many of our agencies have been just plain careless in dealing with the Soviets and the investigation I am proposing might help improve this situation. It is entirely possible that the U-2 failure ultimately will be traced to sloppy operations. But when we are fighting for our very survival we can no more tolerate carelessness than we can tolerate espionage.

Mr. HOEVEN. I understood you wanted the information as a Member of Congress. Again I say we are dealing with a very delicate subject, to wit, the intelligence and national defense of this country. Would the gentleman want confidential information given to the public which might jeopardize our national defense structure?

Mr. PUCINSKI. No; I do not want to disclose anything which would jeopardize our national defense. I have said many, many times, where matters of national security are at stake, certainly, these things and the secrecy of these proceedings should be respected. I agree with the gentleman. I am not suggesting that. But I would like to say this. Too often I have found that inefficiency and mistakes are covered up by the label "top secret," and I would be glad to get another special order to go into greater detail on that. Too often we have permitted agencies in our Government to mark a situation "top secret" because they could not stand the scrutiny of a congressional committee to decide whether they were conducting themselves properly.

I, for one, feel it is the duty of Congress to see that the conduct of our Federal agencies is such a not to impair the safety of our Nation. I am not satisfied with self-serving statements of department heads who deal in broad generalities. I do not want this Nation to wake up some morning and find that we had failed to properly oversee the activities of essential agencies. In our dealings with the Soviet Union, we can leave nothing to chance and that is why I am suggesting this full-scale investigation. Not just a superficial inquiry, but a full investigation which would minutely check out every conceivable phase of this disastrous U-2 flight. A full-scale investigation conducted by responsible Members of Congress in a nonpartisan manner and in a way that would preserve the rights of individuals.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to include with my remarks a column which appeared today in the Washington Daily News and which was written by one of its top columnists, Mr. Ed Koterba. I believe it demonstrates so well one of the points I have been discussing here today.

Mr. Koterba's column follows:

THERE'S LOTS TO BE SAID ON SECRET
EAGLE

(By Ed Koterba)

The press relations man at the Pentagon said, "I'm sorry, but that information is a military secret. It's classified."

The reporter said: "But I have the information before me at this moment. And he reeled it off. It gave all the detailed facts on the air-to-air missile, the Eagle.

On the Pentagon end of the phone there was shocked silence—followed by a dozen queries and, later, by a congressional request for a full-scale investigation.

This was one of several instances of apparent blundering by our side on military secrecy. Ironically enough, this case of opening up supposed secrets by the Pentagon came at a time when Russia was charging us before the world with obtaining military information from the Soviets.

TEXAS NEWSMAN

The reporter in this story is John Harris, Washington correspondent for a Houston, Tex., newspaper.

His information came from the "1960 Missile Handbook," which was distributed just down the hall in the National Press Building.

A few days after his story was printed, a bigshot Communist, Valdimir D. Pavlov, third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, showed up and procured a copy of the book, paying the asking price of \$2.

Oddly enough, Mr. Harris' story did not identify by name nor location his source of information.

Publisher of the missile handbook is Kendall K. Hoyt, director of the Association of Missile and Rocket Industries.

When I confronted Mr. Hoyt, he said: "We have information on 300 U.S. missiles." He showed me his bulging files.

DATA

Data on the secret Eagle showed that it was 15 to 20 feet tall, weighed a half-ton, had a range of 100 miles and flies up to 100,000 feet. All this information was marked classified at the Pentagon.

"For heaven's sakes," I said to Mr. Hoyt, "where did you get all this information?" Calmly, he said he got it from the Aircraft & Missiles magazine, which is distributed to 9,000 firms. Originally, he said, it came from—of all things—Pentagon handouts.

But, to be on the safe side, he said, he checked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation when the Communist—who openly identified himself as a Soviet technician—showed up in his office. The FBI, Mr. Hoyt said, cleared the sale.

And what is the Red official going to do with all that compiled information?

Over the phone he said, candidly: "Some of our Soviet scientists may be interested."

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 minute in order to inquire of the majority leader as to any changes in the program for next week.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I am glad my friend makes that inquiry because I do want to advise the House that since announcing the program, and you will remember I referred to the bill, S. 1892, having to do with the project in Oklahoma, I have had the opportunity since announcing the program to talk with the chairman of the Committee on