


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19 May 1960

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WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN
(As of 1700 19 May)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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19 May 1960

WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN

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WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN

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I. Soviet Propaganda

1. During the first week following Khrushchev's disclosure on 5 May that a US reconnaissance plane was shot down over USSR territory, the USSR was cautious and restrained in its exploitation of the incident. Soviet propagandists gave it comparatively moderate publicity and followed the lines of Khrushchev's two speeches before the Supreme Soviet. However, after the 11 May opening of the exhibition of the wreckage and "evidence" of US espionage at which Gromyko and Khrushchev ridiculed the US statements on the affair, the volume of Soviet propaganda denunciations of the US policy of "provocation" and "treachery" increased. Attacks on Secretary Herter and "US ruling circles" and "warmongers" became sharper, but propagandists still avoided personal attacks on President Eisenhower. The press treatment of Khrushchev's statements at his impromptu press conference on 11 May indicate a Soviet effort to tone down the impact of some of his harsh off-the-cuff remarks, and seemed to reflect a desire to forestall the conclusion that there had been any shift in his attitude toward the Summit. After a delay of almost 24 hours TASS issued a revised version of Khrushchev's statements which clearly softened his references to the President and gave a more optimistic assessment of future Soviet-US relations.

2. Mass meetings solely to protest the US espionage flight started on 13 May. (Previously, mass meetings to discuss the

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materials of the Supreme Soviet, including the statements on the U-2 incident, were held from 6 to 11 May.) By 14 May the plane incident dominated the Moscow press, and personal criticism of President Eisenhower and attacks on Secretary Herter were intensified.

3. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Summit talks, Soviet commentators continued to stress Khrushchev's statement that he would still go to Paris "with a pure heart" but to insist that the outcome of the conference would depend largely on the attitude of the West, particularly the United States. Pravda's correspondent in Paris asserted that "there can be no question of easing international tension" as long as Western policy continues to be influenced by the "aggressive militarist quarters" in the United States.

4. There is considerable evidence that the USSR's propaganda apparatus had no forewarning of Khrushchev's intended moves in Paris and was forced to reverse prepared stories on the Summit. Three hours after Khrushchev's statement in Paris on 16 May, TASS instructed the Soviet regional press not to publish any despatches on the Summit it had transmitted earlier that day and sent revisions strongly condemning US actions.

5. Massive Soviet jamming of VOA's transmissions in the languages of the USSR was resumed on or about 17 May. This followed the selective jamming of VOA's output on the plane incident during the previous week. There was also selective jamming of

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BBC broadcasts to Russia during the past week, followed by more extensive interferences on 17 May.

6. Throughout this period and up until 17 May, studied caution had been particularly evident in output for Russian domestic consumption. Despite cries of indignation against the US "provocation," Soviet domestic propaganda avoided pointing to the danger of accidental war as a result of such flights and did not stress "vigilance." It was made clear that the present situation is not a "crisis" situation and that "calmness" was the principal requisite. The Russian people were assured that the USSR would continue its struggle for peace and told that Khrushchev is an "incurable optimist" about the further relaxation of tensions.

7. Since the breaking off of the Summit meeting, Soviet commentary has concentrated on "proving" that the United States torpedoed the summit. As "proof," Pravda offered Secretary Herter's remarks to the US press in Paris and the US "fear" of another "preliminary meeting" on 17 May. Izvestia asserted that the US refusal to condemn espionage flights and promise not to repeat them, "which wrecked the Summit," was only a link in a chain of US actions--such as the President's alleged "retraction," under pressure of the US monopolists, of the view that the Berlin situation is abnormal and Undersecretary Dillon's speech against a change in Berlin's status. After initially ignoring President Eisenhower's statement that there would be no further U-2

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flights, Soviet commentators followed Khrushchev's lead, dismissing it as a mere "maneuver to avoid responsibility" and placing all emphasis on the fact that Khrushchev's full demands were not met. All attacks are aimed at the United States, with the exception of passing criticism of Macmillan and De Gaulle for their alleged failure to persuade Eisenhower to condemn the flights.

8. Subsidiary coverage has been devoted to reports alleging worldwide support of the Soviet Union and condemnation of the United States and to protest meetings voicing "enthusiastic approval" of Khrushchev and indignant denunciation of US leaders. However, the population generally continues friendly to US Embassy personnel and American tourists in Moscow.

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II. Eastern European Propaganda

1. Eastern European propagandists apparently were unprepared for the sudden turn of events, with many of them preferring not to comment but merely to repeat TASS releases. The few early attempts at independent comment, which reflected an underlying belief that the conference would somehow go on, were by those regimes we believe most opposed to the policy of detente with the West--Albania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

2. As the collapse of the conference became more apparent, all the satellites except Rumania began broadcasting independent comment which reflected a national, in addition to a bloc, point of view. The East European bloc countries are unanimous--as might be expected--in support of Khrushchev. All place the blame for the collapse of the conference on "Eisenhower's intransigence." Most commentaries hint that future summit, disarmament and other conferences are not only possible but also desirable, although the way in which such possibilities are handled varies from vituperation to probing attempts at reconciliation. Satellite commentaries also link the successful flight of the new Soviet sputnik to the claims that the USSR is the most powerful state in the world, and that it is "high time" that US policy recognizes this fact and abandons its false "position-of-strength" in any future negotiations. Reports of differences among the Western big three continue to be circulated.

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3. The Albanians, Bulgarians, Czechs and Hungarians have unleashed the most vicious attacks, reminiscent of the Stalinist era. The first two regimes have broadcast highly vituperative condemnations of US "imperialist aggressions" and report numerous worker demonstrations supporting Khrushchev. In the meantime Czechoslovakia protested Secretary Herter's references to the 1948 take-over in his 9 May speech, and called this statement evidence of a "two-faced" policy in Washington, which they inferred was just as unacceptable to Prague as it was to Khrushchev. Budapest mixed a vitriolic attack on President Eisenhower and on both John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles with the comment that summit conferences are still the most "efficient means of settling international disputes" and are "more fruitful than routine diplomatic exchanges." The broadcast concluded, however, with the statement that so long as the President must "subordinate his own ideas" to "US reactionary circles" and must adhere "to the absurd... principle of 'freedom of espionage'," there can be little hope for progress.

4. East Germany immediately resorted to threats against continued Western occupation of Berlin, but later statements by middle-level GDR officials were intended to suggest that there would be no action on this problem, or that of a separate peace treaty with East Germany, until after "negotiations" had failed. The East German party paper editorially stated on 18 May that the GDR "will not wait indefinitely for a treaty" and that "the international balance of power is such that the imperialists

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are no longer in a position to delay...indefinitely." Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower have been consistently linked together as the two men most responsible for the failure at the Summit.

5. Polish press comments have been generally moderate, and have stressed that even though the US bears responsibility for "torpedoing the Summit," Poland will "not change its basic policy of seeking international detente," and Polish "faith in the possibility of peaceful coexistence" cannot be shaken. The Poles have stressed their "complete and unreserved" support for Khrushchev in all comments on the events in Paris. Belgrade has continued its neutral pose, broadcasting full coverage of Eastern and Western comments, but the programming indicates a leaning toward Khrushchev. For instance, reports of worker demonstrations in support of Khrushchev from TANJUG correspondents in the USSR have been followed by broadcasts from London rounding up condemnations of US "spy flights" in British papers. On 14 May a senior Foreign Office official in Belgrade stated that in the event of a failure in Paris, Yugoslavia would probably support the USSR and sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

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III. Communist Far East

1. Peiping's first major comment on the Summit breakdown-- a statement by Premier Chou En-lai on 19 May--places the Chinese Communists squarely in line with the rest of the bloc in supporting Khrushchev and in condemning US "imperialism." Chou stated that Peiping "firmly supports" the measures taken by the USSR at the Summit and warned the US government not to mistake Communist efforts for peace as "signs of weakness." Chou continued: "Encroachment on any socialist country is an encroachment on China, on the entire socialist camp, and will assuredly meet with an annihilating rebuff." In closing his remarks, he stressed that "the 650 million Chinese people will continue to unite closely with the great Soviet people, the peoples of all the socialist countries, and all the peace-loving people of the whole world, and work persistently and untiringly for the relaxation of international tension and a lasting world peace."

2. Although Chou did not indulge in the "I told you so" attitude which was apparent in some earlier lower-level comment, politburo member Peng Chen used this line at a rally in Peiping on 19 May. Peng said that the U-2 incident showed that President Eisenhower was "not a peace envoy but a warmonger" and proved to the world that "no illusions should be held about the real nature of US imperialism." A few days before the Summit, Mao Tse-tung had implicitly criticized Khrushchev for being one of those people

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who held such illusions. However, the Chinese Communists probably feel that Khrushchev's actions in Paris were so in line with Peiping's own attitude toward the West that they can now wholeheartedly endorse Soviet policy. Chinese leaders did not feel they could do so when there was still some chance that the Summit conference would result in agreements which might undercut their policy in the Far East and in underdeveloped areas where Peiping is active.

3. Because of the time lag customary in the response of Asian satellite capitals, material presently available is limited to commentary on Khrushchev's remarks at the opening session of the conference on 16 May. However, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Mongolia have all resoundingly endorsed Khrushchev's position. Hanoi's official party organ Nhan Dan on 18 May termed the Soviet stand "understandable and necessary" and asserted "peaceful negotiations cannot be conducted with those who continue to prepare aggressive wars." The press and radio in Pyongyang and Ulan Bator reiterate this line with little variation.

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IV. Non-Communist Far East

1. In general, the Japanese, Koreans and Nationalist Chinese blamed Khrushchev for the breakdown of the Summit conference, although some Japanese newspapers ascribed a share of the blame to the US because of the U-2 incident. The Nationalists were relieved that the conference was ended and want a more aggressive policy toward the bloc; the Koreans want strengthened defenses, while the Japanese hope that efforts to solve the impasse will result in a new summit meeting in the near future.

2. In Japan, official and editorial comment tended to lay blame for the breakdown of the Summit talks squarely on Khrushchev; there was general agreement that his behavior was entirely unwarranted. Some major newspapers, however, attributed a share of the blame to the US because of the U-2 incident. Prime Minister Kishi expressed "deep regret" over rupture of the talks. Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that Khrushchev used the U-2 incident as an excuse to hide his belief that there is no prospect of agreement on the German problem. The chairman of the left-wing Socialist party termed Khrushchev's action "highly regrettable" but said he understood the reason. The feeling is unanimous that the short-term result will be a resumption of cold war tensions, but most Japanese comments expressed hope that efforts would be made to solve present differences at a new summit meeting in the near future.

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3. Following the plane incident, the Japanese government had been on the defensive in attempting to secure ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty. However, possibly hoping to capitalize on Japanese criticism of Khrushchev and the threat of a revived cold war, the government moved suddenly late on 19 May to force a vote on the treaty in the lower house of the Diet over a combination brawl and boycott staged by the opposition Socialists. Although successful on the vote, the government possibly has exposed itself to public charges that its methods are dictatorial.

4. South Korean reaction has unanimously blamed Khrushchev for the failure of the Summit meeting. The semi-official Korean Republic, along with other papers, asserted that the free world must now unite and not be intimidated into concessions, but rather strengthen its defenses. Regarding the U-2 incident, a Foreign Ministry announcement reflected the United States position that such flights are made necessary by Soviet secrecy and linked the situation to the Communist sneak attack on South Korea in 1950.

5. Nationalist Chinese officials, apprehensive that the US would make an agreement in Paris detrimental to their interests, are relieved that the Summit conference has collapsed. They believe that Khrushchev "sabotaged" the conference and that even without the U-2 incident, he would have found another pretext for breaking up the meeting. They are worried, however,

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that the US will weaken in the face of Soviet threats and are using the incident to call for a more aggressive policy toward the bloc.

6. The non-communist Hong Kong press has initially attributed the collapse of the Summit meeting to the Soviet Union. The British China Mail accused Khrushchev of sabotaging the Summit and spoke of his "display of petulant self-righteousness... intransigence and vindictiveness." Earlier some papers labeled the U-2 incident a propaganda victory for the Soviets and asserted that the US had walked into a Soviet trap. The pro-Chinese Nationalist English language Hong Kong Tiger Standard suggested that Khrushchev's behavior at the Summit was due to domestic rather than international reasons. However, the British South China Morning Post called the U-2 flight a "stupid enterprise" made without top-level knowledge or authority, "an example of provocative brinkmanship far more dangerous than anything attempted diplomatically by Mr. Foster Dulles." The local Communist press reflected Peiping's attacks on the US.

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V. South and Southeast Asia

1. Official reaction in Southeast Asia to the breakup of the Paris Conference so far has been limited. The earliest theme in widespread press commentary--distress over the setback to hopes of world peace--has given way to almost universal condemnation of Khrushchev's tactics at Paris.

2. Indonesian, Australian and Philippine government officials have commented publicly to date. In Djakarta, on 18 May, Acting Foreign Minister Leimena expressed regret at the breakup of the Summit, and stated that under the circumstances, "we should not blame either side." He urged that efforts be made for another heads of government meeting, possibly under UN auspices. In Canberra, in parliament sessions of 18 and 19 May, both government and opposition parties unanimously supported acting Prime Minister McEwen's position that Khrushchev, not the West, was responsible for the collapse. In London, on 18 May, Prime Minister Menzies said "the world's ordinary, sensible and honest persons regard the Russian maneuvers with contempt." Philippine Foreign Minister Serrano stated in New York on 18 May that he believed Premier Khrushchev had committed a diplomatic blunder in torpedoing the conference and called his behavior "inexcusable."

3. Throughout the developing crisis since the U-2 incident, the Southeast Asian press has shown itself to be both thoughtful and responsible. With the exception of the Communist press, almost all accounts have been sympathetic to the United States'

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position; although initially there had been considerable criticism of United States handling of the plane incident. Following Khrushchev's extreme accusations and intransigence at Paris, Southeast Asian criticism of Khrushchev has mounted rapidly. Editorials published in Bangkok, Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Djakarta all place the onus for the meeting's failure directly at Khrushchev's door.

4. Reaction in South Asia generally has also been a good deal more hardheaded than on similar occasions in the past. The Indian press, indignant over the Summit breakdown, has been virtually unanimous in holding Khrushchev responsible. While consistently critical of American U-2 operations, Indian papers agreed that Khrushchev was not justified in using them to "make a shambles" of the conference. Nehru's first comments were more cautious. He carefully refrained from pinning the blame for the "fiasco" on either side, noting only that it was "certainly due to lack of good will." Nehru similarly refused to condemn the U-2 incident, pleading lack of information. Although he pointed out that "one does not push his nose into everything," Nehru's comment on possible mediation suggested that he would at least urge moderation on both parties.


5. Pakistan has lodged a mild protest against the flight, but Ayub has made it clear where his sympathies lie: "Today the Free World must live under an umbrella of American nuclear deterrent." Afghanistan's formal protest was far stronger, but


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Foreign Minister Naim  convinced this "unfriendly act" involved no "unfriendly intention" by the US against his country. The Afghans are probably more concerned over future Soviet intentions.

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VI. Africa

1. In the independent nations of Africa, the reaction to the failure of the Summit conference and the period of tension preceding the meeting has stressed the danger to world peace, especially for the smaller uncommitted nations of the world, but has avoided strong condemnation of either party. Generally the United States has been criticized for its intelligence activities on the eve of the Summit; the USSR has been rebuked for its intransigent attitude and insistence on an unrealistic apology.

2. The Tunisian attitude was reflected in the government party's press, which stated that the US could not comply with the Soviet demand for an apology, even though the plane incident cast doubt on American intentions and desire to preserve the peace. According to the independent press, nearly all political observers attributed the failure of the conference to the stiff attitude taken by Khrushchev. Earlier, in relation to the plane incident, President Bourguiba was extremely complimentary to Secretary Herter for a "courageous and master stroke" in handling the matter publicly.

3. Morocco has not reacted officially. Prior to the Summit meeting, news agency dispatches tended to stress Soviet statements, but the press did not take sides. The statements concluded that US prestige had suffered more than its reputation for wanting peace.

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4. The Ethiopian press, unofficial but subject to control, maintained a balanced position prior to the Summit breakdown and saw in the espionage activities of both nations proof that immediate disarmament was needed if the world were to avoid hostilities. The press commented that Khrushchev, in adopting an innocent attitude, would be saying in effect, "forget my past because my future is so spotless."

5. The government-controlled Ghana press editorialized against the danger of recklessness on the part of either government which could threaten mankind--both the "folly of US flying spy planes over Russian territory" and "the trump card hilarity of the Soviet Union in crude espionage and sabotage charges against the American government." Prime Minister Nkrumah, defending the interests of small nations, opposes settlement of the world's problems by the "big four" alone.

6. Reaction in the remainder of the continent has not been reported.

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VII. Middle East

1. Reactions vary widely among the Arab states. The common denominator is bitter disappointment over the Summit breakdown and fear of extreme international tension to come.

2. Cairo press and radio blame both sides for the Summit failure. They are concerned that Khrushchev might throw another bombshell by signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany very soon. Nasir, busy with the final session in his talks with Nehru, has as yet made no direct comment. The UAR press has contrasted the Summit fiasco with the Nasir-Nehru "peace-promoting discussions" and stressed the need for "nations of positive neutrality" to play a bigger role in world affairs.

3. Israeli officials and press have strongly backed the Western stand, seeing no justification for Khrushchev's "torpedoing" of the conference.

4. Jordan's foreign minister, expressing admiration for Eisenhower's candor on the U-2 incident, said he had been sure--but wrong--that Khrushchev would have accepted the President's "transparent honesty" and closed the matter. Jordanian newspapers, a number of which receive small British subsidies, have sided emphatically with the West.

5. Press reaction in Lebanon has typically ranged all over the spectrum: One paper, for example, speaks of "another in the series of American blunders"; one blames the Soviet military for forcing Khrushchev's hand.

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6. The pro-Communist press in Iraq holds US "imperialist provocations" entirely responsible for the frustration of "the high hopes of humanity." The Iraqi nationalist press pointed out that the U-2 incident showed the need for reaching a settlement and warned the leftist papers against "propagating for the Communist camp."

7. Turkish and Iranian comment has been favorable to the United States, although Turkish reaction has been limited by the need of political leaders and of the press to concentrate on domestic problems.

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The Turkish press gave the U-2 story rather superficial treatment but reacted with surprise and irritation to the collapse of the Summit talks. Khrushchev was denounced for sabotaging the conference and no sympathy for the USSR's action in demanding a US apology was shown.

8. Iranian military officials

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believe that the U-2 aircraft

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incident indicates that the US "has not been sleeping" regarding the USSR and that US prestige in the intelligence field has risen considerably. The newspaper Etelaat, which usually reflects the viewpoint of the Iranian government, blames the break-up of the Summit Conference on the USSR. No reaction has yet been received from the Shah.

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VIII. Western Europe

1. The feeling is strong among diplomats, newspapermen, and assembly deputies in France and in the general public that Khrushchev has overplayed his hand. Khrushchev [redacted] [redacted] has largely destroyed the image he built during his March-April state visit and is now widely referred to as a fool and a buffoon. The belief is strong that the three Western leaders did everything possible to salvage the Summit, and that greater allied unity is necessary. While the ultimate blame for the Summit failure is laid to Khrushchev, the US is not exonerated. The chief editor of the influential Le Monde said on 18 May that Khrushchev cannot be blamed for taking advantage of such a "beautiful occasion" and of the "confused" US statements following, but Khrushchev far overplayed his hand in presenting his ultimatum to Eisenhower. He added that the failure of the conference may call the leadership of American diplomacy in the West into question. The most recurrent press theme on Khrushchev's motivation is that he decided to break off when he could find no breach in Western unity. Earlier, Khrushchev's tactics had been attributed more to domestic (army) pressures and to Soviet bloc (principally Peiping) pressures. The French press is almost unanimous that the Summit failure brings a return of the cold war, but believes that it is unlikely to "go much further." Fears are, however, evident in the calls for renewed allied unity.

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A few typical quotes:

Paris-Jour (Mass-circulation sensationalist type):

"Twelve days ago, on May 5, addressing the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev suddenly and without forewarning stopped talking like Khrushchev. On that day he became the spokesman of Mao Tse-tung..."

Le Figaro: (Moderate): "The torpedoing of the conference by Mr. Khrushchev is a development over which no one in France will rejoice. But if it contributes to tightening Western solidarity it will not be a totally bad thing."

Humanite (Communist): "The policy of peaceful coexistence is not in any way jeopardized." (Failure of Summit is) "only a dramatic vicissitude in the struggle for peace." There will be other vicissitudes, but "an uncertain peace is better after all than war."

Le Monde (Independent): "If Khrushchev thinks everything will be better after the US elections, he has much to learn on how the US is really governed."

2. Italian Foreign Minister Segni

underlined the need for allied solidarity. Soviet belligerency might even be advantageous to the anti-Communist cause in Italy. On the unofficial level the non-Communist Italian press sees Khrushchev as having greatly inflated the U-2 incident, and as having overplayed his hand in the process. Socialist Avanti

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also criticizes Khrushchev. Various papers attribute Khrushchev's harshness to sheer bluff, or to a need to conciliate his own military people and the Chinese. "Khrushchev wanted to prove to the tough Stalinists of Moscow that he was no softy," said independent Il Giorno. The free press in general has expressed concern at the increase of international tension, and stresses the need for maintaining allied solidarity. Khrushchev is strongly criticized for his "premeditated" wrecking tactics. A rightist paper calls him "a working heir of Genghis Khan." Others compare him to Stalin.

3. The Bonn [redacted] believes that Khrushchev went to Paris determined to wreck the conference and attributes his arrogant behavior either to belief in superior Soviet military strength, to some undisclosed weapon, or merely to his intent to impress and split the West through psychological tactics. West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt [redacted]

[redacted] is now convinced that the USSR will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Bundestag politicians in Bonn are reported "unruffled" over the Summit collapse, but note considerable uneasiness in the country at large, especially in Berlin. They view "salami-tactics" of slicing away at Berlin as the greatest present danger and do not expect an East German peace treaty for perhaps several months. Although critical of earlier stages of American handling of the U-2 incident, they approve US conduct at Paris.

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A Social Democratic foreign policy expert suggested that differences between West German parties on foreign policy would diminish in the face of the tougher Soviet line. Press reports describe the West German public as worried and puzzled over Khrushchev's future intentions. Reflecting this nervousness, the West Berlin stock market had another bad day on 18 May, but Mayor Brandt says no flight of capital has occurred and there has been no panic selling. The West German press consensus is that Khrushchev deliberately wrecked the Summit with unreasonable demands to discredit Eisenhower and US policy. Many papers believe the Western alliance has been strengthened by Khrushchev's extremes. The respected Hamburg daily Die Welt terms the Paris meetings a "bitter lesson" for the West and says the real victor is Mao Tse-tung. All papers express concern for Berlin and one drew a parallel between Hitler's tactics in 1938 and Khrushchev's now.

4. The British press and public statements of political leaders unanimously blame the Soviet government for the collapse of the Summit conference. There is also general agreement that, in overplaying his hand, Khrushchev has demonstrated the continuing need for Western solidarity--a point supported by critics of the US in the U-2 incident. The West is nevertheless urged to indicate readiness to negotiate whenever the opportunity is seriously offered. Some typical statements:

Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell: "Once President Eisenhower had announced that no more intelligence flights would

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take place, Mr. Khrushchev should have been satisfied." He states that a nuclear test ban agreement is now all the more urgent.

Liberal Party leader Joseph Grimond: Urged the US not to retreat behind a curtain of "her own fears and suspicions."

Manchester Guardian (Liberal, a habitual conciliator): "Breakdown of Summit seems certain to mark return to cold war.... If Russians threaten to impose (Berlin) blockade, West must not flinch."

Herald (Labor, which had called the U-2 flights "lunacy"): "...In eyes of peace-seeking world what a sorry, despicable character he (Khrushchev) now appears, spitting in the face of peace."

Times (Independent): "Immediate dangers--Berlin, pressure on outlying NATO states--are obvious but the only remedy is to restate our will to negotiate seriously whenever opportunity is seriously offered."

Telegraph (Conservative): "Back to Stalinism." "...likely that the object of recent Kremlin policy has been so to disarm, confuse, and divide the West that its public opinion, if not its statesmen, would be in no position to resist the kind of apocalyptic pressure which the Kremlin can now deploy."

5. In Austria, on the eve of the Summit meeting, informed public opinion was highly favorable to the United States

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[redacted] Since the collapse of the meeting, however, a sharp reversal has apparently begun.

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[redacted] the American position in Austria has suffered "considerable damage" as a result of the "contradictory" treatment of the U-2 episode. In their opinion, the tactical error of admitting the flight was compounded, first by defending the necessity of such flights, and second, by suspending them. These views

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[redacted] are shared by conservative circles and the diplomatic corps. Despite this criticism, there are few illusions regarding Soviet exploitation of the affair and general condemnation of Soviet hypocrisy. Some typical press comments are: "There can be no doubt the world situation--is considerably more serious than at any time since before Suez and Korea." "The row in Paris has at least spared us those false tones which we know from Geneva and Camp David." The cold war cannot be "much colder than the climate of coexistence."

6. There is no available Swiss comment since the actual collapse of the Summit meeting. As of 17 May, however, the following press comments were typical: "In exploiting the Sverdlovsk incident, Khrushchev went to the limit. He demanded from the United States humiliating apologies--he has asked for the submission and humiliation of the US, affronted Eisenhower, probably exploded the Paris conference, and considerably

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aggravated the international situation." "His impolite behavior is believed a result of increased pressure from a military clique which for a long time has reproached him for having reduced some troop contingents, and which for the time being wants a continuation of the cold war to preserve its strong position in the country." However: "It is embarrassing if the President during the first conference hour, so to speak, had to eat as hors d'oeuvres the words which the State Department issued to the world a few days ago." Swiss opinion of the Summit meeting has been colored to a considerable extent by its own spy episode and the expulsion of two Soviet diplomats on spy charges.

7. The Belgian and Dutch press generally attribute the failure of the Summit meeting to Khrushchev's deliberate attempt to sabotage the conference by exploiting the U-2 incident. One Catholic Flemish paper says: "If Khrushchev hoped to see De Gaulle and Macmillan condemn Eisenhower, he was grossly mistaken. Eisenhower has shown the proper reaction. The West is in a better position in a continued cold war than the East." However, a Socialist Flemish paper says: "Once again inept American political and strategic policy has permitted Khrushchev to pose as the victim...arguments advanced by him only plausible, but give basis for spectacular propaganda...he takes first round on points." Foreign Minister Luns in a statement to the Dutch parliament on 17 May said: "This is not the first time the Soviet Union has precipitated an international crisis. Since 1945, switching from grin to intimidation has been the constant method for what

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is happening in Paris at the moment. Absolute unity and steadfastness of West are more important than ever." Prime Minister De Quay, in a private conversation with Ambassador Young in The Hague, also strongly emphasized the absolute need for Western unity.

8. Khrushchev's insulting manner toward the Norwegian in connection with the U-2 affair, and his threats to obliterate bases used in connection with overflights, made a bad impression on the Norwegians. Although disturbed at the Soviet leader's threats, the Norwegians resented his accusations and allegations regarding their complicity. Norwegian resentment contributed to making them more critically disposed toward Khrushchev's actions at the Summit. All non-Communist newspapers in Oslo on 18 May blamed Khrushchev for the failure of the Summit meeting. Foreign Minister Lange called a meeting of the Norwegian cabinet on 18 May to consider the situation following the breakdown of the Summit. He had planned to go to Moscow on 23 May to attend the wedding of the Norwegian ambassador's daughter and then make a 10-14 day private visit, during which he planned to see Gromyko. He has now cancelled the trip "because of the increased burden of work in the situation which has arisen."

9. Danish press comment on the break-up of the Summit conference is rather restrained with all papers voicing disappointment at the turn of events in Paris. Most papers agree that Khrushchev had gone to Paris with "good cards" and had overplayed

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them. The only official comment has been that of Foreign Minister Krag who said news of the conference's failure was received with great regret by the Danish government. In a possible move to ward off possible Soviet charges that Danish territory is being used for "aggressive" purposes, the Danish defense minister told a parliamentary committee on 17 May that Denmark will not permit American airbases in Greenland to be used for reconnaissance flights over the USSR.

10. The Swedish press has generally agreed that Khrushchev used the U-2 plane incident as a pretext to scuttle the Summit, knowing from his prior talks with President Eisenhower and De Gaulle that no concessions would be forthcoming on Berlin, etc. The leading Conservative paper criticizes Khrushchev for his "crude behavior" in Paris and states the Russian leader has the responsibility if the world now enters a period of greatly increased tension. The semi-official government paper is more reserved in its judgment, however, and condemns "activists" in both the Soviet Union and the US for pressuring the leaders to adopt more uncompromising positions.

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[redacted] the Swedish Foreign Ministry took a gloomy view of developments in Paris and referred to the dangers to the world of a return to "primitive diplomacy" in the nuclear age. Convinced that we are in for a long period of greater tensions, [redacted]

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[redacted] there was no escaping the fact that the US

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had presented Khrushchev with the excuse which he desperately needed. He believed that Khrushchev was sincere in desiring a detente. With the world likely to be entering a new period of tension, the Russians may be tempted to get some difficult things done--i.e. a German peace treaty--which would have been difficult to achieve during a period of detente.

11. Finnish officials are keeping close-mouthed. While the Finns may feel that Khrushchev bears the responsibility for the Summit fiasco, they will exercise considerable caution in openly criticizing him in the press.

12. The Madrid press of 17 May expressed no surprise over the breakdown since it never was optimistic about the outcome. However, it expressed full sympathy for the US and the President. The press and also the Madrid radio on 18 May speculated on the cause of Khrushchev's sudden truculence, ascribing it to pressure from Red army leaders and Peiping and to a probable weakening of his control over that sector of the Communist party's central committee which opposes a relaxation of East-West tension.

13. The President's exchanges with Khrushchev appeared to have enhanced his popularity in Portugal, according to press reporting.

14. General popular and press reaction in Greece to the U-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Summit talks has been favorable to the United States. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff believes the Greek people, while excited by the U-2

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incident, are "taking it well" and is of the opinion that no lasting harm has resulted from the propaganda advantage which initially accrued to the USSR. The action of nationalist opposition leaders in joining with the government to reject the communist-front United Democratic Left's demand for a parliamentary debate on US bases in Greece is an unusual example of collaboration by all Greek nationalist elements in the face of communist propaganda attacks against the West. The non-communist Greek press, while critical over the timing of the U-2 flight and the "inadequate control and defective coordination" of US intelligence services, praised the "typical American honesty" in admitting the flight's purpose and noted with pleasure the indication of Soviet vulnerability to aerial attack. The collapse of the Summit talks was blamed on Khrushchev's "cold-blooded torpedoing" of the conference, but the US was criticized for handing him the opportunity.

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"maybe history will applaud you (for the U-2 avowal) but in today's world, as seen from Greece, only a great power could afford the luxury of honesty in those circumstances." However, he said that Khrushchev, by the grossness of his behavior in Paris, dissipated his assets.

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IX. Western Hemisphere

1. The Canadian press strongly condemns Khrushchev and blames him for the Summit conference failure. Prime Minister Diefenbaker has associated Canada with the Western communique and claimed Khrushchev's actions had strengthened Western resolve to remain united. He added that the failure "has not and must not mean return to a cold war status." Liberal opposition leader Pearson has endorsed this position. The usually anti-American Toronto Globe and Mail editorially speculated on 18 May that the people of the uncommitted nations in Asia will take note of Khrushchev's "appalling discourtesy toward the President" and commented on the inconsistency of Khrushchev's refusal to negotiate with the US because of alleged American aggression with his demands that Communist China be recognized in world councils.

2. Reaction from Latin American countries is limited so far. The Dominican Republic, Peru and Venezuela highlight Khrushchev's responsibility for the conference failure, while Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador suggest that the smaller powers can help to calm tensions between the great powers. Reported Mexican and Panamanian reaction is thus far limited to expressions of concern, while Cuba tends to follow the Communist line.

3. Brazilian Foreign Minister Lafer stated on 18 May that he did not think the Summit failure would lead to war.

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Editorials in two important papers accuse both sides of "imprudence," and "inflexibility" and express fear for the "salvation of mankind." One newspaper proposes that smaller nations be given a voice rather than leaving all crucial decisions to a handful of "technologically advanced" nations.

4. Chilean Foreign Minister Ortuzar lamented "the failure of the conference in which all the world had placed its hope for better days for humanity." A conservative radio commented that the United Nations might now be allowed to play its proper role in world affairs: "Withholding from the United Nations any knowledge of the agenda of the abortive meeting in Paris turned out to be dangerous. Matters of war and peace should not be considered exclusive attributes of nations having the largest stock of weapons...The American plan in sum is nothing but a return to the principles of the United Nations."

5. The Castro-controlled press used Khrushchev's diatribes to emphasize Cuban charges that US policies are basically aggressive. Mambi Radio, known to be government controlled, referred to Eisenhower on 17 May: "The gentleman who misrules the people of the US has just been deflated...has backed down...has asked pardon...What he did would be called moral cowardice anywhere... Where is the world going to end with men such as these?"

6. The official Dominican radio commented that President Eisenhower's attitude was dignified and energetic. It portrayed Khrushchev as "oozing venom between his wolf's fangs" in revoking the invitation to Eisenhower to visit the USSR. It admonished that Communism retreats only in the face of force.

7. Prior to the end of the Summit, Ecuadorean President Ponce suggested that the medium and small nations join as a force to prevent the "catastrophic clash of interests between the great powers."

8. Mexican radio comment on 18 May expressed concern that a failure of understanding could lead to war. "It is not right and not human to permit two groups with differing political ideas to carry humanity to an armed struggle which could...lead to its extermination."

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