

**NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS**

CONTINUED CONTROL

24 May 1960

OCI No. 2633/60

Copy No. 2

**WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN
(As of 1700 24 May)**

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.**

~~SECRET~~

24 May 1960

WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN

- I. Soviet Propaganda**
- II. Eastern European Propaganda**
- III. Communist Far East**
- IV. Non-Communist Far East**
- V. South and Southeast Asia**
- VI. Africa**
- VII. Middle East**
- VIII. Western Europe**
- IX. Western Hemisphere**

SECRET

WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN

24 May 1960

I. Soviet Propaganda

1. During the first week following Khrushchev's disclosure on 5 May that a US reconnaissance plane was shot down over USSR territory, the USSR was cautious and restrained in its exploitation of the incident. Soviet propagandists gave it comparatively moderate publicity and followed the lines of Khrushchev's two speeches before the Supreme Soviet. However, after the 11 May opening of the exhibition of the wreckage and "evidence" of US espionage at which Gromyko and Khrushchev ridiculed the US statements on the affair, the volume of Soviet propaganda denunciations of the US policy of "provocation" and "treachery" increased. Attacks on Secretary Herter and "US ruling circles" and "warmongers" became sharper, but propagandists still avoided personal attacks on President Eisenhower. The press treatment of Khrushchev's statements at his impromptu press conference on 11 May indicate a Soviet effort to tone down the impact of some of his harsh off-the-cuff remarks, and seemed to reflect a desire to forestall the conclusion that there had been any shift in his attitude toward the Summit. After a delay of almost 24 hours TASS issued a revised version of Khrushchev's statements which clearly softened his references to the President and gave a more optimistic assessment of future Soviet-US relations.

2. Mass meetings solely to protest the US espionage flight started on 13 May. (Previously, mass meetings to discuss the

materials of the Supreme Soviet, including the statements on the U-2 incident, were held from 6 to 11 May.) By 14 May the plane incident dominated the Moscow press, and personal criticism of President Eisenhower and attacks on Secretary Herter were intensified.

3. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Summit talks, Soviet commentators continued to stress Khrushchev's statement that he would still go to Paris "with a pure heart" but to insist that the outcome of the conference would depend largely on the attitude of the West, particularly the United States.

4. There is considerable evidence that the USSR's propaganda apparatus had no forewarning of Khrushchev's intended moves in Paris and was forced to reverse prepared stories on the Summit. Three hours after Khrushchev's statement in Paris on 16 May, TASS instructed the Soviet regional press not to publish any despatches on the Summit it had transmitted earlier that day and sent revisions strongly condemning US actions.

5. Massive Soviet jamming of VOA's transmissions in the languages of the USSR was resumed on or about 17 May, following selective jamming of VOA's output during the previous week on the plane incident. However, on 22 May jamming was again reduced and only about 46 percent of VOA's are being selectively jammed. VOA broadcasts in the Armenian and Georgian languages are completely unjammed. Soviet jamming of BBC/s broadcasts to the USSR apparently has followed the same pattern.

6. Throughout this period, studied caution has been particularly evident in output for Russian domestic consumption. Despite cries of indignation against the US "provocation," Soviet domestic propaganda has avoided pointing to the danger of accidental war as a result of such flights and did not stress "vigilance." It is made clear that the present situation is not a "crisis" situation and that "calmness" is the principal requisite.

7. Since the breaking off of the Summit meeting, Soviet commentary has concentrated on "proving" that the United States torpedoed the Summit. As "proof," Pravda offered Secretary Herter's remarks to the US press in Paris and the US "fear" of a second "preliminary meeting" on 17 May. The deliberate scuttling" of the Summit was said to be a logical link in the chain of US policy planned in advance to prevent the relaxation of tension and to step up the war psychosis in order to enrich arms producers. TASS cited as another link in this chain President Eisenhower's signing of the mutual security program bill. Red Star asserted that Vice President Nixon's "boasting" about the US reconnaissance flights in his 15 May TV speech shows that US wrecking of the Summit meeting "was an operation planned and prepared in advance." Pravda and New Times have charged that American concentration on the development of "spy satellites" proves that the US space program is geared primarily to espionage and subversion.

8. All attacks are aimed at the United States with the exception of passing criticism of Macmillan and De Gaulle for their

failure to persuade the President to condemn the flights. But the distinction drawn by Khrushchev between these leaders' loyalty to an ally and their own previous efforts to contribute to the success of the Summit is maintained. Strong personal attacks on the President by several commentators show the Soviet Government's desire to destroy Eisenhower's image as a man of peace in the eyes of the Russian people and to show that he has succumbed to the influence of various "US circles." One of the most vitriolic, a Pravda article, said that "General Eisenhower" is a devoted servant of "his capitalist class" and "gangster system of imperialism," and added that Khrushchev was suspicious of his behavior during the Camp David talks. Izvestia said the reason Eisenhower twice rejected opportunities to save face over the plane incident was because he had become the "stooge of the American monopolies" and concluded that he could not "rise above the moral and intellectual level of a common, garden-variety general of a capitalist country."

9. However, many of the commentaries stress Khrushchev's subsequent line that the USSR "would like to believe" that prudence will finally triumph in the West and that a Summit meeting can be held in six to eight months in "new and more propitious circumstances." Commentaries on the German issue generally restate Khrushchev's opinion that the USSR and other countries have the full right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR now, thus solving the Berlin question, but that the USSR is willing to wait a

while in the hopes of a joint solution by the four powers.

10. Subsidiary coverage has been devoted to reports alleging worldwide support of the Soviet Union and condemnation of the United States and to protest meetings voicing "enthusiastic approval" of Khrushchev and indignant denunciation of US leaders. However, the population generally continues friendly to US Embassy personnel and American tourists in Moscow.

24 May 1960

II. Eastern European Propaganda

1. As in the USSR, Eastern European propagandists apparently were unprepared for the sudden turn of events, with many of them preferring not to comment but merely to repeat TASS releases.

2. As the collapse of the conference became more apparent, all the satellites except Rumania began broadcasting independent comment which reflected a national, in addition to a bloc, point of view. The East European bloc countries are unanimous--as might be expected--in support of Khrushchev. All place the blame for the collapse of the conference on "Eisenhower's intransigence." Most commentaries hint that future summit, disarmament and other conferences are not only possible but also desirable, although the way in which such possibilities are handled varies from vituperation to probing attempts at reconciliation.

3. Although European satellite commentaries have moderated in tone and noticeably decreased in number in the past two days, personal attacks on President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer have become stronger. East German and Czechoslovak commentators attempt to show a split in the Western alliance and to point out that the US is trying to revive the cold war, while West Germany is "fanning the war psychosis again."

4. Official statements published by the Albanian, Bulgarian and Czechoslovak governments, and speeches by Hungarian and East German party first secretaries have become relatively moderate in tone, in line with Khrushchev's 20 May Berlin speech. The

II-1

SECRET

statements and speeches, doubtless coordinated in detail, are remarkably similar. They all contain the outlines of bloc foreign policy as set forth by Khrushchev for the future: 1) convocation of another summit conference in six to eight months; 2) resumption of negotiations for general and complete disarmament; 3) resumption of negotiations for banning nuclear tests; 4) the eventual signing of a peace treaty with East Germany; and, 5) creation of an internationally governed free city of Berlin.

5. Yugoslavia no longer maintains its neutral pose between East and West. After suffering severe public attacks from Albania, China, and the USSR for "assisting imperialism" by its stand on the Summit talks, Belgrade has reversed its position, and condemned the US for espionage flights, stating that under the circumstances the USSR could not be expected to negotiate. The reversal accords with the 14 May remarks by a senior Yugoslav foreign office official who said that in the event of a failure at the Summit, Belgrade would support Khrushchev and probably would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany when the time comes.

6. While satellite propaganda attacks continue, contacts between US diplomatic personnel and satellite officials have remained unexpectedly cordial. Usually difficult Bulgarian officials have been uniformly friendly on three occasions since 16 May, and [redacted] the Poles would like to play down tensions as long as possible. Highly placed Yugoslav Army officers have expressed understanding for the US position, and stated that they [redacted] found themselves

25X1

25X1

in close agreement. The Rumanian cultural negotiating team in Washington suddenly cancelled all future meetings on 17 May, but suddenly amazed State Department officials two days later with its effusiveness and eagerness to resume negotiations immediately.

7. Reports of popular reactions in Eastern Europe have been spotty. in Bulgaria reported great publ^{25X1} interest in the events at the Summit, but stated that the average citizen appeared to be "going about his business." Hungarian press articles of 18 May indicate that some tension existed in Hungary, as well as criticism of Khrushchev's actions in Paris, but that after the situation was "explained correctly," "...people were again working normally as before...." Although the general atmosphere in Warsaw is calm after some panic buying and bank withdrawals of gold and dollar currency, considerable popular uneasiness remains, with the man in the street apprehensive about a future tightening of regime policies. Many Poles feel that Gomulka will be forced into closer uniformity with the Soviet bloc on domestic issues. According to a recent repatriate from Bucharest, initial Rumanian public reaction to the U-2 incident was one of disbelief. Confirmation of the incident reportedly contributed to a general feeling of regret, and a fatalistic judgment that the US is incapable of liberating the satellites from Soviet control.

24 May 1960

III. Communist Far East

1. Peiping's first major comment on the Summit breakdown-- a statement by Premier Chou En-lai on 19 May--placed the Chinese Communists squarely in line with the rest of the bloc in supporting Khrushchev and in condemning US "imperialism." Chou stated that Peiping "firmly supports" the measures taken by the USSR at the Summit and warned the US government not to mistake Communist efforts for peace as "signs of weakness." Chou continued: "Encroachment on any socialist country is an encroachment on China, on the entire socialist camp, and will assuredly meet with an annihilating rebuff." In closing his remarks, he stressed that "the 650 million Chinese people will continue to unite closely with the great Soviet people, the peoples of all the socialist countries, and all the peace-loving people of the whole world, and work persistently and untiringly for the relaxation of international tension and a lasting world peace."

2. Peiping's largest and most acrimonious demonstrations against the United States since the Lebanon crisis in 1958 continued unabated on 23 May. In the past four days more than 45 million people have participated in nationwide protest marches, meetings, and rallies against American "aggression" and "sabotage" of the Summit conference. Peiping declares nothing like this has happened before in China. American officials in Hong Kong note, however, that Peiping claimed in 1958 that 147 million people denounced US "intervention" in Lebanon. In language as

III-1

SECRET

intemperate as Khrushchev's in Paris, Peiping is denouncing the United States and personally castigating President Eisenhower. The Chinese are militantly proclaiming that should the "US imperialists" dare to unleash a new world war, the "powerful socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the peace-loving people of the whole world will resolutely liquidate imperialism forever from the earth."

3. Behind these public demonstrations of support for Soviet conduct at the Summit conference, Peiping is taking advantage of the conference breakdown to vindicate its views of opposition to any accommodation with the US. A People's Daily editorial of 20 May states that the outcome of the conference was no surprise to those (e.g., the Chinese) who view the international situation correctly and are not misled (as was Khrushchev) by "certain superficial phenomena."

4. The editorial contains some indications that the Chinese may fear that Khrushchev will not maintain, in the long run, the uncompromising attitude he adopted toward the West at the Summit conference. In this connection, the editorial assesses the Summit breakdown as "helpful" because it "laid bare" the "ferocious" features of "US imperialism" and calls, as did the Chinese in the pre-Summit period, for further exposure of the United States. There has thus far been no Chinese Communist comment on Khrushchev's moderate Berlin speech which Peiping may well interpret as confirming its fears about Soviet tactics vis-a-vis the West.

III-2

SECRET

5. By implying that the Chinese were right and Khrushchev wrong, the 20 May editorial suggests the Chinese probably hope to use present developments to increase their influence throughout the Communist world as the most accurate interpreters of Western intentions and of Marxist-Leninist theory.

6. There was the customary time lag in the response of Asian satellite capitals. It was not until 19 May that comment was forthcoming from North Vietnam, North Korea, and Mongolia. All three have resoundingly endorsed Khrushchev's position and followed the bloc line in criticizing the US.

24 May 1960

IV. Non-Communist Far East

1. In general, the Japanese, Koreans and Nationalist Chinese blamed Khrushchev for the breakdown of the Summit conference, although some Japanese newspapers ascribed a share of the blame to the US because of the U-2 incident. After the conference failed, the Japanese press in general blamed both sides. The Nationalists were relieved that the conference was ended and want a more aggressive policy toward the bloc; the Koreans want strengthened defenses, while the Japanese hope that efforts to solve the impasse will result in a new summit meeting in the near future. The domestic political crisis over the US-Japanese security treaty has reduced Japanese interest in the Summit breakdown and comment has declined.

2. In Japan, Prime Minister Kishi has expressed "deep regret" over rupture of the talks. Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that Khrushchev used the U-2 incident as an excuse to hide his belief that there is no prospect of agreement on the German problem. The chairman of the left-wing Socialist party termed Khrushchev's action "highly regrettable" but said he understood the reason. The feeling is unanimous that the short-term result will be a resumption of cold war tensions, but most Japanese comments expressed hope that efforts would be made to solve present differences at a new summit meeting in the near future.

IV-1

SECRET

3. Following the plane incident, the Japanese government was on the defensive in attempting to secure ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty. The success of the government's sudden move late on 19 May to force a vote on the treaty in the lower house of the Diet has not relieved the government from attacks on the treaty relationship and has exposed it to charges that its methods are dictatorial. As a result of public agitation over the treaty, Prime Minister Kishi is in a difficult position that will become worse if he is unable to convince his country that no US planes have in the past or will in the future make illegal overflights from bases in Japan.

4. South Korean reaction has unanimously blamed Khrushchev for the failure of the Summit meeting. Acting Chief of State Huh Chung said the Paris events were "fortunate" as they would solidify Free World vigilance against aggressive Communist designs. The semi-official Korean Republic, along with other papers, asserted that the free world must now unite and not be intimidated into concessions, but rather strengthen its defenses. Regarding the U-2 incident, a Foreign Ministry announcement reflected the United States position that such flights are made necessary by Soviet secrecy and linked the situation to the Communist sneak attack on South Korea in 1950.

5. Nationalist Chinese officials, apprehensive that the US would make an agreement in Paris detrimental to their interests, are relieved that the Summit conference has collapsed. Vice

IV-2

SECRET

President Chen Cheng said long experience of negotiating with Communists had taught him they will "bow low when weak, shake their heads at everything when they are as strong as you, and jump on you when they think they are stronger." The Nationalists believe that Khrushchev "sabotaged" the conference and that even without the U-2 incident, he would have found another pretext for breaking up the meeting. They are worried, however, that the US will weaken in the face of Soviet threats and are using the incident to call for a more aggressive policy toward the bloc.

6. The non-communist Hong Kong press has initially attributed the collapse of the Summit meeting to the Soviet Union. The British China Mail accused Khrushchev of sabotaging the Summit and spoke of his "display of petulant self-righteousness... intransigence and vindictiveness." Earlier some papers labeled the U-2 incident a propaganda victory for the Soviets and asserted that the US had walked into a Soviet trap. The pro-Chinese Nationalist English language Hong Kong Tiger Standard suggested that Khrushchev's behavior at the Summit was due to domestic rather than international reasons. However, the British South China Morning Post called the U-2 flight a "stupid enterprise" made without top-level knowledge or authority, "an example of provocative brinkmanship far more dangerous than anything attempted diplomatically by Mr. Foster Dulles." The local Communist press reflected Peiping's attacks on the US.

IV-3

SECRET

7. British Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, in Hong Kong en route to Communist China, said the U-2 incident was a "tragedy" and then "to bring your allies into a thing like this without telling them is awful. If you use any of these measures over other countries you must not be found out...and if you are you must fasten the blame on someone else." He ruled out the possibility of a hot war because it would mean suicide on both sides.

24 May 1960

V. South and Southeast Asia

1. Official reaction in Southeast Asia to the breakup of the Paris Conference has been limited. The earliest theme in widespread commentary--distress over the setback to hopes of world peace--has given way to almost universal condemnation of Khrushchev's tactics at Paris. Former Prime Minister Hokyoake, leader of the New Zealand opposition party, also characterized Khrushchev as a "lout and a thug." He strongly supported US policy toward the Soviet Union, including the U-2 overflight, as necessary for the free world's survival. Philippine Foreign Minister Serrano stated in New York on 18 May that he believed Premier Khrushchev had committed a diplomatic blunder in torpedoing the conference and called his behavior "inexcusable."

2. On the Southeast Asia mainland, except for the Communist output, almost all accounts have been sympathetic to the US position, although there has been considerable criticism of American handling of the plane incident. In South Vietnam, however, confidential governmental guidance to the local press resulted in the deletion of all wire accounts of the U-2 incident which could be unfavorable to the United States. Editorials in Bangkok, Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Djakarta all place the onus for the Paris meeting's failure directly on Khrushchev.

3. Indonesian, Australian, New Zealand and Philippine government officials have commented publicly. In Djakarta on 18 May, Acting Foreign Minister Leimena expressed regret at the

V-1

SECRET

breakup of the Summit, and stated that "we should not blame either side." He urged that efforts be made for another heads of government meeting, possibly under UN auspices. Privately, both he and the Secretary General of the Foreign Department have expressed the view that Khrushchev sabotaged the Summit under pressure from Communist China. In Canberra, both government and opposition parties unanimously supported acting Prime Minister McEwen's position that Khrushchev, not the West, was responsible for the collapse. In London, on 18 May, Australian Prime Minister Menzies said "the world's ordinary, sensible and honest persons regard the Russian maneuvers with contempt." In New Zealand, on 19 May, Acting Prime Minister Skinner issued a public statement regretting the breakup of the Summit as a setback to world hopes. He commended Western leaders for their restrained joint statement.

4. Reaction in South Asia generally has been more realistic than on similar occasions in the past. Nehru's comment has been cautious. He has carefully refrained from pinning the blame for the Summit "fiasco" on either side, and similarly refused to condemn the U-2 incident until the facts are known. In communique issued after visiting Nasir and Menderes, Nehru "deplored" the failure at Paris, and hoped the big powers would try again. The communique also suggested some move to "help" was under consideration, although in Ankara on 21 May Nehru specifically ruled out personal mediation. Other top Indian officials estimate that

Khrushchev came to Paris with the intent to scuttle the conference. Some see the Chinese Communists as partially responsible; Deputy Prime Minister Pant noted there is "only one country" (Communist China) which does not feel unhappy over the outcome. The Indian press continues to castigate both sides, but the initially strong criticism of Khrushchev recently has taken second place in some papers to complaints of US "bungling."

5. In Pakistan, Ayub has made it clear where his sympathies lie: "Today the Free World must live under an umbrella of American nuclear deterrent." The government-monitored press, however, is beginning to put more blame for the world crisis on the US. Afghanistan's government-controlled press meanwhile has flailed the "aggressive" attitudes and actions of the US and Pakistan.

Late Additions

6. In Rangoon Premier Nu, without assigning blame for the Summit breakup, asserted that the failure of the Paris Conference would not lead to war since "both sides have developed weapons of mutual destruction and they will try their hardest to avoid war."

7. New Zealand's Prime Minister Nash, in the wake of the Summit breakup, continued optimistic. He declared in Bonn, that he is convinced the Soviet leaders still desire peaceful coexistence and disarmament. He blames the breakup of the conference upon public statements of US government officials but he did not disapprove the American U-2 flight, although he felt the flight was made at the "wrong time."

24 May 1960

VI. Africa

1. In their reaction to the Summit collapse, African leaders and press have stressed the danger to world peace; and they have shown some irritation that the "big four" should claim to speak for the world. They have generally criticized the US for its intelligence activities but have also rebuked the USSR for its intransigent attitude. The government party press in Tunisia has taken the position that the US could not comply with the Soviet demand for an apology, but that the plane incident cast doubt on American desires to preserve the peace. The independent press has reported that nearly all political observers attribute the Summit's failure to the stiff attitude taken by Khrushchev. President Bourguiba earlier had complimented Secretary Herter for a "courageous and master stroke" in handling the U-2 matter publicly.

2. Ghana's Prime Minister Nkrumah, claiming to be speaking on behalf of the small nations of the world, questioned the right of the "big four" to settle the world's problems. His controlled press editorialized against the danger of recklessness by either the US or the USSR, "the folly of US flying spy planes over Russian territory," and the "trump card hilarity of the Soviet Union in crude espionage charges against the American government."

3. Ethiopia's controlled press blamed the USSR for giving undue importance to the plane incident and acting irresponsibly

VI-1

SECRET

in breaking up the Summit. Emperor Haile Selassie said privately that "Khrushchev acted like a child."

4. Liberian President Tubman blamed the US for a violation of international law, but his tone indicated he believed the US was justified.

5. The Nigerians--leaders and press--generally blame Khrushchev for the Summit breakup, but they deplore the timing of the US plane flight.

24 May 1960

VII. Middle East

1. Reactions among the Arab states vary widely in the proportion of blame attributed to the US or USSR, but all show deep disappointment over the Summit breakdown and fear of extreme international tension to come.

2. Cairo press and radio blame both sides for the Summit failure. They contrast it with last week's "peace-promoting" discussions between Nehru and Nasir, and they stress the need for "nations of positive neutrality" to play a bigger role in world affairs. Nasir himself is reported to believe that, while the US blundered seriously in its handling of the U-2 incident, Khrushchev badly overplayed his hand in Paris and Eisenhower's restraint helped salvage American prestige. Nasir has said privately that Khrushchev's behavior had puzzled most Arabs as much as it had his own young son who asked, "Has Khrushchev gone crazy? Does he want war?"

3. Israeli officials and the Israeli press have strongly backed the Western stand, seeing no justification for Khrushchev's "torpedoing" of the conference.

4. Jordan's foreign minister, expressing admiration for Eisenhower's candor on the U-2 incident, said he had been sure--but wrong--that Khrushchev would have accepted the President's "transparent honesty" and closed the matter. He observed in a press interview that Khrushchev's actual performance at Paris

VII-1

SECRET

was like that of Shakespeare's Shylock in seeking "a pound of flesh." Jordanian newspapers [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] have sided emphatically with the West.

25X1

5. The prime minister of Lebanon declared that, in view of the atmosphere then prevailing, the Summit conference should have been postponed before it convened. Lebanese press reaction has been typically mixed but, on balance, has been sympathetic to the West.

6. Following several days of quarreling between the pro-Communist and nationalist press in Iraq as to who was responsible for the Summit failure, the emphasis has shifted to the need for "redoubled efforts by the peace-loving nations" to check the dangers of increasing world tensions.

7. Several middle-ranking Saudi Arabian officials have expressed the view that the American handling of the U-2 incident embarrassed all friends and allies of the US, including Saudi Arabia in particular, since Khrushchev's threats against free world bases include Dhahran airfield.

8. Turkish comment has been favorable to the United States, although Turkish reaction has been limited by the fact that political leaders and the press are preoccupied with domestic problems. The Turkish press gave the U-2 story rather superficial treatment but reacted with surprise and irritation to the collapse of the summit talks. On 19 May, Foreign Minister Zorlu publicly stated: "The incident which prevented the Summit conference is, in fact, an incident which could be a subject for the

VII-2

SECRET

conference." He also said that Turkey's views are identical "with the decision taken and hopes expressed by the NATO Council." Zorlu has said privately that, in view of recent events, Premier Menderes' anticipated visit to Moscow in July is now up in the air.

9. Iranian military officials, according to Brig. Gen. Arbabi of the Iranian Supreme Staff, believe that the U-2 aircraft incident indicates the US "has not been sleeping," and that US prestige in the intelligence field has risen considerably. The newspaper Etelaat, which usually reflects the viewpoint of the Iranian government, blames the breakup of the Summit on the USSR. The Shah's reaction has not yet been received.

24 May 1960

VIII. Western Europe

1. Although there is no disposition to minimize the seriousness of the Summit collapse, official and public appraisal has become somewhat clamer in the last few days. Khrushchev's speech in Berlin has led many to believe that a crisis is not imminent in that area; many observers have stressed that the West has been drawn closer together; there is some belief that the Summit failure cleared the atmosphere of false illusions and made the West more realistically aware of the true nature of the adversary.

2. Most observers continue to blame the USSR for the Summit breakdown, and there is still considerable speculation on the reasons for Khrushchev's changing attitude. Aside from the belief that he was under pressure from within the Kremlin and from Peiping, another theory has received some emphasis; that Khrushchev wanted at any cost to avoid the President's visit which would have followed a successful summit meeting. Several observers have opined that the visit would have increased American prestige and influence--which Moscow could not tolerate.

3. There is a persistent undercurrent of criticism of American handling of the U-2 episode in relation to the subsequent events at the Summit. Both press and responsible government officials have called the flight ill-timed and ill-prepared, have frequently deplored American admission that espionage was involved, and have charged that Washington was "trapped" into a

VIII-1

SECRET

series of contradictory statements. As a result, it is alleged, the USSR was so directly challenged that it had no choice but to react violently and was given the opportunity it was looking for to break up the Summit meeting. There is some feeling that the US "abused" its smaller allies and exposed them to increased dangers. Several of these have shown signs of taking precautions to minimize the possibility of a recurrence of such episodes.

France

4. While there is still considerable thinking in France that Khrushchev's tactics stemmed from internal Soviet and external Soviet bloc pressures, seasoned observers now see Khrushchev's handling of the air incident and the Summit as "an episode and maneuver" to improve the Soviet position in the world vis-a-vis the US and not as an indication of a fundamental reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev's outrage over the 1 May flight is believed to be simulated and no reason is seen for the belief that the Soviet military were more concerned with the 1 May U-2 flight than with earlier ones, or that Soviet military influence had suddenly increased. The new element was that this time the Russians were able to get hold of the U-2 plane and pilot, a situation which presented them an opportunity for exploitation.

5. While De Gaulle is reported to have told the French cabinet on 20 May that "there must be no dependence on others to assure our own destiny" Couve de Murville, in answer to a parliamentary query on the meaning of the President's statement,

VIII-2

SECRET

said that the solidarity of the Western Allies was complete and there was no question of France's playing a separate role.

6. The French press has moved away from the question of blame for the Summit breakdown and looks to a period of increased tensions, beginning with the "prestige battle" in the United Nations. Several have noted that the East-West problems remain, and Le Monde asserts that the East and West would have to start talking again when the storm abated.

Italy

7.

25X1

25X1

Soviet belligerency

might even be advantageous to the anti-Communist cause in Italy. On the unofficial level the non-Communist Italian press sees Khrushchev as having greatly inflated the U-2 incident, and as having overplayed his hand in the process. Socialist Avanti also criticizes Khrushchev. Various papers attribute Khrushchev's harshness to sheer bluff, or to a need to conciliate his own military people and the Chinese. "Khrushchev wanted to prove to the tough Stalinists of Moscow that he was no softy," said independent Il Giorno. The free press in general has expressed concern at the increase of international tension, and stresses the need for maintaining allied solidarity. Khrushchev is strongly criticized for his "premeditated" wrecking tactics. A rightist paper calls him "a working heir of Genghis Khan." Others compare him to Stalin.

VIII-3

SECRET

United Kingdom

8. The British press and public statements of political leaders unanimously blame the Soviet government for the collapse of the Summit conference. There is also general agreement that, in overplaying his hand, Khrushchev has demonstrated the continuing need for Western solidarity--a point supported by critics of the US in the U-2 incident. The West is nevertheless urged to indicate readiness to negotiate whenever the opportunity is seriously offered. Some typical statements:

Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell: "Once President Eisenhower had announced that no more intelligence flights would take place, Mr. Khrushchev should have been satisfied." He states that a nuclear test ban agreement is now all the more urgent, but adds that the recent events point the need for NATO members to coordinate their activities more closely.

Liberal Party leader Joseph Grimond: Urged the US not to retreat behind a curtain of "her own fears and suspicions."

Manchester Guardian (Liberal, a habitual conciliator): "Breakdown of Summit seems certain to mark return to cold war.... If Russians threaten to impose (Berlin) blockade, West must not flinch."

Herald (Labor, which had called the U-2 flights "lunacy"): "...In eyes of peace-seeking world what a sorry, despicable character he (Khrushchev) now appears, spitting in the face of peace."

VIII-4

SECRET

Times (Independent): "Immediate dangers--Berlin, pressure on outlying NATO states--are obvious but the only remedy is to restate our will to negotiate seriously whenever opportunity is seriously offered."

Telegraph (Conservative): "Back to Stalinism."
"...likely that the object of recent Kremlin policy has been so to disarm, confuse, and divide the West that its public opinion, if not its statesmen, would be in no position to resist the kind of apocalyptic pressure which the Kremlin can now deploy."

9. According to a Gallup poll taken 21-22 May, some 44 percent of Britishers blamed the Russians mostly or entirely for the breakdown, but 17 percent blamed the United States, with the rest dividing the blame equally or expressing no opinion.

West Germany

10. Addressing the West German Bundestag on 24 May, Chancellor Adenauer said that the USSR alone was responsible for the collapse of the Summit conference and that the Soviet Union had displayed irresponsibility to a "frightening" extent. Adenauer expressed doubt that Khrushchev's statement concerning a resumption of negotiations at a later date can be taken seriously and warned that a threat to Berlin was incompatible with future negotiations. The Chancellor stated that the failure of the Summit demonstrated the correctness of the Federal Republic's position that the German and Berlin problems were not the cause but rather the expression of international tensions.

He once again insisted that successful disarmament negotiations are the prerequisite for the solution of the Berlin and German reunification questions.

11. The West German press is giving heavy play to the proposition that Khrushchev used the U-2 incident as an excuse to delay the Summit, believing that it would be unproductive at this time from the Soviet viewpoint.

12. Khrushchev's more conciliatory speech in Berlin on 20 May was greeted both by the public and in official circles with a "sigh of relief," according to press reports. However, the initial nervousness engendered by Khrushchev's outbursts in Paris had already begun to subside by then. West Berliners reportedly feel the West is more united than ever in its determination to protect the city's freedom. Mayor Brandt has voiced Berliners' determination to remain an example of "patience, coolness and firmness."

13. On 19 May the West German member on the NATO Working Group on Germany and Berlin stated that some members of the Bonn Foreign Ministry favor a new treaty between the Federal Republic and the Western Big Three or perhaps all NATO powers in the event of the conclusion of a USSR-GDR peace treaty. The new treaty would not be a peace treaty, but rather one in which the signatories would undertake to do everything possible to achieve a just peace treaty for all Germany on a basis of self-determination, to conclude no peace treaty with the Ulbricht regime, and to withhold

recognition of any peace treaty concluded with a part of Germany. The treaty would serve to exert counterpressure on neutrals to deter them from acceding to the USSR-GDR treaty.

14. Adenauer's Christian^{25X1}

Democratic Union takes a certain amount of quiet satisfaction at the course of events, believing that they justify Adenauer's estimate of Soviet behavior. Members also believe the Western powers should draw closer together and that counteraction should be taken, perhaps in the form of dispatch of an additional US division to Europe and increased support for military-scientific research. They are gratified that the crisis was brought on by a direct US-Soviet issue rather than one involving Germany.

15. The attitude of the opposition Social Democrats (SPD) and Free Democrats (FDP) is more complex. Their hopes for the Summit meeting were greater and their disappointment is more intense. A lead article in the Socialist Vorwaerts attempts to justify a statement of the party presidium alleging that a relaxation of tensions still is achievable through efforts to placate the Russians. Nevertheless, the SPD sees Khrushchev as chiefly responsible for the Summit collapse. A prominent FDP deputy, Thomas Dehler, takes a sharply partisan note, echoing Soviet propaganda charges that Adenauer's influence with Eisenhower is somehow partially responsible for the Summit collapse.

VIII-7

SECRET

Norway

16. Khrushchev's insulting manner toward the Norwegian ambassador in Moscow in connection with the U-2 affair, and his threats to obliterate bases used in connection with overflights, made a bad impression on the Norwegians. Although disturbed at the Soviet leader's threats, the Norwegians resented his accusations and allegations regarding their complicity. Norwegian resentment contributed to making them more critically disposed toward Khrushchev's actions at the Summit. All non-Communist newspapers in Oslo on 18 May blamed Khrushchev for the failure of the Summit meeting. Foreign Minister Lange called a meeting of the Norwegian cabinet on 18 May to consider the situation following the breakdown of the Summit. He had planned to go to Moscow on 23 May to attend the wedding of the Norwegian ambassador's daughter and then make a 10-14 day private visit, during which he planned to see Gromyko. He cancelled the trip "because of the increased burden of work in the situation which has arisen."

17. The Labor party leadership and government is clearly determined to tighten procedures for the granting of permission for foreign aircraft to use Norwegian airfields, and a member of the Prime Minister's staff clearly indicated to the US Embassy that the Norwegian government would not like to see air missions resumed. All responsible non-Communist newspapers regard the breakup of Summit as a deliberate act on the part of Khrushchev, but government circles feel Khrushchev had a handful of high cards

which he threw away in a single gesture. Although there is no outward evidence of deep concern, there is widespread disappointment, particularly in Labor circles that the hopes for lessening tensions have been frustrated.

25X1

25X1

Sweden

18. The Swedish press has generally agreed that Khrushchev used the U-2 plane incident as a pretext to scuttle the Summit, knowing from his prior talks with President Eisenhower and De Gaulle that no concessions would be forthcoming on Berlin, etc. The leading Conservative paper criticizes Khrushchev for his "crude behavior" in Paris and states the Russian leader has the responsibility if the world now enters a period of greatly increased tension. The semi-official government paper is more reserved in its judgment, however, and condemns "activists" in both the Soviet Union and the US for pressuring the leaders to adopt more uncompromising positions. In a conversation [redacted] the Directorate of Political Affairs in the Swedish Foreign Ministry took a gloomy view of developments in Paris and referred to the dangers to the world of a return to "primitive diplomacy" in the nuclear age. Convinced that we are in for a long period of greater tensions, the Swede stated that, while he thought Khrushchev had overplayed his hand, there was no escaping the fact that the US had presented Khrushchev with the excuse which he

25X1

desperately needed. He believed that Khrushchev was sincere in desiring a detente. With the world likely to be entering a new period of tension, the Russians may be tempted to get some difficult things done--i.e. a German peace treaty--which would have been difficult to achieve during a period of detente.

19. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] the collapse of the Summit was a "great tragedy." He expressed puzzlement as to why Khrushchev did not let the conference proceed after President Eisenhower stated such flights would not be resumed. [REDACTED] did not feel there was an immediate danger of war, he feared that the world faced a long period of growing tension. The Swedish foreign office does not believe the USSR has the legal right, according to international law, to try the US pilot since the US government recognizes him as an American agent and the matter is consequently one for diplomatic discussion between the two governments.

25X1

25X1

Finland

20. President Kekkonen [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] read Secretary Herter's admission regarding the overflight, since it left the Russians no other choice but to present demands. When President Eisenhower did not disassociate himself from overflights, Khrushchev had no alternative, said Kekkonen. As a result, he thought Khrushchev had achieved a solid victory until he behaved so coarsely in Paris. Kekkonen expects Khrushchev to start pressing within a

25X1

VIII-10

SECRET

couple of months for a new summit, and if President Eisenhower does not agree, "people of the world will say that the President is in the hands of the Pentagon."

Iceland

21. All newspapers except the Communist press hold Khrushchev responsible for a deliberate rupture of the Summit, although the plane incident and subsequent handling are deplored. A Conservative party newspaper accused Khrushchev of attempting a "diplomatic Pearl Harbor," and together with a Social Democratic newspaper predicted intensification of the cold war for which Khrushchev must bear responsibility. A newspaper of the opposition Progressive Party said the conflict between Soviet and Chinese interpretations of Marxism-Leninism was an added cause for Khrushchev's conduct.

Denmark

22. Danish press comment on the breakup of the Summit conference is rather restrained with all papers voicing disappointment at the turn of events in Paris. Most papers agree that Khrushchev had gone to Paris with "good cards" and had overplayed them. The only official comment has been that of Foreign Minister Krag who said news of the conference's failure was received with great regret by the Danish government. In a possible move to ward off any Soviet charges that Danish territory is being used for "aggressive" purposes, the Danish defense minister told a parliamentary committee on 17 May that Denmark will not permit American airbases in Greenland to be used for reconnaissance flights over the USSR.

VIII-11

SECRET

23. In commenting on a more recent incident, i.e. the forcing down in East Germany of an unarmed US transport plane en route from Copenhagen to West Germany, the Director General of the Danish Foreign Ministry in a conversation with the US ambassador on 21 May repeatedly deplored the timing of the flight and the carelessness of the pilot in continuing the journey so close to the East German frontier when the plane appeared mechanically deficient soon after leaving Copenhagen. Later the foreign minister telephoned the embassy and said that Prime Minister Kampmann had instructed the foreign office to reaffirm privately the Danish government's concern over the incident. the Danish government is apparently eager to head off possible criticism from the Soviet bloc.

25X1

Austria

24. In Austria, on the eve of the Summit meeting, informed public opinion was highly favorable to the United States and officials privately expressed considerable gratification from the success of the U-2 reconnaissance operation. Since the collapse of the meeting, however, a sharp reversal has apparently begun. According to a well-informed source, who reputedly reflects the views of Socialist Foreign Minister Kreisky and Vice-Chancellor Pittermann, the American position in Austria has suffered "considerable damage" as a result of the "contradictory" treatment of the U-2 episode. In their opinion, the tactical error

VIII-12

SECRET

of admitting the flight was compounded, first by defending the necessity of such flights, and second, by suspending them. These views, in the opinion of [redacted] observers in Vienna, 25X1 are shared by conservative circles and the diplomatic corps. Despite this criticism, there are few illusions regarding Soviet exploitation of the affair and general condemnation of Soviet hypocrisy. Some typical press comments are: "There can be no doubt the world situation is considerably more serious than at any time since before Suez and Korea." "The row in Paris has at least spared us those false tones which we know from Geneva and Camp David." The cold war cannot be "much colder than the climate of coexistence."

25. The Austrian Socialist press shows signs of increased optimism following the conclusion of Khrushchev's Berlin visit, but still thinks it doubtful any new summit meeting can be arranged in six or eight months. Several conservative papers draw conclusions that new East-West tensions make it imperative that Austria establish its neutral status with "complete clarity"; that there be no "escapades" in foreign policy, and that Austrian defenses be improved.

Switzerland

26. [redacted] [redacted] that every true friend of the US can only be "extremely unhappy" that an overflight of the USSR could have been permitted on the eve of the Summit meeting,

25X1
25X1

that the pilot was apparently insufficiently trained and did not destroy his plane, and that the US allowed itself to be trapped into a series of contradictory statements. He felt, however, that Khrushchev in any event would have seized upon some other incident to create tension since Moscow "greatly feared" the prospect of the President's visit. In this respect, the reception accorded Eisenhower in India had been an "eye-opener" for Moscow. The Swiss official added that he had a strong personal impression that Khrushchev personally had desired a detente

25X1

[redacted] but may have had to take an intransigent stand in Paris in order to maintain his own position in the USSR.

25X1

27. Swiss press comment stresses the unlikelihood of another summit meeting even in six or eight months, and is dubious that Moscow can make much more capital out of the U-2 episode with its approach to the UN Security Council. The tone of press comment has become optimistic, due to a belief that a crisis in Berlin is not imminent and that the Paris debacle has increased Western unity.

Benelux

28. Writing before the actual collapse of the Summit meetings, the president of the Belgian Senate--a Catholic--editorially declared that the handling of the U-2 episode had "prejudiced the American position of moral leadership within the Western Alliance." He felt that the gravest aspect of the

VIII-14

SECRET

incident was American "abuse" of the smaller powers whom it thus involved in a "distasteful adventure, which brings the menace of excessive and unjust retaliation on the part of the USSR." He asks: "How can the US profess to be surprised if the small countries do not show themselves eager to put missile launching bases at its disposal?"

29. Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns issued a statement late 19 May calling the Summit failure "most disappointing, because all of us in the Western world had entertained hopes that now at last a beginning of the easing of tension could be attained." He added, however, that he was not surprised at this outcome inasmuch as it had become more and more obvious that there was no genuine desire in Moscow for real top level talks. Noting that the West has become accustomed to the present state of uneasy peace, he thought that "we can stand it a little longer." Prime Minister De Quay, in a private conversation with Ambassador Young in The Hague, strongly emphasized the absolute need for Western unity.

30. A ranking official of the Luxembourg foreign ministry has expressed the view that Khrushchev seized upon the U-2 episode as a pretext for "avoiding" both the Summit meeting and the President's subsequent visit to the USSR--events which Moscow anticipated would considerably enhance the US position in the eyes of the world. The official was, however, "frankly unhappy" at US admission of espionage because it gave Moscow an excellent propaganda weapon and forced Khrushchev into the position of

having to threaten retaliation. On balance, he thought the USSR would suffer more than the West from the Summit failure, noting that Luxembourg has long been convinced of the dangers of too great a public reliance on an East-West detente and that the West will again be more alert to the true nature of their adversary.

Greece

31. General popular and press reaction in Greece to the U-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Summit talks has been favorable to the United States. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff believes the Greek people, while excited by the U-2 incident, are "taking it well" and is of the opinion that no lasting harm has resulted from the propaganda davantage which initially accrued to the USSR. The action of nationalist opposition leaders in joining with the government to reject the communist-front United Democratic Left's demand for a parliamentary debate on US bases in Greece is an unusual example of collaboration by all Greek nationalist elements in the face of communist propaganda attacks against the West. The non-communist Greek press, while critical over the timing of the U-2 flight and the "inadequate control and defective coordination" of US intelligence services, praised the "typical American honesty" in admitting the flight's purpose and noted with pleasure the indication of Soviet vulnerability to aerial attack. The collapse of the Summit talks was blamed on Khrushchev's "cold-blooded torpedoing" of the conference, but the US was criticized

VIII-16

SECRET

for handing him the opportunity. Prime Minister Karamanlis told
[redacted] that "maybe history will applaud you (for the 25X1
U-2 avowal) but in today's world, as seen from Greece, only a
great power could afford the luxury of honesty in those circum-
stances." However, he said that Khrushchev, by the grossness
of his behavior in Paris, dissipated his assets. He added that
a period of inaction must be avoided and emphasized that the
West should come up with a variety of proposals to capture the
initiative from the USSR and attract the attention and imagination
of the Free World, especially the neutrals.

VIII-17

SECRET

24 May 1960

IX. Western Hemisphere

1. The Canadian press strongly condemns Khrushchev and blames him for the Summit conference failure. Prime Minister Diefenbaker has associated Canada with the Western communiqué and claimed Khrushchev's actions had strengthened Western resolve to remain united. He added that the failure "has not and must not mean return to a cold war status." Liberal opposition leader Pearson has endorsed this position. The usually anti-American Toronto Globe and Mail editorially speculated on 18 May that the people of the uncommitted nations in Asia will take note of Khrushchev's "appalling discourtesy toward the President" and commented on the inconsistency of Khrushchev's refusal to negotiate with the US because of alleged American aggression with his demands that Communist China be recognized in world councils.

2. Reaction from Latin American countries is limited so far. The Dominican Republic, Peru and Venezuela highlight Khrushchev's responsibility for the conference failure, while Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico are critical of the US in varying degrees. Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador suggest that the smaller powers can help to calm tensions between the great powers. Cuba tends to follow the Communist line.

IX-1

SECRET

3. In Brazil, Foreign Minister Lafer said on 18 May that he did not think the Summit failure would lead to war. Editorial reaction condemns both sides but places greater blame on Khrushchev and his "violent tactics." Most newspapers also demand that smaller nations be given a voice in working out problems affecting the whole world. One conservative paper refers to the US and the USSR as "dinosaurs" and says they are "unfit to make decisions vital to mankind because they are guided by 19th century philosophies in a 20th century world." Most editorials see a renewal of the cold war but feel a hot war is unlikely. A Foreign Ministry official, however, privately expressed concern lest the US lose its moral authority, in the eyes of the general public, as the leader the Western alliance. The line put forth by the Communist press--that Khrushchev was forced to abandon the conference because of US intransigence, but is clearly willing to return when the US mends its ways--has had very limited currency in the non-Communist press.

4. In Chile, criticisms of US leadership are the sharpest in recent years. Even President Alessandri reportedly expressed disappointment at Western strategy. Chilean Foreign Minister Ortuzar lamented "the failure of the conference in which all the world had placed its hope for better days for humanity." A conservative radio commented that the United Nations might now be allowed to play its proper role in world affairs: "Withholding from the United Nations any knowledge of the agenda of the

abortive meeting in Paris turned out to be dangerous. Matters of war and peace should not be considered exclusive attributes of nations having the largest stock of weapons."

5. In Cuba, the Castro-controlled press used Khrushchev's diatribes to emphasize Cuban charges that US policies are basically aggressive. Mambi Radio, known to be government-controlled, declared on 17 May: "The gentleman who misrules the people of the US has just been deflated...has backed down...has asked pardon...What he did would be called moral cowardice anywhere... Where is the world going to end with men such as these?" The daily El Mundo on 19 May editorialized, "We no longer know on whom the safety of the world depends nor when the slim thread of peace will break...This permanent fear is supremely harmful to small, underdeveloped nations..."

6. The official radio in the Dominican Republic commented that President Eisenhower's attitude was dignified and energetic. It portrayed Khrushchev as "oozing venom between his wolf's fangs" in revoking the invitation to Eisenhower to visit the USSR. It warned that Communism retreats only in the face of force.

7. Prior to the end of the Summit, Ecuadorian President Ponce suggested that the medium and small nations join as a force to prevent the "catastrophic clash of interests between the great powers."

8. In Mexico, as the Summit began to disintegrate there was a change from a cool attitude toward the US following the U-2 incident to one urging Mexican neutralism in the whole affair. Toward the end of last week Mexican commentary became increasingly critical of the Soviet stand.

9. Costa Rican radio commentary has featured criticism of "childish behavior and smallness in world politics" which was observed at Paris. The commentary asserts that the international policy of the US has been wrong, but policy errors of the US in the U-2 incident are "not of such magnitude as Russians have tried to make out."

25 MAY
2019 60

SECRET

SECRET

III. THE WEST

Reaction to U-2 Incident and Summit Developments

The limited Asian reaction received thus far has been surprisingly sophisticated over the U-2 incident and dismayed and critical of Khrushchev for his summit actions. Nevertheless, the United States has not escaped blame for provoking Khrushchev.

In Japan, initial official reaction blamed Khrushchev for the threatened breakdown of the summit meeting. Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that Khrushchev is using the "spy plane" incident as an excuse for breaking off the talks because he feels there is no prospect of agreement on the German problem. The chairman of the left-wing Socialist party termed Khrushchev's action "regrettable" but said he understood the reason.

In Southeast Asia, there has been no high-level official comment yet on the U-2 incident and succeeding developments. Distress over the serious setback to hopes of a world detente was a major theme in widespread press commentary on the situation. While the comment was generally sympathetic to the American position in this matter, there was recurring criticism of the United States for handing the USSR a major propaganda issue.

India, while critical of the overflights in general, has played down the U-2 incident. New Delhi had placed much hope in the summit as a means of relieving world tension and is greatly concerned by the breakup of the meeting. Early Indian comments blame Khrushchev for making a propaganda play. Pakistani President Ayub has lodged a mild protest with the United States over the U-2 incident, but publicly has charged the USSR with overflying Pakistan.

Reaction of the nationalist press in Iraq has been relatively subdued, but pro-Communist newspapers have made intensive attacks on the U-2 incident. Radio Cairo, which had earlier treated the incident as constituting a major barrier to any progress at the summit, has alleged "the present tension has intentionally or unintentionally been created by certain groups in the United States." The Israeli press and radio regard the U-2 incident as a Soviet propaganda victory which Khrushchev is exploiting to the hilt. Turkish Foreign Minister

SECRET

SECRET

Zorlu in conversation with Ambassador Warren was genial and showed every desire to maintain a united front before the USSR. The Turkish Government intends to reply to the Soviet protest note of 13 May along lines acceptable to the United States.

There has been little editorial comment in the African press except in Ethiopia and Tunisia, where the need for world peace and disarmament was stressed. Neither the United States nor the USSR was specifically blamed. President Bourguiba of Tunisia complimented Secretary Herter for a "courageous and master stroke" in handling the matter publicly.

Khrushchev's actions in Paris have brought universal condemnation from the non-Communist press in Western Europe. Influential papers that had been most critical of American handling of the U-2 incident have applauded Western firmness. West German papers have likened Khrushchev's tactics to those of Hitler or "Stalin in his best days." French papers blame Khrushchev for the conference break, and speculate that some internal crisis which caused his brusqueness may point to his own weakness and possible loss of power in Moscow.

British papers all hold Khrushchev responsible for the turn of events, with the pro-Liberal Manchester Guardian noting that "while the British Government over the past 18 months has gained a reputation for supple diplomacy, it may now have to earn a reputation for firmness." The Laborite Daily Herald, which alone had unreservedly condemned the American role in the U-2 incident, on 17 April decided that President Eisenhower's statement had made it "impossible for Khrushchev to say he is being threatened by aggressive Americans, and it will be monstrous if he can still think of throwing the world's hopes in an ash can."

Limited non-Communist Latin American press opinion on the U-2 incident thus far has been moderately critical, but has expressed some sympathy for the US position and explanation. It has also reflected concern over the incident's effect on the summit meeting. The controlled Cuban press and radio for the most part have used the U-2 affair to bolster their charges of "US aggression" against the Castro regime.

SECRET

SECRET

There has been virtually no official or unofficial opinion on summit developments. A Chilean radio has commented that Khrushchev "wants the talks to fail" so that "Ike will finish his presidential term with a great failure."



25X1



25X1

SECRET