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The Caribbean Left: New Tactics for Old Problems



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A Research Paper



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November 1985*

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The Caribbean Left: New Tactics for Old Problems

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by
with contributions by
, Office of African and
Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to Chief, Middle America–Caribbean
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**The Caribbean Left:
New Tactics for Old Problems** [redacted]

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Key Judgments
*Information available
as of 10 October 1985
was used in this report.*

Caribbean leftists, [redacted] are trying to polish their image—tarred by the Grenada debacle—by toning down their rhetoric and aligning with political moderates. As part of this broad front strategy, leftists are trying to build grassroots support among such key interest groups as unionized labor and youths. Because of the region's social, economic, and political complexity, tactics vary widely from country to country. [redacted]

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The Caribbean area's prolonged economic crisis is providing fertile ground for leftists to gain support and to portray themselves as a moderate force. We believe the left's chances of harnessing discontent are brightest in two key countries, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Should Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga be forced to call early elections—a distinct possibility—leftist patriarch Michael Manley would stand a reasonable chance of winning. No matter what the outcome, Jamaican elections could be a crucial turning point for leftist tacticians because of Manley's close identification with the shift to the moderate approach. We expect leftists in the Dominican Republic to increase their congressional representation in elections scheduled for May 1986. [redacted]

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Elsewhere, disunity, lack of resources, public suspicion, and government countermeasures—backed by economic aid from Washington—work against quick leftist gains. Consequently, despite the left's solid showing in recent elections in Dominica, we expect most leftists to make only gradual inroads. Even marginal increases, by providing a forum and an opportunity to sabotage necessary austerity measures, could be disruptive, however.

[redacted]

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Actions taken by Caribbean leftists make clear that their primary strategy now is to win power through the electoral system by focusing on the economic shortcomings of the centrist administrations now dominating the region. Nevertheless, some radical groups, particularly in the Dominican Republic, are apparently considering a two-track policy and are trying to enhance their paramilitary capabilities. In the French-ruled Caribbean territories, the radical proindependence minority is considering improving its capability for armed action, [redacted]

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Elsewhere in the region, opposition leftists show few signs at present that they have seriously considered adopting a more violent tack. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Cuba and the USSR see the region's deteriorating economic conditions and rising political tensions as working in their favor. Aware that efforts to rebuild their influence will take time, both countries are concentrating on fostering regional leftist unity, providing aid and advice that promotes a moderate public image for the left, and building links to organized labor.

[Redacted]

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For its part, Libya is cultivating a broad range of contacts among Caribbean leftists. [Redacted] Tripoli has concluded, but not yet implemented, a military agreement with Suriname that may include transshipment rights and involve military training.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Given the low-key approach to the Caribbean that the USSR and Cuba have adopted since the Grenada intervention, we believe Cuba is likely to be increasingly concerned over Libya's activist role in the area. Havana's concern will be deeper if, as appears likely, Qadhafi continues to encourage violent tactics. Caribbean leftists probably will try to play Cuba and Libya against each other to gain more assistance, thus adding to tensions between the two countries.

[Redacted]

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Increased leftist-led violence appears likely over the next few years. For example, recent Libyan offers of funding and training to French Caribbean separatists, already adept at coordinated bombings, would upgrade their existing terrorist capabilities. Increased military training and the apparent belief of some leftist leaders that the climate in the Dominican Republic is conducive to revolutionary upheaval suggest that leftists there may resort to terrorism. We believe leftists throughout the region will capitalize on mounting economic discontent by attempting to turn spontaneous demonstrations against austerity into sustained antigovernment protests.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Based on the left's weaknesses and public distrust of it, we see little chance of a Grenada-like regime emerging in the region over the near term. Still, regional decisionmakers' concern over gradual leftist electoral inroads and

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an increase in the leftists' paramilitary readiness probably will lead to requests for increased aid from the United States. Because Manley's return to power in Jamaica would bolster area leftists and undermine already fragile regional organizations, his reelection would pose special challenges for the United States. 

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Should the leftists' current tactics prove more effective than we expect, Washington's problems would quickly grow. To preserve stability, regional leaders would intensify calls for more direct US economic aid, additional purchases of strategic materials, and increased security assistance. Cooperation among the states of the region on security issues since the Grenada events is closer, but is still at a rudimentary level; this raises the risk that Washington might again be called on to take action should violence threaten another leftist takeover. 

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The Caribbean Left: New Tactics for Old Problems

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Introduction

To broaden their appeal and popular support in the aftermath of Grenada, according to US Embassy reporting, Caribbean leftists are playing down Communist rhetoric, trying to form alliances and front groups with political moderates, and targeting unionized workers and students.¹ In Dominica, this strategy paid off in a solid leftist showing in the July 1985 elections. Most leftists seek power by operating within existing political systems, but intensified paramilitary training by several groups, particularly in the Dominican Republic, suggests that leftists there are considering a two-track policy. A resurgence of leftist parties in the Caribbean in challenge to incumbent administrations, by intensifying public opposition to necessary belt-tightening, would lead to wider social unrest.

This paper analyzes the left's present and potential role in the Caribbean and examines the internal dynamics of leftist parties in individual countries and the general strategies and tactics leftists are employing to bolster their public appeal. The paper also assesses the role of foreign actors in the region and the implications for the United States of increased leftist activity—and of a potentially greater Cuban, Soviet, and Libyan role—in the area.

The Left in Perspective

A Disparate Group

The Caribbean left is complex and multifaceted. It includes the former ruling parties of Jamaica and

¹ The Caribbean area for purposes of this paper includes the English-speaking countries (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher [St. Kitts] and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos Islands), the French territories (Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana), the Dominican Republic, Haiti, the Netherlands Antilles, and Suriname. The total population of these states and territories is about 12 million.

Grenada; influential supporters of the Surinamese Government; the ruling party of Guyana; and violence-prone, proindependence groups in the French departments. We judge that at present only 15 leftist parties and front groups have demonstrable or potential electoral significance, but numerous splinter groups, as in the Dominican Republic, push the total number of leftist groups in the Caribbean to well over 100. Several have existed for more than two decades, but most, reflecting the upswing in leftist sentiment in the English-speaking Caribbean during the mid-1970s, are of more recent vintage. The majority have had close links to Havana and Moscow.

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The record shows that leftists have been particularly influential in the English-speaking Caribbean. Guyana under Forbes Burnham (1964-85), Jamaica under Michael Manley (1972-80), and Grenada under Maurice Bishop (1979-83) moved forcefully leftward: increasing state control of the economy, expanding ties to Havana and Moscow, and, in Bishop's case, attempting to establish a single-party state. In St. Lucia and Antigua, according to academic studies, calls by a new generation of leftist leaders to distribute political power and income more equitably attracted considerable support during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In St. Lucia, leftists took control of the government in general elections in 1979.

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The Grenada Debacle

Bishop's overthrow and murder in 1983 was a watershed for most Caribbean leftists. Those in the English-speaking islands, whose appeal was already tarnished by Bishop's and Manley's inability to sustain economic growth, were particularly hard hit, Bishop's death at the hands of pro-Soviet radicals in his inner circle heightened public perceptions of the left as a destabilizing force and helped to fuel a sharp swing to the right in the area. Equally damaging, in our view, was the effect of the Grenada debacle in crystalizing the

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Characteristics of the Caribbean Left

Ideology. *The Caribbean left is an ideological hodge-podge. According to academic and US Embassy observers, Social Democrats and Marxist-Leninists predominate, but pro-Albanian, pro-Maoist, and Trotskyite splinter groups crop up periodically, especially on university campuses. Highly personalistic parties whose leaders have close ties to Havana and Moscow—such as Juan Bosch's party in the Dominican Republic—also are significant. Some academics say that the deep roots many Social Democrats had in the influential Black Power movement that flourished in the Caribbean in the early 1970s have helped boost their appeal.* [redacted]

The fluidity of Caribbean politics frequently blurs ideological distinctions. In Jamaica, for example, Marxists have long participated in the Social Democratic People's National Party. Because most Caribbean countries have so few resources and opportunities for economic and social advancement, government offers unique rewards. Political jobs earn international and national status. As a result, shifts in party affiliation are common, and many leftist groups display little staying power. [redacted]

Organization. *Academic studies indicate that most Caribbean leftist parties are organized from the top down. Party leaders, especially those in the English-speaking islands, are members of highly educated, middle-class elites with few contacts among industrial workers or farmers. Intellectuals are particularly prevalent at the upper echelons of Marxist parties. Reflecting the hierarchical structure of leftist parties, decisions are dictated from above.* [redacted]

Support Bases. *Caribbean leftists enjoy wide freedom of action. Leftist publications circulate openly, and several prominent leftists have their own radio programs. Building grassroots support, however, has proved difficult. Manley's party in Jamaica, in our view, comes closest to being a mass-based party. It has a strong trade union foundation but also draws support from middle-class and business elements. Elsewhere in the English-speaking Caribbean, party membership is small and overlapping, and support is localized.* [redacted]

Social Democratic parties, reflecting their deeper ties to the Caribbean community, generally have more extensive grassroots support than Marxist parties, in our view. Academics indicate that Marxist organizational efforts, hindered by public suspicion of intellectuals and their image as radical outsiders, also have suffered because politics in many Caribbean nations center on nonideological concerns. Trinidadian and Guyanese politics, for example, are largely racially motivated. [redacted]

Attitudes Toward Violence. *Traditionally, most Caribbean leftists reject armed action. Bishop's overthrow of the despotic Gairy regime in Grenada in 1979 was the first coup in the English-speaking islands. In Jamaica, however, the use of armed thugs as pressure groups by major parties often makes politics a bloody business, particularly during elections. Sporadic outbursts of proindependence violence have plagued the French departments since the 1960s.* [redacted]

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tactical and ideological differences among regional leftists. Moreover, because Moscow and Havana apparently backed opposing factions in Grenada, Bishop's fall strained relations between them, according to US Embassy reports. [redacted]

Leftists in the French departments and the Dominican Republic, however, were affected much less by

Bishop's death and the subsequent US-led intervention than their counterparts elsewhere. Indeed, based on US Embassy reports, we believe that leftist parties in these two areas probably are stronger now—in terms of membership and electoral appeal—than at any time in the recent past. For example, Communist and Socialist parties in the French departments—who

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oppose independence from France—won numerous mayoralties and council seats in local elections earlier this year. Moreover, leftist proindependence groups, offshoots of the mainstream Communist and Socialist parties, have also scored some recent successes in broadening their popular base. In the Dominican Republic, public opinion polls show a rise in support for the left, especially Juan Bosch's party. Leftists there also have made significant progress in recent years in expanding support among unionists; US Embassy officials estimate that leftist groups control 30 percent of unionized labor and are cultivating support among peasant groups. [redacted]

Strategy and Tactics Since Grenada

Leftists are working hard to show that they are a serious and moderate force in the region. We believe their overall strategy is to win power through the electoral route by focusing on the economic shortcomings of the centrist governments now dominating the area.² Ideological differences, the uneven impact of the Grenada debacle, and country-specific circumstances result in varying short-term tactics. In the English-speaking Caribbean, leftists, in our view, have emphasized rebuilding public trust. Relatively well established groups elsewhere have focused on broadening popular appeal and mobilizing antigovernment sentiment. Efforts by Communists and other radicals in the Dominican Republic to upgrade military capabilities, however, strongly suggest that they are prepared to adopt a two-track policy, especially if public discontent with falling standards of living rises sharply. [redacted]

Toning Down Rhetoric

In our opinion, leftists generally see a reduction of their radical rhetoric as the most effective, low-cost means of rebuilding public confidence and broadening appeal. The trend is most noticeable among the small leftist parties in the English-speaking islands, which were hard hit by the fallout from Grenada. US Embassy officials, for example, say leading leftists in

[redacted]

St. Lucia, Dominica, and Antigua are trying to project a moderate image. Indeed, Dominica's Michael Douglas, a prominent leftist spokesman, publicly promised to strengthen ties to Washington during that country's recent election campaign. Underscoring the potential payoffs of this strategy, the left in Dominica tripled its parliamentary representation—to 6 of 21 seats—in the July 1985 elections and gained 43 percent of the vote. [redacted]

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Opposition efforts to tone down rhetoric in Jamaica date to Manley's electoral defeat in 1980 and, based on US Embassy reports and polling data, are bearing considerable fruit. According to the Embassy, Manley has removed radicals from influential positions within his People's National Party (PNP), indicated that Cuban technicians would not return to Jamaica if he were reelected, and played down confrontational tactics to force Prime Minister Edward Seaga to hold national elections before the 1989 constitutional deadline. His mild criticism of the recent US trade embargo against Nicaragua also appears designed to reassure both Washington and a domestic audience that strongly supported US action in Grenada. Additionally, in part to reassure foreign investors, Manley has publicly indicated he would honor the Seaga government's international obligations, presumably including its accord with the IMF. [redacted]

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In line with their efforts to dampen radical rhetoric, more moderate leftist leaders throughout the Caribbean are refusing to cooperate with extremist parties in their countries. In Jamaica, for example, Manley has distanced himself from the violence-prone Marxist Workers' Party of Jamaica. According to the US Embassy, PNP leaders have publicly rejected involvement in "any political alliance with any other party."

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[redacted] leaders of the more moderate Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement in Grenada are refusing even to discuss possible joint projects with the radical New Jewel Movement. US Embassy sources indicate that general animosity between moderate leftists and Marxist hardliners in the area continues to hamper regional leftist cooperation. [redacted]

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Table 1
Major Leftist Parties and Front Groups

Party/Year Formed	Leadership	Estimated Membership	Comments
Antigua and Barbuda			
Antigua-Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM), 1970	Leonard "Tim" Hector	75 to 100	Highly nationalistic; favors socialist economic system; working to build support among youth. Nonviolent; pro-Cuban, anti-Soviet. Hector active in regional unity efforts. Boycotted last general election in April 1984; holds no seats in Parliament.
Barbados			
Barbados Workers' Party (BWP), 1984	George Belle	25 to 50	Marxist; pro-Cuban; outgrowth of small Movement for National Liberation (MONALI). May field candidates in upcoming national elections, although MONALI did not participate in June 1981 general election.
Dominica			
Labor Party of Dominica (LPD), 1985	Michael Douglas	500	Social Democratic; one of few leftist front groups in Caribbean; fragile internal unity; holds five of 21 seats in Parliament.
Dominica Liberation Movement (DLM), 1972	Pierre Charles	100	Marxist; anti-US; had electoral accommodation with LPD; has small union affiliate; staying power suspect; two members won parliamentary seats in July 1985 elections running as LPD candidates.
Dominican Republic			
Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), 1973	Juan Bosch	16,000 to 20,000	Country's largest and best organized leftist party; strong in capital; controls seven seats in national congress; operates within the system but has not discarded armed struggle as an alternative; has links to labor through faction of General Central of Labor (CGT); plagued by internal splits; pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet.
Dominican Leftist Front (FID), 1983	No single leader, but Communist Party Secretary General Aris Narciso Isa Conde is best known. Rafael "Fafa" Taveras is a rising star.	6,000 to 8,000	Umbrella group formed by merger of some 13 leftist groups; Dominican Communist Party predominates; loosely organized; ideologically disparate; most member parties tiny; some endorse armed action; has links with labor through CGT and Communist-controlled United Workers Confederation (CUT); strong support at National University; sponsors numerous front groups, including so-called popular struggle committees; no congressional representation.
French Departments			
Communist Party of Guadeloupe (PCG), 1944	Guy Daninthe	3,000	Strongest leftist party in Guadeloupe; won 20 percent of popular vote in March 1985 elections; has two representatives in French National Assembly; has some union support; moderate; supports greater autonomy but opposed to independence; youth arm favors independence and privately supports violent tactics.
Martinique Communist Party (PCM), 1921	Armand Nicolas	1,000	Favors autonomy, not independence; plagued by disunity and weak leadership; large following among civil servants; affiliated with several trade unions; disgruntled members have formed proindependence groups; has no national representation.
Guianese Socialist Party (PSG)	Leopold Heder	1,000	Strongest single party in French Guiana; won 48 percent of vote in March 1985 election; advocates greater local autonomy but opposes independence.

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Table 1 (continued)

Party/Year Formed	Leadership	Estimated Membership	Comments
Grenada			
Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM), 1984	Kenrick Radix George Louison	150	Social Democratic leanings; offshoot of Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement; consists mainly of former Bishop loyalists; won 5 percent of vote in 1984 elections; not represented in Parliament; pro-Cuban.
New Jewel Movement (NJM), 1984	Ian St. Bernard under direction of imprisoned Bernard Coard	40 to 100	Avowed Marxists; Coard and other party leaders on trial for Bishop's murder; reportedly has formed insurrectionary wing; did not participate in 1984 elections.
Guyana			
People's National Congress (PNC), 1965	Desmond Hoyte	18,000 to 20,000	Only ruling leftist party in Caribbean; Socialist-oriented; strongest among Guyanese blacks; solid Third World credentials; holds 41 of 53 seats in Parliament.
People's Progressive Party (PPP), 1950	Cheddi Jagan	12,000 to 18,000	Marxist; well disciplined at top; membership largely Indo-Guyanese; harassed by government; received almost 20 percent of vote in fraudulent 1980 general elections; some labor support; holds 10 of 53 parliamentary seats.
Jamaica			
People's National Party (PNP), 1938	Michael Manley	25,000	Social Democratic, but contains active radical faction; strong support within labor affiliate, National Workers' Union (NWU); largest opposition party in Jamaica; boycotted 1983 elections but operates within the system; holds no parliamentary seats; attempting to downplay leftist image; hampered by internal splits; uses armed thugs as pressure groups; party leader a Socialist International vice president.
Workers' Party of Jamaica (WPJ), 1978	Trevor Munroe	3,000 to 3,500	Marxist; strong on university campuses and has some union support; more radical than PNP; [redacted] uses armed gangs; party leader active among regional Marxists.
St. Lucia			
Progressive Labor Party (PLP), 1981	George Odlum	25 to 50	Nationalistic, Social Democratic; hampered by internal splits; party leader maintains high regional profile; member of Socialist International.
Workers Revolutionary Movement (WRM)	Earl Bosquet	50	Marxist; strongest support among Rastafarian religious cult.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines			
United People's Movement (UPM), 1979	Renwick Rose	50	Marxist-Leninist; won 14 percent of vote in last general election; no parliamentary representation.
Movement for National Unity (MNU), 1982	Ralph Gonsalves	50	Splinter group from UPM; generally pro-Cuban; no parliamentary representation.
Trinidad and Tobago			
National Joint Action Committee (NJAC), 1969	Geddes Granger	100 to 200	Highly nationalistic; deep roots in Black Power movement; trying to shed reputation for violence; no parliamentary representation.
[redacted]			

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Broad Front Approach

In addition to toning down their rhetoric, opposition leftists, particularly in the English-speaking mini-states, also are trying to enhance their legitimacy by cooperating with nonleftist parties and front groups. For example, the left-leaning United Dominica Labor Party merged last January with the more moderate Dominican Labor Party and several independent groups.

[redacted] leftist leaders in St. Lucia and Antigua have tried—so far unsuccessfully—to reach alliances with centrist parties. [redacted]

With an eye toward the future, leftists throughout the region are organizing groups to exploit growing economic dissatisfaction and to increase their grassroots support. For example, leftist groups in the Dominican Republic are trying to build links to the hard-hit middle classes by forming neighborhood organizations, the so-called “popular struggle committees.” These committees have few visible links to established leftist parties, and, according to the US Embassy [redacted] recruit from a cross section of Dominican society: housewives, students, teachers, and other workers. US Embassy sources indicate that the committees—which probably now number several hundred—played a key role in organizing a peaceful one-day nationwide work stoppage last February. [redacted]

Prime targets elsewhere include organized labor, the most powerful interest group in many Caribbean nations, and unemployed youth:

- [redacted] both factions of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada are attempting to build links to youth and labor groups.
- In Jamaica, [redacted] the Marxist Worker’s Party is working to expand its toehold among influential unions.
- In Trinidad, [redacted] leftist unionists are considering forming a labor-oriented party to mobilize antigovernment sentiment.
- [redacted] Dominica’s leftist-dominated alliance plans to organize youths. [redacted]

For its part, the proindependence leftist minority in the French departments has tried to balance its radical tack—bombings, assassination attempts, and arson—with recent moves to build popular support at home and abroad. [redacted]

[redacted] the radicals are trying to unify proindependence groups, improve relations with established leftist parties, and expand links to labor and youth groups. Their more sophisticated approach was underscored, in our view, by the success of July protests in Guadeloupe, where they exploited the island’s racial tensions and high unemployment rate to mobilize proindependence sentiment. These radicals have also tried—so far with limited success—to gain international backing by seeking support from the Socialist International, encouraging ties to English-speaking Caribbean countries, and hosting regional conferences on labor and leftist unity. [redacted]

Paramilitary Training

At the same time that most regional leftists are trying to appear more temperate, several groups have enhanced their paramilitary capabilities. For example, [redacted] about 350 leftists from the Dominican Republic—mostly members of parties affiliated with the Communist-dominated Dominican Leftist Front—received military training in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya during 1983 and 1984. In addition, we estimate that at least 20 members of the Dominican Communist Party have served with insurgent forces in El Salvador since 1983. [redacted] members of Juan Bosch’s party have received military instruction in Nicaragua since 1981. [redacted]

Although we lack details on the location or duration of the military training, we believe that Cuba trains the largest number. Havana not only has traditionally close ties to Dominican leftists, but, more important, has the facilities to provide them with a broad range of instruction—including ideological and organizational training—tailored to their specific needs. [redacted]

[redacted] several leftists sent to fight in El Salvador previously received

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political instruction in the USSR suggest a well-coordinated training program. [redacted]

We believe the large number of leftists from the Dominican Republic receiving military training—a substantial increase over earlier reported levels—suggests an increased willingness by leftists there to take aggressive measures. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

We have no credible evidence, however, that leftist organizations in the Dominican Republic are pushing for immediate revolutionary activity. US Embassy reports indicate that Juan Bosch—encouraged by public opinion polls showing an increase in popular support for his party—continues to emphasize the electoral path. In fact, the situation in the Dominican Republic most closely parallels present trends in the Caribbean Basin country of Costa Rica. There, too, traditional leftist elements continue to pursue the electoral path, while at the same time other factions are building a more extensive paramilitary capability with Nicaraguan and Cuban assistance. [redacted]

Leftists from several English-speaking Caribbean nations have the expertise to take more aggressive measures [redacted]

[redacted] in Jamaica members of both major leftist parties received military training in Cuba during the Manley years. Each also maintains well-armed gangs. [redacted]

[redacted]

So far, however, opposition leftists throughout the English- and Spanish-speaking Caribbean show few signs that they have seriously considered adopting insurrectionary tactics anytime soon. Reporting from US missions in the region clearly indicates leftist leaders believe violent tactics would be counterproductive. Those in Grenada, for example, reportedly

fear that violence will provoke a US military retaliation. Beyond Grenada and the Dominican Republic—where even radical plans appear based more on hopes of taking advantage of spontaneous popular protests than on initiating violence—credible reports of recent military-related training are limited to Dominica. [redacted]

[redacted]

The picture in the French departments is mixed. Influential Communist and Socialist parties, according to US officials, reject violence. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Role of Outside Actors

[redacted] the Grenada episode, while cooling the ardor between many Caribbean leftists and their Soviet Bloc mentors, has not jeopardized their longstanding relationship. The majority of leftists, especially during elections, depend heavily on foreign funding, according to US Embassy reports. Leftist leaders also rely on Cuba and the USSR, and to a lesser extent Libya, to provide organizational training and—in some cases—military instruction, according to US mission reporting. Although Libya still lags far behind Havana, it is rapidly emerging as an important player on the Caribbean scene. During the past year, Embassy reporting indicates that Tripoli's traditional contacts with leftists in the English-speaking islands have spread to opposition leftists in the Dominican Republic, proindependence radicals in the French departments, and the Bouterse regime in Suriname. [redacted]

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Table 2
International Links of Major Leftist Parties

Party	Political	Economic	Military	Comments
Antigua and Barbuda				
Antigua-Caribbean Liberation Movement	Party leaders maintain regular contacts with Cuba and Libya; attend Cuban-sponsored meetings.	Libya may have provided financial assistance; Cuba providing handful of scholarships and reportedly some funding.		
Barbados				
Barbados Workers' Party	Party leaders have long-standing ties to Havana.	Cuba reportedly has made scholarships available. Libya may have provided some funds to party's predecessor, but we have no credible evidence of recent support.		Party serves as channel for dissemination of Cuban propaganda in English-speaking Caribbean.
Dominica				
Labor Party of Dominica	Party leaders have contacts with Cubans and Libyans. Cuba reportedly may train party youth organizers.	Libya and Cuba bank-rolled recent election campaign. Cuba and Guyana provided campaign literature. Party sympathizers reportedly among 30 to 40 Dominican leftists studying in Cuba.	Several party members reportedly received security training in Guyana this year.	Has been focus of Tripoli's recent efforts to expand its influence in the English-speaking Caribbean and to help contact leftists in the French departments.
Dominican Republic				
Dominican Liberation Party	Party leader travels frequently to Cuba. Cuba and USSR provide advice and training. Party members also train in Nicaragua.	Receives funds from Cuba and USSR. Cuba provides 30 to 45 scholarships yearly for party members. In 1981, the Soviets began providing scholarships.	Cuba and the Soviets have provided military training. Some members now train in Nicaragua.	
Dominican Communist Party ^a	Cuba and USSR provide advice and training. Some party members (propaganda specialists) are working in Nicaragua. Party leaders travel to Soviet Union and Cuba. East Germany also provides political and labor training.	Receives bulk of funds from USSR. Moscow provides 100 to 150 scholarships per year—the most to any Caribbean leftist party.	10 to 15 members currently are serving with insurgents in Salvador. Cuba and USSR have provided military training. Vietnam recently offered strategic command course.	Operates Soviet press (NOVOSTI) office in Santo Domingo. Labor affiliate is a member of Prague-based World Federation Trade Union. Party has representatives in Havana, Moscow, and Managua.

Footnotes appear at end of table.

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Table 2 (continued)

Party	Political	Economic	Military	Comments
Socialist Bloc ^a	Embassy reports leaders travel to Cuba to study labor, journalism, and peasant affairs. Party leaders have ties to Nicaraguan ambassador in Santo Domingo.	Dominican Security Service claims Nicaragua provides funds.	[redacted] members receiving military training in Libya and Cuba.	
French Departments				
	Leaders of Communist parties maintain active and open relations with Cuba. Havana and Libya are in contact with proindependence groups.	Proindependence radicals [redacted] have received funds from Cuba, the USSR, and Libya.	Libya has offered military training to radicals.	Party leaders coordinate Cuba's extensive program of cultural, education, and sports exchanges.
Grenada				
Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement	Party leaders receive advice from Cuba.	Cuba has provided funding, campaign material, and scholarships.	Party members have received security training in Cuba.	Cuba and Soviets reportedly urging unity with hardline New Jewel Movement.
New Jewel Movement	Looks to Moscow for advice.	Soviets probably provided funds for Coard's defense.		Cuba and Soviets reportedly urging unity with moderates.
Guyana				
People's National Congress	Party leaders frequently travel to Soviet Bloc nations.	Soviet Bloc provides limited economic aid including agricultural and medical assistance. Some scholarships also granted. Libya has entered into joint fishing venture with Georgetown.	Cuba provides some security training. North Koreans reportedly supply small-arms training.	Cuba and USSR pressing for coalition with Marxist PPP.
People's Progressive Party	Party leaders look to Moscow for advice. Frequently travel to Cuba and other Bloc nations.	Soviets and Cubans probably provide funds.		Soviets view party leader Jagan as ideological kinsman.

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Table 2
International Links of Major Leftist Parties (continued)

Party	Political	Economic	Military	Comments
Jamaica				
People's National Party	Party leaders maintain especially close contact with Cuba. Also have range of contacts with other Soviet Bloc nations and Libya.	Cuba, North Korea, and the USSR offer small number of scholarships. They also provide funding. North Korea has given funds to the party's union organization; Soviets reportedly provide party's union affiliate with scholarships for study in Eastern Europe. Libya also may have provided funds.	During the 1970s, PNP members received military training in Cuba. Havana may also supply some weapons to party gangs [redacted] received on-island paramilitary training from North Korea in 1982.	Overt contacts with Cuba and the USSR have been reduced as part of the party's effort to broaden popular appeal. Party, for example, has yet to fill liaison post in Havana.
Workers' Party of Jamaica	Party leaders [redacted] meet frequently with Soviet and North Korean representatives in Kingston to plan strategy. Cuba also provides advice.	Cuba, North Korea, and the USSR [redacted] provide funds. Party sympathizers also study in Moscow. Libya reportedly may have passed funds in the past. Hungary reportedly provided medical supplies in 1984.	Party members received paramilitary training in Cuba during Manley years.	Party leader Munroe, a Soviet conduit, particularly before Grenada intervention. Havana's displeasure with Munroe's support for hardline faction in Grenada prior to Bishop's death apparently easing. Munroe active among regional leftists.
St. Lucia				
Progressive Labor Party	Party leaders travel to Cuba and Libya.	[redacted] Libya has provided financial support in the past. Predecessor organization received funding from Cuba.	[redacted] 20 to 60 party members received paramilitary training in Grenada during Bishop years. Efforts to send members to Libya in 1983 dropped when ruling party disclosed plans.	Party leader Odum a frequent Libyan contact.

^a Both the Socialist Bloc and the Dominican Communist Party are part of the Dominican Leftist Front.

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The Soviet Bloc

[redacted] the region's mix of deteriorating economic conditions and rising political tensions as providing opportunities for exploitation. Havana and Moscow train regional youth, labor organizers, and political activists, although the Soviets are less visible largely because of their willingness to let Cuba take the lead for them. Moreover, Cuba—and to a lesser extent Nicaragua—continues to provide paramilitary training to radical leftists, [redacted] Reflecting Cuba's and the USSR's awareness of the region's prevailing political conservatism and, more important, their concern over Washington's increased attention to the area, neither is encouraging armed action; reporting from US Embassy and other reliable sources during the past two years suggests that their main objective is promoting leftist unity. Nevertheless, [redacted] both Havana and Moscow maintain contacts with violence-prone groups, such as the Marxist Workers' Party of Jamaica, in hopes of taking advantage of any leftist resurgence that might occur if the region's economic problems grow. [redacted]

Since mid-1984, Cuba has sponsored a series of conferences for Caribbean labor leaders, while Soviet labor delegations visiting the Caribbean have, according to US Embassy reports, invited Surinamese union leaders to visit the Soviet Union. [redacted] Cuba already has established an organizational framework to oversee the cultivation of regional unionists. [redacted]

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We believe Cuba, in particular, is concentrating its assistance on leftist groups that it perceives have the best chance of making electoral gains—especially in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. According to US Embassy reports, Cuban officials met frequently with leftists from the Dominican Republic during the past year, presumably to pass funds and help them chart domestic tactics. Havana, in addition to providing military training, is reportedly urging the two major leftist groups in the country to merge. To boost Manley's chances of regaining power in Jamaica.

Libya

Tripoli's program to expand its influence in the Caribbean is increasingly active; its clear objective is to undermine US and French interests. [redacted]

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Underscoring the USSR's and Cuba's appreciation of organized labor's strong clout in the region, both are intensifying efforts to improve ties to trade unions.

and ideological disunity, lack of material and manpower resources, continued public distrust, and government countermeasures—backed by economic aid from Washington—are, in our view, roadblocks to rapid advances by the left. [redacted]

Lack of Unity and Resources

Persistent ideological, tactical, and personal differences are a major obstacle to the emergence of leftist parties strong enough to challenge incumbent regimes. In our view, leftist infighting contributes to the public's perception of the left as an assortment of political amateurs, complicates recruitment, undermines access to outside funding, and provides ruling party tacticians with valuable propaganda. By forming an umbrella organization in early 1983, leftists in the Dominican Republic took the first step toward building a broad-based leftist political party in that country, but Embassy reporting from elsewhere in the region indicates that leftists have remained a fractious lot. [redacted]

Unity efforts on a regionwide basis also have come up short. The Caribbean Regional Progressive Movement—formed in December 1983 in Kingston to help establish a unified front group of leftist organizations—appears to be foundering. [redacted]

[redacted] a recent meeting of the group's leaders accomplished little, and press reports indicate a followup meeting scheduled for November in Trinidad is likely to be contentious. Several other regional leftist groups appear inactive. [redacted]

In many cases, the lack of material and manpower resources limits the left's ability to create or exploit opportunities for political gain and magnifies the problems caused by internecine bickering. Available evidence suggests that leftists find domestically generated funds scarce, reflecting the narrow bases of support of most leftist parties. Foreign donors, particularly Libya, frequently deliver less than what they promise and tend to favor more established parties. Many leftist parties also lack a solid cadre of well-trained and well-placed individuals capable of influencing institutional policies. [redacted]

Public Suspicion

Despite the left's efforts to take a more moderate tack in most Caribbean countries, we see little credible evidence that pro-leftist sentiment has grown much in the region overall. Several recent antigovernment demonstrations in the Dominican Republic, for example, have fizzled. Moreover, although the left in Dominica recently turned in a good showing at the polls, leftists in St. Vincent and Grenada since mid-1984 have turned in poor electoral performances; those in Antigua have refused to run candidates. In Jamaica, although public opinion surveys show Manley would win a general election, the same polls show little support for new elections soon. Indeed, Seaga's postponement of local elections at least until December 1985 has not caused much of a popular stir. [redacted]

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Government Countermeasures

Reports from US Embassies throughout the Caribbean indicate that regional rulers generally tolerate a wide range of leftist activities but are determined to fend off potential leftist challengers. Government tactics vary. The Dominican Republic's Jorge Blanco has used both a well-orchestrated campaign to educate the populace that austerity is necessary and frequent deployment of security forces to head off any leftist-led demonstrations against belt-tightening. To buy more time for his austerity program, Jamaica's Seaga has pointed to Manley's dismal economic record when he was in power. In our view, Seaga and Jorge Blanco also have relied heavily on US aid to check rising political tensions. Elsewhere, St. Lucian Prime Minister John Compton has tried to diffuse leftist support by increasing wages in step with inflation, according to US defense attache reporting. Despite Haiti's nascent political opening—this spring the Duvalier regime laid the groundwork for legalizing political parties and installing a parliamentary system—leftist parties remain outlawed. [redacted]

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To prevent another Bishop-like coup, governments in the English-speaking islands are trying to improve their mutual defense arrangements. They have

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Leftist Funding: The Case of Jamaica

A review of recent US Embassy reporting from Kingston indicates that Jamaican leftists, like their counterparts elsewhere, derive funds from a multitude of sources. Quantitative data are sketchy, but we estimate that foreign assistance accounts for at least half of operational expenses. Narcotics trafficking also appears, directly and indirectly, to provide Jamaican leftists with an important, and perhaps growing, source of funds. [redacted]

Jamaican leftists raise money at home by sponsoring social activities and operating small businesses. Dances, bingo parties, and sporting events reportedly are favorite fundraisers. [redacted]

[redacted] the Workers' Party runs—currently at a loss—a garment factory, farms, and several taverns near Kingston. Money also is raised by selling party newspapers. [redacted]

the Workers' Party frequently resorts to criminal activity—bank robbery and burglary—to raise funds. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Soviet Bloc provides some nonfiscal assistance. In addition to providing campaign material, expenses for Jamaican leftists attending Cuban and Soviet conferences are covered. [redacted]

[redacted]

Other foreign donors in recent years reportedly include West European socialist parties and trade unions. Contributions from Jamaicans living in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are, in our view, especially beneficial to Manley's party. [redacted]

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agreed, through the so-called Regional Security System, to help each other put down potential threats from a foreign or extralegal group.⁴ Fiscal constraints and domestic political pressures have aborted plans to launch a standing regional army. At present, the mutual defense organization consists of only about 500 specially trained police. Moreover, this defensive umbrella covers only 5 percent of the region's population. [redacted]

Outlook

We believe most regional leftists over the next few years will stick to the gradualist approach that they have adopted in the wake of Grenada. This is especially true in the English-speaking Caribbean. Available evidence—primarily Embassy reports and press—suggests that they have been encouraged by the solid showing of the left in Dominica during recent elections. Public opinion polls showing leftists in Jamaica gaining ground also are likely to strengthen the conviction of leftist leaders that they are on the right track. [redacted]

We believe that because Jamaica's leftist patriarch Michael Manley is known throughout the region as one of the chief architects of the post-Grenada moderate approach, results of national elections in that country would be a crucial signal for leftist tacticians elsewhere in the area. Manley's reelection would give moderate leftists a boost and provide an additional incentive for unity. Likewise, his defeat probably would embolden radicals who advocate more militant action. At present, we judge that Manley has an even chance of regaining power in the next few years.⁵
[redacted]

⁴ The Regional Security System was created as a result of the memorandum of understanding signed in October 1982 by Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. It was designed to fill the security gap left by the departure of British military units after these states gained independence. The agreement provides for the development of a self-defense capability by its members and enables any state to call upon the others to handle potential troublemakers. Since its creation, Grenada and St. Kitts have joined the arrangement.
[redacted]

A variety of factors suggests that the radical leftist minority in the French departments—and possibly in the Dominican Republic—will in any event pursue a more militant course in the coming years. [redacted]

[redacted] Although we believe that some radicals will attempt more terrorism, we judge that most proindependence leaders in the departments will remain wary about being associated with terrorist incidents to avoid jeopardizing their public relations effort. Because of increased military training and the conviction of some radicals in the Dominican Republic that the climate in that country is conducive to revolutionary upheaval, we believe that leftists there might try to disrupt stability through terrorist-type incidents. [redacted]

We believe that mounting economic problems will cause sporadic outbursts of leftist-led social violence throughout the region during the next few years. We agree with US Embassy officials that the danger is highest in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. Regional leftists also will try—as they did in Jamaica last January—to turn spontaneous demonstrations against austerity into sustained antigovernment protests. US defense attache reports indicate that recent budget cuts have played havoc with morale, recruitment, and equipment maintenance among military forces in the area—and mutual defense capabilities remain untested. Nonetheless, we believe most security forces can handle the kinds of sporadic outbursts of violence—riots and antigovernment protests—that we foresee. In the unlikely event of widespread unrest, however, security forces probably would be overwhelmed. [redacted]

Libya is likely to intensify its efforts to subvert Western interests in the Caribbean. [redacted] Tripoli plans to increase support to leftists in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua, and the French departments, believing that Libya has the best chance of inciting violence in these countries. We believe most English-speaking leftists will continue to welcome Libyan

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financial aid but will resist inciting violence. In the French departments, however, we judge that Libyan funding and training would improve the radicals' organization and their capabilities for violence.

[redacted]

We believe Cuba's concern over Libya's expanding role in the Caribbean will grow, especially if, as seems likely, Qadhafi continues to advocate violent tactics. Indeed, although their long-range goals are similar, Havana probably sees Libya's recent moves as more competitive than complementary. Unless Havana perceives Libyan machinations as threatening to prompt a strong US response, however, we judge that Cuba will limit its response to urging leftists to continue their moderate tack. A move by Caribbean leftists to play Havana and Tripoli against each other to wring more assistance from them probably would, at least indirectly, increase tensions between the two countries.

Reporting from US Embassies in the region suggests that Cuba and the Soviet Union will maintain their low-key approach in the Caribbean area. We believe, however, that external developments might encourage them to initiate more activist policies. A dramatic turnaround in leftist fortunes in Central America, for example, almost certainly would embolden Moscow and Havana. A perception on their part that Washington's interest in the Caribbean was flagging also might cause them to consider a change of course.

[redacted]

The complexity of the area's political systems suggest that over the short run, at least, leftist influence will vary widely from nation to nation. In sum, we believe leftist prospects for making sizable electoral gains during the next few years are brightest in Jamaica. We also believe leftists in the Dominican Republic will gain in the May 1986 national elections there; at the least, we expect Juan Bosch's party to increase slightly its congressional representation. Elsewhere, in large part because of growing public discontent with austerity, we expect leftists to make gradual inroads into the overwhelming parliamentary majorities enjoyed by most moderate regimes. Even marginal increases, however, could have a disruptive impact.

In addition to providing a forum for leftist spokesmen, we believe increased parliamentary representation will afford leftists opportunities to sabotage necessary economic adjustment measures. (See appendix for more detailed country assessments providing a closer look at leftist prospects in the near term.)

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Implications for the United States

Because most leftist parties in the region remain weak and divided, and because the public is highly skeptical of their abilities and intentions, we judge that the chances of another Grenada-type regime emerging in the Caribbean area anytime soon are remote. Nevertheless, we expect the concern of conservative leaders in the region to grow because of some probable leftist electoral inroads, improved—if latent—paramilitary capabilities in a few countries, and Libyan activism. These leaders are likely to ask Washington and other Western governments for increased economic, and perhaps military, aid. We believe failure to secure adequate economic assistance might make leaders in several countries, especially Trinidad, more receptive to continued Cuban attempts to increase bilateral commercial ties.

[redacted]

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Manley's election could pose a significant challenge for the United States. We doubt he would move rapidly toward the Soviet camp, but—based on his previous track record—he almost certainly would intensify criticism of US Central American and Third World policies. Cooperation with Washington on narcotics eradication and regional security could also diminish. Because many Caribbean conservatives distrust Manley, we believe his return to power also might disrupt the fragile unity of regional bodies, such as the Caribbean Community, and undermine their efforts to help find common solutions to the area's economic woes.

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On balance, greater rivalry between Castro and Qadhafi and growing Cuban determination to forestall further Libyan inroads among the Caribbean left could cause Havana to try to do more to support

regional leftists. Still, we doubt that Cuba—fearful of the likely US reaction—would press Caribbean radicals to adopt armed action.

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Should the left prove more effective than we expect, Washington's problems obviously would be magnified. To preserve domestic stability, conservative governments in the area almost certainly would press even harder for direct US economic aid, additional purchases by the United States of strategic materials, and increased security assistance. Widespread leftist-backed violence could raise the chances that Washington might be called on to take action to prevent another leftist takeover. We believe a leftist resurgence also would stimulate illegal immigration, give the Soviets and their surrogates new opportunities to expand their regional influence, and open US and other foreign-owned firms to threats of nationalization. The absence of a common revolutionary ideology among regional leftist leaders suggests, however, that Washington would be unlikely to face coordinated action by the Caribbean left.

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Appendix

Near-Term Prospects for the Caribbean Left: A Country Survey

The English-Speaking Islands

Antigua and Barbuda. We doubt that the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM), a small leftist-nationalist party and the most active opposition group in Antigua, will soon become a serious threat to Antigua's ruling party. [redacted]

[redacted] party chief Tim Hector, with an eye toward the general election due by 1989, is trying to soften the movement's radical image. To bolster its support, the movement plans a number of community service projects. We believe the ACLM could gain a foothold in parliament if, as we expect, the 74-year-old Prime Minister Vere Bird names his son, Lester, to succeed him and the ruling party splits. Under Hector's leadership, which seems secure, we believe the movement will continue to seek power by constitutional means. [redacted]



Tim Hector, head of ACLM. [redacted]

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Dominica. The chances for success of the left in Dominica turn in large part on the ability of the new alliance to hold together. Party leader Michael Douglas's job will not be easy. Internal bickering has already led to the expulsion of one key lieutenant, according to press reports. US Embassy sources speculate that Douglas also will be hard pressed to control radical hangers-on. [redacted]

[redacted] Douglas is worried that the Marxist Dominica Liberation Movement—two of its members ran on the alliance's ticket and won parliamentary seats in the recent elections—will try to take over the coalition. Douglas, however, apparently can count on Libyan financial aid to help preserve party unity. [redacted]



Michael Douglas, leader of Labor Party of Dominica. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Grenada. Grenada's fractionalized left will have to work hard just to stay afloat. Despite attempts by the more moderate Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM) to muster popular support through social, cultural, and political activities designed to perpetuate Bishop's memory, [redacted]

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Kenrick Radix, leader of Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement. [redacted]

World Wide ©



President Desmond Hoyte. [redacted]

Camera Press ©

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[redacted] Grenadians spurn the MBPM because of its leaders' perceived opportunism in trying to capitalize on Bishop's memory and their lack of political credentials. The MBPM received some 2,000 votes in the election last December, but active supporters number considerably less, [redacted]

In the wake of the party's resounding defeat, MBPM leaders—Kenrick Radix and George and Einstein Louison—are rethinking their options. [redacted]

[redacted] Radix regrets participating in the election and realizes that it may take several years to rebuild the left. He also believes, [redacted] that the MBPM must broaden its appeal before competing in another election. For their part, radical leftists in the New Jewel Movement, are concentrating on fund-raising and rebuilding political support. [redacted]

The left's main hope of regaining support over the near term is linked to Prime Minister Blaize's performance. Based on opinion polls, we believe that the populace has high expectations that Blaize will reduce the island's 35-percent unemployment rate, repair its deteriorated infrastructure, rebuild the bureaucracy, and oversee the establishment and maintenance of a new police force. Should he falter, we believe popular discontent would provide an opportunity for leftists to foment unrest. Both leftist factions, however, appear resigned to bide their time. [redacted]

Guyana. The constitutionally protected paramount role of the ruling party has ensured an apparently smooth transition since President Forbes Burnham died in August, and augers well for near-term stability. Upon his confirmation, new President Desmond Hoyte announced his intention to continue Burnham's socialist policies, and we believe relations with Cuba and the USSR will remain close in the near term.

Nevertheless, Embassy [redacted] indicate that the influence of the radical left wing of the ruling party will decrease as Hoyte—backed by party moderates—strengthens his control. Moreover, without Burnham's personal involvement, we believe Guyana's efforts to help revitalize the Caribbean left may suffer [redacted]

Georgetown recently promised funds to regional leftists to form fronts and to work within the electoral system; it also provided campaign material to leftists in Dominica. [redacted]

Jamaica. The electoral prospects of the People's National Party (PNP) depend in large part on party chieftain Michael Manley's chances of sticking to his moderate course. Based on US Embassy reports, Manley clearly recognizes that efforts to bury his radical past have been a major reason for his rise in the polls. At the same time, he must also convince the populace that he has viable solutions to the country's

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Michael Manley, leader of the People's National Party. [redacted]

Camera Press ©



Trevor Munroe, Secretary General of Workers' Party of Jamaica. [redacted]

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economic woes. Indeed, according to the US Embassy, the specter of Jamaica's economic collapse while he was Prime Minister has weakened Manley's campaign to force Seaga to call early elections. [redacted]

Dissension within the party could undermine Manley's apparent determination to steer a moderate course. PNP radicals already have publicly questioned Manley's "revolutionary zeal." [redacted]

[redacted] radical frustration has upset party plans for antigovernment demonstrations in recent months, and, potentially more damaging, prompted maneuvers by D. K. Duncan and other PNP radicals to gain control of the party. Manley's poor health [redacted]

[redacted] by raising questions about his ability to hold onto the leadership reins, also has intensified party infighting. In addition to emboldening the party's radical faction, Manley seems worried that moderates are trying to take advantage of his illness to increase their stature. [redacted]

[redacted] the party's decision in June temporarily to abandon direct efforts to force early elections in favor of working through labor unions was a byproduct of Manley's concern. An open split in the party—probable, in our view, only in the unlikely event that Manley reacted harshly to dissident machinations or became too sick to lead—would further sap its vitality. [redacted]

On balance, we believe Manley will stick to the center-of-the-road course he has charted. Despite their grumblings, radical spokesmen probably recognize that their best chance of gaining power is to stay

the course. Indeed, they played a low-key part in the PNP's recent national convention, according to US Embassy reporting. To help maintain leftwing support, we judge that Manley will make enough small concessions to prevent a split in the party. [redacted]

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Trevor Munroe's Marxist Workers' Party of Jamaica (WPJ), the island's second most important leftist party, stands little chance of gaining power in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, we believe it is likely to play a more pivotal, if indirect, role in the months ahead. The party's apparent willingness to use violent tactics, for example, could raise political tensions. Any public backlash against WPJ violence would, in our view, hurt Manley's party most. Should the WPJ, as we expect, field candidates in the next general elections, we believe much of its support would come from PNP leftwingers—a development that probably would benefit Seaga's party. [redacted]

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St. Lucia. The left in St. Lucia shows few signs of pulling out of the downward spiral that began in the early 1980s. The public image of George Odlum's Progressive Labor Party, the island's largest leftist group, remains tarnished because of its plans, aborted after being publicized by the government, to send a group of sympathizers to Libya for military training in 1983. As a result [redacted]

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[redacted] many party leaders, including Odlum's deputy, Mikey Pilgrim, have resigned. We believe this development could spell the collapse of the party. [redacted]

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George Odum, Progressive Labor Party leader. [redacted]

St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Disorganized and lacking popular support, the left in St. Vincent poses little threat to stability in the foreseeable future. The two most significant leftist parties—the Marxist United People’s Movement and a splinter group, the Movement for National Unity—are divided ideologically, according to US Embassy reports. Like other Caribbean leftists, both lost support after the events in Grenada. Calling itself a “progressive” party, the Movement for National Unity failed in trying to form alliances with moderate parties before the 1984 general election because of party leader Ralph Gonsalves’s leftist reputation. Both leftist groups were trounced in the election and, in our view, will remain inactive for some time. [redacted]

Trinidad and Tobago. Leftists in Trinidad’s powerful labor movement are likely to try to exploit the country’s deteriorating economic situation. The Committee for Labor Solidarity controls several large trade unions in Trinidad’s influential sugar and petroleum industries, and, according to US Embassy officials, has become increasingly active in recent years. We believe ideological squabbling within its leadership, however, could undermine the organization’s ability to capitalize on worker unrest. Moreover, we believe leftist political parties will be hard pressed to gain much ground, despite Prime Minister George Chamber’s flagging popularity. The most prominent leftist group, the small and highly fragmented National Joint Action Committee, has yet to make a significant showing at the polls. [redacted]

Others. Elsewhere in the English-speaking Caribbean, leftist influence is essentially nonexistent. Leftist efforts to play a meaningful role on the Barbadian political stage appear stalled; two older groups—the People’s Progressive Movement and the People’s Pressure Movement—are inactive, and the new Barbados Workers’ Party lacks mass support. [redacted]

[redacted] No recognized leftist political parties exist in the ministates of Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, and the Turks and Caicos. In The Bahamas, the small Marxist Vanguard Party lacks popular support, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

The French Departments

The independence issue is likely to remain divisive for French Caribbean leftists. We believe the mainstream Communist and Socialist parties will continue to support greater local autonomy short of outright independence. Recent efforts to resolve their differences with the proindependence radicals in Guadeloupe have faltered. [redacted]

[redacted] We doubt that even increased Libyan support would lead to an early solution to the independence issue. Senior French officials have said publicly that France will not grant independence as long as the majority of the local population continues to oppose it. While the dim prospects for achieving independence through the political process argues for greater leftist militancy, the radicals’ new comprehensive strategy portends the development of a more sophisticated independence movement. Apart from pursuing more confrontational tactics toward French rule, we believe the separatists will also try to participate in activities that allow more public visibility, such as international and regional political and labor conferences. [redacted]

Dominican Republic

Dominican leftists see the country’s worsening economic situation as playing into their hands. They expect to make hefty gains among those dissatisfied with Jorge Blanco’s management of the economy, especially the hard-hit middle class, according to US [redacted]

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
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Juan Bosch, Dominican Liberation Party leader. [redacted]



Narcisco Isa Conde, Secretary of the Dominican Communist Party. [redacted]

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Embassy reports. The President's difficulty in maintaining a working relationship with powerful ruling party chieftains, particularly Senate leader Jacobo Majluta, has presented further opportunities for his opponents—on the left and right. [redacted]

Although we believe opposition to government belt-tightening has heightened the left's sense of purpose, longstanding personal differences among leftist leaders will continue to hamper cooperation. Juan Bosch, according to the US Embassy, refuses to join the Communist-dominated Dominican Leftist Front largely because of animosity between him and the leader of the Communist Party. Conflicts between Bosch and Communist Party chieftain Isa Conde led to a split last year in the country's major leftist labor confederation. At the same time, the recently formed front is weakening. US Embassy sources say members of the front elect their own leaders, hold separate party congresses, and sponsor competing organizations. Moreover, several of the component members of the front have in fact split to form additional parties.

[redacted]

Suriname

In Suriname, leftist-opportunist Army Commander Desire Bouterse, in our view, is primarily interested in staying in power but may take steps to ease the political climate somewhat over the next year. According to Embassy reports, he is considering the reestablishment of parties proscribed since 1980. Meanwhile, to help consolidate his control and promote support for the regime, Bouterse has used leftist

slogans and organizational techniques. The 25 February Movement, an embryonic radical party, is his primary vehicle to instill a sense of nationalistic pride and unity. About 50 left-leaning intellectuals—some from the small pro-Cuban Revolutionary People's Party—also are part of the loose coalition of political opportunists who support Bouterse and affect decisionmaking. [redacted]

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We believe bilateral relations between Paramaribo and Tripoli will grow only slowly. Libyan doubts about Bouterse's reliability as an ally are matched by the opposition [redacted] to Libyan military aid, [redacted]

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[redacted] Moreover, Bouterse appears wary of antagonizing Washington. Given sufficient financial inducements, however, we believe Bouterse would cooperate with the Libyans in nonviolent regional leftist activities. [redacted]

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