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BRIEFING

WHAT'S WRONG WITH
U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

The problems that plague the intelligence community are so deeply rooted that only fundamental changes can improve performance



BY ALAN E. GOODMAN

The recent campaign for the White House marked the third straight presidential election in which the American intelligence community's performance was a factor.

From their offices in a state that President Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski all left often thinking intelligence had not served them well.

Moreover, over time the debate in the Senate and House about intelligence on intelligence has been sharply critical of the extensive briefings they have received from the intelligence agencies.

As early as 1952, the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the CIA was not without its criticisms. In 1974, the House Intelligence Committee's report on the CIA was not without its criticisms.

Since the White House has not permitted the director of central intelligence to resign or to be removed from office, the CIA's performance has been sharply criticized.

And in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the CIA's performance was sharply criticized. The CIA's performance was sharply criticized.

Intelligence and foreign policy are closely linked. The CIA's performance is closely linked to the foreign policy of the United States.

Many intelligence operations have left the president wondering if the community has become

too fragmented, disorganized and inefficient. Intelligence agencies have actually impeded the sharing of information. And rival agencies are still responsible for launching programs that have been extremely costly to U.S. security.

Unfortunately, much progress has been made in the intelligence community for more than a decade and we are deeply rooted in the same fundamental changes in the system and improve performance.

The quality of intelligence provided by the community has been seriously questioned for years. There have been at least 20 alleged intelligence failures investigated by Congress or the press since 1960.

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The intelligence community

also brought the attention of the public and the Congress to the CIA's performance. The CIA's performance was sharply criticized.

U.S. intelligence agencies have failed to anticipate the Soviet attack and to identify the Soviet targets in the Soviet Union.

These failures include the Soviet attack on the USS Maine in 1960, the risk to the USS

Liberty of Israeli air attack if the ship contained a nuclear weapon. The CIA's performance was sharply criticized.

In each of these cases, the CIA's performance was sharply criticized. The CIA's performance was sharply criticized.

However the policy-makers

received their information. They were passed by the intelligence community and the CIA's performance was sharply criticized.

The Iran Revolution

The most fully documented intelligence failure of the 1970s was the Iran Revolution. The CIA's performance was sharply criticized.

To be sure, the intelligence community who occupied the CIA's position was not fully informed, and a single person in or out of government would be the source of the CIA's performance.

very few people predicted correctly, but U.S. intelligence agencies and their analysts failed even to make runs.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution

To be sure, the intelligence community who occupied the CIA's position was not fully informed, and a single person in or out of government would be the source of the CIA's performance.

At the same time, the CIA's performance was sharply criticized.

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When Pressure
Forces a CIA Officer to Quit

ST. JOHN HORTON

continue from the director's

Nothing will get an intelligence officer's back up faster than a staff of the kind of pressure in the CIA. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

A National Intelligence Director is not an intelligence officer. He is a member of the CIA's staff. He is not an intelligence officer.

As a member of the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence Director is not an intelligence officer. He is a member of the CIA's staff. He is not an intelligence officer.

It is not the first time that pressure has been put on a CIA officer to quit. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

A previous director had been asked to resign. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

In any case, it was not the pressure that forced him to quit. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

and it was expected in the future.

Strong-minded officials often think they know better than intelligence officers. They are not intelligence officers.

William Casey, the current director, is not an intelligence officer. He is a member of the CIA's staff. He is not an intelligence officer.

That may appear to be an intelligence officer's back up. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

We should face the fact that the CIA's performance was sharply criticized.

If we accept this as inevitable, we can do nothing to improve the CIA's performance. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

This would be the case if the CIA's performance was sharply criticized.

from the path of duty, and talk quietly with other parties to see if the differences can be made or not and to avoid conflict. If the rate is to be run, it will be the case.

The result would be a more efficient and more effective intelligence community. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

In the CIA there is an Office of the Inspector General that reports the agency and acts as a watchdog for the CIA's performance. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

Two other organizations charged with oversight of the intelligence community are the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

What would happen in a program of oversight of the intelligence community? It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

Good intelligence is vital to our country. Our government is for the people. It is a matter of fact that he is not an intelligence officer.

John Horton was a CIA operations officer from 1968 to 1973 and served as the National Intelligence Council from 1973 to 1974.

GREAT DECISIONS '85

Starting Next Week

What year marks the 50th year of the Great Decisions program? The answer is the beginning of the Great Decisions '85 program, which is the beginning of the Great Decisions '85 program.

Starting next week, the Great Decisions '85 program will be the beginning of the Great Decisions '85 program.

Great Decisions '85 is sponsored by the World Affairs Council of the United States in cooperation with the Foreign Policy Association, a non-partisan, non-profit organization.

Participation in Great Decisions will reward their work in the field of international relations. The program will be the beginning of the Great Decisions '85 program.

Discussion groups are still being formed and members are being recruited for the Great Decisions '85 program. The program will be the beginning of the Great Decisions '85 program.

How to Improve U.S. Intelligence

From Page 1

They were set for political intelligence in 40 countries whose stability was judged directly to affect major American interests.

The group recommended more resources to hire expert political analysts — not collectors — and decreed greater coordination in the collection of political intelligence between the Foreign Service and the intelligence community.

The only tangible result achieved by the group, however, was a substantial expansion of reporting requirements that fell largely on clandestine collectors because the Foreign Service was not given the staff resources to respond.

During his 1980 presidential campaign Reagan pledged to make improved intelligence one of his top priorities. Once elected, he appointed his campaign manager William Casey as director of central intelligence.

Politics and the CIA

Casey moved decisively and rapidly to bring in his own team to reorganize the analytic part of the CIA along geographic lines, to parallel the organization of the operations directorate, and to substantially increase the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget.

According to a Jan. 16, 1983, New York Times Magazine report by Philip Taubman, the CIA is the fastest-growing major federal agency. Its 25 percent budget increase in fiscal year 1983 exceeded even the Pentagon budget's 18 percent growth that year.


Although the intelligence budget's size is classified, Taubman quotes congressional sources as pegging the cost of annual CIA operations at more than \$1.5 billion.

In his exhaustive 1983 study, "The Puzzle Palace," James Bamford reports that estimates of the supersecret National Security Agency's budget run "as high as \$10 billion."

Yet little improvement is apparent with respect to the accuracy of the intelligence community's product.

Charges of intelligence failures have surfaced over estimates of the Soviet military buildup, the accuracy of arms-control monitoring, the threat against the U.S. Embassy and the Marine barracks in Beirut, the ability of the Lebanese army, the nature and extent of the Cuban presence in Grenada, and the likely outcome of elections in El Salvador, well as that country's domestic shifts in general.

Another major congressional and public concern has been the politicization of the position of the



CIA Director William Casey

CIA director in the Reagan administration.

The appointment of Casey and his elevation to cabinet status have put the intelligence community deeply into the policymaking arena.

In the atmosphere of a National Security Council meeting, the cabinet room, and the Oval Office itself, the central intelligence director can be tempted, if not basically inclined, to take sides and to express a policy preference.

Yet the temptation is an important one to resist, especially for the president's make. As the president's principal adviser, only the CIA director can provide the security council with assessments independent of policy preferences.

Report on Lebanon

The trend today at the CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence community is to tailor the product to the needs and nuances of policy debate.

As one senior intelligence officer said in an interview, "Casey comes back here from the White House looking for reports to buttress his stand. He does not ask us for a review of an issue or a situation. He wants material he can use to persuade his colleagues, justify controversial policy, or expand the agency's involvement in covert action."

A case in point is Lebanon. Casey repeatedly returned drafts of one National Intelligence Estimate for revision with the notation "try again."

Many analysts think Casey was dissatisfied with the National Intelligence Estimate's conclusion that the government of Lebanese Presi-

dent Amin Gemayel, and especially his army, were not viable and that they would not be significantly strengthened by a U.S. Marine presence.

Charges that reports have been altered have also surfaced in connection with the CIA's work on Central and South America. Two senior analysts resigned recently claiming that Casey ordered their findings to be rewritten to inflate the threat to U.S. security.

Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd, D-W.Va., has asked the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to conduct a thorough evaluation of their allegations. "If accurate," Byrd said in a letter to the committee's vice chairman, "these reports indicate there has been a shocking misuse of the CIA for political purposes."

In addition, the Senate select committee has repeatedly expressed "concern" about whether Casey would keep the committee "fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities."

These anxieties proved well-founded when it was revealed by the New York Times that the CIA had launched a covert action to mine the harbors of Nicaragua without adequately briefing the committee.

Unfortunately, some of these problems are not new. Policy-makers constantly seek intelligence to support their policies and frequently encourage the CIA director to provide it. And intelligence officials have always tried to tell congressional oversight committees as little as possible, especially regarding covert operations.

One fundamental problem is that the current reporting system

discourages analysts and agencies from sharing information. Consequently, when collectors or analysts in one part of the community find new data that challenge conventional wisdom, their first instinct is to squirrel them away.

What Is Needed

The immediate need is for an overhaul of the analytic career service and production process that will correct patterns of thinking and of management that have contributed to past intelligence failures.

A central, community-wide foreign-intelligence data base should be created to assure that an analyst working on a specific problem would have access to all the information collected.

Analysts also should be provided with incentives to do more reflective writing and research. Work and travel abroad should be facilitated and a thorough, substantive review procedure for all products and publications should be developed. These steps would greatly improve the accuracy and quality of the intelligence product.

Analysts must also pay more attention to distinguishing between what they know and do not know, to identifying judgments based on specific evidence vs. those based on speculation, and to making projections about the future.

Reorganizing the way U.S. intelligence services collect, analyze and disseminate the knowledge essential for national decision-making should be a high priority.

In particular, a return to the concept of central intelligence collection and analysis would help improve the performance of both tasks. Such centralization, along with the separation of collectors from analysts, would break down agency-erected barriers to the badly needed sharing of all information.

Thus the United States should establish a central collection agency, able to command and mix human and technical intelligence collectors to use each most effectively.

Also needed is a central agency for research and analysis where, again, the best talent can be deployed to work on a problem in as much depth as required. These two agencies should replace the CIA, NSA, and other intelligence organizations.

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Excerpted from the Winter issue of Foreign Policy magazine. Allan E. Goodman served in several senior staff positions in the Central Intelligence Agency from 1975 to 1980, including presidential briefing coordinator of central intelligence. He is associate dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.