

OUTSIDE COUNSEL

JAIL FOR NAMING CIA AGENTS?

Cov 1.02 Carlucci

NOTE: This fall congressional committees considered, but did not vote on, legislation that would make it a crime for anyone, including a newspaper reporter, to disclose the names of secret American intelligence agents. The proposal is likely to be reintroduced this January. Floyd Abrams and Frank Carlucci have markedly different views about it. Their essays are adapted from testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

YES


BY FRANK C. CARLUCCI

There exists today a small and apparently interrelated coterie of Americans who have openly devoted themselves to the destruction of certain of the Nation's authorized institutions of government, namely, the foreign intelligence agencies. This group includes a small number of renegade former CIA employees, such as Philip Agee, and a larger group of Americans who have capitalized on disclosures of classified information made in the past by such renegade former employees.

This group has engaged in a course of action openly and avowedly undertaken in order to destroy the Nation's intelligence-gathering capability through the medium of exposing as many undercover intelligence officers and agents as possible. The perpetrators of these disclosures understand correctly that secrecy is the lifeblood of an intelligence organization and that disclosures of undercover identities can disrupt, discredit and—they hope—even ultimately destroy an agency such as the CIA. The two principal organs of such exposure have been a series of books written and edited by these individuals and a publication, *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, published here in Washington, D.C. These have disclosed cumulatively approximately 1,500 to 1,600 names, many correct and many incorrect. In addition, persons such as Agee and Louis Wolf, one of the editors of *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, have traveled to various foreign countries to carry on a campaign dedicated to stirring up local antagonism to U.S. officials through what appears to me to be only thinly veiled incitements to violence.

The tragic results of this activity are well known. Five years ago Richard Welch was murdered in Athens, Greece. Mr. Welch was first alleged to be CIA Chief of Station, Lima, Peru, in the 1974-75 winter edition of *Counter-spy*. On November 25, 1975, the *Athens Daily News* printed a letter to the editor in which a number of U.S. Government employees—including Mr. Welch—were alleged to be CIA officers. Included in that article were

Frank Carlucci is the deputy director of the CIA.



Mr. Welch's Athens home address and telephone number. Less than a month after the article appeared in the *Athens Daily News*, Mr. Welch was brutally gunned down in front of his home. A few weeks ago only luck intervened to prevent the death of the young daughter of a U.S. citizen employed by the U.S. Embassy in Jamaica whose house was shot up only days after Mr. Wolf appeared in Jamaica and, at a highly publicized news conference, gave the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and license plate numbers and descriptions of the cars of U.S. government employees whom he alleged to be CIA officers.

I think it unnecessary to go into detail about the adverse effects this behavior is having on the work of the Nation's intelligence agencies. Simply put, our officers willingly have accepted the risks necessarily inherent in their taxing and dangerous occupation. They have not accepted the risk of being stabbed in the back by their fellow countrymen and of being left unprotected by their Nation's Government. The failure of the Congress to act so far has had a demoralizing effect. Refusal to enact effective legislation in the face of most recent developments would be incomprehensible to them. I stress the word "effective." Everyone who has any familiarity with this problem knows full well that a criminal statute limited only to disclosures made by employees and former employees would not provide the kind of relief we need. Enactment of such a statute would be little more than a misrepresentation to the public and a cruel disappointment to our personnel.

Let me turn now to the policy advisability and constitutional status of

the controversial portions of these bills. As an introductory comment, I would like to say that I have seen numberless discussions of the constitutional rights of Messrs. Agee and Wolf and company, but almost nothing as to the constitutional implications of what they are trying to do. Their purpose is no less than, by direct action, to destroy institutions of government that our constitutional authorities, the President and the Congress, have authorized to exist and operate. They are taking the law into their own hands. Nothing could be more subversive of our constitutional system of government than to permit a disgruntled minority of citizens freely to thwart the will of the majority. I recognize the great importance of the First Amendment, but I have never understood that the First Amendment is the entire Constitution of the United States, and I suggest to the Senate Judiciary Committee—as I understand the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment actually to be—that First Amendment considerations must be balanced against other compelling constitutional requirements, including the inherent constitutional right of the people of this country to have an effective defense against external aggression, a defense that necessitates a working intelligence system.

Now I would like to address a key factual element in this situation that seems to be widely misunderstood. There is no unclassified document that identifies undercover employees or agents of the CIA. Neither the House nor the Senate version of this legislation would purport to criminalize the mere disclosure of an identity that had been acknowledged by the U.S. Government in any such document. It is

claimed by some opponents of these bills that the activity on which they would impact consists merely of picking information out of certain unclassified publications in which the U.S. Government, through carelessness, has allowed the names of CIA officers to be revealed. This is simply nonsense.

Some critics of this legislation have suggested that it would open up to prosecution any person who came across a classified intelligence identity, including a journalist who exposed such an identity in the course of a legitimate story on CIA activities or alleged CIA wrongdoings. This simply is not the case, as any careful reading of either the Senate or the House version would demonstrate. The version before the Senate requires that the actor be engaged in a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede intelligence activities of the United States. In short, the bill describes a very narrow category of persons engaged in a crusade whose commonly recognizable effect is to destroy intelligence activities in general and who furthers that purpose by doing much more than merely restating that which is in the public domain.

A second canard about this legislation that I would like to lay to rest is that it is unnecessary because anything that a private citizen can uncover can also be uncovered by the KGB. Even if true, this observation is irrelevant. I question its accuracy because, as Americans, the publishers of *Covert Action Information Bulletin* probably have easier access to misguided or duped sources of information within Government agencies than would the KGB.

A third and increasingly important consideration is to protect against terrorist attacks such as that which caused the death of Richard Welch and almost caused the death of Richard Kinsman and other U.S. Government employees in Jamaica.

What the Congress can do is protect us from the malicious and deliberate acts of Americans who are bent on our destruction, acts that exacerbate the inherent difficulties present in our operating conditions overseas.

NO

BY FLOYD ABRAMS

The naming or listing of undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants and sources by any of their colleagues is an outrage; those who engage in such activities disgrace themselves and disserve both their colleagues and their country. Without covert intelligence operations, we would lose much

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Association does not define the questions upon which certiorari is granted."

Ashton covered her main point in a crisp, firm and knowing delivery that no doubt did much to make up for the turgid brief the state had filed. Aware that the court has been increasingly hostile to the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause, she simply dwelled on the point that the Court should resist any extension of the clause to limit testimony on punishment after the verdict is in.

When it was time for rebuttal, she rose and swept smartly through her answers to Berger. As matters stood then, Ashton had saved more time than she would need; Berger had not been at his best. Ashton thus was about to wind up early. She wanted to make one further point: if defendant Ernest Benjamin Smith, Jr., had been so troubled about the psychiatrist's testimony that Smith had shown no remorse when interviewed, Smith "could have taken the stand and said he was sorry he did it."

Blackmun, hunched over his papers, looked up and asked, "Could the state call Smith as a witness at that stage?"

"No, your honor, it could not," Ashton answered confidently.

"Given your answer," Blackmun returned, "how does that apply to your argument that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to that phase?"

Ashton had an answer, but it did not resuscitate her point. "The Fifth Amendment," she said unconvincingly, "should not be used to prohibit the use of testimony that forms the basis for an expert opinion."

Justice Thurgood Marshall, keenly aware that Ashton had not gotten out of Blackmun's trap and apparently wishing to keep her there, asked: "What if Texas had a statute that said that, at a bifurcated trial, a psychiatrist could determine the sentence? Would that violate due process?"

Yes, she said, it would. "An expert witness may not determine an issue of fact that a jury must consider."

Marshall's question had sounded beside the point, and her answer was solid, but the exchange did not come out in her favor. It did not alter the impression that Ashton's rebuttal had gotten cleanly away from her.

Had she passed up rebuttal altogether, her case would have been in much better shape. Joel Berger had gotten into needless verbal combat with the Court and had displayed too often an unpleasant way of starting his answers with "well . . ." in a tone suggesting that questions were getting in his way.

His brief was notably stronger. It marshaled the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against psychiatric testimony in capital cases. Berger's brief made it seem plain that capital case defendants would not know of the hazards of talking to a doctor about future criminal propensities.

For reasons that were in no way obvious, Berger had come to the oral argument determined to discredit the particular psychiatrist involved in the Smith case, Dr. James Grigson. He wanted to be sure that the Court knew the doctor was "prosecution oriented"—a point that his brief had made, but far more subtly.

"Aren't all expert witnesses oriented to the side who calls them?" Rehnquist wondered when Berger brought up the complaint.

Berger agreed, but insisted that it

was "particularly relevant here" because in Texas, "prosecution-oriented psychiatrists are going in to see these defendants."

He would not give up the point when ridiculed sharply by Justice Byron White for failing to prove his claim about Grigson's supposed bias.

Justice Stevens offered Berger a chance to get off that line, asking, "It wouldn't make any difference, would it, to the legal question, whether the psychiatrist was defense oriented?"

Berger said that was correct, thus switching his ground to suggest that "this case is not about Dr. Grigson." Even after that exchange, however, Berger returned to his theme and abandoned it only after the chief justice rather bluntly forced him off it.

♦ ♦ ♦

ESCHEWING POLITICS: Benjamin Civiletti may be one of the most political of U.S. attorneys general, and he may have had one of the more interesting political assignments in a waning presidential campaign. But he handled it like a lawyer.

Standing before the Court's lectern for the first time as attorney general (he was there once before as a private lawyer in 1973), Civiletti showed none of the political artlessness that last summer took him to the White House to talk about not talking about Billy Carter's legal troubles.

There were Jewish votes to win with the case of *Fedorenko v. U.S.* and Civiletti knew that—but he never let on.

The case is about the right to continued citizenship of Russian-born Feodor Fedorenko, who lied on his visa application in 1949 about his past as an armed guard at the Nazi death camp in Treblinka, Poland. The Justice Department's move against him is part of the continuing campaign to ferret out "Nazi collaborators," perhaps to deport them. Fedorenko's case has brought major Jewish groups to the government's side in the Court, and its political impact is well known at the department.

Outside the Court, Civiletti insisted that politics had had nothing to do with having the case assigned to him for argument; there is always an election going on, he remarked drily to the gaggle of press following him.

Inside the chamber, he was as good as any of the subordinates the solicitor general sends up. He argued the case with a bare lectern and did not drop a syllable or a crucial fact. The absence of props (he also had no apparent need for assistant Andrew Frey, who sat close enough to be of help) revealed a confidence that turned out to be justified.

The attorney general is known as anything but a rash man, and he exhibited the utmost deliberation as he spoke. Civiletti, collected, composed and well-studied, was on top of his case, even though its legal points are complex and the attorney general had not had much time to learn them. The main points turn on the concepts of "materiality" of information withheld by immigrants. The Court's past utterances about those concepts are far from helpful guides, but Civiletti gave them new clarity. Handsomely tanned below his deftly combed gray hair, the attorney general was as much the sartorial expert as he was the forensic superior of his adversary.

Fedorenko's lawyer, Brian Gildea of New Haven's Celentano and Gildea, is

as dandy a looker as shows up at the bar. He has a face fit for a shirt ad and exquisitely oiled hair. Gildea, too, came prepared—but his preparations were too visible, and he was too dependent on them. He departed from his notes only with difficulty and evident strain. For more than 20 of his allotted 30 minutes, Gildea was obsessed with the papers that lay before him.

He was nearly finished before his side had achieved anything like oral clarity, and it did so then only because Justice William Brennan, Jr., generously talked him through it in simple terms.

He treated his case as if it were entirely fact bound, and thus left the legal questions at stake entirely open to Civiletti's practiced exploration.

♦ ♦ ♦

TICKLED WHITE: Justice White seldom seems as tickled as when he has put a question that an attorney had never once pondered. He was positively gleeful when Kevin Forde came up short on a jurisdictional idea floated by White in the hearing on *U.S. v. Will*.

White may have had a special reason for the particular puzzler he asked of Forde. The *Will* case is a test of whether all federal judges (including all nine Supreme Court justices) have a constitutional right to a cost-of-living raise every year. The discomfort of facing that issue was everywhere evident on the bench and across the courtroom, and White's question involved a possible way out.

Forde, incidentally, did little to ease the pangs. Repeatedly in the opening minutes of his argument on behalf of the 14 judges who sued for higher pay, the Chicago solo practitioner made an apology for the lawsuit.

He called it an "explanation we owe the American people, if not this Court." It was simply a matter of duty to bring such a case, he said at the start.

"What canon of ethics," Justice Rehnquist asked archly, "requires federal judges to file a lawsuit urging other judges to raise their salaries?"

Forde relied upon the mandate that it is a judge's responsibility "to preserve the independence of the judiciary," and the thought that Congress's refusal to assure an annual pay raise by law was a threat to that independence.

Twice more, before turning to the merits, the Chicago lawyer asked for implied forgiveness for the lawsuit: "There is nowhere else to go."

White immediately wondered out loud if that were really so. "Could you have sued Mr. Foley in state court?" (William Foley, director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, pays judges their salaries.)

Stumped at White's thought, which is nowhere touched in his brief or the Justice Department's brief on the other side, Forde nevertheless was quick to remember that the U.S. government could not be sued in state court.

"I did not say the government. I said Mr. Foley," White responded. "Could he be sued in state court? State courts handle federal question cases all the time."

Rehnquist chimed in: "Couldn't the Circuit Court of Cook County have heard this suit?"

"No, no," replied Forde. With not a hint that he had ever looked up the question, he went on, "There is no state court in which we could have proceeded."

INQUIRY

29 December 1980

Old Spies and Cold Peas

By JEFF STEIN

A HUTCH OF RABBITS WAS MUSTERED FOR SECURITY duty in the kitchen of the Holiday Inn in McLean, Virginia, in October, pretesting samples of fried chicken, roast beef, and cold as the Association of Former Intelligence Officers sat down for a luncheon at its fifth annual convention. It wouldn't do to have America's finest ex-spies knocked off in one fell swoop by a KGB chef.

The association, founded in 1975 by senior CIA covert operator David Phillips (Cuba, 1960; Brazil, 1964; Chile, 1973), appears to be having a vintage year after five years of sour grapes. Membership has increased tenfold from an original 250 to 2600 former CIA, FBI, and military intelligence agents and officers, and this year, for the first time, corporate membership has been solicited and enthusiastically received (\$500 a year gets a company three free memberships). Lockheed was first in line.

A marked departure from earlier years, when the more prominent brethren were busy ducking subpoenas or television network crews, the mood at this year's convention was both joyous and combative, apparently thanks to the bracing Cold War tingle in the air and the solid prospects for new laws making it a crime to disclose the name of a CIA officer learned from publicly available sources.

This year's convention of spies found cause for joy in every corner. Key "anti-CIA" liberals Frank Church, George McGovern, Birch Bayh, and John Culver were in deep trouble in their reelection bids (and went on to lose). The Supreme Court had grabbed Frank Snepp's "ill-gotten gains" from *Decent Interval* back for the government. The Congress had repealed the Clark Amendment prohibiting covert intervention in Africa on the side of apartheid and had retreated from its early promise to write a strong CIA and FBI charter. As former CIA intelligence chief and present Reagan adviser Ray Cline crowed to the assembled CIA, FBI, and military men, "We are on the upgrade at last."

Or are they? A few days of milling around at the conference, dipping into panel discussions and chatting with a number of intelligence officers in the lobby or bar, suggests that the U.S. intelligence community remains mired in delusions about itself and the world about it. Its chronic and crippling problem remains its inability to distinguish between intervention and intelligence, security and repression. In the real world, moreover, its solution to these problems is not as harmless as hiring rabbits to pretest food for a convention banquet.

A series of sharp exchanges at the conference is instructive. On Friday, October 3, a panel on Soviet Bloc intelligence operations unveiled its star performer, the former chief of "disinformation" for Czech intelligence, Ladislav Bittman. Chaired by Ray Cline, the panel sought to draw out of Bittman a pattern of omnipotent KGB and Eastern Bloc efforts to recruit Western journalists and plant false information in the press.

The issue is important. In recent months, the devil theory of international relations has made a big comeback. The Soviet Union is said to be not merely throwing its weight around and protecting its vital interests, like any other great power; it is evil unto itself. A corollary to this grand design is the apparently fashionable view that Russian "moles" have burrowed into the loose fabric of American life, poking, climbing, and chewing their way into the highest echelons of the U.S. press and the intelligence community itself. Thus, an editorialist's support for human rights cannot merely be a sensitive response to much of the world's state-organized cruelty; it has to be "proof" of seduction by Soviet intelligence's "false flag" technique of wooing liberals to communist aims.

Czech defector Bittman, with Leninist goatee and speaking in "Moscow-impossible" Eastern European accents, played the role assigned to him in the panel discussion. He titillated this special audience, producing chuckles when

Washington Whispers

STATINTL

Should Caspar Weinberger get his way as Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, a career civil servant who is now No. 2 man at the Central Intelligence Agency, will become deputy to Weinberger. Carlucci would be in day-to-day charge at the Pentagon, permitting Weinberger to spend time as a member of Reagan's "super-cabinet" on a broad range of issues.

A CIA report circulating in the intelligence community estimates it would cost the Soviet Union 10 billion dollars a year in economic aid and military spending if it invaded Poland—a sum big enough to constitute a deterrent, in the CIA view.

Nick Thimmesch

Look Who's Undercutting Carlucci

Power is heady stuff and can make jackals out of people who suddenly find themselves wielding it. This verity might explain why some jackals on the far right are out to stop the nomination of Frank Carlucci, 50, a seasoned federal official, as Caspar Weinberger's deputy secretary of defense.

Carlucci, now deputy director of the CIA, served in the Nixon and Ford administrations in top policymaking jobs. Much of his experience was in working as right-hand man to Weinberger when he was director of the Office of Management and Budget and secretary of health, education and welfare.

Indeed, Weinberger and Carlucci were a team, known for fixing gimlet eyes on budgets and for manfully struggling against waste and inefficiency. If Weinberger earned a reputation as "Cap the Knife," his younger aide deserved to be called "Carlucci the Cutter." It seemed natural for Weinberger, once nominated to be secretary of defense, to ask that Carlucci, with nearly 25 years in public service, be his right-hand man again.

But now a document is circulating in Republican circles describing Carlucci as "an obstruction, rather than an asset, to Reagan's interests," and leveling heavy criticism against him. This document, prepared for the Senate Republican Steering Committee, but conveniently distributed elsewhere in Washington, claims that Carlucci, as the CIA's No. 2 official, helped impair U.S. intelligence capability, assessment and product, and gave "active support" to a 1978 presidential order on intelligence community conduct.

This broadside also charged that Carlucci refused to comply with Department of Justice requests for CIA cable traffic and other information relating to Billy Carter's involvement with Libya. The paper also claimed that Carlucci refused to publish an estimate of Soviet intentions and objectives after the Afghanistan invasion.

Now, Frank Carlucci is a conservative, a Republican, a patriot, a bright, hard-working public official, and hardly the unreliable fellow that the far right-wingers would have President-elect Reagan believe he is. But ultraright senators, and a clutch of hawks determined to greatly increase the defense budget, see a Weinberger-Carlucci team likely to be too diligent in cost-cutting at defense.

They want an outright militarist to be Weinberger's deputy. It is significant that the paper damning Carlucci originated in the office of the Defense Department transition team, headed by William R. Van Cleave, who sees himself as the sort of deputy Weinberger needs for balance.

Most people who closely observed the trials and tribulations of the CIA—and I include myself in that group—feel that Carlucci has helped preserve a sense of rationality at the agency, particularly during the Carter years.

It is absurd to charge Carlucci with taking actions weakening our intelligence capability, and whatever work he did in carrying out a presidential directive on CIA conduct was in line with following the law. The charges that he covered up for Billy Carter are rubbish, and so is the claim that he was derelict on Afghanistan.

Carlucci is a professional public servant, the kind Republicans need to run the government. He served as a State Department official in South Africa, the Congo, Zanzibar and Brazil. As assistant director of the Office of Economic Opportunity under President Nixon, he had to fend off holdover Democratic liberals and, at one point, directed that all Xerox machines be locked up in the basement in order to prevent documents from being copied and leaked to congressional Democrats.

Weinberger, aware of Carlucci's good work at OEO, took him to the White House for the OMB job, and then to HEW. In 1975, Carlucci became ambassador to Portugal, argued against Henry Kissinger's inclination to write off that nation to the revolutionary movement and did much to maintain U.S. credibility during that turbulent time. Carlucci worked closely with Gen. Al Haig, then commander of NATO forces, to keep Portugal in the alliance.

By any measure, Carlucci is a valuable asset, and no wonder Weinberger wants him as his deputy at Defense. Carlucci's friends say that if he is nominated for the job, he would love to confront his accusers in Senate hearings. What his accusers are hoping is that such a day will never come. They want to cut him off by spreading the charges—cited in this curious staff paper—so that Reagan will be pressured not to nominate Carlucci at all.

There are several issues here. If Weinberger wants Carlucci as much as I think he does, will he refuse to become secretary of defense unless Reagan nominates him? Does Reagan want Weinberger badly enough to nominate Carlucci, knowing that the right wing will howl and try to undercut the nomination? Is the president-elect mindful enough of the need to make a good showing in the early months of his administration to resist the jackals and put the best people in his government?

And, if the Reagan administration and the hawkish Congress are bound and determined to substantially increase defense spending, isn't it best to have a pair of cost-minded professionals such as Weinberger and Carlucci on top at Defense to prevent scandal and waste?

ESSAY

The Cabinet Scorecard

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Dec. 24 — Twice in recent weeks, a group of people have stumbled onstage at transition headquarters — awkward, defensive, blinking in the unaccustomed limelight — and lined up to face a flock of witnesses and potential accusers.

I half-expected one member of the audience to leap to his feet and shout at one man in the lineup: "That's him! There he is! That's the one who promised me a rose garden!"

The dreary, frayed-edge introduction of the Reagan Cabinet — "Hi, I'm the new Secretary of Whatever, and I can't answer any questions yet" — is part of the incoming Administration's post-election slump.

At first, the Cabinet-in-formation was presented the way a tie salesman sells ties: "You like this one? How about this instead?" The Washington landscape was littered with deflated trial balloons.

Later, the transcontinental distance between the President-elect and the men and woman finally selected left the impression that Mr. Reagan was at the receiving end of the decision-making process.

In the end, when the lineup managed to lurch onstage, no rhyme or reason accompanied their introduction. Neither the foreign-defense group nor the economic-issues group presented any thematic approach. As crowds of transitioners bumped into appointees at the stationhouse, the elected leader seemed to be off on some distant patrol: Car 54, where are you?

At this rate, both Reagan's "hundred days" and his honeymoon are in danger of being over by Inauguration Day, a modern record. That's unfair, of course, but by failing to act as master of his own ceremonies, Mr. Reagan invites others to search his selections for a sense of purpose.

At Defense, Cap Weinberger is a superb choice. If defense budgets are to be increased dramatically, who is better at Defense than an experienced cost-cutter? Weinberger has both a sense of proportion and a sense of humor, and nobody will be closer to President Reagan. His infighting skills were shown in Weinberger's first bureaucratic test: he rejected hard-liner William Van Cleave as Deputy Secretary in favor of deputy C.I.A. chief Frank Carlucci, to the dismay of the "Madison Group," which preferred cleavage.

At State, Al Haig is a question mark. Seeking Democratic help in his Senate confirmation, Haig reached first for lawyer Newton Minow, then hired his Johnson Administration sponsor, Joe Califano; seeking to please the Kissinger faction and diplomatic establishment, Haig abruptly dismissed the right-wing transitionaries who were worrying the striped-pants set. All his attention now is focused on the left, but his long-range battle will be with the hawks. (For his deputy, Haig seeks to circumvent Richard Stone, Fred Ikle and Laurence Silberman with a dark-horse Californian beholden only to him.)

At Treasury, Donald Regan was chosen because he is neither Alan Greenspan (resented by the supply-side Simonites) nor William Simon (resisted by the traditional Greenspanics). He is a fine manager who may not realize that he is backing into a philosophical buzz saw. We will be better served by Reagan's Regan than Regan's Regan.

At Justice, the choice of Mr. Reagan's personal lawyer was a mistake. William French Smith would have been a perfectly good White House counsel, but the Attorney General should be neither the President's brother nor his buddy nor his campaign manager nor his former lawyer. Justice has been profoundly politicized in the past four years; we shall see if the job of chief of the Criminal Division goes to someone who combines prosecutorial zeal with judicial temperament, or to Robert Blakey.

To Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige brings the experience of running a tight ship at Scovill Manufacturing; his sister, Tish, is editor of Amy Vanderbilt's "Book of Etiquette," so we can expect the Reagan Cabinet to use

the right forks.

As Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey is a natural — World War II master spy, international lawyer, refugee advocate, economic statesman. By treating this appointment as of Cabinet rank, Reagan sends a clear signal that the C.I.A. can stop feeling guilty and start getting results.

Skipping over most of the others, as Reagan probably will, we come to the most inspired appointment: Jeane Kirkpatrick as ambassador to the United Nations. Intellectual, articulate, forceful, this Jackson Democrat will sweep away the guilt-ridden pretensions of the Andy Youngs and bring back memories of Pat Moynihan. With Cabinet rank, she will have direct access to the President if the Secretary of State wavers on policy. At the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, hers was the strongest voice for support of Israel; America will not soon again be embarrassed by the spiteful anti-Israel vote cast by Mr. Carter's man last week.

A good bunch, by and large, bolstered by Richard Allen and Martin Anderson within the White House — certainly a big improvement over the crew sinking from view. The pity is that the "team" has not been presented as a team; the fault for that lies with the man who may have chosen his Cabinet, but failed to give meaning to his choices.

Admiral Inman Likely to Get No. 2 CIA Post

By Jeremiah O'Leary

Washington-Star Staff Writer

Vice Admiral Bobby Ray Inman is expected to be named deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency by President-elect Ronald Reagan, according to well-informed sources in the transition process.

The 49-year-old naval officer has been director of the super-secret National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md., since 1977. Transition sources said Inman was at the top of the list for taking over as deputy to director-designate William J. Casey because Inman's talents would complement those of the 67-year-old director.

Casey is a respected political strategist who took over as Reagan's campaign manager on the eve of the New Hampshire primary and had a successful career as an OSS operator during World War II. But Casey is said, even by his friends, to be somewhat disorganized when it comes to details, occasionally forgetful and out of touch with modern intelligence techniques.

In addition, the CIA tradition is that when the director of the agency is a civilian, the deputy's spot goes to a military man. Outgoing director Stansfield Turner is a Navy admiral and his departing deputy, Frank Carlucci, is a civilian.

The Reagan talent hunters have been looking for someone organized, articulate and current in

present-day intelligence craft and technology to install as Deputy CIA Director under Casey. While Inman's nomination is not final, several sources consider him to be a runaway leader for the post.

Inman, a native of Rhonesboro, Texas, entered the Navy after graduation from the University of Texas in 1950. Although not a graduate of the Naval Academy, he did graduate from the prestigious National War College here in the 1972 class.

He became an ensign in 1952 and advanced through all the officer ranks until his promotion to Vice Admiral in 1976. In his career, Inman has served as assistant naval attache in Stockholm, Sweden, a key listening post for events in the Soviet Union. He also was assistant chief of staff for intelligence under the commander of the Pacific Fleet from 1973 and 1974.

For the following two years, Inman was director of the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. He was vice director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1976 to 1977 when he was named head of the NSA.

The National Security Agency has the task of listening in electronically on all world communications and has the major role in U.S. efforts to break other nations' codes.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
21 December 1980

The Real Power: The Subcabinet

Reagan is right to control its members as much as possible

By Walter Shapiro

NOW THAT Washington has begun to grasp the shape of the new Reagan Cabinet, it is time to begin thinking about where most of the real power will reside in the new administration.

No, it will not be in an official or unofficial "super-cabinet," a notion of some close Reagan advisers who would like to be super-cabineteers. Nor, for that matter, will it be with the Cabinet as a whole.

If experience is any guide, we will have under Ronald Reagan what we have long had in Washington — sub-cabinet government. Outside of urgent crisis areas, foreign and domestic, most power will rest with the legion of undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, general counsels and their staffs who comprise the subcabinet.

That is why the Reagan people are wise to have prepared lists of prospective subcabinet members for their new bosses, who will have to choose from among them or else get special permission from the White House command to hire somebody else. Having as tight control as possible over the subcabinet is no sin; it is essential to the success of any administration, regardless of whether career bureaucrats, the press or others sometimes portray it as a sinister scheme (in Washington, of course, anything Richard Nixon once tried to do is *ipso facto* "sinister").

Indeed, many of the outgoing administration's problems stemmed from the weakness of Carter's subcabinet — which was generally chosen by Cabinet members themselves, with little White House consultation. The unpopularity of the CETA jobs program, to cite just one example, is traceable directly to the administrative weakness of Ernest Green, the assistant labor secretary responsible for it.

The White House and Cabinet members, after all, spend their time dealing almost exclusively with issues that are on the front pages. The subcabinet, meanwhile, controls what most voters consider "the government." They manage the federal departments and their myriad programs, develop new policies, legislation and regulations, dicker with Capitol Hill and the inescapable constituency groups. All this brings with it control of perhaps the most important resource in government — information.

* * * *

Nobody better understands the importance of the number two man in Cabinet-level agencies than Frank Carlucci, the deputy director of the CIA, who may become the Elliot Richardson of the subcabinet.

He was Caspar Weinberger's undersecretary at HEW in the early 1970s and is a leading, albeit controversial, candidate to follow his former boss to Defense as the deputy secretary. It is a post that John Marsh, a former Ford aide mentioned as a possible secretary of the Army, calls "the most important job in the subcabinet." Traditionally, the defense secretary worries about global strategic policy and the deputy secretary handles the nuts-and-bolts of running the Pentagon.

Carlucci's career at the CIA suggests that in the foreign policy/national security arena even the number two man may not have the time to actually run the agency. Long, agonizing hours are spent at the White House managing the foreign policy crisis of the moment. A tremendous amount of coordination is required between Carlucci and people like David Newsom and David Aaron, his counterparts at State and the National Security Council. Even moving from HEW to the CIA did not free Carlucci from the necessity of congressional hearings. The only difference is that, these days, his testimony takes place behind closed doors.

The same phenomenon of top policymakers being overwhelmed by the immediate evidently takes place at State as well. "What you have to understand is the top people at the State Department tend to be preoccupied with the crisis of the moment — the Iranian hostages, relations with the Soviet Union or whatever." That is the case with the new undersecretary of state for security assistance. "That is why he has to be extremely

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
19 DECEMBER 1980

Favorite for Pentagon Post Attacked

By JOHN H. AVERILL
and NORMAN KEMPSTER
Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON—Conservative Republicans in the Senate are mounting a determined effort to dissuade President-elect Ronald Reagan from nominating Frank Carlucci as deputy secretary of defense, The Times learned Thursday.

Carlucci, now deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is reportedly the first choice of Secretary of Defense-designated Caspar W. Weinberger for the No. 2 Pentagon job.

Carlucci, 50, a career foreign service officer and former ambassador to Portugal, served in two high positions under Weinberger during the Richard M. Nixon Administration.

He is described in a staff paper prepared for the Senate Republican Steering Committee, an organization of conservative GOP senators, as "an obstruction, rather than an asset, to Reagan interests."

The paper complains that Carlucci:

--Has had "direct involvement in a number of undertakings that have severely impaired U.S. intelligence capability, assessment and work product."

--Gave "active support" to a



Associated Press

Frank Carlucci

February, 1978, presidential order that set forth guidelines on how the U.S. intelligence community should conduct itself. The order grew out of Senate hearings that were highly critical of the CIA's conduct. The staff paper says the order "enormously restricted intelligence collection."

--"Consistently refused to comply with Justice Department requests for critical cable traffic and other intelligence the CIA possesses" that related to Billy Carter's relations with Libya. The paper adds that Carlucci "persisted in withholding potentially damaging information" about the President's brother.

--Refused "to publish a national intelligence estimate on Soviet intentions and objectives following the invasion of Afghanistan."

Carlucci could not be reached for comment. But a source close to the intelligence community said, "Carlucci apparently denied these people (Reagan transition team members) access to some stuff and was singularly uncooperative, and this is their way of getting back at him."

If a significant number of Senate Republicans subscribe to the allegations against Carlucci—and if Reagan nominates him—the opposition could be troublesome for Weinberger too.

Weinberger twice has chosen Carlucci for high positions in government. When Weinberger was director of the Office of Management and Budget in the early 1970s, he made Carlucci an associate director and later deputy director.

Carlucci also followed Weinberger to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, where Weinberger later served as secretary. Carlucci became Weinberger's under secretary.

President Gerald R. Ford named Carlucci ambassador to Portugal in 1974, and President Carter made him deputy CIA director in 1977.

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WASHINGTON POST
19 DECEMBER 1980

Reagan Team Divided Over Carlucci as Deputy Defense Secretary

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

A behind-the-scenes battle is being waged in the Reagan camp against the prospective appointment of Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as deputy secretary of defense.

Carlucci's critics contend he is not conservative enough and does not know the defense industry he would oversee in the Pentagon's No. 2 job. Some Reaganites are trying to sell the president-elect instead on Ruben F. Mettler, board chairman and chief executive officer of TRW Inc.

Carlucci is aware of the battle but is staying out of it. He is telling friends he is willing to serve as deputy to his old friend and Reagan's choice for defense secretary, Caspar W. Weinberger, but will not be broken-hearted if he is passed over.

One of Carlucci's critics on the Reagan transition team conceded yesterday that Weinberger could insist on Carlucci and get him, but said this would cost the new Republican president support among conservatives in Congress who would shape future defense programs to their own liking if disillusioned with the new Pentagon team.

Another argument being made against Carlucci in transition team screening sessions, which one insider yesterday termed "really rough," is that with Weinberger and Carlucci, there would be two managers with a reputation for budget cutting at the top of the Pentagon. Neither would have balancing expertise in defense procurement or military policy, critics charge, at a time the Pentagon would be spending record amounts of money on readiness and modernization.

Mettler was part of the "blue-ribbon" panel which reviewed Pentagon practices in 1969 for then-Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, with an eye to improving efficiency. Mettler

also headed a presidential panel in 1970 which recommended "increased emphasis on research and development for national security purposes, even at the expense of current military hardware procurement if necessary."

The TRW chief executive said through a spokesman yesterday that he has not been contacted by the Reagan team about the Pentagon post "and consequently has nothing to say."

The TRW complex Mettler heads has offices in several states. Its sales to the U.S. government in 1979 totaled \$872 million, or 19 percent of its total sales of \$4.56 billion. The Pentagon is a big customer for TRW electronic equipment.

While the Carlucci appointment was creating transition controversy, insiders said there was comparative harmony in discussing the leading candidate for at least one Pentagon job — secretary of the Army. John O. Marsh Jr., former Democratic congressman from Virginia's 7th District and White House counselor to President Ford, has a big edge, they said. Ford is pushing Marsh for the post.

Rep. Robin Beard (R-Tenn.), who was sounded out about becoming Army secretary, agreed yesterday that Marsh looked certain. Beard added that Vice President-elect George Bush had told him the Reagan team did not want to risk losing Beard's congressional seat to a Democrat by appointing him Army secretary. Beard wrested Tennessee's 6th District seat from the Democrats in 1972.

The main competition for secretary of the Navy pits long-time Reaganite Robert D. Nesen against John Lehman, former deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and currently president of a Washington management firm.


Reached at his Ventura County,

yesterday, Nesen said: "Yes, there have been discussions" with the Reagan transition team about becoming Navy secretary. "I'm interested, but there's nothing definite."

Nesen has considerable political leverage, given the fact he has been active in California Republican politics for 30 years, knows both Reagan and Weinberger, and headed the state's delegation to the GOP convention this year. He served as assistant secretary of the Navy 1972-74 under President Nixon. "I'm a young '63," Nesen quipped.

Lehman, 38, a former Navy pilot, said Navy secretary is the only job in the administration he wants, or would take. He is president of the Abington Corp.

Still far from settled are what job William Van Cleave, Reagan's defense adviser, will end up with and who will be secretary of the Air Force, transition sources said yesterday.



FRANK C. CARLUCCI

... lacks expertise, critics contend

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ON PAGE A-21

WASHINGTON POST
19 DECEMBER 1980

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Why Weinberger? Why Carlucci?

Back in California after being announced as secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger placed calls to Republican members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that deepened the loss of joy among Reaganites six weeks after their great victory.

Weinberger told the senators he wanted as deputy secretary his own selection: Frank Carlucci, a career civil servant who is deputy director of President Carter's CIA. Having heard rumbles against Carlucci's appointment, Weinberger wanted the senators to know how much he needed the bureaucrat who was his deputy at two domestic agencies in Nixon-Ford days.

Almost surely, Ronald Reagan will ignore muted alarms from Capitol Hill and satisfy the wishes of his defense secretary. That guarantees more anguish within the Reagan transition, and raises some unpleasant questions:

Why is Reagan getting a secretary and deputy secretary at defense who both need remedial courses in military nuts and bolts? Why did he pick a reputed

budget-cutter ("Cap the Knife") to rebuild the nation's leaky defense structure? Why is he naming a deputy without known convictions on national security who, fairly or not, is tied to the Carter administration's undermining of American intelligence (and whose nickname in CIA back rooms is "Hamlet")?

The answer falls under this rubric, delivered by a senior transition official, on Reagan decision-making since Nov. 4: "Disorganized, disconnected, lackadaisical." Other transition aides about to return to private jobs agree. Viewing the nation on the brink of domestic and foreign chaos, they have been stunned at the lack of urgency shown by the president-elect and his inner circle.

None of this was obvious in the euphoric post-election mood when defense experts converged on the Pentagon to plan the Reagan takeover. To them, Cap Weinberger was just a "kitchen cabinet" member in California who during the campaign wanted restraints on defense spending. Never did they dream of him as secretary of defense.

One reason the non-dream became reality is the misconception of the kitchen cabinet's aged millionaires that governing a great nation is like running a big corporation. Failing to perceive that the secretary of defense is responsible for policy rather than administration, they thought of Weinberger managing the Pentagon much like the Bechtel Corp. Reagan did not disagree.

No defense secretary has been less familiar with defense problems since Charley Wilson in 1953 (when the hardware was simpler and the dangers more distant). Weinberger's transition experts are preparing elaborate dossiers and hours of tough questioning so he can survive Senate confirmation hearings. They also recommend an experienced deputy secretary for Weinberger to lean on in choosing policy options.

The list is long: William Van Cleave, a nuclear arms expert who was a Reagan campaign adviser and heads his defense transition team; Dr. John Foster, former Pentagon research chief and now a TRW, Inc., vice president; J. Fred

Busey, president of Texas Instruments; former deputy secretary Paul Nitze, a converted Reaganite; Ambassador Seymour Weiss, former State Department politico-military chief. Outside the list, a push has been made for Tom Reed, a former secretary of the Air Force.

But Weinberger insists on fellow neophyte Carlucci, showing as little interest in a knowledgeable deputy as Reagan did in a knowledgeable secretary. Nor did he share apprehension by defense transition officials that as a senior intelligence official of the Carter administration, Carlucci could not be totally separated from its demolition of the CIA.

Van Cleave's men set out to find evidence of Carlucci's complicity but discovered none. ("Frank does not leave footprints," said one prober.) His governmental record is distinguished, crowned by service as ambassador to Lisbon during the Portuguese crisis of the mid-1970s. But he shows no ideological commitment to Reagan's national security policy. "He could work as easily for George McGovern as Ronald Reagan," one transition official told us.

Neither policy views nor experience seem to rate high in filling other Pentagon posts. Rep. Robin Beard of Tennessee, an expert on the volunteer army, would bring rare expertise if named secretary of the Army. But Beard may be passed over in favor of John Marsh, a White House aide under President Ford. The reason: Jerry Ford wants it, as a personal favor.

Dr. John Lehman, a former deputy director of the arms control agency (ACDA), is unusually qualified for secretary of the Navy. But he may be passed over for a junior member of the kitchen cabinet: Bob Nesen, a 62-year-old Cadillac dealer from Thousand Oaks, Calif.

Nobody planned a Pentagon hierarchy so lacking in both background and policy commitment. As with most new administrations, it just happened. What makes this cause for anguish is the nation's desperate condition as it changes government—a condition not often reflected the last six weeks in the president-elect's hunt-and-peck Cabinet making.

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FAN-REAGAN-CARLUCCI;BJT;590

DISTRIBUTION II F CONSERVATIVES TRYING TO BLOCK CARLUCCI

F BY ROBERT PARRY

F ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS, UPSET WITH THE CIA'S PERFORMANCE UNDER PRESIDENT CARTER, ARE TRYING TO DISSUADE RONALD REAGAN FROM APPOINTING DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI TO THE SECOND-RANKING JOB AT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, GOP SOURCES SAY.

CARLUCCI, 50, WHO ALSO SERVED IN THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS, IS REPORTEDLY THE CHOICE OF DEFENSE SECRETARY-DESIGNATE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER TO BE HIS DEPUTY.

BUT SOME CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS HAVE LAUNCHED A BEHIND-THE-SCENES CAMPAIGN TO DENY CARLUCCI THE INFLUENTIAL JOB, CHARGING THAT HE CONTRIBUTED TO THE WEAKENING OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND AIDED CARTER'S CAMPAIGN TO WIN RATIFICATION OF THE SALT II TREATY, SOURCES SAID.

THE REPUBLICAN SOURCES, WHO ASKED NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED, ALSO SAID CARLUCCI IS COMING UNDER ATTACK FOR HIS LACK OF DEFENSE EXPERIENCE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF WEINBERGER'S LIMITED BACKGROUND IN MILITARY MATTERS.

"A LOT OF PEOPLE THINK HE DOESN'T KNOW NOTHING ABOUT DEFENSE," SAID ONE SOURCE.

IN ADDITION, THE SOURCE SAID RIGHT-WING REPUBLICANS FELT CARLUCCI "DIDN'T DO ENOUGH TO STOP THE PROSTITUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DATA" THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION CITED TO BACK ITS RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE.

"MANY PEOPLE FEEL HE PARTICIPATED IN A GRAND DECEPTION, THAT HE UNDERESTIMATED SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONALLY ALLOWED MISASSESSMENTS TO MISLEAD THE CONGRESS IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE," SAID ANOTHER SOURCE.

THE SOURCE CLAIMED THAT IF CONGRESS HAD BEEN CORRECTLY ADVISED OF SOVIET STRENGTH, THEY WOULD HAVE VOTED MORE MONEY TO BEEF UP U.S. MILITARY FORCES.

ANOTHER SOURCE COMPLAINED THAT CARLUCCI PRESIDED OVER THE "DECINATION OF THE (COVERT) OPERATIONS SECTION OF THE CIA" AS DEPUTY TO CIA DIRECTOR STANFIELD TURNER, WHO CRITICS CONTEND HAS RELIED TOO MUCH ON ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE GATHERING WHILE DOWNPLAYING THE USE OF AGENTS.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
16 December 1980

CIA's No. 2 Man Rumored in Line for Pentagon Post

Carlucci Formerly Aided Weinberger

By John J. Fialka
Washington Star Staff Writer

Frank C. Carlucci III, deputy director of the CIA, has emerged as a strong contender for the No. 2 post at the Pentagon, deputy secretary of defense, according to sources close to the Reagan defense transition team.

Carlucci formerly served as the top assistant to the man President-elect Ronald Reagan has designated to be his secretary of defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, in two posts during the Nixon administration.

Sources said that one of the problems Carlucci is running up against in the selection process is the same one that afflicts Weinberger: a lack of Pentagon experience.

Although Carlucci, who is reportedly being pushed by Weinberger, is regarded as having a thorough knowledge of how the federal bureaucracy works, all of his administrative experience has been in other agencies, most of them dealing with domestic problems.

He was deputy to Weinberger when Weinberger served as director of the Office of Management and Budget and then undersecretary of Health Education and Welfare after President Nixon named Weinberger secretary of HEW in December of 1972.

Carlucci's lack of Pentagon experience is said to be regarded as a serious handicap by some of Reagan's senior advisers because they feel Weinberger should be backed up by a veteran Pentagon hand. Carlucci could not be reached for comment.

Under the "super-Cabinet" scheme being developed by the Reagan advisers, the deputy slot may be crucial because Weinberger will have to devote part of his time as a senior policy adviser to Reagan on other matters at the White House.

Sources said Carlucci's name heads a list being studied in Washington and Los Angeles, where the Reagan "kitchen Cabinet" continues to provide advice on personnel matters. Weinberger, they said, does not have total control over the process, although he does hold what is described as "veto power" over certain key defense posts.

Other contenders for the deputy slot are Fred J. Bussey, president of Texas Instruments; David S. Lewis, chairman and chief executive officer of General Dynamics; and Reginald H. Jones, chairman of General Electric.

Sources familiar with the selection process say that all three businessmen have run into some congressional opposition because their firms are major defense contractors. Two other people believed to be in the running for the deputy slot are John Foster, a TRW Corp. executive and former deputy defense secretary for research and engineering, and Paul Nitze, a member of the SALT delegation during the Nixon administration and secretary of the Navy under President Johnson.

The man who is said to have the inside track for the third highest Pentagon slot, undersecretary of defense for policy, is William Van Cleave, the head of the Reagan defense transition team and an international relations professor at the University of Southern California.

Two other contenders for the job are Fred C. Ikle, former head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Seymour Weiss, vice president of the Abington Corp., a defense consulting firm. In 1974, Weiss left his post as director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs after a series of disagreements with Henry Kissinger, who was the secretary. Both Weiss and Ikle are members of Reagan transition teams.

The prime contender for another crucial Pentagon job, the undersecretary for research and engineering, is the deputy director of the defense transition team, Ben T. Plymale, a Boeing aircraft systems manager who formerly held the deputy position to the research and engineering slot in the Nixon-Ford administrations.

Plymale is a physicist who has had long experience with the B-52, ICBM and Trident submarine programs. After he left the Defense Department in 1978, he was subjected to a security investigation which resulted in the temporary suspension of his access to classified information. Seymour L. Zeiberg, deputy undersecretary of defense for strategic and space systems, said yesterday that Zeiberg was later "totally exonerated" and had his security clearances restored.

"There was less there than met the eye," said Zeiberg, who explained the affair was a "mixup" over the release of a document that should not have been classified in the first place. Plymale did not play a role in its release, Zeiberg said.

Others reportedly being considered for the post are Norman R. Augustine, a former assistant secretary of the Army for research and development, and R.D. DeLauer, executive vice president of TRW Corp.

John F. Lehman Jr., president of the Abington Corp. and a former deputy director of the arms control agency, appears to have the edge for secretary of the Navy. Lehman, once an aide on Kissinger's National Security Council staff, is in contention with former New York Sen. James Buckley, who was defeated in his bid for a Senate seat in Connecticut.

Dr. Patrick J. Parker, a professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and another member of the Reagan defense team, is also said to be in the running.

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ON PAGE A21

THE WASHINGTON POST
15 December 1980

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The Sub-Cabinet May Be the Key

"A really terrific appointment!" gushed a senior aide to President Carter upon hearing that Merrill Lynch's Donald T. Regan would be Ronald Reagan's secretary of the Treasury. Small wonder. Don Regan not only personally contributed the maximum \$1,000 to Jimmy Carter's campaign, but supported his administration's economic ventures.

In contrast, he played no part in Ronald Reagan's campaign and did not back his daring tax-reduction program until being named to the Cabinet. Even then, the prospective Treasury chief stumbled; Regan seemed to make tax cuts conditional on budget cuts, which never has been the president-elect's policy.

So peculiar an appointment to the Treasury is no aberration but flows naturally from Reagan Cabinet-making. Instead of seeking men of ideas or just ideological compatibility with Reagan, the president-elect's inner circle stressed managerial skills and status in the establishment.

This results in a Cabinet ill-equipped for the radical reform of economic, social and national security policy intended by Reagan—save for Rep. David Stockman as budget director and, presumably, Gen. Alexander Haig as secretary of state. Consequently, the president-elect now may be forced to impose sub-Cabinet officers on his Cabinet members to carry out those reforms.

Reagan himself is responsible for some peculiar choices. Caspar Weinberger, the secretary of defense-designate who during the campaign resisted Reagan's formula of rebuilding the nation's defense no matter what the cost, is intensely admired by the president-elect. William French Smith, the attorney general-designate who as a University of California regent supported racial quotas found abhorrent by Reagan, is the president-elect's personal lawyer.

But the president-elect did not even know Regan two weeks ago. His name was surfaced by that artfully boozing backroom maneuverer, William Casey (campaign chairman and now CIA director-designate). Casey is Don Regan's friend and, what's more, his New York law firm receives fat fees from Merrill Lynch. Republican politicians who did not take Regan seriously as a contender for the Treasury underestimated Casey.

For Don Regan to become a senior Cabinet member in a Republican administration amuses Wall Street insiders, who always figured the self-described "lifelong Republican" was angling to give the bipartisan touch to a Democratic Cabinet. The \$1,000 personal contribution to Carter's campaign and the extra \$1,700 from Regan's Merrill-Lynch political action committee were not the end of his 1980 Democratic dalliances.

He personally contributed to Sens. Russell B. Long of Louisiana and Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York. Recipients of Merrill-Lynch PAC funds are a liberal Democratic Who's Who: Sen. Alan Cranston (Calif.), Sen.-elect Chris Dodd (Conn.), Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton (Mo.), Sen. Pat Leahy (Vt.), Sen. Gaylord Nelson (Wis.), Rep. Thomas Downey (N.Y.), Rep. Robert Eckhardt (Tex.), Rep. Wyche Fowler (Ga.), Rep. Henry Reuss (Wis.) and many others.

Since Regan and the Merrill Lynch PAC also contributed to many Republicans, this can be dismissed as big-business cynicism playing both sides of the street. More troubling is the esteem for Regan at the Carter White House for supporting the Carter economic policy (including wage-price guidelines) and not supporting Kemp-Roth tax reduction, embraced by the president-elect.

Even after Ronald Reagan's nomination for president, lifelong Republican

Don Regan could not endorse the party's tax position in a statement submitted July 25 to the House Ways and Means Committee. That statement and comments following his Cabinet nomination betrayed the need for a cram course in supply-side economics.

Interviewed on the CBS Morning News the day after his unveiling, Regan was asked whether he would still push tax cuts if Congress resisted budget cuts. His reply: "I think the thing has to be done as a package." That confirmed the absolutely unfounded suspicions of the Wall Street smart boys that the president-elect was abandoning tax cuts.

Why was Don Regan preferable to New York City businessman Lewis Lehrman, who is a loyal Republican, a devoted Reaganite and a brilliant student of supply-side economics? Lehrman is too young (42), too unknown, say Reagan insiders. But why not, then, 67-year-old shipping tycoon Peter Grace, who also is loyally Republican, Reaganite and supply-side? Probably because Bill Casey did not back him.

Apprehension about Treasury policy would be eased if Lehrman (who knows, likes and admires Don Regan) were named deputy secretary. Similarly, a defense expert would help Weinberger as deputy at the Pentagon. But Weinberger stunned the defense community when he advised that his tentative choice is Frank Carlucci, a non-ideological civil servant who is now President Carter's deputy CIA director.

The president-elect has promised visitors he will make sure sub-Cabinet officials fit his policies. Since he set no such requirement for Cabinet members, picking the sub-Cabinet could determine what happens to his radical plans for transforming national policy.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 6CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 December 1980

For congressional Democrats —

By Stephen Webbe

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

"Cap the Knife" is back in town. And Caspar Weinberger — who earned that sobriquet as a cost-cutting director of the Office of Management and Budget and secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in the Nixon administration — will have to call on all his reputed skill and toughness as an administrator in his new assignment with the incoming Republican administration: secretary of defense.

The former infantry captain whom President-elect Ronald Reagan calls "my Disraeli" is charged with the awesome task of solving the complex problems of the nation's armed forces.

Why would Mr. Weinberger forsake the vice-presidency of the Bechtel Corporation, a multinational engineering company, to take on such a job?

"The President-elect asked me to do so, and I have always found it very difficult to say no to presidents," he declares. "I believe very strongly in Governor Reagan and what he's trying to do — what he has done in California and what I think he can do for the nation."

Weinberger says he intends "to do my best and to have the defense forces of the United States in a state of full readiness to perform any mission that the President might direct them to perform for the maintenance of the peace of the world."

Observers note that the new secretary's first task after moving into his office at the Pentagon will be to resolve a dispute between the President-elect's defense advisers, who are split over the immediate priorities facing the department. On the one hand, William Van Cleave, Mr. Reagan's senior defense adviser, believes that "the highest national priority" should be given to "fixing the weaknesses in our strategic posture as rapidly as possible." But opponents of this view, most notably Sen. John Tower (R) of Texas, a one-time contender for the post of defense secretary and soon-to-be chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, favors the immediate invigoration of US conventional forces, believing that their Soviet counterparts are a much more immediate threat than any current US strategic inferiority.

Quite apart from helping determine national defense strategy, Mr. Weinberger will inherit a series of troubled weapons systems from the Carter administration, primarily the Trident submarine program, the woes of which are to be investigated by Congress next year, and the Navy's F-18 fighter, which has encountered cost, production, and performance problems.

Weinberger will also have to wrestle with deployment of the controversial MX missile system. Proposals to base it in Nevada and Utah are viewed as unduly costly and complicated by many defense experts, and as anathema by numerous environmentalists and residents of the states concerned.

Caspar Willard Weinberger was born in San Francisco on Aug. 18, 1917. He was graduated magna cum laude with an AB degree from Harvard in 1938, and three years later received an LL.B. degree from the university's law school. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.

During World War II he saw service with the 41st Infantry Division in the Pacific before being transferred to Gen. Douglas MacArthur's intelligence staff. He was discharged from the Army in 1945 with the rank of captain and a bronze star.

an off-key swan song

In 1952 Weinberger was elected to the California Legislature, and reelected in 1954 and 1956 without opposition. In 1955 he was voted the most able member of the state legislature by reporters who covered the session.

Governor Reagan made him director of finance for California, and he turned a state budget deficit into a surplus, earning himself a smiling photograph of the governor inscribed: "The smile is for real, thanks to you. In friendship and best regards, Ron."

Two years later Weinberger joined the Nixon administration as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. Subsequently, he served as deputy director of the White House Office of Management and Budget (1970-72), director of OMB (1972-73), and HEW secretary (1973-75). He joined Bechtel Power Corporation's general counsel in 1975.

Mr. Weinberger, who has reviewed books for California newspapers and has recently been writing a newspaper column, once described himself as "a frustrated newspaperman." Reputedly endowed with a wry, even self-deprecating, sense of humor, he is an avid theater and concertgoer, though some contend that his real recreation is hard work. As state finance director in California he frequently arrived at his office at 7 a.m. and worked into the night. Weinberger and his wife Jane have two children: Arlin Cerise and Caspar Willard Jr.

"Cap" Weinberger's selection for the Pentagon post has not received universal acclamation in the defense community. Critics point out that he is not thought to be particularly conversant with defense matters and that he returns to Washington with a reputation for budget slashing to head an agency that is about to embark on massively increased spending.

But others point to the fact that he has proved himself a first-rate manager both at OMB and HEW, and assert that a



'I believe very strongly in Governor Reagan and what he's trying to do.'

man of his intellectual gifts will undoubtedly learn rapidly on the job. In any case, they add, he has legions of experts at the Pentagon to draw on.

His longtime advocacy of higher military spending will undoubtedly endear him to the Pentagon brass, they add.

Many defense analysts are waiting to see what other ap-

CONTINUED

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ON PAGE A3THE WASHINGTON POST
12 December 1980**TRANSITION
NOTES**

Caspar W. Weinberger, defense secretary-designate, reportedly has his eye on Frank Carlucci of the CIA for his deputy.

Cass Peterson

EXCERPTED

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CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

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WEINBERGER-CARLUCCI

WASHINGTON (AP) - DEFENSE SECRETARY-DESIGNATE CASPAR WEINBERGER REPORTEDLY WANTS FRANK CARLUCCI, CURRENTLY A TOP CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL, TO SERVE AS DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY.

THE DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY, ALTHOUGH WORKING IN THE SHADOW OF THE PENTAGON'S CIVILIAN CHIEF, WIELDS GREAT POWER IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GIANT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. NORMALLY HE PLAYS A MAJOR ROLE IN DECISIONS ON WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER SOURCES SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD CARLUCCI, 50, IS WEINBERGER'S CHOICE TO BECOME HIS SECOND IN COMMAND. THIS COMES AS SOMETHING OF A SURPRISE BECAUSE THERE WAS SPECULATION CARLUCCI WOULD BE SWEEPED OUT OF GOVERNMENT IN THE CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP AT THE CIA WHERE HE NOW IS DEPUTY DIRECTOR UNDER ADM. STANFIELD TURNER.

CARLUCCI, WHO HAS A WIDE AND VARIED EXPERIENCE IN THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AND OTHER GOVERNMENT POSTS, WAS SAID TO HAVE BECOME CLOSE TO WEINBERGER AT THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND IN THE HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE DEPARTMENTS.

WEINBERGER WAS OMB DIRECTOR AND LATER HEW SECRETARY AND CARLUCCI HAD SENIOR POSTS IN BOTH AGENCIES.

CARLUCCI, WHO WAS A PROFESSIONAL FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER IN EARLIER YEARS, WAS AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL BETWEEN 1975 AND 1977. HE IS A GRADUATE OF PRINCETON AND THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL.

AP-WX-1211 1917EST

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C 2

THE WASHINGTON POST
26 November 1980

The
Federal Diary
By Mike Causey

STATINTL

Transition Special: Key members of the Carter and Reagan administrations will be on hand Dec. 1-2 at the 11th annual meeting of the American Society for Public Administration at the Statler-Hilton. A to-be-announced Reagan official will keynote the session, and former cabinet officers Elliot Richardson, Brock Adams and John Dunlop will be on hand for the Tuesday meeting. Past and present stars of government — Frank Carlucci, Jim McIntyre, Sara McClendon (the media), Bruce Babbitt, Bill Medina, William Howard Taft (the fourth), Donald Stokes, Hale Champion, Eileen Shanahan, Horace Busby, Constance Newman, Harriet G. Jenkins, CIA's Don I. Wortman — are on various panels. Price is \$100 for members, \$115 for others with special student rates. Call Ray Millard on 755-7286 for details.

EXCERPT

Say Reagan plan to let the ax fall on CIA chief Turner

STATINTL

By LAURENCE McQUILLAN

Washington (News Bureau)—President-elect Reagan plans to inform CIA Director Stansfield Turner next week that he will nominate someone else to direct the nation's intelligence-gathering operations, sources close to the Reagan transition team said today.

Adm. Turner was President Carter's second choice for the CIA post four years ago, after Theodore Sorensen, a former speechwriter for John F. Kennedy, asked that his name be withdrawn from Senate consideration.

Sorensen withdrew amid right-wing anger over alleged "security violations" in his 1965 book on President Kennedy's years in the White House.

Among the possible candidates to replace Turner and his deputy, former Ambassador Frank Carlucci, are Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman, who now heads the National Security Agency; William Hyland, former deputy director of the National Security Council and former head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research during the Kissinger years, and William J. Casey, Reagan's campaign chief who was a top official of the old Office of Strategic Services during World War II.


CASEY, HOWEVER, has told friends he does not want the CIA post.

According to CIA sources, Turner has no plans to submit his resignation. There were reports that he planned a low-key but intensive effort to save his job when the President-elect comes to Washington next week.

Unlike a new President's cabinet choices, there has been no clear-cut policy on whether the tenure of a CIA director coincides with that of the President who names him. However, the director does serve "at the pleasure of the President."

After Carter won the 1976 election, there was some talk about keeping on then-CIA Director George Bush, now Reagan's vice president-elect, but it was thought to be merely a gesture of courtesy toward Bush.

As for Turner, "there is no way he'll



Stansfield Turner—may be replaced

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT reportedly will deliver the verbal ax next week when he visits CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., for briefings. Turner's only hope of saving his job, in the view of most observers, is to try to convince Reagan that the job should be above politics and the director should not be replaced with every change of administration.

Turner, a Naval Academy classmate of Carter, has been lobbying privately for the past few weeks to keep the job. However, he has little support from two important constituencies—the Pentagon, where his policies have sometimes drawn wrath, and veteran CIA staffers.

In other developments, the Reagan transition headquarters here today released the President-elect's schedule for next week—when he makes his first trip to the capital since winning the election.

HE FLIES FROM Los Angeles Monday night and the next day meets with GOP and Democratic congressional leaders. Reagan and his wife, Nancy, meet with President Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, on Thursday at the White House.

Reagan's first CIA briefing will be on Wednesday, with a follow-up the next day. He will visit California on Friday.

Reagan to Fire Chief of CIA

Shake-Up At Agency In Planning

Quick Action Slated By President-Elect

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

GOLETA, Calif. — President-elect Ronald Reagan, dismayed by what he considers to be serious deficiencies in the nation's intelligence-gathering capabilities, will remove Stansfield Turner as director of the CIA, according to sources close to Reagan.

They said that both Turner and his deputy, Frank Carlucci, would be replaced despite efforts by Turner to convince the incoming Republican administration that he should be allowed to remain.

"One task that has to be addressed immediately is to build up the CIA and our intelligence capacity," said Edwin Meese, chief of staff in the Reagan transition organization. "The Iranian situation showed us what's wrong with our intelligence. Our briefing at the State Department made it clear that they are getting their information from other embassies, other intelligence services, friends and businessmen who call them up. It is a tragedy.

"Our sources of intelligence are only as good as they feel they will be protected," Meese said. "If you have constant turmoil in agent handlers and people up and down the line, and if you don't know if agents are going to be exposed by Philip Agee and people like that, it is hard to recruit informants and agents in other countries."

Reagan is scheduled to receive a CIA briefing next week, when he will be in Washington. Aides to the president-elect say he will tell Turner at that time that he intends to make his own nomination for a new CIA director from the list of names now being assembled by an appointments committee headed by Los Angeles attorney William French Smith.

Within the next few days, the Reagan transition office will send a small team headed by Lawrence Silberman, former ambassador to Yugoslavia, to CIA headquarters to begin planning a new structure for the agency.

One of the most important voices in recommending changes at the CIA will be that of David Abshire, chairman of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. Abshire, a former assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, heads one of the Reagan "issue cluster" teams for national security affairs.

Silberman, a former Justice Department official, is team leader for the CIA transition reporting to Abshire and John Lehman, former deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Critics of Turner contend that his mass firings and retirements deprived the agency of its most experienced senior officers, damaged the morale of others, and would inhibit the recruitment of young officers. Turner has contended that the CIA has suffered no lack of bright young men and women anxious to become intelligence officers.

CHATTANOOGA NEWS-FREE PRESS
8 October 1980

Secrets Are Essential

"Our country," Deputy CIA Director Frank Carlucci said, "is becoming known throughout the world as a country that can't keep secrets."

Why? It's because of unreasonable recent attacks upon the CIA, the FBI and other necessary protective agencies, because of foolish laws that force the spilling of our security secrets on demand, be-


cause of unconscionable telling of secrets by irresponsible former agents.

Why would other nations cooperate with us when we can't keep secrets vital to our mutual defense? We live in a world that is a dangerous jungle inhabited by Communist predators. If we can't keep secrets, we may not be able to keep freedom.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

STATINTL

PROGRAM First Line Report STATION WTOP Radio
CBS Network

DATE October 16, 1980 7:23 AM CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT News Leaks

IKE PAPPAS: Are there Reagan moles at the Defense Department and elsewhere in the government?

We'll do some digging in a moment.

* * *

They began this summer just after the conventions when the presidential election campaign began in earnest, news leaks one after the other. Most of them stories that in one way or another portrayed President Carter and his defense policies primarily in a bad light.

The big one, of course, was the Stealth airplane leak. The one about America's new radar resistance so-called invisible airplane.

Then there was the one about the secret Army report that said six of the ten divisions based in the United States are not combat ready.

The list is long and painful for the Carter administration.

Government officials were dismayed by the news leaks. Congressional investigations were launched into sources. The FBI started its own probe and so did the Pentagon.

Now a new wrinkle in the election year saga of news leaks. An apparent campaign of disseminating disinformation or phony information in an effort to embarrass President Carter.

4 Oct 80

OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

NEWS SERVICE

DISTRIBUTION II UP014 (SPOOKSPILL) (BY DANIEL
R W

FAIRFAX, VA. (UPI) -- DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR CARLUCCI SAID THE
SPY AGENCY IS PREOCCUPIED TRYING TO PROTECT THE IDENTITY OF ITS
AGENTS AND SOURCES, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS BECOMING KNOWN AS A
NATION THAT CAN'T KEEP SECRETS.

"OUR COUNTRY IS BECOMING KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AS A COUNTRY
THAT CAN'T KEEP SECRETS," CARLUCCI TOLD THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. "WE HAVE PICKED UP
ENOUGH INFORMATION TO KNOW THAT THIS IS A PROBLEM" AMONG U.S. ALLIES.

THE ASSOCIATION, WHICH NOW NUMBERS 2,500 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE
CIA, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, THE
FBI AND MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES OF THE ARMED SERVICES,
WAS FORMED IN 1975 AT THE HEIGHT OF INVESTIGATIONS AND JOURNALISTIC
EXPOSES OF PAST MISDEEDS.

CARLUCCI SAID HIS CHIEF CONCERN NOW IS THE "PROTECTION OF OUR
SOURCES AND METHODS."

THE UNITED STATES BEGAN DEVELOPING A REPUTATION AS A NATION THAT
COULD NOT KEEP SECRETS IN THE 1970S, BECAUSE OF INFORMATION RELEASED
UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THROUGH BOOKS BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE AGENTS, HE SAID.

"THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY BOOKS" ABOUT U.S. INTELLIGENCE, HE SAID.
"THE BEST INTENTIONED BOOK RAISES A LOT OF EYEBROWS" AMONG U.S.
ALLIES.

CARLUCCI SAID CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER URGED HIM TO TELL THE
INTELLIGENCE VETERANS "NOT TO TALK TO JOURNALISTS."

AS HE SPOKE, THE PRESS TABLE INCLUDED THE EDITOR OF COVERT ACTION
INFORMATION BULLETIN, WHICH SPECIALIZES IN PUBLICLY IDENTIFYING U.S.
INTELLIGENCE AGENTS WORKING ABROAD.

"WE SEE NO REASON WHY A GROUP OF MISGUIDED AMERICANS SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO REVEAL IDENTITIES OF OUR PEOPLE OVERSEAS AND DISRUPT THEIR
ACTIVITIES," CARLUCCI SAID.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1.

CHRIST
22 Sep

SPY TW



FRANCE
Alexander de Marantès



ISRAEL
Issak Holt

The global

Who's who

By Daniel Soudre Janb

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Paris

Riding the escalator out of the Paris Metro station, Vladimir Kostov felt a sharp sting just above his belt. At the same time he heard a sound like a pebble striking the metal stairs. He turned to face a tall, athletic-looking man who quickly disappeared into a crowd along the Champs-Élysées.

Kostov later learned that the man was an assassin — probably a member of Bulgaria's secret intelligence service. In the eyes of the Bulgarian regime, Vladimir Kostov, a defector to the West and a former member of the Bulgarian Communist Party, was a traitor.

But on Sept. 22, 1991, Kostov was not in Paris. He was in London, where he had just returned from a trip to the Balkans. The attacker had fired a poison-filled metallic ball about the size of a pinhead into Kostov's back.

Appro

CONGRESS EYES SPY-WATCHERS

Guardian Correspondent

Washington, D.C.

The objections of civil libertarians, journalists and political activists were ignored last week as Congress continued its double-time march toward passage of a bill outlawing the publication of the names of CIA and FBI employes.

The House Judiciary Committee voted Sept. 3 to approve legislation which its sponsors acknowledge is aimed directly at former CIA agent Philip Agee and the three coeditors of the Washington-based *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. As sent to the floor by the panel, the bill mandates a prison sentence of up to three years and/or a fine of \$10,000 for anyone who uses even publicly available, unclassified information to identify a covert CIA employe, or FBI agent. By an 18-9 margin, the committee refused to endorse the action of one of its subcommittees which had earlier deleted this provision from the legislation.

The bill will soon be considered by the full House, which is expected to pass it easily. On the Senate side, a similar measure has already been cleared by the Intelligence Committee. The bill is now before the Senate Judiciary Committee, which held hearings on it Sept. 5, and it is also expected to reach the Senate floor within the next few weeks.

In its zeal to "get Agee" and to "nail" Louis Wolf, one of the coeditors of the *Bulletin* who specializes in naming names of purported CIA personnel, Congress is steamrolling contentions that the legislation is bla-

tantly unconstitutional. Indeed, Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) noted at last week's Senate committee hearings that he had agreed to receive testimony on the legislation only with the understanding that the bill will be reported out as soon as possible.

The Senate panel thus seemed to be engaged in a largely pro-forma exercise as it listened to several witnesses criticize the measure on a variety of grounds.

The legislation, said Morton Halperin and Jerry Berman of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), is "unconstitutional on its face. It would reach, chill and punish speech which is clearly and unmistakably within the protection of the First Amendment." In a Sept. 5 letter to Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), the Judiciary Committee chair, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press called the legislation "a classic 'Official Secrets Act.'" It authorizes the virtually automatic conviction of former agents, independent researchers and members of the press if they identify FBI or CIA employes," the committee warned.

DIRECTED AGAINST AGEE

A group of 14 legal scholars added to the chorus of constitutional complaints about the bill when they urged the Senate panel to reject it in an Aug. 30 letter. Several activist organizations have also denounced the legislation, pointing out that it prohibits a group from publicly exposing an FBI infiltrator or provocateur.

The Carter administration, through its Justice Department, meanwhile supports the legisla-

tion. In his Sept. 5 Senate testimony, Deputy Attorney General Robert Keuch said that a slight moderation in the language of the measure met previous Justice Department objections and insured the protection of "mainstream journalists." The provision in question states that an individual must be engaged in "a pattern of activities" involving exposure of covert agents in order for the proposed statute to be applied.

This passage is clearly directed against Agee, a former agent who now works for the dismantling of the CIA from West Germany where he has been living in exile. It is also aimed at Wolf and his colleagues at *CovertAction Information Bulletin* who explain their practice of publishing the names of alleged agents on the grounds that the CIA still engages in "dirty work" around the world and has shown itself invulnerable to reform initiatives.

So blatant is the attempt to, in the words of Sen. John Chafee (R-R.I.), "put away" Wolf that the witness list for the Senate legislation referred to the measure as "the Agee bill."

For its part, the CIA strongly favors passage of the legislation. Frank Carlucci, an agency deputy director, told the Senate Committee last week, for example, that Wolf and other anti-CIA researchers are "deliberately endangering the lives of patriotic men and women." Carlucci cited the 1975 assassination in Athens of CIA station chief Robert Welch and the machine-gunning on July 4 of a U.S. official's house in Kingston, Jamaica, as instances,

when revealing the names of alleged CIA personnel has led to "death and extremely close calls."

Wolf, along with coeditors William Schaap and Ellen Ray, has repeatedly pointed out that only unclassified sources are used in developing lists of names. They also say that the only effective way of fighting the CIA is by exposing its employes so that covert action becomes more difficult. Wolf notes, too, that he cautions people not to physically attack anyone named as a CIA agent since personal violence "only plays into the hands of the agency."

BOSTON HERALD-AMERICAN
15 September 1980

Forum

A free exchange of ideas on the issues of the day

CIA bill: the need is now...

By EDWARD P. BOLAND

In the past several years the intelligence activities of the U.S. government have been exposed to the light of public scrutiny to a degree never before witnessed in this or any other country.

Presidential commissions, congressional committees, judicial decisions, investigative reporters have all, at one time or another, given us a detailed glimpse of the day-to-day practices of our intelligence agencies.

To an unfortunate degree, some of these practices were found wanting — wanting in terms of their compatibility with American values, morals, laws, and constitutional precepts.

We have now, I believe, taken the painful but necessary steps to bring a halt to such practices and to insure that they do not occur again.

All of this has not taken place without rancor, divisiveness, and heated debate among our people and within the government.

Significantly, however, both sides of the debate have always proceeded on the unquestioned assumption that it is both necessary and proper for this country to possess a clandestine intelligence service.

An effective clandestine service is especially important to American interests in these troubled times. As recent events demonstrate, it is as vital to our security to possess some insight into the thought processes of seemingly obscure religious figures as it is to know the location of Soviet missile launchers. Technical systems which are purchased, quite properly, at significant cost to determine the latter are of little use in gleaning the former. In such areas, the nation must rely on our clandestine service.

The operating heart of any such service is the use of undercover agents and officers overseas to collect intelligence information. Obviously, if the names of these people are spread upon the public record, their usefulness is ended and the effectiveness of the clandestine service is diminished.

In the past few years, that is precisely what has been occurring. A small number of Americans, including some former intelligence agency employees, have been engaged in a systematic effort to destroy the ability of our intelligence agencies to collect information secretly by disclosing the names of overseas undercover intelligence agents. Not only are legitimate intelligence activities thwarted, but the careers of dedicated intelligence officers are disrupted, service morale is lowered, the taxpayer's money is wasted, and — perhaps most important — lives are directly placed in danger.

In my opinion and, I think, in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the American people, unauthorized disclosure of the names of undercover intelligence agents is a pernicious act that serves no useful informing function whatsoever. It does not alert us to abuses; it does not further civil liberties; it does not bring clarity to issues of national policy; it does not enlighten public debate; and it does not contribute one iota to the goal of an educated and informed electorate.

Whatever the motives of those engaged in such activity, the only result is the complete disruption of our legitimate intelligence collection programs — programs that bear the imprimatur of the Congress, the President, and the American people. Such a result benefits no one but our adversaries.

Later this month legislation to combat such disclosures will be debated on the floor of the House of Representatives. Under consideration will be H.R. 5615. The Intelligence Identities Protection Act, a bill which has been reported favorably, after several days of hearings, by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which I chair, and the House Judiciary Committee.

This bill would make it a crime to disclose any information that identifies covert United States intelligence agents. Different penalties and elements of proof are established depending on whether the defendant was a present or former government employee who acquired his information from authorized access to classified information, or whether the defendant derived the information disclosed from non-classified sources.

The publishers of the "COVER ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN" and similar groups, contend that they fall into the latter category. They claim they can discover the identities of our undercover agents by diligently studying previously published diplomatic lists and biographical registers and comparing and collating the information contained therein with other publicly available information. Having had no access to classified information, they claim it is unconstitutional to prohibit their disclosures.

In recent days, many newspapers, while denouncing such articles, have also stated that the proposed legislation violates the First Amendment. I respectfully disagree. H.R. 5615 is a carefully crafted limited solution to an urgent or grave problem. It responds to an evil the government clearly has a right to prevent; it is narrow and precise in its scope so as to give notice of its proscriptions; and it

C.I.A. Official Asserts Need for Law to Protect Agents

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 5 — The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency testified today that the agency was seeking passage of legislation to prevent disclosure of agents' names and thereby to guard its operations against "detection by local authorities" or "political outcry" in countries where leaders have secretly condoned such operations.

The aide, Frank C. Carlucci, also told the Senate Judiciary Committee that it was "irrelevant" to argue that the pur-

pose of such a law was to thwart the Soviet Government's intelligence and internal security service. "The purpose of our cover in many places is not to fool the K.G.B.," he asserted, but to preserve "plausible deniability" of agency actions and to preserve access "to appropriate targets," such as foreigners considered for recruitment as C.I.A. agents.

"A third and increasingly important consideration," he said, "is to protect against terrorist attack."

The legislation in question, pending in both the House and Senate, would fine or imprison Federal employees, present or past, for disclosing the identities of agents, "sources of operational assistance" and others who have a classified relationship with United States intelligence agencies. Both bills also would punish private citizens who disclose such names, even if they deduced the agents' identities from unclassified material. The penalty would apply to such persons if their disclosures formed a "pattern."

Mr. Carlucci disputed those who have said that the bill would violate the First Amendment guarantees of free speech. "Nothing could be more subversive of our constitutional system of government than to permit a disgruntled minority of citizens freely to thwart the will of the majority," he said in a statement.

Floyd Abrams, a lawyer noted for expertise in press freedom cases, who testified later, said of Mr. Carlucci's remark that he had seldom seen a statement "so directly antithetical to the spirit of the First Amendment."

The acting chairman of the committee, Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, Democrat of Ohio, also criticized the statement, saying that Mr. Carlucci should "pay a visit to the floor of the Senate" to witness an exercise of minority rights.

The proposed measures have been ap-

proved unanimously by the two intelligence committees of Congress and by a margin of almost 3 to 1 in the House Judiciary Committee. These bodies have refused to make it a legal defense that the disclosures stemmed solely from non-classified information.


Mr. Abrams testified that to make it a crime to disseminate such public information would be to "start down a very dangerous and certainly novel path."

Seven journalistic organizations today sent letters to all members of the House urging them to give "additional careful deliberation" to the bill and saying that it "should be opposed as it stands." The organizations were the National Newspaper Association, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Radio-TV News Directors Association, the Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press, Sigma Delta Chi and the Association of American (book) Publishers.

Proponents of the bill contended again today that their intent was primarily to stop the frequent disclosures of agents' names by a Washington newsletter called the Covert Action Information Bulletin.

The proponents have contended that the bill is needed to protect the safety of agents.

NATIONAL REVIEW
5 September 1980



■ TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE, DEPT.

June 25

Dear Bill:

Want to thank you for the air duel scene in *Saving the Queen*. Gave us a few ideas for this week's spectacular acrobatic plane crash in India.

All regards.

Frank Carlucci
Langley Field

Needless to say this doesn't exist. Please dispose. FC

July 7

Dear Frank (I gladly reciprocate the informality):

Your note was so exhilaratingly funny, I dare not keep it, lest my amusement overwhelm my judgment. Accordingly I return it, having committed it to memory. I won't even confide it to Jim Angleton. Bill

July 28

Dear Bill:

My secretary called to tell you I am not the one who wrote the enclosed. Someone is having fun with my name.

Best regards.

Sincerely,
Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-4

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 July 1980

Freedom of Information Act

Unlocking Uncle Sam's secrets

By Stewart McBride

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

San Francisco

Archaeologists make a business of digging in ancient rubbish heaps for stone tools, arrowheads, or odd bits of pottery that open windows on old cultures.

In the same way, contemporary historians are sifting through government records hunting for a phone message, interoffice memo, or doodle that might illuminate that modern subterranean culture called "the bureaucracy."

While the ancients had neither knack nor interest in hiding from the prying eyes of posterity, federal agencies have both. The government is notorious for covering its tracks — and documents — with rubber stamps marked "CLASSIFIED." Until recently, scholars trying to unearth records of the post-World War II period from agency files have found themselves vainly clawing at this "buried history."

Now they have a sophisticated new tool to dig with — the 1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with the strengthening amendments of 1974 and 1976. With it, researchers have already dug up important information on some Central Intelligence Agency activities such as: spying on Martin Luther King Jr. and other United States citizens; experiments with mind-control drugs in the '50s and '60s that killed at least two Americans (Project MK-Ultra); Project Resistance, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's controversial COINTELPRO program to infiltrate, discredit, and disrupt the antiwar and other radical movements; covert actions in Chile; the agency's relations with journalists, academics, and local police departments; and its attempt to keep the story of the Glomar Explorer (the attempt to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine) out of the press.

The Freedom of Information Act has also helped to uncover the dangers of Agent Orange to the health of Vietnam war veterans, and the hazards of low-level radiation to communities near nuclear testing sites.

Publishing houses and university presses alike are cranking out volume after volume based on government documents declassified through the FOIA. Among the most notable books are Allen Weinstein's "Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case," Peter Wyden's "Bay of Pigs: the Untold Story," and William Shawcross's "Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia."

A few months ago, a Columbia history professor, Sigmund Diamond, published an account in The Nation magazine of the FBI's presence on the Yale campus in the '40s. The article, which has caused quite a stir in New Haven and throughout academia, centered on FBI records to which Diamond gained access through the FOIA.

"Most of the bits of information we turn up under the act don't make headlines," says Barton Bernstein, a Stanford history professor who has gotten hundreds of government documents declassified. Over the last several years Bernstein has used the information to publish articles reinterpreting the Korean war, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the decision to drop the atomic bomb. Last year, he made public that at least 11, and perhaps more than 20, American POWs in Hiroshima were killed when the A-bomb was detonated — a fact the government had kept secret for decades.

"In isolation, the documents are not usually dramatic, but they do help fill in the web of history and have strength in their collectivity," Bernstein says. "For anyone working in the history of foreign and domestic policy in the postwar period, the act is essential."

At the moment, scholars like Bernstein are seriously concerned that their new research tool is about to be blunted.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iran's taking of US hostages, and Cold War II looming on the horizon, congressional support for the Freedom of Information Act is eroding. The act has come under specific attack from the CIA, which claims it cannot properly function as an intelligence service under disclosure laws applied to the rest of government. In an attempt to strengthen the CIA — whose wings were severely trimmed after Watergate — the Carter administration has been pushing for a new CIA charter which, among other things, would grant the agency broad exemptions from disclosure requirements of the FOIA.

Last February, Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of the CIA, told Congress: "The Freedom of Information Act has emerged as the focal point of the often-heard allegation that the CIA cannot keep a secret . . . it is virtually impossible for most of our agents and sources [in foreign countries] to understand the law itself, much less why an organization such as the Central Intelligence Agency . . . should be subject to the act."

When asked by the Monitor how the CIA's sources and methods had been endangered by the act, the agency's general counsel, Daniel Silver, responded: "Classified information has been disclosed through the FOIA as a result of our own mistakes . . . and I am convinced that FOIA litigation has harmed the agency in rather subtle ways. We have not released . . . headline secrets, but have painted a picture that would have been better left unsaid."

Scholars championing the fight against CIA exemptions are quick to point out that the agency has made an about-face since 1978, when John Blake, the career CIA officer in charge of FOIA requests, told the Senate Judiciary Committee that with respect to the act: "We have been able to make the necessary adjustments. I am pleased to report that, in fact, I . . . have been able to make the necessary adjustments for it."

GOVERNMENT

CIA Redfaced Over Its Gaffe on Saudis

By David Leigh
Washington Post Staff Writer

An air of intense embarrassment still hangs over the entire affair. The deputy director of the CIA, Frank Carlucci, even apologized to Saudi Arabia's ruling circles for it afterward.

It began simply enough, with that venerable and almost routine Washington maneuver, the leak. But this was a leak that went wrong.

Earlier this year, the CIA warned the White House that Saudi Arabia's ruling regime might collapse within two years.

When it leaked, the agency privately briefed two journalists—another longstanding Washington habit. No one quite knows why the agency did it on this occasion.

One person who was not well-served by this turn of events was President Carter's national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was to depart within days on a delicate trip to Saudi Arabia. The Arab kingdom is one of the main pro-western states in the Middle East and the largest producer of oil imported by the United States (20.1 percent of U.S. oil imports in December 1979).

The agency realized it had made a gaffe. It started twisting arms to keep the lid on the story and confine it to the extensive Washington grapevine, where it could do no harm.

It almost succeeded in killing the story with high-level telephone calls. But it could not prevent the Saudis from being miffed.

So instead of gaining a reputation for being smart spies, the agency ended up offending everyone.

In the close-meshed world of Washington bureaucrats, politicians and journalists, this episode cannot be detailed without a certain indistinctness. Neither the CIA nor anyone else involved will discuss it on the record.

But it began in January, barely two months after the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca by traditionalist Saudi dissidents, an event that sent shock waves through the ruling family of 67-year-old King Khalid.

As Brzezinski prepared to visit Saudi Arabia, by way of Pakistan, to discuss the prospect of military bases in the region, the story of the CIA warning began to surface on Capitol Hill.

For all its secrecy, the CIA gives selected U.S. journalists "background briefings" at its Langley headquarters. The briefings occur on request or when someone in the CIA thinks it might serve the agency's purposes, and the articles that result generally attribute the information to "intelligence sources."

In the case of the Saudi report, the agency decided to brief Roberta Hornig of The Washington Star and Jane Whitmore of Newsweek.

They apparently were told of the report suggesting that the Saudi regime might collapse within two years. As one source quoted the report, Crown Prince Fahd, next in line to the throne, "would have to go." The man to watch was Prince Abdallah, the conservative commander of the national guard.

Official sources, who do not wish to be identified, say the two journalists were briefed by a CIA analyst. The reporters say they cannot discuss CIA briefings.

The day after the briefing, Brzezinski lunched with Newsweek editors. He was to leave for Saudi Arabia within a few days.

What happened then remains obscure. Newsweek printed a paragraph attributed to an administration official, who said that the White House had received numerous pessimistic "alert" memos from Langley in recent weeks.

The official sarcastically pointed out that with so many predictions "some of them are bound to be right," and added that "there are few crises lately they haven't predicted one way or another."

Early on the day after Brzezinski's lunch with Newsweek editors, the CIA launched its efforts to kill the story of its Saudi warning.

Both the Star and Newsweek reporters were beseeched by the agency not to write the story. They were threatened that if they did, they would not get any more briefings. References were made to the "national interest."

According to intelligence sources, the CIA claimed to have suddenly realized that it was not supposed to brief reporters on "countries which are actively involved in U.S. foreign policy."

Did someone in Brzezinski's office point out that his trip would not ex-

actly be helped by such stories?

No one is saying. And the CIA's efforts to suppress the story almost worked—the Star did not run it.

And not until after Brzezinski's return did Newsweek print two guarded lines on the subject in a five-page analysis of Saudi Arabia's uncertain prospects.

"One secret U.S. report," the magazine said, "warned recently that the regime's survival could not be assured beyond the next two years."

There was no reference to the CIA's apparent flood of gloomy "alert" memos in the wake of the Iran debacle. But this glancing reference to Saudi Arabia was enough to make senior CIA people fear anew about Saudi blood pressure.

After Khalid's illness in February, reports quoting French intelligence sources said the royal family could be overthrown within the next few years.

On May 3, the Saudi minister of industry and electricity, Dr. Ghazi Algo-

saibi, encapsulated Saudi complaints about the U.S. media when he told the National Association of Arab-Americans that the fate of the regime did not depend on "the pronouncements of third-rate bureaucrats reading fourth-rate intelligence reports from fifth-rate spies."

Carlucci apologized. "He conveyed to us," said one source, "that it had been an unfortunate briefing, and the briefer had since been moved."

The hapless Langley analyst is not alone in his thinking. Many Middle East experts expect traumatic changes in Saudi Arabia within five years.

One former U.S. diplomat who returned from Saudi Arabia this spring said that corruption, internal unrest and strains within the ruling family combine to make the regime highly fragile.

"If we're talking about guarantees," he said, "then the survival of the Saudi regime can't be absolutely guaranteed for more than six months."

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES
6 July 80

9
FOUO SIA-2TAKES-07-05

BY JAMES WARREN

(c) 1980 CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (FIELD NEWS SERV
CHICAGO-ONLY IN AMERICA. SPIES CAME IN FROM
OPENLY DISCUSS THEIR BUSINESS-THE ESSENCE OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AND AMERICAN BAR
UNUSUAL TWO-DAY CONFERENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL
INTELLIGENCE. THE STARS WERE A WHO'S WHO OF
ALTHOUGH MANY COLLEAGUES; GIVEN THE ESSENCE
NEVER ATTEND SUCH A GATHERING.

NOT SO LONG AGO; THE CONCLAVE WOULD HAVE BEEN
BIG-SHOT CIA OR FBI OFFICIAL MIGHT APPEAR (K
BEFORE A CLOSED SESSION OF A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
AN OPEN UNIVERSITY FORUM.

NOW; THERE ARE DOUBTS ABOUT OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES THAT
RIVAL THE DOUBTS RAISED BY THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR WHICH
LED TO CREATION OF THE CIA. FURTHER; EVENTS SUCH AS A COUP D'ETAT IN
CHILE AND A BREAK-IN OF A ROOM AT THE WATERGATE HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS
ABOUT INTELLIGENCE EXCESSES.

THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE; ARRANGED BY CHICAGO ATTORNEY MORRIS
LEIBMAN; WAS TO "DEFINE THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY AND THE CONGRESS; THE JUDICIARY AND THE PUBLIC THROUGH
LEGISLATION."

IF IT DIDN'T OFFER ANSWERS ON SEVERAL RELATED MATTERS-INTELLIGENCE
CHARTERS; THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY AND CONGRESS IN INTELLIGENCE OR
THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW VS. THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL SECRECY-IT
REVEALED DISPUTES THAT MAKE THE DEBATE AS CONTENTIOUS AS IT IS
IMPORTANT. AN EXAMPLE:

"THE NEW YORK TIMES OFTEN PRINTS; WITH APPALLING FREQUENCY; CIA
INFORMATION;" SAID AN UNHAPPY DANIEL B. SILVER; GENERAL COUNSEL FOR
THE CIA.

"LEAKED FROM WHERE; DO YOU THINK?" SNAPPED FLOYD ABRAMS; COUNSEL
TO THE NEW YORK TIMES.

"WE HAVE OUR SUSPICIONS;" RETORTED AN UNSMILING SILVER.

-0-

AN OPENING DINNER FEATURED CHICKEN; GREEN BEANS; ARTICHOKE HEARTS;
PINOT-CHARDONNAY-NAACON AND FRANK C. CARLUCCI; DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE
CIA.

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00010013

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 July 1980**CIA complains to CBS
on covert-action report**

New York

Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of US central intelligence, has formally objected to a recent CBS Report titled "Return of the CIA" which accused the CIA of reviving the use of covert actions.


In a letter addressed to the new CBS president, Thomas H. Wyman (with a copy sent to The Christian Science Monitor), Mr. Carlucci accused the documentary of "selectively combining 25-year-old facts and footage with current interviews and innuendo . . . to convince the audience that covert action is virtually our only activity. [CBS] Correspondent [Ed] Bradley says the return of covert action and the return of the CIA are synonymous. This is a distortion which underestimates the intelligence of your audience and does a disservice to our many dedicated people who work in the collection and analysis area."

Monitor TV critic Arthur Unger points out, however, that Mr. Carlucci does not deny that the CIA is involved in covert actions.


26-28 June 1980

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000



**CONFERENCE ON
INTELLIGENCE
LEGISLATION**



Standing Committee on Law
and
National Security
American Bar Association



Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100130001-5

June 26-28, 1980

University of Chicago Law School

C.I.A. Seeks Jail Terms For Disclosure of Agents

WASHINGTON, June 24 (Reuters) — The Central Intelligence Agency today asked Congress to pass a law providing criminal punishment for unauthorized disclosure of the identities of its agents.

Hundreds of agents have been compromised by the publication of their names in books and magazines, the agency's deputy director, Frank C. Carlucci, said.

"It is imperative that the Congress clearly and firmly declare that the unauthorized disclosure of the identities of our intelligence officers and those allied in our efforts will no longer be tolerated," he said.

Mr. Carlucci told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the disclosure of identities of undercover agents and the C.I.A.'s foreign sources of information had had a harmful effect on the United States intelligence program.

"Our relations with foreign sources of intelligence have been impaired," he said. "Sources have evinced increased concern for their own safety. Some active sources, and individuals contemplating cooperation with the United States, have terminated or reduced their contact with us."

Mr. Carlucci, who advocated prison terms and fines for offenders, was speaking at the first of a series of public hearings by the committee.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 712

THE WASHINGTON POST
25 June 1980

Ex-Agent Criticizes CIA Identity Shield, Antagonizes Senator

Associated Press

Legislation that would make it a crime to publicly identify secret agents is an unnecessary threat to freedom of speech, a CIA official-turned critic told senators yesterday.

Most such agents "work out of embassies and everyone around them knows they are CIA," former agency official John Stockwell told a Senate intelligence Committee hearing.

In fact, Stockwell said, he was told early in his 12-year agency career that "you want people to know you're CIA so they will come to you with information."

He said the agency's aim in seeking criminal penalties "is clearly not to protect the safety of secret agents but rather to gain an important weapon for the CIA to use in silencing its critics in its domestic fight for existence."

Sen. John Chafee (R-R.I.) told Stockwell his statement "flies in the face" of testimony from current CIA officials.

"You have been deceived," Stockwell said.

Chafee said agents overseas had told him that a non-CIA "cover" was valuable to their work and sometimes even to staying alive, and asked whether their statements were part of "a massive plot."

No, Stockwell replied, "just the party line."

Stockwell is author of the book "In Search of Enemies," which is highly critical of agency operations but names no agents.

Sen. Jake Garn (R-Utah) said he found it hard even to talk to Stockwell because he felt "such disgust for your activities and your book and your loyalty."

Stockwell told Garn he'd been awarded medals for serving his country and added, "I can't let any one challenge my loyalty to this country."

"I just did," retorted Garn. "I have my freedom of speech, too."

Chafee said Stockwell's opinion of the CIA made his observations on agent identification worthless. Garn agreed.

Deputy CIA Director Frank Carlucci said earlier that other agency critics have publicly identified "substantial numbers" of secret agents. Besides occasionally endangering their lives, such public identification means an end to these agents' effectiveness, he said.

"As a result, the pool of experienced CIA officers is being reduced," he said.

Carlucci repeated the agency's plea for legislation that would make it a crime to name agents in public. A number of bills are pending on the subject. All are aimed at current or former agency personnel; some also are directed at journalists and others.

OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

NEWS SERVICE

Date. 24 Jun 80

Item No. 2

Ref. No.

STATINTL

DISTRIBUTION II

AM-Intelligence

WASHINGTON, June 24, Reuter - The Central Intelligence Agency today asked Congress urgently to pass a law providing criminal punishment for the unauthorized naming of U.S. spies.

Hundreds of agents had been compromised by the publication of their names in books and magazines, CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci said.

"It is imperative that the Congress clearly and firmly declare that the unauthorized disclosure of the identities of our intelligence officers and those allied in our efforts will no longer be tolerated," he said.

Mr Carlucci, a former Ambassador to Portugal, told the Senate Intelligence Committee the disclosure of identities of undercover agents and the CIA's foreign sources of information had had a harmful effect on the U.S. intelligence program.

"Our relations with foreign sources of intelligence have been impaired," he said.

"Sources have evinced increased concern for their own safety. Some active sources, and individuals contemplating cooperation with the United States, have terminated or reduced their contact with us." MOPE 1350 AM-Intelligence 2 Washington

Mr Carlucci said foreign sources had questioned how the U.S. government could expect its friends to provide information in view of continuing disclosures of information that might jeopardize their careers, liberty and very lives.

"Many foreign intelligence services with which we have important liaison relationships have undertaken reviews of their relations with us," he said.

Contacts were reduced and there was less sharing of information, the CIA official said, adding:

"We are increasingly being asked to explain how we can guarantee the safety of individuals who cooperate with us when we cannot protect our own officers from exposure."

Mr Carlucci, who advocated prison terms and fines for offenders, was speaking at the first of a series of public hearings by the committee. It is looking at a number of suggestions for legislation to stop the naming of names in the U.S. intelligence community.

The legislation is informally known as "the Agee Bill" after Philip Agee, a former CIA operative now living in West Germany, who has published the names of people said to be U.S. intelligence agents and their foreign sources. MOPE 1353

AM-Intelligence 3 Washington

Last year, in a book titled "Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa," Mr Agee disclosed the names of 729 people identified as CIA officers who had served or were serving in Africa.

The Washington magazine "Covert Action Information Bulletin", which exposes clandestine U.S. operations abroad, regularly prints the names and countries of people it identifies as CIA spies.

UPI

24 June 80

(GOVERNMENT LEAKS)

(BY ED ROGERS)

WASHINGTON (UPI) - SEN. BIRCH BAYH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, SUGGESTED TODAY THAT GOVERNMENT POLICY MAKERS WHO LEAK DAMAGING INFORMATION SHOULD BE PUNISHED.

"I AM TIRED OF READING IN NEWSPAPERS INFORMATION THAT HAS TO COME FROM PERSONS IN HIGH PLACES. I WANT TO GET IT STOPPED ACROSS THE BOARD," THE INDIANA DEMOCRAT SAID.

BAYH COMMENTED WHILE QUESTIONING DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI ABOUT PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR PERSONS WHO REVEAL NAMES OF UNDERCOVER CIA AGENTS.

HE DID NOT MAKE ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE METED OUT.

ONE OF THE FIVE BILLS BEING STUDIED CALLS FOR UP TO 10 YEARS IN PRISON AND A \$50,000 FINE FOR VIOLATORS, AND ADDS A CONTROVERSIAL PROVISION FOR UP TO FIVE YEARS IN PRISON AND A \$10,000 FINE FOR THOSE WHO RECEIVE AND PUBLISH CIA IDENTITIES.

BAYH CRITICIZED POLICY MAKERS WHO USE STRATEGIC LEAKS TO CREATE PUBLIC PRESSURE TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT DECISIONS.

DURING THE SENATE DEBATE ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY THERE WOULD BE A "PRO-SALT LEAK ONE DAY AND AN ANTI-SALT LEAK THE NEXT," BAYH SAID, WHILE "THE RUSSIANS WERE SITTING THERE LAPPING IT UP."

CARLUCCI COULD SUGGEST NO WAY TO CURB SUCH LEAKS.

THE CIA OFFICIAL SAID HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS PERSONS WHO SET OUT TO DESTROY THE AGENCY OR DISRUPT ITS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING BY PUBLISHING IDENTITIES OF ITS UNDERCOVER AGENTS ABROAD.

SUCH EXPOSURES NOT ONLY ENDANGER THE AGENTS' LIVES BUT ALSO HAMPER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING BY MAKING SOURCES AFRAID TO COOPERATE WITH THE CIA, HE SAID.

UPI 06-24 03:41 PEO

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
20 June 1980

Two Authors Urge Congress To Keep FOIA Restraints

A pair of authors urged Congress May 29 to reject proposals to free the various U.S. intelligence agencies from the disclosure rules of the Freedom of Information Act.

"I come before you as a citizen who is deeply concerned that the CIA's attempt to further restrict FOI access to its files, indexes and documents is a bureaucratic Trojan Horse," said William R. Corson, author of "The Armies of Ignorance" (*Dial*), which traces the rise of the American intelligence community since the Revolutionary War.

Corson and Athan Theoharis were among a group of witnesses who testified before a House Government Operations subcommittee on legislation proposed by the administration to free the intelligence agencies from FOI strictures.

Theoharis, author of "Spying on Americans" (*Temple University Press*), an examination of U.S. political surveillance from 1936 to 1970, listed several allegedly illegal actions or political activities by the CIA and FBI that would not have been disclosed if the administration's proposal had been in effect.

Sought by the Justice Department and the CIA, the proposal would eliminate the requirement that courts be allowed to review decisions by intelligence agencies to deny information sought by citizens under the act. The proposal also would allow the CIA or FBI to withhold almost all information about its activities, requiring them only to release information to persons who request it about themselves.

A much milder bill, introduced by Rep. Richardson Preyer (D., N.C.), chairman of the Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee, as a "talking piece," would add to the categories of material now exempted from coverage by the FOIA information that is "obtained under an express promise of confidentiality by the Central Intelligence Agency either from a secret intelligence source or from a foreign intelligence service." The bill would not alter current procedures allowing judicial review of agency refusals to release such information.

Corson said in his testimony that recent books such as Peter Wyden's "Bay of Pigs" (*Simon & Schuster*) and David Martin's "Wilderness of Mirrors" (*Harper & Row*), which deals with the CIA's fruitless search for a "mole," "underscore the worth of the FOI act in providing our people with a more accurate rendition of events and the roles of those involved."

The witnesses noted that in an appearance before the same panel in February, Frank Carlucci, the deputy CIA director, acknowledged that the CIA has not had to give out any information under the FOIA that was potentially dangerous to the national security. Carlucci and the CIA are arguing now that it is the perception by potential sources abroad that the CIA must divulge many of its activities that is having a chilling effect on their cooperation with the CIA.

Theoharis and other witnesses said they would prefer no changes in current law, but if either proposal had to survive, it should be the milder Preyer measure.

HOWARD FIELDS

STATINTL

The Director
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

Message Registry

80-1580 STATINTL

June 17, 1980

Mr. Thomas H. Wyman
President
CBS, Inc.
51 West 52 Street
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Wyman:

Objective reporting obviously went out the window with "Return of the CIA" on CBS Reports last Saturday evening. By selectively combining 25 year-old facts and footage with current interviews and innuendo you work overly hard to convince the audience that covert action is virtually our only activity.

Correspondent Bradley says the return of covert action and the return of the CIA are synonymous. This is a distortion which underestimates the intelligence of your audience and does a disservice to our many dedicated people who work in the collection and analysis area.

Sincerely,

STATINTL

Frank C. Carlucci
Acting Director

cc: Television Critics: Washington Post
New York Times
Christian Science Monitor
Los Angeles Times

13 JUN 1980

Mr. Reese Cleghorn
National Conference of Editorial
Writers
Post Office Box 34928
Washington, D.C. 20034

STATINTL

Dear Mr. Cleghorn:

This is in response to your letter of May 12th to
Admiral Turner.

I am surprised that the National Conference of Editorial
Writers has just discovered our current regulations and policy
concerning CIA relations with U.S. news media organizations and
personnel. Those regulations were announced and promulgated
as an enclosure to a news release on 2 December 1977. They
were widely reported in the news media, including Editor and
Publisher on 17 December 1977. There were also lengthy open
hearings on this same subject conducted in December 1977 and
April 1978 by the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

We remain opposed to a law that would bar a journalist or any
other patriotic American from voluntarily aiding his country in a
time of critical need, emergency or when human lives were at stake.
I have trouble believing that any thinking person would want a law
on the books that would prohibit CIA from enlisting the voluntary
services of an American journalist under any possible circumstances.
Further, I feel certain that most professional journalists would be
embarrassed to admit they needed legislation to protect their personal
ethics. Any journalist unwilling to cooperate needs only the moral
strength to say "no."

We do understand your concern and regret that we are so far
apart on this subject. I do think, however, that continuing to
debate the issue in public creates more potential harm to U.S.
journalists abroad than would be possible under our existing policies
which have worked safely and well for the past two and one half years.

Sincerely,

/s/ Frank C. Carlucci

Frank C. Carlucci
Acting Director



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Phone: (703) 351-7676

5 June 1980

The Editor
 The New York Times
 229 West 43 Street
 New York, New York 10036

Dear Sir:

Frustration compels me to write The New York Times since there are no letters to the editors of television networks.

Last week (28 and 29 May), ABC News presented "a special three-part report on the power of the CIA" which totaled some 24 minutes. It left the viewer with the clear impression that CIA opposes a charter to define its authorities and functions, favors legislation restricting the press, and is seeking a total exemption from the Freedom of Information Act. This is not the truth and ABC knows it. ABC correspondent Brit Hume interviewed CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci for almost 40 video-taped minutes on these very subjects. Not a millisecond of that interview was used.

Today (5 June), ABC's "Good Morning America" adds insult to injury. E. Howard Hunt, a convicted Watergate plumber who has been gone from CIA for over ten years, is given prime morning time to appraise the Agency's effectiveness, judge the performance of our Director and tell young Americans the qualities they must possess to be successful intelligence officers.

Clearly the power of CIA to set the record straight is no match for the editorial power of ABC.

Sincerely,

STATINTL


 Herbert E. Hetu
 Director of Public Affairs

Identical letters sent to the Editors of The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times

22 May 1980

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100130001-5



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Phone: (703) 351-7676

STATINTL

As you will see from the attached advertisement which appears in today's WASHINGTON POST, ABC will run a three-part report on CIA beginning tonight. Mr. Carlucci was interviewed for this report but we, of course, have no control over how that interview will be edited. Accordingly we are attaching a complete transcript of Mr. Carlucci's interview with Brit Hume for your information. STATINTL


Herbert E. Helms
Director of Public Affairs

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI

Interviewed by ABC News correspondent Brit Hume

22 May 1980

MAN: May 22nd, 1980. Headquarters Building, DCI Conference Room. Brit Hume, ABC TV, interviews DDCI Carlucci for a special ABC is producing for the nightly news in two segments on CIA and the charters.

BRIT HUME: Okay. Are you all settled now? All right.

I would just like to ask -- a lot of things seemed to be about to happen a few years ago. Major reforms seemed inevitable. New charter legislation for this agency seemed to be practically sure of passage. And here we are four years or more later and those things have not come to pass. Can you tell me why?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Well Brit, I think I disagree a bit with your thesis.

[Off-mike comments.]

HUME: Go ahead.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Brit, I think I disagree a bit with your thesis. It seems to me that a lot of significant changes have taken place in the past four years. The President has issued an executive order regulating the activities of intelligence agencies. And as you know, an executive order has the force of law. An Intelligence Oversight Board has been established. Intelligence oversight committees have been established on the Hill, select committees, very capable committees in both the Senate and the House. And finally, the agency has taken a number of steps to strengthen its internal management control. We've built up our Office of Inspections; built up our audit system; built up our general system of accountability; and built up our system, internal system of reporting to the President and cooperating with

-2-

other agencies who have an interest in intelligence activities.

HUME: Well, what I meant to say -- I didn't really suggest that nothing has changed, nor did I mean to suggest that the agency had not changed. What I was trying to get at was that there seems to be a kind of a political climate in which legislation of a major kind affecting the agency and changing the agency by that course seemed inevitable as a result of circumstances and in terms of the atmosphere that had been created. And no such major legislation has been forthcoming. And there are now very many people who don't believe that it should and believe indeed that, if anything, the restrictive measures that have been taken by law, some of them, should be lifted. And what I was really trying to get you to address yourself to is the question of what has brought about that change in public and, I think, in congressional attitude?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't know that I'm really qualified to talk about congressional attitudes and public attitudes. We have tried to conduct the agency in a responsible manner, in a way that will help to instill confidence in the agency and confidence in the very many dedicated people that perform very difficult tasks here and overseas. We in the agency favored major charter legislation which would lay down the ground rules for our activities so that our people, who do take risks in the interests of their country, would know exactly where they stand.

If you go back to the Pike Committee hearings and the statements by Senator Inouye, the highly respected first Chairman of the Senate Oversight Committee, you find that the criticism of the agency was that, if anything, it was too responsive to direction from above, including Presidents. If that's the case, then a statutory base can only be helpful to our people in telling them where they stand.

Hence, we were pushing very hard for charter legislation, And we're disappointed that it has not come to pass in this session.

HUME: Now there are some measures that in lieu of, or in addition to charter legislation that you and others have urged. One of them, for example, has to do with making it a crime to disclose the identities of agents....

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: That's correct.

HUME: ...not only applying to those who release the information, but, in one form of the legislation, to those who make use of it. And I gather that you and others feel quite strongly about the need for that. Could you elaborate on that?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Certainly we do. We see no social value whatsoever in revealing the names of CIA personnel.

-3-

overseas or in the names of agents. We don't think this helps the oversight process. It doesn't make us any more accountable. The Congress, our oversight committees are the proper forums in which we can be held accountable.

This kind of activity is only directed at destroying the agency's effectiveness, and, indeed, it can be fairly said that it puts the lives of some of our people in jeopardy. Nobody wants to deal with a CIA officer whose name appears on the front pages of the newspapers. The essence of the intelligence business is the ability to protect the information that you get and your ability to protect the identity of people who give it to you. And nobody is going to have any confidence in our ability to protect them if our names appear in the newspapers.

Hence, we do feel quite strongly about this.

HUME: Now, I gather that there's also a considerable feeling that you should have an exemption from the Freedom of Information Act.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We have asked for a partial exemption from the Freedom of Information Act. We would not exempt ourselves from first person requests, so to speak. That is to say, if you want to know what is in your file, we would continue to be responsive. We would also continue to make our finished product subject to the Freedom of Information process.

What we are seeking exemption for is the names of our sources and our methods, that highly sensitive information, which, once again, serves no real purpose in the public domain and, if revealed, undermines the very effectiveness of the agency.

The Freedom of Information Act has come to be viewed as somewhat of a symbol of the U. S. government's inability to protect the information given to it in confidence. We think we have to deal on a partial basis in a responsible way with that problem.

HUME: When you say it's one of the symbols, would you explain what you mean by that?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: It is generally perceived around the world that the United States government cannot protect the information that is entrusted to it. And much of that inability is attributed to the Freedom of Information Act.

Now granted, there are certain provisions in the Freedom of Information Act that enable us to withhold classified information. But it's very difficult to convince somebody, say, in a communist area who sees volumes of material coming out under the label of Freedom of Information Act, that something he gives us

-4-

that might be traceable to him won't also come out under that act. This is particularly the case since, as you know, our decisions are subject to judicial review. And while other services and our agents can have confidence in us, they can't -- nobody can predict what one of 400 federal judges might decide with regard to Freedom of Information lawsuits.

HUME: So what you're saying is, in effect, that while the Freedom of Information Act, as it's written, does not actually enable anybody to get ahold of the identities of sources or to disclose other classified information, that it is perceived -- that it is so perceived around the world by people in communist countries or elsewhere?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: It is so perceived around the world. I don't know if people have actually gotten ahold of sensitive information through the Freedom of Information Act, because obviously they're not going to let us know if they do. Also, there is a fairly standard technique in the counterintelligence business of putting together bits and pieces of information. We can't go beyond the request. That is to say, we can't ask who the requester is or what his motive is. Therefore, we don't know if that little piece of information that we give out is the final to the mosaic that could enable someone to track down a source of our information.

So I really can't answer your question.

HUME: Now, is it your view -- I gather that one of the things that the agency would like as well would be to limit the number of committees to which it must report in Congress and to which it must make disclosures of its activities. Why?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, first of all because we feel that our two select committees are doing a very effective job. Just two hours ago I came off of a hearing with the Senate committee, where they went over a range of issues. Those are carefully picked committees, highly responsible congressmen and senators. They are congressmen and senators who serve on other committees, including the Foreign Relations Committees, including the Appropriations Committees. We think it's appropriate that we keep them informed. And they can inform their colleagues, as appropriate.

For us to be required to go to some seven committees on covert action operations, that is clandestine operations designed to influence events around the world, violates one of the basic principles of security. I'm not saying that the Congress leaks. Certainly leaks come out of the executive branch and the Congress. Our objective should be to cut down the access to information to the smallest number of people who need to know. And the Congress has decided that the select committees are the appropriate bodies

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to exercise oversight.

HUME: Yeah, but the Congress is still -- you're still faced with the situation where you still have to report to all of these committees.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Yes, we do currently.

HUME: Do you contend that the number of committees to which you have had to report on these activities has, in fact, resulted in leaks?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I contend that it is unnecessary to report to seven committees, since these committees are represented on the select committees. And I contend that it is a violation of good security practice. I'm not levelling accusations of leaks at the Congress or the executive branch. Leaks come from everywhere within our government. I think that's a rather sterile argument. I think we need to cut down on access to information generally, intelligence information generally in the executive branch and within the Congress, consistent with the need for effective oversight.

HUME: Now, is that also partly the result of your concern with this worldwide perception of this agency and its....?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Perception is indeed a problem. I indicated the concern for good security practice. But the intelligence world is largely a world of perceptions. Whether a person gives you information or not depends on how he perceives your ability to protect that information, not how you perceive it. It's important to bear that in mind.

So we need to deal with these perceptions if we're going to continue to be an effective organization.

HUME: There seems no doubt that the case that you have advanced for the [words inaudible], quite apart from the issue of the charter, has been persuasive to a great people on Capitol Hill, and elsewhere as well. Why do you think that is?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I would like to think that our arguments have merit. I myself have testified a number of times on these issues. And I think we have created some understanding of our problems.

HUME: Obviously you're quite right. These arguments I'm sure, do have merit. What I'd really like to get to -- let's compare 1976, or mid 1975. I think that the same arguments could have been advanced then. I think you'll agree that they might have been differently received, even by the same people. So what I really wanted to get at was the question that something has changed. What

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has changed?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I think the main thing that has changed has been the existence of an oversight mechanism on the Hill. As the committees have looked at the agency, as they have scrutinized our activities, as they have made suggestions, as they have altered appropriations, they have found that we have been responsive to their desires, by and large. We don't always agree, but where we disagree, it's been a healthy disagreement. I think they've come to appreciate that the agency does consist of people who are dedicated to the principles of this country. And I would hope that they would perceive that the agency is being led in a responsible way.

And not only do we deal with our own oversight committees, but, of course, we testify before appropriations committees; we appear before foreign relations committees, and we appear before a number of other committees on the Hill. I think it's also fair to say, of course, that the current international climate has created a greater awareness of the importance of the intelligence function. And people want to see that function carried out in an efficient, as well as a responsible way.

HUME: Do you think that the question of perceptions that you raise, the threat of disclosure that you must make in terms of the number of committees on the Hill and the existence of the Freedom of Information Act here affecting your organization has had a measurable impact on the work product of the agency?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Let me say this. I believe that we are still the most effective intelligence organization in the world. We are doing our job. That's not to say we don't make mistakes. Everybody makes mistakes, and we try to correct our mistakes and do better the next time. But we are indeed effective.

How much more information we could collect if we did not have these problems is anybody's guess. Somebody does not come to you and say "I won't cooperate with you because you have a Freedom of Information Act." He just decides that he won't, he or she won't have any contact with you. But we have had enough cases where people have expressed concern, including other intelligence services, to make us very aware that this perception is not allowing us to be as effective as we might otherwise be.

[Off-mike discussion.]

HUME: There are those who feel that part of what's at work here in the agency's urging that these restrictions be lifted is -- part of what's at work is a desire to diminish the amount of accountability that you have to have, that really it would simplify your life. Do you agree that that's a factor?

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: No. No, I would not agree. We want better accountability. We think that accountability can be achieved through the oversight mechanism on the Hill, through the Intelligence Oversight Board, which consists of three distinguished Americans and has total access to all of our activities. But we believe that there are some measures that are called accountability measures, but which really aren't accountability measures. There's no way that the intelligence organization can be made accountable, for example, through 4000 Freedom of Information requests. Those requests come from a select group of people. They are not broadly based. A number of them come from foreigners. We think that proper accountability is the issue, not the shotgun approach to accountability.

HUME: I'd like to raise a personal case, not because it matters to me, but because I happen to know about it. A Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, to which I was not a party, disclosed that I was one of several Americans who was the target of a covert domestic spying operation back in 1972. If that suit had not been filed -- and I didn't file it and was not a party to it -- I wouldn't know about that.

Do you think it's desirable that I know about that? And what would you -- how would you deal with a situation like that?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I certainly think it's desirable that this agency not be involved in so-called spying on Americans. But I think there are times when it may be necessary to collect some intelligence information on Americans, but there ought to be controls. Such controls were built in to the charter legislation that we were supporting.

Don't forget the period that we're talking about was the period that preceded the creation of oversight committees on the Hill. My understanding -- and I wasn't here at the time -- is that most of the abuses that were attributed to the agency were developed by the agency's own inspection mechanism and with I think one major exception, very few -- with one major exception, were not uncovered through the Freedom of Information Act. But in any event, the important point is that we do have a different oversight mechanism now. And for whatever value the Freedom of Information Act might have served as an oversight mechanism, we now have something in place that's more effective.

HUME: Are you suggesting that if something like this were to happen in the future, that I could expect the House and Senate Intelligence Committee to tell me about it?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Oh, I think you could expect them to find out about it and put a stop to it. I certainly think....

HUME: What about -- what about a citizen, a citizen abroad

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or a citizen in this country? How would he know about it? How would....

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, bear in mind....

HUME: Or should he know?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: No, but bear in mind....

HUME: Maybe he shouldn't know.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Bear in mind what I said earlier, that we are not seeking exemption from first person Freedom of Information Act requests.

HUME: I understand.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: That is to say, if you want to know what's in your file, under our formulation, you would still be entitled to receive it.

HUME: I know, but if you happen to know that there is a file. I had no idea. I had no way of knowing. I don't make this into an argument. I think -- the only point I'm making is that, is there not something to be said for the idea that the Freedom of Information Act does indeed act as a check of a sort in that things can -- things can end up becoming discovered by citizens indirectly that they would not otherwise have any way of knowing.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, if you want to write in and say "Let me know what's in my file," we have to respond.

HUME: I understand that. That really doesn't answer my question.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Then I'm not sure I understand your question.

HUME: Well, I'm simply saying that, does not the existence of the Freedom of Information Act and its processes indirectly serve the purpose of letting the people know what may be happening with regard to them that they would not otherwise know or even know to ask?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we agree that that desire ought to be accommodated to the extent that it does not interfere with our ability to protect our sources and methods. Again, let me emphasize that we're not seeking a total exemption from the Freedom of Information Act. We want to make as much information available to the public as we can. Indeed, we put out approximately 150 unclassified publications a year. We think this is healthy.

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All we are seeking to do is protect that information which needs to be protected by the very nature of the intelligence business.

HUME: Now do you endorse the proposal that would make it illegal not only for the identities of the individuals working for the agency to be disclosed, but also would come down as well on those who use that information, even the news media?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, where the information is legitimately classified and the person knows that it's classified, we would favor making that a criminal offense where it pertains to the identities of CIA people and our agents overseas. Once again, we see now useful purpose in revealing the names of our people.

HUME: You don't have a problem with that in the First Amendment?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, this has been looked at extensively by the Justice Department. And it's basically their formulation. Certainly there are First Amendment issues involved in any legislation of that sort, and we're very conscious of it. And we tried to frame it so that we did not interfere with First Amendment rights.

HUME: Well, you've said much here, and others would certainly concur with what you say, to the effect that the agency has done a good job within its own house of trying to set about to correct some abuses that may have existed in the past. Would it be your view that the agency today, as an intelligence agency, is functioning more or less effectively than it did prior to whatever day you'd begin the time of the great revelations?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I wasn't here at the time, Brit, so it's very hard for me to comment. My general impression is that we are functioning as effectively as we have ever functioned in our history. I think this is a good organization. We're getting good intelligence. But as I said earlier, you can always get more; you can always do the job better. And what we are seeking to do is to get the necessary tools to do the job better.

HUME: Would you -- there has -- there is almost a slogan that has emerged in connection with the discussions over what should be done regarding the agency that goes something like "unleash the CIA," "unshackle the CIA." How do you regard that? Do you have mixed feelings about that?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We don't look upon ourselves in canine terms, and we don't look upon the measures we are seeking as unleashing us. We simply like to be -- we want to be able to carry out our responsibilities in an effective way, a way in which

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we're also accountable.

[Momentary break in recording; end of Side 1.]

HUME: How do you feel about all of these cries -- and they're quite widely heard -- that the CIA ought to be unshackled or unleashed? And obviously these are people who are sympathetic to your cause. How do you regard this, all this hue and cry?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't know if there's a hue and cry. But we don't favor an extremist approach one way or another. What we favor is doing our job efficiently, effectively and in an accountable way. And we think we can strike a balance between effectiveness and the necessary guarantees for civil liberties. We think a charter would do this. And we continue to favor an intelligence charter.

HUME: I think that that probably covers the territory, unless there's something that I don't doubt that you'd like to comment on that I may have missed.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: You covered the waterfront.

HUME: I've occasionally asked that of people and had them then say that's the only truly relevant thing that has been said, because I've not been smart enough to ask the right questions.

So that was a very good interview indeed. If you can stay with us just for a second.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Sure. This will go with it?

MAN: How long is each piece going to run, do you think?

HUME: I don't really know, but we'll have more than the ordinary minute and a half.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: What -- you know, what I find interesting is your perception about a -- you described it as a clamor. And I look at Herb Hetu's press clips, and the clamor still seems to be in the other direction.

MAN: Editorial clamor.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The editorial clamor. And I just wonder how representative the press is of the people.

HUME: Well, I came in -- part of my perception stems from being out on the road with George Bush for two months and noting the response to his calls for strengthening the CIA. And he's not talk-

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ing about more accountability. Which is not to say that George Bush is an opponent of accountability. What I mean by that is that what he -- the direction of his remarks is clearly toward making the CIA, the agency more at liberty to do what it feels it must and maybe to have fewer reports about it. And boy, I mean that never fails to get applause. That's clearly a -- and certainly -- Terry, you haven't....

[Off-mike comments.]

It certainly is a different set of circumstances than you faced four or five years ago, I mean to the extent George Bush hasn't won this race for the nomination, but he hasn't done so badly compared to some pretty formidable competitors that he had. And it hasn't hurt him at all that he spent a year here and is thought to have done well here. And that's something that he cites with tremendous pride. And a few years ago, that would have been probably a matter that would have caused him trouble politically.

So something has happened politically. Clearly something has happened. Now you make the point that it's become clear on Capitol Hill that you all are more accountable and a more responsible agency. And I don't doubt that that's so, and I don't doubt that that perception exists on Capitol Hill. But really there's a broader climate than that in this world.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, you know, I did indicate on tape that the world situation, I think, has had an effect. But there's also something that I'm not in a position to talk about, but you are, and that's the more conservative mood in this country that's illustrated by the Reagan campaign, and I think everybody generally acknowledges it. I think it probably has some bearing on it. It's hard to measure.

HUME: Yeah, I think it's fair to suggest that the public would think that, "Boy, that CIA, they might have been some rough-necks in the old days, but they would have fixed the Ayatollah's wagon."

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: That's a simplistic approach.

HUME: Oh, no doubt. But I think that's probably -- they would like some way they could settle the ash (?) of the ayatollahs of the world.

[End of recording.]

By Tad Szulc

Room S-407 on the Senate side of the Capitol has more than its share of protective electronic devices inside and armed guards outside. It is designed to keep its secrets.

On Wednesday, Jan. 9, during the Congressional Christmas recess, a small group of Senators was summoned back to Washington to meet in S-407, the most "secure" room in all of Congress, with high officials of the Central Intelligence Agency. The agenda: a presentation by the C.I.A. of its plans for covert, paramilitary operations in Afghanistan.

The Senators included Birch Bayh of Indiana, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence; Barry Goldwater of Arizona, vice chairman, and Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware — plus the committee staff director, William G. Miller, and the minority staff director, Earl D. Eisenhower. The C.I.A. was represented by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Frank C. Carlucci, accompanied by John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations, the top man in clandestine operations.

What Mr. Carlucci spelled out at the session was a new covert aid program for the anti-Soviet Moslem guerrillas of Afghanistan. Since last November, as the Senators knew, the C.I.A. had been secretly providing the rebels with limited assistance — field hospitals and communications equipment. But after the Soviet invasion of Dec. 27, the Carter Administration had decided to escalate that aid program dramatically. The C.I.A. proposed to provide the Afghan rebels with Soviet-made AK-47 assault rifles from American stocks, TOW antitank weapons and SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles and launchers. (The SAM's were for use against an anticipated spring offensive when the weather would permit the Russians greater use of planes and helicopters; the offensive has since begun.)

The Senators listened. They offered no major objections. The next day, Mr. Carlucci advised the White House of the results of the session, and President Carter signed a Presidential Decision (known as a P.D.) setting the program in motion.

PUTTING BACK THE BITE IN THE C.I.A.

For all the secrecy and the high-stakes international gamble involved, that progression from Room S-407 to the signing of the P.D. was fairly routine. It was a standard example of Congressional oversight of American intelligence work as it has developed in the last five years — a balancing of the C.I.A.'s national-security requirements and the Congress's desire to keep a hand in foreign-policy decisions and safeguard Americans' individual rights. According to sources in both camps, the agency has been informing the appropriate Congressional committees of its plans, and the committees have, apparently with few exceptions, gone along.

Today, however, that relationship is undergoing dramatic change. The C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies are openly and successfully seeking greater independence of Congressional oversight and of a variety of other restraints, as well. According to its critics, the "unleashing" of the C.I.A. is well under way.

■ A bill that would deprive the Congressional intelligence committees of the right to review all C.I.A. covert operations has been approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It is likely that some such legislation will be passed by Congress this year.

■ A measure, once encouraged by the Carter Administration, which would for the first time have defined the powers of the intelligence agencies, is given little chance in Congress this year.

■ A bill to amend the Freedom of Information Act to protect the agency's secrets is expected to pass the Senate. Further protection has been granted by a Supreme Court ruling.

doing the shouting. In the wake of the Vietnam War, Congress took a long, hard look at the freewheeling ways of the C.I.A. The first concrete result was the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization Act of 1974. According to this measure, no funds could be spent on a covert intelligence operation unless it was reported in a "timely fashion" to the appropriate committees in Congress. Public reports of secret, widespread and illegal C.I.A. moves against political dissenters in the United States (code-named Operation CHAOS) led to the hasty creation of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, with Senator Frank Church of Idaho as chairman.

Along the way, the committee learned in detail of C.I.A. plans to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro and the Congo's Patrice Lumumba, and of the agency's crucial role in establishing a climate in which Chile's President Salvador Allende Gossens, a democratically elected Marxist, could in 1973 be overthrown by the Chilean military. The committee also discovered that the agency had been conducting mind-control experiments, feeding LSD and other drugs to unwitting subjects; covertly passing money to foreign political parties to affect the outcome of elections, and recruiting American journalists, clergymen and academics for secret intelligence work.

Congress demanded a curtailment of the C.I.A.'s ability, in effect, to make

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WASHINGTON BRIEFS

WASHINGTON (AP) -- A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE SAYS HE HAS ASKED CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER TO SAY CLEARLY WHETHER THE AGENCY HAS USED THE RELIGIOUS OR ACADEMIC PROFESSIONS AS "COVERS" FOR OVERSEAS SPYING.

TURNER TOLD THE COMMITTEE IN A RECENT LETTER THAT THE AGENCY HAD WAIVED ITS OWN RULE AGAINST USING EMPLOYEES OF AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA THREE TIMES DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, REP. LES ASPIN SAID SUNDAY.

DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI HAD EARLIER TOLD THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE THAT THOSE WAIVERS DID NOT LEAD TO ACTUAL OPERATIONS AND THAT "THERE WAS NO USE OF JOURNALISTS."

"BUT TURNER'S LETTER WAS SILENT ABOUT ANY DEALINGS WITH OTHER GROUPS SUCH AS CLERGYMEN AND TEACHERS," SAID ASPIN, D-WIS.

Justice Dept. Opposes CIA On Information Act Relief

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Justice Department has voiced its opposition to the CIA's effort to win a broad-scale exemption from the Freedom of Information Act.

In a speech here Thursday, Associate Attorney General John H. Shenefield called the proposal "vastly overbroad and . . . in stark contrast to the spirit and philosophy of the act."

He said the Justice Department will propose "much narrower" relief for the CIA as part of a comprehensive effort to streamline the act and overcome the complaints of various government agencies since Congress put teeth into the law in 1974.

The CIA has asked for a virtually blanket exemption for its operational and technical files on the grounds that the freedom of information law has "perhaps unfairly" become "a focal point for the often-heard allegation that the CIA cannot keep a secret."

The debate so far has been largely confined to the Senate and House intelligence committees. Both are considering the CIA proposal as part of overall charter legislation for the U.S. intelligence community. Yesterday, however, another and potentially less-sympathetic House committee said it intends to make its jurisdiction over the FOIA issue with additional hearings of its own next month.

Rep. Richardson Preyer (D-N.C.), chairman of the House Government Information subcommittee, said he plans to call public witnesses and spokesmen from the Defense Department. An aide noted that the Pentagon receives more freedom of information requests than any other government agency and has one of the best records of compliance with the law.

Preyer's subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over the freedom of information law, has been receiving a mounting number of objections to the CIA proposal from historians, journalists and others, aides said.

In a letter to Preyer and other interested committee chairmen earlier this week, more than 150 organizations and individuals charged that the CIA bill would "represent a radical change in government policy and would severely limit the disclosure of information to the public."

The signers included Common Cause, the American Historical Association, the Association of American Publishers, the National Women's Political Caucus, the U. S. Catholic Mission Council and the Organization of American Historians. They said the CIA's files constitute "an invaluable resource for historians, political scientists and others" because of the major role the agency has played in U. S. foreign relations since the end of World War II.

In his talk, delivered to the Federal Bar Association's Government Information and Privacy Committee, Shenefield said the Justice Department proposals, which have been under study for more than a year, would be sent to the White House shortly.

Shenefield said he was convinced of the necessity to protect confidential intelligence information and confidential intelligence sources and methods from disclosure, but "we are not persuaded by arguments for sweeping file exemptions that would have virtually exempted intelligence agencies from the act."

Under the CIA bill, the agency's operational and technical files would be immune from disclosure, except to Americans seeking records about themselves. The CIA could reject other requests without even searching its files.

Shenefield did not spell out the "much narrower document exemption" the Justice Department is drafting, but he said it would correct the "perception" problem the CIA said it has encountered in dealing with foreign agents and other sources.

Testifying on the issue last month, CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci acknowledged that "under the current Freedom of Information Act, national security exemptions do exist to protect the most vital intelligence information. The key point, however, is that those sources upon whom we depend for that information have an entirely different perception."

Preyer said he will introduce the CIA proposal Monday as a separate bill to get it squarely before his subcommittee.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 22

THE VILLAGE VOICE
17 March 1980

Sunshine Jimmy and of Darknes

By Nat Hentoff

The citizens of Chile clearly were too irresponsible to be left free. Why, Salvador Allende was about to come to power as the result of a democratic election. God knows the CIA had tried terribly hard to save these people from themselves. The Agency had secretly funded—with your tax dollars—huge propaganda campaigns in Chilean newspapers. It had paid workers to stay out on strike to further “destabilize” the situation, and it had spread bountiful anti-Allende bribes around. Nonetheless, the natives had insisted on making up their own minds.

And so, on September 15, 1970, CIA Director Richard Helms attended a meeting with President Richard Nixon, Attorney General John Mitchell, and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. The sole item on the agenda was “Track II”—the mounting of a military coup in Chile. (Not Afghanistan. Chile.) When he left, Helms quickly wrote down the essence of the Star Chamber resolution:

1 in 10 chances perhaps, but save Chile!

worth spending

not concerned risks involved

no involvement of embassy

\$10,000,000 available, more if necessary

full-time job—best men we have

game plan

make the economy scream

48 hours for plan of action.

It didn't work then. Three years later, it did. Largely because of the CIA, American banks, and multinational corporations, Allende was killed, and the childishly free-thinking citizens of Chile were placed under the protectorate of a dictatorship. Many had to be murdered be-

cause of their incurable addiction to liberty, but what the hell, Chile had been saved.

This Helms document—both the handwritten original and a typewritten copy—can be found in the recently published *DOCUMENTS: A shocking collection of memoranda, letters, and telexes from the secret files of the American intelligence community*. Christy Macy and Susan Kaplan assembled and annotated the documents, and the publisher of this invaluable outsize paperback is Penguin.

The book could not have been published without the Freedom of Information Act which, as Macy and Kaplan say, “is responsible for much of what we now know about the clandestine world of the national security apparatus.”

Also in *Documents* is a draft of the anonymous (actually, FBI) letter to Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1964 urging that he commit suicide to forfend the release of tapes made from bugs planted by the FBI in his hotel rooms: “There is but one way out for you. You better take it before your filthy, abnormal fraudulent self is bared to the nation.”

That's an FBI document, but the CIA also spied on King. Not only overseas, but here. As George Lardner, Jr., has pointed out in the *Washington Post*, not a trace of the CIA's surveillance of King appeared “in the extensive congressional or executive branch investigations of the agency conducted in recent years.” But, when Harold Weisberg, a writer from Frederick, Maryland, filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit to get the CIA documents on King, they finally made their way—much to the discomfiture of the Agency—into the light.

There is a long list of crucially instruc-



CIA Director Stansfield Turner:
Only the Shadow knows.

tive books that could not have been written without the FOIA. One is William Shawcross's *Sideshow*. Another is John Marks's *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control*, just reissued in a McGraw-Hill paperback. In 1975, Marks noticed two sentences in the Rockefeller Commission report on the CIA. They had to do with a “CIA program to study possible means for controlling human behavior” and said that some of the studies had “explored the effects of radiation, electric-shock, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and harassment substances.”

15 March 1980

CIA Uses Agee Case in War on Freedom of Information Act

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The strange case of Phillip Agee has become one of the Central Intelligence Agency's prime exhibits in its campaign against the Freedom of Information Act.

A former CIA officer who resigned from the agency in 1968, Agee, 45, now is one of its most outspoken enemies. Since he resigned, he has made a career of exposing the names of CIA personnel and attacking the agency's methods. He also is entitled, like anyone else, to ask for CIA documents under the Freedom of Information Act.

"It is frankly disgraceful that we are required to assist him in his endeavors," CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci told a House subcommittee recently in pleading for a change in the legislation.

"Modification of the Freedom of Information Act makes sense," Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) asserted in co-sponsoring a CIA bill that would put most of the agency's operational and technical records beyond the reach of the law.

"Congress," Wallop declared, "Never intended that the American taxpayers should pay to provide

Philip Agee with four full-time research assistants within the CIA, but that is exactly what happened under the law in 1978."

The implication is that such requests no longer would be permitted if Congress would give the CIA the extraordinary exemption it is seeking.

But the bill would do nothing of the sort. Instead, it would block freedom of information requests from newspapers, historians, civil libertarians and just about everyone and anyone except individuals such as Philip Agee.

Under the CIA proposal, the agency's operational and technical files would be immune from disclosure, except to Americans seeking records about themselves. The CIA still would have to entertain those requests. And that is all that Agee, an American citizen, has asked for: records about himself.

"We do not seek a total exemption," Carlucci said in his House testimony. He said the CIA had constructed "our amendment in such a manner as to keep all of our files accessible to American citizens and permanent resident aliens requesting information on themselves, subject to existing FOIA exemptions."

So far, Agee has gotten very little. On Nov. 9, 1977, he asked the CIA, among other agencies, for copies of "all files and records . . . that pertained to, referred to, or in any way related to himself." Last November, more than two years later, he filed suit in Federal court here under the Freedom of Information Act, saying that he had yet to get a single piece of paper from the CIA beyond a letter acknowledging receipt of his request.

Now, according to court records, Agee wants to drop the lawsuit. From its rhetoric on the issue, it appears that the CIA would be only too happy to accommodate him. But the government is expected to try to keep the case alive in order to press a counterclaim it filed against Agee last month for his anti-CIA writings.

CIA officials refused to discuss Agee's suit, but according to the agency's annual report to Congress last

year, the CIA had "already expended four man-years"—the equivalent of four men working a year—on Agee's request and might spend as much as "nine man years of labor" by the time it was finished.

"Thus," CIA Deputy Director for Administration Don I. Wortman reported on April 2, 1979, "The requester [Agee] is not only succeeding in tying up the time of agency experts, but, in addition, can be expected to use whatever information is ultimately released in his efforts to discredit the agency and destroy its operations."

The suggestion that the freedom of information law enables Agee to pry damaging secrets from the CIA willy-nilly is not supported by the record. The law already allows the CIA to withhold documents that would disclose sources and methods or endanger national security. And CIA Deputy Director Carlucci asserted last year, in a letter to the Office of Management and Budget, that the law "is more often than not of little use to the recipient."

In addition, Agee, who currently lives in West Germany, is the subject of "an intensive counterintelligence investigation," court records show. The Freedom of Information Act permits withholding investigatory records on various grounds.

According to one of Agee's lawyers, Melvin Wulf of New York, the CIA has given them nothing beyond a two-inch-thick personnel file that was turned over two weeks ago.

"They told us at a status conference [on the lawsuit] that that . . . was about 10 percent of what they had—which means they might be coming up with about 20 inches of documents," Wulf recalls. "That doesn't sound like nine man-years to me. . . . They've been working the Agee angle in order to destroy the Freedom of Information Act."

Justice Department lawyers who are defending the CIA and other agencies in the Agee case filed a counterclaim against him Feb. 5 in an effort to confiscate the profits of two controversial books he helped write that exposed the names of CIA agents in Western Europe and Africa.

Encouraged by a Supreme Court decision expanding the CIA's censorship powers, government attorneys also are seeking an injunction that would require Agee to submit all his future writings to the CIA for review.

The government says it needs the freedom of information suit as a vehicle to make its case.

"Plaintiff [Agee] has resided abroad since the late 1960s and he has not been subject to the jurisdiction of any United States court," the Justice Department said in a memo filed with U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell. "Now, through his own actions, this court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff. Thus, for the first time in nearly 11 years, the United States may assert claims against Philip Agee."

The American Civil Liberties Union has joined in the litigation, arguing that Agee has the right to drop his own lawsuit. A hearing has been set for March 27.

The outcome is uncertain, but it is clear that the government is more interested in keeping Agee's widely deplored Freedom of Information Act request alive than Agee is. The CIA has found it useful in more ways than one.

THE NATION
15 March 1980

C.I.A. Symbolism

Testifying February 20 before the House Subcommittee on Information and Individual Rights, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci repeated the Agency's oft-stated plea to be largely exempted from the Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I.A.). Admitting, as he has in the past, that sufficient "national security exemptions do exist" in the F.O.I.A. to protect vital secrets, and that the act itself had not caused leaks, Carlucci nonetheless argued that would-be spies, informers and accomplices "have an entirely different perception." They refuse to sell us information because the act has assumed "a larger-than-life role as a symbol" of the Agency's inability to keep secrets. Although Carlucci insisted that this perception was not correct, he nevertheless wanted the Agency freed from the act's disclosure provisions because, as he explained, "It is unimportant whether they are right or not . . . in our business perception is reality."

Setting aside our questions about the value, ethics and corruptive quality of the C.I.A.'s intelligence-by-bribery policies, we find Carlucci's argument intriguing. By the same logic, how long will it be before some creative prosecutor takes up the cry to repeal the Fourth Amendment on the ground that, though it may not actually cause criminals to go free, some policemen and crooks think it does? And if a marginally more efficient C.I.A. justifies removing it from public accountability, then why would not marginally safer streets justify removing such inefficient prohibitions as those against unreasonable searches and seizures?

Carlucci also testified that the F.O.I.A. was no longer needed as an oversight device because Congress now has its own oversight committees, and he affirmed that those committees were being supplied with "whatever information they need" to prevent abuses. The very next day, however, C.I.A. Director Stansfield Turner informed a Senate intelligence committee that sensitive information had been and would continue to be withheld from the committees, despite his assurances to the contrary in his confirmation hearings. The Senate, to its credit, does seem to be concerned about this deception, but Turner's revelation should serve as a timely reminder that in the past Congress has done more overlooking than overseeing. The Freedom of Information Act provides an independent check; no wonder the intelligence agencies and their friends want to get rid of it.

Carlucci's testimony was also revealing in other respects. Given his confession that the C.I.A. depends on sources who are unable to recognize the difference between symbol and reality and the Agency's inability to explain the difference to them, it is not surprising that the quality of the intelligence it provides has been so disappointing. How can an agency that cannot abide the public accountability our system requires and that cannot explain that system to its own accomplices represent our interests abroad?

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
10 March 1980

Washington Whispers

Intelligence officials say Carter, in an effort to boost CIA morale, is likely to stick within the agency for a successor to Adm. Stansfield Turner if the present director leaves. Reported on the inside track: Frank Carlucci, the current No.2 man.

* * *

Asian intelligence sources report that sizable quantities of Soviet-supplied chemical-warfare material, including poison gas, have been put in place along Vietnam's tense border with China for use in case of another war. Refugees from Laos, in fact, say the Vietnamese already have used poison gas against tribal insurgents there.

* * *

The White House is getting this word from top CIA officials about leaks of agency secrets: Look to the State Department, not just the CIA itself or Congress, for the source.

Spy units pushing for end to curbs

By James Coates
and John Maclean

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON—The United States' intelligence community has seized on a changed national mood to press for the removal of restrictions on their agencies.

Moving on several fronts under leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency, administration officials are seeking to ease demands on disclosure of agency files under the Freedom of Information Act and to decrease requirements of informing Congress of covert schemes in advance. The restrictions were imposed in the 1970s after agency abuses of civil rights were brought to light.

Perhaps most importantly, the agencies have won support for the idea that new charters should be written for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the CIA in a fashion to increase their powers in some areas while restricting their methods in others.

The moves are in sharp contrast to the past when, for example, then-CIA Director William Colby sat meekly at a hearing table while former Rep. Bella Abzug [D., N.Y.] ridiculed him for having her mail opened.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS, obviously pleased, contrast Colby's humiliation to the forceful — some have said arrogant — presentations recently made by CIA Director Stansfield Turner on Capitol Hill.

At a session of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Turner stunned Sen. Stevenson [D., Ill.] by disclosing that he has broken a promise to advise the intelligence panel in advance of all covert CIA activities.

Turner insisted that when he said under oath in 1977 that he would have "no difficulty" in reporting all covert plans to Stevenson, he only meant he would "try" to pass on data. Besides, Turner told Stevenson's Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, there is no law forcing him to inform that committee.

Later, Turner aides disclosed one story that the CIA had withheld from the Senate — the agency's knowledge that the Canadian diplomatic mission to Tehran was hiding six American embassy workers.

WITHIN THE so-called intelligence community, recent events in Iran and Afghanistan are credited with winning support, rather than condemnation, for the various spy agencies after nearly a decade of concern over civil liberties, domestic spying against U.S. citizens, and even efforts to kill U.S. dissenters.

A newsletter circulated among the intelligence and defense communities recently summed up the new climate by saying: "Out of the gathering clouds of the Iranian and Afghanistan crises there may be a silver lining.

"... Because of the lack of good information about Iran [before the Shah's downfall and since] there is growing sentiment on Capitol Hill to revamp the laws governing the intelligence agencies in such a way as to restore a clandestine capability."

The letter was endorsed by several hardliners, including Adm. William Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Many hardliners argue that clandestine operations are limited severely by the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which requires the House and Senate Foreign Affairs committees be informed of plans for covert operations.

SPEAKING ABOUT Hughes-Ryan and the Freedom of Information Act at a recent House hearing, Frank Carlucci, deputy CIA director, said that numerous foreign intelligence networks have refused flatly to work with the CIA or other U.S. intelligence operations because they fear leaks on Capitol Hill.

Just as Turner had surprised the Senate committee with his strong position, Carlucci startled the House Government Operations Committee when he argued that he personally believes the CIA can guarantee that no information will leak. But foreign spies just don't believe that, Carlucci argued.

"Foreign agents — some very important — have either refused to accept or have terminated a relationship on the grounds that, in their minds — and it is unimportant whether they are right or not — but in their minds the CIA is no longer able to absolutely guarantee that the information which they provide the U.S. government is sacrosanct."

Following Carlucci and Turner, FBI Director William Webster and Bob Inman, director of the super-secret National Security Agency, along with representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency made congressional appearances to argue that their agencies need some of the same relief from past reforms.

At the White House, an official told reporters that President Carter endorses "relief across the board" for intelligence officers who have complained about the Freedom of Information Act.

That prompted Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan [D., N.Y.] to wonder aloud about the changes in national mood.

Moynihan said that in the fall of 1978 Vice President Mondale, who led the drive for CIA reforms as a senator, displayed a change of heart at a meeting with lawyers for the CIA, National Security Agency, defense intelligence, and the FBI.

STATINTL

9 March 1980

Free

Again

In Its Hawkish New Mood

Congress Is Too Eager
to Remove CIA Restraints

By DAVID WISE

The smile on the face of Adm. Stansfield Turner told it all. It was there for 50 million Americans to see during President Carter's Jan. 23 State of the Union speech. The television cameras focused on the CIA director just as Carter came to the part about removing "unwarranted restraints" on the intelligence agency.

The admiral's smile lit up the screen. There was his old Annapolis classmate, the President of the United States, ready once again to unleash the CIA. In that brief moment, one could easily visualize the agency rising from the ashes of intelligence reform.

The CIA's timing is flawless. In the present hawkish atmosphere in Washington, intelligence reform has become almost a dirty word, an X-rated idea whose time has come—and probably gone. Thanks to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Soviet takeover in Afghanistan and Carter's hard-line foreign policy, the emphasis now is on strengthening the CIA's powers and punishing its critics with jail sentences and fines.

All but forgotten are the abuses that were revealed by a Senate investigation in a much different atmosphere five years ago, when a committee headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.) disclosed how the CIA had tested drugs on unsuspecting American citizens (one of whom, Dr. Frank Olson, committed suicide); how it opened first-class mail in violation of federal law, spied on the anti-Vietnam War movement in Operation CHAOS, and hired two Mafiosi, Johnny Rosselli and Sam Giancana—both of whom have since met violent deaths—to try to murder Fidel Castro. The list of CIA horrors was much longer, of course.

Last month, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, with the "virtually complete" support of President Carter, introduced an intelligence "charter" that seemed only remotely related to the findings of the Church committee. While outlawing CIA assassinations, the bill would loosen procedures for covert operations; give the agency a free hand to use the press, clergy and academics as spies; and all but exempt the CIA from complying with the Freedom of Information Act.

For a time, in the wake of the Church committee investigation, there was considerable pressure to streamline the CIA, the FBI and the other intelligence agencies. Two years ago, the Senate intelligence committee, the successor to the Church panel, hammered out its first charter, attempting to define in law what the agencies could and could not do. The bill, S 2525, set off a great howl among the agencies and their conservative supporters on Capitol Hill. "Too restrictive," they said.

The staff of the Senate committee diligently went back to the drawing board. An endless series of meetings ensued between the committee staff and representatives of the National Security Council, the Justice Department and the intelligence agencies. Little by little, the provisions of the reform bill were whittled away.

In the meantime, the original reform measure died at the end of 1978. It was not reintroduced last year. The newer, milder version of the charter that made its appearance on Feb. 8 was supposed to have been unveiled by the White House and the Senate committee last fall. But a series of foreign policy crises intervened—first the skirmishing over SALT II, then the seizure of the hostages in Iran, then Afghanistan.

In the wake of these events, Adm. Turner and his deputy at the CIA, Frank C. Carlucci, saw the hole in the line and plunged through. Not only might it be possible to avoid any reform, but in the crisis atmosphere the agency might be able to ram through legislation vastly expanding its powers.

The President's speech had barely ended when Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) broke ranks with his colleagues on the intelligence committee and introduced a three-pronged CIA-backed legislative package. The first part of his bill would repeal the Hughes-Ryan amendment and free the CIA to conduct more covert operations without telling Congress in advance. The second part would virtually exempt the agency from the Freedom of Information Act, and the third is a mini-Official Secrets Act that would punish government officials and—until Moynihan later modified his position—the press and other citizens who talked or wrote about the agency if "identities" were revealed.

Moynihan's ploy was not designed to endear him to Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, or to Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), who heads the subcommittee that has been trying to salvage a CIA charter bill.

In varying form, all three of the features of the bare-bones Moynihan bill are contained in the Carter-backed CIA charter package. The danger, however, is that Congress in an election year—and amid the relentless beating of war drums—will choose to pass only the three pro-CIA parts of the package and abandon all or most of the curbs on the agency.

There is broad support in Congress for repeal of the Hughes-Ryan amendment, which has required the CIA to report covert operations to as many as eight congressional committees.

STATINTL

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 272-273

THE NATION
8 March 1980

PORTUGAL MOVES RIGHT What Happened To the Captains Of April?

STEPHEN TALBOT

Lisbon

For the visitor to Portugal in 1980 it may seem hopelessly remote, but there was a time, less than six years ago, when the armed forces were more popular than the favorite national soccer team, when the sight of a soldier in the streets of Lisbon warmed the heart of even the most committed pacifist. In April 1974 Portugal had an antiwar army—an army so bruised and battered from more than ten years of colonial warfare in Africa, so fed up, that its draftees and junior officers rose up against the obdurate generals and rigid Government officials who refused to end the debilitating, draining conflicts. The "captains of April" led a popular military coup; a revolt that ended nearly fifty years of dictatorship under António de Oliveira Salazar and Marcello Caetano, led to the dismantling of the antiquated and brutal Portuguese empire in Africa and ushered in important economic reforms in Western Europe's poorest and most underdeveloped nation. The symbol of the April 25 revolt was the red carnation, which soldiers placed in the barrels of their rifles. They called it "the revolution of flowers."

But in recent years the red carnation has withered and faded. Last December a coalition of conservative parties, the Democratic Alliance, won a narrow, six-seat majority in the 250-seat Chamber of Deputies, and the new right-wing Prime Minister, Francisco de Sá Carneiro, has just introduced a program that would put the Portuguese revolution in reverse. An ambitious, temperamental lawyer from Portugal's conservative North, Sá Carneiro has proposed accelerating the return to private hands of land in the Alentejo "red zone" seized by farm workers and transformed into agricultural cooperatives, paying compensation to landlords and industrialists whose property was nationalized after the 1974 revolution, stimulating foreign investment, revising the labor code to give employers more power over their workers and setting up private banks and insurance companies to compete with those nationalized by previous leftist governments (despite a provision in the current Constitution specifically prohibiting their denationalization).

Sá Carneiro has also outlined a foreign policy increasing Portugal's role in NATO and the European Economic Community. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100130001

ment, which favored nonalignment and development of

closer economic links with the Third World. The ruling Democratic Alliance has already refused to allow Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, a former "caretaker" Prime Minister, to return to her post as Portugal's representative to UNESCO because the left-of-center independent is considered to be insufficiently pro-NATO.

Sá Carneiro's desire to undo hastily the radical reforms of the Portuguese revolution—nationalization of major industries, support for communal farming, defense of trade union rights—is tempered by the fact that the Portuguese Constitution, adopted in 1976, requires the Government to pursue a socialist program. The socialist-oriented Constitution may be amended for the first time by the Government chosen in the elections that must be held next October. It is Sá Carneiro's strategy to try to implement his conservative program cautiously in the next eight months; win reelection and proceed to "de-radicalize" the Constitution. At the same time, Sá Carneiro and his allies in the old-line military establishment are moving to reduce the remaining influence of the Armed Forces Movement in political life.

Today's army in Portugal is a far cry from the anti-fascist, red-carnationed military rebels of April 25. Gone is the special feeling between the Portuguese people and men in uniform. The left-wing junior officers who passed out guns to workers in the "hot summer of '75" have long since been purged from the ranks as the country has moved to the right. The army is smaller, more disciplined, more traditional. Once again it is closely integrated with NATO. And the new leaders of the Portuguese military—while not fascists—bear a closer resemblance to the generals who ran things before April '74 than to the captains of the coup.

What has become of the soldiers of April? The enlisted men were demobilized. Most of the officers of the Armed Forces Movement—an ideologically diverse group of some 200 men—have been investigated, arrested, tried in secret military courts, transferred to the reserves or booted out of the military altogether. Some still have charges against them, even though they were supposed to be covered by a special amnesty law passed last year. Others who have managed to continue in the military under the new regime have been moved from command posts to desk jobs or have been passed over for promotion.

One of Portugal's highest-ranking and most decorated officers describes the repression of progressive military men as a "witch hunt," in which vague, Kafkaesque charges—of "incompetence," say—suddenly appear in one's file. The accusations are usually anonymous and are never made specific, and the accused is often denied an opportunity to clear his name in public. Referring to the Inquisition, the officer added with bitterness, "Our legal system has 500 years of experience in this sort of repression." Although he still holds a relatively important position in the army, the officer said he had been harassed constantly by the military community. The veteran Armed Forces Movement members I interviewed, he was afraid to let his name be published. That would mean an end to his career, or even jail.

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ON PAGE A1-13

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 March 1980

GSA Sitting on Gold Mine of Gifts

By Ronald Kessler

Washington Post Staff Writer

A \$1,200 bottle of wine given to Henry Kissinger, a \$1,600 diamond and mother-of-pearl watch given to CIA Director Stansfield Turner and a \$1,700 gold dagger given to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance are among the gifts from foreign countries sitting in government vaults because the General Services Administration so far has failed to sell them as required by law.

The federal government has 918 such gifts, valued conservatively at more than \$100,000. The gifts date back to 1966, when government officials were first required to turn over presents they had received from foreign officials or governments.

The law allowed officials to accept gifts if they are donated to museums or turned over to the government to be sold. If a gift does not go to a museum, GSA, the federal housekeeping agency, is supposed to handle its sale, once the secretary of state has determined that it

would not harm relations with other countries.

Since 1966, only seven gifts have been sold—for about \$25,000. Another 1,400, valued at about \$452,000, have been transferred to museums, according to GSA records. The gifts now in storage have been turned down by museums.

Gifts to presidents are covered by the same regulations. But some presidents have been able to keep their gifts by displaying them in

their libraries, considered to be GSA storage areas.

Most of the unsold gifts of watches, exotic furniture, elephant tusks, necklaces, carpets and inlaid boxes are kept in a living-room-sized GSA vault on the first floor of the Forrestal Building on Independence Avenue SW. Four persons know the combination, and the vault is protected by alarm devices that detect movement inside.

The seven items that have been sold went at public auction, advertised in the newspapers, in 1974, according to Stan M. Duda who is in charge of the program.

GSA made \$37.6 million for the U.S. Treasury in fiscal 1979 by selling such items as government typewriters, adding machines, cars and other surplus property.

Duda acknowledged that GSA has had the authority to sell the items since 1966, but he blamed the State Department for failing to take the initiative.

The law was revised in 1978, and Duda said, "We're in the process of preparing regulations. We'll get rid of everything eventually. There's a lot of sensitivity about selling the items [because they are gifts]," he said.

A year ago, the State Department approved the sale of 37 items, he said. Asked why GSA has not sold those gifts, Duda said, "We weren't ready to do it . . . It wasn't practical."

"I don't know when they will be sold," he said. "They will be sold, sometime in the near future. We don't have a special staff for this."

Duda said GSA may negotiate

prices with potential buyers or take competitive bids. The government officials who received the gifts originally are allowed to buy them back at any time, he said.

Duda said the GSA's estimates of the value of items are generally made without obtaining formal appraisals. He said the real values may be much higher because of recent dramatic increases in the prices of gold and other precious materials.

"The real proof of the value will be when we sell them," he said.

Among the gifts turned in by government officials are a gold watch, originally valued at \$1,500, given to Vance by Saudi Arabia; a silver samovar set originally valued at \$1,500, given to Frank C. Carlucci of the CIA by an undisclosed donor; and a \$1,000 vase given to then-secretary of commerce Juanita M. Kreps by the People's Republic of China.

Various other State Department officials received a carved ivory tusk from Malawi, four ladies' gold Piaget watches valued at \$4,000, a \$500 rug from Morocco, and a turquoise-and-diamond necklace, earring, and ring set from Iran valued at \$1,000.

Among the gifts transferred to museums are a \$10,000 gold dagger frame with 49 diamonds, 42 rubies and 47 blue sapphires, along with a dagger with 17 blue sapphires, given by Morocco; a \$100,000 7.9-carat diamond from the Congo (now Zaire); and a \$1,200 yellow gold bracelet from the Ivory Coast.

The \$1,200 bottle of wine given to Kissinger was a 1927 Rudesheimer Apostelwein-Rheingau Bremer Ratskeller, a gift of the West German government.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM	Communique	STATION	WETA Radio NPR Network
DATE	March 7, 1980	6:30 PM	CITY Washington, DC
SUBJECT	The Legal Authority and Accountability of the CIA		

PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER: We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guaranty that abuses do not recur. But we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information, and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence.

ANNOUNCER: In his recent State of the Union address, President Carter called for greater operating freedom for the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies. The Administration wants to step up their use, especially in the area of covert activities, as a tool of American foreign policy.

This edition of Communique examines the controversy surrounding the changes planned for the intelligence community. Our host is Morton Kondracke, executive editor of The New Republic magazine.

MORTON KONDRACKE: In the history of the world, it's probably never happened that a country could reconcile its needs for secret intelligence operations with the ideals of democracy. Few have ever tried. Some would say that the two goals are inherently antithetical. Democracy implies openness, accountability, popular control, and respect for law. Spying involves secrecy, conspiracy, deniability, and often the breaking of laws.

Most countries resolve the dilemma by spying and not worrying about the implications. For much of our history, the United States has avoided the dilemma by avoiding intelligence operations. We did no peacetime spying until after World War II, when the Central Intelligence Agency was founded.

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THE CHRONICLE OF HI
3 March 1980

Scholars Mount Campaign to from Avoiding Freedom of In

By Anne C. Roark

WASHINGTON

Historians, political scientists, and other scholars are launching a campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency's efforts to free itself from public scrutiny.

Unless prompt, concerted efforts are made to block the C.I.A.'s efforts, representatives of several scholarly associations told *The Chronicle*, university research into current political and diplomatic affairs will be nearly wiped out.


At issue is a proposed exemption for the C.I.A. from coverage by the Freedom of Information Act, the federal law that provides public access to government documents. The exemption is one of many proposals in a proposed charter for the C.I.A. that would give the President more flexibility in ordering intelligence missions.

Bill Would Extend Exemption

While highly sensitive intelligence material is now exempt from public disclosure, the legislation being considered by Congress would extend the exemption to all of the C.I.A.'s operational and technical files. The only exception would be for people who request information on themselves.

So far, the Organization of American Historians and several other scholarly groups have spoken out against the exemption provisions in the C.I.A. charter. Many others are expected to follow suit soon.

A grassroots lobbying campaign is already under way, some sources say. In



WIDE WORLD

Stansfield Turner says C.I.A. needs flexibility in dealing with universities.

Maryland, for example, university professors are sending letters to their Senators and Representatives, urging them to oppose any further limitations on public access to government documents.

In most places, the efforts are being coordinated by historians, although some legal scholars and a few researchers from other disciplines are expected to join.

"I have very strong feelings about this

records from disclosure would virtually "close down serious scholarship in recent contemporary history."

John Rosenberg, a historian and an adviser to the Organization of American Historians, described the proposed exemption as "frightening" and full of "implications far more serious" than the C.I.A. has admitted.

The exemption that is causing scholars so much concern is included in a bill, S 2284, introduced last month by Sen. Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky; Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Republican of Maryland; and other members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Additional Bills Being Considered

Other bills, now being considered by both the Senate and the House of Representatives, also would lift many of the restraints imposed on the C.I.A. in the 1970's, when it was discovered that the agency had been involved in questionable activities both at home and abroad.

Most of the proposals now being considered would exempt the agency from the

Freedom of Information Act, but few of them go as far as C.I.A. officials would like.

In testimony before the Senate intelligence committee last month, C.I.A. Director Stansfield Turner urged Congress to extend the exemptions to the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other intelligence groups.

"The same problems which face the C.I.A. in this regard face the other intelligence-community components as well," Admiral Turner said.

Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of central intelligence, explained in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights how enemy agents could make use of the Freedom of Information Act.

Moreover, Mr. Carlucci said, the requirement to make certain documents public under the act has left many U. S. intelligence sources with the "impression" that their secrets

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CONTINUED

IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION address, President Carter called for the end of unwarranted restrictions on American intelligence agencies. "An effective intelligence capability," he said, "is vital to our nation's security." Although the remark drew an ovation, there have been no dramatic initiatives from the Carter administration to revitalize what is generally considered to be a demoralized and often dangerously ineffective American intelligence community. Yet the president's words demonstrate that the mood of the administration—and with it, by all indications, that of the country—has changed dramatically from the time when the Central Intelligence Agency was considered to be a "rogue elephant" dangerously out of control.

What is required to realize the president's goals? According to those who have spent their lives in and around the intelligence business, the primary requirement is a change in the domestic attitude toward the CIA. Such persons—including former directors and top officials of the agency—say the CIA must be freed from some of the more exaggerated forms of congressional scrutiny, such as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which gives more than 200 senators and staff members access to agency data. They also urge that those members of government and the media who have harassed the intelligence community for the past half decade must now recognize that a viable intelligence agency is urgently needed. And, they say, the agency and the intelligence community as a whole badly need the finest possible leadership, both from the White House and from the office of the director of central intelligence (DCI). That post is currently occupied by Admiral Stansfield Turner, and in the view of an impressive number of intelligence experts, Admiral Turner is not able to lead the CIA back to respectability.

WITHIN MONTHS OF HIS 1977 appointment as DCI, Stansfield Turner had acquired the nickname "Captain Queeg" in CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. One morning in January 1979, he came to work to find the bulletin boards and mailboxes full of a forged edition of his own "Notes From the Director." Dated January 15, it has become an underground classic in the intelligence community:

I was in my office fairly exhausted last evening after a long day. I asked the

Michael Ledeen is executive editor of The Washington Quarterly.

NEW YORK

Tinker, Sailor,

By Michael Ledeen



Stansfield Turner, critics say, has demoralized and politicized the CIA.

CONTROL

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 12-18THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
2 March 1980

The KGB In Washington

There are about 200 Soviet agents here
They read a lot, attend congressional hearings,
have lunch with the right people and, of course,
they recruit infiltrators

BY TAD SZULC

Some information in this article was produced from interviews with U.S. intelligence officials and from other federal security specialists who insisted on anonymity. The author also is acquainted with Soviet diplomats.

Boris V. Kondratsev, as we shall call him, though that is not his real name, leaves his fourth-floor apartment at 1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW, in Washington every weekday morning at precisely 7:45. A round-faced man, about 38 years old, he usually wears a dark gray suit and a conservative tie. He walks toward Scott Circle, then turns left on 16th Street to reach the Soviet Embassy, the old-fashioned building next to the University Club, a few minutes later. He can see the White House four blocks down 16th Street as, strolling past uniformed officers of the Executive Protective Service at the iron gate, he enters the embassy.

Every morning he is discreetly followed from home to office by two men in business suits who had been waiting for him across the street from the apartment building. A large number of Soviet Embassy officials and their families. The two men are

officially listed as a second secretary of the Soviet Embassy, is an agent of the KGB, the Soviet secret service, its Russian initials standing for *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (State Security Committee). Boris knows he is being tailed, and the FBI

agents know he knows. This is all part of the endless intelligence war being silently waged in Washington—and elsewhere in the United States—between the KGB and American counterintelligence services, a war with clearly defined rules.

This contest, American officials say, is now more intense than at any other time since World War II. The reason is that the Soviet Union is steadily expanding and streamlining its intelligence operations in the United States—from sophisticated espionage to efforts aimed at establishing long-term hidden political influence assets in this country—in a fashion highly worrisome to the American government.

Soviet intelligence, of course, has always been extremely active in the United States (just as American intelligence, working against much greater odds, has striven to penetrate the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies), but the conviction among Washington's security specialists is that the Russians made a major policy decision, probably in the early 1970s, to reorganize, step up and improve these activities. The same is true in Western Europe, where the traditionally well-entrenched KGB has scored significant intelligence successes in recent years.

All signs are that Moscow is reaching for intelligence superiority over the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance as forcefully as it seeks to achieve military superiority, nuclear and conventional. These moves, Washington experts say, are closely linked.

In light of the dramatic deterioration in Soviet-American relations this year over the Afghanistan invasion and other tense foreign situations, the importance of the Soviet intelligence apparatus already in place in the United States is greater than ever. L

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E-4NEW YORK TIMES
2 MARCH 1980

The Nation

In Summary

A New Disclosure In C.I.A. Dispute

Shackles aren't what they used to be. After an initial round of Congressional hearings late last month, it appeared that in some instances United States' intelligence-gathering agencies — whom the Carter Administration says are overdue for an unshackling — have in fact been able to slip their manacles with little trouble.

Appearing before a Senate committee, Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, testified that he had "in very limited occasions" waived restrictions and authorized the use of journalists, teachers and clergymen for covert missions in recent years. Deputy director Frank Carlucci, on a mission of clarification last week, said that the operations were never carried out, in one case because "the need to do it was suddenly removed." The Select Committee on Intelligence is considering charter legislation that would, among other things, prohibit use of the three professions for "covers"; Mr. Carlucci said the C.I.A. didn't like that proposal.

For their part, many members of the committee clearly haven't liked much of what they've heard so far. Agency officials — and their ostensible masters in the White House — are still dead set against required briefings for a handful of Congressmen in advance of significant secret operations. Nor can critics of the agencies, on and off Capitol Hill, be pleased with the intelligence that the agencies are expected to get what they want from the full Senate, perhaps before this summer. Still, last weekend, Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, the Senate majority leader, insisted that "accountability" must be a matter of law, not an informal understanding. Congress, he said, won't give the C.I.A. "or any other agency carte blanche."

Carlucci Says C.I.A. Has Not Used Reporters, STATINTL

Clerics or Academics

WASHINGTON, Feb. 29 (UPI) — A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency said yesterday that, contrary to a previous indication, the agency had not in recent years used United States reporters, clergymen or academics for intelligence purposes.

The agency's deputy director, Frank C. Carlucci, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that he was clarifying remarks made to the panel last week by the Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stanfield Turner, about the use of such groups.

Admiral Turner had said that using "internal" powers he had "in very limited occasions" waived provisions of a 1975 Senate resolution forbidding the use of journalists, clergymen or academics for "cover" for intelligence purposes.

Admiral Turner said he did not consider himself bound to give prior notice to the committees about very sensitive, planned covert events because "leaks" could risk the lives of agents.

The remarks created concern in the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and brought protests from religious

leaders. The committees asked for clarification of the remarks.

At yesterday's hearing on proposed charters for some branches of the intelligence community, Mr. Carlucci said that, although Admiral Turner had authorized waivers for the use of the proscribed groups, the waivers had not been used.

Mr. Carlucci said that the agency was in favor of a charter for its operations but wanted latitude in exceptional cases to waive some of the restrictions.

Mr. Carlucci appeared before the committee along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Director, William H. Webster; Adm. Bobby Inman, director of the National Security Agency; Lieut. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe Jr., director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

None objected to charters or reasonable regulation governing the gathering of intelligence or in counterintelligence so long as sources and methods were not compromised.

All strongly objected to disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act that they said tied up hundreds of their employees in search and analysis, cost millions of dollars a year and could disclose classified material unless most carefully monitored.

STATINTL

CIA Head Approved Use Of Journalists 3 Times

CIA Director Stansfield Turner has approved the use of journalists in secret operations three times, but they were never pressed into duty, the Senate Intelligence Committee was told yesterday.

Elaborating on testimony by Turner last week, CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci said the intelligence operations were "never carried out" for various reasons. He said one of the projects "became impossible" to carry out and another became unnecessary.

Carlucci did not cite any reasons for abandoning the third plan but he emphasized "there was no use of journalists" in any of the cases.

CIA regulations issued in 1977 prohibit the use of fulltime or parttime journalists accredited to U.S. publications, broadcasting outlets or wire services—unless the CIA director decides to make an exception.

Members of the Intelligence Committee had been unaware that any waivers had been granted until Turner said last week that he had approved them "on very limited occasions."

ASSOCIATED PRESS

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SPIES-REPORTERS

BY ROBERT FURLON

WASHINGTON (AP) -- CIA PLANS TO USE THE NEWS BUSINESS OR OTHER SENSITIVE PROFESSIONS AS "COVERS" FOR SPIES OVERSEAS HAVE NEVER PASSED THE PLANNING STAGE DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, A TOP AGENCY OFFICIAL TOLD CONGRESS THURSDAY.

DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI SAID HE WANTED TO CORRECT "MISUNDERSTANDINGS" ARISING OUT OF DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER'S TESTIMONY LAST WEEK THAT HE HAD WAIVED "GENERAL PROHIBITIONS" AND HIS OWN DIRECTIVE AGAINST SUCH COVER "ON VERY LIMITED OCCASIONS."

TURNER'S STATEMENT TO THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE BROUGHT A QUICK DEMAND FROM REP. LES ASPIN, D-WIS., A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, FOR TURNER TO TURN OVER DETAILS ON "ALL EXCEPTIONS" HE HAS MADE, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO REPORTERS.

CARLUCCI SAID TURNER HAD INDEED "BEEN WILLING TO GRANT WAIVERS IN THREE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THE OPERATIONS WERE NEVER CARRIED OUT AND THERE WAS NO USE OF JOURNALISTS." USE OF CLERGY AND EDUCATORS ALSO IS DISCOURAGED IN ADMINISTRATION DIRECTIVES.

IN ONE CASE THE OPERATION "BECAME IMPOSSIBLE," AND IN ANOTHER "THE NEED TO DO IT WAS SUDDENLY REMOVED," CARLUCCI TOLD THE SENATE COMMITTEE THURSDAY. HE DECLINED TO ELABORATE TO REPORTERS AFTER THE HEARING.

CARLUCCI, FBI DIRECTOR WILLIAM WEBSTER AND THE DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WERE AMONG MEMBERS OF A PANEL TESTIFYING ON THE COMMITTEE'S PROPOSED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CHARTER TO SPELL OUT DUTIES AND LIMITS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING.

CARLUCCI REITERATED CIA OPPOSITION TO CHARTER PROVISIONS THAT WOULD FLATLY PROHIBIT USE OF THE THREE PROFESSIONS FOR "COVERS," REQUIRE THE AGENCY TO GIVE SELECTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ACCESS TO ALL ITS SECRETS AND REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF THOSE MEMBERS BEFORE UNDERTAKING BIG OR RISKY UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS.

AP-WX-0228 2002EOT

CIA Asking Hill to Cut Back Public Access to Agency's Files

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

On June 8, 1965, a CIA security officer met with an informant in the Hilton Hotel in downtown Washington to discuss the progress of his spying on the civil rights movement and especially on the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.

The meeting, which lasted nearly four hours, dealt with "highly derogatory information" involving King and allegations of "communist-directed infiltration into the movement," according to a nine-page memo prepared the next day for the chief of CIA's Security Research Staff. The highly placed informant, who had "long provided information on the Negro civil rights movement and its leaders" to the CIA, promised to stay in touch. He emphasized he did not want to be "downgraded" by being asked to report to the FBI.

The CIA's spying on King, which produced a file including some of his haberdashery bills, Diners Club receipts and notes listing phone calls and appointments, was never disclosed in the extensive congressional or executive branch investigations of the agency conducted in recent years. It has come to light solely as the result of litigation under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Thousands of documents on CIA activities—from reports on President Kennedy's assassination to controversial mind-control experiments and other excesses—have been made public under FOIA since the agency was effectively brought under the law five years ago.

Now the CIA is seeking to halt all but the most limited disclosures. Under a bill pending in both the House and the Senate, the agency has asked for an "extraordinary exemption" that would put its operational and technical files almost completely beyond reach of FOIA. Even illegal activities, it appears, could be legally covered up. Public inquiries could be rejected without any inspection of the documents sought. Lawsuits would be fruitless. The files would be immune from court action, except for individuals seeking records about themselves.

The CIA has described the proposal in more modest terms. According to CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci, the bill would provide only "a limited exemption to protect our most sensitive information." He maintains that "the loss to the public from the removal of these files from the FOIA process would be minimal."

Despite such assurances, the law has forced the CIA to release a great deal of information that would still be buried in the agency's files if the bill it wants had been the prevailing rule.

Some documents that have been made public expand, or contradict, what the CIA reported in the 1975-76 investigations. Some deal with issues that the investigators never touched, such as the CIA's spying on Dr. King. (That was disclosed in an FOIA lawsuit brought by author-critic Harold Weisberg of Frederick, Md.)

Item: The Rockefeller Commission, appointed by President Ford in 1975 to investigate CIA activities in the United States, came across a program started in 1967 by the CIA's Office of Security "to identify threats to CIA personnel, projects and installations," especially those stemming from the antiwar movement on college campuses.

The commission was satisfied that the operation "used no infiltrators, penetrators or monitors" and relied primarily on press clippings, campus officials and police authorities.

Records later released under the Freedom of Information Act about the program, which the CIA styled "Project Resistance," show that it used confidential informants repeatedly in Texas, California, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere. The CIA file even included a blank "Confidential Informant Identification" form for Project Resistance.

Item: The Senate investigating committee headed by Frank Church (D-Idaho) said in its final report that Project Resistance, which lasted until 1973, eventually developed a nationwide index of 12,000 to 16,000 names.

But according to records later made public under FOIA, the CIA's Office of Security indexed 50,000 members of the California Peace and Freedom Party alone, primarily college students in just two counties.

Item: The CIA told the Church committee that the records for MKULTRA, the agency's premier mind-control program, had been destroyed in 1973, reportedly with concurrence of then-director Richard Helms.

Some 16,000 pages of records dealing with MKULTRA and other CIA experiments with exotic drugs were subsequently unearthed and turned over to John Marks, a former State Department employe and frequent CIA critic, under the Freedom of Information Act.

Testifying about some of the newly discovered documents in 1977, CIA Director Stansfield Turner said they showed the CIA carried out 149 projects involving drug testing, behavior modification and secret administration of mind-altering drugs at 80 American and Canadian universities, hospitals, research foundations and prisons. But he assured Congress that the mind control work had been al-

most completely phased out in the mid-1960s.

According to Marks, who kept pressing for more documents as he wrote a book on the subject, the CIA replaced MKULTRA with another wide-ranging, supersecret behavior control project that continued into the 1970s under the agency's Office of Research and Development. The CIA told Marks in June 1978 it had discovered "130 boxes" of mind control material, in response to his inquiry about the ORD project, but he is still waiting to find out what is in them beyond a few "trivial documents" that were released.

"They've been diddling me ever since," Marks says. "In effect, they've already repealed the FOIA, at least as far as mind control is concerned."

Item: The CIA's view of its once-secret war in Laos was reflected in still another release under FOIA. Its position was set down Oct. 30, 1969, in a memo from CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston regarding congressional inquiries on the issue, espe-

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THE NATION
23 February 1980

Future Secrets

Once again, from a new, if predictable, quarter, the Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I.A.) is under attack. The proposed foreign intelligence charter bill (S. 2284), which was unveiled by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 9, would almost totally exempt the Central Intelligence Agency from the act (except for individuals who request their own files), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is expected to push for an amendment that would cover their "foreign" intelligence files (including the antiwar movement and the Communist Party investigation) as well. A similar section in Senator Daniel P. Moynihan's bill (S. 2216), introduced on January 24, would exempt not only the C.I.A. but also the F.B.I. and any other "intelligence agency or component" of the Government (see George Lardner Jr., "Moynihan Unleashes the C.I.A.," *The Nation*, February 16).

In the present charged atmosphere it hardly seems to matter that no injury to national security has been persuasively traced to the F.O.I.A. Indeed, only last year, C.I.A. Deputy Director Frank Carlucci told the House Select Committee on Intelligence, "It is undeniable that under the current F.O.I.A. national security exemptions exist to protect our most vital information." John Blake, deputy director for administration at the Agency, went even further. Testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1977, Blake admitted that at first the act was traumatic for a service that was schooled in secrecy. But, he concluded, "We have been able to make the necessary adjustments. I am pleased to report that, in fact, I think the Agency is better off for it."

The F.O.I.A. may not have helped the Russians or the Iranians but it has enabled the American people to make the C.I.A. more accountable. Now that Washington is clamoring to jump on the cold-war wagon, the C.I.A. and its supporters in the Administration and the Senate have seized the chance to push F.O.I.A. in front of the crowd, hoping that it will be trampled to death in the mad rush. And no wonder. Of all the "leashes" restraining the C.I.A., none has proved more effective than the public scrutiny fostered by the F.O.I.A.

In the conclusion of his perceptive study, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the C.I.A.*, Thomas Powers recalls the new day that appeared to be dawning because of the creation of an intelligence oversight committee in the wake of the Church committee's probe into C.I.A. abuses, but he questioned whether anything had really changed. "The worst blunders and most egregious excesses of the past tended to occur when everyone in Washington recognized the same threat and agreed that something had to be done. The Senate's intelligence oversight committee, after a year or two of skepticism, may simply join an expanded inner circle of policy makers who determine the American role in the world, and keep the secrets of the future as their predecessors did those of the past."

Powers was chillingly correct. Once again everyone in Washington recognizes the same threat and agrees that something must be done, and they have produced the Moynihan bill and the foreign intelligence charter to keep secret the blunders and egregious excesses of the present. Hearings are scheduled to begin in the Senate intelligence committee on February 21; unless voices are raised now, the F.O.I.A. will be trampled under, along with other valuable measures—on which we will have more to say.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
22 February 1980

CIA Information Withheld From Hill, Turner Testifies

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

CIA Director Stansfield Turner said yesterday that the administration has been holding back more information from the Senate and House intelligence committees than its members previously suspected and that the White House intends to continue the practice.

Testifying before the Senate committee on a proposed legislative charter for the CIA, Turner assailed a provision that would require advance notice to Congress of all "significant" intelligence activities as "unnecessary, improper and unwise."

He also voiced strong opposition to more than half a dozen sections of the Senate proposal, including one that would entitle the two intelligence committees to whatever after-the-fact information they deem necessary for proper oversight of the U.S. intelligence community.

Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), the committee chairman, expressed surprise at the breadth of the administration's complaints.

Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), who has spent several years in an effort to reach agreement with the CIA and the White House, said he feared that their bluntly stated position could jeopardize the measure.

Several committee members said they had been under the impression that the administration has been notifying them in advance of all covert actions and other significant undertakings—with one exception—since President Carter took office.

"That is not correct," Turner told them. He did not elaborate, saying that, "We are on the dangerous

ground of a public forum." But he indicated that information had been withheld more than once, in cases where he and the president felt that advance notice to the intelligence committees might jeopardize the lives of the agent or agents involved.

Under questioning by Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson (D-Ill.), the CIA director acknowledged that he had testified at his confirmation hearing in 1977 that he expected "no difficulty" in complying with an advance-notice requirement embodied in Senate Resolution 400, which created the Senate panel.

But the resolution does not have the force of law, and Turner insisted that he had never "endorsed" it. He told Stevenson that he had said only that he would have no difficulty "in trying to comply with it," and not that he had promised to do so.

Turner maintained that Carter is still strongly committed to enactment of a legislative charter for the CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, but Turner followed up with what amounted to a gloomy assessment of its prospects.

"This is, as we all know, a short legislative year," he told the senators, "and there is some question as to whether both houses of the Congress will be able to take up and pass the charter even if all the outstanding differences between this committee and the administration can be settled quickly."

Offering one concession after another, Huddleston said he thought that most of the disagreements could be resolved. For example, he said he thought there would be no problem in cutting back the Freedom of Information Act even further than the

Senate committee has been planning.

The CIA has been seeking a virtual blanket exemption from the Freedom of Information Act for its operational and technical files, but Turner said the administration wants similar "relief" for the National Security Agency, the FBI "and other intelligence agency components."

"An area of even more serious concern," he added, is a provision in the Senate proposal that would make unauthorized disclosure of the names of CIA operatives a crime only for people, such as former CIA officers, who have authorized access to such information. The CIA wants criminal penalties also made applicable to outsiders, such as journalists.

Huddleston said he hoped some accommodation could be reached in this area, too. But he said he thought the issues of prior notice and guaranteed access to intelligence agency information "crucial" to proper congressional supervision.

Turner indicated that the White House does not intend to relent on either point. "I believe the president feels very firmly about these two issues," he told the committee.

Huddleston pointedly noted that CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci, in testimony Wednesday before a House subcommittee, had argued that the CIA should not be held to the full rigors of the Freedom of Information Act, since it was already supplying the two congressional intelligence committees "with whatever information they need" to guard against abuses.

"Do you disagree with that?" Huddleston asked the CIA director.

"No," Turner replied.

STATINTL

CIA Seeking Court Writers of Unauthorized

By George Lardner Jr.
and Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writers

Its censorship powers bolstered by a new Supreme Court decision, the CIA is seeking court action against the authors of other unauthorized books about its activities, sources said yesterday.

Even before the Supreme Court ruling, which was handed down Tuesday, the Justice Department had filed suit against former CIA officer Philip Agee to confiscate the profits of two controversial books he helped write, exposing the names of CIA agents in Western Europe and Africa.

Sources said the government is considering similar suits against other authors in the wake of the high court decision. CIA officials refused to comment.

"I don't want to prejudice any litigation," CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci told a reporter yesterday afternoon following an appearance before a House subcommittee.

In the touchstone case, involving a book by former CIA agent Frank

Snepp that admittedly contained no classified information, the Supreme Court held that the government can severely restrict the release of information bearing on national security by employees and former employees, even if no secret material is involved.

Calls for still more secrecy reverberated on Capitol Hill yesterday. In his testimony before the House government information subcommittee, Carlucci assailed the law that makes CIA files subject to public scrutiny under the Freedom of Information Act.

Meanwhile, at another hearing before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), appearing as a witness, urged that journalists who publish sensitive national security information be tried for treason.

Goldwater's ire was provoked by articles in last Friday's editions of The Washington Post and last Saturday's New York Times reporting on secret U.S. arms shipments to Afghan rebels that were started last month.

"I feel it's very treasonable for any media in this country to come out

with chapter and verse about what I heard in top secret hearings just 2 weeks ago," the Arizona senator protested. "I think that has to be stopped. . . . I think that's abuse of freedom of the press and I don't have any respect for publications that do that because they are tearing down the security of our nation."

Rep. Dan Quayle (R-Ind.), a former newspaper reporter, was the only subcommittee member to challenge Goldwater's testimony.

"I'm a little concerned about your proposals for sanctions against the press rather than against blabbermouth bureaucrats. . . . They're the ones who are responsible," Quayle told him.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner, who testified later, maintained that the agency has no effective legislation it can use to punish, let alone find out, who the leakers are. All he can do at present, he said, is dismiss offending employees.

The Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing had been convened to discuss the role of intelligence and foreign

policy, but it was dominated by Goldwater's denunciations. The vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which prides itself on assumptions that it is leak-proof, Goldwater sought repeatedly to claim that "99 percent" of sensitive leaks come from the executive branch rather than Congress.

The Carter administration, however, is seeking charter legislation for the CIA that would sharply cut back the number of congressional committees that must be notified of covert activities such as the Afghan arms shipments. The administration is also unwilling to guarantee by law to share CIA secrets with the two committees that would continue to supervise the agency: the Senate and House Intelligence panels.

House Intelligence Committee Chairman Edward P. Boland (D-Mass.) suggested in his testimony yesterday afternoon that this was carrying the secrecy drive too far.

If congressional oversight of the intelligence community is to be limited to only two committees, Boland said he regards it as essential that those

the House government information subcommittee, Carlucci took the position that the congressional oversight now afforded by the Senate and House Intelligence Committees was more than adequate to make up for the loss of public scrutiny under the Freedom of Information Act.

Carlucci acknowledged that the Freedom of Information Act had "perhaps unfairly" come to be tagged as the source of improper disclosures. But he maintained the law still needs to be changed, primarily because the CIA has been unable to convince many of its foreign agents and other sources that they have nothing to fear from it. He called the "perception"

more important than the reality because in intelligence work, he contended, "the perception is the reality."

Forced to comply with the Freedom of Information Act in 1974 by a series of congressional amendments, the CIA is seeking a change that would put most of its operational files beyond the reach of the law and thus of the courts, which enforce it.

It could not be ascertained what books about the CIA are the likeliest targets of new lawsuits. As the result of the Supreme Court decision, Snepp will have to give up all earnings from his book, "Decent Interval," and submit all future writings for CIA screening. The government is seeking the same remedy against Agee for his books, "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe," which was published in 1978, and the just-released, "Dirty Work II: the CIA in Africa."

Washington Post staff writer Laura A. Kiernan contributed to this story.

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WASHINGTON STAR
6 February 1980

THE EAR

UNBLOCKED . . . There's a teeny wave of panic at the CIA, Ear hears. With the great Morale Slump in the wake of the Iran and Afghanistan Experiences, lots of hotshot Company Men are seeking out shrinks. Now, The Agency, sweetly, keeps a passel of Company Shrinks on tap, to hear Troubled Agents' woes. This way, Our Boys won't flop on outside couches, change their socks and spill the beans. Suddenly, a nasty note: All Company Men are *not* going to Company Cranium. . . . meisters with their little secrets. Are they naughtily seeing Shrinks of Their Choice on the outside? Ear cannot tell. But Ear hears for sure that Deputy Director Frank Carlucci has launched a mission to track down horizontal tattlers and Bung Up The Leaks. . . .

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SUBJECT CIA and Its Restrictions

JIM LEHRER: There are those who say events in Iran and Afghanistan might have gone differently if only the CIA were alive and well. It's the meaty timely part of an argument over restrictions, one often framed in canine terms: Does the CIA have too tight a leash on it? And is it time to loosen or remove that leash? Questions, among others, we pose tonight to a high-ranking CIA official, two key members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and a civil liberties lawyer.

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: The flurry of activity over the CIA was sparked by President Carter's State of the Union message. He called for removing the, quote, unwarranted restraints on our ability to collect intelligence, unquote.

Since then, two major efforts have been launched to do just that. One is a bill announced by seven senators last week; the other, an idea that has been in the works for three years, responds directly to President Carter's call for a new charter to, quote, define clearly the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies, period, close quotes.

The main target of the proposed legislation is the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment that required tighter controls on the agency by both the President and Congress. That law was passed in the wake of reports of widespread abuses by the CIA in the '70s that ranged from character assassination campaigns aimed at Americans to real assassination plots against foreigners.

LEHRER: First, the CIA's own view of its problems from the agency's number two man, Frank Carlucci. He's a career Foreign Service Officer who was the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
31 January 1980

World-Wide

U.S. intelligence agents need more protection from being identified publicly by Americans hostile to the CIA, the agency's deputy director told a House panel. Frank Carlucci was testifying for a bill spelling out criminal penalties for "blowing the cover" of an agent. Such incidents have hurt recruitment of informants, he said.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
31 January 1980

CIA, Justice Dept. Differ on Data Disclosure Curb

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA opened a congressional drive to regain its Cold-War vigor yesterday and was promptly chided by the Justice Department among others—for beginning with a bill that may be unconstitutional.

The intramural bickering within the Carter administration came to light at a hearing before the House Intelligence Committee on a bill that would make it a crime to disclose information—even when obtained from public sources—that serves to identify U.S. intelligence operatives working abroad.

CIA Deputy Director Frank C. Carlucci acknowledged that the proposal could under certain circumstances outlaw the publication on unclassified information obtained from unclassified sources. But he insisted that the measure had been carefully drafted and described it as essential "to the maintenance of an effective foreign intelligence service."

Voicing the Justice Department's reservations, Associate Deputy Attorney General Robert L. Keuch warned that the bill would have "a chilling effect" on freedom of speech. He stopped short of flatly labeling the measure unconstitutional but other critics, outside the government, were more outspoken.

The hearing reflected the start of a determined drive by the CIA to gain a freer hand for its activities on the heels of the crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After years of discomfiture brought on by congressional investigations of the mid-1970, the agency is pressing for a greater measure of secrecy and "operational flexibility," including repeal of current legislative controls of its covert operations.

A milder version of the so-called "Intelligence Identities Protection Act" aired before the House committee is expected to be included in the administration's long-delayed charter for the CIA. Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee met at the White House with President Carter yesterday to discuss the omnibus measure and, according to Sen. Charles McCMathias Jr. (R-Md.), reached "a very large measure of agreement" on outstanding issues.

The charter proposal, which may be introduced next week, would also make it a crime to disclose the names of CIA operatives or sources, but only for past or present government officials who have had "authorized" access to such information. The CIA bill would also provide for the prosecution and conviction of outsiders, such as journalists, who make such information public if the government can show they intended to "impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States."

Under questioning by Rep. Robert McClory (R-Ill.), Carlucci said he thought it vital to subject outsiders to prosecutions. "It is imperative," he testified, "that a message be sent that the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence identities is intolerable."

The main targets of the proposal are avowed anti-CIA publications such as the Covert Action Information Bulletin and Counterspy, which regularly publish the names of CIA station chiefs and officers working abroad. But the Justice Department emphasized that the impact would be much broader.

The measure the CIA wants, introduced by all 14 members of the House Intelligence Committee last fall, "would cover disclosures of publicly available information made by ordinary citizens who claim no special expertise in intelligence affairs and have not held special positions of trust nor associated with others who have," Keuch testified.

He said that even "conversational speculation about whether foreign officials may have been a CIA source and whether we have covert operatives in country... could come chillingly close to criminality" under the terms of the bill. He said journalists could also find critical stories or even remarks about the CIA used against them later at a criminal trial as evidence of an "intent to impede" foreign intelligence activities.

Carlucci sought to emphasize the damage done by naming names. As former ambassador to Portugal, he said he was in Lisbon several years ago when a "so-called expose" of the CIA personnel in the U.S. Embassy there came complete with names, addresses and even directions such as "second apartment to the right as you set off the elevator."

"It was a clear incitement to violence," Carlucci protested. "We had to move people out of the country. Sources were drying up."

In an exchange with Rep. Wyche Fowler (D-Ga.), Carlucci said "it would be virtually impossible" to prosecute a reporter from, say, The Washington Post or The New York Times—because of the difficulty of proving intent—"unless the journalist went around town boasting he was on a vendetta against the agency."

Keuch observed, however, that "the First Amendment is intended to protect a wide range of people, far beyond The Washington Post and The New York Times."

Carlucci maintained that it takes "specialized knowledge and substantial effort" to clean the identities of CIA personnel from publicly available documents—such as old State Department biographic registers (the new ones are classified)—but other witnesses such as American Civil Liberties Union spokesman Morton Halperin said this was far easier to do than Carlucci suggested.

New York lawyer Floyd Abrams, who represented The New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case, attacked the bill as "flatly unconstitutional" in its efforts to subject outsiders, including members of the press, to criminal penalties. He said every newspaper that printed the name of U2 spy plane pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1960 when he was shot down by the Russians but before the White House acknowledged he worked for the government would have been subject to prosecution if the bill had been law back then.

STATINTL

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3A

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
31 January 1980

Cloak and dagger

Bill to safeguard CIA starts rights debate

By Robert Furlow
Associated Press

WASHINGTON — A bill aimed at guarding the identities of secret agents could choke legitimate CIA criticism that is protected by the rights of free speech, a Justice Department official said yesterday.

But a CIA official praised the bill, now before Congress, saying that it was "urgently needed" to protect agents' lives and valuable sources of U.S. intelligence information.

The Justice Department supports legislation to protect identities of agents, but has constitutional questions about the effects of the bill on news articles or even casual conversations by citizens, Robert Keuch, an associate deputy attorney general, said. The bill is before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Keuch joined CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci and several congressmen at an Intelligence subcommittee hearing in calling for a new law to punish people who destroy the "cover" of secret agents. The hearing, however, ran quickly into a dispute over the rights of free speech.

All participants agreed that a person should be heavily fined or imprisoned for using access to classified information to expose a secret U.S. agent or a foreign informant.

But the House bill, sponsored by all 14 committee members, also would fine or imprison private citizens with no formal access to classified information if they identified an agent "with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States."

Carlucci gave strong support for the entire bill, suggesting only changes that would toughen it further.

He said that identity disclosures in recent years had hampered U.S. intelligence efforts, threatening lives and undercutting informant confidence in dealing with U.S. agents.

"We are increasingly being asked to explain how we can guarantee the safety of individuals who cooperate with us when we cannot protect our own officers from exposure," Carlucci said.

Keuch said the Justice Department wanted the bill to penalize private citizens only if they knowingly used classified information to expose an

agent or informant.

The "intent" provision in the House bill was not a sufficient safeguard for "a mainstream journalist, who may occasionally write stories based on public information mentioning which foreign individuals are thought to have intelligence relationships with the U.S.," Keuch said.

Such persons might be fearful that any later stories critical of the CIA could be used as evidence of an intent to impede foreign intelligence activities, he said. That "could have the effect of chilling legitimate critique and debate of CIA policy," he added.

He said it also might be a "practical impossibility" to prove such intent by someone seriously engaged in such an effort.

Committee chairman Edward Boland (D, Mass.) thanked Keuch for his suggestions but chided him for not formally furnishing them sooner.

Keuch acknowledged the delay had been due to disagreement on the bill within the Carter administration, including failure of "efforts to reach an accommodation of viewpoints" with the CIA.

3

REUTER

R 09528)1WYDWDZOT 30 Jan 1980 STATINTL

47AM-INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, JAN 30: REUTER - NEARLY ALL MAJOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WHICH COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES HAVE REVIEWED THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOLLOWING THE IDENTIFICATION OF UNDERCOVER AGENTS; A TOP CIA OFFICIAL SAID TODAY.

RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE HAVE BEEN IMPAIRED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE NAMES OF CIA AGENTS ABROAD; A CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE WAS TOLD.

FRANK CARLUCCI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CIA, SAID: "SOURCES HAVE EVINced INCREASED CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY.

"SOME ACTIVE SOURCES, AND INDIVIDUALS CONTEMPLATING COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES, HAVE TERMINATED OR REDUCED THEIR CONTACT WITH US."

HE TOLD CONGRESSMEN WORKING ON LEGISLATION THAT WOULD PROVIDE CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF UNDERCOVER AGENTS:

"SOURCES HAVE QUESTIONED HOW THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CAN EXPECT ITS FRIENDS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION IN VIEW OF CONTINUING DISCLOSURES OF INFORMATION THAT MAY JEOPARDIZE THEIR CAREERS, LIBERTY AND VERY LIVES."

MORE 1802

47AM-INTELLIGENCE 2 WASHINGTON

MR CARLUCCI, A FORMER AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL, SAID CONTINUING DISCLOSURES HAD RESULTED IN REDUCED CONTACT AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

"WE ARE INCREASINGLY BEING ASKED TO EXPLAIN HOW WE CAN GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF INDIVIDUALS WHO COOPERATE WITH US WHEN WE CANNOT PROTECT OUR OWN OFFICERS FROM EXPOSURE," HE SAID.

LEGISLATION TO PROTECT UNDERCOVER CIA AGENTS WAS URGENTLY NEEDED AND VITAL TO THE FUTURE SUCCESS OF U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS; HE SAID.

MR CARLUCCI SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED TWO FORMER U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENTS WHO HAVE GONE PUBLIC WITH THEIR INSIDE KNOWLEDGE OF CIA OPERATIONS AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND THEM.

PHILIP AGEE AND JOHN MARKS, DESCRIBED BY MR CARLUCCI AS "FAITHLESS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES", HAVE PUBLISHED THE NAMES OF HUNDREDS OF UNDERCOVER AGENTS AROUND THE WORLD.

AGEE, WHO LIVES IN HAMBURG, WEST GERMANY, IS FIGHTING A SUED FOR THE RETURN OF HIS U.S. PASSPORT, WHICH WAS RECENTLY REVOKED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

REUTER 1804

30 January 1980

CIA agent exposure is threat to intelligence, official says

WASHINGTON (AP) — A top CIA official told Congress today that a new law is urgently needed to stop intelligence operatives from being "fair game" for dangerous exposure by fellow Americans.

Publicly identifying intelligence agents not only threatens their careers — and sometimes their lives — but reduces the likelihood that informants will continue to help U.S. intelligence efforts, said Frank Carlucci, deputy director of the CIA.

"We are increasingly being asked to explain how we can guarantee the safety of individuals who cooperate with us when we cannot protect our own officers from exposure," Carlucci told a House Intelligence subcommittee.

"Some immediately discernible results of continuing disclosures include reduction of contact and reduced passage of information" by major foreign intelligence services, he added.

Carlucci was testifying in favor of a bill, co-sponsored by all 14 members of the Intelligence Committee, to spell out criminal penalties for "blowing the cover" of a secret agent or his secret sources of information.

The committee hearing came amid growing congressional concern about U.S. intelligence in light of international events. And Carlucci said, "Recent world events have dramatically demonstrated the importance of maintaining a strong and effective intelligence apparatus."

A number of representatives and senators have been call-

ing for legislation to cut public access to intelligence activities and to lift various restraints Congress slapped on intelligence agencies in the mid-1970s.

Congress voted for the restraints after revelation of various abuses including assassination plots against foreigners and CIA infiltration of American anti-war groups during the 1960s.

Indicating bi-partisan support for changes, Senate Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd and acting Republican Leader Ted Stevens have both said in recent days that the pendulum has swung too far the other way since Congress imposed the restraints.

Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan — and feelings that the United States needs better intelligence information — have led several members of Congress to renew their work toward overall revamping of the CIA charter.

The bill to protect agents, a less sweeping step, would call for a prison sentence of up to 10 years and a fine of up to \$50,000 for anyone who uses access to classified information to reveal the identity of a secret agent or informant.

Private citizens with no formal access to classified information also could be fined or imprisoned if they revealed an agent or informant's name "with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States."

The penalty for such private citizens would be limited to one year in prison and a \$5,000 fine.

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100130001-5
28 January 1980

CIA needs a new set of teeth

The Congress will have earned its keep this session if it does nothing else but restore some teeth to the Central Intelligence Agency.

This is easier said than done, inasmuch as no two congressmen seem to agree on how much power to invest in the CIA, and how the CIA can exercise its powers without injuring the innocent. Most agree, however, that events in Iran and Afghanistan have lent a sudden urgency to the need to revitalize and restructure the nation's flabby intelligence apparatus.

The CIA's teeth were yanked

in 1974 by an instrument called the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. It required that the President approve in detail nearly all covert operations, and worse, that eight congressional committees be consulted in advance. The committees included Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs and Intelligence in both House and Senate, and the number of people involved exceeded 200.


A House member said that presenting plans for covert operations to so many people was the equivalent of "making a formal announcement in Lafayette Park."

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment also forced the CIA to answer questions about its intelligence files, and that included foreigners as well as United States citizens.

The CIA's Deputy Director, Frank C. Carlucci, has complained that "if the KGB were to write us (for information), we would be required to respond in 10 days."

That's teeth-pulling with a reckless vengeance. The CIA may have been guilty of abuses but the way to eliminate them is not to wreck the entire intelligence structure.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 31-32NEWSWEEK
28 January 1980

Knock on every door: A battle over how many congressmen must be briefed

UNSHACKLING THE CIA

Could some secret plan by the Central Intelligence Agency have blocked the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Could an All-American James Bond have saved the Shah's throne in Iran, or at least prevented the taking of U.S. hostages? Not very likely. But with the U.S. on the defensive in trouble spots around the world, the CIA is fast regaining favor in Washington. Agency supporters are demanding that the CIA be "unshackled" and permitted wider latitude for covert operations. The new get-tough mood comes just when Congress is considering a new charter for the CIA—and a major fight is brewing over how much oversight Congress should have on CIA plans for covert activity around the world.

At the heart of the debate is the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment, which requires the President to approve in detail most CIA plans for covert operations. It also provides that eight Senate and House committees—with a total of more than 200 members—be informed of such operations in advance or soon after they get under way. The amendment was passed after dramatic disclosures about CIA "destabilization" plots against Chile and secret political intervention. Critics of the amendment now say it poses too great a risk of dangerous security leaks and thus has a "chilling effect" on covert action—the gray area that goes beyond diplomacy but stops short of open warfare. Informing so many Congressional committees, says one senior White House aide, is tantamount to "making a formal announcement in Lafayette Park." As a result, says another Administration security expert, "you don't even contemplate it because you have to share them with lots of people whose motives you're

director Stansfield Turner claims that on at least one occasion, an allied intelligence service "withdrew a proposal for a joint action . . . beneficial to both nations" because of the Hughes-Ryan reporting requirements.

KNEE JERK: The White House wants to change the disclosure requirements of the law and make them part of the new CIA charter pending in Congress. The changes would limit CIA briefings to the House and Senate intelligence committees—which have only 27 members. The proposed new charter would also broaden the scope of covert operations that could be carried on without specific Presidential approval. "At one point, people wanted to write scores and scores of restraints," says one White House aide. "It was a knee-jerk reaction [to] all the abuses . . . a very important application of checks and balances. But now we need to put more balance into the checks."

Not everyone agrees. Among those most

operations to be able to ask the right question . . . There is no eagerness here to be cut out of the conduit." What's more, many congressmen are outraged at the idea that they are leak-prone—especially when a number of serious intelligence leaks in recent years may very well have come from sources in the executive branch.

PRESSURE: Yet in the supercharged mood created by Iran and Afghanistan, some easing of the requirement for Congressional briefings is probably inevitable. What worries Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Birch Bayh and others is that other needed reforms will be lost along the way. "There is pressure to push ahead rapidly and that might mean having to set aside some of the important provisions of a charter in the interests of giving the agency more latitude," said Kentucky Democrat Walter D. Huddleston, chairman of the intelligence subcommittee working on the new legislation. "But I would hate to have that happen because it would be awfully difficult to come back and win a full charter."

Aside from modifying rules on covert action, the proposed charter would put strict limits on intelligence operations targeted on U.S. citizens, and it would bar the CIA from hiring journalists, clergymen or academics as agents. On the other hand, one version of the charter would also limit the CIA's obligations under the Federal Freedom of Information Act; the CIA would have to respond only when U.S. citizens were seeking personal information about themselves. At present, the CIA must answer queries from foreigners as

Huddleston (left) and Bayh: Memories of past abuses



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 12

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
26 January 1980

Nick Thimmesch

Our handcuffed, hobbled CIA suddenly has friends again

WASHINGTON—The CIA, that necessary rogue, is appreciated again. The Republic's overseas troubles have swung the public and the decision-makers over to its side. Rational people know that the United States must have a Central Intelligence Agency—a title, by the way, far more popular in surveys than the pejorative initials CIA.

Only a few years ago, Congress was beating the whey out of the CIA. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act all but stopped the CIA from engaging in covert actions. Between 1975 and 1979, four major congressional committees went over every wart and pimple on the CIA, producing 7,093 pages of hearings and reports, and creating the notion that perhaps the agency's days were numbered.

The CIA crawled out of this wreckage, retreated to its Langley, Va., campus, and began offering the public all manner of free documents to reassure everybody that it was an open enterprise.

But it can't be. Since Iran, Congress has been demanding that the Central Intelligence Agency behave more like the old CIA and have spies in appropriate vital places so that our government will know what's going on. Birch Bayh, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, even goes around defending the CIA these days on matters like its Afghanistan intelligence.

A 73-19 majority of Americans, according to a recent ABC News-Harris Survey, now favors "overhauling and stepping up CIA intelligence activities around the world." A 57-34 majority wants the United States "working to overthrow the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran."

Several years back the survey gave the CIA a 49-32 negative rating. The agency was a favorite target for politicians and the press. Sinister motives were attributed to the CIA in movies, TV films, and skin magazines.

CIA recruiters had to knock before entering any college door; some universities are still opposed to such recruitment. But agency officials now report no serious difficulties on this one-time enemy soil. Applications by college graduates are up, and the applicants' educational levels are up to one-third better than a few years ago. In 1979 there were 104,000 inquiries about employment at the CIA, with 16,400 interviews conducted. There is a 21 per cent increase in recruitment of women.

Still, the agency has serious problems. Wholesale firings during the reform period caused loss of people needed now and diminished morale. Euphemisms like "special actions" replaced "covert actions." Indecision and a feeling of lack of purpose plagued the building. The idea got around that PHOTINT [acronym for photo-intelligence] would prevail over HUMINT [human intelligence].

The Freedom of Information Act has been invoked 25,000 times at the CIA by individual Americans, universities, Congress, and foreigners, the latter group no doubt including intelligence agents from hostile countries.

The Polish Embassy here even asked for sensitive information, as it is allowed to under the act. Last year, the CIA spent more than 116 man-years on requests for information. No request

galls the agency more than those from Phillip Agee, one-time agent and now an admitted enemy seeking to put the CIA out of business.

"Total application of public disclosure statutes to the CIA is seriously damaging our ability to do our job," Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director, told a select congressional committee last year.

Foreigners willing to serve as information sources are leery of doing anything for the CIA because of FOIA, Carlucci said.

"A foreign intelligence source from a Communist country broke off a productive association with us specifically because of fear of consequences of disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act."

Similarly, foreign intelligence officers of friendly nations are reluctant to cooperate. Patriotic Americans are also afraid to volunteer information. Carlucci told of a president of a U.S. firm, a former cabinet member, who said "any company was out of its mind to cooperate with the CIA as long as the provisions of FOIA apply to it."

Anyway, Iran and Afghanistan demonstrate that American interests are hardly served by the enfeebling of the CIA, the degradation of its work by the three TV networks, and the aberration of the top intelligence agency having to show its innards to anybody who comes along.

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100130001-5

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C2THE WASHINGTON POST
10 January 1980

The
Federal Diary
By Mike Causey

CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci will talk about government in the 1980s at the Jan. 18 luncheon sponsored by the Society for Public Administration. Its local chapter will meet at George Washington University's Marvin Center. Make reservations by calling Dona Wolf at 357-1100.

Lisbon Leader to Curb Feistiness

By Ronald Koven

Washington Post Foreign Service

LISBON—Francisco Sa Carneiro, the conservative victor in Portugal's national and local elections held two weeks apart this month, makes it clear that he is prepared to press on all the most explosive issues in Portuguese politics.

His confrontational approach as leader of the center-right opposition apparently appealed to an electorate that had grown tired of the revolutionary rhetoric surrounding most of the previous 11 cabinets in the five years since "the revolution of the carnations" overthrew the half-century of rightist dictatorship.

His approach led to the election of the first parliamentary majority that looks as if it will last.

Yet, Sa Carneiro insisted in an interview that attacking everything in sight—military-backed President Antonio Ramalho Eanes, the constitution, the Socialists, who prevented a Communist takeover, and the growingly influential Communists themselves—is a thing of the past. "The style is different," he said, "for a leader of the opposition and a leader of the majority, the prime minister."

In the political and military elite that led the country out of the dictatorship of Antonio Oliveira Salazar there is much genuine-seeming skepticism about Sa Carneiro's capacity for moderation, even though there is general recognition that it is in the future premier's own interest to be as statesmanlike as possible to lead his conservative coalition to reelection when parliament's term expires in less than a year.

"Good sense might prevail," said an intimate of President Eanes. "I hope so. Theoretically, everything can go well. In practice, we'll see. Sa Carneiro's statements so far have been responsible. Everything seems to be going well, maybe too well."

A member of the Revolutionary Council, the group of military men who still pass on the constitutionality of laws, said he had no doubts about Sa Carneiro's genuine intellectual commitment to democracy, but, he said, he is afraid of his "authoritarian personality."

The 45-year-old Sa Carneiro first made

his mark by refusing to play along with the tame role of the official parliamentary opposition under Salazar.

Sa Carneiro sponsored a series of measures with no chance of adoption, such as a bill abolishing press censorship and a demand for an investigation of police abuses. In 1973, the year before the revolution, he resigned his seat in parliament—a gesture still considered courageous.

It was only the first of several resignations that wound up paying off for Sa Carneiro. He has seemed to be in search of a leading role for a long time, first as a champion of the center-left, now of the center-right. He has always refused to be subordinate to anyone. Sharing the limelight does not seem to come naturally to him, even though he is now making obvious efforts for the sake of keeping his coalition together.

Twice, Sa Carneiro resigned as leader of his own party, the Social Democrats. Both times it was only a tactical retreat after which he eliminated his adversaries and came back stronger than before, turning weakness into strength.

It is a commonplace to hear his combativeness attributed to his need to compensate for his shortness. He is often referred to as "a rooster." Always immaculately tailored, he is variously estimated to be 5 feet 2 inches. His thick-heeled shoes make it hard to judge.

Sa Carneiro's sensitivity seems to have had more to do with his bad relations with the last U.S. ambassador, Deputy CIA Director Frank Carlucci, than substance.

The Portuguese leader described how he refused to attend a Lisbon dinner in honor of Vice President Mondale. He said he was miffed over first being asked by Carlucci's embassy to meet separately with the visiting American and then being told that the vice president had decided against any separate sessions with leaders of the opposition to the government of Mario Soares, then the Socialist premier being heavily backed by Washington as the best barrier to the Communists.

Sa Carneiro described his relations with the equally diminutive Carlucci as "quite cold." The relationship became entangled in Sa Carneiro's complicated personal life when his outspoken companion of many

years, Snu Bonnier Abecassis, berated the U.S. ambassador at a diplomatic dinner in the presence of other envoys for his alleged hostility to her man.

"Frank felt it was just about time for him to go when he left Portugal," said one of his colleagues. Part of the problem was apparently that Carlucci underestimated Sa Carneiro's ability to get to the top. Portugal's next premier recalls that the ambassador told him it was impossible to arrange requested meetings for him with top Carter administration figures when he visited Washington in 1977.

The United States is not the only naturally ally that Sa Carneiro has defied. The Roman Catholic Church backed him heavily in the elections, but not because it could have any particular illusions about his attachment to Catholic tradition.

Sa Carneiro's wife lives with their five children in his native town of Oporto, the northern Portuguese bastion of conservatism.

He spends his time in Lisbon with Abecassis, a 39-year-old blond divorcee and mother of three. A member through her Swedish mother of the great Stockholm publishing family of Bonnier, the Danish-born Abecassis is herself one of Lisbon's leading book publishers with her now perhaps inappropriately named company, the Don Quixote Press.

She was often present on the sidelines of the Sa Carneiro campaign trail, and the couple let themselves be photographed together on the way to vote on election days. There is much speculation about whether she will now become his official hostess.

By attacking President Eanes, elected with 61 percent of the vote as the official candidate of the armed forces, Sa Carneiro defied all the conventional wisdom of Portuguese politics and got away with it. Eanes seems to be boxed in by the future premier. A clash seems inevitable over Sa Carneiro's insistence on introducing the right to hold national referendums, which Eanes has already said would be unconstitutional. In that conflict, it is clear that Sa Carneiro would have the advantage of being able to accuse the president of wanting to restrict democracy.

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ON PAGE A-7

THE NEW YORK TIMES
17 December 1979

U. S., Wary of Islamic Upheaval, to Increase Broadcasts to Moslems

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 16 — In a response to what the White House perceives as the prospect of long-term ferment in the Moslem world, President Carter last week approved portions of a plan to expand United States radio broadcasts in Persian and in seven languages of Moslems in the Soviet Union, Administration officials say.

Administration sources said Friday that the plan was outlined and agreed upon Tuesday at a White House meeting of the Special Coordination Committee, which is headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser.

The plan envisions the spending of about \$1 million to expand Voice of America broadcasts in Persian, which now occupy two hours a day. In addition, the Administration is to explore the possibility of buying time on Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and Israeli transmitters for broadcasts into the Soviet Union in seven of the languages of that country's 50 million Moslems. Israel has reportedly indicated an interest in the idea, although some American officials said broadcasts from Israel to Moslems would be of doubtful value.

Extra \$2 Million for Radio Liberty

The group also approved the spending of about \$2 million to improve the effectiveness of Radio Liberty programs aimed at Soviet Moslems, the officials said.

Expansion of the broadcasting services to the Islamic world is in large part owing to the efforts of Paul B. Henze, the National Security Council specialist on United States propaganda, the officials said. Mr. Henze was formerly the Central Intelligence Agency's station chief in Turkey.

Attending the Tuesday meeting with Mr. Henze were David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; John E. Reinhardt, director of the International Communications Agency; John A. Gronouski, director of the Board for International Broadcasting; Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of the C.I.A.; and John P. White, deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Mr. Reinhardt, Mr. Gronouski and Mr. Henze acknowledged that the White House meeting had taken place, but declined to comment on it. Mr. Henze said he knew details of the session. But he heatedly accused a reporter of being "another example of the press wallowing in a crisis in an irresponsible way and undermining "national security." He asked to be quoted on that point.

One Proposal Reported Stalled

According to other officials, a fourth proposal from Mr. Henze, to build new transmitters so that more Soviet Moslems can be reached by the United States programs, was stalled at the White House meeting on the ground that there was no hospitable location for them and that they would take years to install. The Office of Management and Budget opposed the new transmitters, saying they should be authorized only if convenient sites and adequate staff were available.

This reservation is said to directly affect Radio Liberty, which was founded in the early 1950's by the C.I.A. and is now under the supervision of the Board for International Broadcasting, an independent agency subject to oversight from Congress, from which it draws its funds.

About 50 people at its headquarters in Munich are involved in broadcasting to Soviet Moslems. Most of them, described as elderly, were recruited at refugee camps in Germany after World War II. They broadcast three hours a day in Uzbek and Azeri, four hours in Tatar, two hours in Kazakh and one each in the Kirghiz, Turkmen and Tadjik languages. Few speak English.

Radio Liberty's signal to Soviet Central Asia, where most of the country's Moslems live, comes mainly from transmitters in Spain and West Germany. It is relatively weak and is jammed by the Soviet Union.

Many Years in Clandestine Radio

Nevertheless, the 55-year-old Mr. Henze, who spent many years in the C.I.A.'s clandestine radio services in Munich and Ethiopia, persists in his hopes of expanding American transmissions to the Islamic world, especially in the Soviet Union, the officials said.

Voice of America's problems in carrying the United States message to Moslems, particularly with regard to the Iran crisis, are simpler than those of Radio Liberty, according to Mr. Reinhardt. He said in an interview that the Voice of America had resumed broadcasting in Persian to Iran in the spring after a hiatus of more than 20 years.

In April, when the station's Persian-language transmissions began, the broadcasts lasted for a half hour. An additional

half hour was added on Nov. 20, two weeks after the American Embassy in Teheran was seized. The station now transmits for two hours a day in Persian.

Mr. Reinhardt said he would like to expand the Persian-language programs to "four, five, ten hours" a day to get the American message across to Iran. He said the station's output in Persian was exceeded by Radio Moscow and Radio Baghdad, and was matched by other Soviet transmitters. Competition also comes from China, West Germany, Britain, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Albania. He said the Voice of America was building 12 new transmitters that would extend the reach of the American signal from stations in the Philippines, Greece and England.

Not Inspired by Moscow

A typical Persian-language broadcast last week over the Voice of America included eight-and-a-half minutes of news on the hostage crisis, commentaries, and a report on an American conference dealing with terrorism.

It has been the view of most Administration specialists in Islamic affairs that recent outbursts of anti-American sentiment, culminating in attacks on American installations in Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Libya, have not been linked or coordinated by Moslems, and certainly not inspired by Moscow.

Mr. Henze, however, holds to the view that the entire Islamic world is undergoing a revival of spirit and identity that is destined to continue for years and should be addressed in American propaganda undertakings.

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PERSONAL

December 14, 1979

Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Frank:

I am pleased to forward to you two sets of the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin for Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of last week carrying your interview on the front page each day. Again, let me thank you for the interview. It has been very favorably received here.

If you have any plans to come to Chicago, please give me a call.

Sincerely yours,

Michael S. Shaw

MSS:mm
Encls.

STATINTL

cc: 

Dictated but not read

International Scene

CIA's Frank Carlucci: 'Don't talk of your successes'



This is the first part of a three-part interview with Frank Carlucci, who became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1978. After serving in the Navy and graduating from Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, he served with the Foreign Service in South Africa; Kinshasa, Congo; Zanzibar and Brazil. He also has been director of the Office of Economic Opportunity; deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget; undersecretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; and ambassador to Portugal.

By MICHAEL SHAW

Q. Mr. Carlucci, what are the challenges the United States will encounter in world affairs in the 1980s?

A. That's a rather broad question. Let me divide my answer into a number of categories. First there would be the national security challenges: our defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviets and a whole series of treaties that are under negotiation, like disarmament and mutual and balanced force reductions. What posture will the United States and the Soviet Union take in these negotiations? Certainly we will continue to face the problem of nuclear proliferation. The energy problem will remain with us and, indeed, it could become even more critical in the '80s. If consumption continues to go up as it has and production remains constant as predicted, additional measures will have to be taken on the energy front.

There is also the question of relationships with the Third World; the issue of equitable distribution of wealth between the have and have-not nations. Connected with this are the difficult issues posed by Soviet and Cuban expansion activity, particularly in Africa. There will also be questions of how the United States can strengthen her relationships with her

allies; how our relationship with the People's Republic of China will evolve; and what role the continuing problem of Vietnam and Cambodia may play in that relationship.

Q. What is the Central Intelligence Agency's role, as you view it, in meeting these challenges?

A. Fundamentally, our role is to provide the policymaker with the best possible information on which he can base policy decisions. This means efficient and good collection, high-quality analysis, and links with the policymaker that permit us to respond to his high-priority needs.

Q. What effect, if any, have recent revelations and books about the agency had on its ability to perform these functions, particularly with respect to its relations with foreign intelligence agencies and sources of information?

A. Obviously, no intelligence organization can function at peak efficiency in the constant glare of the public spotlight. But, we accept some of this as a fact of life. Books always cause a problem. Particularly damaging are the ones that reveal our sources and methods. Consequently, we have established a procedure

to try to deal with this problem. Employees sign a contract when they come to work for us authorizing us to review their manuscripts for sensitive intelligence information. We have had generally good results with this practice, with one or two notable exceptions. In the case of Frank Snepp, we took the issue to court and so far the position of the agency has been upheld. There is also a group in Washington, D.C., that publishes a bulletin entitled "Covert Action," whose purpose is to expose the names of CIA personnel and agents overseas. This is particularly harmful, and so we are consulting with the Congress and the attorney general on measures that might be taken to curtail it. It is very difficult in an intelligence organization to ever know how much information you might have received if these kinds of activities were not going on. People who co-operate with us express concern about these books, and the activities of people like Phillip Agee. We have reason to believe that this has impacted adversely on the flow of information to us. Nonetheless, we continue to be an effective organization.

Q. Recently, there have been articles in the press which have criticized the agency with respect to developments in Iran and other articles which suggest that the limitations that have been placed on the agency and criticism of the agency have hobbled its effectiveness. Would you care to comment of these statements?

A. It is hard to generalize on these matters. Generally, when people talk about intelligence failures, they tend to think in absolute terms. But, intelligence does not operate in absolute terms. It is always possible to have more information about a given situation. How much information is enough? In cases such as Iran, the press accounts prior to the departure of the shah were generally exaggerated. This is not to say that our predictions were perfect. But it is certainly inaccurate to say that the intelligence community did not forecast the difficulties in Iran. We have tried recently to sharpen our reporting and analysis on broad social movements.

One of the problems in the intelligence business is that you can never talk about your successes. Generally, a successful operation is only successful as long as it can be kept secret. If we talk about our successes, we com-

promise our sources and our methods. Usually, it is only the so-called failures that come to light. That's just one of the facts of life that we have to live with in the intelligence business. I assure you there have been successes and that they have been important successes.

As far as constraints are concerned, this is essentially a matter of establishing the proper checks and balances without impeding intelligence effectiveness. We think that Executive Order 12036, issued by President Carter at the outset of his administration, is an important step in this direction. We also think it is possible to develop charter legislation which will set out broad guidelines for intelligence activities which will reassure the Congress and the American people that intelligence organizations are under control, yet will not impede their effectiveness.

In connection with the charter legislation, there are some areas of concern to us. For example, we are required to report plans to carry out covert actions to seven committees of Congress. That obviously imposes constraints on the president's ability to carry on covert action activities. Mind you, we think we ought to report to Congress, but to a reasonable number of committees, not seven. The Freedom of Information Act has caused us a number of problems. We find that the practice of using the disclosure process in trials to push for the revelation of more classified material than the Intelligence Community can comfortably accept, and thereby stymie the prosecution—a practice referred to as "gray mail"—has impeded our efforts to deal with serious security breaches. We also think that the antiquated 1917 Espionage Act is not a good instrument for solving the kinds of problems such as the "Covert Action" bulletin problem that I described earlier.

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Next: Covert operations.

(As Received)

CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN
10 December 1979

CIA's Frank Carlucci: 'Covert action is a policy tool'



This is the second part of a three-part interview with Frank Carlucci, who became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1978.

By MICHAEL SHAW

Q. If you had a free hand to write not only the charter by the operations book for the agency in the 1980s, how would you structure things and what would you do?

A. Well, I think the first concept that has to be understood, and understood fully, is that confidentiality is the heart of an intelligence operation. There are certain things that we can make available to the public. We try to do that by declassifying up to 150 finished intelligence products per year on a wide variety of subjects. But we have to restore an environment where we can distinguish between that information which can be made public and information which must be kept confidential in the interest of the nation. It is very difficult to establish a set of written proscriptions in statute. Some proscriptions on intelligence activities already exist. But if you try to make a comprehensive list, you inevitably imply that something nobody thought to put on the list is therefore authorized.

I think that you need to establish a surrogate process through congressional oversight and something like the present Intelligence Oversight Board, which would see that intelligence activities are within the acceptable limits of U.S. public opinion. These oversight mechanisms exist in one form or another today and are still evolving. All and all, I think we are moving in a healthy direction and, aside from correcting some of the problems I mentioned earlier, I do not think I would try to reverse course in any way at this point.

Q. What would you do to sharpen the intelligence community's ability to discern and prioritize signals from different parts of the world?

A. We have given a lot of thought to this problem and have taken certain steps to deal with it. The most important was to establish a focal point in the intelligence community for "warning." We have put one of our most senior and able officers in charge of that function. He in turn reports to an intelligence committee which I chair. This has worked very well and I think will continue to serve us in excellent fashion.

Q. Covert operations, particularly during the Vietnam/Watergate period, took on some negative connotations that may not necessarily fit in their historical perspective. Can you give our readership a view of covert operations within its long-term historical perspective that can enlighten us on what a nation must do or be able to do in the world in order to meet the challenges that we face today?

A. First of all, both the president and the Congress have recognized that covert action is a legitimate foreign policy tool. That is exactly what it should be, a foreign policy tool, and not an independent capability. Covert action is attempting to influence events in other parts of the world without the source of that influence becoming known. Most people do not have any problem with trying to influence events in other parts of the world. Indeed, that is what much of our foreign policy is about. Most people also recognize that most things that an intelligence organization does have to be done clandestinely.

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Somehow, it is just when you put the two together that people have problems with it. Yet one can conceive of many circumstances where a friendly, democratic government needs help. It cannot accept that help overtly without incurring political difficulties. Let us say, for example, that they have to deal with a terrorist problem and ask the United States for that help. If the statesmen are politically vulnerable, they may well ask that that help be given clandestinely.

I find that when most people take issue with covert action they are really quarreling with the policy and not the instrument. Just because I disagree with giving economic aid to country X, that does not mean that I believe economic aid should not continue to be a foreign policy tool. Covert action has become associated with one or two highly controversial foreign policies.

Once again, the successes cannot be mentioned because the credit for those successes must go to the foreign government, not to us. The important point is to ensure that a mechanism for policy control is set up and that we not do away with the policy instrument itself. Such a control mechanism has now been established, although, as I mentioned earlier, it would be appropriate to cut down on the number of congressional committees which have to be informed when a covert action operation is undertaken.

Q. Following the definition of a successful covert action as being in fact covert, I would assume that one reason we do not read too much in the press about the activity of KGB or covert operations of terrorist groups or of perhaps Cuba and other countries, is that by that definition, if they are not discovered, they have been successful. Can you outline, for example, in the Mideast, what are the operative forces beneath the surface there? To what extent is there the unreported and unseen challenge of the opposition, if one wants to put it that way?

A. Well, I cannot go into any detail without revealing sources of information. Incidentally, most people do not appreciate how easy it is for another country's counterintelligence operation to trace a seemingly harmless factual statement about a situation back to a particular agent or a particular method. So, we can't be too careful.

One thing that is important to recognize is

that, in most cases where our adversaries have been successful, they have been willing to undertake either covert actions or overt military actions. We now see a substantial Cuban military presence in Africa, for example. There are various parts of the world where you see a substantial Soviet presence. They do not really operate under the same set of constraints that we, as a society, do. In most cases you find them exploiting existing unrest.

That is why it is so important for our country to work to resolve problems which create unrest and conflicts between and within nations. It is also why it is important for our country to help countries friendly to us to resolve their underlying economic and social problems. Certainly the KGB is at work and they put substantial resources into their operations. But, our country, despite the constraints our intelligence organizations face, has superior intelligence service.


Q. At the risk of doing some crystal-ball gazing, do you believe that the world energy crisis can be dealt with in the next few years?

A. I think it can be dealt with but not without the exercise of a great deal of willpower by Americans and by the people of other countries in the free world. The problem is essentially one of restraining increasing consumption while stimulating sources of production. Unfortunately the rate of consumption has so far outstripped the rate of increase of sources of production that over the next few years only consumption restraint will solve the problem. But, given the will, I think we can solve it.

Next: Oil and the Middle East.
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CIA's Carlucci: The agency's morale is 'high'

This is the last part of a three-part interview with Frank Carlucci, who became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1978.



By MICHAEL SHAW

Q. In light of what has happened in Iran, do you believe the other Mideast oil-producing countries represent an ongoing, stable supply of oil?

A. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on individual countries, but the line between production and demand is now so thin that any disruption such as has occurred in Iran is bound to have an immediate impact on consumers. Obviously, there are sources of instability in the oil-producing areas of the world, and these are things that we have to monitor very closely.

Q. Has the Central Intelligence Agency provided the president with a worse-case scenario in the event that there are further disruptions of the oil supply from the Mid East?

A. We supply the president with a continuing analysis including both optimistic and worse-case assumptions.

Q. How pessimistic is your worse-case assumption?

A. It is the kind of assumption that would entail some hardship on the part of Americans.

Q. One book written about the beginning of World War II suggested that Japan's timing of its attack on Pearl Harbor was related to an approximately 90-day-or-so supply of oil. Does history repeat itself?

A. I don't know about history repeating itself, but we can certainly learn lessons from history and one of the great lessons of Pearl Harbor was that our nation needs effective intelligence. It was precisely as a result of Pearl Harbor that the predecessor agency of the CIA, the Office of Strategic Services — the OSS — was created.

Q. Many assertions have appeared in the press to the effect that the American people have lost the will to assert themselves in world affairs. In analyzing world developments, and in sketching scenarios for different questions that present themselves, is the willingness of the American people to react to particular situations plugged into the equation?

A. We deal with foreign intelligence only, and do not analyze domestic reaction to foreign events. Our job is simply to tell the policymaker what those foreign events are and what the likely intentions of foreign leaders might be. It is then up to the policymaker to assess the domestic ramifications of their decisions.

Q. Is it fair to say that the Central Intelligence Agency will gather the facts, analyze them, sketch the scenarios, and pose the alternatives, but it is the ultimate responsibility of the president to decide what the country shall do and he is the one who must make that decision in light of American public opinion?

A. That is a fair assessment.

Q. There has been considerable discussion that the morale of personnel in the Central Intelligence Agency has fallen off in recent years.

Would you attribute that development to the environment and attitudes within the United States toward the intelligence business generally, or would you say that there have been some organizational problems within the agency that are being met at the current time?

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A. Morale is a nebulous thing. Obviously there are a number of factors that impact on morale. The barrage of criticism to which the agency has been subjected has had its impact on our employees. This is particularly true because of the facts have been distorted or inaccurate and, given the nature of our business, we are unable to put them in perspective. Like any organization, we have our internal problems. We like to think that we are dealing with them effectively.

From my own experience, in a number of government agencies, I would characterize the morale of the CIA as high. Certainly we have some of the most competent and dedicated people in government working in the CIA. Many of them work extremely long hours and cannot even tell their families what they are doing. Perhaps a measure of the state of our health is the fact that we have no trouble recruiting people. In fact, the number of applications for employment with the agency has been going up and the quality of people that are coming into the agency today is as good as, if not better than, it ever has been.

Q. Which is more important, the quality of the people that you bring into the Central Intelligence Agency, or the development of the new technologies that are making the spy business very different than it used to be?

A. Both are important. Without quality people, you do not develop quality technology. If the question is what is more important, technical collection or human collection, the answer once again is that both are important. The technical systems can accomplish a great deal but they have their limitations. They can only tell you what is happening right now or what happened yesterday. It really takes human intelligence to know what people's intentions are.

Q. You are privy to probably the most stark view of the world of just about anybody. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future

of the United States?

A. Basically, I am an optimist. I think our country has the resources, both human and natural, and the will to deal with the problems it faces.

Q. Do you place your guarded optimism within a certain time frame in which we must do certain things?

A. Certainly. And some of those things have already been discussed in this interview. We need to deal with the question of our defense capability, vis-a-vis the growing defense capability of the Soviets. We need to deal with problems such as nuclear proliferation and we need to deal with the problems of energy and the Third World.

Q. Is time running out on any of these issues?

A. In foreign affairs, time does not usually run out. The problems become more difficult to deal with if you do not face up to them. In most of the areas I have mentioned, I believe our country is moving to face up to the problems,

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International SceneCIA's Frank Carlucci: 'Don't talk
of your successes'

This is the first part of a three-part interview with Frank Carlucci, who became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1978. After serving in the Navy and graduating from Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, he served with the Foreign Service in South Africa; Kinshasa, Congo; Zanzibar and Brazil. He also has been director of the Office of Economic Opportunity; deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget; undersecretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; and ambassador to Portugal.

By MICHAEL SHAW.

Q. Mr. Carlucci, what are the challenges the United States will encounter in world affairs in the 1980s?

A. That's a rather broad question. Let me divide my answer into a number of categories. First there would be the national security challenges: our defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviets and a whole series of treaties that are under negotiation, like disarmament and mutual and balanced force reductions. What posture will the United States and the Soviet Union take in these negotiations? Certainly we will continue to face the problem of nuclear proliferation. The energy problem will remain with us and, indeed, it could become even more critical in the '80s. If consumption continues to go up as it has and production remains constant as predicted, additional measures will have to be taken on the energy front.

There is also the question of relationships with the Third World; the issue of equitable distribution of wealth between the have and have-not-nations. Connected with this are the difficult issues posed by Soviet and Cuban expansion activity, particularly in Africa. There are also questions of how the United States can strengthen her relationships with her

allies; how our relationship with the People's Republic of China will evolve; and what role the continuing problem of Vietnam and Cambodia may play in that relationship.

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means efficient and good collection, high-quality analysis, and links with the policymaker that permit us to respond to his high-priority needs.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24-35

THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
9 December 1979

How Spy on Russia

We look down from space, listen underwater, track with radar and infrared, and put agents in the field to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT

BY NICHOLAS DANILOFF

The view from CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., is superficially serene. The director's private elevator whisks the visitor to the top floor, where a corridor runs along the north face to his quarters. The passageway is warmly carpeted; the tan walls are hung with abstract paintings in elegant gold-leafed frames. By the elevator door hangs a display of medals the CIA awards its officers for especially meritorious or valorous service.

To the left is the airy office of deputy director Frank Carlucci, who made a name for himself as U.S. ambassador in revolutionary Portugal. To the right is the office of the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Retired Admiral

1979
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100130001-5

Stanley Turner, who occasionally invites journalists to "background"

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The Sinister Doings of the CIA

"Dossier" *Carlucci/CIA*. Lisbon, Editorial "Avante!" Publishers, 1978. 167pp.

These documents and comments on US imperialist interference in Portugal's internal affairs, notably after the April 25, 1974 revolution, give an insight into the activities of the CIA and US officials in that country from 1973 to December 1977.

The opening chapters recount the practices of CIA agents in Portugal prior to the revolution and the initial response of the US State Department and Congress to the revolution. The Pike report, produced by the special commission set up by Congress, witheringly criticised CIA activities in Portugal, charging that its agents were in hibernation.

Indeed, the CIA was certain that the fascist regime was strongly entrenched in Portugal. William Colby, CIA Director at that time, considered posting to Portugal a "prize" for his agents. Nevertheless, members of Congress were apparently hasty in imputing all the "blame" to the CIA, which was caught by surprise at the scale of the events of April 25, 1974 and their subsequent development. The example of Portugal and other countries, Iran, for instance, shows that where objective conditions were ripe and the people united, organised and ready to battle, the CIA will never succeed in preventing the success of a revolution however hard it tries. Thanks to the strength of the mass movement and the patriotism of the heroic military and those who participated in the April 25 events, thanks to the alliance that took shape immediately after these events between the Armed Forces Movement and masses, the revolution followed a road the CIA could not have foreseen: Portuguese democracy gradually took an anti-monopoly and anti-landowner orientation.

It was not easy for spokesmen of the US administration to understand what was happening. This is what led to Stuart N. Scott's recall as Ambassador to Portugal and his replacement by Frank C. Carlucci—a trusted and tough man in contrast to Scott who, in Kissinger's opinion, underestimated the "communist danger" in Portugal (p40).

The new US Ambassador, Frank Carlucci, arrived in Lisbon January 17, 1975. But some facts of his biography, especially his "services" were well known long before he came to Portugal. The Lisbon weekly *Sempre Fixe* wrote that he had been expelled from Zanzibar after that country's security forces learned that this "diplomat" had telephoned for more weapons. Subsequently, Carlucci explained in English the word "ammunition" was innocuous and all he meant was "ammunition for arguments". At Lisbon's Portela Airport the new US Ambassador was more categorical saying there were no grounds for the "rumours" of CIA infiltration in Portugal (p44). Three years later, however, this man would be appointed Deputy Director of the CIA.

In Lisbon Carlucci lost no time: He presented his credentials to President Costa Gomes just a week after his arrival and met with Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves February 8. On February 21 he went to Oporto. Everywhere his schedule was heavy. He paid his respects to the Commander of the Northern Military District, met with the civilian governor, the Bishop of Oporto, and the chairman of the Municipal Council. Besides, pages 48 and 49 give the names of the ambassador's aides who likewise were up to their neck in the embassy's day-to-day "routine".

Aided by imperialism and European Social-Democratic parties, the local

CONTINUED

reactionaries started a savage assault in February 1975 to destroy the revolution. That was when NATO began war games on the Portuguese coast. On February 4, 1975, the Portuguese Communist Party issued a statement, declaring: "In the present political situation the NATO exercises in Portugal are totally inopportune . . . Objectively they may be regarded as an attempt to influence the political situation in Portugal".

Replying to this statement in an interview for the weekly *Expresso* on February 15, Carlucci made a thinly veiled threat. "Most important," he said, "is for a NATO member to fulfil its responsibilities. There will be no problems as long as Portugal is true to its commitments".

On February 20 the Portuguese Communist Party again noted that the situation was dangerous and that anti-communism had been visibly intensified. On March 3 the Lisbon evening newspaper *A Capital* carried an article headed "CIA Plans Coup in Portugal Before the End of March".

Carlucci called these reports "fantastic and blatant lies". But on March 11 Spinola led a counter-revolutionary rising which was crushed by the Armed Forces Movement aided by the people.

It is interesting to trace the link between ensuing events and Carlucci's comings and goings. On June 29, 1975, 89 PIDE¹ agents "escaped", while the day before, June 28, Carlucci suddenly fell ill and left for Madrid where he entered the military hospital run by the US base at Torrejon de Ardoz. On July 10 he returned to Lisbon. But during his stay in Spain, he met with Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA. Throughout this period acts of terrorism were committed in Portugal; there were 105 assassination attempts, 34 bombings, 20 cases of arson, three armed attacks, and five cases of manhandling. The Portuguese CP alone was attacked 77 times.

Suppression of Spinola's counter-revolutionary rising and the defeat of the rightist forces on March 11 compelled Henry Kissinger to urge a strong and reliable rightist, or, if necessary, a pro-fascist regime as an alternative to the success of the Left forces. In giving these facts the book refers the reader to a curious article printed in *Harper's Magazine* in 1977, saying that Kissinger was disappointed in "his man" sent to replace the unpugnacious Scott (p68). "The point apparently is that Frank Carlucci was a more flexible and resourceful spokesman of imperialist interest than his own bosses . . . There were two things the ambassador learned quickly: the first was that any efforts to reinstall the most reactionary rightist forces would inevitably unite Portugal's democratic forces, and, second, that broader opportunities could emerge for action in a more favourable situation if the 'moderates' were used and the stake was made on politicians advocating a 'European choice', and, if an alliance were formed with Europe's Social-Democrats . . . This would help erect a barrier to socialism and freedom in Portugal" (p68).

Carlucci won this round, as is evident from a speech by Kissinger in Alabama in August 1975, which *The New York Times* called a victory for his envoy.

The book deals extensively with the attention Carlucci and his aides gave to the events in Angola while the United States and its imperialist and racist allies were straining to prevent Angola's independence and the victory of the MPLA. That was exactly when former CIA agent Philip Agee supplied the British paper *Workers Press* with the names of 16 CIA agents operating in Lisbon. The book also details the changes in CIA agents in Portugal, Carlucci's actions in relation to the Azores and Lages where the Social-Democratic Party and Social-Democratic Centre were in the majority and where the Left parties, particularly the Communist Party, were persecuted and not permitted to function over the greater part of this territory.

In February 1977 Carlucci went to Washington, where he urged granting

CONTINUED

loans to Portugal and testified before the House sub-commissions on Europe and the Middle East and the Commission on Foreign Affairs. The debate was over the allocation of 30 million dollars for a NATO brigade stationed in Portugal. Transcripts of this debate, which lasted until March 1, 1977 (pp99-116) show clearly the extent of US interference in the affairs of Portugal, which imperialism looks upon as its own private domain.

Relative to the planned reorganisation of the armed forces, which two years earlier Carlucci had called a gang, he called the NATO brigade "the beacon illuminating their further development . . . giving them moral strength and sustaining their professional spirit" (p116).

The closing chapters deal with US handouts and the Socialist Party's credits policy which made Portugal more dependent than ever on the capitalist powers. Some sidelights on Carlucci's active "social life" reveal circumstances of no little importance. For instance his tennis partners included leaders of the Socialist Party Maldonado Gonelha, Jaime Gama, and Manuel Alegre, President of the Social-Democratic Centre Diogo Pinto Freitas do Amaral, and SDC Vice President Adelino Amaro da Costa, and SDC Secretary-General Basilio Horta, Chairman of the SDP Sa Carneiro and one of its leaders Pedro Roseta.


In the meantime James E. Carter replaced Gerald R. Ford in the White House. Learning that Carlucci stood high in Mario Soares' favour Carter left him in Lisbon until December 23, 1977, when finally the sensational news was released that Carlucci had been named Deputy Director of the CIA. That's the way it is, esteemed reader. On December 22, 1977 the newspaper *O Diario* wrote editorially: "This was an appropriate appointment by Carter; he officially formalised the position of a CIA veteran. Frank Carlucci, the insider, is now where he belongs. However, it will be some time before our people learn of the price the nation had to pay for what the present Deputy Director of the CIA was engaged in in Portugal".

And the weekly *Opcao* will ask: "What can we say about a country that sends future heads of its secret services to countries experiencing critical situations?" The answer to this question is self-evident and the question itself remains topical today, because in many parts of the world imperialism's "insiders" of the Carlucci type are implementing a policy of unparalleled diktat and interference in the affairs of sovereign states.

Domingos Lopes

¹Salazar's secret police. After the April revolution its most brutal agents were tried and convicted.

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NEDELYA ARTICLE VIEWS CARLUCCI'S LINKS WITH PORTUGUESE ELECTIONS

LD301156 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1146 GNT 30 NOV 79 LD

(TEXT) MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 30, TASS--THE NDELYA WEEKLY VOICES DOUBTS THAT THE EXPOSURES IN THE PRESS OF THE TIES OF MENZIES ALVES, A CONTENDER TO THE PRESIDENCY IN THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC, WITH THE FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR IN THAT COUNTRY, NOW DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI "WILL PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN SINCE CARLUCCI'S CLANDESTINE INTRIGUES HAVE EVOKED THE NATURAL AND LAWFUL INDIGNATION OF THE PORTUGUESE PUBLIC".

NEDELYA PUBLISHES AN ARTICLE BY VALDIMIR GONCHAROV CONTAINING SOME INFORMATION ABOUT FRANK CARLUCCI'S CAREER, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES IN THE POST OF AMBASSADOR IN PORTUGAL, WHERE HE WAS EXPOSED BY THE PORTUGUESE PRESS AS A CIA AGENT. WITH REFERENCE TO THE WESTERN PRESS THE AUTHOR WRITES: "FRANK CARLUCCI WAS INVOLVED IN PREPARATIONS TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA IN THE CONGO. IN THE RIGHT-WING COUP IN BRAZIL AND IN THE PLOT OF THE 'BLACK COLONELS' IN GREECE".

"THE INTENSIVE 'DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY' OF FRANK CARLUCCI IN LISBON", VLADIMIR GONCHAROV CONTINUES, "TOOK THE FOLLOWING FORM: WHILE SHOWERING COMPLIMENTS AND SMILES ON PORTUGAL'S LAWFUL GOVERNMENT HE SIMULTANEOUSLY SUPPORTED THE PLOT BY THE NOTORIOUSLY KNOWN REACTIONARY GENERAL SPINOLA, THAT DEVELOPED INTO THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT MUTINY OF MARCH 11, 1975..."

AND NOBODY WAS SURPRISED WHEN THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED CARLUCCI'S APPOINTMENT TO THE POST OF DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT, WROTE THE LISBON DIARIO, WAS A LOGICAL RESULT OF THE CAREER OF A MAN WHOSE SOLE BUSINESS WAS TO ENGINEER STATE COUPS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES...

"CARLUCCI'S SECRET ACTIVITIES IN PORTUGAL WERE EXPOSED BY THAT COUNTRY'S PRESS ALREADY AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF HIS 'DIPLOMATIC SERVICE' IN LISBON", THE AUTHOR OF THE ARTICLE IN NEDELYA WRITES FURTHER. "FACTS SHOW THAT THE DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR IS INTERESTED IN PORTUGAL TO THIS DAY". "CARLUCCI'S RECENT SECRET INTRIGUES HAVE ALSO BECOME KNOWN TO THE PRESS AND PUBLIC. HERE IS A TYPICAL EXAMPLE. THROUGHOUT 1979 NEWSPAPERS IN PORTUGAL AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CARRIED A NUMBER OF MATERIALS IN CONNECTION WITH A TRULY SCANDALOUS MATTER--CARLUCCI'S ATTEMPTS TO RECRUIT MENEZIS ALVES WHO INTENDS TO RUN...FOR THE PRESIDENCY OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC."

ACCORDING TO THE PORTUGUESE PRESS MENEZIS ALVES, A 34-YEAR-OLD LAWYER, THE FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE "PORTUGAL-USA FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION", MAINTAINS VIGOROUS TIES WITH A NUMBER OF RIGHT-WINGERS AMONG THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY. ACCORDING TO THE SAME REPORTS HE HAS A SUBSTANTIAL PERSONAL CAPITAL AND AT THE SAME TIME INTENDS TO GET HELP FROM PORTUGUESE EMIGRES IN THE UNITED STATES AND VENEZUELA TO FINANCE HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN. AS NOTED BY THE WEST GERMAN DIE WELT, "THE FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR IN PORTUGAL FRANK CARLUCCI HAS ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH MENEZIS ALVES".

"BUT SUCH EXPOSURES IN THE PRESS ARE UNLIKELY TO PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF MENEZIS ALVES", VLADIMIR GONCHAROV WRITERS IN CONCLUSION.

-0-

USSR: NEDELYA VIEWS CAREER OF CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI

LD301605 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1424 GMT 30 NOV 79 LD

(TEXT) MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 30, TASS--THE "NEDELYA" WEEKLY WRITES THAT THE CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI "IS BETTER IN PURSUING HIS CAREER IN THE WASHINGTON CORRIDORS OF POWER THAN IN PREVENTING EXPOSURES OF THE SHADY DEALINGS OF THE AMERICAN ESPIONAGE SERVICE."

"NEDELYA" HAS AN ARTICLE BY VLADIMIR GONCHAROV CONTAINING SOME INFORMATION ABOUT FRANK CARLUCCI'S CAREER; IN PARTICULAR, ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES IN THE POST OF AMBASSADOR IN PORTUGAL WHERE HE WAS EXPOSED BY THE LOCAL PRESS AS A CIA AGENT.

THE AUTHOR BELIEVES THAT CARLUCCI HAS FAILED AGAIN, THIS TIME BY ATTEMPTING TO SUPPORT MENEZIS ALVES, A CONTENDER TO THE POST PRESIDENT IN PORTUGAL, "BECAUSE HIS CLANDESTINE INTRIGUES HAVE CAUSED THE PORTUGUESE PUBLIC'S NATURAL AND LAWFUL INDIGNATION."

TOUCHING ON FRANK CARLUCCI'S CAREER IN THE POST OF CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THE AUTHOR QUOTES THE CIA HEAD TURNER AS SAYING THAT HE HAD PLACED AT THE HEAD OF THE "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY" "EXPERIENCED AND TESTED PEOPLE". GONCHAROV WRITES FURTHER: "BUT THE QUESTION OF WHO PLACED WHOM IN A LEADING JOB AT THE CIA HEADQUARTERS IN LANGLEY IS BY FAR NOT CLEAR. ACCORDING TO REPORTS IN SOME WESTERN NEWSPAPERS CARLUCCI WAS APPOINTED TO HIS POST CONTRARY TO THE ADMIRAL'S WILL AND ON PROMPTING BY BRZEZINSKI WHO, AS THE CYPRUS NEWSPAPER "NEA" WRITES, "HAD SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING PRESIDENT CARTER THAT THE TANDEM OF THE IDEALIST TURNER AND THE PROFESSIONAL CARLUCCI WOULD BE THE BEST VARIANT FOR THE CIA AND THE WHITE HOUSE."

"VIEW ABOUT THE NEED TO 'REORGANISE' THE CIA ARE NOW QUITE FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED IN THE AMERICAN PRESS. IT IS NOT RULED OUT THAT AS A RESULT OF SUCH A REORGANISATION TURNER MIGHT LOSE HIS POST".

"VIEWS ABOUT THE NEED TO "REORGANISE" THE CIA ARE NOW QUITE FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED IN THE AMERICAN PRESS. IT IS NOT RULED OUT THAT AS A RESULT OF SUCH A REORGANISATION TURNER MIGHT LOSE HIS POST".

"TURNER IS HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR A WHOLE NUMBER OF SETBACKS OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. IT IS CHARGED, FOR INSTANCE, THAT DESPITE THE BIG POSSIBILITIES THAT IT HAD IN IRAN, IN PARTICULAR DESPITE IS CLOSE TIES WITH SAVAK, THE SHAH'S SECRET POLICE, THE CIA HAD FAILED TO GIVE WASHINGTON TIMELY AND COMPETENT INFORMATION ABOUT THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THAT COUNTRY (IT IS NOTED IN SOME ARTICLES THAT THE CIA DIRECTOR HAD FORCED HIS SUBORDINATES TO REWRITE SEVERAL TIMES AT A TIME INTELLIGENCE EVALUATIONS CONCERNING IRAN AS A RESULT OF WHICH THESE EVALUATIONS WERE DRAWN UP TO PLEASE THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND DID NOT REFLECT THE OBJECTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS.)"

THE AUTHOR OF THE ARTICLE IN "NEDELYA" WRITES FURTHER:
"CARLUCCI IS FORMING A NEW TEAM AND DISCARDING VETERANS AS SPENT MATERIAL--THIS IS HOW CARLUCCI'S ACTIONS ARE COMMENTED ON BY A FORMER CIA EMPLOYEE, 'HE WANTS TO BECOME A SECOND DULLES AND DECIDE ALL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS HIMSELF EVEN WITHOUT ALWAYS CONSULTING WITH THE PRESIDENT'".

"IN THE OPINION OF MANY PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON CARLUCCI IS OBVIOUSLY CHALKING UP POINTS IN HIS RIVALRY WITH THE ADMIRAL FOR THE TOP POST IN THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. ALTHOUGH CARLUCCI IS SERVING THE ADMINISTRATION FOR DEMOCRATS IT IS BELIEVED THAT HIS VIEWS HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN THE POLITICAL STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES THAT CONTAINS THE DEMAND FOR REVISING THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE SO AS TO PUT AN END TO "CHAOS AND CONFUSION".


"MANY SAY THAT CARLUCCI'S STAR IS APPROACHING THE ZENITH, THAT CONSERVATIVE FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDER HIM AN ACE OF ESPIONAGE AND COUNT ON HIM".

POINTING OUT CARLUCCI'S FAILURE IN SUPPORTING MENEZIS ALVES, VLADIMIR GONCHAROV SUMS UP: "IT APPEARS MUCH MORE EASIER TO CHALK UP POINTS IN MAKING A CAREER IN WASHINGTON'S COORIDORS OF POWER THAN TO PREVENT AN EXPOSURE OF THE SHADY DEALINGS OF THE AMERICAN ESPIONAGE SERVICE."

30 NOV 1750Z CLB/CAJ

THE CORNELL DAILY SUN
 CORNELL UNIVERSITY
 19 November 1979

Official Urges Faith in CIA



INTELLIGENCE HEADQUARTERS: The Central Intelligence Agency headquarters lies obscured in the woods of Langley, Va.

By MARCIE PENN

Special to The Cornell Daily Sun

Washington, D.C. — Flanked by an American flag and a banner bearing the C.I.A. emblem, the agency's Deputy Director Frank C. Carlucci urged a gathering of Cornell and Princeton alumni last week to have more faith in the intelligence community.

"Only our failures come to light," although "there have been a number of... substantial... successes," Carlucci told 480 members of the Cornell and Princeton Clubs of Washington, D.C.

The intelligence chief said he was not at liberty to discuss the successes, because he would have to betray his C.I.A. sources, thus preventing future successes.

He was reluctant to say anything about the current crisis in Iran, a situation the C.I.A. has drawn a lot of heat for.

"'Intelligence failure' is too categorical a term" to describe past U.S. actions there, he said.

"As a result of the Iranian experience, we've taken a fresh look at social movements in the Third World as opposed to narrow reporting of political movements."

The Princeton alumnus had taken a break from the Iranian crisis to address Cornell and Princeton alumni on "The State of American Intelligence Today." During his talk he focused on the nature of and need for covert action in any successful intelligence program.

Carlucci explained how the C.I.A. is dependent on accurate information complimented by "superior analysis."

"People think of us as a spy factory. It's more like a university." The C.I.A. does "pure analytical work" using information which originates largely from open sources and, in part, from secret ones, he explained.

Human Collection

Carlucci said technology, while "impressive," has "distinct limitations" in information collection.

"Human collection will continue to be fundamental," he said.

This aspect of intelligence gathering is especially problematic for the C.I.A., he said, in part because of the "unique" circumstances involved in the clandestine relationship at the "heart of intelligence collection."

Because the C.I.A. must seek out individuals who would otherwise not be in contact with the agency, its sources are often motivated by ideological rather than material reasons.

Pay frequently takes the form of an insurance policy to protect the person or his family in case he must leave his country, said Carlucci.

Although a C.I.A. contact "frequently... will violate laws of his [own] country," Carlucci said, "on no occasion" does he violate United States law.

Can't Keep a Secret

The C.I.A. is faced with the problem that the United States government is developing a reputation as "a government that can't keep a secret," Carlucci said.

A contact who believes his information will reach the press and be traced back to him is not likely to offer that information, he explained.

Yet, "we live in a climate where we glorify the whistle-blower, the investigative reporter... National security... [has] become a discredited term," he said.

In response to a question on the role of the media, Carlucci said he is not in favor of "abridging freedom of the press," but would argue with those who give out information "for their own purposes."

Media representatives are much less likely today than they were years ago to check with the C.I.A. on the sensitivity of a particular piece of information, he said.

Carlucci described "distribution" as a contributing factor in the

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ON PAGE B2

THE WASHINGTON POST
18 November 1979

The
Federal Diary
By Mike Causey

Central Intelligence Agency: Although the CIA is exempt from most civil service rules and procedures it has adopted — and adapted — the concept of the Senior Executive Service. CIA's version is called the SIS, for Senior Intelligence Service. Like its civil service counterpart, the SIS includes top-paid career employees in the \$47,889 to \$50,112.50 pay range. Outstanding SIS members will be eligible for special ranks which carry extra pay, and bonuses worth up to 20 percent of salary. CIA's deputy director Frank Carlucci, a veteran of the State Department, HEW and Office of Management and Budget is largely responsible for setting up the SIS.

EXCERPT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-3

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
14 NOVEMBER 1979

The events in Iran dominate the Washington scene

Betty Beale

Even with Ted Kennedy announcing and all those stories about Chappaquiddick, and even with Ronald Reagan announcing, too, the sole story consuming Washington at every social event is what to do about the hostages in Iran.

At a dinner party the other night, discussions raged in varying degrees of polite vehemence at every table — and the opinions at one were fascinating.

Seated together were House Foreign Affairs Chairman Clement Zablocki who composed the congressional letter to the Ayatollah Khomeini; Deputy Director of the CIA Frank Carlucci who was carefully limiting his comments lest something be read into them; Middle East expert and former Undersecretary of State Joe Sisco who as president of American University had something to say about Iranian students; a beautiful young Iranian woman with Zbigniew Brzezinski staffer, bearded Bob Hunter, Shirley Metzenbaum who was the best listener, and Carl Rowan, who did the most talking.

Most rejected the idea that we should have conducted a tit-for-tat operation here the minute our embassy over there was invaded. The Persian girl, who has family in Iran, said Khomeini is an absolute madman who might then have ordered the Americans killed.

Sisco said there are definite signs on his campus that some Iranian students are shifting from support of the Ayatollah because his dictatorship betrays the goals of the revolution. Zablocki produced the letter

which House leaders and 220 members of Congress signed. It did not mention the shah, but urged release of the hostages "on humanitarian grounds."

"To love God and to do his will through righteousness and piety is a universally accepted religious tenet. We find this great truth in the words of the Koran," wrote Zablocki, soothingly to a man who hasn't shown an ounce of humanity to his own people who disagreed with him.

Privately, all seemed to be in agreement about one thing. Once all Americans are out of that country, we should cut off relations and ship all their students home.

With that off their chest, everyone took to the dance floor where Secretary of Treasury and Mrs. Miller, Secretary of Energy and Mrs. Duncan, Presidential As-

sistant and Mrs. Frank Moore, were already sashaying to relieve the week's tension. No wonder this is the dancingest town around.

Things got even more serious at the Ken Giddens' supper Saturday night that was billed as "An Evening with Clare Luce" and put on by Ernest Lefever, director of the Ethics and Public Policy Center. He likes to gather, once a month, around an acknowledged brain, a cross section of opinions from public officials to press, pose a question to the brain — and let the evening unfurl from there.

The question was — Is the United States on the skids? Are we on an unstoppable decline, and what should we do about it? The gist of Clare's answer was, she has confidence in the American people providing they can get the right leadership.

For two hours La Luce held forth with her philosophical view of the world, accented with historical references, captivating reminiscences, and take-offs of famous personalities — she mimicked Churchill perfectly — and so entertained the group. They sat spellbound.

She wound up unravelling an hilarious plot about an American president, pretending Sen. Nancy Kasselbaum, who was there, was the president, and Arthur Burns, also present, was her advisor.

When the question, what can we do about Iran? came up, Burns said both the Iranian government and the Iranian citizens have enormous assets in this country which we could freeze; also, he suggested, by halting the shipment of spare parts, their advanced technology would eventually grind to a halt.

Frank Barnett, defense expert and president of the National Strategy Information Center, a think tank here and in New York, said our lack of military muscle was responsible for our inferior posture in the whole Persian Gulf area.

Brookings Institution President and Mrs. Bruce MacLaury were there along with Sen. and Mrs. Spark Matsunaga, Sen. Ted Stevens, and numerous others.

Clare was walking that evening. She had just been outfitted by a pair of soft contact lenses by famed Dr. John McTigue and for the first time in over 10 years, can wake up in the morning and see. They are the kind that are not taken out of the eyes for six months.

She was also pleased over the number of friends who came to West Point to see her get the Sylvanus Thayer Award and sword last month. "People came from all over the

Murphy, author of the popular "The Winsor Story." Former Ambassador and Mr. William Sullivan was there, as was Gen. E. Black from Honolulu, President John Silb of Boston University, and Gen. Richard Stilwell. She was particularly touched that Gen. and Mrs. Lauris Norstad came.

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ON PAGE 6

THE DAILY PRINCETONIAN
12 NOVEMBER 1979

Princeton in the CIA's service

By JOHN CAVANAGH GS, SALLY FRANK '80, and LAURIE KIRBY GS

There is nothing covert about the CIA employment interviews taking place today in Clio Hall. But that should not deceive any of us about the nature of the CIA's activities.

As citizens of the United States, we need to be aware of the actions the CIA carries out in our name. As Princeton students and faculty, we must understand the history of covert CIA intrusions into our campus, activity which is still permitted by the university today.

From Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954) and the Congo (1960), to Chile (1973) and Angola (1975), the CIA has made it its business to overthrow governments and to install (or attempt to install) dictatorial regimes sympathetic to United States business and military interests.

These interventions are not merely the dark underside of American foreign policy. Rather, they reflect the mainstream of establishment through from World War II to the present, a consensus which has been nourished in respectable institutions such as this university. Not coincidentally, there is also a long and multi-faceted tradition of Princeton in the CIA's service.

Breeding ground

From Allen W. Dulles '14 (later a Princeton trustee), who was the CIA's first director, to William E. Colby '40, who played a key role in the CIA's secret war in Laos, in the 1973 "destabilization" of democratic government in Chile, and in the Phoenix program of torture and murder in Vietnam, and who was CIA director from 1973 to 1975, Princeton has been a particularly fertile breeding ground for the agency, right up to the present Deputy Director, Frank J. Carlucci '52.

CIA recruitment at Princeton has benefited from the active participation of university officials. Former Career Services director Newell Brown admitted in 1976 to *The Daily Princetonian*, "We are aware of the kinds of people the CIA looks for and when we run into the type we tell them to send a resume."

But not all CIA recruiting at Princeton has been conducted through Career Services. An article in the *Trenton Times* of February 12, 1975, reported the story of a Princeton senior summoned in the late 1960's to meet with the dean of students, at that time the university's chief disciplinarian. How so? Dean William D'O. Lippincott '41 had other things than discipline on his mind:

"I understand you've been interviewed for CIA," the dean said. The senior found the question perplexing. It was true that he had applied for a job at the intelligence agency, but officials there had insisted on complete confidentiality. How had the dean of students found out?

"The answer was soon forthcoming. 'You see,' the student recalls Lippincott saying, 'I'm with the agency. And I thought we might have a talk — confidential, of course — about its work.'"

A spy in our midst

The CIA announced last year that it will continue the secret recruiting of foreign students at American universities. Such students have been used to report on the political activities of their compatriots. These reports are often communicated to secret police agencies abroad with potentially dangerous consequences for the students and their families.

Foreign students' fears about CIA spying are not merely conjectural. In May 1967, the Woodrow Wilson School was forced to admit that several students had been working covertly for the CIA while participating in the school's summer program abroad. Embarrassed WWS officials responded by issuing a ban on "any covert intelligence activity while the student is enrolled in school" (*The Washington Post*, May 4, 1967). The policy apparently applies, however, only to WWS graduate students, not to its undergraduates or professors.

According to Dean of the College Joan Girgus (*The Daily Princetonian*, October 24, 1978), Princeton University has no specific prohibition against the covert recruitment of foreign students. In contrast, Harvard President Derek C. Bok has taken a firm public stand against covert CIA activity on his campus, charging it threatens "the integrity and independence of the academic community."

Princeton professors have been involved with the CIA in many different capacities. Former history professor Joseph Strayer, for example, took a year's leave of absence from Princeton to work at CIA

CONTINUED

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
12 November 1979

The Intelligence War NEW CHALLENGE TO CIA

By ROBERT MOSS

SECURITY officials in the United States are worried about an influx of Communist illegals—spies operating under false identities—from an unexpected quarter.

They believe that many illegals working for Hanoi or Moscow have entered the country in the guise of Vietnamese refugees. Because the State Department has waived the normal visa checks in the case of refugees from Vietnam, and because of curbs imposed on the FBI's powers to carry out surveillance of suspects, little or no screening and investigation are taking place.

For example, when fellow-refugees recently reported their doubts about a Vietnamese now living in the vicinity of Los Alamos in New Mexico—who had moved into South Vietnam from Hanoi less than a year before joining the flight of the "boat people," the FBI had to explain that, under existing restrictions, it could not investigate without clear evidence that the man was engaged in spying for a foreign power.

This is only one further indication of the continued erosion of America's counter-intelligence capacities.

Glum confession

Relations between the CIA and other Western services have not recovered from the emasculation of the Counter-Intelligence (CI) staff, which formerly handled liaison, in 1973/74. There is little confidence in other Nato services, as Mr Frank Carlucci, the Deputy Director of the CIA, has glumly confessed in public, that the Americans can protect their secrets.

The director of a major European secret service now flatly declines to meet with Stansfeld Turner, CIA director, or the CIA station chief in his capital.

This is almost without precedent, as is the fact that a senior officer of another friendly service with close historical ties to the United States has visited the country twice so far this year without checking in with the Agency.

One aspect of the problem that now provokes acute concern is the possibility that—because of the erosion of CI—the KGB may have succeeded over many years in systematically deceiving United States intelligence about Moscow's military capacities and intentions.

Prior to the sacking of the key members of the CI staff at the end of 1974 they were engaged (with the help of the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology) in conducting review assessments of military intelligence culled from Soviet agents recruited by the FBI in New York whose credentials have since come under question.

The tentative conclusion reached was that much of the information from these suspect sources—for example, exaggerated accounts of problems faced by the Russians in constructing missile guidance system—was part of a strategic deception programme which was at least partly responsible for the CIA's notorious undervaluation of the Soviet defence effort in the mid-1970s.

Biggest worry

The biggest worry now is that, in the absence of effective CI (which, in reviewing an intelligence service's sources and estimates, should function as an institutional devil's advocate), Washington may have failed to detect developments in Soviet planning and military technology that could produce a radical shift in the strategic balance overnight.

The whole issue is put well in a paper by Mr Newton ("Scotty") Miler, the former Chief of Operations on the CI staff, that has just been published by the National Strategy Information Centre in New York as part of a symposium entitled "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s."

Counter-intelligence, defined by Mr Miler as "the national effort to prevent foreign intelligence services from infiltrating our institutions and establishing the potential to engage in espionage, subversion, terrorism and sabotage" is the base, the "tap root," of a healthy intelligence system.

But since 1973, Mr Miler charges, "concern about the reliability of sources, enemy security service ability to catch our spies and the need for good compartmentation of our collection activities has not been subject to review and assessment by a non-partisan element specialising in just these problems."

He goes on: "It became official CIA policy that human source intelligence collection activities would no longer be scrutinised by counter-intelligence specialists."

In Mr Miler's view which reflects a growing school of opinion this may mean that the CIA has been drinking from a poisoned well, failing to sift fact from disinformation in reports from sources whose bona fides have not been thoroughly checked.

His prescription is for President Carter to "exert his authority to reassemble the 'files and functions' of the CI staff that were thoughtlessly dispersed in 1973/74 and to appoint a 'counter-intelligence overseer' on the National Security Council.

His arguments are compelling, but they are unlikely to sway

those who are currently seeking to complete the demise of American intelligence through a new National Intelligence Act to replace the National Security Act of 1947 that has hitherto provided the basic legal framework for CIA operations.

The present draft of this new Act, resulting from consultations between its initiators on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Administration, is a blueprint for intelligence-in-a-goldfish bowl.

A basic principle of the document is "to ensure that special activities are undertaken only to meet exceptional circumstances affecting important interests of the United States."

What are these "special activities?" The document is quite specific: actions abroad in which the involvement of the United States Government is not publicly acknowledged. In other words, the entire clandestine work of intelligence.

Covert operation

Presidential approval would be required for any covert operation; and such an operation would have to be approved at a meeting of the National Security Council where the Secretary of Defence, the Secretary of State, the Attorney-General and the Director of National Intelligence (as the co-ordinator of the intelligence community would henceforth be known) were all present.

Any Congressional committee would have the power to demand a review or audit of any aspect of intelligence work.

Section 152(a) of the draft Act further requires the CIA to keep the House and Senate Select Committees "fully and currently informed of all national intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated intelligence activities."

Executive Registry
79-8653
STATINTL

2 NOV 1979

Mr. Joseph R. L. Sterne
Editor
Baltimore Sun
501 North Calvert Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Dear Mr. Sterne:

The cartoon on page A-18 of your 30 October edition is in the poorest of taste. I find the gratuitous suggestion that the Central Intelligence Agency had even some remote connection with the murder of President Park disgusting.

You on the one hand demand perfection from this Agency while on the other print scurrilous material to malign our reputation and damage the morale of our hard working and loyal employees. You can't have it both ways.

Sincerely,

Frank C. Carlucci
Frank C. Carlucci

D/PA/HEHetu/kgt/7676/31 Oct. 1979

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
- 2 - ER
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Handwritten notes:
 I would like to see a letter to the editor
 I would like to see a letter to the editor
 I would like to see a letter to the editor
 I would like to see a letter to the editor

2 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]

Deputy Director of Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Panola News Service Filmed Interview

1. You are scheduled to be interviewed at 0900 hours on Tuesday, 6 November at the Rayburn Building. The interview is for station WBRE-TV of the Wilkes Barre/Scranton area and will be conducted by Pat Gregory of Panola News Service, a small Washington-based television firm which tailors TV features for small stations. WBRE requested a profile of you and your job.

2. Pat Gregory will ask a couple of questions about your early life and career but will focus quickly upon your activities as the DDCI. While she may ask questions in a substantive context, she will be more interested in your role in the process of intelligence and how the Agency works than with the answers to the issues raised. Gregory plans to ask about how you do your job, the importance of intelligence, FOIA, Agee-type exposures of Agency employees under cover, and the Agency's support of Congress. To emphasize the latter, she may well ask you to be filmed walking along the corridor of the Rayburn Building as if to enter an office for a hearing.

3. Gregory would also like to ask a question along the lines of "your name has been mentioned as a possible congressman from Pennsylvania; have you given any thought to leaving government service and entering politics?" I told her I saw no problem but that she should check with you before the filming starts. She allowed as how she would go over all the questions with you beforehand.

4. The interview will be conducted in Room B-364 (the Radio and TV Gallery) of the Rayburn Building. You should enter the Independence Avenue entrance, turn right and then left at the end of the hall; B-364 is immediately on your left. I will meet you just inside the Independence Avenue entrance.

SIGNED

[REDACTED] STATINTL

DD/PA/[REDACTED]/kgt/7676/2 Nov. 79

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ON PAGE A1-21

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1979

President Park Killed in South Korea

By William Chapman

Washington Post Foreign Service

TOKYO, Oct. 27—South Korean President Park Chung Hee was shot to death by a government official last night, and the country was placed under martial law early this morning, according to authorities in Seoul.

The Korean strongman, who had ruled for 18 years, was shot by the chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency—Kim Jae Kyu during an argument at a dinner party, according to the report.

Government troops this morning occupied all important buildings; universities were closed, and all unauthorized meetings were banned.

The prime minister, Choi Kyu Huh, was named acting president after a Cabinet meeting early this morning. The streets of the city were calm.

The minister of culture and information, Kim Seong Jin, gave this version of the slaying.

Park was dining in a KCIA headquarters restaurant with the agency's chief. The KCIA director became involved in an argument with the president's chief bodyguard, Cha Ji Chul. Kim began shooting and Park was wounded. He died on the way to an Army hospital at 7:50 p.m. (6:50 a.m. EDT.)

The presidential bodyguard and four other men were also slain, the Information Ministry statement said.

Kim, the KCIA director, was arrested by martial law authorities.

The South Korean Cabinet was called into an emergency session at about 11 p.m. and made its first announcement more than five hours later.

The disclosure that Park was dead did not come for several more hours, or about 12 hours after the shooting reportedly occurred. There was no explanation for the delay. The government's first announcements this morn-

ing said only that Park had been "incapacitated."

The Cabinet announced that Prime Minister Choi had been designated acting president in accordance with the constitution.

A division of American troops stationed in South Korea was placed on alert. Seoul is approximately 30 miles from the Demilitarized Zone that separates South Korea from communist North Korea, which has troops on the border.

[The Carter administration issued a statement obviously directed at North Korea, warning that the United States "will react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to the Republic of (South) Korea to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of (South) Korea."

[Senior Defense officials said that the South Korean Army appeared to hold power following Park's death.

[U.S. officials said that South Korean Chief of Staff, Gen. Chung Sunz Wha, had emerged as the key figure in Seoul following Park's death. Government officials in Seoul said that Gen. Chung had been named martial law administrator for the whole country.

[U.S. Defense Department officials said that Prime Minister Choi, whose position under Park was largely nominal, does not appear to have emerged with any increased power.

[The State Department issued a statement that said, "The United States regards the matter as an internal one for the Republic of Korea and urges restraint on the part of all."

The announcement of Park's death stunned the capital, but there was no sign of any antigovernment activity on the streets.

The country had been racked by violent student riots at the southern cities of Pusan and Masan, but both cities were calm after Park had imposed

martial law and ordered a roundup of those responsible.

The KCIA has long been a powerful force in South Korean domestic politics and had been considered loyal to President Park, who used the agency repeatedly to round up political dissenters and to root out alleged subversives.

The martial law proclamation promptly banned all unauthorized public gatherings, extended the nightly curfews from four to six hours, imposed nationwide censorship and ordered all ports of entry to be closely checked.

Park's increasing authoritarianism has created strains between Seoul and the Carter administration, which has urged a relaxation of his rule.

Early this summer President Carter visited South Korea and is known to have urged Park to liberalize his government. Carter also met with 12 South Korean religious leaders, several of whom were known to have been opposed to Park's policies.

After Carter left, however, there was a new crackdown. The U.S. administration was particularly disturbed about a bloody police raid on opposition party headquarters Aug. 10.

At the start of his administration in 1977, Carter had ordered a gradual reduction of the U. S. ground troops in South Korea. That proposal was shelved this year, following intelligence reports of a substantial buildup in North Korean military power.

Park, who was 62, had been the target of several assassination attempts. In January 1968, a commando group from North Korea snaked into Seoul and made an unsuccessful attempt to storm the Blue House, the South Korean presidential residence. Two days after that North Korean gunboats captured the U.S. spy ship Pueblo.

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ON PAGE A-19

NEW YORK TIMES
25 OCTOBER 1979

ESSAY

The Road To Morocco

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 — When President Carter changed his mind and decided to sell offensive arms to conservative King Hassan of Morocco, it marked the end of the Andrew Young era of United States diplomacy. At a White House newly awakened to political reality, the third world no longer rules the roost.

Morocco is a conservative Arab monarchy on North Africa's West Side, closely allied to Saudi Arabia. When Spain gave up some uranium-rich territory in North Africa four years ago, Morocco laid claim to it but so did a guerrilla force called the Polisario, supported by Libya, Algeria and the Soviet Union.

When King Hassan made his move, the guerrillas bloodied his nose; now the Polisario is attacking Morocco and the King needs our help — Cobra helicopter gunships and Bronco armed reconnaissance planes — in order to survive.

In the Andrew Young era, he didn't have a chance. The Organization for African Unity, along with radical Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization, supports the guerrillas. The C.I.A., sensitive after missing the fall of the Shah, has been warning of Hassan's vulnerability. Early this summer, Mr. Carter's budgeteers cut arms sales to Morocco from \$45 million down to \$30 million. King Hassan looked like a loser.

Then Saudi Arabia began making noises behind the scenes. Our State Department, which customarily fears any efforts to "prop up right-wing regimes," was split between its Middle East department, headed by Harold Saunders, which wants to accommodate the Saudis, and the Africa corps, headed by Richard Moose, who heeds the call of the Andy Youngs.

On Tuesday, Oct. 16, the "Policy Review Committee" met in the White House to thrash out what to recommend to the President. Cyrus Vance tilted slightly toward the Saudi view, recommending only a minor increase in help to King Hassan (which — at new Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Brown pressed for providing the offensive weapons Hassan needs —

tial decision was therefore needed.

That night, the Moroccan ambassador to the U.S., Alf Bengelloun, gave a dinner party welcoming Saudi Arabia's new ambassador, Faisal Algelan, and his wife, Nuha. Present were three U.S. senators, Mr. Brzezinski, and C.I.A. Deputy Director Frank Carlucci. The new Saudi envoy, responding to a toast, stressed the closeness between the two kingdoms, and made it clear that his Government hoped the United States would be more helpful in supporting Hassan. That was mother's milk to Mr. Brzezinski.

The Saudi ambassador was moved to point out the importance of U.S. support because an editorial in The New York Times that morning had urged "no arms for Morocco's war" because "no American interest is at stake."

At stake is America's credibility in the eyes of governments who try to resist radical, Soviet-supplied, Arab-financed, third-world-supported takeovers. King Hassan is one of the few friends that Egypt's Anwar Sadat has in the Arab world; he helped arrange the first trip to Jerusalem; he will get help from Sadat in his fight to stay in power; and though he takes his Arab-world signals from the Saudis, Hassan is the one most likely to end the Arab isolation of Sadat for the sin of dealing with the Israelis.

With this in view, the new, 1980-model Carter — mindful of Saudi wishes, hopeful of getting some support for the Camp David accords from the Arab world — decided to overrule the Mooses and send out the Cobras and Broncos. The first bite will be within the \$45-million limit, but supplementals will soon take it to \$200 million, which the Saudis will pay for out of their change pocket.

The last vestiges of the Andrew Young set let out a howl. George McGovern fretted in the Senate, and Stephen Solarz (Democrat of New York) — head of the African subcommittee in the House — complained that the aid to Hassan "will encourage intransigence rather than flexibility." (Mr. Solarz is an anomaly: he represents much of Brooklyn, but aligns himself with the most anti-Israel third-worlders. His constituents don't complain.)

Although Representative Solarz threatens to launch a resolution of disapproval to block the arms transfers, that's just talk: such a resolution would have to be passed in both houses, and would surely be turned down in the Senate Foreign Relations Mideast subcommittee headed by Richard Stone, Florida Democrat. Mr. Stone, a strong Israel supporter, has long pressed for more aid to the conservative Arabs of Morocco.

ally would be encouraged to negotiate by being made strong or being made weak. For a change, strength won out.

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ON PAGE A-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
21 August 1979

U.S. Didn't Heed Alert On Young-PLO Parley

State Was Warned Of Possible Meeting

By Martin Schram
and John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writers

In a message characterized as a "heads up alert," intelligence officials warned the State Department, White House, and the intelligence agencies last month that Arab diplomats had suggested that Ambassador Andrew Young meet with a Palestine Liberation Organization official, according to U.S. intelligence sources.

But — although such a meeting would have violated U.S. policy — Carter administration officials did not follow up on the alert by instructing Young not to meet with the PLO official, nor did they even check to see if the meeting took place, administration officials say.

In fact, Young did carry out the suggestion and—in a move that eventually cost him his job — met with the PLO envoy, Zehdi Labib Terzi, on July 26, just hours after the U.N. ambassadors from Kuwait and Syria had first made the suggestion to him.

The "heads up alert" did not reach administration policymakers until July 30—four days after the Young-Terzi meeting took place.

It was unclear last night whether the alert ever reached the highest-level officials in the State Department or the White House. State Department spokesmen have maintained that the department did not know of the meeting between Young and Terzi until it received a query about the meeting from Newsweek magazine on Aug. 11.

The intelligence alert, dated July 30, referred to suggestions that were made to Young on July 26, at a luncheon meeting at the New York City residence of the ambassador from Kuwait.

In addition to the intelligence alert, there was one other reference in State Department files to what went on in that luncheon meeting, according to a department official. It was a report prepared by Young's own office at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the source said. However, it could not be learned just how much detail was contained in this report or whether it made any mention of the suggestion that there should be a meeting with the PLO official.

Young maintained this past weekend that the State Department had in its files a detailed, almost verbatim account, dated July 30, of what was said at his meeting with the PLO official on the evening of July 26. Young said he saw the document at the State Department on the day he resigned, Aug. 15. Whether the document he saw was the July 30 intelligence "alert" is unclear, but State Department officials indicate they were one and the same.

State Department officials continued yesterday to deny that the department on July 30 had a detailed account of Young's July 26 meeting with Terzi.

Department spokesman Thomas Reston reiterated his Sunday statement that no account of the meeting was available before Aug. 11 and that on July 30 the department only had information that "a suggestion" had been made about a Young-Terzi meeting, "but not that a meeting had been agreed upon."

A senior department official later amplified Reston's statement by suggesting to reporters that if they checked with Young, the ambassador would not disagree with the statement. However, aides in Young's office in New York would say only that they had "no comment" on what had been said at the State Department.

In private, department officials said the statement had been worked out in consultation with Young on Sunday by Warren M. Christopher, who is acting secretary of state while Cyrus R. Vance is on vacation. These officials argued that Young's refusal to comment was, in effect, a confirmation of their assertion that he would not disagree with the statement.

In addition, Reston also said that the department had checked with the office of the director of central intelligence, which coordinates all U.S. intelligence activities, and had been assured that it does not know of the existence within the U.S. government of an account such as that described by Young.

Elaborating on that point, department sources said Christopher had contacted Frank Carlucci, deputy director of the Central Intelligence

Agency, yesterday morning after reading a New York Times report that senior U.S. intelligence officials knew about the substance of Young's meeting with Terzi.

Carlucci, the sources said, reported back that his office had no information to back up such a charge. Other sources within the intelligence community also denied there had been prior knowledge of the meeting; and the Justice Department, which had promised to investigate whether the FBI had been involved, said yesterday that neither the FBI nor any of the other agencies under its control "had any knowledge of the substance, or contents, or even existence" of the meeting.

In short, the thrust of the accounts being offered by State Department and intelligence officials was that on July 30 only one document—the "heads up alert"—appeared to exist relating to the Young-Terzi meeting and, according to their descriptions, that document could not be described as a detailed account of an actual meeting between the two.

17 August 1979

NEWS FOCUS

Playing Politics With Foreign Intelligence

By Cord Meyer

WASHINGTON — The Republican National Committee has fired the opening gun in a campaign to make the Carter administration's handling of foreign intelligence a major issue in the election, but the scattershot blast was wide of the mark.

Last week, GOP Chairman William Brock issued the report of his subcommittee on intelligence. It called for a non-partisan approach and then lambasted the Democrats for causing all the ills that have befallen the intelligence community without mentioning Richard Nixon's destructive role in trying to involve the CIA in Watergate.

The Republican study, however, is essentially right on two general points. In a time of growing Soviet military strength, the United States is more dependent on accurate foreign intelligence than ever before. In the face of this need, it is also true, as the report charges, that morale at the CIA is dangerously low.

Just how low is revealed by the fact that senior CIA officials fear a mass exodus of competent officers at year's end when they become eligible for higher retirement pay. About 200 are retiring this summer, and this loss of vital skills is expected to become a flood. Resentment against CIA Director Stansfield Turner's style of management has reached the point where one senior officer has refused to accept the agency's highest decoration from the admiral. Turner's deputy, Frank Carlucci, had to preside at the award ceremony.

BUT WHEN IT DEALS with specific institutional reforms, the GOP report goes off the track. Downgrading the role of the director of central intelligence, it proposes the creation of a chief intelligence adviser on the White House staff. This czar would defend the intelligence budget before Congress and act as the president's eyes and ears in controlling the intelligence agencies.

Aside from the fact that the top White House staff has not been notable in recent years for its apolitical objectivity, there is the disadvantage that such an intelligence czar would be cut off from day-to-day contact with the CIA's analysts and operators and would lose his grasp of essential detail.

As former CIA Director Richard Helms remarked, "To separate the president's principal intelligence adviser from his control of the CIA is like removing the head from the body. A disembodied intelligence adviser cannot compete with the other claimants for the president's time and attention." There may be a case for

ordinating his successor to a political appointee.

Even less helpful is the Republican proposal for dismembering the CIA by removing the clandestine service, the Operations Directorate, from the agency and establishing it as a separate "Foreign Operations Service." The GOP study would solve the cover problem by requiring all government agencies to provide official cover overseas to the intelligence operators, but where would their Washington headquarters be located, if not within the CIA? In the words of one congressional staffer, "We would really be dead in the water if we went down that road."

THE EFFECT OF this partisan initiative is to reduce to the vanishing point any chance of adoption of a new legal charter for the CIA in this session of Congress. Contrary to the implication in the GOP report, long negotiation between the Carter administration and both Republicans and Democrats on the Senate Intelligence Committee has led to a much improved version of the excessively restrictive legislation introduced last year.

This CIA charter will be introduced next month, and the intelligence agencies believe they can do their work effectively within new legal limits that protect the rights of private American citizens.

By politicizing this issue, the Republican National Committee has postponed legal reform until after the election. There would be no great damage done by this delay except for the fact that the world does not stop to wait for American elections.

In Central America, time is running out. Even Latin leaders who supported the more moderate wing of the Sandinistas now fear a covert Cuban takeover of the Nicaraguan revolution and its spread to El Salvador. In a bitter, recent confrontation, the left-leaning Panamanian leader, Omar Torrijos, accused Castro of infiltrating Cuban political agents to seize power.

Under present law, the Carter administration must inform eight congressional committees before it can provide discreet assistance to democratic moderates trying to resist the Cuban offensive. When so many have to be informed, the danger of leaks is so great that Carter officials, with good reason, hesitate to take action that requires secrecy.

The United States will have one hand tied behind its back until congressional oversight is limited to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. But that legal change is now unlikely in the brief time that remains to turn the political tide in Central America.

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ON PAGE B-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
5 August 1979

Smuggling Arms To South Africa

By David C. Martin
and John Walcott

AT ABOUT 8 o'clock on the evening of Aug. 25, 1977, the West German freighter Tugelaland eased alongside the wharf in the harbor of St. John's, the ramshackle capital of the tiny Caribbean resort island of Antigua. Dockworkers began filling her hold with metal containers labeled "steel forgings," which were to be shipped to Barbados, 250 miles to the south. Then there was an accident. Dockworker Mottley White remembers it:

"The crane on the dock, it collapsed, and the crane, the boom, everything went down into the hold. The big, heavy hook fell down and one of the containers flew open. I see the same big bullet shells we unloaded for this company before."

At first, White did not make much of the accident. He knew the American company that was shipping the containers, Space Research Corp., tested artillery shells for the U.S. military in Antigua and Barbados, and he had become accustomed to unloading thousands of the shells at a time.

But the falling crane broke open something more than a container of 155-mm artillery shells. It revealed the first glimpse of what the U.S. Customs Service considers an intricate arms smuggling scheme in which an American-Canadian munitions firm with close Pentagon ties has illegally supplied the apartheid government of South Africa with special 155-mm shells that have 20 percent greater range than standard ammunition and no less accuracy.

David Martin and John Walcott are reporters in Newsweek's Washington bureau.

The company, SRC, refuses to discuss the charges, which are contained in classified U.S. government documents. Those documents state that some 55,000 artillery shells, along with the expertise to duplicate them, were exported from the United States and Canada to South Africa in 1977 and 1978, thanks in part to the Pentagon, which unwittingly shipped at least 1,700 of the rounds to Antigua on vessels chartered by the U.S. Navy.

And some U.S. officials fear that government involvement in the scheme may extend beyond unwitting complicity, that someone at the CIA or the Defense Department, eager to counter Cuban military involvement in Angola, may have joined with Space Research and concocted a plan to bypass the 16-year-old arms embargo against South Africa. As one high-ranking State Department official put it: "It is inconceivable to me that someone, either in the Pentagon or in Langley, did not at least know about this operation or, more likely, have a hand in it." At the Pentagon, an internal memo on the affair warned officials of "possible spill-over repercussions."

Over the years Space Research, whose headquarters straddle the border between Vermont and Quebec, had done a small but steady business with the Defense Department — \$9 million worth since 1968, including one contract to test eight-inch artillery shells at the company's Antigua test range.

Under the leadership of a ballistics genius named Gerald Bull, SRC had developed a worldwide reputation for extending the range of conventional artillery with no loss in accuracy. In 1972, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird praised Bull's "excellent technical capability and clear thinking"; a number of high-ranking officers, including an up-and-coming admiral named Stansfield Turner, visited SRC's North Troy, Vt., headquarters.

Following the 1973 Mideast war, the Pentagon secretly arranged for Israel to purchase from SRC some 50,000 rounds of specially shaped 175-mm shells that were capable of reaching downtown Damascus from hardened emplacements on the Golan Heights, says a former company official.

Had the Pentagon or the CIA made similar arrangements for the South Africans, despite the arms embargo, in an attempt to counter Cuba's growing military presence in southern Africa?

Former CIA officer John Stockwell, at one time head of the agency's Angola task force, has written that in October, 1975 "the South Africans requested, through the CIA station chief in Pretoria, ammunition for their

STATINTL

CONTINUED

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ON PAGE 13

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
29 July 1979

SHAKING UP THE C.I.A.

By Tad Szulc

Jimmy Carter was furious. He sat in the Oval Office on this chill November day, staring at the note paper before him. Riots were sweeping Iran. The Shah had just been forced to impose a military government on his nation. And the President of the United States hadn't even known a revolution was coming — had, in fact, been assured all along by the American intelligence community that there was no such danger. Mr. Carter lifted his pen and wrote: "I am not satisfied with the quality of political intelligence." The notes were addressed to "Cy," "Stan" and "Zbig" — Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Those handwritten messages of last Nov. 11 were not the President's first expression of concern over the state of American intelligence, but they were by all odds his strongest. They removed any doubts of White House determination to force change upon the intelligence apparatus. It had failed him in a most astonishing manner.

A nation Jimmy Carter considered America's linchpin of stability in the Middle East, a nation in which the United States had essential strategic and economic stakes, was in the midst of a profound crisis. By February, Mr. Carter would see Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi's government replaced by a radical Islamic re-

Tad Szulc is a Washington writer who specializes in international affairs.

STATINTL

The Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

July 11, 1979

The Editor
National Review
150 East 35th Street
New York, New York 10016

Dear Sir:

I take exception to an item in the "The Week" section of your 6 July issue. By excerpting selected facts and quotes from an accurate article by David Binder in the New York Times of 18 June, and rearranging them to suit your argument, you have distorted my position. You also have me making serious accusations about the actions of CIA people which are totally untrue. I know of no case where the CIA's employees are "undercutting our defense arrangements, blowing the cover of secret agents, conniving in 'leaks for policy reasons,' and giving our allies cause to withhold their info from us lest we blow their operations out of the water."

Sincerely,

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the signature of Frank C. Carlucci.

Frank C. Carlucci

STATINTL

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4701 WALLARD AVENUE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 636-4058

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Prime Time Sunday STATION

DATE July 8, 1979 10:00 PM CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT Exposing CIA Agents

TOM SNYDER: ...Also, a report from Chris Wallace at the headquarters of the CIA in Langley, Virginia, a place we hear about so often but seldom get to see.

CHRIS WALLACE: Tom, CIA Headquarters here in Virginia is just what you'd expect: big, impersonal, and bristling with security. But our story tonight is about how a handful of radicals have penetrated that security. Working just a few miles from here, they are exposing CIA personnel all over the world, blowing their covers.

It's all very damaging to the CIA, and all perfectly legal.

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SNYDER: It is no secret that the United States, as most other nations, uses its embassies not only for diplomacy, but also for gathering intelligence information. A spy working out of an embassy has good cover, good communications, and diplomatic immunity if he or she happens to get caught.

Most Americans who work at our embassies are not agents for the CIA, but some of them are. Who they are has always been a closely-guarded secret, for an agent's effectiveness depends on maintaining his or her cover, keeping his or her job secret. There is nothing so useless as a well-known secret agent.

Chris Wallace is standing by now in the main lobby of CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia with the story of how some people are methodically blowing the covers of American agents overseas, and how that is in fact damaging the CIA.

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ARTICLE APPEARED NATIONAL REVIEW
ON PAGE \$ 38 6 July 1979

THE WEEK

□ The Freedom of Information Act allows the government to withhold public access to material "specifically authorized under criteria established by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" or material "in fact properly classified pursuant to such executive order." Notwithstanding, CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci now contends that the CIA's eighty employees who handle the four thousand requests a year for info are undercutting our defense arrangements, blowing the cover of secret agents, conniving in "leaks for policy reasons," and giving our allies cause to withhold their info from us lest we blow their operations out of the water. Meanwhile, for two years the National Journalism Center has been trying to get the Commerce Department to release, under the same Act, the names of American firms licensed to trade with the USSR, the nature of the goods exported, and the dollar value thereof. Commerce has refused, pleading, *inter alia*, national security. The NJC (M. Stanton Evans, plaintiff) has sued in the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia. Nice move. Whichever way the courts finally rule, either Commerce will have to fess up, or CIA will be granted legal precedent to shut up.

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ON PAGE 3

WYOMING VALLEY OBSERVER (Pennsylvania)
24 June 1979

Flood hopes to return to job

By MIKE McGLYNN

According to an aide to embattled local congressman Daniel J. Flood, the question of Flood's resignation has not been discussed and, therefore, it is evident that Flood plans to remain at his 11th District post indefinitely.

Recently, Flood has been encumbered by both legal and physical torments. His retrial on bribery charges in Washington Federal Court has been postponed till September by Judge Oliver Gasch. Within the last two weeks, the House Ethics Committee has brought a bill of particulars against Flood. The bill entails the same 25 charges for which Flood has already been tried once. The first trial ended in a hung jury. While all this goes on, Flood is recovering from successful eye surgery at Georgetown Medical Center, Washington.

Flood aide Mike Clark asked The Observer to thank the people of the 11th Congressional District on Congressman Flood's behalf for the thousands of "get-well" cards which he has received, as well as the many notes of personal encouragement which have found their way to the congressman's bedside.

Clark added that Flood is making excellent progress, that he's feeling great, and hopes to be back to work in

"several more days".

Asked if Flood intends to respond to the Ethics Committee charges in writing, Clark said that Flood's attorneys were considering the matter at the moment and that a statement should be issued soon. (The Ethics Committee would prefer that Flood answer the charges in writing, although he is not legally bound to do so.)

Asked about rumors spreading locally that Frank Carlucci could be Flood's Republican opponent in 1980,

Clark would say only that Flood's office admires Carlucci, but that no firm statement would be made until Carlucci's candidacy is definite. There is a certain residency problem with Carlucci's potential candidacy. He would have to establish residency in Pennsylvania prior to attempting to become a candidate for Flood's seat.

In any case, Clark makes it obvious that Flood has no intention of giving way to Frank Carlucci or anyone else. Not at the moment, anyway.

Dunmore's Carlucci doesn't satisfy residency requirement for congressional seat here

Responding to media reports suggesting that the local Republican Party is looking to run Frank Carlucci, since he has been Ambassador to Agnes recovery fame, Portugal and is presently a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Herbert Hetu told The Observer that Carlucci has said for the record: "I have not been approached by anyone and have no plans to leave my present residence in Pennsylvania at least six months prior to being certified as legally entitled to run for the 11th Congressional seat."

Carlucci, a Dunmore native, is best remembered locally as President Richard Nixon's

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WILKES-BARRE TIMES LEADER
21 June 1979



Carlucci eyed as candidate for Flood's House seat

By JOHN ANDERSON
Staff Writer

WILKES-BARRE -- Republican officials, seeking a strong candidate to run for Daniel J. Flood's congressional seat, are interested in supporting Frank J. Carlucci III.

Carlucci is a former Wyoming Valley resident who now serves as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He became a household word in this area in the summer of 1972 while serving as then-President Richard Nixon's personal emissary in the aftermath of Tropical Storm Agnes. In that capacity, Carlucci streamlined the tangled bureaucracy involved in the post-storm cleanup operation.

Exclusive

The Times Leader has learned that a representative of the National Republican Congressional Committee was in Wilkes-Barre last week testing reaction to a Carlucci candidacy.

The representative, C. March Miller II, field director for the NRCC, said Wednesday his visit to the area showed a positive response to the idea of Carlucci running for Flood's seat.

The 35-year-old Carlucci, serving his 16th term in the House of Representatives, is a patient at Georgetown University Hospital in Washington.

Flood's term in the House ends in 1980. However, because of uncertainty about the congressman's future, GOP officials on the local, state and national level are making contingency plans in the event a special election is needed sometime this year.

In addition to his health problems, Flood is under indictment for bribery, conspiracy and perjury for alleged influence peddling. The government alleges that Flood accepted 550,000 and 100 shares of bank stock in return for using his congressional influence.

Carlucci, a former resident of Bear Creek and Kingston, was unavailable for direct comment Wednesday. However, through a press spokesman, he said, "I haven't been approached by anyone and I have no plans to leave my present job."

Carlucci is a veteran foreign service officer who, prior to joining the CIA, served as Ambassador to Portugal. The GOP's interest in a candidate of his prominence indicates the Republicans intend to mount a strong push to take the seat in Flood's district.

Last week, Miller talked to such influential local Republicans as Harold Rosem, Andrew J. Sordani III, State Sen. Frank O'Connell and Atty. James Geddes. Miller said he came to the area after hearing reports that Carlucci was interested in becoming a candidate.

Any formal attempt to draft Carlucci into the candidacy, he said, would have to be forthcoming from a contingent of local Republicans.

Miller indicated his committee would be involved in the congressional campaign if the candidate were to be Carlucci, O'Connell or State Sen. attorney Robert Hudock, who ran against Flood last year. Flood won by only 14,000 votes. In 1960, Flood carried his district by over 100,000 votes.

Miller said involvement means the candidate's campaign committee could stand to receive close to \$25,000 from various state and national Republican organizations as well as additional funds from associations and special interest groups.

In addition, he said, the local campaign would receive help in selecting and training a staff.

Miller said he would like to see Flood's seat contested in a special election rather than waiting until 1980 for a primary and general election. He said the Republicans have captured the last six congressional seats decided in special elections.

Whoever is finally chosen to become the GOP candidate for Flood's seat will be facing stiff competition -- whether by running against Flood or one of two other Democrats most often mentioned as potential candidates, Wilkes-Barre attorneys John Moses and Frank Harrison.

Democrats in Luzerne County, the largest of the five counties in the 11th Congressional District, hold a considerable vote registration edge. Although neither Moses nor Harrison have sought elected office in the past, both are considered capable of mounting effective campaigns.

21 June 1979

STATINTL

CIA Official May Run for Flood's Seat

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The representative, C. March Miller II, field director for the NRCC, said Wednesday his visit to the area showed a positive response to the idea of Carlucci running for Flood's seat.

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Georgetown University Hospital in Washington. Flood's term in the House ends in 1980.

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Carlucci is a veteran foreign service officer who, prior to joining the CIA, served as Ambassador to Portugal.

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ON PAGE A-11

NEW YORK TIMES
18 JUNE 1979

C.I.A. Aide Says News Leaks in U.S. Worry Allies

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 17 — The problem of leaks of sensitive information to the press is inherent in the American political system, but Frank C. Carlucci, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, says he believes leaks now are the worst he has seen in 23 years of Government service.

In an interview last week, he said a spate of leaks during the last year by former C.I.A. officers, current Pentagon officials and current members of the National Security Council and Congress had prompted "friendly foreign intelligence

services" to be more cautious in sharing secrets with the United States.

Recent leaks disclosed classified information about American relations with South Korea and Japan, new weapons systems and the identities of covert operatives of the C.I.A., he said, adding that some of the revelations had come about inadvertently through accidental releases under the Freedom of Information Act.

But Mr. Carlucci, a career Foreign Service officer who was appointed to his C.I.A. post in 1977, said he was much more concerned about the "erosion of the environment" for protecting national security information. He said the erosion was caused by "leaks for policy reasons" by officials wishing to influence a course of action.

He said he was firmly opposed to "running one investigation after another" to try to find the source of the disclosures, which has usually been futile. Instead, he said, the solution was to reinstitute "a sense of values on the part of employees about what is proper and what isn't, emphasizing that while whistle-blowers have their place, legitimate grievance mechanisms and mechanisms for dissent exist."

Mr. Carlucci said the combination of deliberate leaks and accidental disclosures had prompted virtually every intelligence service that maintains relations with the C.I.A. to voice concern during the last eight months "about our ability to protect the information they give us."

"It isn't all one-sided," he said of the foreign complaints, explaining that Britain, West Germany and Australia were developing freedom-of-information laws and were "trying to profit by our experience."

But he went on to say that the gravity of the disclosure problem, underlined by C.I.A. compliance with about 4,000 requests a year under the information law, could be illustrated by a foreign intelligence chief "who told me he couldn't cooperate as much as he'd like, because of the disclosure practice."

Covert Operative Identified

A visiting British intelligence delegation recently told American authorities they needed new assurances that their se-

crets would not be compromised by the information law.

There was also a disturbing incident, Administration officials said, in which a covert operative of an American intelligence service was identified through Freedom of Information disclosures. "He got a knock on the door and his cover was blown," an official said.

Mr. Carlucci noted that some foreign intelligence services were so jumpy about the American disclosure practices that they had sharply curbed secret-sharing, even on matters where the C.I.A. knew they had certain valuable information.

"They don't say, 'We aren't going to give you X, Y, Z,'" he said. "That is not the way intelligence services work. But we do know of information in the possession of friendly services that was not given to us."

Mr. Carlucci said he and his aides, as well as officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, were working closely with Senate and House committees to draft new legislation increasing the Government's power to protect vital secrets. He said a draft bill might be ready by late next month.

"I am mildly optimistic that we can do something about the Freedom of Information Act problem and reasonably sure we can protect secrets," he said.

He said that he approved of the principles embodied in the 1974 law making it possible to obtain Government documents not protected by the security exemptions. But he said the C.I.A. had to commit 80 to 90 employees to the processing of such requests and received no extra funds for the purpose.

STATINTL

ESSAY

The New-Boy Network

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, June 6 — Eighteen months from now, a newly-elected President will be going over recommendations to appoint a group of foreign and defense policy professionals who operate just below the top, who have grown up reading and criticizing and helping each other, and who frame most of the far-reaching decisions made by the men in the limelight.

The "new-boy network" will write tomorrow's opinion papers, turn the spigot for tomorrow's leaks, determine the parameters for the top leader's decisions. Like cartridges in a clip, when the order comes from the electorate to "lock and load," these men will naturally be inserted into our national security system.

They know who they are; the ones chosen first will bring in the others. One network would be called to arms by a soft-lining Kennedy Presidency; a different set would be put in place by a Reagan, a Connally, or a Moynihan. Since they could determine our destiny, let's take a preliminary look at them.

In a Kennedy White House (haide-manned by David Burke), many soft-line apparatchiks would remain: David Aaron, Tony Lake, Richard Holbrooke, David McGiffert, Richard Moose (there goes Africa again) and Lynn Davis of PRM-10 fame. The National Security Adviser could be Thomas Hughes of the Carnegie Foundation, John Steinbruner of Brookings, Graham Allison of Harvard, or the present N.S.C.'s former Kennedy staffer, Robert Hunter. Jan Kalicki, who now heads foreign policy for the Kennedy shadow government, would be placed near, but not at, the top.

This soft-line network would want an amenable hawk to be Deputy Secretary of Defense — perhaps the Navy's James Woolsey, or non-Irish Philip Odeen. Jan Lodal would be a likely activist for the arms control agency, and Toni Chayes is destined to be the first Democratic woman service chief, as Secretary of the Air Force.

If the next President is a hard-liner attuned to the Soviet global threat, five names spring to mind as potential National Security Advisers: Harvard Prof. Richard Pipes, Deputy C.I.A. Director Frank Carlucci, and three heavyweight strategists — John Lehman, Edward Luttwak and Richard Allen.

Let's put Pipes in that slot, with Carlucci as DEPSECDEF, Lehman as Navy Secretary (to save the nuclear carriers), Allen at the N.S.C. to revamp our intelligence and African policy (the Georgetown Center), and the brilliant Luttwak as the N.S.C.'s free-

wheeling intellectual and unthinkable-thought man.

To add Congressional and press savvy to the Special Coordinating Committee of Forty, we'll make Senator Jackson's aide, Richard Perle, Deputy National Security Adviser, with Congressional staffer William Schneider and U.S.C.'s William Van Cleave to be the SALT-shakers.

That N.S.C. staff, which should once again become an exciting place to be, would include Prof. Scott Thompson of Tuft's Fletcher School; Kenneth Adelman of Stanford; Michael Ledeen of the Georgetown Center, to handle Europe; Sven Kraemer, a Senate staffer, on global issues; RAND's Richard ("A Revolution is not a Dinner Party") Solomon toughening our China policy, in tandem with Penn State Prof. Parris Chang. Senator Sam Nunn's adviser, Jeff Record, would add Congressional know-how and William Odom could be the holdover from the Brzezinski era, as the new man's military aide. Richard Whalen would take over for Jerrold Schecter as strategic ombudsman.

Outside the White House in a hard-line era, Cabinet officials like Don Rumsfeld, Paul Nitze, Laurence Silberman, Robert Ellsworth and Thomas Reed would look below to find Martin Hoffman and Prof. Bing West at key posts in Defense, with Seymour Weiss — an old Kissinger adversary — as Deputy Secretary of State. John Connally's issues director, Sam Hoskinson, would be a likely choice for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under C.I.A. chief William J. Casey or wiry Al Haig.

But what if a dark horse flashes by the finish line first? If it's Jerry Brown, the N.S.C. job could go to Jane Fonda, unless he opts for newly hard-line Joan Baez.

If the ship of state comes in for George Bush or Howard Baker, the Kissingerian network stands a chance: Hal Sonnenfeldt is adamant about remaining in private life, but Winston Lord would be a natural for a key post at State in a centrist network, and Brent Scowcroft is available for the N.S.C. call. William Hyland, who knows where the bodies are buried, would be useful in any administration, and help mop up the memoirs later.

Is the existence of these "new-boy networks" sinister? Quite the contrary: after we decide on our President next year, there will be no long, indecisive groping about for a way to make and carry out policy. All that is needed is an articulated point of view, a definite mental set, and a trumpet that is not uncertain. With that long-chosen-up teams will hit the ground running.

U.S. monitoring capability probed

Can the American intelligence network effectively monitor the Soviet Union to ensure compliance with strategic arms limitations agreements?

Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, declined to provide that assurance during a news conference Saturday at the Lake of the Ozarks.

"I think the Senate will be impressed with the monitoring capability we have," Carlucci said with reference to the upcoming Senate hearings on the Carter administration's proposed SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union.

Carlucci, however, declined to discuss any specifics of that monitoring capability or its effectiveness. The deputy director was visiting Mid-Missouri during the Memorial Day weekend to speak before members of the Central Missouri Press Association.

"All we can do is tell the Senate in closed sessions how we can monitor the Soviets and how we can detect cheating," Carlucci said. He added, "it would be inappropriate for someone in my position to express a personal point of view."

The deputy director said two recent developments — the loss of the CIA monitoring base in Iran and the leak to the Soviet Union of a top-secret manual explaining the KH-11 U.S. satellite system — have "reduced the confidence level" of the monitoring network.

The KH-11 manual was stolen by a junior CIA employee and turned over to the Soviet Union. The CIA employee,

William Kampiles, was subsequently convicted of treason and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment.

"I'm unhappy that the KH-11 manual was furnished to the Soviet Union," Carlucci said, "and while it is serious, I wouldn't describe it as crippling."

The deputy director made a similar observation concerning the loss of the Iranian base. "Our monitoring capability is essentially a network and the loss of any one part reduces our confidence level," Carlucci said. "While it is a concern, it is not crippling."

Carlucci described strategic arms limitations agreements as "a process leading to mutual restraints" and he added, "all of us are in favor of limiting strategic arms."

Carlucci later declined to give an opinion specifically regarding the proposed SALT II accord. "Our people do not take a position," he said, "we're not a policy-making part of the executive branch."

Asked his opinion of what would happen to a CIA official who publicly opposed SALT II, Carlucci said, "if someone wanted to express a personal view, he would have an obligation to resign."

"When a person goes to work for the CIA, he accepts a certain amount of discipline," Carlucci said. "A CIA without discipline cannot be effective."

Carlucci added, "this is not to say that there is no dissent within the organization." When questioned about the frequency or nature of dissenting opinions regarding SALT II, he said, "I don't think it would be appropriate for me to comment."

Carlucci also felt it inappropriate to comment on a number of other questions put to him Saturday. He declined to comment on the recent trade of captured Soviet spies for Soviet dissidents and he declined to discuss his view of retired military officials who have publicly opposed SALT II.

A native of Scranton, Pa., and a former U.S. ambassador to Portugal, Carlucci took office as deputy director of the CIA in February of 1978.

He is a 1952 graduate of Princeton University and he served as a lieutenant junior grade in the U.S. Navy before attending Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.

Carlucci has previously served as under secretary of the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare, deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, and assistant director for operations, Office of Economic Opportunity.

CONTINUED



Intelligence aired

Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responds to a question during a Saturday news conference held at the Lake of the Ozarks. Carlucci, who visited Mid-Missouri during the

Memorial Day weekend to speak to members of the Central Missouri Press Association, discussed the role of the intelligence network in monitoring strategic arms limitations agreements with the Soviet Union.

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ON PAGE D-3

THE WASHINGTON STAR
27 May 1979

Betty Beale

It was the kind of diplomatic dinner that embassy hostesses strive for. It was awash with figures that give Washington soirees a certain *eclat*. It abounded with political observations and recollections as every proper Capital dinner should.

It was Moroccan Ambassador and Mrs. Bengelloun's party for Washington Star Editor and Mrs. Murray Galt and it drew, among others, the chief justice of the United States and the Senate's most powerful member (at least next to the majority leader) Russell Long — two men who rarely sally forth for mid-week, black-tie socializing. Another rarity on the party circuit was the CIA's deputy director Frank Carlucci and his wife. Frank admitted he knows where the Shah of Iran is going to live but wouldn't say.

Deputy CIA Director To Give Keynote Talk

Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, will be the keynote speaker at the 54th annual convention of the Central Missouri Press Association



Frank C. Carlucci

Saturday evening, May 26, at Kirkwood Lodge on the Lake of the Ozarks.

Carlucci's address is scheduled for 8 p.m. Saturday in the Kirkwood Lodge Terrace Room.

Carlucci was sworn in as deputy director of the CIA on Feb. 10, 1978.

A native of Scranton, Penn., Carlucci graduated from Princeton University in 1952. He served as a

lieutenant (junior grade) in the U.S. Navy from 1952 and 1954 and following his military service attended the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration (1954-55).

He joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1956.

From 1969 to 1970, Carlucci served as assistant director for operations Office of Economic Opportunity, and from January to September 1971 as director of OEO. In 1971, he was appointed associate director of the Office of Management and Budget, followed by his appointment as deputy director. From 1972 to 1974, he served as under secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Carlucci was appointed United States ambassador to Portugal in December, 1974, and served in that position for three years. He is a career minister in the U.S. Foreign Service.

WILMINGTON SUNDAY NEWS
20 May 1979

Article appeared
on page A-1, 8

Insurance firms un- Paisley is dead

By JOE TRENTO
and RICHARD SANDZA

Two life insurance companies are refusing to pay John A. Paisley's widow \$200,000 in death benefits because they are not convinced the former top CIA official is dead.

A body pulled from the Chesapeake Bay last Oct. 1 was identified as Paisley by the Maryland state medical examiner, with the help of the FBI. Both Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York (MONY) and Mutual of Omaha think otherwise.

"There is no evidence Mr. Paisley is dead," said Jerry Vysocil, an assistance vice president of group claims at MONY.

"There is no convincing evidence Mr. Paisley is dead," echoed Len Tondell, a spokesman for Mutual of Omaha. "We consider this a false death claim."

Each company holds a \$100,000 policy in Paisley's name, with his widow, Mary Ann, as the beneficiary. Mrs. Paisley, from whom he was estranged, was herself not convinced that the body in the bay was her husband's and hired an attorney and a private investigator to determine the facts.

Paisley, 55, had been serving as deputy director of strategic research for the Central Intelligence Agency when he officially retired in 1974.

After his empty boat was found in the bay, and after the body later identified as his was found a week later, the CIA claimed he had been retired from a low-level analyst's job for several years and was working for Coopers & Lybrand, the world's largest accounting firm.

Paisley was covered under a MONY group insurance policy with Coopers & Lybrand, with which he had a Washington office and was supposedly working full-time. Friends of Paisley as well as CIA sources said, however, the of-

\$180-a-day consulting job for the agency.

Bernard Fensterwald, Mrs. Paisley's attorney, said the accounting job "just doesn't add up. He couldn't even balance his own checkbook."

Said Vysocil of Mutual of New York, "It is not clear who he was working for when he came under our coverage." An investigator for the company went further, "We have a hunch Paisley is not only alive but being held . . . Nothing adds up here."

Said Tondell of Mutual of Omaha, "It is an unusual case, to put it mildly. Our investigators are working on it."

United Mutual of Omaha, the division that handled the Paisley claim, has sent its investigators to review police reports and has been in contact with the Senate Intelligence Committee, according to a source in the company.

The Senate committee also is not convinced it knows all the facts about either Paisley's role with the agency or his disappearance. The committee is continuing its own probe after expressing dissatisfaction with a Justice Department probe.

A body, weighted with diving weights, and with a bullet wound behind the left ear, was fished from the bay in October. It was identified by Dr. Russell K. Fisher, the Maryland state medical examiner, from fingerprints supplied by the FBI and from an upper dental plate.

The prints, the News-Journal later learned, had been mailed in nearly 40 years earlier to the FBI office in Phoenix, Ariz., by a "Jack Paisley." No later prints were allegedly found. And the dentist who identified the teeth said later he was merely shown a plate to a million people, since he had no dental records.

Maryland State Police listed the cause of death as of "unknown determination" but decided Paisley had probably committed suicide.

In the June 11 issue of Look magazine, Betty Myers, a woman who said she had had a "liaison" with Paisley for more than a year before his death, said she had tapes made by Paisley aboard his sloop Brilliant in which he discussed his unhappiness with life.

Paisley's job with Coopers & Lybrand is being investigated by the insurance companies and by the intelligence committee. The News-Journal has learned that Paisley was assessing for the CIA the impact of the United States' loss of satellite secrets to the Soviet Union while he was supposedly working for the accounting firm.

The Senate committee is looking at the apparent close links between Coopers & Lybrand and the Central Intelligence Agency. Paisley's immediate boss, K. Wayne Smith, once had the responsibility of concealing CIA spending in the Defense Department budget, according to department sources.

Philip A. Odeen, partner in charge of the accounting firm, was a staff official of the National Security Council during the Nixon administration. Marcia Carlucci, wife of the present deputy director of the CIA, is manager of the special projects division of Coopers & Lybrand's Washington office.

A spokesman for Coopers & Lybrand in New York said, "our offices are run on an individual basis. We are not aware of any arrangement" with the CIA. Smith,


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How to Get Yourself Organized
America's Oil Lobby—the Way It Works



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Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00010-3
Sensfield Intelligence Agency

CAPITAL COMMENT



Edited by Joseph Goulden

May 1979

The Langley File Turner Is in Trouble

Another wave of departures at the Central Intelligence Agency—many of them under pressure—has so outraged some senior officials that one of them, in only halfhearted jest, is advocating a "coup d'etat" to topple Director Stansfield Turner.

Certainly Langley contains the classic ingredients for revolution: an autocratic and unpopular leadership, a demoralized citizenry, loss of pride, and bumbling performance.

The person being pushed by the intelligence community for Turner's chair is Frank Carlucci, his present deputy. A skilled bureaucrat, Carlucci is one of the few high-level Nixonites to retain power in the Carter administration. He first gained prominence as a troubleshooter in HEW, then luckily sat out the Watergate years as ambassador to Portugal, and came to the CIA in 1977.

Although Carlucci has no intelligence background, pros respect him as a talented administrator with the good sense to keep his hands off daily agency operations. "As director," says one official, "Carlucci would be content to work as a manager and not try to play superspy."

Turner commands no such re-

spect among intelligence careerists serving under him. He is blamed for the current brain-drain of resignations that is stripping the agency of what one person calls its "intellectual cadre." The more than 300 resignations since January 1 include such key figures as William Christison, chief of the office of regional and political analysis; Vincent Heyman, chief of the operations center; and Sayre Stevens, deputy director of the National Foreign Assessment Center.

To insiders, these departures are even more serious than

Turner's "Halloween Massacre" in 1977, when he summarily fired, retired, or reassigned more than 800 clandestine operatives, many by terse form-letter.

"In 1977," one official says, "Turner got rid of the spooks. This time he got rid of the brains." Even loyalists concede the CIA was overloaded with Cold War-era covert officers. Yet they decry Turner's ouster of analysts responsible for refining the rivers of raw intelligence that flow in daily from agent and embassy reports, satellite pictures, and electronic intercepts.

Rightly or wrongly, the view within the CIA is that Turner is preoccupied with self-promotion. He wants to incorporate the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's spy branch, into the CIA, and elevate the post of director of Central Intelligence to Cabinet rank.

Turner lost both these attempts during the last round of budget writing. But he continues to curry favor with the White House, and particularly with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national-security adviser. Turner is accused by subordinates of rewriting National Intelligence Estimates to avoid any SALT II or détente ripples. He is also said to have cut off the agency's Iranian desk from key message traffic during the Shah's final turbulent days. Defense Secretary Harold Brown, also knocked off the routing list, dispatched a spy of his own to pilfer a copy of one key cable from the National Security Council.

Prognosis: The intelligence community is capable of toppling an unwanted director—witness the hapless Theodore Sorensen. The same voices are now being raised, in quiet congressional offices and elsewhere, against Stansfield Turner. By fall, expect Jimmy Carter to see Turner as heavy baggage and find some place else to send him.



Stansfield Turner



Frank Carlucci

STATINTL

Advice and Dissent

Carter wants a tighter ship

For more than two years, Jimmy Carter has tolerated his Cabinet members' shortcomings, forgiven their mistakes and ignored the advice of outsiders that he shake up the top level of his Administration or even fire some people. But now Carter is beginning to have second thoughts. Reports TIME Washington Bureau Chief Robert Ajemian: "According to close aides, Carter is dissatisfied with the quality of certain advice and with some of the decision making beneath him. Mindful of his wobbly standing in the polls, he is determined to improve the Cabinet's performance."

One result is that, to assure loyalty, the President has taken more control over agency appointments. For example, Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps wanted to promote Frank Weil to be her under secretary, but was told to find someone who was a stronger supporter of Carter. Weil lined up endorsements from several Senators and Cabinet members, but the President held firm.

In addition, Carter is showing increasing irritation with aides who seem unprepared or uncertain. After hearing several high-level staffers in the Oval Office debate how he should announce his energy policy, Carter angrily shut off the discussion and bluntly ordered, "Get your act together." Now, say aides, he intends to put similar pressure on top-level officials outside the White House. Among them:

► James Schlesinger. "He feels shafted by Schlesinger," says a top presidential aide. The President believes that the Energy Secretary has shown insensitivity toward Iran and bollixed negotiations for Mexican gas by insulting Mexico's envoys. Carter no longer relies on Schlesinger alone for advice on energy policy. In preparing for his energy speech earlier this month, the President reached around the Energy Secretary and invited all Cabinet members to chip in with ideas. Last week, Carter named Domestic Adviser Stuart Eizenstat to head the Administration team that will lobby for the windfall profits tax in Congress, and deliberately left out Schlesinger.

► Ray Marshall. Administration officials complain that the Labor Secretary has been a dead loss at negotiating with the Teamsters Union. As a result, Carter has had to deal directly with Union President Frank Fitzsimmons. Carter made some headway with Fitzsimmons but was unable to head off the Teamsters strike.

► Stansfield Turner. The CIA director looked better to Carter in Navy whites than he does in charge of U.S. intelligence. Carter is now said to agree with critics that his Annapolis classmate is too much of a lightweight and military bureaucrat for the job. Carter gives higher marks to Turner's deputy, Frank Carlucci. But because of the frequent turnover of CIA directors—five in six years—the President is reluctant to make a change.

► Alfred Kahn. The loose tongue of the chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability is increasingly bothersome to the White House. Within two working days, Press Secretary Jody Powell twice had to "clarify" Kahn's statements. First the inflation czar told a congressional committee that he did not favor Carter's plan to decontrol oil prices. Soon afterward presidential aides apparently changed Kahn's mind. Said Kahn: "I am now 100% behind the decision to decontrol. I always have been 49½% behind it." Then he told an AFL-CIO rally that failure of voluntary wage-price guidelines to slow inflation would lead to either mandatory controls or a recession. Powell had to make clear to reporters that the President disagreed and that Kahn was not signaling an imminent change in policy. Said a White House aide: "Kahn does a wonderful job, but he's too damn flip."

Carter, in fact, is dissatisfied with his economic policymaking in general. One problem is that he refuses to rely on only a single adviser. As a result, his advisers often shifted from one position to another as he listens first to Charles Schultze,

chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, then to Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal and finally to several other aides. Moreover, the economic advisers are unable to work well together. Kahn does not get along with his council's director, Barry Bosworth, and has set up his own little bureaucracy separate from the wage and price guidelines program a block away. Blumenthal has been squabbling with Trade Negotiator Robert Strauss. At a Cabinet meeting

last month, the Treasury Secretary accused Strauss of having worked out a sweetheart deal with the textile industry that limits imports, in exchange for its support of the Tokyo Round of tariff reductions. Strauss claims his actions were politically necessary.

The President's top economic advisers are also distressed at the situation. They engaged in some soul searching at a danish-and-coffee breakfast two weeks ago in Blumenthal's Treasury Department dining room. For instance, they criticized themselves for failing to follow through on policy decisions and for having talked for three months about ways to slow down the economy without agreeing on a set of recommendations for the President. Complained one adviser at the table: "We talk and talk and nothing happens."

On the other hand, the Administration's foreign policymaking seems to be functioning better than ever. Carter seems more comfortable with National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. On a picture of the two of them joggling in Jerusalem last month, Carter jokingly wrote: "At least once we're in step." The President is still high on Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, but some aides believe that because of Carter's personal involvement in the Middle East negotiations, Vance alone will not have the clout to keep future talks on track.

Despite Carter's unhappiness with some of the people around him, there is no sign of any imminent major personnel changes. Instead, the President is considering ways to bear down harder on his team and improve performance. Says an aide who has the President's confidence: "If he wants to get re-elected, he's got to have the stomach for being tougher on his people. They've got to do better and he knows it."

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

11 April 1979

Scrutiny For CIA

Arguing that it is losing valuable information because of the Freedom of Information Act, the Central Intelligence Agency is trying to get the law amended to protect the agency from FOI suits. CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci told a House Intelligence subcommittee that foreign sources are reluctant to cooperate with the CIA because of fear that their identities will be exposed under the FOI act.

Under the amendment proposed by the CIA, certain materials, such as those dealing with clandestine activities and relations with foreign governments, would not have to be reviewed by a court unless they contained information about the person making the request. The objection to this proposal is that it seems to cover categories under which some of the worst CIA abuses of the past have occurred — bribing of foreign officials and meddling in the internal political affairs of democratic countries.

If the CIA is getting information that is genuinely essential to the national security of the United States, the agency can already count on judges to rule out disclosure of that information under existing exemptions in the law. At the same time, foreign intelligence services would have good reason to be assured that genuinely valid security information would be safeguarded. Doubt would be most likely to arise as to information about intrusion into matters in which the CIA has no business meddling. It is exactly this kind of information that should be subject to review and disclosure. In view of the CIA's record of dirty tricks at home and abroad, risking the loss of some fringe information from foreign sources is better than assuming the risk of another spree of CIA abuses.

EDITOR & PUBLISHER

7 April 1979

Article appeared
on page 20

CIA chief says: 'We are trying to be more open'

By M.L. Stein

The Central Intelligence Agency is trying to be "more open with the media and the public" by passing out unclassified material and being responsive to inquiries, Director Stansfield Turner said in Los Angeles (March 30).

"We're no longer stuck in the 'no comment' grove," Admiral Turner added, "although we sometimes have to say 'no comment.'"

Speaking at a breakfast meeting of the Greater Los Angeles Press Club, the CIA chief said, "We are doing a vital job and we want you (the press) to know as much about it as we can. But sometimes our need for some level of secrecy is in contradiction to the media's job of keeping the public informed."

Turner noted that, like the press, the CIA also has a responsibility to protect its sources. The organization, he continued, must also protect government policy makers.

"When we have an 'exclusive' we try to hold on to it as long as we can," Turner admitted. "But still, we can understand each other's purposes and motives so we can keep you informed while protecting our sources and our policy makers."

At the same time, however, Turner was sharply critical of newspaper accounts that, in his opinion, dredge up "well worn" CIA stories and present them as news.

"We read about some charges against the CIA and then in the last paragraph we find that it happened in 1952," he explained. The director also took a swipe at government employees who leak information to the press.

"A large percentage of the leakers have motives which are not altruistic," he said. "To publish their information may not be in the public interest."

The director said he favored prosecution of persons who release classified information.

Turner expressed further distaste for ex-CIA agents who have written critical books exposing the inner workings of the agency.

In a question and answer session, Turner claimed that the publication of the Pentagon Papers weakened the CIA and "led to more disclosures by irresponsible people." Turner said he favored tightening the rules for releasing classified information, noting that the United States exchanges some secrets with friendly countries.

"These nations will not want to share their secrets if they are to appear in the US press," Turner pointed out.

However, the director said the CIA has made changes in its handling of classified and unclassified material so that standards are more specific and authority to classify more limited.

To another questioner, Turner conceded that the CIA had miscalculated events in Iran but added, "the press in academia didn't do much better."

* * *

The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) told a Harrisburg, Pa., audience March 10 that the Freedom of Information Act is "eroding" the ability of the agency to recruit and protect agents overseas.

Frank C. Carlucci, in an address at a meeting of the Keystone State Chapter of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, said the "Principal impediment" facing CIA agents is the ability to "protect their sources and methods", adding that this ability has "eroded" under FOI.

"Everyone is claiming a legitimate need to know, but it's axiomatic, the more people who know, the more leaks are likely.

"It's not the workload" of handling 88 requests a week at a cost of \$3 a year, "but the 'chilling effect' this has on our work overseas. We seem to have laws that help our enemies. No one is going to confide in you if his information or his name is going to come out in the newspaper or congressional hearing," Carlucci said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-12

NEW YORK TIMES
6 APRIL 1979

C.I.A. AIDE DEPLORES DATA-RELEASE LAW

Says Freedom of Information Act Scares off Valuable Sources

WASHINGTON, April 5 (AP) — The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence testified today that his agency was losing valuable information because its domestic and foreign sources feared that their identities would be exposed under the Freedom of Information Act.

"The head of a large American company and former Cabinet member recently told me he thought any company was out of its mind to cooperate with the C.I.A. as long as the provisions of the F.O.I.A. apply to it," the official, Frank C. Carlucci, said.

Mr. Carlucci did not identify the former Cabinet member in testimony before the House Intelligence Committee's legislation subcommittee.

The Freedom of Information Act provides for public access to Government information on demand, but permits agencies to withhold certain sensitive material in specified categories. Decisions to withhold information can be appealed to Federal courts.

Requests From Foreigners

Mr. Carlucci said that the Central Intelligence Agency received many requests from foreigners, "possibly representatives of hostile intelligence services."

The C.I.A. has proposed an amendment to the law under which certain materials, such as those dealing with clandestine activities abroad and relations with foreign governments, would not have to be reviewed unless they contained information about the person making the request.

"Recently, the chief of a major foreign intelligence service sat in my office and flatly stated that he could not fully cooperate as long as C.I.A. is subject to the act," Mr. Carlucci testified.

"This representative noted, correctly, that even information denied under the exemptions was subject to later review and possible release by a U.S. court," he said. "While this has fortunately not yet happened, I was not in a position to guarantee that it will not."



STATEMENT OF
FRANK C. CARLUCCI
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION
OF THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 5, 1979

CIA deputy director offers insight on U.S. prestige

Frank Carlucci, a Scranton native named deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1978, is interviewed by staff writer Don Sarvey.

Q: When you work for an organization such as the CIA it must make your outlook on the world a little different than the ordinary citizen. How does it differ?

A: Well, it's an enormous education. You get a perspective of the world that you can't get anywhere else in government. I've been a for-

foreign service officer for some 22 years, serving in different parts of the world, but never have I gotten quite the overview that I have now. Not only do you see what the policies are, but you get an insight into all the inside information. From that aspect, it's a fascinating experience.

Q: It sometimes seems through American eyes that the world is an ever more hostile place. Is that really true? Do we have genuine friends?

A: Let's put it this way, I think the world's a more complicated place. Twenty years ago when I came into the foreign service, things were fairly straightforward. I can recall at that time we were worried about Korea. Korea was allied with China. China was allied with the Soviet Union. We've now seen a proxy struggle between the Soviet Union and China, and who knows where Korea stands? We've seen the Third World emerge as ... an ideological

battleground. We've seen the non-aligned movement. We've seen the growth of strategic weapons and an effort to reach a SALT agreement. We've seen national revolutions ... most recently in Iran. It's become a lot more complicated. I don't think this ... means that we don't have friends, that people don't listen to us and respect us. The fact that our president is in Israel trying to bring the two sides of that dispute together is evidence of the continuing prestige of the United States.

Q: With detente seemingly losing ground, is there any chance there's a new Cold War era ahead of us?

A: I don't know that I'd accept your characterization that we're losing ground. If you put yourself in the shoes of the Soviets, if you are Ivan Ivanovich looking at your government, we find that that government has problems. It's got a succession problem, it's got a leadership problem — aging leadership. It's got an oil problem. Their oil is topping out, rising demand. It's got an agricultural problem. It's got a problem of rising consumer expectations and declining growth rates. And they haven't done all that well. Obviously, they've got problems with China. And their relations with Japan are not all that good. They don't have much to show after massive support for Castro all these years in Latin America. In Africa they've got some targets of opportunity, but they were kicked out of Ghana and Guinea, Zaire, Sudan, Egypt, Somalia.

They've made some progress, obviously, in places like Afghanistan and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, (but) it's by no means certain that they've done all that well in the Middle East — not even in Iran, because the foreign policy orientation of Iran has yet to be decided.

So, I don't accept the characterization that we are losing. I would accept the characterization that the Soviet Union has become much more adventuristic in its foreign policy. It has shown a greater propensity or greater willingness to use its own military personnel overseas and to exercise its influence through Cuban and other proxies. And that is a significant new development that we have to take into account.

Q: Did China give any advance warning to the U.S. of its intent to invade Vietnam?

A: Well, the vice prime minister of China really didn't hide his intentions from anybody at any time, whether he was in the United States or in China. He made it clear that the People's Republic of China took a hostile view toward the Vietnam invasion of Cambodia and indicated China would be obliged to take action. It came as no great surprise to me.

Q: There has been some criticism that the U.S. government didn't have adequate intelligence, or perhaps adequate analysis of the information we did have, to anticipate events in Iran. Is that true?

CONTINUED

A: Well, that's a complicated question. The answer is, yes, we were able to follow the decline in the shah's authority and were able to predict, at least over the short term, that the populace was turning against him and that Iran was in for serious problems. It is fair to say that neither we nor anybody else that I know of predicted the dimensions of the national revolution that occurred — that one man would return on a crest of popular emotion the way that Khomeini returned, or that the country ... would start to splinter and we would see leftist factions and rightist factions and religious factions and modernization factions and now ... women's groups. That sort of thing, we didn't predict that.

Q: Had there been changes in the shah's regime, liberalizations, say a year ago, is it possible he could have survived?

A: Well, don't forget that one of the reasons the shah got in trouble was his liberalization program. He was the one who tried to modernize Iran. He was the one who gave the rights to women. And it's Khomeini who has taken the position that those rights are not appropriate under Islamic law. So, I don't know that more progressive policies would have helped him. You always, in a situation like this, have the question of when do you pass the point of no return? At what point could he have altered his policies, tried to put together a coalition, tried to work with the religious opposition? I couldn't even hazard a guess on when that might have been appropriate. Certainly, in retrospect, one can say had some action been taken a year ago it might have been helpful. But the dimensions of the upheaval in Iran suggest that it was very deep-rooted.

Q: What are the prospects for stability in that country in the coming months?

A: We're all hopeful, of course, but there's no question (that) there are factions. There are leftist factions ... and then there are more conservative groups. Prime Minister Bazargan is trying to get his government under way. The military ... is without a command structure. The populace is divided and the economy is in bad shape. There are various nationalist groups, the Kurds for example, that are demanding more autonomy. The country is, in effect, riddled with problems. My own view is that, despite the best efforts of well-intentioned leaders, it will take some time to sort out these problems.

Q: Does what happened in Iran hold any lesson for other Middle East countries, such as Saudi Arabia? Is there a danger of revolution spreading — something with Islamic overtones?

A: I think Iran does demonstrate that Moslem fundamentalism can be a potent political force. You have powerful Moslem groups in places like Egypt. You may have noticed that President Sadat made a speech about two weeks ago in which he criticized the Moslem Brotherhood for opposing his policies. The Moslem Brotherhood is a fundamentalist group. Saudi Arabia is a little bit different, in the sense that it is much less secularized than some of the other countries are. And, of course, the shah had almost completely secularized his country.

Also, you've got to take into account the fact that the rest of the Arab world is, by and large, (composed of) Sunnite Moslems, as opposed to the Shiites in Iran. That's significant, both in religious terms and in political terms, in the sense that the Shiites tend to have a more hierarchical religious structure, which can give rise to a single, paramount leader, whereas the Sunnites do not. The Sunnites are much more inclined to work with a secular government, whereas the Shiites traditionally have been a sect of opposition. It is by no means automatic that this would spread to other countries. But certainly, the fact that Moslem fundamentalism can be a potent political force will not be lost on the rest of the Moslem world — and there are about 750 million

Q: How keenly felt is the loss of the CIA stations in Iran that, I understand, monitored Soviet missile sites?

A: Well, I'm not able to talk about that. We don't talk about any of our intelligence operations.

Q: It has been suggested that perhaps the loss of these would affect our ability to monitor a new SALT agreement.

A: Well, I think it's premature for me to comment on that. The SALT agreement hasn't been signed, so we really don't know all of its provisions. And there will be quite an extensive debate in the Senate on ratification. There, one of the central issues will be verification. Until the administration knows the provisions of the agreement and has prepared its presentation, I think it would be inappropriate for me to comment.

Q: With oil playing an increasing role in world politics, how closely does the CIA monitor the flow of oil and keep tabs on reserves in various parts of the world?

A: Very closely. It's one of our principal concerns. We make regular reports on it to the president; to the Department of Energy, to the secretary of state and secretary of defense. We've also put out one unclassified report on the world's oil reserves and we've had some updates. We monitor that very closely.

Q: We hear a lot about spy satellites and sophisticated gadgets of all sorts. Have these things replaced the man in the trenchcoat?

A: By no means. In fact, they're complementary. Technical collection can generally only tell you what happened yesterday or, if you're lucky, what's happening today. It can't tell you anybody's intentions. And the traditional human collection is extremely valuable in knowing people's intentions. Our effort is trying to get the two to work together. One will never supplant the other.

Q: How much information is out there for the taking, without any special effort?

A: An awful lot of our information comes from unclassified sources. We only gather information clandestinely when we can't get it overtly. I can't remember the figures, but I think some 30 or 40 percent of the information used by our analysts does come from unclassified sources.



STATINTL

— Sunday Patriot-News Photo by Dennis Nye

CIA Deputy Director Address Local Group

Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Saturday night tells a gathering of former intelligence officers in Camp Hill that the Freedom of Information Act is "eroding" the CIA's ability to protect its agents overseas.

Information Act 'Eroding' CIA Scope, Aide Claims

By MARY O. BRADLEY
Staff Writer

The Freedom of Information Act is "eroding" the ability of the Central Intelligence Agency to recruit and protect agents overseas, a CIA official told a local group Saturday night.

Frank C. Carlucci, CIA deputy director, told a meeting of the Keystone State Chapter of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers at the Penn Harris Motor Inn, Camp Hill, that the agency spends \$3 million a year answering 88 requests a week about information and reports.

"It's not the workload that's troubling us, but the 'chilling effect' this has on our work overseas," Carlucci said. "We seem to have laws that help our enemies. No one is going to confide in you if his information or his name is going to come out in a newspaper or congressional hearing."

The "principal impediment" facing CIA operatives now is the ability to "protect their sources and methods," he said, adding: "this ability has eroded."

"Everyone is claiming a legitimate need to know, but it's axiomatic, the more people who know, the more leaks are likely," Carlucci said. He has held the No. 2 spot in the CIA since February 1978.

In addition to external assaults on the CIA's wall of security, the agency faces pressures from within, Carlucci said. "We have a problem with former employees who like to take pen in hand," he said.

CIA agents are required to sign an agreement promising never to divulge classified information without the prior consent of the CIA director, he said. But some agents have ignored their oath.

"If we are unable to support our contract, we are in a bit of a

ee Frank Snapp, who wrote a book alleging that the CIA bungled the American departure from Vietnam in 1975.

Carlucci said the issue in the case is not whether Snapp published classified information, but who should determine what is classified.

"I submit we have to make a greater effort if we are going to protect our sources and methods. If we lose sources and methods, we lose information, and in some cases, lives are lost," he said.

"In spite of the problems we face, I still think we have one of the most effective intelligence agencies in the world," he said.

Carlucci said the involvement of the CIA in "covert activities" overseas has "become a highly emotional issue in the United States." He defined covert activity as an "effort to exert some political influence in a clandestine fashion."

It is an issue that "has been blown out of proportion," since the CIA's covert-operation capability is "used very sparingly."

The new Intelligence Oversight Board and select committees in the House and Senate serve as watchdog agencies over CIA activities. The review agencies were formed following disclosure of alleged illegal activities by the CIA in the United States and foreign countries.

The Oversight Board, of which former Pennsylvania Gov. William Scranton is a member, is empowered to examine charges of wrongdoing within the CIA and reports directly to President Jimmy Carter, Carlucci said.

However, Carlucci said, getting presidential and congressional approval for overseas operations delays the CIA's "reaction time."

Carlucci said, however, that he would be "the last person to make the last person to stand here and defend the abuses of the past."

Carlucci said congressional stud-

ies have shown that CIA abuses were ordered by persons at top levels in the government.

Carlucci said the goal of the CIA must be to strike a balance between "control and effectiveness."

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 50

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL
MARCH 1979

The Slow Murder The American Intelligence

by Benjamin F. Schemmer and the Journal Editor

STANSFIELD TURNER IS ADMINISTERING THE *COUP DE GRACE* to the slow murder of the National Intelligence Community. The initial hope of many intelligence analysts in 1977 that he would replace investigations with reform, and political interference with objectivity and high quality analysis, faded in 1978 into discouragement—and often into contempt.

Turner's willingness to politicize intelligence, his priority for self-advancement, preference for technology over people, and his single-minded focus on centralizing control of the intelligence budget and collection activities has destroyed morale within the Central Intelligence Agency, led hundreds of key CIA personnel to resign, and has prompted far more to "retire in place." While Turner has done some useful work to continue cutting back CIA's once bloated operations staff and to reform the Intelligence Community administratively, that progress has been more than offset by damage he has done to its Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities, to CIA's integrity and independence, and—most important—to the quality of its product.

Administration sources admit that more than 250 CIA professionals put in their papers during the first pay period of January, and rumors have gone as high as 600. Further, these resignations include such personnel as Sayre Stevens, Deputy Director of the National Foreign Assessments Center (NFAC); Dick Cristenson, Chief Office of Regional & Political Analysis; Vince Heyman, Chief of CIA's Operations Center; John Blake, the Deputy Director for Administration; and Ernie Olne, the Agency's chief Iranian analyst. And at press time, *AFJ* learned Anthony Lapham, CIA's General Counsel, had also resigned and will be leaving in April for "personal reasons."

Some of CIA's massive resignations are the legitimate result of deadlines imposed by retirement incentives (because senior officials reached the "high three" level, having served three years in the highest pay grade counted for retirement), and because new government-wide conflict of interest regulations (resulting from the Ethics Law of 1978) made it impossible for many to find an outside job. But far too many resignations symbolize the slow, steady, and deliberate destruction of the American Intelligence Community.

Carter Administration will ever provide effective leadership and reform. Several of the departing officials told Turner candidly that they were leaving because of his pervasive interference in intelligence reporting—in areas where he had neither intellectual depth or expertise, and in which he overrode expert opinion with his own judgement.

This broad dissatisfaction with Turner occurs among personnel the nation needs most to keep, the intellectual cadre that is the brain of the American Intelligence Community. The professionals Turner has disenchanted are not "cold warriors," special or "black" operations executives, or counter-intelligence officers. The firing of Operations Director William Wells, and the firing, retirement, or reshuffling of 820 operations personnel in Turner's 1977 "Halloween Purge" had already removed most of that cadre from the Community, a reform that former CIA Director William Colby had proposed earlier in a form that even more drastic cuts than Turner's.

The men who are now rejecting Turner and the present senior management structure that the Carter Administration has brought to Intelligence, are men who quietly fought pressure from a parade of CIA Directors to give the Rostows, Kissingers, and Brzezinskis intelligence analysis which was tailored to their policies of the moment on Vietnam, Cambodia, SALT II, Angola, and Iran.

These analysts and managers are also men who stayed on when the Community's best positions were given to "operators" who had little understanding of modern collection and analytic methods. In fact, for all the sound and fury of Turner's actions, this conflict between the operations and analysis aspects of CIA's work is still one of the agency's most pressing problems. Despite Turner's purge, the operations managers still believe they are best qualified to interpret events—especially politico-military events, and they still control the access to sensitive source reporting which allows them to play one-upmanship with the analysts they are supposed to support.

The Professionals

Can Stick It Out No Longer

There are limits to any man's dedication. As intelligent professionals, men who stuck it out through investigation after investigation and director after director, who responded and resisted their operations to

now face pay increases too small to keep up with inflation, but more work because Turner ignored analytic personnel needs to buy more technical collection assets—in spite of the fact the Community lacks the analytic manpower to process its existing "take." They have worked for two years under a director who systematically hamstringed or ignored HUMINT, and whose priority are reflected in the fact that the entire US intelligence community now has only 20 to 40 analysts covering *all* of Africa, and roughly half that number for *all* of South America.

Under the Carter Administration, The National Intelligence Community's Senior Management Answer to, "Why Not the Best?" Is "Here Are The Worst."

Ironically, such CIA professionals originally shared the hope Stansfield Turner and the Carter Administration would end management structures that had become a political filter between intelligence and the user. They were joined in these hopes by many professionals in the National Security Council (NSC) staff, State Department, National Security Agency (NSA), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Stansfield Turner became DCI with unique and wide-ranging, bi-partisan support from the Senate and House Committees on intelligence. There was a general belief that the reforms begun under President Ford would receive far more support and effectiveness under President

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
5 February 1979

Washington Whispers

The way CIA insiders tell it, the White House is so down on intelligence chief Stansfield Turner that it often bypasses him and now relies more on assessments by the agency's No. 2 man, Frank Carlucci.

A fire that damaged the building opposite the U.S. Embassy in Moscow—the building from which radiation rays are beamed into the embassy—provided only temporary relief for American diplomats. Within days, beams from another nearby structure were stepped up to the old level.

Western intelligence sources say the Soviet grain harvest is turning out to be much smaller than grandiose official claims. Result: Russia will be trying to buy grain from the U.S., other Western nations for most of 1979.

Article appeared
on page E-2

31 January 1979

Australians' party may be the end all o national day events

STATINTL

Betty Beale

The smashing success of Australian Ambassador and Mrs. Alan Renouf's Australian Day Party — a dinner-dance for over 200 — may mark the beginning of the end of the annual battering bashes known as National Day receptions. Everybody there — and that included a lot of Washington VIPs — told them it was the best National Day party they'd ever been to.

There were initial doubts as the black-tie guests wandered into G.W.'s Marvin Center, along with blue-jeaned and wool-capped students, to take the elevator to the third floor. But once in the snappy confines of the bar and disco spot of the Faculty Club, doubts dissipated.

EXCERPT:

The CIA's deputy director Frank Carlucci and his wife were making a rare appearance and letting themselves go to rock music on the dance floor later.

U.S. Seeks Ways to Gauge Foreign Nations' Stability

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 — The Carter Administration is assembling a comprehensive plan to upgrade its ability to forecast political turbulence around the world, a step that senior Government officials said today could result in sweeping changes in existing methods of intelligence collection and evaluation.

The officials said that since early December, a high-level interagency task force has been examining ways for intelligence agencies to improve their ability to predict political instability in countries of critical importance to the United States.

The task force, they said, was created after President Carter expressed his displeasure in November about the failures of the agencies to anticipate the crisis in Iran.

The task force was not expected to issue its formal recommendations to the President until next month, the officials said, but a high-ranking intelligence aide in the State Department said that the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department had already been ordered to determine if other strategic nations might be susceptible to events similar to those in Iran, and to suggest ways in which the United States might respond to such future situations.

The intelligence aide declined to name the countries under study, but other offi-

cialists said they included Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Philippines, Indonesia, Egypt, South Korea and Brazil.

Some officials believe that opposition groups in each of these countries could threaten the viability of their governments, which are friendly to the United States. In essence, the intelligence aide said, the Administration wants to know more about the aims and strengths of such opposition groups so that the United States will not be surprised by events similar to those in Iran.

Efforts to enhance political forecasting have been given special priority by the Administration: Zbigniew Brzezinski, the adviser on national security, and others have stressed that military intelligence alone was no longer adequate.

The intelligence aide said that the United States "can no longer just bludgeon its way into situations."

"As our relative power declines," the aide said, "we must learn, like the British did years ago, to become more discriminating, alert and skilled in political intelligence."

Memorandum From Carter

Other officials traced the task force's origin to a handwritten memorandum sent by Mr. Carter in November to Mr. Brzezinski, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence. In the note, Mr. Carter said that he "was dissatisfied with the quality of political intelli-

gence" that he was getting and told his aides to work on together to upgrade such information.

Shortly thereafter, officials said, Mr. Carter's aides formed the task force and put each of their top assistants in charge. They are: David L. Aaron, Mr. Brzezinski's deputy; David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for political affairs, and Frank C. Carlucci, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. According to the officials, the task force has met regularly since December.

The intelligence aide said that the task force has identified several shortcomings of existing intelligence practices. One such problem, the aide said, was that American diplomats and intelligence agents have ignored social changes in key countries during the last decade, and have focused instead on what the ruling elite was thinking.

This has meant, officials said, that in contrast to the early 1960's, American officials abroad have had little contact with forces outside governments, such as youth groups, intellectuals and religious leaders. Within the Central Intelligence Agency, the officials said, this trend was reinforced in the 1970's when more reliance was placed on technical means of intelligence collection than on human sources.

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The New York Times
229 WEST 43 STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036

Executive Registry STATINTL
79-045

January 4, 1979

Dear Mr. Carlucci:

Thank you for your letter of December 27 on William Safire's reference to John Blake in his December 25 column.

As you know Mr. Safire corrected the error in his column of January 1 and that correction has been made part of the permanent morgue files.

In view of this there are no plans to publish the letter as a second corrective.

Sincerely yours,

Kalman Seigel

Kalman Seigel
Letters Editor

Mr. Frank C. Carlucci
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

ks:ss

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ESSAY

Office
Pool,
1979

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — A desire to improve my abysmal prediction percentage has caused me to delay the sixth annual office pool until after the publication of the prophecies of what the National Enquirer calls "the top ten psychics."

However, those seers have turned out to be suckers for old rumors: They have 1979 as the year Walter Cronkite takes a job as a top diplomat. (We who start those rumors know that it's John Chancellor for top diplomat, and Walter Cronkite for New York Democratic senatorial nomination against Bess Myerson — the winner to face the survivor of the Republican Kissinger-Kemp race, in the Super Bowl.

On, then, to the fearless forecast, in which every reader can be psychic for a day. We will skip the obvious projections (Bert Lance gets indicted, convicted, pardoned and whips Andy Young for the Georgia Senate seat of Herman Talmadge) and go directly to the hard choices.

1. *The big news in North and South America in 1979 will be:*

(a) A Cuban expeditionary force backed by MIG-23's comes to the aid of Communist rebels in Nicaragua and the United States responds fiercely by filing a formal protest with the Organization of American States; (b) Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada has a joyful reconciliation with his estranged wife, Margaret, but his nation splits apart; (c) Conducting hard-nosed negotiations in Mexico, President Carter wins the heart and mind of President López Portillo by declaring in Spanish that the U.S. will pay whatever price Mexico demands for its oil and gas.

2. *Following the current unpleasantness in Iran, the hooted-at domino theory will be re-examined, as:*

(a) The Soviets reach an accommodation with Pakistan — until recently, when we started tilting away from it, an ally of the U.S.; (b) Mr. Sadat comes under assaults from the newly invigorated Moslem brotherhood in Egypt; (c) Saudi Arabia's leadership has a sheikout.

3. *The novel that will cause famous teeth to grind in the night will be:*

"Truth," about a future President who acts like a past President; (b) "Providence," by Frank McDonald, about

(c) Neal Travis's "Manhattan," fictional treatment of the takeover of New York magazine; (d) Joseph Heller's "Good as Gold," a novel about a Jewish Secretary of State, sure to be dubbed "Catch-Kissinger."

4. *The nonfiction that people will turn to after wrestling with their op-ed pages will be:*

(a) Shana Alexander's "Anyone's Daughter," about Patti Hearst; (b) Dr. Herbert Benson's "The Mind-Body Effect," about holistic medicine, soon to be the big thing with trendies who have thought twice about meditation and have run themselves ragged; (c) Leon Jaworski's "Confession and Avoidance," in which I assume he confesses to letting the Congressional Koreagate crooks go free and avoids paying taxes on the book's profits through the Jaworski tax-exempt charitable foundation.

5. *On the economic front we will see:*

(a) A "soft landing," as inflation is reduced without a recession and Alfred Kahn is hailed as America's top banana; (b) Real growth declining for three quarters, a Dow Industrial Average dipping below 600, with little impact on inflation, causing economists to reach for their hair curlers; (c) The Democratic National Chairman reacting to the reaction by labeling the Republicans "The Party of War."

6. *Most surprising successful lawsuit of the year will be:*

(a) The case brought by a small union against the President for denying due process in his coercive wage-price guidelines; (b) Sen. Goldwater's suit against the President for abusing his power by abrogating a defense treaty without the Senate's advice and consent.

7. *The Senate's February response to the President's contempt of its unanimous resolution calling for Senate consultation before abrogating the Taiwan defense treaty will be:*

(a) Symbolic, by long delaying approval of Carter's first choice as ambassador to Peking; (b) Substantive, by forcing into the open any secret Brzezinski understandings with the P.R.C. about not making any new arms agreements with Taiwan during the next year; (c) Political, by inducing some senators who want to "get well" from their votes on the Panama Canal to vote against a SALT treaty, or by adding unacceptable reservations.

My choices: (c) all the way, except for number 7, which is (a). And if 1979 proves me wrong — what am I, a psychic?

Correction: C.I.A. Deputy Director Frank Carlucci has read my recent essay on the unconscionable double-dipping of former Naval Person Stansfield Turner and wants it known that the Deputy Director for Administration was not fired. Sorry. Okay —

The new Director of Central Intelligence will be

The CIA/FBI Campaign for New FOIA Amendments

By Morton H. Halperin

In recent months both the FBI and the CIA have launched public relations campaigns designed to, in effect, repeal the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as it applies to them. Although there does not appear to be much sympathy for these efforts in the relevant congressional committees or even in the administration (which has not endorsed them), they need to be taken seriously.

The CIA campaign, managed largely by Deputy Director Frank Carlucci, is based on the premise that an FOIA is fine for the government in general but not for the CIA. An intelligence agency, he argues, must operate in secret and it is a waste of time to have it respond to requests since nothing of consequence can ever be released.

This is as far as the CIA could take its claims, since it is not possible for the Agency to argue that it has been injured by FOIA releases: no court has yet forced it to release anything over its objections. The Agency is free to withhold anything where the damage to sources and methods outweighs the public value of the information: in a democratic society, the CIA is entitled to no more than this.

But it is not true that nothing of consequence has been released by the Agency. On the contrary, the CIA, often under the pressure of FOIA litigation, has released material of great value in the public debate over the proper role of the CIA. These releases belie Mr. Carlucci's assertion that the FOIA has been, at best, a waste of time. To cite just a few of the significant documents released: the Center for National Security Studies has received material on CIA drug testing, the Colby report on the CIA's program of secret recruitment on college campuses, and CIA efforts to suppress the *Glomar Explorer* story. [These and other documents are available from the CNSS library; use the order blank on p. 15 to order the *Abstracts* of such documents.]

And finally, Carlucci's argument should be laid to rest by the testimony of the CIA official responsible for the FOIA, who told a congressional committee that the Agency is better off because of the Act.

But no FBI official has ever made a similar claim, and, indeed, in a series of speeches, FBI Director William Webster has been arguing that real damage has been done to the FBI's informer program. As discussed in more detail in December's *First Principles*, the Director has put forward for discussion the proposal that there be a moratorium on release of most investigatory files until 10 years after the investigation is closed. Since the present law requires that current and recent files be reviewed for releasable material, and since many investigations go on for many years, this proposal would lead to a drastic change in the FOIA.

The Bureau's proposal is indeed put forward as a basis of discussion, and if it is ready to accept some limitations on the use of informants, then some agreement might be possible. Critics of the FBI's position might well be willing to consider installing some delay in the release of files relating to investigations of violent criminal activity, particularly in the organized crime area, if other changes in Bureau procedure were agreed to.

In other words, if what the Bureau wants to do is to protect its informers from truly dangerous criminals, that problem can be solved in part by curing the past problems of using infiltrators in peaceful groups, and in part by strengthening the public accountability that FOIA provides. □

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Point of View

identities will be exposed. Director Webster does concede that the current law allows them to withhold informer material: the exemption provisions were basically drafted by the FBI and they exempt not only the identity of a confidential source but also "confidential information furnished only by the confidential source." Thus information can be withheld if it could be used to identify a source, but Webster worries about possible mistakes.

Bureau descriptions of the problem concede that there has not yet been any documented case of an informant being injured, or even identified, through a mistaken release of material under the FOIA. What they argue instead is that they are having more difficulty in recruiting informants and that some informants have been reluctant to provide information.

At the request of Senator Eastland (D-Miss) the General Accounting Office conducted a study to document injury to the FBI and other agencies from the FOIA, but the GAO's report concluded that, on the contrary, there was no firm evidence of any injury. The GAO report instead suggests that much of the difficulty the Bureau is having stems from an increasing public concern for privacy in general.

The FBI's concern about informants seems to stem at least as much from the progress being made in lawsuits against political surveillance as from the FOIA "threat." In both the SWP and Chicago class action cases the Bureau has been ordered to turn the names of informants over to the plaintiffs under a protective order. However, these are not FOIA cases and would not be affected by the proposed amendment. Moreover, the informants affected by these orders spied on lawful political activity of non-violent organizations. By linking all informants together—both those targeting crime and those targeting dissent—the Bureau weakens its case and causes unnecessary concern among its informants in organized crime. No court has ever ordered lists of such names released.

If the Bureau proposal is indeed put forward as a basis of discussion, and if it is ready to accept some limitations on the use of informants, then some agreement might be possible. Critics of the FBI's position might well be willing to consider installing some delay in the release of files relating to investigations of violent criminal activity, particularly in the organized crime area, if other changes in Bureau procedure were agreed to.

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Richard R. Fagen

STATINTL

THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION
AND LATIN AMERICA:
BUSINESS AS USUAL?

Latin America was very much on the agenda during the first months of the Carter Administration. During that period, visits to, analyses of and speeches about Latin America emerged from the new Administration at a rate not seen since the early days of the Kennedy presidency.¹ Addressing the Organization of American States less than three months after taking office, the President spoke boldly of a "new approach" based on "a high regard for the individuality and the sovereignty of each Latin American and Caribbean nation, . . . our respect for human rights, . . . [and] our desire to press forward on the great issues which affect the relations between the developed and the developing nations."

Bold words—and now that almost two years have passed, what does the record say? To what extent have the energy and excitement of the first months been translated into policies and practices that really constitute a "new approach" to U.S.-Latin American relations? And perhaps most important, what are the new issues, problems and contradictions that have been illuminated by the Administration's attempts to translate the rhetoric of its commitment to human rights and democratic practice into a hemispheric foreign policy that is truly different from the conservatism and anti-communism of the immediate and not-so-immediate past?

¹ Throughout this article, the phrase "Latin America" should be understood to include Latin America and the Caribbean.

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Whereas the initiatives on Panama survived the U.S. political process, those on Cuba did not. Faced early in 1978 with a Soviet and Cuban buildup in Ethiopia, and later with the clear involvement of Cubans fighting against Somali troops in the southern Ethiopian province of Ogaden, the Administration responded to Havana with harsh words and thinly veiled threats.² On March 17, President Carter said pointedly that Soviet military intervention "in local conflicts" along with "mercenaries from other Communist countries" is an "ominous development." Subsequently Frank Carlucci, the Deputy Director of the CIA, told a Senate subcommittee that the Soviet Union and Cuba were waging "the most determined campaign to expand foreign influence in Africa since it was carved up by the European powers in the late 19th century." But the Administration could find no appropriate policy initiatives to match its angry words.

In this context of substantial frustration at Cuban and Soviet activities in Africa, and criticism at home and abroad for not "doing something" about it, the Administration reacted sharply in mid-May when approximately 4,000 Angola-based rebels invaded Shaba Province in southern Zaïre. Within hours, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division had been placed on alert, the first such mobilization since Carter's inauguration. Accusations that the Cubans were deeply involved in the invasion followed shortly. In his news conference of May 25, President Carter said that Cuba must share both the burden and the responsibility for the attack. Three days later National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was warning, "I do not believe that this kind of Soviet and Cuban involvement ought to be cost free." In June, the Senate voted 53 to 29 to approve a nonbinding sense-of-the-Senate resolution calling on the President to terminate the Interests Section agreement until Cuba withdrew militarily from Africa.

² For background, see Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1973.

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Then came the Cuban reaction. Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, speaking in the United Nations, called Carter's charges of Cuban involvement "absolutely false." During June, Fidel Castro repeatedly denied Cuban involvement, explaining Cuban policies and activities in the area in great detail to journalists and U.S. officials and other visitors. It was, for many, an absurd and even depressing spectacle: the Carter Administration first accusing the Cubans of complicity in the invasion, and then of not being resolute enough in preventing it. In the end, it was Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who became the spokesman for a more moderate and conciliatory policy, but not before the Congress was both confused and inflamed by the conflicting reports. When the dust had settled at the beginning of July, senior U.S. officials were ready to admit in private that the Administration had "never had the evidence" of the Cuban involvement.

That a year which began in this fashion saw no further U.S. initiatives toward improved relations with Cuba is not surprising. But the final word had not yet been heard from the Cubans. In November, in a startling reversal of previous policies, the Cuban government announced that it was considering the release of all political prisoners and the implementation of plans that would enable tens of thousands of Cubans living abroad to return for family visits and reunions. Using the mechanism of a dialogue in Havana with representatives of the Cuban community in exile, President Castro announced at a second meeting in December that as many as 12,000 former prisoners would be allowed to leave the country if they so desired. Making pointed reference to U.S. human rights rhetoric, Castro said that it was now up to the United States to demonstrate that it cared as much about the fate of these persons as it had been claiming all along. As the year ended, U.S. officials were still seeking appropriate responses to the Cuban initiatives. At the same time, they were attempting somewhat weakly to explain why Cubans now seeking entry to the United States were being screened so slowly and carefully by authorities who only a few years earlier had welcomed exiled Cubans to the United States by the hundreds of thousands.

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