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FILE ONLY - DCY

How to be the hit of the New Year's Eve party

ART BUCHWALD

WASHINGTON - It's New Year's Eve and you're speechless. Stick this in your wallet or purse and become the hit of the party.

— "My daughter gave up her Cabbage Patch doll for adoption."

"If Ed Meese thought Scrooge was the victim of a bad press, remember what they did to Count Dracula."

"I don't see how you people can celebrate New Year's Eve when Premier Nakasone lost 36 seats in the Japanese elections last week."

"I always cry at the end of 'Love Boat.'"

"George makes spare parts for the Pentagon."

"Would anyone like to come over to our house after dinner and see a videotape of 'The Day After?'"

"Try this cheese. We got it standing in line at a government warehouse."

"My kid managed to break into the Chrysler computer and ordered it to ship 1000 trucks to Lee Iacocca's house for Christmas."

"I don't see why you have to have 'The Right Stuff' to be an astronaut."

"If you want to know what the Germans really think of us, read 'Hitler's Diaries.'"

"You'll never get a nuclear arms treaty with the Soviets by sitting down and talking to them."

"I wish Ronald Reagan would grow a beard."

"Does anyone know if Andropov's health is improving?"

"Shall we all drink a toast to Australia for winning the America's Cup?"

"If I marry Joanna Carson, she'll never get \$50,000 a month out of me."

"I'd rather have my kid learn how to play football than worry about whether he was getting an education or not."

"I think the media are doing one helluva job, and I hope they keep it up."

"Does anyone want to bet that George McGovern will be our next President?"

"Can any of you remember where you were the exact moment James Watt retired as Secretary of the Interior?"

"I'd rather be nouveau riche than not rich at all."

"My son is suing his female boss for sexual harassment."

"We just got into a tax shelter with William Casey, director of the CIA."

"Every time we buy land underneath a volcano in Hawaii, the damn thing blows up."

"Did you hear the latest about Zsa Zsa Gabor?"

"Allan put a dump truck in front of our driveway to stop terrorists, so now we have to park our car in the street."

"No. Sidney didn't come tonight. He got drunk at his Christmas office party, and they called for a volunteer driver from the Safe Holiday Motor Pool, and she took him home to her apartment, and now they're living together."

"I figure flying must be safe or the Moonies wouldn't hang out at airports."

"I got bored playing golf and tennis when the children left the nest, so I decided to become a lady barber."

"I'll bet you there isn't a person in this room who knows how much I paid for this watch."

"If everyone will shut up for one moment, we'll tell you what our four-year-old grandchild said to us on Christmas Eve."

"I'll show you my American Express card, if you show me yours."

"Woody had a triple heart bypass before the doctors discovered he was allergic to Orlon underwear."

"I'd rather have a gender gap than a missile gap."

"Hey, everybody, it's midnight. Would you all join me in singing the Grenada National Anthem?"

Art Buchwald is a syndicated columnist.

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STAT

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21 years after JFK-Khrushchev, Cuba accord haunts U.S. policy

By Ted Agres
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

The Reagan administration, faced with a growing threat of Soviet missiles being deployed 10 minutes from the U.S. coast, may be forced to decide soon whether agreements made 21 years ago with the Russians are valid.

This assessment is based on secret documents obtained from the State Department and interviews with policymakers in the administration and Congress.

At issue is the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, in which the Soviets promised to remove their

offensive weapons from Cuba in return for an American pledge to lift its blockade of the island and not to invade. The agreement also has been contingent upon the Soviet Union not using Cuba to export insurrection in the region.

The understanding has been a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy since the two leaders made the agreement in October 1962.

But closely held documents, among some 2,400 pages locked in State Department files, reveal widely varying opinions held by U.S. officials over the years as to whether the Soviets have kept their part of the agreement.

Now concern is growing among

senior government officials that the Reagan administration is unsure how it should respond to new Soviet threats and activities in this hemisphere.

Three Republican senators, James McClure and Steve Symms of Idaho and Jesse Helms of North Carolina, want President Reagan to disavow the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement based upon Soviet abrogation of it. They are urging Mr. Reagan to use the disavowal as legal justification for whatever military action may be required to protect U.S. interests in the hemisphere.

For several months, Soviet officials have been warning that they would deploy nuclear missiles off the coast of the United States, targeted on major U.S. cities, if NATO

proceeds with modernizing its medium-range nuclear missile forces in Europe, targeted on Soviet bases and cities.

Installation of these cruise and Pershing II missiles began last month, and the Soviets have since walked out of arms control negotiations in Geneva.

One recent Soviet threat was delivered by Gen. Nikolai Chervov, who warned that Soviet missiles would be deployed within "10 minutes" flying time of the United States, most certainly based in the hemisphere.

Soviet spokesmen subsequently denied that Cuba would be used to base these missiles, but U.S. officials are not convinced. Nor is the possible use of Soviet facilities in other Latin American countries, including Guyana, being dismissed.

President Reagan has twice publicly accused the Soviets of "abrogating" the agreement, citing the introduction of "offensive weapons" in Cuba counter to the understanding.

Other senior officials, including CIA Director William Casey and Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle, have likewise charged the accords have been violated and "eroded away to nothing" due to Soviet non-compliance.

The Soviets are reported to have on Cuba some 40 MiG-23 and MiG-27 "Flogger" fighter bombers with nuclear capability, 12 TU-95 "Bear" heavy bombers, nine airfields to accommodate these and other bombers, a strategic nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos and a Soviet combat brigade.

In all, the Soviets have about 52 operational nuclear delivery systems in Cuba, nearly twice the number they had in 1962.

But what analysts consider most important is that abrogation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement gives the United States a "legal right" to take military action "to prevent aggression in the hemisphere" fomented by the Soviet-Cuban axis — this according to a secret 1982 legal memorandum by the Reagan administration.

Nevertheless, Mr. Reagan refrained from invoking the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement in justifying the U.S. military action in Grenada. Instead, he cited concern for the safety of U.S. stu-

dents on the island and the request for assistance from West Indian island states.

Mr. Reagan has since incurred criticism from many quarters for this rationale, despite his wide support from the American public.

Secret documents relating to the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement obtained by The Washington Times are part of some 500 documents, totaling 2,400 pages, sequestered in locked State Department files.

But neither the National Security Council, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency nor members of the Senate have been allowed recent access to the documents.

Reasons are murky. Richard Burt, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, who is said to be controlling access, did not return repeated calls to his office for comment.

The documents withheld from U.S. policymakers outline the varying interpretations of the agreement during the past 21 years. Indeed, a secret legal analysis by the Carter State Department in November 1978 concluded that the Kennedy-Khrushchev "understanding . . . has not been treated as an international agreement binding in law."

The Reagan administration analysis, done for then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig in January 1982, takes a different tack. It admits that "we have in the past taken the position, at least internally, that the 1962 U.S.-Soviet exchanges were not legally binding agreements."

But it concludes, "It would be ill-advised to continue to foster the view that these exchanges are less than legally binding understandings."

CONFIDENTIAL

CIA's Blind Eye to the Pope Plot

By CLAIRE STERLING

The order of arrest for Mehmet Ali Agca signed last night by Attorney General Achille Giliucci accuses the Turkish terrorist of "an attempt on the life of a head of state . . . in concourse with other persons who remain unknown." This last "is not just a precaution; it is more than that," he said.

(Judge) Luciano Infelisi, the examining magistrate who signed the warrant, said more explicitly: "For us, there is documentary proof that Mehmet Ali Agca did not act alone."

—La Stampa of Turin, May 15, 1981 (datelined Rome)

Police are convinced, according to government sources, that Mr. Agca acted alone.

—the New York Times, May 15, 1981 (datelined Rome)

He did not act alone. We know that now, since he has said so himself and the Italian judiciary has confirmed it. If not for Agca's testimony, no amount of fragmentary evidence would have convinced the world that the Bulgarian secret service, acting on behalf of the Soviet Union's KGB, conspired to murder the head of the Roman Catholic Church. Much of the world still refuses to believe it: because it seems unbelievable, and because the Western public, deliberately deceived by its own leaders, was led to conclude that there never was a conspiracy at all.

It took less than 48 hours to mount the deception. Pope John Paul II was shot and very nearly killed in St. Peter's Square on the afternoon of May 13, 1981. The first official falsehood showed up on the morning of May 15, in the New York Times, as cited above, and elsewhere in the international press.

Distorted Image

Alive and in prison, Mehmet Ali Agca was a time bomb, ticking away until the inevitable day when he would be induced to talk. So began a singular Western effort to discredit what Agca might say before he said it, suppress the supporting evidence, dismiss him as an incorrigible liar of unbalanced mind. Why the governments of free nations should have gone to such lengths to shield the Soviet Union is a long story, told only in part here, of ingenuous expectations and self-inflicted defeats. How they did it is easier for me to explain than why.

When the first arrests were made on the strength of his confession, in late November 1982, his image was so effectively distorted that hardly anybody was prepared to believe him. Those who might have been willing to listen were discouraged by semiofficial leaks to the press. A spokesman for Whitehall in London warned

against crediting "convicts who sing to get out of jail." German and Israeli secret services were quoted in the New York Times as blaming the arrests on "doubtful information or downright disinformation." The CIA's deputy director in Rome was quoted in the Italian press as telling the interior minister bluntly: "You have no proof"—this last while rumors were spreading through Europe that Agca had been told what to say, secretly, in his prison cell, by the CIA itself.

The world was left with a somewhat confusing yet somehow comforting image of the pope's would-be assassin that would never quite fade. He was a Turk; that was something people would always remember. It made him truly a stranger in Western eyes, coming from an alien and indistinct Islamic land, stirring hazy visions of fierce mustachioed Ottomans, starving Armenians, and Ambleresque Byzantine intrigue.

Personally and politically, Agca was held to be everything and its opposite. Planetwide headlines had made him out to be at once an unregenerate neo-Nazi and a Moslem fanatic consumed with hatred for the Christian West; a cold professional killer already convicted of murder at home, and an irrational crackpot; a member of Turkey's right-wing Gray Wolves, who presumably travel in packs, and a loner—above all, a loner.

That suited a great many people at top-most international levels who feared—indeed assumed—that the truth, if uncovered, would prove to be awkward, untimely, impolitic, inexpedient, and thus unacceptable.

Much the same reasoning had contributed greatly to the global expansion of international terrorism over the previous decade. The argument went that detente must not be endangered by exposing the Russians' peccadilloes, that scolding them in public would merely bring out the worst in them—in effect that the KGB would go away if we would only be nice to it.

The results could be measured year by year in the rising levels of terrorist equipment and proficiency, assured by the Russians directly or through their surrogates. By 1981, practically all Western governments had a lengthy record of denying in public what they knew in private to be the provenance of these terrorists' training and weapons. Bigger and bolder terrorist strikes, which they might be said to have brought upon themselves, did not deter them from this course. Judging by experience, the pope's assailants might logically count on their continuing indulgence.

The operation was evidently planned to simulate the kind of mindless terrorist hit that has gradually been accorded a kind of numbed acceptance, a hit designed not so

much to eliminate the victim as to frighten the audience. In this instance, however, the purpose was not to frighten the audience but to eliminate the victim. It was no terrorist hit at all. The setting was an elaborate ruse. The assassin had been hired, and paid. He had no passionate ideological commitments, nor did his employers, who were simply agents of a foreign state. Would Western governments—whatever their past performance—help to keep a secret of such magnitude?

They would, and did.

Faced with a crime of the highest international order, against the supreme leader of the largest organized church on earth, a crime committed on Vatican soil by a Turkish citizen whose trail crossed at least seven national frontiers, the Italians were essentially left to deal with it alone. Neither the six other countries implicated directly nor any of Italy's natural allies

made an urgent point of gathering relevant information, still less of passing it on to Rome. The papal shooting was "not a matter of intense scrutiny" for the CIA, said one of its senior officials in Washington. "It is an Italian matter, and it would be inappropriate for us to intrude."

Vital leads were frequently ignored, knowledge infrequently shared, indispensable evidence withheld. An establishmentarian longing to keep the lid on was apparent wherever I went. "Come, now. Whatever makes you believe there was any such thing as an international plot? Our police in Germany really don't see the attack on the pope as the big operation you seem to think it was." I was told with a tolerant smile by a ranking functionary of West Germany's Bundeskriminalamt.

Agca "did not come from nowhere," the Court of Assizes in Rome declared: "Hidden minds" had sent him. He was no "delirious ideologue," felt "no personal hostility" toward the pope, and "not a word of the proceedings" had shown him to be a religious crank. Far from being crazy, he had "uncommon gifts of mental equilibrium." His "spirit of discipline, professional commitment, and skill in the use of lethal weapons" had made him an ideal instrument for the operation in St. Peter's Square—just that, and no more. In the court's opinion, Agca had "merely been used as a pawn."

Yet the cult of disbelief died hard, sustained by the one source that should by rights have been above suspicion. If anybody ought to be seizing triumphantly on the Russo-Bulgarian conspiracy theory, it was the redoubtable CIA. Precisely because it had come to be seen so widely as the world's primeval anti-communist force (and prime evildoer besides), its excep-

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USA TODAY
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INQUIRY

Topic: INSIDE THE CIA

William Casey, 70, is director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He began his intelligence career in World War II, and then served in a variety of public and private jobs, including a State Department post and as a partner in a New York City law firm. He was interviewed about the activities of the CIA for USA TODAY by free-lance writer Morgan Strong.



William Casey

Public has positive attitude about CIA

USA TODAY: What are the CIA's chief functions?

CASEY: The agency's chief function is to produce intelligence on matters of national interest that are important to the policymaking and decision-making process. We collect information through various means, including such technical means as photography, then evaluate, analyze and synthesize this information to reach judgments.

USA TODAY: Is the CIA the coordinator of all the government's intelligence activities?

CASEY: As director, I'm charged with coordinating the activities of the intelligence community, which is made up of a group of organizations including the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, the FBI, the Departments of Energy, Treasury, and State. The CIA is the primary assembler of all

sources of intelligence. The CIA also has a collection role, acquiring information openly and clandestinely; other agencies also collect information.

USA TODAY: Isn't there some competition among the agencies, though?

CASEY: There's deliberate competition. We believe in

competitive analysis, in the sense that we encourage the components of the community to come up with their own judgments. Then we meet in the National Foreign Intelligence Board to sort it out and reconcile differences. What we can't reconcile, we flag for the attention of the policymakers. In that sense, we encourage competition.

USA TODAY: Is there any tension among the intelligence agencies?

CASEY: Very little. Today, I'm going to meet with the heads of the agencies. We'll spend a full day sorting out problems. We meet each week to approve National Intelligence Estimates. We look for differences and if they are significant, we make clear that they exist. The only turf I have to protect is our objectivity.

USA TODAY: There were differing estimates of the strength of the defenders during the Grenada invasion. Do policymakers sometimes ignore or misinterpret information provided by the CIA?

CASEY: I don't think the Grenada example is a good one. Although there were no CIA officials on the spot, we had a number of sources on the island providing information

regularly. There was never a difference in the intelligence community (regarding Cuban strength) of more than 200. Intelligence is not an exact science, and there will be differences. That's why we try to bring out the significant areas of disagreement and determine the rationale and reasons for them. There is a danger if intelligence is ignored, but we've done a lot to minimize that.

USA TODAY: How?

CASEY: We brief principal officials in government every day. We've increased the number of National Intelligence Estimates to about 50 a year, up from about 12 a year in the late 1970s. These estimates are on the table when decisions are made. Sometimes this intelligence isn't given sufficient weight by policymakers, but there is a good give and take that provides assurance that it will be looked at and understood. The best assurance ... rests in a good relationship between the intelligence people and the policy people. Now this relationship is very close.

PARIS, Dec. 15 — For years now, U.S. foreign policy in Central America has been undermined by private or semi-private U.S. groups encouraging the extreme right to disregard official Washington warnings.

A senior State Department official said not long ago that it must be dreadfully confusing for the local politicians. They are told publicly that the U.S. supports democracy and reforms, and opposes death squads and wanton murder of peasants.

But then they hear whispers from Americans who seem influential that all this talk is for public consumption, and that the U.S. backs anyone who fights Communists. The contradiction is widely known in Washington.

The private activities probably violate the Logan Act, passed in 1799 and still on the books. It forbids unauthorized U.S. citizens to deal with foreign governments in an attempt to influence foreign policy, which well-placed people were already trying to do in the earliest days of the Republic. Aaron Burr was an example. The act is considered virtually unenforceable now.

But there are disturbing signs that private involvement in covert actions has substantially expanded well beyond political and economic measures, exemplified by the I.T.T. in Chile before the Pinochet coup, to paramilitary activities.

Whether or not this subverts U.S. policy depends on what the policy really is. In any case, such involvement shields participants from the legal oversight mandated for specially cleared Congressional committees. According to Adm. Stansfield Turner, former C.I.A. Director, it also probably blocks C.I.A. control once operations are launched, risking runaway disasters.

There is an argument in Washington about whether the Administration is deliberately disguising an attempt to overthrow the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua and help the far

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Left Hand, Right Hand

By Flora Lewis

right elsewhere, or whether it is lax in reining in its own supporters.

John Carbaugh, the busy former aide to Senator Jesse Helms, said flatly that the C.I.A. was totally in charge, sometimes through private contracts or by accepting "contributions." These seem to include planes and possibly U.S. mercenaries sent to perform sabotage. Mr. Carbaugh has intimate knowledge of devious moves in Central America, but he doesn't hide his contempt for what the C.I.A. is doing.

Philip Taubman and Jeff Gerth of The New York Times recently tracked several privately owned American planes involved in secret operations, but they haven't been able to pinpoint the source of the orders or the money. Argentine soldiers helped train "contras" in Honduras and plan attacks in Nicaragua before the Falkland war, but they are no longer available, Congressional sources say.

The U.S. military and paramilitary network is now expanding through the region. The Administration says it endorses the efforts of the Latin Contadora group to demilitarize Central America and promote negotiated settlements. But U.S. actions cast doubt on the declarations, even as Henry Kissinger and his commission tour the area preparing to recom-

mend huge sums of economic aid to evolve moderate regimes interested in negotiating.

It is easier to see the political underpinning for the conflicting drive to the right. There are conservative "think tanks" in the Washington area that make a point of having good relations with such ultras as Salvador's Roberto D'Aubuisson and Guatemala's Mario Sandoval Alarcon, who are officially shunned by the U.S. because of their murderous reputations.

Among them are the Council on Inter-American Security, the American Security Council, and the National Strategic Information Center, the last organized in the 1960's by William Casey, now C.I.A. Director. Retired U.S. military officers and former C.I.A. officials are among their active members.

They travel to Central America, and arrange high-level meetings for their friends when they come to Washington. These sessions are then used by the Latins to spread word that they have confirmed secret U.S. Government backing, despite public denunciations. U.S. ambassadors have confided that they are powerless to reverse the impact.

If the policy is what the Administration announces, to promote moderate, democratic regimes capable of social and economic development that will head off Communist advance, then it is being flouted by its servants and friends. If that is only lip service, it is not only deceiving the country and wasting a lot of money, it is compounding the danger.

The jungle of intrigue, undercover attacks and provocation has helped make Central America the mess it is. There have been no successes. More militarization, in collusion with corporations, covert or open with U.S. troops, diminishes the prospects of both security and freedom. Mr. Kissinger should take the hidden side into account in his report.

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SAN FRANCISCO

ADMINISTRATION EXEMPT FROM NEUTRALITY ACT, GOVERNMENT SAYS
BY SUSAN GOLDFARB

The U.S. Justice Department, claiming the Neutrality Act does not apply to the administration, says the Attorney General has the authority to decide whether the President broke the law in telling the CIA to conduct covert activities in Nicaragua.

Attorney David Anderson of Washington D.C. asked a U.S. District judge Thursday to revoke his court order requiring the Attorney General to investigate whether Reagan violated the Neutrality Act. The federal lawyer said he would appeal to a higher court if the judge denies the request.

Anderson argued that the Attorney General -- not the court -- has the discretion to decide whether or not to prosecute, even before any investigation is conducted.

"The department's judgment on the law of the Neutrality Act is that it does not apply to executive officials conducting foreign policy on behalf of the United States," Anderson said.

U.S. District Judge Stanley A. Weigel said he would consider the matter and issue a ruling later.

Anderson said he would appeal to a higher court if Judge Weigel rules against him.

Judge Weigel issued a ruling Nov. 3 ordering criminal investigation of the President and other high government officials in a case brought by Rep. Ronald Dellums, D-Oakland, and two other plaintiffs. If found guilty, the President and his key advisers face up to three years in prison and fines of \$3,000 each.

The suit alleged President Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, CIA Director William Casey, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and other high government violated the Neutrality Act, which prohibits training civilians to overthrow a government with which the United States is not at war.

Dellums earlier had asked Attorney General William French Smith to investigate the President for criminal activity but Smith refused, and Dellums went to court.

"We assumed the Attorney General would conduct a good faith investigation," said Dellums' attorney, Jules Lobel. "He has refused to do that. Instead, the government argues the President is not subject to the Neutrality Act, that he is above the law."

The United States has been conducting military training of Nicaraguan exiles in Florida since 1980, the lawsuit claims.

Nicaragua is not a declared enemy of the United States.

According to Dellums, the plan provided at least \$19 million to finance covert paramilitary operations against the people of Nicaragua; train armies of 10,000 to 15,000 Nicaraguan exiles in the United States and Honduras; conduct CIA intelligence activity and send hundreds of CIA agents and government officials to Honduras to assist in attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

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Albosta probers run into memory lapses

But hearings are set in case of Carter papers

By Nancy J. Schwerzler
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — A House subcommittee investigating how Carter administration documents ended up in the Reagan campaign is faced with a series of memory lapses by witnesses and suggestions of partisan bickering over the way hearings next month on the panel's findings will be conducted.

After nearly six months of investigation that began in a flurry of publicity last summer, the House Human Resources Subcommittee, under Chairman Donald J. Albosta (D, Mich.), is near the end of its inquiries and is scheduled to hold hearings beginning January 26.

The work of the subcommittee, which oversees ethics laws covering government employees and is primarily concerned with how those standards might be improved, could be overshadowed, however, regardless of its outcome, by a separate criminal probe conducted by the FBI. The FBI has not yet released the findings of its investigation, although it is believed to be near completion.

"We're not going to oversell it," Micah Green, staff director of the subcommittee, says of the forthcoming hearings. "We don't want to make a mountain out of a molehill."

"I think it will prove to have much less interest to the press and public than when it began," Steve Hemphill, counsel to the panel's Republicans who has been monitoring the probe, said of the subcommittee investigation.

Those associated with the panel's investigation are reluctant to discuss or draw conclusions about the substance of the inquiry — how a briefing book intended to prepare President Jimmy Carter for the October, 1980, debate with Republican candidate Ronald Reagan ended up in the possession of Mr. Reagan's campaign staff. The panel is also probing the apparent transfer of other materials from the Carter White House to the Reagan campaign organization.

During the investigation, about 200 witnesses — most of them Republi-

cans — have been interviewed, thousands of documents have accumulated from the campaign and personal files of top Reagan administration officials, and conflicting versions of events and conversations have been uncovered.

One of Mr. Albosta's main concerns is that there may have been unauthorized disclosure of sensitive national security data during the Iranian crisis that could have jeopardized the safety of American hostages.

Richard V. Allen, President Reagan's former national security adviser and a former Reagan campaign official, has said publicly that he found in his files excerpts of material prepared by the Carter National Security Council staff, but he has characterized the material as "innocuous" and unclassified.

However, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former Carter security adviser, has claimed that the staff reports usually contained highly sensitive and classified data, especially at a time when the Carter administration was consumed with the hostage situation in Iran.

Reagan campaign officials have also acknowledged that they were extremely concerned about what they called "an October surprise" — a sudden step by President Carter to win the freedom of the American hostages and thus ride to reelection on a crest of popular support. The Republican officials have maintained there were no improper efforts to obtain secret information, however.

Mr. Albosta said in an interview that his investigation was examining whether unauthorized disclosures of sensitive security materials "could have endangered the lives of the hostages."

"We're looking at that very, very closely," he said. "The public would be very opposed to a group or individuals getting that type of information" and potentially using it for political gain, Mr. Albosta said.

Mr. Hemphill, the minority counsel for the subcommittee's parent Post Office and Civil Service Committee, says that although the inquiry has focused on the hostage question, "I do not perceive it as being a very time-consuming portion of the investigation." Nevertheless, Mr. Hem-

phill, who has participated in the staff interviews of witnesses, acknowledged that he is not privy to the majority staff's discussions.

Mr. Albosta also said that investigators were looking into possible links between William Casey, the CIA director and a former Reagan campaign official, and Paul Corbin, a Democrat with ties to the Kennedy family who was paid for some campaign work for the Reagan organization. Mr. Albosta, however, said he mentioned the Corbin-Casey link primarily because it has been disclosed previously in media reports and that it was simply one of many matters being examined.

Mr. Corbin has been cited by some witnesses as claiming credit for obtaining the Carter briefing book, but he has denied it. Mr. Casey has denied receiving the briefing book from anyone, but other Reagan aides have said the briefing book came to the campaign through Mr. Casey.

Mr. Albosta said one of the problems investigators have faced is memory lapses by witnesses. "I don't know really how you resolve it," he said. One of the functions of the hearings will be to highlight the "conflicts" between witnesses' versions of events or their inability to remember them.

Reagan administration officials have often displayed detailed "memory capacity" in other matters, he said, but "all of a sudden they can't remember something as important as this."

Although both sides say they are not trying to turn the probe or next month's subcommittee hearings into a partisan battle, there are already signs of political tensions.

Mr. Hemphill, the Republican counsel, has been keeping a tally of the political affiliations of the witnesses called by the majority staff and says there have been twice as many Republican or Reagan-affiliated witnesses as Democratic or Carter-affiliated witnesses.

Mr. Albosta acknowledged that more Republicans had been interviewed, but said this was simply because "that is where the statements seem to be coming from."

CONTINUED

Mr. Albosta said investigators had asked Mr. Brzezinski and Jody Powell, the former Carter administration press secretary, about "any leads they could give us on the Democratic side." He added, however, that "it's been very difficult at best to get anything from those people; I felt they really didn't know."

"I don't see any gain for me or for the Democratic Party in this," the Michigan Democrat said of the probe. "Obviously, there is just as much fault in the Democratic camp for somebody to give out material as there is on the Republican side" to receive it.

Mr. Hemphill said Republicans were reserving the right to call their own witnesses at next month's hearings and that under committee rules they were entitled to at least a day of such testimony. The Democrats' witness list has not yet been established.

"I'll not turn this into a three-ring circus to please the minority," Mr. Albosta said. Although he hopes to work with Republicans in organizing the hearings, he said, he "will not yield to pressure" to turn them into a partisan event.

"I think it strange they would consistently oppose this type of investigation," Mr. Albosta said. Republicans on the panel have questioned the necessity of the probe, saying that if changes in ethics laws are truly the chairman's goal, they could be made by simply "assuming the worst" and rewriting the law accordingly.



Associated Press/1983

Representative Donald J. Albosta (D, Mich.) has been working on probe for nearly six months.



Associated Press/1980

CIA Director William Casey, former Reagan campaign aide, has denied receiving Carter papers.

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FILE ONLY

DC

WASHINGTON TIMES
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DIANA HEARS

CASEYS AT THE BAT... New York's super-social ex-Rep John LeBoutillier, toppled from his perch by Democratic Rep. Bob Mrazek, has been brooding about taking another dive at the twig. Well, darlings. His last poll shows a 48 per cent "Negative" response, even from His Kind of Folks. On the sunny side: Pals say this means that the adorable Larry Casey will take a shot at that very seat. Larry's not only an old Jack Kemp sidekick and a whizbang on the staff of Rep. George Wortley; he's *also* the nephew of CIA superstar Bill Casey — who actually pitched for that very seat back in '66, but never grabbed it. What an incredibly weeny world. Watch that space.

Decision to Get Tougher Led to Bombing by U.S.

By GEORGE SKELTON,
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The U.S. retaliatory attack on Syrian anti-aircraft positions Sunday resulted from a decision by President Reagan late last week to get tough militarily in Lebanon in an effort to bolster the morale of the Lebanese government and army, Administration officials said.

After having refrained for six weeks from retaliating for the terrorist bombing attack that killed 239 American servicemen at Beirut airport on Oct. 23, Reagan decided during meetings Thursday and Friday with his top security advisers "to respond vigorously and promptly" to the next assault on U.S.

forces, a White House official said.

"No one in those meetings realized that, come Saturday morning, we would be faced with a classic attack on our forces," said the official, Robert B. Sims, public affairs director for the National Security Council.

Reagan's decision to "generally toughen up the U.S. position" in Lebanon, Sims noted, coincided with his meeting on Thursday with Lebanese President Amin Gemayel.

In his meeting with Gemayel, Reagan urged that the Lebanese army become more aggressive and take control of territory not occupied by Muslim, Syrian or Israeli forces. This would assert Lebanese authority and help persuade the Israelis that they could safely withdraw their forces without having territory near their northern border fall into the hands of pro-Syrian elements, Reagan contended.

"Here we were asking them to be more forceful and we really hadn't done very much ourselves," said one Administration official, who did not want to be identified by name. "There was question of our resolve by Gemayel and the Lebanese. The Lebanese probably are pleased now that we have taken decisive, concrete action and shown we are not in a cut-and-run mood."

'Redouble Efforts'

Sims said Reagan decided to "redouble our efforts in the spirit of showing Gemayel we are not giving up on Lebanon."

He had also said that after an unsuccessful Nov. 17 attack on U.S. reconnaissance planes, the Administration had used diplomatic channels to warn Syria "in forceful terms" that a similar future assault could prompt American retaliation. The U.S. representatives also told the Syrian government that the American planes will continue to fly reconnaissance missions, Sims said.

The attack Saturday morning on two U.S. F-14 aircraft by Syrian anti-aircraft weapons, and 10 surface-to-air missiles, was stronger by far than any previous assault on American planes in Lebanon,

Sims said.

Reagan's national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, consulted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon officials, and by late Saturday afternoon was ready with a retaliatory plan for Reagan's approval. The President quickly approved it.

McFarlane sat in on the Thursday and Friday White House meetings with Reagan, as did Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, CIA Director William J. Casey and Gen. John W. Vessey Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Administration officials said the Israelis were neither consulted nor advised about the retaliatory attack before it took place. Neither did the Israelis consult with the United States before they hit Syrian targets Saturday, they said.

The U.S. military, however, consulted in advance with the Lebanese and the other three nations represented in the multinational peacekeeping force Lebanon—Italy, France and Britain.

ARTICLE APPROVED
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Air raids viewed as part of U.S.-Israeli accord

By Peter Almond
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

LONDON — The Israeli and American air raids against Syrian targets in Lebanon are described here and in Israel as the first evidence of a U.S.-Israeli pact to force Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon.

For the record, Israeli officials said yesterday they knew of no such pact, which would have been made by President Reagan and Israeli

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in Washington last week.

The Observer, a London Sunday newspaper, quoted "well-placed Western and Arab intelligence sources" as saying the United States and Israel have agreed to cut Syria down to size "by war if need be."

The apparent political disarray caused by the mysterious illness of Syrian President Hafez Assad has encouraged hawks in Israel and the United States to seize this moment

to move against Syria, the newspaper says.

The Sunday Times quoted a "highly placed Middle East source" as saying the new pact means the United States would come to Israel's aid in the event Moscow intervened in a Syrian-Israeli clash.

The Sunday Times quoted its source as saying Secretary of State George Shultz, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and White House Chief of Staff James Baker III persuaded President Reagan to endorse the agreement against the advice of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey.

The Sunday Times also reported that the U.S.-Israeli agreement lends credibility to remarks made by a senior Israeli intelligence official, to five leading Lebanese Christian leaders whom he met in an East Beirut villa on Nov. 23, that Israel would move against Syria in the Shouf Mountains in eight to 10

days. Syria, he said, would receive a "sharp blow." The Reagan-Shamir meeting, he said, would be critical for the plan to go forward.

U.S. and Israeli planes hit Druze positions in the Shouf mountains 10 and 11 days after that meeting.

(Radio Moscow yesterday also tied the escalation of U.S. and Israeli air raids in Lebanon to agreements purportedly reached between the United States and Israel in Washington last week.

("Observers connect the escalation of the fighting by the United States and Israel in Lebanon with the new strategic agreements reached during the visit to Washington" of Mr. Shamir, the broadcast said.)

Yesterday in Israel, the newspaper Ha'aretz reported a similar version of a U.S.-Israeli agreement. Regardless of whether Israel and the United States actually signed a formal agreement last week in Washington, diplomatic and military sources said, both nations could find several compelling reasons to act swiftly and decisively now against Syria:

- For President Reagan, going into an election year, the continued presence of 1,600 U.S. Marines in Beirut might be politically intolerable if there's no favorable end in sight. The deaths of 239 Marines — and now eight more, killed yesterday — make the withdrawal of the Marine contingent necessary.

- For Israel, also exposed to suicide-bomb attacks and with its own dead to mourn, maintaining troops in southern Lebanon is becoming a liability as well. Israeli troops, digging into fortified positions, have begun to assign responsibility for their security to Lebanese militiamen. As a result, they are increasingly resented by Lebanese civilians. But they are determined that Israeli soldiers won't move back from the Awwali River until Syria withdraws its troops from Lebanon.

- For Lebanon, to continue in the current situation invites disaster. The economy is in a shambles, investment has fled, and the Lebanese government's inability to

expand its authority outside Beirut and its suburbs increases the likelihood of a nation permanently divided between hostile religious factions.

The illness of President Hafez Assad of Syria compounds the uncertainty with confusion.

Mr. Assad has not been seen in public since Nov. 13, when he was said to have been taken into a hospital for appendicitis surgery. But sources in the Middle East say Mr. Assad's appendix was removed in Cairo in 1958, and that he may, in fact, have suffered a serious heart attack.

He appeared on Syrian television last week, provoking such delight among his nervous supporters that Damascus rang to the sound of celebratory automatic gunfire, but the authenticity of his television appearance was doubted in Israel.

One Israeli source said the film, which did not record his voice, also showed a senior Syrian military official who was believed to be on military maneuvers elsewhere.

In London, The Observer said yesterday that Mr. Assad's condition was serious enough that his family wanted to take him abroad for treatment — perhaps to Switzerland — but that the family had been unable to persuade Syrian intelligence experts, who fear he may be assassinated.

Mr. Assad and his brother, Rifat, his likely successor, are hated by the fundamentalist Moslem Brotherhood, which has tried more than once to assassinate them. Mr. Assad crushed the Brotherhood's uprising in Hama last year without mercy.

The new fear of assassination abroad apparently stems from the discovery last year that a group of British-based mercenaries had been paid \$15,000 to make a feasibility study of how to kill Rifat Assad in Geneva, where he has a private home.

The same group of marksmen also went to Damascus where they concluded that Hafez Assad would be a difficult target because he travels everywhere by helicopter.

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FILE

THE INMAN FILE

BY JAMES CONAWAY

James Conaway is a staff writer for The Washington Post Magazine.

Back in 1975, when Bobby Ray Inman was director of Naval Intelligence, he was invited by some Senate staffers to come up to Capitol Hill and discuss the Soviet threat. The invitation proved to be more complicated than it appeared, as invitations to spies often do . . . but let Inman tell the story himself:

"After the meeting, a staffer asked me to lunch. We went to a little restaurant on the back side of the Hill, and two characters slid into the seats next to us. They started talking to me, suggesting that if their companies got some contracts, they could be of great help to the Navy. I was just beginning to get incensed when one of them said, 'By the way, I work for you.'"

Inman was flabbergasted. The man was Edmund Wilson, a hulking former CIA agent who belonged to the secret Naval Intelligence organization known as Task Force 157, whose members gathered intelligence about harbors around the world. While working for Task Force 157, Wilson had managed to become a rich man, owning a Virginia horse farm, among other things. He would go on to procure illegal explosives for Libyan terrorists and attempt to have some people assassinated, but that's another story.

"I went back to the office," Inman says, "and asked, 'Who is this guy?' That day I decided to terminate Wilson's contract." Inman had already decided to do away with Task Force 157, to meet the Navy's

budgetary requirements, but the meeting with Wilson convinced him that the decision was sound. "Later"—and Inman smiles the gap-toothed smile so familiar to congressional committees and intelligence operatives—"Wilson blamed me for a lot of his troubles."

Inman was Wilson's antithesis, principled to a fault, and so physically unassuming that as a child he was often beaten up in east Texas schools (until he helped two brawny classmates with their homework and learned the value of bodyguards).

Today Wilson is in prison and Inman is drinking California riesling in the first-class cabin of a Boeing 727 streaking between Washington and Austin. "The thought crossed my mind," he says, gazing at his wan reflection in the blackened window of the aircraft, "that Wilson might try to do me harm."

Inman is a civilian now, the director of a consortium of electronics and computer companies known as MCC that is racing the Japanese toward the next generation of supercomputers. When Inman retired last year as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he probably had more varied experience in analytical intelligence than anyone. Though not a Naval Academy graduate, Inman

worked his way up through Naval Intelligence to become a four-star admiral, was named deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1976 and then became the youngest director ever of the secretive, monolithic National Security Agency.

He tried to retire in 1981, with 30 years of military service, but President Reagan personally asked him to take the number-two job under CIA director William Casey. Inman agreed, but left the CIA a year later, to critical acclaim from congressmen and soldiers alike, some of whom feared that American intelligence was losing one of its most valuable assets.

Inman resisted interviewers while in government, but decided to talk about intelligence-gathering for the simple reason that "it's an important subject." His views on the men and the machines in the business are instructive. Former CIA director William Colby says Inman "had all the jobs and never let the bureaucracy get in his way . . . He respected the congressional prerogative, but was also concerned with keeping the necessary secrets."

"He's a consummate professional and a highly moral individual," says George Carver, who was deputy of national intelligence in the CIA in the mid-1970s, now a senior fellow at the George

International Studies. "Bobby Inman has always been an extremely articulate and able advocate of the true net interests of whatever agency he represented."

That is a fair description of a good spy.

"Articles saying that I'm a master spy are pure garbage," Inman says. "I've never run a clandestine operation. But I've been an avid user of what they produce."

Disputes over covert action were cited as the reason Inman left the CIA; however, differences between him and Casey reportedly arose from personality conflicts, rather than philosophy, and the natural differences between generations. Casey was dropping spies into Nazi Germany when Inman was a Texas whiz kid.

Computers are as essential to the government Inman worked for as they are fundamental to his new endeavor, in a world where private enterprise and government service often overlap. His competitors might well be uneasy, given the admiral's vita.

Inman insists he is no longer in the business: "I'm not using any clandestine or technical sources to determine what the Japanese are doing. I do know that wherever I go to speak, there are substantial Japanese in attendance."

He looks like the class valedictorian, twisting a University of Texas ring around his finger while deflating some notions about spies and technology.

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WASHINGTON TIMES
2 December 1983

BARRY RUBIN

Untangling the Middle East snarls

The Lebanon crisis, President Reagan's main foreign policy problem, has provoked some major debates within the administration. Since Syria refuses to reach a negotiated agreement for withdrawing its troops, the problem threatens to drag on indefinitely, with about 1,500 U.S. Marines remaining in Lebanon under periodic attack.

Secretary of State George Shultz, seconded by National Security Advisor (and former Middle East negotiator) Robert McFarlane, wants to take a tough stand in order to pressure Syria into some sort of compromise. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, supported by CIA Director William Casey, favors finding the fastest possible pretext for pulling the Marines out of Beirut. President Reagan has decided in Mr. Shultz's favor, at least for the time being, and this choice will set the course for most U.S. Middle East policy in the months leading up to the 1984 presidential election.

An accident of timing helped settle the matter. The terrorist truck-bombing attack on Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 239 U.S. soldiers, took place shortly after Congress agreed to allow 18 months for leaving peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. If the incident had happened before the legislature gave this support to President Reagan, pressure from Capitol Hill to remove them would have been much greater. As it happened, despite public horror at the heavy losses, he does not face a significant challenge at home over the U.S. role in Lebanon.

The terrorist attack against the Marines was designed primarily by Iranian forces in Lebanon and their small group of Lebanese sympathizers as part of what they deem a continuing war with the American "Great Satan," but the Syrians countenanced such actions as a means of pressuring the United States to leave Lebanon. Ironically, calls to pull out the Marines only encourage the Syrians to permit or encourage more such assaults on the U.S. forces.

After all, as the U.S. elections come closer, public impatience with the Marines' presence in Lebanon is likely to increase, so Mr. Shultz's opportunity to face down Syria may last for a limited period. Syria knows that the United States will not fight over Lebanon; Damascus can merely wait until the United States grows tired of the contest and goes away. At that point, Syria could renew its domination over Lebanon — or at least the larger portion of the country outside Israeli occupation — at a much lower cost.

Since Syria can outwait the United States, Washington must give Damascus a reason to move toward resolving the issue. One way to do this might be to escalate the conflict. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger publicly suggested that the United States should encourage Israel to stage operations against the Syrians — or should even itself launch some military activities. Such ideas were not taken completely seriously by the administration itself, since the dangers of setting off a larger Middle East war cannot be taken lightly.

What Mr. Shultz wants to do, and this makes sense in diplomatic terms, is to frighten the Syrians while avoiding any major risks of embroiling the United States in fighting. A number of steps are involved in this effort: increased U.S. flights over Lebanon, heightened cooperation with Israel, Israeli and French airstrikes against the eastern Lebanon base used to launch bloody car-bomb attacks against the soldiers of all three states.

In calling for the U.S.-Israel cooperation in Lebanon, and in the region as a whole, Mr. Shultz has undergone a dramatic turnaround. At the beginning of his term as secretary of state, in August 1982, he insisted that some quick solution to the Palestinian problem was needed before progress could be made on any other question.

The secretary of state made a valiant effort to make progress on the matter by developing the Reagan plan — calling for a federated

Palestinian-Jordanian state including most of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. But the Saudis, the PLO, and Jordan refused to cooperate, making President Reagan look foolish and leaving the United States with few attractive options.

Further, contrary to State Department reports, the Syrians showed little interest in negotiating their way out of Lebanon even if Israeli withdrawal was assured.

A disillusioned Mr. Shultz ordered a shake-up in the State Department's Near East bureau and called for better ties between the United States and Israel. Mr. McFarlane, the new national security adviser, fresh from the frustrations of trying to negotiate with the Syrians in Lebanon, took a similar stand. The resignation of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who had poor personal relations with President Reagan and other U.S. officials, also aided improved bilateral ties. Thus the period of friction that began during Israel's invasion of Lebanon in July 1982 was quite over by the autumn of 1983.

There is still some hope in Washington that the Syrian-backed revolt against Yasser Arafat's leadership in the Palestine Liberation Organization might push Palestinian Arabs toward accepting Jordanian leadership and the Reagan plan. New steps were also taken to encourage indigenous leadership on the West Bank which might some day come forward in peace talks.

Still, the United States is not willing to try major efforts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict when the Arab states themselves are not willing to make concessions or take risks for peace. Arguments that the United States should recognize the PLO have little impact when the PLO itself is split and Arab regimes did relatively little to save Mr. Arafat from a drubbing at Syrian hands. Repeated statements by PLO leaders of their willingness to grant the U.S.S.R. bases in any independent Palestinian state also inclines Washington toward a more pro-Israel position.

PATRICK BUCHANAN

All the president's mensches

"See how these Christians love one another."

— Tertullian, Apologeticus

Observing from a distance as the warring factions, tribes and sects of central Lebanon beleaguer and butcher one another with near monotony — Palestine Liberation Organization "rebels," Arafat loyalists, Shi'ites, Sunnis, Druze, Maronites, Syrians, Phalangists, etc. — the sentiment of more and more bewildered Americans seems to be settling down to this: Let Lebanon be Lebanon, and let's get out.

Yet, imagine, if you will, some Druze chieftain, high in the Shouf Mountains, attempting to sort out what the Americans — with their carriers and gunboats just outside Beirut harbor — are up to, from his careful study of several weeks' reports on President Reagan's palace guard.

Several weeks back, Bill Clark, the president's confidant and friend, startled Washington by resigning his national security office, to escape the bloody feuding inside the West Wing.

Hard upon Mr. Clark's announcement, chief of staff James Baker, his adversary, attempted a West Wing coup, supported by allies Michael Deaver and Richard Darman, in which, it is said, the first lady was involved. Mr. Baker was to move to the National Security Council; Mr. Deaver — the treacherous "Lord Chamberpot" in the demonology of the New Right — would become chief of staff; the "moderates" would control the palace.

Alerted, Mr. Clark rallied U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey, who blocked the takeover advancing Mrs. Kirkpatrick as Mr. Clark's successor. After a brief, fierce struggle, the position went to Mr. Clark's deputy, Bud McFarlane.

Before leaving for the Interior Department, however, Mr. Clark set a time bomb ticking inside the locker of the moderates, whose aggressions had wearied him and eventually driven him out. The time

bomb took the form of a criminal investigation by the FBI of a leak from the National Security Council which reported that Mr. McFarlane — then Mideast negotiator — had advanced the idea of U.S. air strikes on some of the very parties with whom he was negotiating, thereby threatening not only Mr. McFarlane's mission, but his life.

That the time bomb threatens the moderates would seem evident from the fact that Ed Meese, their old antagonist, is pressing the investigation, while the White House press corps, de facto allies of the Baker-Deaver-Darman clique, are dismissing the leak as insignificant.

The moderates themselves, however, are no strangers to hardball. Through his affidavit to the Albosta Committee, looking into the purloined Carter briefing book, Mr. Baker — who received and handled the fruits of the breach of trust for the Reagan campaign — pointed the finger of suspicion directly at CIA Director Casey as the source. Yet, Mr. Baker, who volunteered for a polygraph test in the briefing-book caper, seems less enthusiastic over the use of lie detectors in the NSC leak.

Meanwhile, Communications Director David Gergen, who leads the White House in threatened resignations (though the Kissinger record, like DiMaggio's 56-game hitting streak, will never be equaled), has threatened again, over the internal trashing he received for reportedly having "panicked" over the ABC film, *The Day After*. Seeing the film as potential disaster for the administration, Mr. Gergen organized a public relations counteroffensive which hyped ABC's rating; and then shoved Secretary of State George Shultz out in front of 100 million television viewers to explain why President Reagan's nuclear buildup was just the thing to prevent the Kansas City holocaust they had just seen simulated on their screens.

Mr. Gergen is also said to have been personally mortified by having been cut out of the pre-Grenada loop and subsequently having been given only scraps to feed a ravenous White House press corps.

Acting Press Secretary Larry Speakes is likewise reported to have threatened resignation over Grenada, though his deputy, Les Janka, said to be responsible for said report, was either fired by Mr. Speakes or resigned on principle, depending on whose leak you trust.

Last weekend came Mr. Meese's turn again. Saturday morning, in the always receptive *Washington Post*, the Baker-Deaver-Darman

crowd dumped on the White House counselor for near-terminal incompetence. "Civil rights is our chamber of horrors," a "White House official" was quoted: "As Pogo would say, we have met the enemy and he is us. The civil rights groups didn't beat us. Ed Meese made a mess of it."

A related Monday story in *The New York Times* reported that "personal insults have become

common" as a form of communication in the president's official family.

With Mr. Reagan's approval rating reaching, in one national survey, 65 percent — an astonishing, unrivaled figure for a modern president late in his third year — maybe the White House staff is less important than it pretends, less significant than the rest of us sometimes make believe.

God and Man at

How Does an Intelligence Agent Reconcile Religion? The CIA Has Thought a Lot About It, and Has Concluded That the Bible and God Are on Their Side.

By Dale Van Atta

After the cornerstone of the Central Intelligence Agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia, had been laid in 1959, CIA Director Allen Dulles cast about for a suitable inscription. What message, he wondered, would be most apropos to grace the foyer of this \$46 million monument to spying? Eventually Dulles settled on the Biblical quotation now carved in marble on one side of the entrance hall: "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. John VIII-XXXII."

Ironical words, given that the CIA is the one American institution whose mission often demands distortion of the truth. The agency plants misinformation in newspapers, magazines, and books throughout the world; routinely its agents misrepresent themselves to gather the informational gold that is the currency of espionage; it once encouraged its employees to lie to Congress; and it has enshrined slippery former director Richard Helms as the CIA soldier most worthy of emulation. That so many CIA employees miss the irony of the Biblical inscription is testimony to the capacity of human beings to disregard a moral code when they're in the service of a cause or of a state.

Most CIA employee recruits hear the "basic speech," during which instructors, describing espionage as a worthy calling, proclaim that to be patriots they must work in silence and without acclaim. The speech calls spying the world's second-oldest profession ("and just as honorable as the first"), adding that God Himself founded the calling when Moses sent leaders of the twelve tribes to "spy out the land of Canaan."

In a less well-known reference, CIA officials like to note that America may owe her existence to the covert action of Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumar-




ILLUSTRATION BY MICHAEL OBERG

chais, author of *The Marriage of Figaro* and *The Barber of Seville*.

It was Beaumarchais who persuaded a reluctant King Louis XVI to aid the American Revolution by making it appear that the French funding came from private citizen Beaumarchais, not from the French government. In a persuasive letter to the king, which is in the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection, the dramatist presented the moral case for covert action:

"Generally speaking there is no doubt that any idea or project that violates justice must be rejected by a man of integrity. But, Sire, State policy is not the same as private morality. . . .

"If men were angels, we ought no doubt to despise or even detest politics. But if men were angels, they would have no need for religion to enlighten them, or laws to govern them, or soldiers to subdue them, and the earth, instead of being a living image of hell, would itself be a region of heaven. But in the end we must take the path of the king who alone wished to be absolutely just among the wicked and to remain

good among the wolves would soon be devoured along with his flock."

The Frenchman's point that covert action—and intelligence itself—is a "necessary evil" is further emphasized by CIA instructors who eulogize one of his American contemporaries, Nathan Hale, the Revolutionary War hero who, posing as a Dutch schoolteacher behind British lines, was captured and hanged for spying. His statue stands outside CIA headquarters today, and his words have been so inspirational to some agents that one former senior official carried this Hale speech in his wallet: "I wish to be useful, and every kind of service, necessary to the public good, becomes honorable by being necessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious."

From Hale's day until the founding of the CIA in 1947, this country had resisted establishing a full-time intelligence organization. Pearl Harbor and America's reluctance. Though public approval of the CIA has never been whole-