

Approved For Release 2008/04/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500060008-2
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
26 March 1984

EX-CIA LATIN AMERICA CHIEF SAYS INTERVENTION INEVITABLE
MOSCOW, IDAHO

Former CIA Director William Colby Monday defended American covert activities in foreign nations, saying the alternative at times is to "send in the Marines."

"The alternative of using a small covert action operation in Guatamela in 1954, in the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, or assisting Guatamelans or Cubans who try to achieve a change in their government, is to send in the Marines," Colby told a University of Idaho audience attending a symposium on the CIA's involvement in Latin America.

"Now you can say we shouldn't send the Marines -- I can understand that -- but does that mean you can do nothing?" he asked.

"I think the question is the wisdom of a particular action and not a general denunciation of the activity," Colby said.

Colby said the CIA's budget for covert activity is now rebounding toward its Cold War level.

"There was a tremendous surge of covert action during the 1950s Cold War," he said. "Roughly half the budget during that period was devoted to covert action. That declined by the end of the 1960s and early 1970s to about 3 or 4 percent of the total budget.

"Obviously it has gone back (to more covert action) to some degree since then, because of, for one thing, the change in American attitudes as reflected by the defeat of the Carter administration and the ascension of the Reagan administration, which has a different attitude about these things."

Earlier Monday, a man who once headed the CIA's operations in Latin America said no president can avoid authorizing clandestine intervention into the activities of other nations.

"American presidents, generally speaking, are going to elect to use covert activities to further their goals," David Phillips said.

"Obviously, it depends on the president, but any president, I think, will use it under certain circumstances.

Continued

Phillips said Jimmy Carter used covert activity less frequently than previous presidents.

"I think Jimmy Carter probably used covert action less than anyone who has been president since the CIA was founded in 1947. But if someone had gone to Jimmy Carter and said, 'I know of a covert action that will get the hostages out from Iran,' I think Jimmy Carter would have said, 'Go.'"

Phillips said he left the CIA in 1975 after 25 years with the agency because he thought the intelligence establishment as he had known it was going to be abolished.

He said he later formed an association of former intelligence officers to demonstrate support for a continued strong U.S. intelligence operation.

Phillips and several other former CIA officials were scheduled later during the two-day Borah Symposium on the Moscow campus to debate U.S. intelligence activities in Latin America.

CASPER, WYO.
COLBY

Former CIA Director William Colby has told a Casper audience the American public has benefited from a transition in the CIA from the cloak and dagger days to modern electronic surveillance.

Colby told a seminar at Casper College Thursday the intelligence agency also has been strengthened by laws passed in the 1970s which give Congress more authority over the agency.

'We have changed the system of intelligence,' he said. 'We now work under the constitution. Thanks to this new concept ... we don't slink out of Hong Kong and sneak through China to see what is going on on the Manchurian border. We look down to see where the tanks are massed or where there is troop movement.'

Colby said sophisticated intelligence operations mean the country will get no strategic surprises from the Soviet Union.

'We may get surprises from Iran, but not from the Soviet Union,' he said.

There is no chance the Korean commercial airliner shot down over Soviet air space last year was being used as a spy plane, Colby said.

Reflecting on the history of the agency, he said after the disaster at Pearl Harbor the intelligence community began recruiting scholars from universities.

'The key was scholarship and study,' Colby said. 'This was a revolution.'

He said cooperation among scholars, chemists, and scientists made possible the high altitude spy planes that spotted nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Colby said during the agency's early stages Americans were willing to have spys more ruthless than our adversaries', but that has changed.

'When Congress, in a united voice said stop we stopped -- which we did in 1975 in Angola,' he said. 'The Congress controls the power of the purse.'

Ex-CIA chief offers overview on diplomacy and finances

William Colby on the intelligence community, the bid for detente and the world's monetary problems.

Former CIA Director William Colby says the most troublesome challenge to peace today is the "World War I scenario," under which a relatively small event propels an unstoppable chain of military events. He thinks the intelligence community has recovered from its trials, sees cautious hope for detente in the arrival in power in Moscow of Konstantin Chernenko, and is enthusiastic about the chances of democracy in Latin America. But he believes that the rift between poor and rich countries will be only solved if the World Bank adopts more realistic loan policies and "gets more capital moving." Mr. Colby spoke to Times diplomatic correspondent Russell Warren Howe.

Q: Tell me something about the book you're writing. Hasn't everything been said about Vietnam?

A: No, I don't think it has. It's a very imperfectly understood event in our history because it's dominated by a few rather dramatic episodes, which in many cases were not typical and often were misinterpreted or, as with the Tet attack, reported just plain wrong. I am really one of the very few Americans who went through the entire experience in a position of responsibility.

Q: What is your basic theme — missed opportunities?

A: Yes — the things I think went well and the things I think went badly. My thesis is fairly simple: that we actually won the guerrilla part of the war. The apt comparison is between the attacks of 1968 and those of 1972 and the final fall: 1968 was a large guerrilla attack supported by military forces which actually failed, but achieved a real psychological victory. The 1972 attacks were a purely military assault at three points on the border, and the (South) Vietnamese held them off. They fought North Vietnam to a standstill with the help, not of American forces, because we'd removed almost all of them, but with the help of American logistics and air bombardments. In 1975, you again had a sheer military assault from the North Vietnamese at three points on the border. A few tactical failures, and collapse.

A year or so before, there had been some very distinct cutbacks in logistics, and the Vietnamese were forced to fight a poor man's war. You don't train someone in American tactics and give them American weapons and then deprive them of American ammunition.

Q: Do you think the intelligence community has recovered from its travails?

A: Yes. Essentially, it's back to where it was. To me, the real mark of the recovery was when Congress very properly passed that law to protect the names of sources and agents.

Q: As you testified, there obviously were some excesses in the past. Do you think they could occur again?

A: No, not at present. There's a control machinery that we didn't have before. Actually, I'd say the excesses were very few and far between, for an organization with all that mystique. Nowadays, it's clear that you have a good system of review and a good legal control.

Q: What are your feelings about the

new "young prince" in the Kremlin?

A: I think he's essentially a bureaucrat. He came up by being a loyal assistant to Mr. Brezhnev, which has one good feature in it, because Mr. Brezhnev, I think, was really interested in the whole detente process. While the Soviets are very difficult to negotiate with, I think there was a commitment to detente on Mr. Brezhnev's part, to try to make it work. I hope that Mr. Chernenko has inherited some of this.

Q: At least, Mr. Chernenko is not really an unknown quantity, as Mr. Andropov was.

A: Well, he's an unknown quantity as a chief, and, let's face it, he's controlled by the fact that he depends upon the people under him. In order to retain power in that college of cardinals, you have to assemble a consensus, or at least a majority, and that means you have to get the military.

Q: If detente doesn't work, and events go from bad to worse, can you see any logical scenario leading to World War III?

A: I'm not concerned about a Hitler-style sudden launching of a war, because that's impossible. Anyone who has been near nuclear weapons, which includes the leadership of both our great powers, knows that the systems are just so horrendous that they couldn't withstand them, and they'd be very cautious. None-

theless, the scenario that bothers me is the World War I scenario, where the various powers get in a tense situation, and then they gradually depend more and more on the planning and the pre-organized actions of the military. How World War I broke out is very clear — they got into a situation where they couldn't turn it off, and the powers found themselves in a four-year war with 50 million people killed, and nobody really knows what the devil the war was about. Everything depends upon an enormous degree of communication between the political command of the two countries, and a degree of rationality.

Q: What are your feelings about Lebanon, and the attempts to relaunch the Reagan Mideast peace initiative?

A: What you will get in Lebanon, it seems to me, is a kind of informal partition, which will go on for quite a long time, because the requirements of the different parties are so incompatible. I think we should bring Syria in. The Syrians see Lebanon as their protegee and feel it ought to be under their protection. And they're naturally concerned to make sure that nobody else has a dominant influence, whether it's the Israelis or the United States. And unless you begin to focus on the Palestine homeland problem, you are not really focusing on anything. If you focus on Palestine, you have a focus for solving the Lebanon thing.

In Israel, there's an increasing growth of the Peace Now movement. The Labor Party is talking gingerly of some kind of resolution of the conflict, and you are getting greater realism in Israel about the long-term implications of continuing to provoke hostility.

Q: What incentive could we offer to move Israel forward?

A: The incentive of a better relationship with the Arab world. With every year that goes by, more Arabs are learning to drive tanks, and sooner or later, that preponderance of numbers is going to be detrimental to Israel.

Q: What do you think about the Gulf war?

A: I think the best comparison, again, is with World War I — masses of people being slaughtered in trench warfare with modern weaponry, and without much generalship, and no use of technology on either side to achieve a breakthrough. The

CONTINUED

real danger, in my mind, is in the Gulf Arab states, given the kind of plots the Iranians have been involved in — coup attempts and things of that nature. There's a threat to the Gulf states' independent alignment with the Western world.

Q: So, it would be in the interest of the Gulf states for Iraq to continue the war indefinitely and keep Iran tied up?

A: Very much so. And it's very much in their interest to go ahead with the development of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and get their own internal and external defenses, because of the possi-

bility of intervention from across the water.

Q: Latin America: Do we have a clear policy and is it the right one?

A: Once again, we're having a period of interest in Latin America, largely brought about by crises there. To me, Latin America is in a period of enormous opportunity right now. You have a trend toward democracy. The big nations — Brazil, especially Argentina, and there are even some stirrings in Chile and Uruguay. These are major developments, and could set Latin America on the right path. The problem there is an impacted social oligarchy. But there are some trends noted by the Kissinger Commission — with whose recommendations I agree — where we can help make changes in the social scene, improve the rule of law, which is absolutely essential, and do it positively.

Q: Has there been too much of tendency in the past for us to support all the George IIIs against all the George Washingtons?

A: No. Sometimes we have, but sometimes we have supported some good people down there. We have supported the democrats in Chile. We supported the free government of Costa Rica. We caused change in the Dominican Republic when the military tried to steal the last election. We've had some impact on Central America. If you look at the five Central-American countries, in the last two years you've had elections in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and even in Guatemala, although the election there was stolen later.

You have not had one in Nicaragua, and the government's official position is that it's not ready for elections until 1985, if then. You have, in other words, a general understanding among most of those countries that you have got to go to the voters. That is the real difference between the democratic process and the others, and I think that trend exists (in Latin America) and it's on a growth pattern. It's something that should be supported, and might really be productive, so that it's plain to the lowest peasant that there's more progress in this direction than there is through any of that foolish revolutionary stuff.

Q: Do you believe the spread of education has brought about the demand for democracy?

A: To some degree. It's the spread of information. Even the Soviets can't keep information away from people. They have the freedom to talk now that they didn't have two years ago. Our own culture is surprisingly becoming more international. Some people complain about this because of the overwhelming idiosyncrasies of some cultures. But it's behind the curve. We haven't figured how to run politics in a way which corresponds to the reality of the economy and the sociology of the world we live in.

Q: I was trying to think of some part of the world where outside influences don't have much impact. Have you given much thought to North Korea?

A: There are those godawful tunnels. There are obvious intentions to conduct attacks on the South. They started digging at the same time they were talking about better relations. It was only the good sense of the Chinese that stopped North Korea from attacking in 1975,

when the Americans were pulling out of Vietnam. North Korean President Kim Il-sung went to Peking, and it's generally thought that he was saying: "Now, boss?" And they told him to go home, and not to attack. He could start anything totally irrational.

Q: And there are 12,500 American troops in the invasion corridors?

A: I think we could stop them, that's the point. And I think, if he started it, he would probably not be supported by the Chinese or the Soviets.

Q: So we would have to be careful not to go too far into North Korea?

A: Yes, we learned that lesson once, and we applied it in Vietnam. We never went beyond the 13th Parallel, except to bomb. We had that very much in mind.

Q: But they would be able to bombard Seoul with short-range missiles. So, presumably, the war would have to be carried over to Pyongyang, with missiles.

A: And by bombing.

Q: But you don't see the likelihood of World War III happening by mistake there?

A: No, it would be in the interest of all the great powers to contain it.

Q: What do you think about our relations with Japan? Do you agree with Ambassador Mike Mansfield that it's the most important ally we've got?

A: No, it's not the most important ally. It's a very important ally, but I would maybe think of Germany as the most important ally, if I had to cast around for one. But Japan is the center of economic activity, and I think a lot of other action is moving eastward. And the Japanese are beginning to play a role with their power in political and economic terms. Mr.

Nakasone sort of personifies this. I think it was going to happen to Japan sooner or later. It was going to have to take the position that its power gives it. But he has done it and I think done it quite well. He's aiming for a true East Asian co-prosperity sphere.

But the Japanese will take pains not to be too dominant, because they know the fear. I don't see, at any time, what the old demographic studies suggested we worry about — Japanese industriousness and organization based on top of China's resources and population. It didn't happen. The Chinese can maintain themselves. They're mainly interested in their own affairs. They're not going to be much of a threat to the rest of the world.

Q: You mentioned co-prosperity. The Japanese see the North-South conflict as more long-lasting than the East-West conflict, and economic aid as a factor for peace.

A: Yes, but that formula is never going to keep the peace alone. They give about 1.3 or 1.4 percent of their GNP as aid. We give about 0.1 percent. So they're giving a lot more than we are. But they won't go over 1 percent of their GNP for military (expenditures) compared to our 6 or 7 percent. Peace isn't going to be solved by aid, even if they spend 2 percent of their GNP on aid.

The thing I worry about right now is that all the banks seem quite happy about having solved the (Third World's) debt crisis. They haven't solved it at all. They just put it on the backs of the workers in the little countries, and you have a terrible shortage of capital for growth. Yet, population growth is continuing.

America, Be Patient With the Philippines

By William E. Colby

WASHINGTON — The scenario unfolding in the Philippines looks depressingly familiar. Vast protest movements fill the streets of Manila. An authoritarian President shows signs of physical deterioration. Armed Moslems and Communists battle the military in the countryside. The security forces had some, unexplained role in the murder of the opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino Jr. Moderate opposition leaders call for the removal of American military bases vital to the strategic balance in Southeast Asia. The national debt is more than \$25 billion and an enormous payment or reluctant rescheduling must take place this year.

It is easy to cry havoc — to believe that the regime of Ferdinand E. Marcos is tottering and that the Philippines will turn as hostile to the United States as Iran or Nicaragua. But a cooler and closer look at the Philippines reveals more differences than similarities to those unfortunate countries. It may be that the Marcos regime is coming to an end, but the cultural, political and social fundamentals of the Philippines argue for a better result than occurred elsewhere.

Even in the short term, it can be said that President Marcos is handling the situation with considerable skill. By officially ignoring but not suppressing the noisy demonstrations in the streets, he allows an outlet for the irrepressible Philippine personality. He has forbidden police and security forces to use ammunition when facing demonstrators, thus avoiding an escalation of violence in a symbolic incident. His gradual concessions — in the formation of the commission investigating the murder of Mr. Aquino, changes in the constitutional structure to revive the office of vice president and agreement to revise voting lists for coming legislative elections — do not satisfy opposition demands for an end to his authoritarian rule, but they do drain some intensity from the struggle to depose him.

The Moslem insurgent effort is limited to a single region and does not threaten the state, although it will remain a continuing security infection requiring long-term political skill and security attention comparable to a Northern Ireland or Basque problem. The Communist effort is only the most recent of many guerrilla campaigns in the Philippines since the 1950's — campaigns that the Philippine bureaucracy and security forces have learned to contain if not eliminate. The opposition to Mr. Marcos may be strident and sincere, but it fragments whenever it has an opportunity to take power, and is thus limited in its effect.

The real struggle under way is to revive the Philippine political system and insure a smooth process of succession after the Marcos regime. Rhetorical hyperbole, regional political bosses and wealthy establishmentarians will continue to play a role on the Philippine political scene. We can anticipate a series of crises and turmoil as Mr. Marcos struggles to retain power against those who oppose him or as his wife, Imelda, backed by some (but not all) of the military, strives to succeed him.

But, most importantly, all Filipinos, from Marcos authoritarians to strident oppositionists, believe that the resolution of Philippine political conflict must ultimately be reviewed at the ballot box. Philippine democratic practices bear a remarkable resemblance to those in the western United States during the 1880's and 1890's, with problems of vigilante groups, corrupt political bosses and intense factionalism. But the basic reliance on the voter, however much effort is made to manipulate him or her, insures that the outcome will be acceptable, if not ideal, to the Philippine people as a whole.

Against this background, the American connection is vital. Ties between Filipinos and Americans exceed our links with most other peoples in the world. Millions of Filipinos look warmly to their relatives in the United States and to their American democratic heritage. Many Americans feel a responsibility for the success of the colony they freed to start the process of decolonization in the third world. Economic relationships are intense. The Philippines' military dependence on American strategic support is matched by America's need for the military bases made available to our forces at Clark Field and Subic Bay.

Americans must make a serious effort to understand Philippine politics. We must be patient with its temporary careenings and look beyond the limited question of support or resistance to the Marcos regime, helping the Philippines to meet its real economic and social challenges. With this kind of assistance, that adolescent nation can go through its present trials to reach a maturity that will make its sponsor proud.

William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence from 1973 to 1976 and a lawyer, is senior adviser to International Business-Government Counselors, an organization that analyzes country risks for investors.

Experts rap, defend CIA evil empire, benevolent force

By JAMES HODGE

A former CIA chief, an ex-KGB agent, a Watergate burglar and an author on international espionage came in out of the cold Sunday night to talk about undercover operations.

Speaking at a Tulane University Direction '84 program, espionage author David Wise characterized CIA operations as rather ominous. He said elected officials need to control the agency to prevent foreign assassinations and domestic spying.

Former CIA Director William Colby said the agency is "not an evil empire." It was founded to be "more ruthless than its enemies," he said, but the agency's abuses "have been few and far between."

Colby said the CIA has been too controlled, that it does not engage in assassinating enemy leaders, although admitting that in Fidel Castro's case it was not "for lack of trying."

He referred to the CIA attempt to have the Mafia poison the Cuban dictator as one of its more stupid miscalculations.

Colby also said he would "have cheerfully carried a bomb into Hitler's bunker."

Add to Hitler, Libya's Moammar Khadafy, said G. Gordon Liddy, convicted Watergate conspirator and former general counsel to Richard Nixon's Committee to Re-Elect the President.

The end sometimes justifies the means when it comes to breaking the law, Liddy said. This is as true in spying as in the case of the husband who goes through a red light to get his pregnant wife to the hospital quicker, he said.

"Spying is the oldest or at least the second-oldest profession," he said. The Bible gives evidence that Moses carried on economic and military spying, he said.

Man spies to determine the capabilities of his enemies and their intentions, he said. The only way to end the business would be to "change the nature of man," he said.

Wise, author of "The Invisible Government," said that spying is neces-

sary, but that it should be controlled to avoid abuses. He said Watergate was a prime example of how it was used for political purposes.

"This is 1984," said Wise, and Americans should beware.

He said a Senate report on assassinations shows the CIA also tried to kill Congo (now Zaire) leader Patrice Lumumba by poisoning his toothbrush.

Colby admitted the CIA had considered "an assassination program" there, but scrapped it.

Liddy backed Colby in downplaying the CIA's intentions to assassinate opposition leaders, asking Wise if he believes the CIA gave "Chairman Andropov his bad cold."

Liddy said the CIA is more of a benevolent force than the KGB. "The difference is that the KGB would throw a little lady into an oncoming train, and the CIA would push her out of the way."

Vladimir Sakharov, a former KGB-turned-CIA agent, said the difference between the two intelligence operations is one of method.

The CIA is a think tank, he said, whereas the KGB spends most of its time setting up communications.

Sakharov, who was at the heart of KGB operations in the Middle East, said his job was largely public relations, "selling the Soviet point of view."

The Soviet agents try to make friends and establish ties, especially in Third World countries.

He said the greatest danger to the United States is the computerization of information. If he were still a KGB agent, he said he would open up a car dealership that would allow him access

to the financial data of hundreds of people.

He would then be in position to take advantage of someone who fell on hard times and may be willing to help the Soviets.

Colby said he thinks the difference between the two agencies is that the CIA has reliable but few sources of information about the Soviets, while the KGB has an abundance of information about the United States, but doesn't know which pieces are correct.

Colby also said he thought Americans have "sobered up from the binge" in the 1970s of being distrustful of the CIA.

Colby confirmed Wise's allegation that the CIA once screened 28 million letters of Americans in violation of federal law, but said the letters were only those coming from the U.S.S.R.

"They weren't your letters to Aunt Minny," he told the audience.

Wise then rebutted Colby's contention that the CIA has operated within the law in the last 10 years.

"How do we know?" Wise said. He said President Reagan has issued an executive order allowing covert domestic operations and has revamped the declassification system so that documents don't automatically become public after a certain period of time.

Wise also said the CIA is involved in wide-spread covert operations around the world, most notably in Nicaragua.

Because it's an election year, Wise said, Reagan has discontinued the use of lie detector tests on federal employees.

Approved For Release 2008/04/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500060008-2

NEW ORLEANS
SPIES

A former CIA chief, an ex-KGB agent, a Watergate burglar and an expert on international espionage got together but the meeting was anything but secret.

The four men discussed the achievements and the dangers of the CIA during a forum Sunday at Tulane University.

Former agency director William Colby and Watergate burglar G. Gordon Liddy spoke in defense of covert operations, while author David Wise characterized such goings-on as ominous.

Vladimir Sakharov added to the picture with memories of his KGB days.

Colby said the agency was not an "evil empire." It was founded, he said, to be "more ruthless than its enemies," but its abuses had been few and far between.

The former director insisted the CIA does not engage in assassinating enemy leaders -- though in the case of Cuba's Fidel Castro it was not "for lack of trying."

Liddy, former general counsel to Richard Nixon's Committee to Re-elect the President, said the end sometimes justified the means when it came to U.S. agents breaking the law.

"Spying is the oldest or at least the second oldest profession," said Liddy.

Sakharov, a former agent for the Soviet intelligence department who later worked for the CIA, said the difference between the two was a matter of method.

The CIA is a think tank while the KGB spends most of its time setting up communications, said Sakharov, who worked at the heart of the agency's operations in the Middle East.

He warned the greatest danger to the United States was the computerization of information. If he were still in the KGB, he said, he would open up a car dealership that would allow him access to financial data on hundreds of people.

Wise, author of "The Invisible Government," said spying was necessary but its abuses should be curtailed. He said Watergate was the prime example of how the mechanics of espionage could be used for political purposes.

"This is 1984," he warned.

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Approved For Release 2008/04/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500060008-2

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2A

USA TODAY
17 February 1984

Update

■ U.S. intelligence agencies should share their information with the public, former CIA Director William Colby said.

Reported by Bill Nichols and Richard Benedetto

BOSTON
Colby

U.S. intelligence agencies should give up "the old myth" of secrecy and share their information with the public, former CIA Director William Colby says.

Colby, the CIA chief under presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, said Wednesday the agency could use its information to correct erroneous information in Congress and the news media.

"Intelligence can contribute to the public debate," he said in a speech at Simmons College. "The functions of intelligence have to be shared with the people. This is very much a change in the operation of intelligence.

"It's an old myth of intelligence that everything should be secret."

Congress and the media are already receiving more information from the CIA than 10 years ago, he said, because of a greater congressional oversight.

"We have another meaning to the initials CIA -- Constitutional Intelligence for America," Colby said.

He defended covert CIA operations in Nicaragua and other countries, saying the agency has followed U.S. laws.

"That's the way the American system works," he said.

Colby said it was "fact of life" that other nations are attempting to interfere with the U.S. government through covert activity.

MOSCOW
CIA

The CIA's Latin American operations will be studied at the 55th annual Borah Symposium on War and Peace scheduled for March 26-27 at the University of Idaho in Moscow.

Ralph McGehee, former case officer on covert operations who left the agency after 25 years, will be a featured speaker.

Former CIA director William Colby and Larry Birns, editor of a bi-weekly publication on Latin America, also will speak.

McGehee said he left the CIA after becoming disillusioned with the agency. He said his decision was largely based on his last four years with the organization, when he had access to almost all information about its worldwide intelligence and covert operations.

McGehee, who had assignments in Japan, Thailand and Vietnam, said he decided the CIA is primarily a covert arm of the presidency. In that capacity, McGehee said the CIA generates "intelligence" operations in foreign countries to overthrow or support a government.

Symposium officials say Birns' publication, "Washington Report on the Hemisphere," is often used as a source on Latin America.

The annual symposium brings American and foreign government officials, diplomats, scientists and political analysts to Moscow to examine causes of war and solutions for peace.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 13MOTHER JONES
February/March 1984

BY PHILLIP FRAZER

DIRTY TRICK DOWN UNDER

DID THE CIA TOPPLE THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT?

In the red moonscape desert of central Australia last November, 116 women climbed a chain-link barrier and invaded a spy-satellite base run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The women, who had traveled hundreds of miles to stage their action, said they were expressing solidarity with British women camped at Greenham Common in England to protest the deployment of U.S. Cruise missiles at that site. But the facility in Australia was targeted for another reason as well. As a major CIA base, it is a reminder to Australians, who elected a Labor party government just one year ago, that the last Australian Labor government was thrown out in what the Aussies call "the Constitutional Coup." The Australian women who climbed the fence at Pine Gap—like most of the country's Labor party supporters—believe the CIA has never been brought to account for its role in that coup.

Born in Australia, Phillip Frazer is now a freelance writer living in Croton Falls, New York. Support for this story was provided by the Mother Jones Investigative Fund.

To Henry Kissinger, Australia was just another minor annoyance in November of 1972. The president's national security advisor had spent most of that month in Paris desperately trying to sell "peace with honor" to the Vietnamese, while rebel forces closed in on Saigon. Back home, students were plotting revolution in college dormitories. In Chile, a Marxist president had expropriated American banks and copper mines. And in the Middle East, our ally-of-preference, Israel, stood on the brink of another war with our Arabian allies-for-oil.

The fact that Australian voters might elect their first Labor party government in 23 years would, however, create a diplomatic vexation for Kissinger. Under a succession of pliable conservative administrations, Australia had sent 50,000 troops to Vietnam. If Labor won and carried out its campaign promise to withdraw, the U.S. would lose one of its handful of allies in Vietnam.

Had Kissinger been able to pay more attention to Australia, he could have channeled a few million dollars to conservative candidates, and they might have won. But Kissinger believed the prediction from his embassy in Canberra, the nation's capital, that Labor would lose; and in the years that followed, a minor vexation became a diplomatic nightmare. For probably the first and only time in its history, the United States felt compelled to meddle in the electoral politics not merely of a small Third World republic but of one of its major allies.

Ten miles west of Washington, D.C., at the Langley, Virginia, headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Jesus Angleton had his own reasons to fear a Labor victory in Australia. Angleton had spent 29 years with the CIA. On Australian election day in 1972 he was in charge of the agency's most secretive division, counterintelligence, and he had a good many friends in Australian intelligence. The Aussies were members of a spy elite—perhaps the most exclusive and powerful club on earth—tied together by what is formally known as the UKUSA Agreement. James Bamford, author of the recent study of the U.S. National Security Agency, *The Puzzle Palace*, describes UKUSA as "quite likely the most secret agreement ever entered into by the English-speaking world." The pact was signed in 1947 by the SIGINT (for signals intelligence) organizations of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

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Approved For Release 2008/04/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500060008-2

MIDDLETOWN (CT)
Winter 1984

IDEA


Current research by Wesleyan faculty.

CHEMISTS SYNTHESIZE SPY POISON

Wesleyan University chemists have announced a laboratory synthesis for a natural substance once gathered clandestinely by the Central Intelligence Agency as a potential suicide pill or a weapon because of its extraordinary toxicity.

Less than a milligram of this poison, called saxitoxin, can kill a person in under an hour. It is produced by red tide algae and is responsible for shellfish poisoning when red tide invades beaches.

But for Peter Jacobi, associate professor of chemistry, and graduate student Michael Martinelli, saxitoxin's vice is its virtue: The powerful paralytic effect it has on nerve impulses makes it ideal for the study of nervous disorders such as multiple sclerosis. Until now, however, the scarce supply of saxitoxin has limited its



laboratory use. Saxitoxin is impossibly difficult to isolate from clams—one ton of clams yields one gram—and has proved to be equally troublesome to make in the laboratory.

Jacobi and Martinelli say their synthesis, although not the first, is a practical one that with further development promises to make saxitoxin available to the medical community. The project, supported by the National Institutes of Health, took seven years to complete; Martinelli took over the problem 3½ years ago.

The CIA was not pursuing medical research when it began experimenting with saxitoxin in the 1950s at Fort Detrick, Md. The CIA reportedly used the poison in suicide pills provided to its own agents (including U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers); the Agency also reportedly developed dart guns and other clever means to deliver the poison to troublesome guard dogs when entering embassies or other buildings.

President Nixon ordered the CIA to destroy its supply of saxitoxin to conform with the draft convention of the U.N. Disarmament Conference, but in 1975, CIA Director William Colby revealed to Congress that 10.9 grams of saxitoxin remained in agency labs in downtown Washington.

Since the CIA held nearly the entire world's known supply of saxitoxin, the scientific community breathed a sign of relief when the agency decided to distribute the substance to researchers. Much of the supply went to scientists at Yale University.

Jacobi and Martinelli are, of course,

taking no chances with their dangerous product. The minute quantity of saxitoxin they have on hand is kept secure. Not until the latter stages in the synthetic process does the substance become poisonous, so they plan to keep the bulk of their supply in a non-toxic form, ready for conversion to saxitoxin only when needed.

The achievement has brought Martinelli a coveted fellowship sponsored by Proctor & Gamble Corp. and awarded annually by the American Chemical Society to four students nationwide.

A curious footnote to the saxitoxin story is provided by the puffer fish, which inhabits waters near Japan and contains a closely related and equally deadly neurotoxin. Far from being feared, however, the puffer fish is considered a delicacy when prepared by specially licensed chefs. They know how to reduce the toxin level so that it produces merely a tingling of the nerves.

Almost all of Jacobi's projects are concerned with naturally active products. Another of his students, Hal Selnick, recently completed the first laboratory synthesis of a substance known as gnididione, derived from a plant native to Kenya that produces a number of biologically active substances. Gnididione is toxic to living cells and is therefore of interest to medical researchers as well as chemists. An advantage of laboratory synthesis is that controlled modifications can be made easily to alter activity. Selnick's synthesis of this compound was the first and was supported by the National Science Foundation.

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CASPER, WYO.
1984

Former CIA Director William Colby will speak at a seminar on George Orwell's celebrated book '1984' scheduled for March 1 and 2 at Casper College.

CC social sciences professor Bruce Tollefson says the seminar will examine intelligence gathering and the use of computers in today's society.

'We want to see if Orwell's predictions, premonitions and warnings or whatever are coming to pass,' Tollefson said.

Other speakers scheduled to address the seminar include Houston Police Chief Lee Brown; Frank Snapp, a former CIA analyst who currently teaches classes censorship and journalism at the University of Southern California; New York Times reporter David Burnham, who specializes in computers and communications; author Leon Martel and Minnesota polygraph specialist David Lykken.

Because the year 1984 has now arrived there have been extensive articles and discussions about Orwell's warnings of a totalitarian society, but Tollefson does not believe people are tired of the subject.

On the contrary, he said the books 'is really a major topic of discussion. I see a lot of things that show we are headed in that direction.

'It bothers me when we have central data banks, where we are listed in places we're not even aware of. And I see a lot of politicians doing a lot of what I would call 'doublethink' and 'newspeak.''

Tollefson said the seminar, funded by \$18,000 in private donations, will be free to the public.

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ON PAGE A-14

WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1984

Ex-CIA Chiefs Fault Marine Role

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

Three former directors of the CIA yesterday faulted the role of U.S. Marines in the multinational peace-keeping force in Lebanon and suggested that they should be moved from their positions at the Beirut International Airport.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, CIA director under President Jimmy Carter, James R. Schlesinger, who held the post briefly under President Richard M. Nixon, and William E. Colby, CIA director under Nixon and President Gerald R. Ford, echoed the growing restiveness in Congress about the Marines' presence in Lebanon.

"I think the Marines are not on a mission which is a Marine mission at the moment," Colby said in a joint interview with Turner on "Meet the Press" (NBC, WRC). "You should not send superpower forces to a peace-keeping mission. The Marines are not a peace-keeping force."

Colby said that if the United States intends to support the government of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, "We should be doing it with a military aid system and advisers and not with Marines."

Speaking on "This Week With David Brinkley" (ABC, WJLA), Schlesinger said that unless the United States is prepared to change the "balance of forces in the region," then the other option is to withdraw.

"The worst of all policies is probably simply to hang in there, because under those circumstances the cost to the United States will rise. It is probably a blunder to have gotten in," Schlesinger said.

President Reagan is under growing pressure from members of Congress and senior military officials to reexamine the role of U.S. forces in Lebanon and possibly pull them out. Reagan is said to be "adamant" in his opposition to withdrawal, but administration officials, with Congress scheduled to return Jan. 23, are planning to intensify their dis-

cussions about Lebanon this week after Reagan returns from his California vacation.

Rep. Nicholas Mavroules (D-Mass.), a member of the House Armed Services subcommittee that issued a report critical of security measures in effect before the Oct. 23 Beirut terrorist bombing that killed 241 U.S. servicemen, predicted yesterday that Reagan will face "many initiatives" seeking to pressure him to redeploy or withdraw the Marines

when Congress returns. Democratic presidential candidate Walter F. Mondale called over the weekend for an immediate withdrawal of the Marines. Many Democrats on Capitol Hill, including Mavroules and House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.), supported a War Powers Resolution compromise with Reagan allowing the Marines to stay for up to 18 months, but have begun to express doubts about the compromise since the Beirut attack.

Both Turner and Colby suggested that some U.S. presence be maintained in Lebanon. Turner said Reagan could use "an option for pulling out gracefully" by redeploying the Marines to ships offshore, rotating some back to the airport—an option the White House has ruled out in

recent days. Colby suggested that Reagan "step up" U.S. training of the Lebanese army, "so we can show that we're not withdrawing entirely."

Last week, a special Pentagon commission investigating the Beirut bombing criticized U.S. cutbacks in so-called "human" intelligence-gathering capability, as compared to that using technology such as satellites, and presidential spokesman Larry Speakes faulted the Carter administration for these cutbacks.

Turner said the Carter administration had "cut some of the fluff out" of the CIA, for example, but denied that the human intelligence-gathering capability had been weakened.

Yesterday, one member of the commission, former undersecretary of the Navy Robert Murray, said he believes that "there was never a great possibility of courts-martial, at least a successful prosecution, because of the enormous extenuating circumstances."