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SUBJECT Interview with William Colby and Anthony Cave-Brown

ROSS CRYSTAL: When we think of the Cold War we think of the '40s and on after. Well, we're going to talk about the Cold War a few years before that.

Joining me right now, here is former CIA Director William Colby, and Anthony Cave-Brown, British journalist, currently an author of, his latest book, "On a Field of Red."

And you, too, have the notion it was -- I think most people, the consensus was the '40s. And you found a lot doing research, didn't you?

ANTHONY CAVE-BROWN: Yes. When we set out to write the book "On a Field of Red," the premise was that the Cold War really began, the present state of relationships between the West and the Eastern Bloc really began at Yalta in 1945. But during the research process for the book, we discovered, of course, that not only was the present tensions a permanent state of modern life, but also it was inherent in the relationship between the Western powers and the Communist Bloc, and was part of the doctrine of the 20th Century, and therefore was a -- as I've just said, a permanent feature of life today.

CRYSTAL: Mr. Colby, why do you think the misunderstanding?

WILLIAM COLBY: Well, I think we all refer to the Cold War. But there was a hiatus in it caused by Hitler's rise, and Hitler provided a threat to both the Western powers and to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union once made a pact with him, thinking that that would turn him off for a while. But nonetheless, the basic Communist doctrine, espoused by Lenin even before he

went to Russia in 1917, was the necessity for a world revolution and a continuing conspiracy to create that, to create revolution, help history along, because history inevitably had to be advanced by revolution. That was their -- they were busy at it during the '20s and '30s, as well as during the '40s and '50s.

CRYSTAL: In researching and finding out about Comintern, more of it, what did you learn? What right away struck you?

CAVE-BROWN: I think what struck me most vividly were the known facts about the organization, that the Comintern, or the Communist International -- Comintern the term in brief for the Communist International -- was supposed to have been formed in 1919. As a matter of fact, it was formed a good deal earlier than that, for the purposes of prosecuting the Russian Revolution and the associated revolutions in Eastern Europe, and perhaps even in Central Europe.

But moreover, the Russians claimed that -- Stalin claimed that the organization had been dissolved, that the world revolution of the proletariat, as it was called, had been dissolved in 1943. But in the course of our inquiries in the late '70s, we established quite clearly that while the organization called the Comintern may have been dissolved, in point of fact in practice, the world revolution of the proletariat, as it was called, had continued unceasingly ever since the formation of the Comintern in Moscow in 1919.

CRYSTAL: Now, to get to this book as a final product, you gained access to some fascinating documents. And how did you go about doing that?

CAVE-BROWN: Well, I mean, this is -- the essential source of the documentation, of course, was the Freedom of Information Act here in Washington, combined with certain private collections, such as the collection of Major General William J. Donovan, who was Mr. Colby's -- one of Mr. Colby's predecessors. Donovan being the founder of OSS and the conceiver of the Central Intelligence Agency. He, in his later years in life, collected every piece of documentation that he could find about Russia, the theory of the perpetual revolution, as Trotsky described it.

And we are in a state of perpetual revolution, by the way. When you come to look at the last five or 10 years, you'll see that there's been nothing but revolutions all over the world, a systematic series of revolutions, many of which appear to me and appear to my coauthor, Charles McDonald, to have their origins or their inspiration in Moscow.

But the essential source was unquestionably the Freedom of Information Act, and nothing more glamorous than the National Archives in Washington. I mean all the paper is there. All that you have to do is to have the time and the money to be able to go

down there and dig into the papers. There were certainly no secret revelations.

COLBY: I think Mr. Cave Brown is not putting foward well enough his own talent for making very alive and lively and amusing some of these rather dead documents. He can put them together in a fashion that makes them read like yesterday's spy novel or this morning's newspaper. And some of these stories of the early days in the Soviet Union and the revolution there, the actions against the revolution by the Western powers to try to stop it, the problems that arose in Germany as the revolution attempted there in 1919, and so forth.

CRYSTAL: What struck you? What was the one, or more than one, fascin -- that struck you, that you might not have known?

COLBY: Well, I think the -- most of it, in gross terms, I was aware of. I was fascinated by the Communist International even when I was back in college in the '30s. And I was aware that there were Communist groups there that were promoting. We now learn that the man who almost became the head of the British Intelligence Service was recruited as a Communist agent out of Cambridge in the late '30s. So that that plot, that effort to recruit people to conduct the revolution was going on at that time.

Friends of mine went to Spain during the Spanish Civil War in the '30s, and there they fell under the control of the Communists. The Spanish Civil War was a war between an essentially right-wing fascist group that were trying to suppress a republic -- the problem was that the democracies refused to help the republic because they thought it was a little left. And the only people helping it turned out to be the Communists, the Soviets. And with that, they asserted control over it. So they actually did achieve control.

George Orwell, in his "[unintelligible] to Catalonia" puts this very clearly. He spent some time there. But that showed at that time that Moscow was thinking in terms of the expansion of its influence, aiding the revolution throughout the world.

CRYSTAL: Let's move through the '40s, through the McCarthy era. How did Comintern change?

CAVE-BROWN: Well, of course, the Communist International was formally dissolved by Stalin in 1943, in an attempt to come to terms, or an apparent attempt to come to terms with the Western powers, and particularly with the United States, which was, of course, as it was called at the time, the arsenal of democracy. Russia needed American trucks, American tanks,

American aircraft, American munitions. The only way it was going to get them was by modifying its revolutionary principles for the duration of the emergency.

But immediately after the war was over, the Kremlin reverted to its old imperialist, Communist-imperialist stance. This was not immediately recognized in the United States, nor was it immediately recognized in Great Britain. But the effect of it was to create a bureau called the Cominform, Communist Information Bureau, which was innocuous enough at its face, but which was in fact the recreation of the Comintern under another name. And its purpose was to propagate the Communist faith throughout the democracies, which were much weakened by war. But more particularly, it was also to reestablish and renourish the old roots of the Comintern so that the Russians could reestablish themselves and their undergroud apparats, as they called them, apparatuses, in the Western democracies, and especially in the United States of America, which, of course, was the one remaining capitalist democratic power which stood in the way of Russian ambitions.

And over the years, they have consistently expanded, until practically every nation in the world is -- well, yes, every nation in the world, I would say, including, sometimes one believes, in Antarctica, has its own little cell of Communist -- of faithful Communists who are prepared to propagate...

CRYSTAL: Can we for a second talk about the effect now on other countries, on Britain, on Germany, that have evolved from '40 to today?

CAVE-BROWN: Yes. That was the object, of course, when we set out to do the book. We switched from one era of the -- of Communist manipulations to the second era.

COLBY: Well, I remember a very vivid example of this. In the fall of 1941, right after -- or just before -- the fall of, excuse me, '39 and '40, when Hitler had made a pact with Stalin, nonaggression pact between those two dictators, which really led to the outbreak of World War II, but -- and led to the carving up of Poland and various other things and the assumption of power by the two dictators.

Now, during that time, Hitler was trying to keep America out of supporting Britain while he went to work to destroy Britain, then later to turn on Germany -- on Russia. But during that period, the object in America was to keep America quiet.

And so I remember at Columbia University in the fall of 1939 and early '40, and through the Battle of France and during that period, Communist groups in Columbia carrying coffins around in an antiwar protest: "Keep America neutral. Keep America out

of war." That was the Communist line in 1940, until Hitler attacked Stalin in 1941. At which point, the call for solidarity with our embattled Soviet allies became the watchword.

CRYSTAL: Gentlemen, I've got to break for one second.

* * *

CRYSTAL: "On a Field of Red," the book by Anthony Cave-Brown and Charles B. McDonald. Anthony Cave-Brown with me right now, as well as former CIA Director William Colby.

And the Cold War is being won, or has consistently, as we were talking about a couple of seconds ago, been won in the past...

COLBY: Well, I think it's still going on. That's one of the themes of the book, and a very accurate theme. But I think it is important not to panic and give up and say it's hopeless. Because we have defeated two major campaigns by the Soviets. The first was during the 1950s, an ideological campaign to take over Western Europe by subversion, through the Communist Party, through youth groups, the peace movement, and all the rest. Now, we met that with a political, ideological campaign for freedom and strength in freedom, with the Marshall Plan, with the NATO, and with the political efforts by CIA, among others, of helping with things like Radio Free Europe and other programs. Now, at the end of the '50s, that attempt by the Soviets to take over Western Europe had clearly failed.

During the '60s they turned to the Third World, Khrushchev's idea of wars of national liberation and the Soviets the natural ally of the dispossessed of the world. And they were doing pretty well at the beginning of the '60s. They had some very successful relationships in Indonesia, in Egypt, and various other parts of the world. The Cuban Revolution succeeded, and it succeeded against the efforts of the Americans to set it back. And it looked like things were rolling very well.

By the end of the '60s, however, thanks to a program of American support of some of these small countries, helping them to develop their capability to meet this kind of a campaign, you saw some major changes in the world. The Malayan attempt to overthrow the free government of Malaya had failed. The Communists were chased out of Indonesia by the Indonesians, not with any outside help. And this was happening in a variety of places. The Egyptians since have changed their orientation.

And I think the point being that you have to understand this ideological thrust that Mr. Cave-Brown is presenting in this book, and then design the appropriate tactics and weapons to meet that kind of a challenge. There's no use putting an MX system in

the desert and think it's going to solve some problem of a guerrilla or a traitor in some country. You have to meet it with the appropriate weapons.

CRYSTAL: Then, what are the appropriate weapons? And what does the Reagan Administration look at today?

CAVE-BROWN: I think there are two issues that Mr. Colby did not present which are very important, indeed. One is the question of industrial espionage, which has been a Soviet method, a Soviet tactic, a soviet strategy ever since the Communist International. One of the reasons why the Communist International was formed was to obtain by the cheapest possible means Western technology. That's one very, very important point.

The Soviet industrial base, and especially in advanced industries, such as the aircraft industry, is almost wholly based upon Western technology which has been stolen, systematically and very cleverly stolen by keepers of the faith throughout the world.

The second most important thing is the -- in other countries, not the United States of America -- is this question of the undermining of the established governments and the established system -- established systems of those countries. And Egypt comes rapidly to mind here, Turkey, Greece, Italy to a point, France. One finds that the Communists are infiltrating not for the good of the nation in which they live, but for the furtherance of the Soviet doctrine, Soviet system. In point of fact, they are carrying out, and have been systematically carrying out for well over 60 years, without too much impediment, the doctrines laid down for them by Lenin and Trotsky at the time of the Russian Revolution. They've been very faithful to those doctrines. And they're there, just like "Mein Kampf" told us exactly what Hitler was going to do. So Lenin's works and Trotsky's works are telling us, with great veracity, what it was that the Russians intended to do.

I think, myself, that the -- and one of the things that emerges very strongly from "On a Field of Red" is -- the inquiries which went into my book -- is that -- is this question of industrial esplonage, because that is the foundation for -- the technological foundation of the Soviet state. Without that foundation, they would not be the superpower that they are today. They might have all the manpower in the world. They might have the industrial base, but they would not have the technological base. And we are giving it to them for free.

COLBY: And we saw these two fellows arrested yesterday for exactly that kind of a thing. A Pole -- and you know his information would go on to the Soviet Union -- was buying for $100,000 some secrets from the Hughes Aircraft Company, through an employee of it who had some access to the secret

technical information of that company.

CRYSTAL: Mr. Colby, you say MX missiles are not the way. Then, what is -- what are the weapons?

COLBY: Well, good intelligence, so that you do understand this technique and who the operators are, who the people are, what the organizations are.

Secondly, programs to increase the political strength of the countries that are under attack. I don't mean necessarily just the military strength, but the political cohesion and strength.

When the -- the Administration has a program today for $125 million for economic assistance to El Salvador, and about 25 million for next year for security and military assistance, I think you see the right balance: 125 for the economic and social advances for those countries, to strengthen their cohesion, and 25 for protective efforts against the guerrillas who are trying to overthrow them. That's not a bad balance in the way to approach this kind of -- this level of threat.

CAVE-BROWN: I was thinking of another point here, too. What has to be understood are the Soviet techniques on the question of subversion. Their methods are extremely clever. What they aim at is to undermine the confidence of ordinary people, such as you and I, in the government system, in the law, in the banks, in the insurance industry, to peck away at the newspapers and at the television, at the publishing industry, all the things that we accept each day as part of our lives. Their technique is to try and systematically undermine our confidence in those institutions.

And, of course, to a certain degree -- Sacco and Vanzetti, for example, is a very good case in point, which we discuss at great length in this book here. A lot of people don't agree with us, but we think that Sacco and Vanzetti were quite rightly convicted and executed because they were guilty of murder. A lot of people in the United States do not agree with that. But all the facts and all the papers seem to us, in all fairness, to indicate that those two gentlemen were guilty of murder. And the law of the land provided the supreme penalty for that.

But by clever, very clever propaganda on an international scale, beautifully manipulated from the great centers of the Communist International in Moscow and in Paris, it appeared to the American nation that their system of justice was defective, that these men were apparently being made the fall guys of a defective judicial system.

One of their techniques, but only one of very many --

the whole program is most cleverly and beautifully thought out. And it can only be resisted and beaten by a more profound of their methods and techniques.

CRYSTAL: In that sense, better intelligence, as was just stated by Mr. Colby...

CAVE-BROWN: Oh, I agree. I agree absolutely.

CRYSTAL: ...add anything to that?

CAVE-BROWN: Absolutely. Better intelligence. And I would have thought -- although probably Mr. Colby won't agree with me -- to make it possible for the Central Intelligence Agency to do its work beyond the light and the glare of the public eye. A lot of this -- we're dealing with the dark side of the moon here, and what happens there, and it's not always desirable that the work of secret agents and that sort of thing should be exposed to -- exposed in Congress on the Hill and in public discussion. To a certain limited extent, the laws have to be revised to permit the agency to do its work in such a fashion that the other side cannot always be aware of what's going on themselves.

COLBY: Well, I agree with that principle. I just think that there are ways to conduct our intelligence system under our constitutional system. We have two good committees of the Congress who have proved that they can know the secrets and keep the secrets for about four years now. Now, that's a pretty good record. And yet they provide the congressional check-and-balance which is a fundamental element of our constitutional system.

CRYSTAL: Should we go back to a stricter and tighter security system?

COLBY: Oh, we certainly have to correct some of the absolute nonsense that goes on now, of people being able to write books about what they said, and then only have a squabble over royalties. Anyone who goes out of the agency and reveals the secrets he learned there, I think he ought to go to jail. And I think there's a law coming on the books that will send him to jail. And that's absolutely right. Groups who go around trying to expose our intelligence officers around the world, they ought to go to jail.

CAVE-BROWN: Oh, that's a crime, isn't it.

COLBY: It's a crime. And it ought to be a crime.

CAVE-BROWN: People who make lists and publish them in newspapers of the identities of...

COLBY: I think that the Congress is going to pass this. And it's necessary that they do this to tighten the thing up.

CAVE-BROWN: It's very interesting. If you look at the system -- I'm not quoting the British system to you as an example. But if anybody does this type of thing in England, you go to jail for 14 years at hard labor.

CRYSTAL: Gentlemen, I would like to go on. Unfortunately, I cannot. But I can tell them the book is "On a Field of Red," and there it is, by Anthony Cave-Brown, Charles B. McDonald.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Braden & Buchanan STATION WRC Radio

DATE June 30, 1981 6:10 PM CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT Interview with William Colby

PAT BUCHANAN: By a vote of 7 to 2, with the liberal Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent, the court had revoked, or at least indicated that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State have the right to revoke a passport on national security grounds. The passport belongs to Mr. Philip Agee, who's the CIA turncoat who's spent a good deal of his time abroad trying to identify American agents abroad and bringing them to public attention.

Right now we're going to talk with former CIA Director William Colby.

Have you looked at the stories on the decision about Mr. Agee and, I guess in the New York Times, the excerpts from the court opinion itself?

WILLIAM COLBY: I haven't seen the opinion itself. But I think it's well-settled law that the government has a right to distinguish between free speech and action, which is what...

TOM BRADEN: Bill, that was what Burger tried to do. I must say I thought he was on a tight -- a very tight wire and fell off it.

COLBY: Well, this fellow -- this fellow did a lot more than just speak. I mean he's conducting a campaign, and not just by speaking, but by acting...

BRADEN: Well, listen, Bill, let me...

COLBY: ...by putting it out with a deliberate intention, which he's quite frank to express.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5

27 June 1981

[redacted]

There's hot debate about self-censorship at the networks whenever a scoop could undermine national security

By Ron Nessen

"It would be like giving Anne Frank's address to the Nazis."

With that graphic argument, NBC News correspondent Richard Valeriani urged his network not to broadcast his discovery that six American Embassy officials in Iran had avoided being taken hostage in November 1979 and were hiding at the Canadian Embassy in Tehran.

NBC executives realized that the story almost certainly would have resulted in the capture of the fugitive Americans by militant Iranian revolutionaries, and so the story was not broadcast. The six American diplomats were later spirited out of Iran to safety on fake Canadian passports.

"That was an easy one to decide," Valeriani remembers.

But the choice of whether to suppress or broadcast a scoop on television news is not usually so clear-cut. The decision—on occasion literally one of life or death—places enormous pressures on correspondents like Valeriani and their network news superiors.

On the one hand, they are mindful that broadcasting a sensitive story could undermine national security, endanger lives (as in the case of the Tehran fugitives), upset delicate diplomatic negotiations or provide comfort and propaganda to the Nation's adversaries. On the other hand, the networks are sensitive to their First Amendment rights and responsibilities, and to the need to resist pressure from Government officials who may wish to kill a legitimate story only because it is embarrassing or politically damaging.

Acting White House press secretary Larry Speakes foresees the time when the Reagan Administration "will have to ask reporters to hold back on using a story when exposure could cause an explosive crisis." Speakes says he is confident that if the White House appeals on a case-by-case basis to the "best instincts" of journalists, the networks will voluntarily agree not to broadcast secrets that could harm the national interest.

He may be wrong. The TV networks—and the news media generally—have become less willing to withhold news stories since their bitter experiences with attempted press manipulation during the Vietnam War, the Pentagon Papers case, and, most of all, Watergate.

In the never-ending controversy over what constitutes improper censorship and what constitutes proper concern for national security, both sides cite dramatic episodes to support their arguments.

Those who claim that TV should broadcast what it knows in virtually every case point to President John Kennedy's famous lament after the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco. Kennedy expressed regret that The New York Times had bowed to his plea not to reveal in advance what they knew of the plans for the invasion of Cuba. Had the Times blown the operation's cover, Kennedy mused later, he might have reconsidered the ill-fated landing.

Those who argue on the other side, that the networks damage the national interest when they ignore Government requests to suppress sensitive secrets, cite the case of the Glomar Explorer, a sophisticated ship built for the CIA to raise a sunken Soviet missile submarine from the → floor of the Pacific Ocean.

The three networks and a number of newspapers learned of the Glomar and its mission in early 1975. But they voluntarily withheld the story at the request of then CIA director William Colby while the ship, which had already brought up half of the Soviet sub, prepared to grapple for the other half, believed to contain valuable Soviet coding equipment.

Says ABC's Jack Anderson: 'I have a duty to report what the Government is doing, which is not always what spokesmen say it is doing.'

Then, in March 1975, Jack Anderson went on the air and broke the Glomar Explorer story. As a result, the CIA says, it canceled efforts to bring up the rest of the submarine for fear that the Soviets—their discomfiture spotlighted on TV for all the world to see—might feel compelled to flex their muscles by interfering with, or even sinking, the Glomar Explorer.

Anderson, now with ABC, explains his role in the incident this way: "I have a duty to report what the Government is doing, which is not always what the authorized spokesmen say it is doing." Yet, Anderson says, "Admittedly, reporters are not security experts and the publication of military secrets is always a thorny question."

Surprisingly, despite his experience in the Glomar Explorer episode, Colby is opposed to any legislation that would give the Government the power to prohibit the broadcast or publication of information by legitimate news organizations, even if authorities consider the information inimical to the national interest.

Legislation here similar to England's Official Secrets Act—which allows for censorship of classified information—would, Colby believes, violate the U.S. Constitution. The former CIA director feels that television and the press must be free from Government censorship. "That's the cost to have this kind of free country," he declares.

In an unexpected reversal of the normal roles in this debate, NBC's Valeriani disagrees. "Britain has an Official Secrets Act," he points out, "and it's still a very good, functioning democracy." If TV correspondents and other reporters act irresponsibly—by divulging the identities of undercover intelligence operatives, for instance—then Valeriani thinks some restraints may be necessary.

"I don't believe in total freedom of the press," the veteran NBC correspondent explains. "I'm not a First Amendment absolutist."

EXCERPTED

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
19 June 1981

SHOP TALK

Glomar Resurfaces

Mysteries surrounding the mission of the Glomar Explorer, a salvage vessel built by Howard Hughes for the Central Intelligence Agency, may never be solved. A federal appeals court ruled recently that the CIA can keep its Glomar files secret.

Concluded the court: "The record before us suggests either that the CIA still has something to hide or that it wishes to hide from our adversaries the fact that it has nothing to hide."

In court papers, the CIA refused to concede that the Glomar's purpose was to recover a sunken Soviet submarine in 1974. But plaintiffs in the disclosure case, led by a citizens' group called the Military Audit Project and an organization supported by the American Civil Liberties Union, countered by citing a passage from the French edition of former CIA director William Colby's autobiography.

The passage, which doesn't appear in the English edition of the book, says the Glomar's mission "was to recover a Soviet submarine stranded some 16,500 feet deep at the bottom of the Pacific."

A lawyer for the CIA says Mr. Colby's statement, "if accurate, is not an official government pronouncement, because he is no longer an agency official."

The CIA also says Mr. Colby never submitted the passage for review by the agency prior to publication.

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ON PAGE 9

THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
June-July 1981

From Washington

EDWARD HAY

NATO outspends Warsaw

Since 1970, the NATO countries have outspent the Warsaw Pact countries by more than $200 billion, according to U.S. government figures. This fact is particularly relevant at a time when President Reagan's administration has proposed vastly increased military spending on the ground that excessive Soviet spending has led to a military imbalance.

In presenting his new economic plan to Congress and to the nation early in 1981, Ronald Reagan stated: "Since 1970, the Soviet Union has invested $300 billion more in its military forces than we have. . . . To allow this imbalance to continue is a threat to our national security." Reagan's figures are based on a CIA report, "Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities 1970–1979: A Dollar Cost Comparison."

The CIA's comparison paints a doubly misleading picture of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. First, the methodology of the report itself has been the subject of considerable controversy; the CIA readily admits that its calculations of Soviet defense spending, a rough estimation at best, contain an upward bias. Second, in restricting its analysis to only the United States and the Soviet Union, the CIA has neglected a more realistic comparison: the directly contending forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is clear that a true analysis of the military balance has to compare both systems as a whole.

Whatever their limitations, the CIA's figures on Soviet defense spending are the only official estimates available. Yet even based on these figures, *an analysis of total alliance defense spending shows a NATO advantage of $207 billion over Warsaw Pact military spending during the period 1970–1979.*

As the table indicates, NATO has in fact outspent the Warsaw Pact countries each year for the past decade, even though the margin has narrowed in recent years. According to Defense Department projections, NATO will continue to outspend the Warsaw Pact nations through 1986 at a minimum, and with a widening of the disparity.

NATO vs Warsaw Pact
Military Spending
(in billions of 1979 dollars)

Year	NATO	Warsaw Pact	NATO advantage
1970	$201.8	$149.5	$52.3
1971	192.8	153.7	39.1
1972	195.6	159.4	36.2
1973	190.9	166.7	24.2
1974	193.9	173.4	20.5
1975	190.5	178.6	11.9
1976	186.6	186.2	.4
1977	193.5	186.8	6.7
1978	195.4	190.7	4.7
1979	205.6	194.6	11.0
	1,946.6	1,739.6	207.0

Source: "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1979 figures from former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's January 1981 final report to Congress.

In short, whatever the alarmist figures used by the President to justify an increasing U.S. military budget, if there is indeed an imbalance in defense expenditures, it is one which favors the United States and our allies. And that $207 billion spending gap undoubtedly understates the NATO advantage by using a CIA approach which serves to overstate Soviet military spending.

In examining the CIA's methodology for comparing simply U.S. and Soviet military spending, an appraisal which removes some of the upward biases would further tip the scales in favor of NATO:

- Measurements in dollars rather than rubles tend to exaggerate Soviet expenditures, as the CIA admits. Valuing, for example, the USSR army of 4.5 million at our high voluntary army rates of pay plus upkeep (over $15,000 per soldier) adds up to almost $70 billion a year. Soviet salaries plus cost of upkeep are probably no more than one-third of ours.
- About 20 percent of total Soviet military expenditures and one-half of their recent buildup have been directed not at NATO but at China.
- Soviet expenditures in both dollars and rubles should be reduced still further to allow for the generally lower quality of Soviet equipment as well as the less sophisticated technology embodied in their weapons systems; CIA estimates insufficiently reflect these factors. Former CIA Director William Colby has stated: "To the extent that we are not able to 'Sovietize' [the method for estimating the cost of Soviet equipment when there is no direct equivalent in our own forces] and U.S. weapons used in the cost estimating methodology are more complex, our estimates tend to overstate the costs of producing the Soviet design."

According to Franklyn Holzman, professor of economics at Tufts University, proper comparisons can be made between U.S. and Soviet expenditures by valuing each in both dollars and rubles and taking a geometric mean of the two. Comparisons of expenditures in ruble prices would put both nations at approximate equality; in dollars, however, Soviet spending appears to be 50 percent higher. □

Edward Hay, research associate at the Council for a Livable World, is a student on leave of absence from Harvard College.