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
**CIRA****NEWSLETTER**

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Editor—Paul A. Borel

*Former DCI Richard Helms  
Awarded OSS Donovan Medal*



AT THE WASHINGTON HILTON ON MAY 24

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Ambassador Helms accepting the award, others left to right: Monsignor John Benson, Ray Cline, John Shaheen, DCI William Casey, Geoffrey Jones, General William Quinn, Vice President Bush, Mrs. David Bruce, John Bross, James Withrow, Rev. Edward Elson

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*The Vice President, Helms and Casey Stress Importance  
of Intelligence at OSS Award Dinner*



The Vice President congratulates Helms

*The Veterans of OSS awarded its William J. Donovan medal to Richard Helms "for brilliantly exemplifying qualities which characterized General Donovan's career and for the outstanding contribution Ambassador Helms has made to the development of the American intelligence effort, reflecting a lifetime commitment of concern for world and American security."*

*The medal was presented on May 24, at a gala affair attended by over 500 enthusiastic supporters of Intelligence. The guest speaker, Vice President of The United States George Bush, was introduced by DCI William Casey.*

*Dick Helm's remarks on accepting the award follow:*

I am touched and honored to receive the William J. Donovan Award. My reasons can be no mystery to any of you. So I want to thank Bill Casey, John Shaheen, Jeff Jones, and the others who participated in my selection for their perspicacity in ferretting me out and in persuading me with incomparable eloquence to appear here this evening. Most particularly I want to thank the Vice President for honoring us all with his presence. Soon after taking over at the Agency, Bill Casey commented that "out there at Langley they think that guy—meaning you, Mr. Vice President—walks around with some of us brought you don't, but there is no doubt of the respect and affec-

tion in which you are held by intelligence officers everywhere.

General Donovan's life is so well known that it requires no description tonight. For me and many of my friends his most important contribution was to found, defend, and operate the first integrated intelligence organization in U.S. history. He was truly the father of American intelligence. Before him our efforts were trivial.

My first personal encounter with General Donovan came in 1944 when Col. Passy, whose real name was Andre' de Wavrin, had been under fire in London for what were known as the Duke Street murders. Frenchmen under interrogation had allegedly died in the basement of the Free French intelligence headquarters.

A few days before Col. Passy's scheduled arrival Col. Atherton Richards, a senior OSS officer, phoned me out of the blue, verified that I had been a newspaperman and could speak French, informed me that I was to join him and two other officers as an escort group to take Col. Passy and two French subordinates on a tour of the United States. My assignment was to insure that there was no press coverage.

At the airport to greet the French visitors I approached General Donovan with considerable trepidation and the following exchange took place: "General Donovan, what about publicity in connection with this visit?"

"We don't want any."

"I know, but what if some newspaperman asks me whether it is true that Col. Passy is in this country."

"That's what you're here for, Lieutenant."

And the General walked away. There was no press coverage.

My introduction to OSS was to be rushed off to a training camp in the Maryland countryside known as Area E. There we were warned to use only first names, to try to spy out the backgrounds of our classmates, and to learn how to handle ourselves in life or death situations. Col. Fairbairn, once of the Shanghai police, later trainer of the famed British commandos, taught us the deadly arts, mostly in hand-to-hand combat. Within fifteen seconds I came to realize that my private parts were in constant jeopardy. I will not describe the unpleasant techniques taught, except to point out that Fairbairn's method of dealing with a hysterical woman was to grab her lower lip, then give her a resounding slap on the face. If the fear of being disfigured by move #1 did not sober her up, move #2 might. In short, the good Colonel's theory was that gentlemanly combatants tended to end up dead, and he persuaded us that this was the proper attitude in the area of personal defense. In some of us brought a tough outlook into CIA a few years later, it is hardly surprising.

Many who had served in OSS before the new CIA when its doors opened in September 1947. We had been trained to work against the Nazis, the Japanese, the Italians, and we had done so. Now we were to confront the Eastern Bloc, adversaries little understood but certainly tough, at least in the intelligence field. Then came the Peoples' Republic of China. For some years we used the same methods, learned from the British in World War II, that had been tried and proven. But the Soviet Bloc in peacetime, particularly the Russians themselves—suspicious, disciplined, possessed of a formidable security police—proved to be a tough nut to crack. Then in the late fifties technology came to the rescue. First the U-2 brought photographs with a mind-boggling volume of detail on Soviet arms and weapons systems. Close behind came the first photographic satellites. And the intelligence explosion of the century was on: a relentless stream of detailed data which turned analytical work on these so-called "denied areas" from famine to feast. Our best Russian agents, Popov and Penkovsky, suddenly seemed pale and inadequate.

But with the passage of time a distortion threatened to change the character of our work. The collectors with technical gadgets began to disparage the efforts of the human collectors. The new cry from the gadgeteers was, "Give us the money and leave it to us." And indeed, why take risks running spies when gadgets would tell you what you wanted to know? But therein lay a fallacy. And the debate over the elements of that fallacy is with us today and will inevitably crop up from time to time in the future. Why? Because gadgets cannot divine man's intentions. Even if computers can be programmed to think, they will not necessarily come to the same conclusion as Mr. Andropov. And if they should, how would we know? There is no substitute for old-fashioned analysis performed by old-fashioned brain power any more than there is a substitute for sound judgment based on adequate facts.

Another reason why we cannot rely exclusively on spies in the sky but also must have some on the ground is the extent to which the Soviets have closed the technology gap. We can no longer rely on our superiority across the board to protect us from the surprises of a devastating technological breakthrough. Since it takes 7 to 12 years to develop a new weapons system to the point of testing, satellite surveillance of a new weapons test could come too late. More than ever we need agents in place to give us advance warning of what is on the drawing boards.

If there is a weakness in our intelligence apparatus, it is in our ability to figure out what the leaders of a foreign power are going to do in any given situation. For example, it is open knowledge in our government that we do not know how the Saudi royal family arrives at its decisions. The same applies to the Russian leadership. In that case we may not even divine for some time that a decision was made, let alone the nature of it. Arkady Shevchenko, the Russian defector from the United Nations, recently wrote that American followers of Kremlin politics have a regrettable lack of understanding about how the Soviet leadership think, how they act behind the scenes and how they make

ambassy in Iran and the political infighting which brought on the taking of the hostages were surprises born of an inadequate grasp of Ayatollah Khomeini's bigotry and zealotry. To this day the varied patterns of Islamic thought are mysterious to our American minds. I could go on and on, but you have my point. As a country we must develop a far deeper knowledge of other peoples' culture, religion, politics than we possess today. Believe or not, we are still essentially a provincial nation.

I recognize that my formulation here is in extreme shorthand, but there can be no denying that the underlying concept is sound and important.

But back to the interplay between humans and gadgets. Let me now use as examples events involving Cuba and the United States in the early sixties.

What is today known as the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in October 1962. As you will recall, Mr. Khrushchev attempted to sneak intermediate range ballistic missiles into Cuba which could easily reach the heartland of America. This action jolted President Kennedy who had been assured by his Russian experts (diplomatic, military, intelligence) that the Soviets would never make such a rash move. Agents had reported seeing missiles on the island as had refugees fleeing to Florida. But it was not until a reluctant government resumed U-2 flights over Cuba that the photographs showed unquestionably that missile sites were being built and that missiles had indeed arrived on the island. The so-called "hard evidence" was at hand. President Kennedy's success in getting the Russians to withdraw the missiles and the bombers is public history. But it took the combined efforts of human and technical resources to make the case convincingly to a skeptical world.

**There is no substitute for old-fashioned analysis performed by old-fashioned brain power any more than there is a substitute for sound judgment based on adequate facts.**

On a later occasion I asked Attorney General Kennedy, who was the President's honcho on matters Cuban, why the White House was not making more of an issue of Cuban weapons support to dissidents and opposition elements in other Latin American countries. He replied, "The President needs hard evidence that this is going on." Again that term "hard evidence." Did it have to be a photograph? Perhaps not. That time the human collectors came to the rescue. On a finca in Venezuela a large arms cache was discovered, the purpose of which was to arm a group intent on mounting a coup in Caracas. In this cache were sub-machine guns of Belgian manufacture with holes the size of a 50 cent piece braised on the stock. Skilled Agency technicians were able to recover for a few seconds the miniature which had been braised away, long enough to photograph it. The official seal of Castro's Cuba

emerged. Triumphantly, I carried the briefcase to the AG's office, gun in a brief case. A half hour later we were ushered into the Oval Office, Bob Kennedy having made the appointment for me to present the "hard evidence." I apologized to President Kennedy for bringing such a mean-looking weapon into his presence. He laconically replied, "Yes, it gives me a feeling of confidence." Three days later he was dead.

The estimating process did much better on what became known as the June War of 1967, but there the analysts had military statistics and known weapons systems to deal with. As war clouds gathered in the Middle East during May, the Israeli government finally sent an estimate to Washington designed to demonstrate that Israel might well be defeated by the Arabs without U.S. assistance. Within five or six hours of receiving this estimate, the Agency produced a written estimate of its own contending that Israel could defeat within two weeks any combination of Arab armies which could be thrown against it no matter who began the hostilities. When Dean Rusk read this commentary, he asked me if I agreed with it. I replied that I did. Then with a wry grin he commented, "Well, in the words of Fiorello LaGuardia, if this is a mistake, it's a beaut!" Later at the request of President Johnson the estimate was reworked or to use his words "scrubbed down." The new version had the Israelis winning in one week. In fact, they took six days.


In conclusion, I want to pay heartfelt tribute to the friends and colleagues with whom I shared the long road which started in OSS and ended ten years ago at CIA. My son, Dennis, had an intern job at the Agency one summer while he was in college. He said to me one evening, "Dad, you are very lucky to be working at CIA." "Why," I inquired. His answer I've never forgotten: "Because the people there are so civilized." That was my experience in OSS as well. With few exceptions these men and women stood up to the stern challenge of anonymity, security, and discipline. Admiral Rufus Taylor, my deputy at one point, recognized these traits when he wrote to President Johnson on his retirement saying that he had never in his life been exposed to a more disciplined group of people, and that included the U.S. Navy. We all did our work because we believed in it, and we understood the need to obey a code of integrity with each other despite the lies and crafty tricks we might be required to use on our adversaries.

That "long road" to which I just referred was sometimes bumpy, unseen potholes punctuated the way. We sometimes wondered whether our compatriots were for us or against us. But in the end few would have traded for any other career. General Donovan would have approved. He was not one to walk away from adversity. Neither was Frank Wisner who inspired and guided me for many years starting in OSS. The other day Bob Ames fell in Beirut, the victim of an incomprehensible trick of fate. Twenty years my junior, I knew him for the star he was. Other names like Allen Dulles, Tom Karamessines spin through my head.

To all of you and to all of them, thank you.

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## *Introduction of the Vice President by DCI Casey*



*Mr.* Vice President, Ambassador Helms, other distinguished guests, all of you:

I would like to read to you a letter given me to bring to our Honoree this evening.

Dear Dick,

It was with great pleasure that I learned the Veterans of OSS are presenting you with their William J. Donovan Award. I can think of few more deserving recipients, indeed few careers in government have been more distinguished than yours or more exciting. History seems to have singled you out for a role in some of the most critical events of our century. As a journalist you saw the Third Reich firsthand; as a Navy officer during World War II you served ably in OSS; as a civil servant you played a role in the founding and direction of the Central Intelligence Agency from its earliest days; as a Director of Central Intelligence you won national regard for your leadership; as a diplomat you served with distinction as ambassador to Iran.

All of your countrymen are indebted to you for these years you have given to America—for your unflinching patriotism, your high standards of professionalism and your commitment to the call of conscience.

Today I join the Veterans of the OSS—heroes all of them—in saluting one of their number. Congratulations, Dick, on the Donovan Award and many thanks for your long years of service to the cause of human freedom.

Sincerely,  
Ronald Reagan

The President's accolade to the Veterans of OSS as heroes recalls how, some fifteen years after the liberation of France, the Amicale Action, the veterans organization of the French resistance, provided a tour through France for some twenty of us who had worked to support them during the war. Everywhere we went there would be a speech and a toast and I was expected to respond. I would dust off my college French and start with "nous sommes tres eueux etre ici," thinking I was saying "we'd done this a few times some French scholar, Henry Hyde or Barbara Shaheen, I

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forget exactly who came to me and said, 'Bill, you are saying 'nous sommes tous heroes,' which means, 'we are all heroes.' " Whatever it was I was saying, I had noticed a look of great skepticism on the faces of our French hosts. And it is reassuring, even at this late date, to have the President of the United States confirm that you really are heroes, even if I was trying to say something else.

But I am certainly very happy to be here with so many friends and comrades of old wars and escapades and particularly to join in this splendid tribute to Dick Helms. Dick and I were present at the creation, worked together in Washington, shared an apartment in London, and I have watched him quite closely over the last forty years always admiring his qualities of character and intellect, his judgment, his discipline and his professionalism. I once told Dick how wonderful it was that he, unlike the great majority of us, had resisted the blandishments of the private sector and dedicated his career to the creation of a permanent American intelligence service. He explained simply that when you sit in the CIA and see the reports that come in from around the world you can't help but realize how beleaguered this country really is and you just have to stick with it.

Certainly our country is no less beleaguered today and we are very lucky to have a very large number of men and women who show that same dedication and have developed a discipline, a know-how and a can-do spirit which is both a joy to behold and a priceless national asset. That is a heritage for which all of us owe much to the leadership and example which Dick Helms provided for some thirty years and, even in his post-intelligence career, still does.

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There came a time in 1974 and 1975 when some of the Congress and the media indulged in an orgy of allegation and recrimination against the American intelligence community, most of it unfounded or wildly exaggerated. It was bruising experience which scattered painfully won expertise and experience, shattered morale and destroyed confidence. Then in 1976 there came, as DCI, a man who in a remarkably short period of time restored the confidence, lifted the spirits and renewed the momentum of the American intelligence community. For that achievement, and for the qualities of character and leadership on which it was based, he has won the admiration and the affection of all of us. I am honored to present him to you tonight.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice President of the United States.

Address by Vice President George Bush



Thank you, Bill. Good evening. I'm honored to be here tonight participating in this ceremony, because I can't think of anyone who deserves the Donovan award more than Dick Helms. Having inherited his job at CIA—if only for a short time—I gained a real respect and admiration for the magnitude of Dick's accomplishments over there.

Not many of you may know that before Dick got into intelligence, he was working for the other side—the press. In the thirties, Dick was a correspondent for UP in London and later, Berlin, where he observed first hand the developments in the Nazi government. He was even able to get a personal interview with Adolph Hitler. I hear tell that this meeting was mentioned in the so-called Hitler diaries, although the scholars apparently became suspicious when the diaries referred to Dick as the future director of the CIA.

Anyway, Dick joined up early with Wild Bill Donovan's OSS, organizing intelligence networks from his vantage point in England and other stations throughout Europe.

Still serving in the OSS after the war he closely observed Soviet methods and intransigence in Germany and Berlin. What he learned then made Dick Helms decide to stay on in Government service. He became convinced that the United States would face many threats in the post-war world, and he realized that effective intelligence was vital if the democratic societies were to be able to defend themselves against those threats.

It's hard to imagine now, but in 1940 and 41, Bill Donovan was a one-man CIA for Franklin Roosevelt. The OSS was brought into being in great part simply through the force of Donovan's determined personality.

Well, after World War II, it took other forceful personalities to define the role of our intelligence service in a very different, but equally threatening world situation. One might even say that with the introduction of nuclear weapons into the equation, the situation became even more threatening than it had been in the past. Dick Helms

## Dubious Deals

### Ashland Oil Criticizes Its Payments to Libyan To Get Oman's Crude

### But Its Report to SEC Denies Illegal Acts in Lining Up Supplies After Shah Fell

### How the Chairman Resigned

By RICHARD L. HUDSON  
And PAUL INGRASSIA

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

When Ashland Oil Inc. convened its annual meeting on Jan. 28, 1982, John R. Hall spoke warm words about the man he had recently succeeded as chairman.

"The prospect of following in the footsteps of Orin Atkins is a humbling experience," Mr. Hall said. "I would appreciate the shareholders' expressing their thanks to Mr. Atkins with a round of applause."

Mr. Atkins didn't bask in the accolade. The man who for 17 years had headed Ashland, the nation's largest independent oil refiner, wasn't even at the meeting at corporate headquarters in Ashland, Ky. He had quit his post four months earlier when confronted with a quiet coup led by the company's outside directors and joined by Mr. Hall himself.

The board-room-coup came near the end of a six-month private investigation, commissioned by Ashland's directors, into whether Mr. Atkins had authorized payoffs to get crude oil from Oman in 1980. Neither Mr. Atkins nor Ashland violated any U.S. law, the investigation concluded. But it criticized questionable payments that Ashland made to a wealthy Libyan with ties to the Sultan of Oman, as well as other dealings with a Canadian adventurer who helped the sultan seize power in 1970.

#### Some Sizable Losses

At one point, the report states, Ashland dropped \$2.3 million in a doomed venture to produce sausage casings that it hoped could be ripped off cooked sausages at processing plants and used again and again. It also invested \$26 million in a Rhodesian chromium mine later proved to be worthless. Both investments were brought to Mr. Atkins by Yehia Omar, a fabulously wealthy Libyan

businessman who said he could help the company buy oil in Oman. In December 1980, Ashland paid Mr. Omar a \$1,350,000 "commission" for its Omani oil contract; but that money was later returned to the company after outside directors intervened.

Ashland had never explained why Mr. Atkins suddenly quit in September 1981, at age 57, giving just two weeks' notice. But last week, the company filed its 500-page internal investigation report with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which had just voted to begin a full-scale inquiry into Ashland's dealings in Oman.

The report, together with interviews of current and former Ashland officials, depicts the company scrambling for oil in the wake of the 1979 Iranian embargo, sometimes tapping former Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms and other former CIA officials for advice. What emerges is a rare glimpse of a struggle within a large U.S. company over the bounds of ethical conduct in the murky business world of the Middle East.

#### Atkins's Statement

Ashland's filing of its report prompted Mr. Atkins to issue a statement yesterday, saying he told Ashland's board "in late 1980" that he wanted to retire. At the time, Mr. Atkins stated, "there were differences within both management and the board" over his diversification moves, but the board asked him to stay "until a successor had been selected."

Ashland outside directors confirm those statements, but add that disagreements over the Omani transactions hastened Mr. Atkins's departure.

Controversies over ethics aren't new at Ashland. In 1973, the company and Mr. Atkins were fined for channeling \$100,000 in corporate money to Richard Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign. A year later, the company pleaded guilty and was fined again for making more illegal political contributions than it had previously disclosed. And some 18 months after the second conviction, Ashland admitted to still more undisclosed illegal contributions, plus payments to foreign officials as well. At around the same time—July 1975—Ashland disclosed that it had accepted money from the CIA and had acted as a cover for covert CIA activities abroad between 1968 and 1973.

#### Diversification Program

In 1979, Mr. Atkins launched a major diversification program. He sold most of Ashland's fledgling oil-producing operations and used some of the money to buy an insurance company and a maker of pollution-control equipment. "An element of the board thought we were doing too damn many

things too damn fast," recalls F.H. Ross, a director and a retired Ashland executive. But Ashland was getting a seemingly secure 100,000 barrels of oil a day from the shah's Iran, so Mr. Atkins had his way.

Then, disaster struck. The shah fell from power, Iranians seized the U.S. Embassy, and President Carter embargoed oil imports from Iran. Almost overnight, Ashland lost one-fourth of its crude-oil supply. It made up some of the shortfall but remained desperate for crude.

Enter Yehia Omar. "A unique and inscrutable figure," says the Ashland investigation report, which was compiled in 1981 at the behest of Ashland's board by the Pittsburgh law firm of Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Johnson & Hutchison. Mr. Omar had amassed great wealth in the 1970s as a middleman for U.S. and European companies eager to trade in the Mideast. He's "a 5% man," says one former U.S. diplomat, referring to his habit of claiming 5% of each contract price as a commission.

Mr. Omar, who hasn't returned phone calls to comment on his dealings with Ashland, had helped Ashland in Libya during the reign of King Idris. But Mr. Omar fled Libya on a U.S. Air Force jet, the Ashland report states, after Col. Muammar Qadhafi seized power in 1969. With U.S. help, he later became an "economic adviser" to Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman. He may have returned the favor by convincing the sultan not to condemn the 1978 Camp David accords, the Ashland report says.

In 1979, Mr. Omar introduced Mr. Atkins and other Ashland officials to Timothy Landon, a Canadian who had become a palace official in Oman after helping the sultan seize the throne from his father in 1970. According to the Ashland report, the two men said Ashland might be able to get 50,000 barrels of Omani crude a day, with a hitch: Some of the oil must be bought from them, rather than from the government, at a marked-up price. While the company mulled the offer, it began a series of exotic—and costly—business ventures with the two men.

On the surface, most of the ventures had little to do with oil. But some Ashland officials suspected that they were simply elaborate ways to funnel money indirectly to Mr. Omar in recompense for any help he might provide in getting Omani crude. At one point, Ashland considered selling him a company jet at \$3 million below its market price "in lieu of commissions" on oil purchases, the Ashland report says. Company documents show that Ashland officials were uneasy about whether U.S. prosecutors might view direct commission payments to the men as bribery.

CONTINUED



# CIA Plots Hurt Interests Of U.S. in the Long Run

STAT

WASHINGTON — A strong case can be made for the proposition that CIA intervention into the internal politics of another nation works against the long-term interests of the United States as well as those of the country involved.

As one who served two years under former CIA Director Richard Helms at the U.S. Embassy in Iran, I long ago reached the conclusion that the CIA made matters much worse for both the United States and Iran when it engineered a coup that overthrew the legitimate government of Iran in 1953.

An official of the Organization of American States recently made the same claim in the case of Guatemala where the United States intervened, engineered the ouster of the legal government and paved the way from the entry of a brutal right-wing dictatorship that has killed or expelled thousands of Indian peasants.

In an unprecedented action last week, the majority Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee issued a report contending that covert U.S. support for guerrillas fighting the government of Nicaragua has strengthened international support for the leftist Sandinistas and has failed in one of its purposes; stopping the flow of arms to rebels in El Salvador.

The Reagan administration has "allowed the spotlight of international opprobrium to shift from Sandinista attempts to subvert a neighboring government (in El Salvador) to a U.S. attempt to subvert that of Nicaragua," the committee's nine Democrats concluded in the report about the on-going covert CIA operation. The ranking Democrat is Chairman Edward P. Boland of Massachusetts. It was Boland who authored the amendment bearing his name that enjoined the administration from using CIA funds to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. Committee members recently voted to end the operation when some of them claimed that the Reagan administration was violating the Boland amendment.

President Reagan inadvertently focused on the issue of moral confusion at his news conference last week when he was asked why his administration doesn't openly support the 7,000 guerrillas trying to destabilize the Nicaraguan government. To laughter among the newsmen and women at the White House, he replied: "Why, because we want to keep on obeying the laws of our country, which we are obeying."

WHILE THE cases of CIA involvement in the internal affairs of Iran, Guatemala and Nicaragua all are open to grave question, one of the most questionable cases of covert meddling is the case of Chile.



## Washington

By MAX MCCARTHY

It was just 10 years ago that the CIA engineered a coup against leftist President Salvador Allende, paving the way for the military regime of President Augusto Pinochet.

The Pinochet regime is so unpopular that it has slapped a classified material stamp on Gallup polls.

In Gestapo-like predawn raids eight days ago, submachinegun-wielding Pinochet troops seized some 1,000 persons and took them to soccer stadiums and police stations in apparent retaliation for widespread protests against the repressive regime.

Some 600 uniformed men in the early hours of Saturday May 14, surrounded two slum areas in Santiago and ordered everyone over the age of 14 to come out. Twelve hours later newsmen could see several hundred boys and men waiting in a stadium for security agents to check their identity cards.

EARLIER, FIVE opposition parties ranging from Socialists to Conservatives issued a joint state-

ment calling for a return to genuine democracy through free elections. Six labor unions called for non-violent demonstrations in support of a return to an open democratic government.

Rodolfo Seguel, leader of the copper mines' union, estimated that 70 percent of Chile's 11 million persons took part in anti-Pinochet demonstrations this month. Tens of thousands of Chileans registered their discontent by blowing car horns, banging pots together inside their homes and keeping their children out of school. Absenteeism one day this month was at least 70 percent in some Santiago schools.

Pinochet has rejected all the appeals and has cracked down ever harder on dissent. The brave members of Chile's endangered human-rights commission report that the regime made 1,789 political arrests in 1982. This was almost three times the number for 1981.

Ambesty International last week accused Chilean police of widespread torture of political prisoners. The London-based human rights organization charged that the police, operating from a clandestine center in Santiago, used medical personnel to examine the victims before and after torture sessions.

The organization said that there are grounds to believe that one or more medical professionals "actively participated in torture."

Thanks in part to the CIA, Chile now has a hated dictator. But this sort of underhanded activity not only hurts the United States in the short-run, it has the long-term potential of undermining the very principles upon which this nation was founded.

WASHINGTON POST  
20 MAY 1983

# Letting Luce With Clare Boothe

STAT

## Drawing a Self-Portrait With Wit & Words

By Sarah Booth Conroy

Clare Boothe Luce has not so much lived her life as written it as an epigram. She was born with the gift of intelligence and the curse of seeing the world as ludicrous.

"Without a tragic view of life, you can't find it as funny as I do," she said last night. "The difference between a pessimist and an optimist is that the pessimist is better informed."

Last night, five weeks after her 80th birthday, the wit and the beauty were holding up well at a verbal "Self-Portrait at the National Portrait Gallery." Those of the about

300 guests who came expecting a drawing room dialogue from the famous playwright of "The Women" were not disappointed.

Neither were those who came to hear the Republican politician and diplomat who was a member of Congress from Connecticut and an ambassador to Rome. Today she is a consultant to the National Security Council, a member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and an amazing combination of a grande dame and an *enfant terrible*.

Paying tribute to her past and her present was an appreciative group that included three CIA directors, two past and one present—William Colby, Richard Helms and William Casey—the Librarian of Congress Daniel Boorstin, the Architect of the Capitol George White, former Nixon secretary Rosemary Woods and Luce biographer Sylvia Morris.

In fine form, shimmering with sequins, wearing enough pearls to decimate a bed of oysters, Luce ranged with Marc Pachter, the National Portrait Gallery's historian, over her var-

ious starring roles with words about the costars and the bit players in the road company of her life. She spoke much about the cheers and a bit about the boos.

She neatly dug a grave for the long-standing rumor that George Kaufman had written parts of "The Women," her biggest hit. "He used to say, 'Do you think that if I'd written a play that made \$3 million, I would've put her name on it?'"

When she was in Congress, she said, "someone was always saying that my husband [Henry Luce, owner of Time-Life] had his staffers write my speeches for me. But it all balanced out, sometimes people said I wrote his editorials for him."

Listening to her last night, it is doubtful that anyone would dare write anything for her. Looking at Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, sitting on a front seat at the discussion, she gave a mild example of the sort of thing that made many enemies in her career. She chastised Weinberger for popularizing the phrase "build-down."

"The secretary is a great patriot," she said, "but he would certainly do the country a favor if he would get rid of 'build-down.'"

She said she learned at a party recently that former senator J. William Fulbright had never forgiven her for the time she corrected his use of imply and infer. And she told about the congressman who told one of her verbal victims not to mind her because "her real vocation is writing. She attaches meaning to the use of words."

Luce told of a time she met her match. "When 'The Women' was a success in London, I was brave enough to ask Sylvia Astor to introduce me to George Bernard Shaw. I wrote out in my mind what I was going to say."

But when she was shown into Shaw's study, he ignored her for so long she forgot her speech. "I just blurted out, 'Mr. Shaw, if it weren't for you, I wouldn't be here . . . He looked at me and said, 'And what is your mother's name?'"

Pachter asked Luce which of her many roles she preferred. She said the most wonderful was to be mother to

her daughter, who was killed in a car accident at 19. Luce said she mourned the grandchildren she might have had.

And in a characteristic shift, from dark to light, she went on to say she was proudest of learning scuba diving after she was 50.

"I took a certain pride in that President Eisenhower gave me 14 missions to accomplish as ambassador to Italy. And I accomplished 15—I persuaded Italy and Yugoslavia to settle their territorial dispute. I believe it is the only border disagreement since World War II solved short of war."

Luce admitted that her first ambition was to be a playwright despite her subsequent diplomatic career. In conversation after the formal dialogue, she said she has a play "gestating. But you know the kind of life we lead often acts as an abortion to the creative impulse."

It is said no woman can be too thin or too rich. Last night, it seemed that Luce, who is neither fat nor poor, could have ruled the world—if she had not also been too beautiful and too witty.

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