The Presidency/Hugh Sidey

Finding Peace in Strength



Hitler in 1935: the burden of history

There is a melancholy echo these days for Richard Helms, former head of the CIA, as he trudges to the Pentagon and pulls up a chair in the somber interior of Room 3E333. He and ten other members of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces have been asked to design the free world's nuclear deterrent for the rest of this century. Helms' entire adult life has been given to studying and acting against forces that would quell freedom. The problem probably cannot be solved for more than a few years at a time, a fact that Helms accepts but many Americans find hard to digest.

As Helms nears 70, his belief that strength brings peace, that vigilance thwarts aggression, is undimmed. And so he is back in public service, alarmed at the rising number of people in the free world who accept without question Soviet declarations of peace, who grow flaccid out of fear of Soviet strength. The cycle repeats itself.

Fifty years ago this Sunday, Jan. 30, 1933, when Helms was a Williams College sophomore getting ready for exams, he

heard that Adolf Hitler had become dictator of Germany. Two years later, in the fall of 1935, Helms was a United Press reporter in Berlin, hunched forward in his seat in the Kroll Opera House watching Hitler rant against the Versailles Treaty. "I noticed that Hitler had become rather pale," Helms recalls. "He was passing a handkerchief back and forth between his hands underneath the lectern." Suddenly Helms understood. "At this moment," Hitler shouted, "German troops are crossing the Rhine bridges and occupying the Rhineland!" His mesmerized audience cheered wildly. Helms, then 23, was stunned. The world shrugged.

In the summer of 1936, Helms covered America's greatest hero, Charles Lindbergh, who became frightened by German air might after Hermann Göring showed him the huge air force he was building. That September, Helms was in Nuremberg at the Nazi Party Congress, where uniformed ranks roared their devotion to Hitler and flights of new bombers thundered endlessly overhead. In all his subsequent years in and around power, Helms has never seen anything quite like it.

Helms rode in the car behind Hitler in a motorcade through Nuremberg, where the frenzy spilled down every street. At the Burg, a medieval castle, Hitler came out on the battlement for one of his rare interviews. Helms was seized by conflicting emotions. He looked down on Hitler, who was smaller than Helms had thought. Hitler's handshake was firm. But his personality was not hypnotic. His eyes possessed no power, as the myths had it. Hitler's skin was coarse and his mustache slightly gray. His bottom teeth were gold-plated, which made Helms suspect they were false. Hitler's smile was humorless but his manner was pleasant enough. What was it about this plain man that had brought him so far, Helms wondered as Hitler talked of his hatred of Bolshevism, of the value of the party congress. Later, Helms would write: "No imagination could make anything godlike out of the ordinary mortal who chatted on that day. The striking things were the ready intelligence, the understanding of German psychology, the complete assuredness." But the sad fact was that Helms was only one of a small group of journalists and diplomats who understood the Nazi menace when there might have been time to stop Hitler.

There is no Hitler in today's world, in Helms' view. The adversary is many men, many nations and many systems. The measures of strength are economic as much as military. But the basic challenge, believes Helms, remains unchanged: how to preserve freedom while preventing war. The world failed with Hitler. It has succeeded for nearly four decades since World War II, largely through U.S. strength and resolve. Now doubt assails us again.

So each day Helms makes his way to Room 3E333 carrying with him the memories of what started just half a century ago next week in Germany, when Hitler rose to power and weary nations turned away from danger and refused ApprovedurFordRelease 2006/051/12/inglAnRDP91-009001R000509150926-2 STAT

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WASHINGTON POST 4 JANUARY 1983

Brzezinski Believes KGB Plotted to Kill the Pope

ROME, Jan. 3 (UPI)—Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski said he believes the Soviet KGB, the secret security police, was behind the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II.

Brzezinski, in an interview published Sunday in the Turin newspaper La Stampa, also was quoted as saying that Yuri Andropov, the new Soviet leader, "represents the most sinister forces at work in the Soviet system."

Andropov headed the KGB from 1967 until only months before his appointment to replace the late Leonid Brezhnev in November.

"The secret police he directed for such a long time is responsible for the suppression of internal dissent and profoundly involved in the control of Eastern Europe," Brzezinski was quoted as telling the Italian newspaper. There is mounting evidence, he continued, "that it was implicated in the most monumental assassination attempt carried out in this century—that against the pope."

"There is no doubt that the investigation made by Italian authorities has established the complicity of Bulgaria in the attack against the pope," the former Carter administration official was quoted as saying. "Those who know the reality of Eastern Europe automatically deduce that the Soviet Union was in command of the operation."

"Only the KGB could have been its instrument and Andropov dominated it for 15 years. The logic of this affair . . . is irrefutable," Brzezinski was quoted as saying.

[U.S. intelligence officials have expressed skepticism about the allegations of a KGB connection to the plot against the pope. But former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, in an interview last week with Cable News Network, said ex-CIA director Richard Helms had told him "it had all the earmarks . . . of a KGB operation."

[Kissinger said he agreed: "If you try to square the known facts, it really leads almost to no other conclusion." said. "The Bulgarians have no interest in coming after the pope."]

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[In Moscow, a Soviet television commentary said the charges of Bulgarian and Soviet involvement were an attempt "to turn Italy into a launching pad for retaliation" and to set Catholics against Communists.]

One Bulgarian—Rome-based airline official Sergei Ivanov Antonov—was arrested in Rome Nov. 25 on suspicion of complicity in the May 13, 1981, attempt on the pope's life. Lawyers for Antonov today formally filed a request for his release on the grounds of lack of evidence.

[According to Reuter, the lawyers' formal application was a detailed alibi, quoting witnesses in an exhaustive account of Antonov's activities on the dates he is alleged to have helped Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Agca plan and execute the attack.

[Ilario Martella, the Italian magistrate investigating the case, is expected to rule on the lawyers' application when he returns from West Germany, where he is interviewing Musa Cedar Celebi, a right-wing Turk

who has been arrested by police in Frankfurt on charges of complicity in the plot.]

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REAGAN APPOINTS A PANEL TO STUDY MX MISSILE SYSTEM

SEEKS TO BREAK DEADLOCK

Chairman of Bipartisan Group Cautious on Prospects of Accord on Basing Plan

By FRANCIS X. CLINES Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 3 — President Reagan today named a bipartisan commission to study the deadlocked MX missile issue, and its chairman quickly cautioned that the panel would not necessarily produce a workable solution.

"Obviously the problem is very difficult," the chairman, Brent Scowcroft said of the dozens of past missile plans studied and discarded by recent administrations. "If it were not very difficult it would already be solved."

The 11-member panel, formally known as the Commission on Strategic Forces, has a broad mandate to study the total array of the nation's nuclear deterrence. It is to make its recommendations to the President by Feb. 18. The Administration is to make its new proposal to Congress on or after March 1.

Chairman Cautious at Prospects

"Nothing is ruled out," Mr. Scowcroft said. "The commission has no kind of restrictions on what it can and cannot do."

At a news briefing, Mr. Scowcroft sidestepped such political questions as whether the panel was established by the President as a safe, bipartisan vehicle to help revive support for the nuclear missile in Congress.

"Whatever we come up with is unlikely to meet the unanimous approval of everyone in the country, of everyone in the Congress," Mr. Scowcroft said.

Asked how the new group, operating against a tight deadline, might solve the MX problem, still intractable after more than 30 studies, Mr. Scowcroft replied, "I'm not sure that we will."

Defense Policy Specialists

, In contrast to some earlier MX study panels that included a heavy representation of technical experts, the commission appointed today appears to put emphasis on former military policy specialists, including some prominent past advocates of the MX missile, a "safe" group, by the estimate of one Capitol Hill official involved with the issue who asked not to be named.

In addition to Mr. Scowcroft, a former Air Force general and national security adviser to President Ford, the panel will have as vice chairman Thomas Reed, a former Secretary of the Air Force and a special assistant to President Reagan on national security.

Mr. Reed was an advocate of placing 100 missiles in a closely spaced basing arrangement in Wyoming, a proposal known informally as "dense pack" that sparked a resounding defeat for the President's MX production plan in the post-election session of Congress last month. Asked whether the commission could be sufficiently independent, Mr. Reed said: "The commission has been asked to take an independent look and I think they will do so. And I think the President values the commission's adyice."

The commission includes Harold Brown, a nuclear physicist who was Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, and Alexander M. Haig Jr., a retired general and Mr. Reagan's former Secretary of State.

Other members of the panel are Nicholas Brady, a New Jersey businessman and former Senator; William Clements, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense who is about to step down as Governor of Texas; Dr. John Deutch, dean of science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former research director at the Department of Energy; Richard Helms, a former Director of Central Intelligence; John Lyons, a vice president and defense subcommittee chairman of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of In-Organizations; Levering dustrial Smith, a retired vice admiral and former director of special projects for the Navy, and James Woolsey, a former Under Secretary of the Navy.

The panel's executive secretary is Dr. Marvin Atkins, director of offensive and space systems for the Secretary of Defense. In addition, such past Government foreign policy and military specialists as Henry A. Kissinger and James Schlesinger will be consulted by the commission.

Mr. Scowcroft, interviewed in the White House driveway after a visit with the President, was asked whether the panel might go beyond the basing question and conceivably recommend veto-

"I feel," he replied, "that the MX is a very important part of our future defense posture, but that's purely personal."

'Rush to Judgment' Questioned

Senator Ernest F. Hollings, the South Carolina Democrat who led opposition to the President's MX plan in the Senate, called on the new panel to "study all options, not just MX." He questioned how the study could be thorough in the limited time available. "I don't see the need or rationale for this rush to judgment," Mr. Hollings said. "After all, we're talking billions of dollars."

President Reagan, who decided to create the bipartisan study panel after Congress rejected his MX plan last month, stressed in his announcement that "an important part of the commission's work will be to consider carefully the views of Congress."

Critics in and out of Congress, in defeating a budget plan to begin producing the new missiles, had focused on the proposal for burying 100 of the new multiple-warhead rockets in silos closely packed in a 20-square-mile plot in Wyoming. Last October, Mr. Scowcroft said such a plan "may be subject to catastrophic failure."

Asked about this today, Mr. Scowcroft commented, "I've said critical things about a number of basing modes."

In appointing the panel, President Reagan said the commission's basic goal was to "to preserve an effective deterrent while moving forward with negotiations to reach equitable and verifiable arms reductions."

The Administration will not be bound by the commission's recommendations, although Mr. Reagan's advisers are hinging their campaign to revive the MX proposal in the new Congress on the panel. While the Congressional language gives the commission a broad mandate to study the subject, President Reagan's statement emphasized that the panel will have "particular focus on our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile system and basing alternatives for that system."

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