

ARTICLE APPEARED
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HUGH SIDNEY

Some Iranian History From Richard Helms

In the search for a new policy to combat terrorism, this government would do well to listen to a bit of history from an old hand who helped make some of it: Richard Helms, former master spy, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, former ambassador to Iran, was down in the salubrious environs of Florida a few days ago ruminating to a select audience about the seizure of the hostages in Tehran and America's failure to perceive the event before it happened and to understand it after it occurred.

Helms is one of those men who was born with wide-angle vision and then trained to be wary of instant gratification in politics and diplomacy. Educated in part in Europe, he went back after Williams College to report for United Press on the rise of Hitler, whom he interviewed in 1936. During World War II he served in the Office of Strategic Services which then became the CIA. Always worked with the globe, pulling a string here then watching to see its effect there.

Exercising admirable restraint, he remained quiet through the hostage trauma. But he has watched and studied the flow of events with his same practiced encompassing eye.

Why Iran Took Hostages

The reason the hostages were taken was not because the shah was admitted to the United States for medical treatment, Helms told his listeners. "It was because the mullahs, the Islamic Republic hard-liners, wanted to bring down the government of Prime Minister Bazargan and put a stop to its quiet efforts to resume at least informal relations with the United States. Put another way, the excuse that the advent of the shah in the United States had caused the embassy takeover was nothing but a cover to hide what was a major domestic political coup inside Iran, i.e., the fall of the Bazargan government."

That is not the first time this cause and effect has been suggested. But because Helms comes to that conclusion makes it considerably more interesting as we sort through the Iran debris for some clue on how to act in the future.

It is Helms' contention that the critical date is not any of those that commemorate the storming of the U.S. Embassy or when the shah was laid out on the operating table in New York, but rather Nov. 1, 1979, when Carter's voluble national security aide Zbigniew Brzezinski, then in Algiers for the independence celebration, set up a meeting with Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yasdi. Helms believes that the session set off alarms all through the ranks of the Islamic hard-liners and three days later they triggered the storming of the U.S. embassy.

The Ayatollah Khomeini had become convinced that the Bazargan government wanted to sustain and perhaps enlarge a relationship with the U.S. That was intolerable to Khomeini, who had fired his movement with the doctrine that America has corrupted Iran. Khomeini was the power, a fact not fully understood by our government.

Contacts With Bazargan

One suspects at this distance that the files of the State Department will some day reveal many more contacts with the Bazargan government than we know about as the Carter administration sought frantically to climb back into bed with Iran. There is simply no other explanation for the indignities that were tolerated from the first embassy takeover Feb. 14

(called whimsically by those present, "The St. Valentine's Day Open House"). Guerrilla groups remained in the American compound to "guard" the place for seven months until bitter complaints finally dislodged them from what should have been inviolate U.S. territory.

If one takes the Helms journey back up through the corridors of confused U.S. power, looking for guidance one comes out inevitably in the Oval Office. There must first be a firm idea of what kind of role the nation intends to play in the world. Then there must be a set of priorities, an appreciation of the critical pressure points. Information then becomes crucial; not just the reports on events but the long view of why trouble arises and from whence it comes. All through the American system there is a desperate need for more meaningful interpretation of the vast amount of fact that flows into Washington.

Summed up, the Helms theory suggests that had we had people of breadth and sensitivity at the top when trouble in Iran arose, we could have grasped its importance, focused our concern, foreseen underlying hostility and prepared for trouble. Instead, the government stumbled in a kind of wishful stupor from event to event never quite understanding the sequence nor out-running it. All that drama around the shah was a sideshow.

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RUDY MAXA'S
Front Page

FRONT PAGE PHOTO QUIZ



Victor Marchetti



Richard Helms



John Stockwell



William Colby



Philip Agee



Frank Snepp

QUESTION: Which pictures don't fit in this group?

ANSWER: The two who aren't broke.

All are former CIA employees who wrote books drawing on their years of service with the Agency. Marchetti (along with coauthor John Marks) criticized the agency's methods. Stockwell blasted

the CIA's role in Angola. Agee attacked the agency's secret operations and named undercover agents. And Snepp criticized America's hasty and ill-conceived withdrawal from Vietnam. The

memoirs written by the two men who aren't telling reporters they're in financial distress, ex-directors Colby and Helms, were bland, flattering portrayals of the CIA.

SUSPICIONS

Have the killers of Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli—two of the mobsters involved with the CIA plot in the '60s to assassinate Fidel Castro—ever been found?

Giancana was shot dead by gunmen in his Chicago home in 1975; Roselli was found dead in an oil drum floating in a Miami waterway a year later. No suspects in either death have been apprehended.

19 February 1981

STAT

Russia: Intimacy Full of Intrigue

By David Shribman
Washington Star Staff Writer

It seems all so fortuitous: An ambassador sets off on the luxurious Red Arrow night train from Moscow to Leningrad and finds a tempting young blonde in his compartment. A young man in the military attache's office finds he has been assigned a sexy Russian cleaning lady. A diplomat gets a whispery telephone call — and the offer of companionship — while traveling in far-flung Uzbek or Kirghiz.

And yet it isn't as innocent as it seems. Behind closed doors, where Soviet agents are most artful, even intimacy is full of intrigue. The walls often have eyes — and flashbulbs.

In hotels, country hideaways and even back alleys, the KGB operates a high-stakes pornography trade befitting the shadowy worlds of Graham Greene and John Le Carre. Its currency is blackmail, not rubles, and the snare is sexual entrapment.

Reports indicating an Army major assigned to the U.S. embassy in Moscow may have been caught up in such a trap are only the latest twists in a Soviet espionage tradition that is as old as the Russian Revolution itself.

"This sort of thing has always been an essential element of espionage," said one source prominent in intelligence circles. "But the Soviets have made it an art. Their target is completely inundated by surveillance, telephone taps, everything. They know his habits better than he knows himself."

Mata Hari lives. Sometimes awkwardly, sometimes with astonishing ease, the Soviets have used the technique of sexual entrapment throughout the postwar period, luring Western diplomats, embassy guards, businessmen and journalists with women known within the KGB as "sparrows."

How often the sparrows get their worm can never be known. And though diplomatic and military ministries throughout the world warn Russia-bound personnel of the dangers that lurk in the unmade beds of Soviet relations, the West has often been embarrassed by activities

in the sparrows' nests throughout the Soviet bloc.

It happens time and again. In the late-1950s six American diplomats and 10 Marine guards were compromised in Poland, a particularly fertile area for such amorous intrigues. The agents, described in the argot of the time as "pretty Polish girls," infiltrated the Marines' sleeping quarters while the diplomats enjoyed their trysts in hideaways around Warsaw. And at the same time, a Soviet intelligence agent seduced the wife of an American foreign service officer, following and courting the woman for days.

"They're throwing girls at us by the scores everywhere behind the Iron Curtain," an American official said, "and they've also begun to work on our wives."

The Americans yielded little more than their bodies in this series of incidents; no classified information apparently was passed on. But two years later, in the celebrated liaison between Irwin C. Scarbeck and Urszula Discner, a number of classified American documents were passed to the Communist side.

Scarbeck was the second officer of the American embassy in Warsaw and Discner was the saucy 22-year-old blonde he fell for. She was a Polish agent, however, and she set him up for a raid that led to blackmail and, finally, to the transfer of classified information. Scarbeck, whose very name still causes anguish in the State Department, was convicted and sentenced to prison.

Such incidents are sprinkled through the tortuous history of East-West relations.

A very prominent Western European journalist travelling through the Soviet Union was drugged in Soviet Georgia, where a high proportion of these cases also seem to occur, and then was photographed with a woman. Once back in Moscow, colleagues advised him to inform his embassy, his editor and his wife of the incident.

In 1965, Cmdr. Anthony Courtney, one of the British Parliament's harshest critics of the Soviet Union, charged the Soviets with abusing their diplomatic privileges. Less than a month later snapshots showing him in bed with an Intourist guide he met four years earlier were circulating through the House of Commons.

There are many more. Gerda Munsinger — prostitute, petty thief and Soviet agent, according to a police report — had liaisons with at least two high Canadian officials. And a Norwegian foreign ministry official took a Russian as her lover; Soviet agents discovered the connection, taunted her and demanded security information.

Then there was the American engineer who vacationed in the Soviet Union. In a restaurant in the city of Kharkov he was ushered, innocently enough, to a table with an attractive woman. They passed a pleasant evening and agreed to meet again. The next night she led him to an outdoor bench. One thing led to another and they began to embrace.

A moment later she began yelling in Russian. The American was arrested for attempted rape and was offered a choice: a long prison sentence or cooperation with Soviet agents.

A similar choice was offered a French embassy subordinate who was lured into a tryst with a KGB agent in 1961. He would neither endure the humiliation of the photographs nor cooperate with the Soviets. He killed himself.

But perhaps the most startling incident involved Maurice Dejean, former French ambassador to Moscow. The Soviets followed him through posts in New York, London and Tokyo and knew he had an eye for a well-turned leg. Once in Moscow, KGB agents set him up with an actress, accused him of adultery and had him beaten.

"Our operation with the French ambassador was one of the greatest in the history of the KGB's inside operations," a former KGB agent told a Senate committee nearly a dozen years ago.

There was, however, no evidence Dejean parted with any classified information and French President

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Today's People

■ Stiff Upper Yellow Ribbon



HELMS

Richard Helms, former ambassador to Iran, former CIA chief and holder of other responsible posts, says he doesn't "mean to sound nasty," but the United States should have left the hostages "to their own fate." Helms told People magazine this week that the hostages "would have returned earlier if (former President Jimmy) Carter had not put a value on them with all this hoopla. The hostages were prisoners of war, and we should have declared war," Helms said. "That doesn't necessarily involve shooting." Helms, 67, was appointed ambassador to Iran in 1973 by then-President Richard M. Nixon. He left Iran in 1977 to return to Washington and open a consulting firm. When he was ambassador, he said, the State Department warned him that if kidnapped, he would not be ransomed. "It's a privilege to serve one's country," he said. "If you get knocked about, that's what life is."

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NEW YORK TIMES
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New Evidence Backs Ex-Envoy on H

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

For six years Edward M. Korry, United States Ambassador to Chile from 1967 to 1971, has insisted that he was not involved in and indeed tried to stop White House efforts to induce a military coup in Chile in 1970 to prevent Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, a Marxist, from assuming the presidency.

Evidence has come to light suggesting that Mr. Korry, despite his strong opposition to the Allende candidacy, was frozen out of the planning for a proposed military coup and warned the White House that it would be risking another "Bay of Pigs" if it got involved in military plots to stop Dr. Allende's election.

Mr. Korry has not worked in his professions, journalism or public affairs, since 1974, two years after the columnist Jack Anderson published International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation documents that seemingly linked Mr. Korry to joint I.T.T.-Central Intelligence Agency operations to block Dr. Allende's election.

Mr. Korry expressed particular bitterness toward The New York Times for what he said was unfair reporting about his role in articles in 1974 that revealed the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile and in refusing in later years, despite his entreaties, to investigate his actions accurately.

Mr. Korry, who lives with his wife in Stonington, Conn., insists that his sullied reputation and his early inability to get appropriate work stem from publication of the I.T.T. documents and from two subsequent widely publicized investigations by Senate committees. He is now a visiting professor of international relations at Connecticut College in New London.

Much of the new evidence, including highly classified internal C.I.A. documents, was provided by a former intelligence official who had direct knowledge of the agency's activities against Dr. Allende, who died in the course of a military uprising against him in 1973. Corroborating information was obtained in interviews with other C.I.A. and White House officials. Internal documents provided by the C.I.A. to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence — and not published by the committee in its reports in 1975 on Chile — have also been obtained. Finally, Mr. Korry made available some of his private communications with Washington during the 1970 election period.

These materials raise new questions about the extent of C.I.A. operations in Chile in 1970 and the efficacy of the Senate committee's investigation. For exam-

ple, an "eyes-only" internal C.I.A. report, filed in early 1971 and not provided to the Intelligence Committee, shows that senior agency officials were aware that an operative had entered Chile under a false passport and posed as a member of the Mafia in making contact with anti-Allende forces.

In another internal 1971 report, William V. Broe, then chief of the agency's clandestine service in Latin America, was formally advised that an operative had posed as a representative of the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation while on special assignment to Chile in October 1970 — a tactic in violation of a Presidential prohibition against the use of American educational and philanthropic foundations as covers. The operative, in later meetings with Chilean businessmen, made it clear, according to the C.I.A. documents, that "as a representative of American business interests," he was eager "to activate a military takeover of the Chilean Government."

None of this, it is now evident, was known to Ambassador Korry.

Not Considered Trustworthy

In interviews, a number of C.I.A. officials directly involved in the anti-Allende operations emphasized that Mr. Korry was not considered trustworthy by the White House or by C.I.A. headquarters. "Korry never did know anything," said an intelligence operative who worked in the embassy under Mr. Korry in 1970.

While he was in Chile, Mr. Korry was known in the Nixon Administration for his outspoken hostility to Dr. Allende and his harsh anti-Communist stance. Mr. Korry, who acknowledges the severity of his views on Dr. Allende, was active in lobbying for a \$400,000 C.I.A. propaganda effort against him and his Marxist views that was authorized by the Nixon Administration in the spring and summer of 1970.

Nonetheless, Mr. Korry insists that he repeatedly advised Washington not to take any steps toward a military solution of the Allende problem. On Oct. 9, 1970, for example, he told the White House in a direct message made available to The New York Times that he was appalled to learn that unauthorized contact had been made by the C.I.A. station in Santiago with Patria y Libertad, a right-wing extremist group advocating the violent overthrow of the Government. "I think any attempt on our part actively to encourage a coup could lead us to a Bay of Pigs failure," he added in the "eyes only" cablegram.

In the interviews Mr. Korry constantly focused on his inability to get newspapers to publish his view of events after he left Chile. But he says that he perhaps waited too long, until 1976, to begin to tell all he knew of the operations of the Nixon Administration and its predecessors in Chile.

tional security interests.

Mr. Korry, who is 59 years old, was a foreign correspondent for United Press and went on to Look magazine, where he served as European editor. In 1962 he was designated Ambassador to Ethiopia by President John F. Kennedy, serving there with distinction, by all accounts, until his assignment to Chile.

His moment in the greatest glare of publicity came in September 1974, soon after The New York Times disclosed that the C.I.A. had spent at least \$8 million in Chile in an effort to prevent Dr. Allende's election and, failing in that, sought to make it impossible for him to govern. Mr. Korry, with Richard M. Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, and two senior State Department officials, was accused by members of the Senate staff of having provided misleading testimony to the Senate multinational subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, which held hearings in March and April 1973 into I.T.T.'s involvement with the Chilean election.

During the hearings Mr. Korry testified that the United States maintained a "total hands off" policy toward the military during the campaign for the election, which Dr. Allende won in a three-way race by only 30,000 votes of three million cast. Mr. Korry denied knowledge of the I.T.T. cablegram that became a focal point of much of the hearings — a report from two I.T.T. officials in Santiago that the Ambassador had finally received "the green light to move in the name of Richard Nixon" against the new President.

Repeatedly refusing to answer many queries in full from the senators and the subcommittee staff director, Jerome I. Levinson, Mr. Korry insisted that to describe confidential communications and official orders would be "contrary to the

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POLICY REVIEW
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Can Counterintelligence Come In From the Cold?

ARNOLD BEICHMAN

"The best hope that the free world will remain an efficient, constitutional, freedom-loving, and adequately secret — CIA and FBI."

— M.R.D. Foot, Professor of Management
University of Manchester, in *Foreign Affairs*

What a cushy job it must be today to run the USSR secret police and espionage agency. If you had the job and job security, not as in the old Stalin days, you were told that if you were years as head of the secret police, you were talking to the KGB.

Better yet, Yuri Andropov, who runs the Politburo secure in the knowledge that his chief adversaries, the CIA and the FBI, have for the first time been so weakened that they are no longer serious threats. Even now, when there is some possibility that the CIA and FBI will allow the CIA and FBI to function once more, it will be years before these agencies will be sufficient to deal with the KGB penetration and disinformation.

Penetration of the CIA by the KGB is now an established fact. On October 29, David H. Barnett, a former CIA agent, confessed that he had been selling important secrets to the Soviet agency for some years — including a top-priority clandestine CIA operation in Indonesia in the 1960s. Mr. Barnett also confessed that he had revealed to the KGB the identities of thirty covert CIA employees.

The organizational deficiencies have multiplied since 1975 because of Congressional investigations, Executive orders and, above all, because of the serious decline of U.S. counterintelligence capacity in the CIA and the FBI. This was the conclusion of many specialists who attended the third meeting of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). It is now possible, for example, to assign Soviet agents to the U.S., literally by the shipload. In 1978, there were 1,300 Soviet and 700 Soviet-bloc officials permanently assigned to the U.S. as diplomats, media and trade representatives, and staff to international organizations. The number of Soviet-bloc graduate students has increased from the usual 35-40 to 200. During 1977, there were almost 60,000 Soviet-bloc visitors to the U.S. Of these visitors, 14,000 were commercial, scientific, and cultural delegates, while the remaining 40,000 were crewmen who enjoyed complete liberty while Soviet ships were docked in 40 U.S. deepwater ports.

Now I have it on good authority that before Congress put the FBI on its "most wanted" list, the FBI routinely covered KGB suspect agents on a one-to-one basis, that is, one FBI surveillance expert to one KGB suspect. Today, as Mr. Andropov knows well, the ratio has dropped to 1-to-4. There are just too many KGB targets floating about the U.S. today, while some 300 FBI staffers are busy checking applications from all kinds of dubious