

Opinion • Comment

A Short Course in the Sec

Washington.

THE VOTE by the House Select Committee on Intelligence to cut off funds for the Central Intelligence Agency's campaign of covert action against Nicaragua comes exactly 35 years after the United States first began such secret operations.

Paradoxically, covert action was not included as one of the missions foreseen for the CIA in its charter. The National Security Act of 1947, which established the agency (as well as the national security Council) does not specifically mention or

By Nathan Miller

authorize secret operations of any kind.

Yet, within a year — by mid-1948 — covert action had become a key element of the CIA's operations and a vital arm of American foreign policy. This transformation resulted from the heating up of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, with some officials fearing that the Russians were on the verge of seizing control of Western Europe.

Alarmed at the prospect of a Communist victory in the Italian parliamentary elections scheduled for April 1948, such ardent Cold Warriors as Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal pressed President Truman to use the CIA to prevent it from happening. As authority, they pointed to a "catch-all" provision in the 1947 act that directed the agency to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security."

Heated debate raged over the proposal within the National Security Council. Admiral Rosco H. Hillenkoetter, the CIA's first director, was reluctant to launch covert operations. Disdainful of unconventional warfare, he was convinced that the high risk of exposure was not worth it. Instead, he thought the CIA should concentrate on collecting and evaluating intelligence.

The activists prevailed, however, and Admiral Hillenkoetter was ordered to make certain that the pro-Western Christian Democrats remained in power. The task was assigned to the CIA's Office of Special Operations which handled secret intelligence activities.

Backed by \$10 million in secret funds, the OSO launched a well-coordinated campaign. Christian Democrat propaganda was financed by the CIA, friendly candidates were given "bonuses," anonymous pamphlets were distributed defaming Communist candidates, and politicians were given "walking around" money to get out the vote. Tens of thousands of Americans of Italian ancestry were persuaded to appeal to friends and relatives at home to vote Christian Democratic.

These activities were enough to keep the Communists out of power, and the success of the campaign created demands for similar actions elsewhere. In June 1948, a new Office of Policy Coordination was organized to do worldwide what the OSO had done in Italy. OPC's charter was National Security Council Directive 10/2 and its latitude was sweeping.

To counter the "vicious covert activities of the U.S.S.R.," OPC was to engage in a back-alley struggle against the Soviets. Propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage and the mobilization of secret armies to overthrow hostile governments were all to be part of its stock in trade.

The only limitation was "deniability," or the proviso that if any of these operations was "blown," ranking American officials should be able to plausibly disavow any knowledge.

Despite the sensitive nature of OPC's assigned task, the agency was a bureaucratic anomaly without sufficient controls. Although its director was to be chosen by the secretary of State, policy guidance was di-

vided between the secretaries of State and Defense. The CIA supplied budgetary support but its chief had no authority over OPC. The net result was that no one had ultimate authority for riding herd on OPC and a strong director could do almost anything he wanted.

Frank G. Wisner, the swashbuckling former member of the wartime Office of Strategic Services chosen to head OPC, was just such a man. Energetic and adventurous, he threw off ideas for rolling back the Soviet empire — some good and others wildly impractical — like a human pinwheel. As far as he was concerned, Admiral Hillenkoetter and his intelligence analysts were "a bunch of old washerwomen exchanging gossip while they rinse through the dirty linen."

Although in theory he was limited to contingency planning, Mr. Wisner immediately began organizing bands of guerrillas and secret armies that were to operate behind the Iron Curtain. And with the example of military intelligence — which was making use of such Nazi war criminals as Klaus Barbie — before him, Mr. Wisner recruited Eastern Europeans who had collaborated with the Nazis and had committed war crimes. Over the years, most of the OPC operations to infiltrate Eastern Europe failed with bloody results because some of Mr. Wisner's recruits were working for both sides.

OPC had access to unlimited funds and manpower. As early as 1949, it had 302 agents in five stations and a budget of \$4.7 million. By 1952, the number of employees had jumped to about 4,000 in 47 stations and the budget had reached \$82 million. Other intelligence agencies feared and envied the all-encompassing OPC and there was considerable infighting among them.

General Walter Bedell Smith, who had

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
WINTER 1980-81

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Guatemala as Cold War History


RICHARD H. IMMERMAN

With the increasing accumulation of interpretive scholarship on international relations following World War II, most episodes in the cold war have been written and rewritten, evaluated and reevaluated. One striking exception, however, is the 1954 American intervention in Guatemala, which led to the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman's constitutionally elected government. This article studies the antecedents, events, and consequences of that coup.

Analyses of hitherto unavailable archival data and of interviews with American participants in the coup who were privy to the covert aspects of the operation suggest that this event was a significant link in the unfolding chain of cold war history. Writings to date on the overthrow of Arbenz tend to be short on detailed documentation and analysis and to treat the coup illustratively. These accounts depict the United States intervention in Guatemala either as a background incident in the escalating cold war, as an example of the inordinate influence of economic interests (in this case the United Fruit Company [UFCO]) on American foreign policy, or as a way station in the evolution of the Central Intelligence Agency. These treatments fail to emphasize sufficiently that the coup typified the foundations of cold war diplomacy, providing a model to be emulated, and resisted, in subsequent years.¹

¹ The most widely cited source remains Ronald Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958), although more recent studies such as Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), pp. 151-77; Max Gordon, "A Case History of U.S. Subversion: Guatemala, 1954," *Science and Society* 35 (Summer 1971): 129-55; and Stephen Schlesinger, "How

RICHARD H. IMMERMAN is associate director of the Presidency Studies Program in Princeton University's Politics Department. He is currently completing a book on the CIA's 1954 intervention in Guatemala as well as collaborating on a biography of Milton Eisenhower and a comparative study of the Eisenhower and Johnson presidencies.



Patrick J. Buchanan

When Truman pardoned the CIA



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WASHINGTON—The odds are now given as even money that Justice will move to indict former Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms for misleading a Senate committee concerning CIA involvement in Chile.

Before the President and Atty. Gen. Griffin Bell allow this senseless hammer blow to fall upon the intelligence community, they might review how President Truman handled a similar matter 25 years ago.

In 1952, the CIA passed along to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and State a report, picked up in Seattle, that Prof. Owen Lattimore was planning a trip to Moscow. [On July 3, 1952, Lattimore was characterized by a Senate subcommittee as a "conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy."] Receiving the Seattle report, the Department of State alerted customs officials to block Lattimore's departure. The matter broke into print.



Truman: Saw obedience.

The report proved inaccurate. Its source, a 32-year-old travel agent named Harry A. Jarvinen, was indicted by a federal grand jury. Two CIA agents, Miller Holland and Wayne H. Richardson, were called to testify. Both stonewalled, with Richardson refusing to testify "on orders of my superior." Along with Miller, he was sentenced to 15 days in prison for contempt.

BUT THIS was unacceptable to Harry Truman. Quietly bypassing Justice, the President issued pardons to both men, since, in the President's proclamation on Richardson's behalf, "... it has been made to appear to me that the said Wayne Richardson at the time of the aforesaid trial was an agent of the United States and acting in obedience to what he believed to be a lawful order from his official superior."

In passing on the President's clemency petitions CIA director Walter C. [Bdell] Smith, went further:

"That your conduct was correct and honorable is recognized by the President in granting this pardon," wrote Smith to agent Richardson. "In the eyes of the law, your record is as if the incident had never occurred. In the eyes of the agency, your meticulous compliance with orders made an enduring contribution to the national intelligence and the functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Legally and morally no fault exists, and your conscience can be clear that your conduct was honorable and in the best traditions of government service."

Truman's precedent is there for Carter to follow.

CLEARLY, testifying before that Senate committee, Helms was confronted with a serious moral dilemma: Should he protect at grave legal risk to himself the secrets he was sworn to protect; or should he spill the "whole truth" about CIA involvement and thereby cripple his agency, and perhaps his country? This is an issue to be debated in ethics courses in postgraduate seminars, not a matter for a federal indictment.

What sort of nation have we become? Helms, who has served his country honorably for decades, is facing this possible indictment, while the turncoat Philip Agee, who fingered dozens of CIA agents abroad, one of whom was subsequently assassinated, is told by the same Justice Department he faces no problem if he comes home to a country whose secrets he betrayed.

Indicting Richard Helms, along with John Kearney of the FBI, would further demoralize these already battered security agencies. It would necessitate opening the most sensitive strategic victory for those, here and abroad, who want the FBI and CIA further smeared, if not destroyed.

If Carter allows this travesty to proceed, it will demonstrate that he lacks utterly that sense of priorities which Truman showed. But, then, -whom the gods destroy, they first make mad.

New York Times Special Features



Smith: Praised honor.

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The Ruling Class

Bernhard, big business and the CIA/By Robert Scheer

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There was absolutely no publicity. The hotel was ringed by security guards, so not a single journalist got within a mile of the place. The participants were pledged not to repeat publicly what was said in the discussions. Every person present, prime ministers, foreign ministers, leaders of political parties, heads of great banks and industrial companies and representatives of such international organizations as the European Coal and Steel Community, as well as academicians, was magically stripped of his office as he entered the door. . . . —From *BERNHARD Prince of the Netherlands*, by Alden Hatch. Doubleday, 1962

Recent revelations of illicit ties between Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and the Lockheed Corporation touch only a corner of this man's murky career—a career made possible only by the support of various American presidents, top corporate leaders and the large tax-exempt foundations. The CIA, hard evidence indicates, was the catalyst in organizing this coalition behind the prince.

The CIA connection was hinted at in one recent *New York Times* story which stated that the prince had maintained an account in a CIA-funded Dutch bank that was set up by one of his closest aides, General John von Houghton, who "reportedly had ties to the CIA." The *Times* noted that "Prince Bernhard was also a close friend of Allen W. Dulles, founder of the CIA." The *Times* also cited "one reliable source close to the government" as saying that when the Dutch prime minister confronted Bernhard about wrongdoing in connection with Lockheed, the prince denied it, but added, "If you would ask me about my relations with the CIA, that would be a different matter"—which is where the *Times* let the matter drop. So far as I can determine, no one has asked the prince or the CIA about their relationship, which revolves around the prince's leadership of the very influential Bilderberg conferences (*The Ruling Class*, September 17, 1976).

The Bilderberg meetings, which have occurred every year since 1954, have been the most secretive, exclusive and influential non-official gathering of the Western European and American corporate and political elite—including President Ford,

Secretary of State Kissinger. Far removed from the public view, they have initiated such significant developments as the European Common Market, basic changes in trade, tariff and currency regulations and Western positions on "hot spots" such as Cuba and Vietnam. But I have come across evidence that none of this would have occurred had it not been for the timely intervention of the CIA in assisting Prince Bernhard in the formation of his Bilderberg group.

A shadowy character by the name of Joseph H. Retinger thought up Bilderberg and peddled the idea to Bernhard. Retinger, a Polish exile, was involved in numerous clandestine cold war operations and had extensive



International fixer Bernhard, right, with Lockheed sales exec Fred Meuser.

contact with virtually all Western intelligence agencies. One early Bilderberger, the late C. D. Jackson, who was vice-president of Time Inc., once described Retinger as a "sort of eminence grise of Europe, a Tallyrand without portfolio." Alden Hatch's laudatory biography of Bernhard, based on extensive taped conversations with the prince and researched with the full support of the royal household, says of Retinger, "Certainly he had almost as many adventures as Ian Fleming's famous secret service operative, James Bond. . . . Though his name is virtually unknown except to the

secret way than many a man who moved to the sound of trumpets and the howl of motorcycle sirens."

Both Retinger and Bernhard had influential contacts in the United States, and after agreeing on the scheme, the duo went off to America to enlist support. A portrait of Bernhard in the December 1970 issue of *Fortune* magazine described that trip:

" . . . Retinger joined him [Bernhard] in Washington, and they proceeded, with the help of Bernhard's wartime comrade, Walter Bedell Smith, then director of the CIA, C. D. Jackson, a vice-president of Time Inc., and the late John Coleman of Burroughs, to recruit an American group."

Bernhard's connection with





C.D. Jackson of Time Inc.; the CIA's head turned Bilderberg over to him.

Bedell Smith and the CIA is described in greater detail in the prince's biography, which states that the Bilderberg idea at first received a cool response from such as Averell Harriman, who thought it was too controversial. Said Harriman: "I won't touch it. It's dynamite." Bernhard, according to his biographer, ". . . saw a number of American politicians. After several more rebuffs he went to his friend Bedell Smith, who was then head of the CIA. Smith said, 'Why the hell did you come to me in the first place?' General Smith then 'turned the matter over to C. D. Jackson, and things really got going.' It is interesting

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An Inside Look: Watergate and the World of



“Are these men really former CIA men or are they still subject to the orders of the CIA? The CIA would like to have it one way, and then to have it overlooked the other way.”

Explosive as the Watergate revelations have been, no disclosure has been more ominous than the 1970 Domestic Intelligence Plan attributed to the pen of Tom Charles Huston. The plan, as revealed last June, provided for the use of electronic surveillance, mail coverage, undercover agents and other measures to an extent unprecedented in domestic intelligence-gathering. This program was to be directed by a committee of representatives from all of the national intelligence agencies. It goes far toward justifying the worst paranoia Americans have felt during the past quarter century over the growth of secrecy and deception in our government. Much of this anxiety relates to what might be called “the CIA Mentality,” the stealthy abuse of power and the practice of deception of the American public—all performed under the cloak of secrecy and often in the name of anticommunism and national security. In fact, what makes the Watergate

case different from other scandals is that the system and methods used, the means by which it was all planned, staffed with experts, financed clandestinely and carried out was all taken from the operating method of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created, and its powers and responsibilities defined, by the National Security Act of 1947. Its character was developed over a span of 11 years by its greatest mentor and guiding spirit, Allen Welsh Dulles. The “Frankenstein” product of this implausible union of a well-intentioned law and of a scheming opportunist is the agency as we find it today.

Before 1953, when Dulles became the Director, Central Intelligence (DCI), the CIA was primarily concerned with performing its assigned task: as the central authority for all of the various intelligence organizations of the government, the CIA’s business was to collect and interpret information gathered by other intelligence units. But that all soon changed.

In 1948, President Truman established a committee to review the CIA, to make recommendations for improvement and to evaluate its past performance. The members of this committee were Allen Dulles, Mathias Correa, and William Jackson, and their report was without question the most important single document on this subject ever pub-

L. Fletcher Prouty was the Air Force officer in charge of Air Force support of the CIA, a position he held from 1955 to 1963. His office put him in constant contact with the top officers of the intelligence establishment, and he has traveled to over 40 countries at CIA request. He is one of the few people with inside knowledge of the CIA who was not required to take a lifetime oath of silence. His book, The Secret Team, is published by Prentice-Hall.

CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIGENCE

REPORT of The Herald of Freedom

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THE SONNENFELDT CASE --

The press, led by the N.Y. TIMES and the Washington POST, has charged to the rescue of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, an insider whose steady rise in the behind-the-scenes bureaucracy ruling the American people may be coming to the end, now that he has emerged from behind-the-scenes. While the Senate Finance Committee is considering his nomination as Under Secretary of the Treasury, the House Internal Security Committee is checking into his subversive background. Powerful forces are bringing pressure to bear to have Sonnenfeldt, top assistant to Henry Kissinger, confirmed in spite of his previous espionage activities.

President Nixon nominated the 46-year old Sonnenfeldt to be Under Secretary of the Treasury in which post Sonnenfeldt would have the responsibility of shaping the Administration's plans for increasing East-West trade and for establishing a new international monetary system that would include Communist nations. Several former Foreign Service career officers filed objections and testified against the nomination which was referred to the Senate Finance Committee for confirmation hearings on May 15, 1973.

On July 26, 1973, Congressman John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, Senior Republican Minority member of the House Internal Security Committee, opened hearings on the Federal Civil Employees Loyalty Security Program. The hearings are being held in executive session and informed sources state that Otto Otepka's testimony about security risks employed by the State Department will be shocking when published. Mr. Otepka personally handled one of the investigations on Helmut Sonnenfeldt, which involved a 24-hour a day surveillance, a legal wiretap on his telephones and the interviewing of numerous witnesses. It was conclusively determined that on more than one occasion Sonnenfeldt had turned over secret documents and confidential information to unauthorized persons among whom were agents of a foreign power.

Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen, who is in charge of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, recently testified before the Senate Watergate Committee and was in complete support of President Nixon's innocence in connection with Watergate. He is also in complete support of Sonnenfeldt. When Petersen's attention was called to Paul Scott's syndicated column which revealed details of Sonnenfeldt's act of turning over secret documents to foreign agents, he replied as follows: (Quote)

This is in response to your recent letter to the Attorney General concerning a recent newspaper article by Paul Scott discussing the nomination of Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt to be Under Secretary of the Treasury Department and whether he would be a suitable candidate for that position.

Executive Order 10450 requires that an investigation be made of all employees of the executive branch before they can be accepted for a position. The Order further requires that all persons privileged to be employees in the executive branch must be loyal to the United States, and that no one may hold such a sensitive position with the government unless his employment is determined to be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. These requirements apply, of course, to all presidential nominees, including those to be an Under Secretary.

In accordance with that Order, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has conducted a number of investigations of Mr. Sonnenfeldt's character and loyalty in connection with various positions he has held in that executive branch in the past. In all of those cases, the results were determined to be favorable. Thus, although we cannot disclose the contents of any of the Bureau's investigative files to one outside the Federal government, we can state that the results of our investigation in his article



The Herald of Free

BOX 3 ZAREPHATH N.J. 08890

AUGUST 17, 1973

UNITED SOVIET STATES OF A

The above title is taken from a chapter in a book entitled "Toward a Soviet America," written in 1932 by William Z. Foster, then national chairman of the Communist Party, USA. The book was a blueprint for the take-over of the United States through force and violence.

Subsequently the international Communist hierarchy in Moscow decided that, instead of battering down the ramparts from without, victory now was to be achieved from within. Trojan horse tactics would be employed. In the face of this altered strategy, a book that advocated violence became a liability. Obviously then "Toward a Soviet America" had to be swept under the rug and the Communists endeavored to reclaim every copy of the book.

In 1961, after the copyright had expired, the book was republished through the efforts of the late Francis E. Walters, Chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The new book contained a commentary by Maurice Reis, a consultant to the committee, and a foreword by Congressman Walters.

The success of the Communists in the take-over of Czechoslovakia without resorting to force and violence became a blueprint for gaining power through internal subversion. This required that key people in government be Communists. Communist agents or persons under Communist control through blackmail, bribery or other devious means.

When President Nixon was defeated in the race for governor of California, he was totally without financial resources and it seemed that he had reached the end of his political career. At the invitation of Nelson Rockefeller, Nixon went to New York, moved into a \$100,000-a-year apartment house belonging to Rockefeller and through Rockefeller was made a partner in a key firm at a salary of \$200,000 a year. His duties were few other than to promote Rockefeller interests and programs.

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Communists. As pointed out in our Confidential Intelligence Report of June 1973, J. Edgar Hoover in 1945 dispatched agents who hand delivered to then Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller two top secret F.B.I. reports on Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White which documented the fact that both were Communists and Soviet agents. This was during the formation of the United Nations Organization. The top secret F.B.I. reports were handed over to Rockefeller at his hotel. Rockefeller later admitted he destroyed both reports. Had this information been made public, the parts played by Alger Hiss and his associates in the formation of the U.N. would also have been made public and the Congress of the U.S. consequently would have been alerted to the conspiracy which ultimately resulted in a Communist-controlled U.N., its headquarters located on property donated by the Rockefellers.

Almost immediately after his election to the presidency, Richard Nixon appointed as his top presidential adviser on national security, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger who had been a protege of Nelson Rockefeller since Kissinger's student days at Harvard. Once Kissinger's position was established, he set up what amounts to a parallel government under his control with a staff of 110 people working directly for him. Kissinger, along with a number of his associates, was known in
... security risk thus we

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Bill Anderson

CIA: Criticism, inquiry, antagonism

WASHINGTON—Since the Bay of Pigs, when the United States lost its gamble under the Kennedy administration to overthrow Fidel Castro, the Central Intelligence Agency has suffered in many areas of public opinion.

It has also suffered internally, going thru a succession of directors and losing other key people under three Presidents [starting with Kennedy] who did not totally believe what the CIA reports were saying.

The CIA was created in 1946 by the late President Truman [as the Central Intelligence Group] from the skeleton of the wartime Office of Strategic Studies. It was formed in an effort to collect information [or spy] on other nations as much as they did on us. From the start, it was an agency cloaked in semi-secrecy noted for generating debate.

An early director, Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, had warned the Truman administration of the then impending Communist invasion of South Korea—and apparently was replaced for his accurate prediction by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.

Smith then grabbed headlines [during the Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy period] by stating in public there was a "moral certainty" that Communist spies had penetrated every security agency in Washington.

Smith did not last long at the CIA after that and was replaced by the

pipe-smoking Allen W. Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower's secretary of state. Dulles put McCarthy down after the senator charged there were double agents operating within the CIA.

Dulles, the first civilian chief of the CIA, came off as sort of a super-spy because of his exploits in the OSS during World War II. After staving off McCarthy, he continued to build the CIA from a small agency [starting with 1,500 agents] to a worldwide network that began to do more than make estimates of what foreign powers might do.

Still, the Hoover commission looked into the operations of the agency and came up with a report saying it was lacking in collecting "intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain." Meanwhile, the CIA squabbled with the long-established intelligence arms of the three military services. In one case it had enough clout to get the Army's chief of intelligence [G-2] fired.

By 1953 the CIA was spending \$359,000,000 a year [now it is spending about \$2 billion]. A year later it was warning that there was an intensive Communist drive underway in Latin America. And then the roof began to fall in on the agency after its secret spy plane, the U-2, was shot down over Russia. The incident caused even more drama and the cancellation of a U.S.-Soviet-Russian summit meeting, along

with a public trial of pilot Francis G. Powers.

The public clamor really began, tho, after the attempted invasion of Cuba ordered by the late President Kennedy. The late Robert F. Kennedy personally ran an investigation of the agency as blame for the fiasco began to fall on the CIA for furnishing faulty data. After a short period of grace, Dulles left as director to be replaced by John A. McCone, a business executive.

Adm. William F. [Red] Raborn followed in the Johnson administration. Raborn's biggest early flap was a charge the CIA got involved in an Indonesian government upheaval. But the involvement also spread to the Congo, Viet Nam, and apparently to some domestic intelligence activities. The deputy director then was Richard Helms, a career government management expert.

Helms moved up to director during the Johnson era of 1956, assuring Congress that the CIA did not create foreign policy. Helms continued to feel public heat because of the CIA financing of foundations and student activities. He was defended by Sen. Kennedy at the time.

When Mr. Nixon became President, one of his first moves was to install a trusted associate of long standing—Marine Gen. Robert Cushman—as deputy director of the CIA. After getting his own reading on the agency, the President promoted Cushman to commandant of the corps—and is sending Helms to Iran as ambassador. Tomorrow we will report on the new director.

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... Exit Richard Helms

✓ It isn't official yet, but our usually impeccable official sources tell us that Richard M. Helms will soon be stepping down after six years as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, presumably to take on a new and important assignment in the Nixon administration. Whatever his future job may be, he will be sorely missed in the one which he is leaving.

✓ Of the men who have headed the CIA since its inception in 1947, Helms stands out as the one truly professional intelligence expert. His career in the spy business covers a span of 29 years, beginning with a four-year stint with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. After transferring to the newly-formed CIA, he served as deputy director for plans under General Walter Bedell Smith and John A. McCone, previous CIA heads.

✓ As director, Helms brought a coolness of judgment and great administrative talent to one of the most sensitive and difficult jobs in the federal government. Under his leadership, the performance of the agency, in contrast to past years,

has been highly discreet and, to the extent that such things can be judged, effective. It is suggested that his departure from the CIA may have resulted in part from a dispute within the intelligence community regarding the deployment of Russian nuclear missiles. Yet from all the available evidence, his assessment of the world situation — and particularly in Indochina, where the CIA has borne heavy responsibilities — has been remarkably accurate.

✓ The highly essential business of intelligence-gathering, being necessarily secret and to some minds distasteful, requires the kind of public confidence that Helms has been able to provide. As President Johnson remarked at his swearing-in ceremony: "Although he has spent more than 20 years in public life attempting to avoid publicity, he has never been able to conceal the fact that he is one of the most trusted and most able and most dedicated professional career men in this Capital." As director of the CIA, Richard Helms has fully justified that assessment.

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Secret and nonsensical

R. HARRIS SMITH:
OSS

458pp. University of California
Press (IBEG). £3.95.

General Walter Bedell Smith once startled a postwar dinner party by suggesting the war might have been won much earlier had the United States diverted the time, money and men expended on the Office of Strategic Services "and the rest of that damn secret nonsense" to the regular forces. It was a singular speculation for a man who had been General

Eisenhower's Chief of Staff and, later, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

R. Harris Smith's OSS, however, is evidence that Bedell Smith was displaying his usual horse sense. The picture of the OSS during and immediately after the Second World War is a depressing one. Its successor, the CIA, has its faults. But the OSS, as depicted in this book, was a mixture of idealism, naivety, incompetence and intrigue seldom matched in the annals of government in America or anywhere else.

Mr Smith's wide reading and extensive research have not saved the book from ingenuousness and error. He begins by labelling his work "the secret history" of the organization, but there is little of note in it that has not been written before and often much better. He gets things wrong. It was the American Navy, not the Royal Navy, that was responsible for landing General Patton's forces in Morocco in 1942. The Purple Gang operated in Detroit, not Philadelphia. Stephen Bailey is not, nor has he been, "President of Syracuse University", which is headed by a chancellor.

Mr Smith's main problem seems to be his tendency to write about the OSS and its operations in North Africa, Europe and the Far East in absolutes. Men and organizations are heroic or dastardly, faithful or treasonable. The story is told in blacks and whites, whereas the dirty, dangerous game played by the OSS is best described in varying shades of grey.

Nor does Mr Smith pay enough attention to one of the more important decisions taken at the outset by General William "Wild Bill" Donovan, the founder and director of the OSS. He was determined to consolidate within the organization all operations—espionage, sabotage, assistance to guerrilla movements. This was an error. The OSS planned operations based on intelligence reports produced by the OSS. There was little objective study of these reports; if they were the organization's, the assumption was, then they must be accurate. They often were not, and the operation failed. Oddly, the CIA, despite the sorry record of its predecessor, has continued this organization, with depressing re-

sults—such as the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs.

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Mr Smith's villains include not only the Germans, Japanese and Italians, but the British intelligence services; any official who seemed to doubt the OSS's competence and its right to order the political end of the war as it saw fit, and, of course, all "colonialists". The style is an extraordinary mixture of exaggeration and parochialism.

Mr Smith writes that "the British Army took a respite of several months from the war against Hitler to suppress the revolt" of the EAM-ELAS partisans in Greece. This was the period when Second Army was fighting bitterly in North-West Europe and the Eighth Army was heavily engaged in Italy.

Perhaps the best chapter in the book is that devoted to the OSS operations in Yugoslavia—best, because it provides a fairly clear picture of the bewildering situation that arose from the presence of two resistance movements and of the naivety of OSS officers. One of these was confident that Tito "was planning no Communist revolution for his country".

Surprisingly, the book is weakest when it deals with the OSS in China during and after the war and with American intelligence operations in Algeria in 1942-43. In both cases Mr Smith tends to adopt the easy explanation of what happened and a somewhat austere attitude towards those officers whose standards differed from his. Association with a New York law firm or bank did not necessarily sour an operator's judgment. In retrospect the OSS probably got more from this type of man than it did from the wild-eyed leftovers from the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain.

There are some bright spots: how often Winston Churchill cut through the red tape to save a promising operation; a good story about General Donovan and David Bruce in Normandy; the gradual professionalization of some members of OSS; a good, although incomplete, picture of Allen Dulles, who is dubbed "the master spy". But these are not sufficient to save the book. The OSS must wait for a more objective and sophisticated chronicler.

Matthew Baird, Headed CIA Training Program

Matthew Baird, 70, retired director of training for the Central Intelligence Agency, died Tuesday at his home in Bethany Beach, Del.

Born in Ardmore, Pa., Mr. Baird was a graduate of Haverford School in Haverford, Pa., and earned his bachelor's and master's degrees from Princeton University. He also held a bachelor's degree in literature from Balliol College, Oxford.

He was headmaster of the Arizona Desert School in Tucson from 1930 to 1937, then worked for three years as a research economist with the Sun Oil Co. in Philadelphia.

Mr. Baird owned and operated the Ruby Star Ranch in Tucson from 1940 to 1942, then served as a colonel in the Army Air Corps during World War II.

He returned to the Ruby Star in 1945, where he became a recognized authority on Brahman cattle. He had another tour of duty with the Air Force from 1950 to 1953, during which time he was detailed to CIA.

The then CIA director, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith asked Mr. Baird in 1951 to join the agency as director of training, with the task of further organizing and developing a training program worldwide in scope.

Until his retirement in 1965, Mr. Baird initiated and implemented proposals that led to the creation of what is considered an outstanding training institution within the CIA. At the time of his retirement, he was presented the CIA's highest award, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

Our Man Beelzebub

Gehlen: Spy of the Century by E. H. Cookbridge

(Random House; \$10)

The General Was a Spy by Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling

(Coward, McCann & Geoghegan; \$8.95)

A year before Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, which formally stated the theme of Act I of the Cold War, a prologue was being written and played backstage in Europe by Americans and Germans. They had already identified Soviet Communism as Enemy Number One, not primarily because Russia had Eastern Europe in its grip, but because Soviet Communism was satanic and was set on conquering the world. And as Hugh Trevor-Roper remarks in his introduction to *The General Was a Spy*, "it is legitimate to use Beelzebub to drive out Satan." Beelzebub was willing. Both these spy stories describe how and why, with the collapse of the German armies, the Americans recruited Hitler's Chief of Intelligence against the Soviet Union and underwrote his postwar espionage operations.

Reinhard Gehlen was a professional, an experienced, single-minded anti-Communist with exceptional contacts. Those who hired him were not of the breed of Henry Stimson, who once said quaintly that gentlemen don't read other people's mail. They were what came to be called realists, and they dominated US foreign policy for the next quarter of a century. The US government secretly financed General Gehlen to the amount of \$200 million, and when he finally left his American supervisors and went to work directly for the Bonn government, Mr. Cookbridge tells us, Allen Dulles gave him "a golden handshake in appreciation of the great work he had done for CIA; a gratuity of 250,000 marks had been authorized. Dulles added the not entirely seriously meant condition that Gehlen should use the money to buy a fine house somewhere in the Bavarian mountains." For the \$200 million, CIA received mountains of paper and thousands of

clandestine tips on Eastern Europe and the USSR. Toward the end, it learned that much of the information was useless; and it learned something more disturbing: the Gehlen organization had been penetrated by the Soviets. By the early '60s, Washington's interest had cooled.

The General Was a Spy is drawn from a series of articles written by two German journalists for *Der Spiegel*. *Gehlen: Spy of the Century* is the product of a European educated British journalist who was himself an intelligence agent in World War II and was imprisoned by the Gestapo. Hohne and Zolling offer a more detailed and dispassionate account and focus more sharply on the intricacies of the postwar intelligence network inside Germany; they are less revealing than Cookbridge, however, on the American involvement and on the Nazi backgrounds of Gehlen's associates.

Gehlen served any master who served his purpose, which was the undermining and the destruction of Communism. When it could no longer be doubted that the German armies were defeated, Gehlen turned to the *Werewolves*, the young terrorists who were to carry on after Hitler's collapse. The *Werewolf* project had been discussed at one of Gehlen's last meetings with the Fuhrer, whom Gehlen found "most charming." They had also discussed Hitler's order that "gramophone records with sound effects of combat noise and rolling tanks . . . be distributed to front line commands and played from dugouts as near as possible to the Soviet lines." Hitler was mad, Gehlen was not. Yet Gehlen accepted this order, as all the others, knowing it was too late to stave off disaster. He did not desert until there was nothing to desert from. He played no

part in any German plot against the Nazi leaders. He waited until the end and then escaped to Bavaria, in early 1945, taking with him files he knew would interest the Americans—to whom he intended to surrender at a price. He met with Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, senior intelligence officer of the American Zone, who (report Hohne and Zolling) "while fighting was still in progress in France . . . had been prepared to make use of Adolf Hitler's officers in the cause of American strategy" and who "had a most excellent impression of him [Gehlen] at once." Sibert promptly took up with General Bedell Smith, US chief of staff, Gehlen's proposal to set up a German intelligence service "financed by the US and directed against the Soviet Union." Bedell Smith "okayed" the project, according to Hohne and Zolling, but did not inform Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, who had forbidden fraternization with Germans. After lengthy interrogation in Germany, Gehlen was flown to Washington.

Though friendship with Moscow was then official US policy, Cookbridge points out, Gehlen knew that "many generals, above all General George V. Strong, the chief of G-2 army intelligence, and Sibert, were very far from regarding the Soviet Union as a future ally. In fact, a vastly different vision was taking place at the Third Army headquarters at Bad Toelz, near where he [Gehlen] had buried his . . . files. There General Patton was dreaming of rearming a couple of Waffen SS divisions to incorporate them into his Third Army and 'lead them against the Reds.'" Said Patton: "We're going to have to fight them sooner or later. Why not now while our army is intact and we can kick the Red army back into Russia? We can do it with my Germans. . . . They hate those Red bastards."

That, of course, went way beyond anything Gehlen's captors had in mind. They wanted information; Gehlen had it. So, says Cookbridge, they treated him with great courtesy, "wooing him like a wayward lass who can bring a large dowry to offset the blemishes of her past. . . . Gehlen bargained his way into the gray dawn of Cold War espionage, conceding or compromising on some points, using pressures near to blackmail to gain others. It says much for his shrewdness, self-assurance and persistence that he was able to take on an array of top-ranking American experts." They agreed to covertly subsidize "an autonomous

"Dear Reinie"

THE GENERAL WAS A SPY
by HEINZ HÖHNE and HERMANN ZÖLLING
377 pages. Coward-McCann
& Geoghegan. \$8.95.

GEHLEN: SPY OF THE CENTURY
by E.H. COOKRIDGE
402 pages. Random House. \$10.

THE GAME OF THE FOXES
by LADISLAS FARAGO
696 pages. McKay. \$11.95.

While waiting for further commu-
niqués from the nostalgia front—Rich-
ard Burton's Mussolini and
the return of the crew cut, per-
haps—the American public is
being deafened by old spies
and their chroniclers whisp-
ering: "Now it can be told."

An alert literary scavenger
named Ladislav Farago dug
a tin box of German intel-
ligence papers out of the Na-
tional Archives; and recycled
them into a bestseller: *The
Game of the Foxes*. The book,
an almost day-to-day account
of German agents at work in
Britain and the U.S. during
World War II, is a stunning
proof of the incredible cost
and even more incredible in-
efficiency of most espionage
networks. Of the many Ab-
wehr agents smuggled into
England, for example, not
one was still operating at the
time of the Normandy in-
vasion in 1944.

Diaries are negotiable cur-
rency, too. *The London Jour-
nals of General Raymond E.
Lee, 1940-41* (Little, Brown)

are bringing \$12.50 on the open mar-
ket, mostly for predicting—you read
it here!—that Russia will prove too
much for Hitler. So it's "Once more
into the attics, fellow soldiers." Even
old memos are worth their weight in
gold, and that, given the art of mil-
itary memo writing, is saying some-
thing. In 1945 Sir John Masterman,
peacetime Oxford don, wartime coun-
terspy, was ordered to write an of-
ficial report about the remarkable suc-
cess British intelligence enjoyed turning
around German spies in England and
deploying them as double agents. Yale
University Press has simply reprinted
this surprisingly readable document
(*The Double-Cross System in the War
of 1939 to 1945*) on the coded doings
of Garbo, Tricycle and the rest, and
bargain-priced the instant book at
\$6.95.

The No. 1 processed cloak and dagger act, how-
ever, promises to be Reinhard Geh-
len. How can you upstage a man who

was Hitler's favorite intelligence of-
ficer, then after the war played "Dear
Reinie" to his CIA chief Allen Dulles.

Born in 1902, just too late for
World War I, he marked time as an ar-
tillery and cavalry officer until World
War II brought out his special talents.
He was one of those who could put war
on paper. Statistics and maps filled him
with a passion to organize them. By
1942 he was chief of intelligence on the
eastern front. Toward the end, when ac-
curacy meant prognosticating defeat,
Gehlen's accurate reports earned him
one of Hitler's temper tantrums. But
this last-minute fall from favor only



LIEUT. GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN (1944).
Just like home.

helped certify his anti-Nazi posture
afterward.

Nothing suggests Gehlen's sublime
insolence better than what he did when
everything fell apart in 1945. He dis-
guised himself as jolly Dr. Wendland,
collected the microfilms of his files,
and buried them in a Bavarian moun-
tain meadow. Then he waited for the
American troops. Whisked to Wash-
ington, the archenemy of only a few
months before convinced his conquer-
ors that they should appoint him (and
those files) as their primary espionage
source against the Soviet Union. The
Gehlen Organization, or simply the
"Org," set up in what had been an
SS model housing development, out-
side of Munich. To a number of re-
cruits—ex-SS men and Gestapo agents
may have run as high as 30%—it
was just like home.

The No. 1 spy for the United States
\$3,000,000. During the decade that
Gehlen worked exclusively for the
CIA, another \$200 million in American

money funded the Org. By 1948 the
Org numbered 4,000 agents and sup-
plied an estimated 70% of the U.S.
Government's information on the So-
viet military. Once Gehlen had the
idea of putting 432 simultaneous wire-
taps on East Berlin phones. New Jer-
sey Bell Telephone supplied the switch-
board, courtesy of the CIA, at a total
cost of \$6,000,000.

When the Org became the official
espionage service of West Germany
in 1956, Gehlen became a global car-
terer. He and the BND—the Org's new
name—discreetly contracted them-
selves out to Tanzania, Afghanistan
and the Congo. The secret services of
Israel and Egypt alike found occasion
to use Gehlen's services.

British Author Cookridge and Ger-
mans Höhne and Zölling have com-
piled dossiers on Gehlen that might
satisfy the Org itself. Cookridge, an
old agent who makes a living out of
spy chronicles like *The Truth About
Kim Philby*, tends a bit to trade
on man-in-the-shadows glamour.

Gehlen turned the gentleman's av-
ocation of spying—Sir John Master-
man still compares it to cricket—into
big business. But Höhne and Zölling
argue that, despite all his thermos-
flask cameras and secret, secret ink,
he still couldn't keep up with the
times. Forced into retirement in 1968,
he sat in his study on Lake Starnberg
with a death mask of Frederick the
Great looking down and wrote his
memoirs (due out later this year) rath-
er like Buffalo Bill after the frontier
went thataway. For spying, like ev-
erything else, has gone automated.

"They expect you to be able to say
that a war will start next Tuesday at
5:32 p.m.," Walter Bedell Smith com-
plained when he was head of the CIA.
While he lasted, Gehlen gave his cus-
tomers what they thought they wanted.
In the cold war he catered to their sense
of sinister conspiracy, then by a more
or less relevant act or report relieved
the anxiety he had helped create. He
predicted the Hungarian revolt, for in-
stance, and the Israeli-Arab Six-Day
War. But these events occurred any-
way. Sentiment dictates that Gehlen be
treated as the last of the Scarlet Pim-
pernels. He was, in fact, more like the
last of the Prussians—a nostalgia the
world could hardly afford even in his
own time.

■ Melvin Maddocks

BOOKS

STAT

STAT

EARTH
March 1972**Heroin traffic:**

Some amazing
coincidences linking
the CIA, the Mafia,
Air America,
several
members of
the Brook Club,
Chiang
Kai-Shek,
the Kuomintang,
Prince Puchartza
of Thailand,
many banks and
insurance companies
— practically
everyone except
Richard Nixon.

Wasn't he asked?

by Peter Dale Scott

Professor Samuel Eliot Morison, a 1903 Theodore Roosevelt national law and moralist, advised the US Navy to support the "repartition" of Panama from Colombia. The "repartition" to the Canal Zone treaty, is described by "Panama businessmen, agents of the United States" [which stood to gain \$40 million from the treaty] and United States agents to add that the "agents" of the United States Company were New York in the person of J. P. Seligman and their Washington office who organized and financed the "repartition" suite in the Waldorf-Astoria.

In some ways, the Panamanian partition is an instructive prelude to involvement in Indochina.² Let us be different today; for many years ago, preparing for revolution and war, was outlawed, under sections 956-60 of the Espionage Act. In theory, at least, responsibility of American "interests" is not to be taken over. But in fact, the CIA still maintains contacts with J. & W. Seligman and similar firms.

These contacts have been maintained from Wall Street which succeeded in bringing the CIA into its first covert operation. The man who created the CIA in 1949 was a man of unhappiness at the deflection of the CIA's original function: "I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations."³ His intentions, however, counted for less than those of Allen Dulles, then a New York corporation lawyer and President of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Administration became concerned that the Communists might shortly win the Italian elections:

Forrestal felt that a secret counteraction was vital, but his initial assessment was that the Italian operation would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing reprisals if the Communists won, and so that hat was passed at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen Dulles felt the problem could not be handled effectively in private hands. He urged strongly that the government establish a covert organization with unvouchered funds, the decision was made to create it under the National Security Council.⁴

continued

1 FEB 1972

After a Long, Inconclusive War . . .**A Non-Communist S. Vietnam Cannot Be Guaranteed**

STAT

By Chalmers M. Roberts

In 1962 in Hanoi, Pham Van Dong remarked to French journalist Bernard Fall that "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win in the end." A decade and three Presidents later it is still an inconclusive war. And Pham Van Dong is still the North Vietnamese Premier.

During that same visit to Hanoi Ho Chi Minh told Fall that "it took us eight years of bitter fighting to defeat you French in Indochina . . . The Americans are much stronger than the French, though they know us less well. It may perhaps take 10 years to do it . . ." Ho is dead but clearly his spirit, and his aim, live on.

It seems to me that Americans today must keep such remarks as these in mind as they assess the disclosures by President Nixon of Henry Kissinger's secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese and the peace proposals put to Hanoi. We suffer from a baseball syndrome; we want to see the final score and then go home to dinner. The North Vietnamese don't think that way; to them there is no final out until their side has won.

There is an aphorism from the American side that can be applied to the current situation in Indochina. In 1954 when he returned to Washington from the Geneva Conference that decreed the "temporary" division of Vietnam, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith remarked that "it will be well to remember that diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield."

In truth, neither side has prevailed on the battlefield. And there is stalemate at the conference table. The American eight-point peace plan, in sum, must seem to Hanoi to be a proposal for surrendering their victory aim. The North Vietnamese nine-point plan, judging from Kissinger's description of it since it has yet to be published, in sum, seems to Washington to be a proposal for surrendering South Vietnam to the control of the Communists.

There are, as the Nixon administration contends, some new elements in the American proposals. But the sum of it is that Hanoi must take its chances on an election in the South in which the Vietcong or National Liberation Front would compete. It is probable that the Communists would end up as a minority; they know that and so do Messrs. Nixon and Kissinger. I have never thought the Communists would participate in an election except as a mechanism to con-

firm a deal already set that would give them key Cabinet and other posts in a Saigon regime. Wide-open, nation-wide elections as the West knows them are both abhorrent to Communist regimes and foreign to the Vietnamese, North and South, as a technique for distributing power. Past elections in the South have been more of a charade than a reality — the result of Americanization of that part of Vietnam—despite all the trumpeting in Washington about them.

Kissinger said that the North Vietnamese told him that there could be no solution that did not include a political element and that they asked the United States for "an indirect overthrow" of the Saigon government;



PHAM VAN DONG

in short, that the United States cooperate in turning over South Vietnam to the Communists. A perusal of Hanoi's public statements supports that reading; presumably the nine-point program, once we see the text, will too.

President Nixon is not prepared to do so, any more than was President Johnson of whom the same thing was asked. It is illuminating that, according to Hanoi's spokesman in Paris, Kissinger remarked at the secret talks that "you must not nourish the illusion that we can settle the problem of

the war only because of the question of the prisoners of war." Secretary of State Rogers some months ago publicly said substantially the same thing. In effect, both were saying that Mr. Nixon will not make a deal to turn the South over to the Communists simply to get back the POWs.

Now it is being said that Mr. Nixon has made a "generous" offer. But Hanoi does not want just a chance to win in the South; it wants a certainty. Mr. Nixon is willing to give Hanoi at least some chance but not anything like a certainty. And from what has been reported from Saigon one can imagine that President Thieu's agreement to resign before a new election is based either on his belief that the procedure offers him a near certainty or his estimate that Hanoi will not accept anything less than near certainty for its side and therefore that there is not going to be any such election.

Where does this leave us? With the likelihood of a continuing inconclusive war, with a continuation of the withdrawal of American forces but with the probability of a residual force remaining in the South at election time next November plus the certainty that American planes will stay in adjacent areas outside Indochina. This is not, of course, absolutely certain for Mr. Nixon before election day could dramatically pull out the last man. But how would he square that with past declarations that some forces will remain until the prisoners are released?

The POWs are hostages and hostages not just for complete American withdrawal but for a political settlement favorable to Hanoi. There are conceivable ways to reach that kind of a settlement such as a deal, confirmed by a sham election, to replace the Thieu regime with some form of coalition giving the Communists real power in Saigon and the strong expectation of eventual total power. But that deal is not likely one to be made by Mr. Nixon. If it is made it will be made by anti-Thieu South Vietnamese who manage by coup or otherwise to displace him and probably only when they are sure Washington is powerless to prevent such a deal.

The truth of the matter is that the United States, despite the vast expenditure of blood and treasure, has failed to guarantee the survival of a non-Communist South Vietnam. If the Nixon administration, or its successor, is determined, as Kissinger put it, to end the division at home over the war it can only pull out completely, hope Hanoi then will release the POWs and leave it to Saigon and Hanoi to settle the political issue.

THE AFRICA DOSE

As British influence in Africa declined, so did British secret service sending hundreds of agents to African capitals like Accra, Lagos to buttress "sensitive" states against communism and protect E. H. Cookridge continues his exclusive series on the CIA

THE adventurous operations often bordering on the bizarre which the Central Intelligence Agency pursued in many parts of the world are usually ascribed to one man: Allen Dulles. They culminated in the abortive invasion of Cuba in 1961. When Dulles departed from the directorship of CIA after the Bay of Pigs debacle, he certainly left an indelible stamp of his influence as the architect of the mighty CIA edifice and its worldwide ramifications.


The policy of his successors has, however, been no less forceful. CIA activities under its present director, Richard McGarrah Helms, may appear less aggressive because they are being conducted with greater caution and less publicity, and because they have been adroitly adjusted to the changing climate in international politics. In the past CIA gained notoriety by promoting revolutions in Latin American banana republics, and supporting anti-communist regimes in South-East Asia. Its operations in Africa were more skilfully camouflaged. For many years they had been on a limited scale because the CIA had relied on the British secret service to provide intelligence from an area where the British had unsurpassed experience and long-established sources of information. But with the emergence of the many African independent countries, the wave of "anti-colonialist" emotions, and the growing infiltration of Africa by Soviet and Chinese "advisers", British influence declined. Washington forcefully stepped, through CIA, into the breach, with the avowed aim of containing communist expansion.

Financial investments in new industrial and mining enterprises, and lavish economic aid to the emerging governments of the "underdeveloped" countries, paved the road for the influx of hundreds of CIA agents. Some combined their intelligence assignments with genuine jobs as technical, agricultural and scientific advisers.

The British Government - particularly after the Labour Party had come to power in 1964 - withdrew most of their SIS and MI5 officials from African capitals, though some remained, at the request of the rulers, to organise their own new intelligence and security services. CIA



A bloodless coup in Uganda in January last year and installed Major-General Idi Amin as military ruler (A section of his troops). How far was the CIA's role in the coup? A pro-rebel poster attacks American intervention



men began hurriedly to establish their "stations" in Accra, Lagos, Nairobi, Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, the "sensitive areas" in danger of slipping under communist sway.

By the mid-1960s several senior CIA officials, such as Thomas J. Gunning and Edward Foy, both former U.S. Army Intelligence officers, were firmly established at Accra. They were later joined by William B. Edmondson, who had already joined his spurs in East Africa, and Mrs Stella Davis, an attractive, motherly woman, whom no one would have suspected of hav-

ing served for many years as a skilful FBI agent before joining CIA and being employed at Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Dar-es-Salaam, acquiring fluency in Swahili. By 1965 the Accra CIA Station had two-score active operators, distributing largesse among President Nkrumah's secret adversaries.

The Americans had every intention of helping Ghana's economy by building a dam in cooperation with a British consortium, the Volta Dam, thus providing hydro-electric power for the

30 Dec 1977

The CIA's New Cover

The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.

Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., \$6.95

Richard J. Barnet

In late November the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its important bureaucrats could consider its public image. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and published statistics, listening to the radio, thinking about the world, interpreting data of reconnaissance satellites, and occasionally

publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations were over. The upper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and elsewhere—Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald—had died or departed.

In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to preparing intelligence "estimates" for the President and collecting information the clean, modern way, mostly with sensors, computers, and sophisticated reconnaissance devices. Even Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now be as much a museum piece as Mata Hari. (There are about 18,000 employees in the CIA and 200,000 in the entire "intelligence community" itself. The cost of maintaining them is somewhere between \$5 billion and \$6 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-man hired army in Laos.)

A week after my visit to the "senior seminar" *Newsweek* ran a long story on "the new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporters clearly had spoken to some of the same people I had. As *Newsweek* said, "The gaudy era of the

adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C. Helms and his gray specialists has settled in." I began to have an uneasy feeling that *Newsweek's* article was a cover story in more than one sense.

It has always been difficult to analyze organizations that engage in false advertising about themselves. Part of the responsibility of the CIA is to

spread confusion about its own work. The world of Richard Helms and his "specialists" does indeed differ from that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organizations, in spite of their predilection for what English judges used to call "frolics of their own," are servants of policy. When policy changes, they must eventually change too, although because of the atmosphere of secrecy and deception in which they operate, such changes are exceptionally hard to control. To understand the "new espionage" one must see it as part of the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, is a global strategy for maintaining US power and influence without overtly involving the nation in another ground war.

But we cannot comprehend recent developments in the "intelligence community" without understanding what Mr. Helms and his employees actually do. In a speech before the National Press Club, the director discouraged journalists from making the attempt. "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men." The same speech is made each year to the small but growing number of senators who want a closer check on the CIA. In asking, on November 10, for a "Select Committee on the Coordination of United States Activities Abroad to oversee activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," Senator Stuart Symington noted that "the subcommittee having oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency has not met once this year."

Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, has also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA." Moreover, soon after

Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.

How Close To War In '54?

By Chalmers M. Roberts



The writer, who retired last summer as senior diplomatic correspondent of The Washington Post, covered the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina.

JUST HOW SERIOUSLY did the United States consider military intervention in Indochina in 1954? The publication of the Pentagon Papers—first in the newspapers and more recently in the 48-volume official edition published as 12 books by the House Armed Services Committee—has made the historian's task in answering that question both easier and more difficult.

It is easier because there is now available a mass of new material on the key year 1954, as well as for many other years. Much of it is confirmatory, of course, but there are new bits and pieces, and above all a sense of the urgency with which events were perceived at the time.

It is more difficult because the new documents do not resolve all the outstanding questions that have been raised in the many books and articles written about the period. And while the possibility that a key piece of the puzzle may still be withheld through censorship cannot be ruled out, a close reading of Books 9 and 10 of the House edition which cover this period leaves the impression that the censors were wholly capricious.

From the 859 pages dealing with 1953 and 1954 (and these are pages of documents, not the analyst's summation) the censors cut out seven items covering 18 pages. In Book 9, however,

the censor did not cut out the summaries of the five documents excised but in Book 10 the summaries were cut out for the two documents omitted. It so happens that among the Pentagon Papers made available to The Washington Post are copies of the five documents from Book 9.

The Pentagon's explanation of the "declassified review" (printed in each book) states that "some of the material has been declassified solely on the basis of prior disclosures." Yet one of the excised documents was printed in full in the New York Times. Furthermore, it was sharply an advance report from Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith in Geneva to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in Washington on an important Associated Press dispatch written by Seymour Topping, now a New York Times editor. The more significant telegram from Smith to Dulles on the following day revealing Topplugs' Chinese Communist source is included in the book! (The informant, incidentally, was Huang Hua who is the new Peking ambassador to Canada and who may be the first envoy to Washington.)

Another censored document recounts a Dulles conversation at Geneva with Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. This cable reflects Dulles' unhappiness with Eden and British policy but far less so than some of the printed telegrams. Still another excised message, from Dulles in Paris to Washington, in July of 1954, details the agreed U.S.-French position just before the end of the Geneva conference but there is nothing in it that has not long ago been known and widely printed.

Finally, the other two excised documents of which The Post has copies deal with American conversations with two French generals, Paul Ely and Jean Valluy. Both were Pentagon conversations, both were pessimistic but neither is remarkable.

A note should be added here about the issue of codes. At the time the Nixon administration went to court to pre-censor publication of the Pentagon Papers there was much talk that their use in toto would compromise cryptographic codes because the messages gave exact dates and times and cable control numbers. But the censors excised none of this information from the hundreds of messages printed.

Nor did the censors eliminate American officials' assessments of Chou En-lai's performance at Geneva, though Chou soon is to be President Nixon's host in Peking.

An Omen By Ike

ON THE CENTRAL question of how close the Eisenhower administration came to military intervention in 1954, Book 10 includes a then-Top Secret summary by Dulles on "French Requests Involving Possible United States Belligerency in Indochina." In it he listed, and detailed, April 4, 23 and 24 as "the three occasions when French officials suggested United States armed intervention in Indochina." Dulles' summary, drafted on Aug. 3, just after Geneva had produced a cease-fire, states American "conditions" for intervention (never fulfilled) but does not go beyond that—perhaps because the draft was intended for publication although it never was published in this form.

This summary, however, does add something. Dulles stated that on May 11, four days after the fall of Dienbienphu and three days after the Geneva conference opened, the French were "advised" that President Eisenhower "would be disposed to ask Congress for authority to use the armed forces of the United States" under certain conditions. This "possibility," said Dulles on Aug. 3, "lapsed" on June 20 when Franco decided to accept the cease-fire that took another month to negotiate.

Numerous French writers, most notably Philippe Devillers and Jean Lecouture in "End of a War," have detailed the French pleas for intervention. American writers such as John Robinson Beal in "John Foster Dulles" have told it from the American side. Most recently Robert F. Randle, a Columbia University professor, in "Geneva 1954," has taken something of a revisionist line. Randle concluded that Dulles in fact was vetoing the intervention plans of Adm. Arthur Radford, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he wrote that "my analysis and conclusions differ substantially from those of Mr. Roberts" in The Post and in a widely reprinted Reporter magazine piece titled "The Day We Didn't Go to War."

In reading the Dulles telegrams against my own accounts and memories of many conversations with Dulles and others at the time I still have no doubt that he wanted to intervene to "save" Indochina from communism. He was stopped, essentially, by two factors: the Democratic congressional leaders who insisted (as did the Republicans as well) on allies, and by Eden, who refused, with Prime Minister Churchill's full backing, to let Britain be the key ally in any "united action."

STAT

11 OCT 1971

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THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad: for what it has allegedly done, as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.


CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big

This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview. (Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U. S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is world-wide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

BROCKTON, MASS.
ENTERPRISE-TIMES

E - 55,308
OCT 5 1971

The Philby Affair

WHEN THE RUSSIANS hit back at the English for their expulsion of 105 Soviet spies masquerading as diplomats and technicians, the name of Kim Philby came back into the news. He is the one who is supposed to have furnished Izvestia with a list of British spies throughout the Arab world.

British traitor Harold A. R. (Kim) Philby was a Soviet agent for 30 years, becoming head of the American Department in London May 1, 1950, and continuing his role for 14 years afterward. As the "third man" he tipped off co-conspirators Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess so that they could escape from Washington to Moscow.

Despite the fact that General Bedell Smith, director of the CIA, sent an ultimatum of the greatest bluntness to the British ("Fire Philby or we break off the intelligence relationship"), he was exonerated in 1955 by then foreign secretary Harold MacMillan. So Philby could play the part of injured hero and good-tempered martyr to security for several more years.

Most of Britain's intelligence recruits are drawn from Oxford and Cambridge, and the inbred nature of the secret services has had one grave defect—the refusal to believe that anyone with the same school tie could be a traitor to England. Thus the affair tells us a good deal about the role of privilege in our society, and the degree to which the insignia of social and economic status can be fatally mistaken for political acceptability.

On the credit side, the Philby affair brought about considerable reform of the British intelligence services.

William H. Jackson Dead at 70; Former C. I. A. Deputy Director

Also a Senior Partner and
Managing Director of Law
and Investment Firms

Special to The New York Times

TUCSON, Ariz., Sept. 23—William H. Jackson, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, died today after a long illness. He was 70 years old.

Mr. Jackson married twice, in 1929 Elizabeth Lyman and in 1951 Mary Lee Pitcairn. Both marriages ended in divorce.

He is survived by two sons of the first marriage, William H. and Richard Lee, and two sons of the second marriage, Bruce P. and Howell E., and four grandchildren.

A funeral service will be held in Nashville, on Friday or Saturday.

Study Begun in Early 50's

The problem of setting up a psychological-warfare organization in a democracy was the task put before William Harding Jackson.

In the early nineteen-fifties, he headed a committee appointed by President Eisenhower to study how to mount psychological warfare to give it "a dynamic thrust in the cold war."

In his report, Mr. Jackson stated that "psychological strategy" does not exist as an independent medium. He recommended that the President abolish the Psychological Strategy Board, which in 1953 had been floundering for two years.

The Jackson committee asked, instead, that the President set up an "operations coordinating board" within the National Security Council.

The mission of this new unit would have been to plan detailed actions for carrying on not mere propaganda or psychological warfare but definitive national-security policies.

In effect, the Jackson report stated that the nation should refrain from propaganda stunts, contrived ideas unrelated to stated policy, in the ideological warfare against the Soviet Union. The report was accepted and the operations board was formed.



The New York Times

William H. Jackson

Behind this major effort was a long career in intelligence work that made Mr. Jackson the ideal man to be the committee's chairman. His World War II service was chiefly in various phases of intelligence, with a brief period in the Office of Strategic Services.

Joined Army as Captain

He entered the Army as a captain in February, 1942, and was assigned to the Army Air Force Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pa. This was followed by antisubmarine service and assignment to intelligence units.

In January, 1944, Mr. Jackson went to London to join the intelligence section of American Military Headquarters, serving as chief of intelligence to Gen. Jacob L. Devers and, later, as deputy chief of intelligence for Gen. Omar Bradley. He was discharged from the Army in August, 1945, as a colonel.

Upon his return, he rejoined his law firm, Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, where he had become a senior partner, but left two years later, because, as he put it:

"My prewar work wasn't satisfying any more. A great many civilian soldiers felt the same way I did."

He became a partner in the investment firm of John Hay Whitney and also its managing

director. Before long, however, he was back in intelligence work.

In 1949, he was named to the National Security Council to serve on a committee with Allen W. Dulles and Mathias F. Correa to investigate the intelligence service of the United States.

Appointed Deputy Director

The following August he was named deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with Lieut. Gen. Walter B. Smith.

In January, 1956, President Eisenhower named Mr. Jackson as a special assistant, succeeding Nelson A. Rockefeller. His job was "to assist in the coordination and timing of the execution of foreign policies involving more than one department or agency."

Some months later, he was named special assistant to the President for national security affairs. He recommended to the President that Richard M. Nixon, then the Vice President, be made chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, a unit whose job it was to see that Presidential decisions, recommended by the Security Council, were closely and quickly followed.

While Mr. Eisenhower was sympathetic to the idea, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, was opposed, and the proposal was rejected.

Mr. Jackson was born in Nashville on March 25, 1901, the son of William Harding Jackson and the former Anne Davis Richardson. The family had been farmers for five generations. A grandfather, a West Point graduate, was a Civil War veteran.

The youth was graduated from St. Mark's School, Southborough, Mass., in 1920. He received a B.A. from Princeton in 1924 and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1928.

Admitted to Bar in 1932

He joined the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft in 1928 and moved to Carter, Ledyard & Milburn in 1930. He was admitted to the bar in New York in 1932 and two years later became a partner of Carter, Ledyard.

Mr. Jackson was a trustee of the Millbrook School for Boys and of St. Mark's. He also was a director of the Spencer-Chemical Company, the Great Northern Paper Company and the Bankers Trust Company.

STAT

September 15, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

ica that now exists in many countries. We will also urge that such a system eliminate the inequitable "reverse preferences" that now discriminate against Western Hemisphere countries.

The President was certainly correct when he said that—

United States trade policies often have a very heavy impact on our neighbors.

As an example, Mexico imported \$1.565 billion worth of American goods, mostly manufactured items, last year. The United States imported \$833 million worth of Mexican goods, resulting in a plus U.S. trade balance of \$832 million.

Mexico, like most of the developing nations in Latin America is striving to build its manufacturing capabilities in order to create jobs and raise its GNP.

President Nixon has not only broken his promise to "press for a liberal system of generalized tariff preferences for all developing countries, including Latin America," but he has slapped Mexico and our other neighbors with a surcharge of 10 percent on their exports to the United States.

Surely the President was correct when he said during the economic package announcement, that the "temporary" surcharge was aimed at trading nations with under-valued currencies. Given that, why did he break his promises to our developing neighbors and levy precisely the same surcharge against them as he applied to the developed nations?

But the levying of the surcharge was not the only broken promise. In order to increase the drama involved in announcing such a comprehensive economic package, President Nixon broke his express promise to have "advance consultation on trade matters" which he made in the Inter-American Press Association speech.

In a speech delivered yesterday before the U.S. Governors Conference in San Juan, P.R., OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza stated:

The new economic policy announced by the United States Government last month has, understandably, not been well received in Latin America. The surcharge on imports seems to undercut both the general U.S. commitment toward freer trade and the specific U.S. commitment to help Latin America expand and diversify its exports.

I find Secretary General Galo Plaza to be most diplomatic indeed. He might have stated simply: "President Nixon lied to us."

I would remind President Nixon and the Members of this body of one or two economic facts of life:

First. Latin America is the only major world area in which the United States maintains a favorable trade balance.

Second. That favorable trade balance amounted to \$790 million last year.

Third. The United States exported almost \$5 billion worth of goods to Latin America in 1969.

Fourth. The old days when the Latin American nations had nowhere else to go for their imports are over. West Germany, Japan, France, Great Britain, and even the Soviet Union are accelerating their exports to Latin American nations. As an example, in a recent closed session

of the Foreign Relations Committee in one of the houses of the Brazilian Congress, the Foreign Minister of Brazil stated that last year, for the first time in its history, Brazil traded more with the Common Market nations than it did with the United States.

This morning the Washington Post published an editorial which is very germane to the subject of the impact of the 10-percent import surtax on our southern neighbors. The editorial entitled, "Who Pays the Tariff?" follows:

WHO WANTS THE TARIFF?

In the current pushing and shoving among the world's great trading nations, a lot of small countries are getting hurt. Latin America illustrates the point. The United States did not really intend to harm the Latin economies last month when it imposed its 10 per cent surtax on imports. The truth is that the White House and the Treasury were not thinking about Latin America at all. But intentional or not, the damage is real and the consequences are going to be serious.

President Nixon worked out his economic program with the advice of a special committee of able and experienced citizens, headed by Albert Williams, whose report has now been published. But in the matter of tariffs the President overrode this committee, which urged him to move toward removal of all barriers to international trade. The Williams committee is right on this issue, and the President is wrong. The evidence is already visible to the south.

The Latin Americans protest, with good logic, that it is unjust to make them pay a surtax designed to remedy a trade crisis in which they played no part. Latin America has traditionally bought more from the United States than it sells here. The Latins are not the people to see about revaluing the yen and the Deutschemark. But the United States meets all objections with a shrug and the observation that it can't start making exceptions now.

Mr. Nixon attempted this week to placate the Latins with the decision that, for them alone, he would cancel the 10 per cent reduction in foreign aid; it had originally been part of the program announced a month ago, with the surtax. But the countries getting the most aid are not those hardest hit by the surtax.

The extreme examples are Mexico and Brazil. Mexico does more business with the United States than any other country in Latin America and will be more severely damaged by the surtax than any other. But Mexico takes no direct aid from the United States. On the other hand, the United States gives more aid to Brazil than to any other Latin country. Brazil does half as much business with the United States as Mexico does. Since coffee is exempt, the surtax applies only to about 15 per cent of Brazil's exports to this country. But it applies to fully 50 per cent of Mexico's exports here.

Less than two years ago Mr. Nixon delivered a glowing speech on this country's responsibilities to Latin America. "They need," he said then, "to be assured of access to the expanding markets of the industrialized world." He promised them advance consultation on trade matters, and he also promised to pursue, worldwide, "a liberal system of generalized tariff preferences." They got no consultation on the surtax, obviously, and now they see the United States taking the lead in raising tariffs. Unfortunately the price of these moves comes high, and much of it is ultimately paid by small nations that cannot afford their large neighbors' mistakes.

BILDERBERG: THE COLD
INTERNATIONALE

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, September 15, 1971

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Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, on several occasions during recent months, I called the attention of our colleagues to activities of the Bilderbergers—an elite international group comprised of high Government officials, international financiers, businessmen and opinionmakers—see Congressional Record, H4018-8 of May 5, 1971, entitled "Bilderbergers' Woodstock Meeting;" H3701 to H3707 of May 10, 1971, entitled "U.S. Dollar Crisis—A Dividend of Internationalism;" H4979 to H4985 of May 24, 1971, entitled "Secret Bilderberg Meeting and the Logan Act;" and H7786 to H7787 of July 16, 1971, entitled "Bilderberg Case: Reply From U.S. Attorney General's Office."

This exclusive international aristocracy holds highly secretive meetings annually or more often in various countries. The limited information available about what transpires at these meetings reveals that they discuss matters of vital importance which affect the lives of all citizens. Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger, who made a secret visit to Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971, and arranged for a Presidential visit to Red China, was reported to be in attendance at the most recent Bilderberg meeting held in Woodstock, Vt., April 23-25, 1971. The two points reportedly discussed at the Woodstock meeting were "the contribution of business in dealing with current problems of social instability" and "the possibility of a change of the American role in the world and its consequences."

Following these secret discussions, which are certainly not in keeping with the Western political tradition of "open covenants openly arrived at," the participants return to their respective countries with the general public left uninformed, notwithstanding the attendance of some news media representatives, of any of the recommendations and plans agreed upon as a result of the discussions—or for that matter even the occurrence of the meeting itself.

Because the American people have a right to know of any projections for a change in America's role in the world and because Henry Kissinger and other Government officials and influential Americans met with high Government officials and other powerful foreign leaders, I sought to have more information about the recent Bilderberg meeting made public by raising the question to the U.S. Attorney General of a possible violation of the Logan Act by American participants and asked if the Justice Department anticipated taking any action in the matter.

The reply from the Justice Department, in effect, was that all of the elements constituting a violation of the Logan Act were present and that the Department contemplated no action but

NO. 19 1971
September

A CIA Paper

"...Although this entire series of discussions was "off the record", the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."

—C. Douglas Dillon

By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'etat's consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agency has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.


For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements

rivalries to be sure, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected — be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.

It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligence apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made available to the Group which will publish the complete text in October, 1971.



CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

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*The complete text of the document will be available for S1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213,

U.S. sabotaged Geneva accords

By Richard E. Ward
Third of a series of articles

Official U.S. policy statements on Indochina issued to the public characteristically have charged the Vietnamese with the crimes actually being committed by the U.S. From 1954 to the present day, among the U.S. ideological keystones have been the spurious claims of North Vietnamese aggression and violations of the 1954 Geneva settlement.

Although U.S. responsibility for sabotaging the Geneva agreements has been recognized widely for well over a decade, the first time it was seriously suggested in the New York Times was last month in its final installment of documents and reports from the Pentagon's history of U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

Following the disastrous French defeat at Dien-bienphu in May 1954 as well as serious military reverses elsewhere in Indochina, France finally faced the necessity of negotiations to avoid complete destruction of its forces. The ensuing settlement at Geneva contained provisions for a durable peace in Indochina. But as quickly as French troops left Indochina the U.S. began its direct intervention, preventing essential provisions of the Geneva agreement from being carried out.

Armed resistance begins

As is well known, the U.S. caused its puppet Ngô Dinh Diem to be installed in Saigon, even before the settlement had been reached in Geneva. Under programs financed and largely conceived by his CIA tutors, Diem instituted a neo-fascist regime. Thousands of patriots who had served in the anti-French resistance were assassinated or jailed and tortured. Armed struggle became the only road to survival; this developed spontaneously in some regions or under the direction of local cadres in others. Full-scale, coordinated resistance began with the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in December 1960, which was headed by a representative cross-section of the leadership of democratic and progressive organizations in the South.

In the U.S. version, which the American press rarely challenged (except to give a partially true picture as Diem neared his end in 1963), the Saigon puppets were treated as the legitimate rulers, threatened by subversive agents acting on behalf of Hanoi. In essence, according to Washington, in the late 1950s the U.S. was not intervening in Vietnam while "foreign aggression" was carried out by Vietnamese.

Unfortunately the press has only published a small amount of material from the Pentagon study on the period following the Geneva settlement. However, there is sufficient information from the Pentagon report to demonstrate that Washington consciously and deliberately was trying to crush the revolution in Vietnam and that virtually every public statement was nothing but a tissue of lies designed to conceal U.S. activities from the American people.

At various stages the U.S. and its apologists have blown hot and cold about the Geneva agreements. At the conference itself the chief U.S. delegate, Walter Bedell Smith, pledged that the U.S. would not upset them by force. Officials based in Washington were more ambiguous, hardly concealing their dissatisfaction. Dissatisfied they well might be, for Bedell Smith's initial

instructions from President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opposed any international recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which had existed for nearly nine years and led the resistance against the French.

Blind policies

Prior to the Geneva conference itself, Washington policy papers of 1954 underscored U.S. aims in Indochina as "a military victory" for the French, whose armies were on their last legs—indicating the lack of realism in Washington. Thus it is not surprising that the U.S. worked to destroy the new peace. This was evident at the time to anyone who wanted to see what was happening in Vietnam.

Clearer than before, the newly available documents show that the U.S. never intended to respect the Geneva settlement. On August 3, 1954, just two weeks after the Geneva conference concluded, the National Security Council discussed Vietnam. About the meeting, Fox Butterfield in the Times wrote: "The objectives set by the [National Security] Council were 'to maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam' and 'to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.'"

Although the Pentagon analyst denied that the U.S. "connived" with Diem to prevent national elections, Butterfield noted that Washington had made its desires known to Diem and when Diem later blocked the elections, the U.S. indicated its full "support." The Pentagon papers could hardly conceal the fact that Diem remained in power by virtue of U.S. backing, although the dependence on the U.S. is sometimes obscured, particularly in ascribing to Diem the repression for which U.S. was ultimately responsible.

Washington's cynical attitude toward the Geneva settlement was stated by John Foster Dulles in a cable to the U.S. embassy in Saigon on Dec. 11, 1955: "While we should certainly take no step to speed up the present process of decay of the Geneva accords, neither should we make the slightest effort to infuse life into them."

Perhaps the most revealing new document from the post-Geneva period is a lengthy report on the activities of the so-called Saigon Military Mission, headed by Col. Lansdale of the CIA. Ostensibly written by anonymous members of the group, there is no doubt that the report which eulogizes Lansdale was largely his doing. Lansdale's activities were described in fiction by Graham Greene, in "The Quiet American." Lansdale's chauvinism and callousness might also be compared to the comic strip character, Steve Canyon, like Lansdale an Air Force colonel.

continued

KEY TEXTS FROM

PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are the texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering events in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents appear verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Report of Ho's Appeals to U.S. In '46 to Support Independence

Cablegram from an American diplomat in Hanoi, identified as Landon, to State Department, Feb. 27, 1946, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.

Ho Chi Minh handed me 2 letters addressed to President of USA, China, Russia, and Britain identical copies of which were stated to have been forwarded to other governments named. In 2 letters to Ho Chi Minh request as one of United Nations to support idea of Annamese independence according to Philippines example, to examine the case of the Annamese, and to take steps necessary to maintenance of world peace which is being endangered by French efforts to reconquer Indochina. He asserts that Annamese will fight until United Nations interfered in support of Annamese independence. The petition addressed to major United Nations contains:

September 1945 of PENW Democratic Republic of Viet Minh:

C. Summary of French conquest of Cochin China began 23 Sept 1945 and still incomplete:

D. Outline of accomplishments of Annamese Government in Tonkin including popular elections, abolition of undesirable taxes, expansion of education and resumption as far as possible of normal economic activities:

E. Request to 4 powers: (1) to intervene and stop the war in Indochina in order to mediate fair settlement and (2) to bring the Indochinese issue before the United Nations organization. The petition ends with the statement that Annamese ask for full independence in fact and that in interim while awaiting UNO decision the Annamese will continue to fight the reestablishment of French imperialism. Letters and petition will be transmitted to Department soonest.

- A. Review of French relations with Japanese where French Indochina allegedly aided Japs:
- B. Statement of establishment on 2

1952 Policy Statement by U.S. On Goals in Southeast Asia

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, early 1952, on "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia." According to a footnote, the document defined Southeast Asia as "the area embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia."

Objective

1. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop will and ability to resist communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

General Considerations

2. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would

seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.

a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist aggression would have critical psychological, political and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism of the rest of

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d. Th especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism.

3. It is therefore imperative that an overt attack on Southeast Asia by the Chinese Communists be vigorously opposed. In order to pursue the military courses of action envisaged in this paper to a favorable conclusion within a reasonable period, it will be necessary to divert military strength from other areas thus reducing our military capability in those areas, with the recognized increased risks involved therein, or to increase our military forces in being, or both.

4. The danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China, but such an attack is less probable than continued communist efforts to achieve domination through subversion. The primary threat to Southeast Asia accordingly arises from the possibility that the situation in Indochina may deteriorate as a result of the weakening of the resolve of, or as a result of the inability of the governments of France and of the Associated States to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion, the military strength of which is being steadily increased by virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese Communist regime and its allies.

5. The successful defense of Tonkin is critical to the retention in non-Communist hands of mainland Southeast Asia. However, should Burma come under communist domination, a communist Thailand might make Indochina, including Tonkin, militarily indefensible. The execution of

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30 JUN 1971



Chief of C.I.A. Is Reported Confering in Israel

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
Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, June 29—Richard Helms, director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, has arrived in Israel for meetings with Government analysts, reliable Israeli sources said today.

This is understood to be the first visit to Israel of a C.I.A. director.

The trip has not been announced, and tight censorship regulations were imposed on publication of news in Israel of Mr. Helms's activities. The Foreign Ministry declined to comment when asked about his presence in the country, and a spokesman for the United States Embassy said he had "no information" on the reports.

Among the main purposes of Mr. Helms's visit is believed to be an examination with Israeli authorities of the growing Soviet role in the Arab world and



United Press International
Richard Helms

the eastern Mediterranean. He is also expected to gather information for the Nixon Administration's current assessment of

Israel's security needs over the coming year and beyond.

The United States Ambassador, Walworth Barbour, is said to be personally arranging the schedule of meetings during Mr. Helms's three- or four-day visit.

It is unusual for the director of intelligence to travel abroad, largely because American diplomats believe that his public presence could embarrass other governments. On the other hand, some diplomats believe that such a personal interest is also a signal of United States interest and commitment in another country that is not likely to go unnoticed.

In most countries, including Israel, persons in such a position are not publicly known figures, though United States Administrations have not followed this practice.

Israeli sources said there had been a possibility up to the last minute that Mr. Helms's visit might be canceled, particularly if there had been premature publicity. Several times previously, such American officials as Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and Allen W. Dulles, both of whom had directed the C.I.A., are known to have canceled scheduled visits to Israel shortly before they were to have taken place.

4 MAY 1971

POLLUTION AND PICTURES

STAT

A Visit With Chou En-lai

By AUDREY TOPPING

Special to The Star

PEKING — Chou En-lai, the prime minister of Communist China, expressed concern over the increasing problem of water and earth pollution during a recent informal chat with an old friend.

"The greatest pollution has taken place in the most advanced industrial countries," Chou said speaking with Chester Ronning, retired Canadian diplomat whom Chou had invited to Peking. "Developing countries, like China, which are not as far advanced industrially can benefit from the experiences of these countries to avoid similar problems."

"That is very true," Ronning replied, in fluent Mandarin, a language he learned as a child. "Aside from our political problems, pollution may be the most important one."

"Actually, this problem is related to politics," Chou said, without elaborating on the connection.

"Younger Generation"

"Pollution is also due to certain aspects of our economic system," Ronning continued. "The solution to this problem depends on whether we can make the necessary changes in our economic system."

"Well, I guess we will have to

Audrey Topping is a freelance journalist-photographer currently visiting China with her father, a Canadian diplomat invited to Peking by Chou En-lai.

leave that to the younger generation," Chou said jokingly, gesturing toward me and my sister, Mrs. Sylvia Cassady of Camerone, Alberta, Canada, who accompanied our father on the trip.

Chou personally welcomed our party to China on May Day. He received us in the spacious reception room of the Hall of the People on Tien-an Men Square. Later, they joined Chairman Mao Tse-tung, members of the government and other dignitaries on the rostrum of the Gate of Heavenly Peace to witness the spectacular display of fireworks commemorating May Day.

Strains of music and noises from the half-million people assembled in the square drifted into the hall where Chou and Ronning spoke and posed for pictures.

Chou was in a jovial mood, looking younger than his 73 years. He asked Ronning, whom he often referred to as "laoteng yu" (old friend), why he had retired from the diplomatic service so early.

"I did not retire early," Ronning replied. "I remained in the Foreign Service until I was 71. Canadians are supposed to retire at 65." Ronning is now 76.

Chou smiled, "Well, you and I are exceptions to the rule. Take me now, why should I retire?"

The two men first met in Chungking in 1946 and again in Nanking when Ronning was charge d'affaires of the Canadian Embassy from 1949 to 1951. They met again in 1954 at the Geneva Conference on Korea when Chou headed the Chinese delegation and Ronning was acting head of the Canadian delegation.

The discussion turned briefly to that conference when Chou had opposed the permanent closing of the meeting. He had proposed instead that the conference be adjourned, subject to being reconvened by the co-chairman at a more appropriate time.

Recalls Bedell Smith

"If we had accepted your proposal," Ronning said, "we could have had a peace treaty."

Chou nodded and laughed a little, waving his arm. "I still remember how Mr. Smith waved his arm at me and closed the conference," he said, referring to Gen. Walter Bedell

Smith who headed the American delegation.

tunic suit, smoked a Central Flowery Kingdom cigarette and tried to bring my sister and I into the conversation, but we were too busy taking pictures. Chou laughed aloud when my father explained that we were infected by a recurring disease called "camera-itis."

This initial meeting included Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador-designate to Canada; and Wang Ku-chuan, leading member of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries.

Invited to Return

As Ronning was departing, Chou invited him to return for a more serious discussion of problems of mutual concern. "This time I wanted only to welcome you and your daughters and to have some photos of the occasion," Chou said.

After their meeting, the two went to the Gate of Heavenly Peace where Chou introduced Ronning to Li Hsien Nien, vice prime minister, and Huang Yung-sheng, whom Chou called officials from the "province of Hupeh."

We are scheduled to accompany our father on May 8 to Fancheng in Hupeh, his birthplace.

NEWPORT, R.I.
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Former Director Of CIA Gives Talk At Newport Discussion Club

The Central Intelligence Agency has "an impossible job" Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, professor of political science at Brown University told the Newport Discussion Club last night at the Hotel Viking. The former executive director of comptroller of the CIA said the task of the intelligence agency

was to direct "the total United States intelligence effort" and to coordinate the activities of 9 other intelligence agencies; as directed under the National Security Act of 1947.

Its duty is not only to gather information, the former newspaperman said, but it is to predict "what the Soviet Union or China is going to be doing five years from now" and so inform the President, the secretary of defense and the secretary of state. It is this prophetic aspect of its duties that make it an "impossible job", he emphasized. He made it evident, however, that he thought it one of the "finest agencies in our federal government."

Kirkpatrick acknowledged that the CIA is not a popular organization. Americans "abhor secrecy", he replied. They have the feeling there is something "slightly dirty" about espionage. The also fear its unchecked power. They wonder if responsible control over its activities is adequate.

The former CIA executive assured his audience there are many powerful checks on the activities of the intelligence organization. Some of them were inaugurated by President Eisenhower 20 years ago. President Kennedy established the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of prominent military men who are free to probe its activities. The Bureau of the Budget may investigate its "managerial control" as well as its finances. And finally there is Congress. Three sub-committees in Congress are constantly informed about important moves of the CIA.

The public sometimes worries about whether there is adequate control over individual agents at work abroad. Kirkpatrick

II, assumed command of CIA in October, 1959, he "straightened things out in a hurry." Smith was a strict disciplinarian who demanded absolute control of operations. The speaker approved of this attitude, saying that espionage is "too dangerous not to be disciplined." "There is no action taken by an agent abroad which is not cleared at home," he declared.

Another apprehension of the public is that we are being watched at home, that dossiers are being run up on people. This is another unfounded fear, according to Kirkpatrick. CIA activities are focused exclusively outside the U.S, he said.

He acknowledged "an aggressive recruiting program" on college campuses. A constant flow of bright new young people into the CIA is an absolute necessity.

In comparing Russia's espionage efforts with this country's, he said their personnel outnumbered ours 10 to 1 or perhaps even 100 to 1. Russia has the greatest espionage effort ever supported by any country, he declared. Even its cultural exports such as the Bolshoi Ballet engage in espionage. In answer to a question about Russian travelers, the speaker said about 18 might be operating off our coasts. Two or three, perhaps, are listening to naval reports right now off Newport.

Stalin had the most complete intelligence information before World War II began that any leader ever had, but he refused to use it. Kirkpatrick said a man was ordered shot by the Soviet leader because he reported troops were moving across the border into Russia when the Germans began their offense in World War II, although Stalin did not know of the German intentions.