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Command and the Intelligence Process

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"Hostile armies may face each other for years striving for a victory that is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the height of inhumanity. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no help to his sovereign, no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge."—SUN TSU—Circa 500 B.C.

"Since Intelligence constitutes a vital element in the Commander's estimate of the situation leading to a decision, it is a basic function of Command to initiate and coordinate the search for the necessary information."
—DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER—1946

The essence of military genius has been, and will continue to be, foreknowledge. The process for obtaining it is called "Positive Intelligence" (as opposed to "Counter-Intelligence") and constitutes one of the essential functions of leadership, whether military or political. This seems so obvious as to hardly require discussion. Yet it does. In fact it has even required legislation. Does anyone remember, for instance, the Pearl Harbor investigation and its results? Here, indeed, it appears we forgot the obvious and Congress found it necessary to remind us all, as Frederick the Great put it, "It is pardonable to be defeated but never to be taken by surprise."

Without rehashing the Pearl Harbor hearings, suffice it to say that there is room for doubt that command at any level fully realized its relationship to the intelligence function. Congress seemed to feel that unification of command would correct the fault, and we have moved far along that road since. But are we still missing the obvious? Perhaps a look at what constitutes the positive intelligence process, with some historical examples of its application and its place in the command structure today, will help answer the question.

The Five Requirements

First of all there is *The Command Requirement.* How does a commander initiate and co-ordinate the search for the necessary information upon which to base his decision? In addition to drawing on his own knowledge

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and experience, he assembles a staff to exploit the resources available and to gather, collate, organize, and present to him the details necessary to keep him fully advised. The creation of such a staff in its turn creates intelligence requirements, for each member of the staff must search for necessary information to complete his part in the staff function of keeping his commander advised. This second element can be termed the *Staff Intelligence Requirement.*

The commander has not finished his task when he has assembled his staff, gathered, collated, evaluated, and interpreted his information on varied subjects into a coherent whole and made his decision. The decision requires execution. For this, the commander also needs a staff to transmit his will to his subordinate elements. But the subordinates cannot themselves operate simply on the basis of their commander's decision. They themselves require support in the form of "necessary information" in order to interpret and lay plans to carry out intelligently the will of their commander. This process generates a third element in the intelligence process, the *Fleet Support Requirement.*

As the complexity of operations increases, the need arises for the commander, his staff, and his subordinate elements to co-ordinate their activities with other agencies, arms, and services. Agencies, arms, and services themselves have intelligence requirements. This imposes a need to exchange necessary information amongst all elements involved in an operation or endeavor that has a common purpose. The inter-play brought on by this situation requires that necessary information be passed laterally, passed up and passed down, so that all concerned are aware of what the other knows and are able to benefit or act accordingly. This fourth element of the intelligence process might be called the *Joint Intelligence Requirement.*

A fifth intelligence requirement is that imposed by combinations with allies. This is quite similar to the joint requirement described above, but more complex and one which requires more delicate control. It is the *Combined Intelligence Requirement.*

Thus, we can say that there are essentially five requirements to be met in any positive intelligence effort: First, the Command Requirement; second, the Staff Requirement; third, the Support Requirement; fourth, the Joint Requirement; and fifth, the Combined Requirement. In organizing an effort to meet the above requirements, the positive intelligence process is broken into what amounts to three fundamental divisions: *Basic Intelligence, Current Intelligence,* and *Estimative Intelligence.*

The dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for Joint Usage defines *basic intelligence* as "general reference material for use in planning, concerning enemies or potential enemies, which pertains to capabilities, resources, or potential theaters of operations." While this definition leaves something to be desired, it seems to convey the idea that basic intelligence is relatively static while at the same time quite comprehensive. *Current intelligence,* on the other hand, is likely to be more volatile and of narrower scope, being confined to the elements of necessary information required to cope with the specific problem at hand. Nevertheless, current intelligence has to be viewed in the light of the ever present basic intelligence without which current information may lose its meaning or even take an erroneous meaning leading to incorrect deduction and decision. The dictionary mentioned above does not specifically define *current intelligence,* possibly because of its variable nature. Third among our fundamental divisions of the intelligence process is what we have called *estimative intelligence.* This is defined in the dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for Joint Usage (under the heading of "Intelligence Estimate of the Situation") as "an appraisal of the elements of intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy and, when appropriate, the sequence in which they may



THE CONSEQUENCE OF A FAILURE IN THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

USS *California* settles into the mud of Pearl Harbor following the Japanese surprise attack on 7 December 1941. To reduce the likelihood of a fantastically more devastating surprise attack in this day of nuclear weapons, the United States must maintain adequate intelligence agencies, which are appreciated and understood on the proper military and political levels, as part of a sound intelligence organization.

be adopted." This definition may be a little restrictive, but nevertheless it conveys correctly the idea that estimative intelligence is a deductive and interpretative process by which one derives useful meaning and portent from the basic and current intelligence available. It is in this aspect of the intelligence function that the commander's personal appraisal becomes essential to a sound estimate. And it is at this point in the intelligence process that the commander must be appraised of all of the essential elements of basic and current information that might affect his conclusion as to the significance of the intelligence he has caused to be gathered and presented to him.

Seven Essential Steps

Seven steps must be taken to provide for the details necessary to meet the five requirements. These are: collection, collation, evalution, analysis, synthesis, interpretation, and dissemination. Opinions may differ as to the order in which these seven steps should be stated, but there is general agreement that they are the essential steps in the fulfillment of the intelligence process. If any of them are slighted, the product may be affected adversely. They apply equally to any division of the intelligence effort. There would seem to be little need for detailed discussion of each of these steps. Yet, if one is to determine whether or not he is engaged in a duplicative or unnecessary effort, an examination of how he is performing these steps and what requirements they are fulfilling is about the only way in which he can tell whether or not he is wasting his time.

Taking *collection* first and referring to General Eisenhower's premise that "it is a basic function of command to initiate and co-ordinate the search for the necessary information," we recognize that the initiation and co-ordination of the collection effort is a vital element of the command function. Thus, if the commander is to have control over his destiny, he must exert a sufficient measure of control over the collection processes that fulfill his vital needs to insure the responsiveness of that process to those needs. Where that process supplies data for a *basic* intelligence effort, time may not be of high importance. However, where *current* intelligence is involved, time is usually of the very essence. Thus, responsiveness to command may not be satisfied if the commander has to rely upon people or resources not under his control to meet his essential requirements. Such a lack would amount to a derogation of command control and would amount to an imposition of responsibility without commensurate authority. The same is true of the estimate process. Since, however, the basic, current, and estimative divisions of the intelligence function are confluent parts and if indeed intelligence "constitutes a vital element of a commander's estimate of a situation leading to a decision," no commander would be justified in permitting any essential element of the intelligence function to escape from his direct control and thus from immediate responsiveness to his demands. These elements are included in the seven processes mentioned above of which perhaps the first, collection, is the most misunderstood. Without control over collection, a commander attempting to direct his intelligence effort would be hamstrung from the start.

Having mentioned collection as one of the essential processes of intelligence over which the commander must exercise at least general control and supervision, brief mention of the other six processes and what they are would seem to be in order so as to provide background for the discussion which will follow thereafter.

The collation process, which amounts to relating the known and unknown, follows close on the heels of, and is often concurrent with, collection. It leads to the evaluation process which is simply a sorting out of the likely from the unlikely as a result of the evidence derived from collation. At this point analysis begins in the form of development of a logical meaning of the data culled by the evaluation step. The analysis step, as the word implies, then provides a means of considering the separate parts of the data in relation to the whole problem on which the data bears. Thus, analysis leads to a synthesis of all that is known into a meaningful whole. This requires highly knowledgeable as well as skilled inductive and deductive reasoning and is the very guts of intelligence production. These two steps are usually performed concurrently by the same individuals. Yet they must be taken as separate steps and must be

susceptible of critical examination by others, particularly the commander concerned. All four of these steps, collation, evaluation, analysis, and synthesis are essentially staff functions performed on behalf of the commander by his staff to relieve him of a task which cannot be performed by him alone. Nevertheless, the commander *must* satisfy himself that these four processes are logically, intelligently, and thoroughly performed and that his own familiarity with the way in which they are performed is sufficient to enable him to discriminate between a sound and an unsound effort, and good and bad advice.

We then come to the interpretative process which is the distilled essence of all of the previous steps and should include the personal experience, knowledge, instinct, and judgment of the commander's broad experience and peculiar military genius as well as that of his staff. The cycle of the intelligence process is then finished by dissemination of the interpreted product to subordinate and lateral echelons for use in their own further plans and decisions.

Some Historic Examples

Commanders are not likely to be able to devote much personal time to the routine activity that produces the intelligence they need. This is particularly true in the production of basic intelligence, but they must assure themselves that such routine activity is taking place and that it is following the guide lines prescribed. They can do this only if the people performing these duties are under their direct control. If commanders are either unable or unwilling to give guidance and direction to all phases of intelligence process, there's no telling what the result may be. And when a commander does have to apply himself personally to the interpretative and estimative phase, he may well find that he lacks basic information essential to his own deductive processes. Consider for a moment the effect of this sort of situation on McClellan's conduct of the Peninsula Campaign in the Civil War. Although the people concerned were under his control, he apparently considered that the business of collecting, collating, evaluating, analyzing, and interpreting information was entirely a matter for his G-2 and all he need concern himself with was the end-product. Here is how John G. Burr in his book, *The Framework of Battle*, describes the result:

"From the time he [General McClellan] took command of the Army of the Potomac until he was removed after the battle of Antietam, he never failed to overestimate the strength of the Confederates facing him. When the famous Pinkerton, acting as Intelligence Officer, said Lee's Army consisted of 200,000 men, Little Mac never verified or questioned the estimate though other officers knew it was absurd; in actuality Lee's forces never exceeded 80,000 and, before Jackson joined, were fewer than 65,000."

Clearly, McClellan gave inadequate attention to his intelligence activities, and it cost his country dearly. Even the victorious Grant had his troubles with intelligence. His failure to see to it that sufficient knowledge was obtained of terrain ruined his plan at Chattanooga. Such a basic omission could hardly be less than an indication of careless intelligence planning for which the commander can no more escape the responsibility than he can its consequences.

Let's turn a few more of Burr's pages and consider the case of the Russians and Germans in the East Prussian Campaign of 1914.

"In 1914, the Russians and Germans faced each other in East Prussia and Poland. The Czarina was a German and the Russian Court was infested with German spies and sympathizers. Even in the Russian armies there were enemy agents in high position. As if that were not enough, at the start of the campaign the Russian High Command issued many orders and sent much information over its radio—in the clear.

"Naturally, information as to the size, composition and location of Rennenkampf's and Samsonov's armies poured into German headquarters. To be sure, von Prittwitz was leery of the stuff coming over the air from Russian headquarters, fearing it was a clever ruse; but the Hindenburg-Ludendorff-Hoffman team, knowing Russian carelessness, greeted it joyfully and used every bit of it."

In contrast to this consider the Russo-German situation in 1939:

"When the Germans made their pact with Russia in 1939 they expected once again to place their spies throughout Russia. But

Stalin had not forgotten 1914. Ever since he had become head of Russia, the Soviet leader had been busy rooting out foreign agents from his government and army. He had no intention of undoing that work, and the German visitors were carefully kept where they could learn and see nothing. I do not mean to say that the Nazis did not obtain a great deal of information on the front-line Soviet Armies. Undoubtedly they did. But they did not learn enough about the potential Russian strength back of those armies, and it was that potential strength which eventually frustrated them.

"Von Brauchitsch was able to smash the Polish communications so efficiently because he knew exactly where all the nerve centers were at all times. In France and Norway the Allied forces and movements were known in the greatest detail.

"Nothing escaped that net of [Nazi] spies and informers spread over all the countries of the world—except Russia. Stalin knew that the more completely he could blind his enemy the better chance he would have on the battlefield."

Aside from the excellence of Russian counter-intelligence, several points of interest stand out here. First of all is the fact that the intelligence policy of the Germans apparently made full provision for the gathering of information from *all sources.*

Next the *high commanding generals themselves* took the trouble to evaluate and interpret. And last, but by no means least, they acted upon what they considered the best information available. Operations and intelligence were closely allied. The policy directing one guided the other as well.

But let's have a look at what Burr says of another front of the 1914 war.

" . . . Von Moltke was surprised by the appearance of the B.E.F. [British Expeditionary Force] in Belgium. There was a physical as well as a psychological reason for that surprise. Shortly before World War I, British Intelligence picked up the threads of the German spy system in Great Britain. Very cautiously Scotland Yard and the War Office unraveled the skein, even locating the great majority of the Boche agents. But they didn't disturb them or give them any reason to be suspicious—until war was declared. Then the authorities pounced on the whole lot at the same time. German GHQ was blind for many months after that, so blind that no word of the movement of the B.E.F. to France ever reached von Moltke. He didn't know they were across the Channel until his IX and III Corps ran into them at Mons."

Here is a beautiful example of British understanding of the importance of integration in intelligence matters. It is a practical demonstration of the close relation between intelligence and counter-intelligence, as well as of the many exacting complexities of intelligence operations that require the most careful integration and guidance at the highest command levels in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. Here also is another demonstration of what lack of intelligence does.

This has its application in a peace as well as in a war period—a fact so often overlooked in American efforts.

Alexander the Great dared the seemingly impossible invasion of the sprawling Persian empire because his agents had told him how rotten inside it was; Elizabeth's England challenged haughty Spain because Sir Frances Walsingham's intelligence service (England's first national effort) was able to obtain conclusive evidence of the low state of readiness of the Armada; and George III lost the American colonies through underestimating the temper of the colonists.

Genghis Khan's was the predecessor of the Nazi method of war. The Mongol chieftain never attacked a nation until he had sent hundreds of agents as merchants, travelers, refugees to collect all available information and to spread morale-destroying rumors.

One would have thought that by World War I the modern captains of war would have learned the intelligence lesson. Some did, but many more did not, and it is to be regretted that an embarrassingly large number of the latter wore the uniform of the United States of America.

Benjamin Cain makes this passing comment with regard to World War I in a *Lecture of Intelligence Experiences During World War II* delivered on 10 December 1946 before a group of the top Allied leaders of World War II:

"By 1916 American employment of intelligence had been reduced to almost a negative

factor. About this time I had become a big shot, being newly promoted to Lance Corporal, I was appointed 'information soldier' for a machine gun unit. Such work was beneath the dignity of the officers and higher non-coms, so I got it!!"

But we were not the only ones to let ourselves fall into such a complacent, if not stupid, attitude. Shipley Thomas in *S-2 in Action* relates the following:

"From time immemorial until 1914 there were but two sources of intelligence of the enemy. These were 'Combat Intelligence' and 'Spies Within the Enemy's Lines.' Beginning with 1914, three additional sources became effective:

"1. Deep airplane reconnaissance.
2. Electrical and radio listening apparatus.
3. Artillery observation.

"The failure to secure and interpret combat intelligence was nowhere more strikingly apparent than in the entire German 1914 campaign. The seemingly disregard of what might have been learned of British and French movements in early September, 1914, and the failure to interpret these correctly, led to disastrous results.

"Von Moltke (nephew of the great von Moltke) and the whole German Army of 1914 suffered from the same basic failure to appreciate and use combat intelligence. In their long years of peace, combat intelligence had become a dead letter. Theory, dogma and schoolroom logic had become, as it usually does, the substitute for combat intelligence."

Of course, contact with the enemy usually brings better opportunities for the completion of the order of battle picture. In that connection Burr relates the following:

"On the stabilized Western Front in 1914–1918 both sides built up systems which located every unit of their opponents by number. In each headquarters was a map showing the location of each of the enemy divisions, which was so thorough that its efficiency was sometimes fantastic. At one time a U. S. Division was sent into the lines at night, as usual and with all precautions for secrecy, only to be greeted by a large sign over the German trenches: 'Welcome-Division!' At another part of the front in the early days of November 1918, an observation balloon with its basket loaded with high explosive and artistically arranged dummies was sent aloft to give the Boche airmen, who had been shooting down many of our gas bags a surprise. Not a German plane would go near it and finally another sign appeared over their trenches: 'Take that damn thing down.'

"Yet, even under those conditions, where Intelligence had every chance to obtain information, both sides succeeded in surprising the other by thorough camouflage and swift concentrations during the hours of darkness."

World War II Experience

One would have thought with the experience of previous wars and peaces behind us our concept of the role of intelligence between wars and in war would have improved by World War II. But it didn't.

Never in its short and turbulent history has the United States been faced with such a sudden and dismaying disaster as it beheld on the morning of 7 December 1941. And never with less excuse. All the lessons of history had been of no avail.

The Congressional *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, including the additional views of Mr. Keefe and the minority views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster concluded by the 79th Congress in July 1946, gives complete testimony of what happened and why. While this investigation had no great fault to find with the amount and quality of the information supplied (except as to reconnaissance) and stressed the need for unity of command, it did find that those in high authority failed to properly appreciate the intelligence at hand and failed to centralize authority as well as to make a clear-cut allocation of responsibility in intelligence matters. In other words, the high command failed to establish a sound intelligence policy. Why? Because it did not have a sound understanding of intelligence. Although both Army and Navy schools of high and low degree had long taught history as well as the fact that intelligence is a function of command, no effort had been made to insure that intelligence assumed its proper place in the staff divisions of command. Many commanding officers took an attitude similar to McClellan's in appointing an intelligence officer and then leaving the matter



THE SUPER-BATTLESHIP *YAMATO* ON HER DEATH RIDE OFF KYUSHU

Naval Intelligence in the Pacific during World War II from the Battle of Midway to the surrender of Japan was rarely perfect, to be sure, but can be rated "outstandingly good" and must be credited with saving thousands of lives and greatly speeding America's victory.

completely up to him from that point on.

In the Navy Department, at the time of Pearl Harbor, a minor feud between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the War Plans Division was being waged unchecked by higher authority. War Plans felt that it should collate and evaluate information and leave only the matter of gathering it to Intelligence. But Intelligence regarded such matters as properly its function. Meanwhile much time and effort that could have been better spent otherwise was wasted on this inter-office strife. In fact the argument wasn't settled until June of 1943, when the Combat Intelligence Division was established!

During this time, the then Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, was reliably reported to have stated that all he wanted of his intelligence organization was an estimate of what the enemy might be up to two weeks hence! Even with the war well joined and before we could see our way clear to victory, another important officer, the senior Army Air Commander in a certain theater, is said to have remarked to the effect that he had "never heard two intelligence officers agree on anything so he just disregarded them altogether!"

Undoubtedly we got better as we went along in World War II. The defeat of the Japanese at Midway was due as much to the Commander-in-Chief's personal understanding of the intelligence process and the application of his own judgment, intuition, and experience to it as it was to the intelligence available, which was pretty sketchy, notwithstanding many published accounts to the contrary.

Samuel Eliot Morison in Volume IV of his *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* states:

"As early as 20 May Admiral Nimitz issued an estimate of the enemy force that was accurate as far as it went—and even alarming. What he did not know was that Admiral Yamamato himself, in the super-battleship *Yamato* was to command the main body of the Combined Fleet, comprising three new and four old battleships, three light cruisers, a destroyer squadron and a light carrier, to operate between Midway and the Aleutians and cover both. Although the picture was not complete the composition, approximate routes and timetable of the enemy forces that immediately threatened Midway were so accurately

deduced that on 23 May Rear Admiral Bellinger, the naval air commander at Pearl, was able to predict the Japanese plan of attack on the Atoll. But for this early and abundant information and (what was equally important) the prompt and intelligent use of it, the Pacific Fleet would have had only a slim chance of winning."

In the early morning hours of 4 June 1942 contact was made and the battle was joined. As Morison puts it in the final paragraph of his chapter on "Midway Preliminaries":

"The battle was on. 'The whole course of the war in the Pacific may hinge on the developments of the next two or three days,' recorded the CinCPac analyst on receipt of this news. It did. The action about to be joined was one of the most decisive of the war."

Another fine example of command's understanding of the intelligence process is available in the Report of Operations of the U. S. First Army in Europe. The First Army estimate of German capabilities and intentions prior to the Battle of the Bulge is an excellent example of intelligence at its best and reflects credit on General Bradley's understanding in spite of the disregard shown by higher command in this case. The point is, however, that no matter how many successes are achieved, failures are both expensive and unnecessary. Why does one leader establish sound intelligence policies while another in the same Armed Forces does not? We cannot afford the luxury of leaders who do not understand the business of getting information of the enemy. We must be sure that our educational system for high command does not permit an officer to reach such command without having demonstrated a thorough understanding of intelligence. Confusion in these matters, such as illustrated by the following extract from Captain—now Rear Admiral (Ret.)—Ellis M. Zacharias's book, *Secret Missions*, must not be permitted to reign where the relationship of intelligence and command is clearly understood. This extract is from a quoted letter dated 3 February, 1942, from Colonel John W. Thomasson, Jr., USMC (then in ONI) to Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, USN:

"I would say . . . that our department resembles more than anything the outside edge of a cyclonic or whirling storm. Everything is being tossed about. King is superimposed on Stark having absorbed most of the latter's functions. . . .

"Wilkinson has ONI, the third Chief in a year and a half. . . . We are swollen enormously. Never was there such a haven for the ignorant and well-connected. As a matter of fact, ONI isn't bad so far as collecting information goes. But what good is information if it isn't used? Here the museum idea seems to prevail."

That this confusion was felt all along the line and that a lack of any intelligence policy was undermining the efforts of the information gathered is evidenced by this quotation from the same book:

"The intelligence organizations afloat and in the field failed to recognize the future planning value of intelligence picked up in their operations, and after culling the immediately usable tactical data from the material to which they obtained access in combat, they discarded the rest." As Admiral King had said, all they wanted to know was what the enemy might do a short time hence.

Another amazing feature of the behavior of some military leaders is their disregard of the most elementary security considerations. An example of this is to be found in publications by the United States of the famous Zimmerman notes of 1 March 1917. Why the Germans did not immediately realize that their diplomatic codes were being read is not known. Certainly the British must have felt a good deal of apprehension for a valuable source and no doubt took steps to see to it that what they might give us would be ready for publication. However, it is a dangerous precedent. More to the point was the disclosure of the Yamamato ambush in the recent war, not to mention the Pearl Harbor hearings.

Through it all, however, progress is beginning to show and ranks of the ignorant are thinning. But still not quite enough. George S. Pettee in *The Future of American Secret Intelligence* says:

"Unfortunately, we were far more consistent in recognizing the modern character of enemy intelligence than we were in appreciating the same facts for the management of our own intelligence work. The history of our own wartime intelligence methods is the

story of how this revolution was half-way carried out, but was hampered at all times by the lack of comprehension of the necessities imposed by new conditions. . . . Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the House Appropriations Committee on November 26, 1945, that up to the beginning of the war, the State Department's technique of gathering information differed only by reason of the typewriter and telegraph from the technique which John Quincy Adams was using in St. Petersburg and Benjamin Franklin was using in Paris! It's a poor excuse, however, to say that we are behind because we started late, unless we also try to catch up."

Pettee says elsewhere that what we must do is to " . . . recruit, discipline and arrange in functional order a number of human minds to the effect that the result of their combined work will approximate the result which would have been obtained by a single rational mind had the task been within the scope of a single rational mind."

That's all very well, but again it isn't enough. We must educate our military leaders to such a thorough understanding of intelligence and its relationship to command that they will establish sound intelligence policies as readily and easily as they establish disciplinary regulations for their men.

Today's Need and Cost

Where do we stand today in the era of "peace" since 1946? We have certainly learned a lot, it is true, but have we learned enough? The situation we face today is quite different from any that we have faced in the past. In fact, it is unique. To quote a 4 December 1959 Interim Staff Memorandum of the Sub-Committee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations:

"In the fourteen years since the end of World War II the traditional distinction between peace and war has been obliterated by a contest which knows no boundaries and no limits except those imposed on world communism by expediency. The competition is total—it is military, economic, scientific, diplomatic, cultural and moral."

This aptly describes that twilight zone some call "The Cold War." But call it what you will, it is not peace, and we may not apply to it the measures of peace and survive. Back of it lurks the not unlikely possibility of limited wars as a means the Communists may pursue (and have pursued) to gain advantage in this competition. And back of *that* lurks the ever present, deadly danger of an unlimited war which none may hope to survive.

In this milieu, accurate, timely information of what our potential enemies may be up to is vital. Indeed, because of our situation in the world, it is also essential to know what our friends and uncommitted nations can or may do to either strengthen or weaken our security in each of the three general situations we have, or may have, to face, namely, once again the present armed truce ("Cold War"), "Limited War," or "Unlimited War."

This is no time "to begrudge the outlay of an hundred ounces of silver" for information. Nor have we, yet. The legislation that established the CIA, the Department of Defense, and its reorganization of 1958 are evidence of this.

But these very institutions bring on a new danger to the intelligence process. That is the critical scrutiny of budgeteers of how much these consolidations and monoliths save in eliminating duplication in the intelligence process. They don't, and shouldn't, save anything. They should only increase its scope and accuracy. But because they all add people and requirements to the structure, they should, and do, cost more.

Careful consideration of the intelligence process described above must reveal the creation of a commensurate expansion in requirements with an expansion of the command structure. Why? Because each executive, whether military or civilian, responsible for advice, decision, or execution of military plans and policies *must* have sufficient control over the intelligence by which his advice, decision, or executive act stands or falls to insure to the best of his ability the soundness of his acts.

You may argue, for example, that since the reorganization of 1958 in the Department of Defense places operational control of the armed forces in the hands of the Secretary of Defense the military departments no longer need operational intelligence components. This is an appealing argument, but not a conclusive one. At the very least it pre-



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN 1948

The several organizational changes in the Armed Forces since World War II do not affect the basic requirements of the intelligence process nor alter the intelligence needs of command at each operational level.

supposes that the function of current intelligence must then be performed by the JCS. This would require that the Joint Staff acquire at least some of the resources now in the hands of the military departments for that purpose. Is this economical? No, and here's why. The SecDef through the JCS exercises operational control through unified commanders. They in turn exercise *their* operational control through component commanders who in their turn depend upon their parent military departments for support in intelligence matters. Thus, you might say that so long as Admiral Felt, CinCPac, needs Admiral Hopwood, CinCPacFlt, Admiral Hopwood needs the intelligence resources necessary to carry out effectively Admiral Felt's will. Admiral Hopwood can't turn over to Admiral Felt CinCPacFlt's intelligence resources and still expect them to be responsive to him. But Admiral Felt can, and does, expect Admiral Hopwood *and* his intelligence resources to be responsive to CinCPac because of his superior position of authority. And so on up and down the chain. So if you lengthen the chain, you expand the requirements at all levels. Some consolidation of the basic intelligence process can and has been achieved. More can be done. But such consolidation can't go beyond the point where the responsible commander can no longer judge the reliability of that process and obtain immediate, effective response from it.

It has been, and no doubt, will continue to be argued that "agreed intelligence" would eliminate the expanding requirement mentioned above and that this can be achieved through the CIA for the government as a whole and through the JCS mechanism for the Defense Establishment. In the writer's opinion "agreed intelligence" is not worth a plugged nickel unless such agreement is spontaneous and unanimous. Any other method of agreement in the intelligence business emasculates the interpretive step to a dangerous degree. Duplication here is a guarantee against concentration of stupidities and is to be encouraged. It is the commander who makes the decision, bears the responsibility for it. He should have all the facts. Only in this way will we achieve the strokes of genius necessary to save us from disaster. We should not begrudge the price. The cost of defeat today is irretrievable.

Thus, in examining our intelligence requirements today, we should ask this question:

Is the information needed as a basis for advice, decision or execution of decision for which adviser, decider, or executor bears full responsibility?

If so, that person must have the means of getting the information he needs when he needs it and of determining its validity. Before circumscribing his authority to do this, he, together with those who have assigned him his responsibilities, must examine the following questions with regard to his intelligence effort.

What part of it is:

a. Indispensable and non-duplicative?
b. Indispensable but duplicative?
c. Highly desirable and non-duplicative?
d. Highly desirable but duplicative?

After this examination and before withdrawing any resources, the authority who has assigned responsibilities should re-examine *those* once more to determine whether withdrawal of resources necessary to perform a duplicative task does not, in fact, circumscribe a necessary authority and therefore calls for a commensurate reduction in responsibility. It may be hard to find a superior willing to do *that*, but that he must do.

Means and Method

How is all this worked out today? To answer that, let's consider briefly the means by which responsibility is fixed. The duties of the President stem from the Constitution which, among other things, assigns to him the responsibility for over-all command of our armed forces. This responsibility is an appropriate portion of his over-all responsibilities as Chief Executive in which capacity he administers the laws passed by Congress. These laws entail an assignment of responsibilities sometimes directly from Congress to departments and agencies of the Executive Department as in the case of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, and the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Within this general framework of law and precedent, the Armed Forces are managed, with the buck for ultimate decision stopping at the President's desk.

Meanwhile, all up and down the line there exists an interlocking complex of responsibilities for advice, decision, and execution. The Director of Central Intelligence, for example, is the principal intelligence advisor to the National Security Council which advises the President. But the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are his principal military advisors, while the Secretary of State is his principal advisor on foreign affairs. Can we say that the DCI should stay out of military intelligence matters and the Secretary of Defense out of foreign political matters? If we consider again the above description of our present situation by the Senate Committee on Government Operations together with the responsibilities of the above officials, it becomes readily apparent that none of them can stay out of any field of intelligence without a change in their responsibilities. So the question becomes one of the degree to which any of these agencies can permit their intelligence needs to be met with resources outside their control. This same line of reasoning extends down through the chain of command.

Because the various departments and agencies engaged in intelligence activities pass to one another copies of their intelligence utterances and because these publications often report on identical items, wasteful duplication is said to be manifest. This just isn't so. Where the reporting is identical, you have agreed intelligence without a forced compromise in Committee. Where it differs, you have a better basis for interpretation. It is not simply a matter of the intelligence people taking in one another's washing. It is a matter of providing responsible officials with a means of interpreting the total available "take." In fact, it is one of the more desirable features of Joint Intelligence. The whole complex is somewhat like basic scientific research. The more you do of it and the greater the independence of thought that goes into it, the more likely you are to get the best product.

This does not mean we should have anarchy in the intelligence field. On the contrary, we should have disciplined control of the *direction* and degree of effort. This, unification can and does provide. Unification should not, however, attempt to force agreement or limit effort without altering responsibilities for advice, decision, and execution. Thus, the need for engaging in all five categories of intelligence at all levels should be viewed in the

light of the responsibilities vested at those levels. We cannot argue, for example, that the Air Force should provide the Navy with all air intelligence. The Navy has responsibilities which require that it know thoroughly what air threat exists to interfere with its ability to carry out its mission. It must have the means at its own disposal to know this or, like McClellan, it may find itself without the means of applying its own experience and know-how in naval matters to the processing of the information on which it must, perforce, act. The same is true of the Air Force, the Army, and so on.

Thus, it appears, everybody has to do at least a little bit of everything. No attempt has been made to show why the Navy, for example, needs political, scientific, and economic intelligence as well as intelligence on foreign navies. It is assumed that the reader will realize many of the factors which enter into the Navy's need to plan and run an establishment whose mission it is to insure U. S. freedom of the seas throughout the world. The factors that enter into sea power and its influence on history are not limited to a knowledge of opposing hardware. Nor can advice in naval matters be so limited. The same is true in varying degrees of the other branches of our Armed Forces. So, again, it becomes a question of degree.

Unification has brought about a means of determining degree and direction of intelligence effort in the Defense Establishment but not a means of reducing it.

The SecDef or the JCS as over-all command organs can remove responsibilities in military echelons below themselves, if those responsibilites are not otherwise stipulated by Congress. They can thus alter intelligence requirements of subordinate commanders. But when they do so, they may not be able to alter the requirement, per se. They can exercise command and control over the efforts of their subordinates, who in their turn can do likewise, and thus concentrate intelligence efforts. The subordinate can depend on the superior, and he can compel the subordinate, but neither has control of lateral efforts. Therefore the SecDef or JCS can concentrate or diversify the intelligence effort in the Defense Establishment as they see fit, so long as they do not circumscribe statutory responsibilities assigned to the military departments. These statutory provisions require almost as much in the way of intelligence production as do Joint Intelligence requirements. Therefore, the military departments must necessarily engage in estimative intelligence production adequate to meet responsibilities imposed by Congress. This includes at least a Staff and a Support Intelligence Requirements which must be met. It follows then that the additional requirements subject to change by the SecDef are in the field of Command, Joint, and Combined Intelligence Requirements. These interlock so closely with the Staff and Support Requirement that much of the basic, current, and estimative process necessary to fulfill one also fulfills the other, and little or nothing would be saved by the shift of responsibilities necessary to reduce the Command, Joint, and Combined Requirement at the military department level and below. In effect then, one must conclude that the intelligence *process* is essentially the same for all levels of command and control. The real point of difference is the use to which the intelligence is to be put. This is what generates the divergencies we have termed the basic, current, and estimative divisions. Any of these can metamorphose into the other and often do. Time is one of the key factors in that metamorphosis and is the ingredient that usually changes basic intelligence into current intelligence. Although the basic and current processes usually differ materially from the estimative process there are types of information of such high validity and broad scope as to become estimates almost at the point of collection.

Common-user systems are dangerous because they lack the element of responsiveness gained through authoritative control. They seldom are able to meet all demands at once and hence are more suitable to service functions (like cafeterias) where time and authoritative control may not be so important. We have agreed that intelligence is a command function. Time and authoritative control may be of the essence in performing that function. Like reading the neighbor's newspaper—it's all right, if you don't need it first.

It is impossible to excise or circumscribe one portion of the intelligence process with-

out affecting another at some, perhaps critical, time. Unification can do little to improve this situation and by trying can only complicate and obfuscate an already complex and difficult problem.

In Conclusion

To sum up, the following propositions are postulated:

a. In order to plan a military establishment capable of acting as an effective instrument of national policy, it is necessary to know the capabilities and intentions of foreign nations, enemy, or friendly, to threaten or strengthen the security of our country in peace, cold war, limited war, or general war.

b. The availability of timely and accurate information in response to the above stated requirement is a *sine qua non* for good advice, sound decision, and effective execution in the management of military forces.

c. Such dependence on intelligence is a vital aspect of responsibility in the employment of armed forces whether in active warfare, achieving a satisfactory state of readiness for warfare, or in using armed forces as strategic instruments of policy in any of the conditions mentioned in "a." above.

d. Information from widely varied sources and on widely varied topics may be relevant.

e. Responsibility must be accompanied by a commensurate degree of authority and resources.

f. Each branch and arm of the Armed Services has special responsibilities and technical considerations peculiar to it alone and these impose an additional and separate requirement for intelligence.

From the above we can conclude that adequate intelligence and positive control over the resources that provide it are essential elements of effective management of the military departments at all levels.

This being so, it is vital that we know as much as possible of the capabilities and *intentions* of any potential enemy throughout the years of peace. We cannot afford the luxury of being surprised in the next war. We must know whether, when, and where a blow is coming, or else our chances of being able to roll with the punch are nil and the likelihood of being able to retaliate at all recedes in prospect. The question of "whether" is a most important one from the economic viewpoint and is usually deducible from a study of basic capabilities.

These circumstances set for us a difficult obstacle but not an insurmountable one. If we establish and nourish adequate intelligence organizations with a sound policy and real backing to support them, there is no reason why we may not expect to know within reasonable limits of accuracy from whence danger may come, where, and when it is most likely to strike, and the expected power of the blow.

We are already on the road to such an organization. *We must not falter now* (as we often have in the past). We must listen to that old Chinaman and begrudge nothing in the way of "honors and emoluments" to insure the nation against surprise.

We can achieve success in this program only if our leaders, political as well as military, steadfastly continue to maintain a sound intelligence policy behind vigorous intelligence organizations.

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". . . we may accept it as a principle, that our navy will be strong enough, when it is stronger than the enemy, and not before."

Commander BRADLEY A. FISKE, USN——1905