

NOT REPRODUCED
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WASHINGTON POST
 19 January 1986

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

DIA Deficiencies

Adm. Stansfield Turner was right on target in his comment on the deficiencies in the Defense Intelligence Agency ["The Pentagon's Intelligence Mess," Outlook, Jan. 12]. He stated, "Often the DIA simply defaulted to the services." In my own experience it may have gone further than that: it often appeared that some senior officers in the DIA actively sided with the service views to ensure that the DIA did not assume a strong role in intelligence and counterintelligence.

As an early civilian employee of the DIA engaged in initial planning for a DIA counterintelligence mission, I soon became aware that the process was indeed one of constant retreat in the face of service objections to the assumption by the DIA of any substantial mission or authority. It was finally agreed that the DIA would not engage in counterintelligence operations or collection activities. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was not happy with this decision, and he ordered DIA to take over all counterintelligence operations from the services. This met with vehement service and opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who finally succeeded in scuttling Mr. McNamara's order.

As a consequence, counterintelligence remains fragmented among the services. This is largely responsible for many of the deficiencies, particularly in counterespionage, that are now the focus of much criticism in Congress and elsewhere.

The problem is not differing views of the threat; the need still is to centralize these functions in the interest of efficiency, economy and, above all, effectiveness to deal with espionage aimed at the United States. As Adm. Turner said, "It's time to put the DIA back on the track McNamara intended by making it the center of the Pentagon intelligence process." In fact the time is long past.

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FILE ONLYGAINESVILLE TIMES (GA)
14 January 1986

Expert says 'bad assumption' by CIA led to 1978 Iranian hostage incident

By ALAN HOPE
of The Times

A "bad assumption" by the CIA in 1978 was partially responsible for the taking of American hostages in Iran, says the former head of the agency at that time.

Former CIA director Admiral Stansfield Turner, speaking at Young Harris College last night as part of the institution's Centennial celebration, offered some insight into the days leading up to the hostage-taking incident that was partially responsible for the downfall of former President Jimmy Carter, who appointed Turner in 1977.

In the intelligence business, Turner said, there "seldom is any piece of intelligence that is conclusive in itself."

"It was pretty clear in the summer of 1978 that the Shah of Iran was in a lot of trouble. There were dissident elements in the clergy and in the

business and political community," Turner said.

"But we made an assumption in the CIA. Here was a powerful leader with a large army, strong police force and intelligence," he said.

And Turner said he, as well as others in the agency, believed that although there might be "blood in the streets," any uprising would be crushed.

"When the time came, we believed (the Shah) would step in with all that power and knock these dissident elements down."

"As we all know, that was a bad assumption," Turner said.

To this day, he said, it is not known why the Shah didn't take action. "Maybe he was out of touch with what was going on in his country. Or he could secretly have been advised he was a dying man, and he couldn't face the difficult decision that would

lead to blood in the streets."

The CIA is a "risk-taking business, you are going to win some and lose some."

Turner said he believes the same situation is brewing in the Philippines.

"It's another Iranian bombshell," he said. And because of the communist influence in that country it will remain for some time, the former director said.

Turner said he will soon publish an article that will say, "For heaven sakes, let's get our (military) bases out of there."

The bases are only causing political problems for the U.S., and "whoever is in power (in the Philippines) will use those bases to help keep them in power."

Although costly, Turner said, the military needs in that area could be met by other means.

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WASHINGTON POST
10 January 1986*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

Trouble Stalks the NSC

Adm. John Poindexter's unannounced choice to fill a key National Security Council job has met resistance both inside and outside the White House, a mini-revolt that suggests new difficulties for President Reagan's troubled NSC staff.

The admiral's decision to elevate his longtime Navy friend, Rodney McDaniel, to the job of NSC executive secretary is the leading edge of new problems besetting the once-potent national security staff. The root of grievances about McDaniel's appointment is not his ability but his close relationship with retired Adm. Stansfield Turner, President Jimmy Carter's CIA director, whose opposition to covert operations was an issue in Reagan's 1980 campaign.

That Poindexter's first major staff decision is in trouble has raised concern that his lack of political experi-

ence may cost him dearly in dealing with the bureaucracy and Congress.

Poindexter sought Pentagon approval in 1984 to have McDaniel, then a Navy captain, routinely assigned to the NSC staff. White House sources told us that Navy Secretary John Lehman refused, not on grounds of McDaniel's competence but because of his long and close relationship with Turner, whom he had served as executive secretary.

Poindexter refused to accept Lehman's "no." He persuaded McDaniel to retire from the Navy and join the NSC staff as a civilian. His work there as chief planner for crisis management has been exemplary.

But Reaganites are far more alarmed over the implications of the new job Poindexter has in store for McDaniel. As NSC executive secretary, and deputy assistant to the

president, he would become No. 3 after Poindexter and chief deputy Donald Fortier. That would give him Oval Office access, control of the NSC paper flow, influence over hiring and firing and major policy input.

Poindexter himself is viewed by Reaganites as a staunch conservative, but one who is singularly devoid of his boss' strong ideological convictions. He has been unmoved by alarm bells sounded by some of his own staffers about implications of the McDaniel appointment.

A firm working relationship with the Pentagon is clearly imperative for any well-functioning national security staff. Bitter disputes between the Defense and State departments over SALT II, technology transfers, regional conflicts and covert operations can be mediated only by an NSC staff that is respected and feared.

Poindexter's own allies warn him that any taint of what they call "Turnerism" in Rod McDaniel could undermine the national security staff's political clout, rendering the president less protected from parochial bureaucrats.

That argument is being quietly reinforced inside the White House by the presence of another Turner protege as chief of staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Retired Navy captain Bernard F. McMahon, appointed a year ago when Sen. David Durenberger (R-Minn.) became committee chairman, has made no secret of his strong opposition to covert operations.

Reaganite critics are claiming that McDaniel's appointment would strengthen forces across the board that oppose all clandestine aid. Moreover, they believe that Reagan right now is planning such sub rosa operations against Libya.

Longtime specialists with no ax to grind have advised Poindexter that what he needs more than a controversial executive secretary is a top-flight operations officer—a tough staff man to do for him what he successfully did for Bud McFarlane. "John Poindexter needs a John Poindexter," one longtime NSC staffer who recently resigned told us; he needs time to move out of the NSC cocoon that contained him during the McFarlane era and into the rough world of congressional politics, bureaucratic feuding and media vantage points.

If, instead of heading toward that sensible goal, Poindexter appoints his controversial colleague as executive assistant, he may be moving himself in the opposite direction.

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December 1985-January 1986

CHIEF OF Spies

When President Carter nominated Admiral Stansfield Turner to direct the Central Intelligence Agency in 1977, the Washington experts thought they had the career officer figured out. Sure, they conceded, he was bright, sophisticated, polished. And yes, they went on to agree, he certainly *looked* the part.

But was he tough enough? Some questioned whether he possessed the qualities to tame an agency that had been under fire in the press and investigated by Congress for illegal activities. Rather than run the "rogue elephant," as the agency had come to be known, it would run him, critics feared. He was, they contended, too nice. "[He] is not Billy Mitchell," the *New Republic* lamented. "For his many strengths, he remains very much a man of the system."

The *New Republic* needn't have worried. Army Brigadier General Billy Mitchell always had been one of Turner's heroes. Like Mitchell—who was court-martialed in 1925 for championing the cause of air power in heretical ways—Turner also relished dissenting from conventional military viewpoints.

Moreover, as part of the team assembled by Admiral Elmo (Bud) Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 through 1974, he helped the contentious Zumwalt modernize an aging, tradition-bound—and often resistant—Navy. Along the way, Zumwalt dubbed Turner his "resident S.O.B.," his devil's advocate.

As CIA director, Turner remained in character. Rather than function as just another figurehead, a trap into which some directors reportedly had fallen, Turner did what few people expected: *He* turned out to be the maverick.

For example, he reasserted the director's authority over the so-called "old boy" network that long had dominated the agency. Consisting of the top men of the CIA's three major operational branches—espionage, analysis and technical development and operation—that network functioned very nearly as a closed and independent fiefdom, apparently resisting all outside interference. Including, incidentally, that of the CIA director himself.

All of that changed under Turner. During the ensuing four years, he reinstated, on a limited basis, "covert"-type intelligence operations (an activity that had fallen into disuse), took steps to open up the agency to greater Congressional oversight, increased the role of technology in spying, and, in one abrupt and fiercely criticized stroke, slashed 820 job slots from the agency's espionage branch.

Such moves embittered a sizable portion of the intelligence work force. One ex-CIA man, John K. Greaney, likens Turner to a "Captain Queeg type" who was suspicious of the more experienced agency employees and ignored their advice. "He thought they were out to torpedo his ship," says Greaney, now executive director of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), a group of 3,200 ex-intelligence personnel. "The trouble with Turner," he adds, "is that he was an outsider who just didn't understand the workings of the intelligence community."

Nonsense, retorts Turner. Precisely because he was an outsider, he maintains, he often was better able to perceive the need for change in intelligence operations than entrenched agency veterans. "The 'old

boys' tried to create a mystique around the idea of intelligence," he says, "and give the impression that only they could understand it. But it isn't that hard for an outsider to grasp."

By this time, you would think, the unseemly tussle between Admiral Turner and the old boys of the CIA would be ancient history. Not so. Five years after leaving "the company," as the CIA is amiably known in Washington, Turner remains embattled. Not as a top government official, but this time as a writer, lecturer and, most particularly, as a critic of America's current intelligence and military policies.

At 62, an age when most retired admirals are easing into lives of comfortable obscurity, Turner once again is departing from the usual pattern.

Still the outsider, and still the quintessential maverick, he very nearly is turning iconoclasm into a third career. For example, early in 1985 he published his first book, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (304 pages, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, \$16.95). The book reflects Turner's worry that the agency he believes he helped reform and modernize in the late 1970s is backsliding—returning to the controversial ways that got it into trouble with Congress.

Gadfly though he may be, he is also, as the *New Republic* was at least partly right to suggest, a man of the system. If he were not, Turner probably would not be found sitting, along with many other retired admirals and generals, on the boards of giant corporations. Turner, for example, is a member of the board of directors of such firms as the Monsanto Chemical Company, the

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National Life Insurance of Vermont and the Times Fiber Communication Inc.

But that's where the stereotype ends. Unlike many of his retired colleagues, who seem to combine board activity with little more than leisure-time pursuits, Turner remains fascinated with public issues and, indeed, the entire world of political action. "To rusticate and not make a contribution would be terribly frustrating," he tells a visitor. "I think I'd die."

To discuss his activities and goals, Turner recently invited MODERN MATURITY to his three-story, luxury townhouse in Washington's Virginia suburbs, which he shares with his second wife, Karin, whom he married early in 1985.

Located just a short drive from CIA headquarters in McLean, Virginia, and about 10 miles from downtown Washington, the spacious townhouse is where Turner now works and relaxes.

In contrast with the demanding, sharp-tongued perfectionist described by at least some former subordinates, Turner is engaging and courtly. While he *does* have a tendency to lecture, he clearly enjoys conversation, and he discusses his ideas openly and enthusiastically. Almost uninhibitedly. He puts no subject "off limits," and he sets no restrictions for use of quotes.

Although his full head of hair continues to whiten, he shows few signs of age and, in fact, still maintains a distinct military bearing. He stays trim by swimming, hiking and playing tennis. A Christian Scientist who takes his religion seriously, he neither smokes nor drinks. He relaxes by reading ("voraciously," says a colleague) and, when he has the time, socializing with old friends.

But Turner seems to draw his main pleasure from the interplay of ideas and the give-and-take of public life. His need for such activity became clear shortly after Jimmy Carter relinquished the Presidency to Ronald Reagan in January 1981. Turner and his first wife, Patricia,

then spent two winters in Sedona, Arizona, a quiet town of 9,000 about 100 miles from Phoenix. Mrs. Turner found the peaceful community to her liking after the traumas of Washington and wanted to stay. Turner didn't.

"Sedona's a wonderful town—great for a vacation—but it's not the sort of place where you can lead the kind of life that I want to lead," he says. The Turners' 31-year marriage ended in divorce in 1984.

"I think there's a lesson here for older people," he suggests. "Yes, it's nice to retire, particularly to retire gradually from the pressures and total preoccupation with business that some people seem to have." At the same time, he admonishes, an individual must maintain some ambition and desire to go on contributing.

"If life is just a matter of eating three meals a day, going to the movies and enjoying life, well, I can't do that," he says. "That's too selfish for me. I think you've got to do something worthwhile."

For Turner, that means bringing to bear on the burning issues of the day the unique perspective he believes he acquired as an admiral and as CIA director. "I'm grateful to this country," he explains. "It's given me marvelous opportunities to serve in ways that have been exciting, thrilling and expanding. And now I want to plough back into the country's reservoir of information some of the lessons I've learned."

The lessons that Turner is initially concerned with involve the CIA. *Secrecy and Democracy* chronicles the extent to which the nature of intelligence activity changed during the years of the Carter Administration. It also explores the dilemmas posed by an agency like the CIA in a democratic society. Turner believes that secrecy can be reconciled with democracy, but he is alarmed by the direction the CIA is taking under his successor, William Casey.

According to Turner, Casey has given covert-type operations an "exaggerated" role. As a case in point, he cites the much-publicized "co-

vert" campaign against Nicaragua—an operation that, he charges, has degenerated into a public spectacle.

Turner also cites the March 1985, car-bombing in Beirut that killed more than 80 people—an act that was traced to individuals who turned out to be backed by the CIA. While he carefully notes that the CIA didn't order the bombing, Turner points out that the car-bombers nevertheless had been supported by the agency. "This opens us up to the accusation that we're supporting terrorism" he argues. "What we've done is exactly what we've condemned the Iranians for doing. This is a disgrace to the country, and to the CIA."

Such activities, Turner contends, reflect a disregard for Congressional oversight, and run the risk of making the agency the focus of the kind of public criticism that debilitated it in the mid-1970s.

Not everyone agrees. In fact, most experts and Congressional sources interviewed for this story believe the oversight process is working. Moreover, they say the impetus for covert action derives from the White House, and they go on to point out that there's no evidence the CIA is acting without Presidential approval.

"Stan is correct in raising a cautionary signal," says former CIA Director William Colby. But Colby doubts that the agency is slipping out of control. "Covert action is a policy thing that comes from the Administration. If the Administration wants to do it, then the CIA is going to do it." The fact of the matter, he adds, is that the Carter Administration didn't really want to do much covert action while the Reagan Administration does.

Lawmakers see little cause for alarm. "There have been times during the past four or five years when people from the CIA weren't as forthcoming as they should have been, especially with regard to activities in Central America," says Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), a

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former chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "But when those activities were noted, the Congress, especially the Senate, responded rather violently. So to suggest that the committee isn't carrying out its oversight functions wouldn't be completely correct."

Whoever is right about the CIA, there is one thing that nearly all observers are agreed upon: Turner bears little resemblance to the bland and somewhat amiable conformist that he was thought to be by some back in 1977. His prickly independence is now taken for granted. But Turner insists his independent-mindedness is nothing new, and he traces it back to his parents and specific academic experiences he had first at Amherst College and later at Oxford University, where in 1950, as a Rhodes scholar, he earned his master's in philosophy, politics and economics.

Turner says he was particularly influenced by his father, Oliver Stansfield Turner, who came to the U.S. in 1909 at age 10 from Ramsbottom, Lancashire, England. Oliver later became successful in the real estate business. Turner recalls that he was especially impressed by the feistiness and independent spirit displayed by his father when he once quit his job on the spot because he didn't like the size of an annual bonus. (He quickly found a better job.)

Raised in the staunchly Republican community of Highland Park, Illinois, Turner says his parents were Republicans who voted for Herbert Hoover in both 1928 and 1932. But in 1936, he remembers, his parents did the unthinkable: voted to give Franklin D. Roosevelt a second Presidential term. "They weren't ostracized, but they were certainly out of step in that community," says Turner, who is a Democrat. "What impressed me is that they were willing to judge issues on the merits rather than accept a set pattern."

After two years at Amherst College, in which he had enrolled in 1941, Turner transferred to the U.S. Naval Academy, where he made his mark as an outstanding student and

left guard on the football squad. He and Jimmy Carter were in the same class at Annapolis, but according to the former President, they did not know each other. "He was so far ahead of us," Carter once told his Cabinet, "that we never considered him competition, or even a peer." (Turner finished 25th in a class of 820, while Carter ranked 59th.)

Just out of Annapolis, Turner spent a year aboard a cruiser, then went to Oxford. He says he particularly relished the work he did in philosophy because of its emphasis on reasoning. "You'd sit down with your professor in a one-on-one situation and have to justify your opinions," he remembers. "It was a marvelous experience. So when I look at some of these issues today, I believe I do so a little more logically and objectively than I would have otherwise."

Turner rose gradually through the naval grades. He earned a Bronze Star and other service decorations in the Korean War. Between commands at sea he had assignments in Washington. Along the way he encountered the reform-minded Zumwalt, and the two hit it off. "Zumwalt was sort of the inspiration for the maverick, logical-thinking young naval officer," says Turner. "We looked up to him as a person who could think and be different and still get ahead."

When Zumwalt in 1970 became Chief of Naval Operations, he looked to Turner for help. "He gave me an absolutely unbelievable job," recalls Turner. "He turned to me and said, 'Turner, you've got 60 days and I want you to write a plan for the Navy.'" The plan that Turner eventually submitted led the Navy at the time to put more emphasis on "sea control"—the ability to control sea lanes during times of emergency—and somewhat less on its tendency to build large carriers and ships aimed at projecting military power inland. Controlling sea lanes had been neglected, he says.

As Turner is the first to admit, Zumwalt accelerated his advancement. In 1970 he assumed command

of a carrier task group of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Not long afterwards, Zumwalt arranged for Turner's promotion to vice admiral and assigned him to be president of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

With his customary independent-mindedness, Turner promptly dispensed with uniforms at the college, revised the curriculum to increase, for example, the reading requirements, beginning with Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, and called for examinations in strategy and tactics. Military observers credit him with helping transform the college from a leisure-oriented reprieve from sea duty into a truly rigorous institution.

"Turner made a really important contribution to the intellectual life of the armed forces," says James Nathan, professor of political science at the University of Delaware. "The kind of structure he gave to the institution allowed people to think more about the political uses of naval power."

Successful as he was, Turner by the summer of 1976 felt his Navy career had stalled. With Zumwalt no longer naval chief, he says, the Navy was starting to turn back the clock as "old-line" Navy men returned to prominence. Although he had been promoted to full admiral, and sent to Naples, Italy, as Commander of the Southern Flank for NATO, he felt relegated to the Navy's periphery. The NATO job, he notes, was out of the Navy's mainstream. "Because I had been a maverick," he explains, "I thought I was being pushed to one side."

Turner considered quitting. "I stayed in the Navy not because of an overwhelming desire to be a naval officer, or because of a plan or vision," he confides. "I had made a rule that I would stay only so long as the next job was more challenging than the last. If I peaked out, then I would drop out, and do something else."

Then Jimmy Carter, with whom he had remained acquainted, re-

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ceived the Democratic nomination for President. Turner decided to defer any decision on his own career until after the election. "So I sort of stumbled along from decision point to decision point," he says.

In the end, he was glad he waited. Carter summoned Turner to Washington after his first choice for the CIA job, Theodore Sorensen, a speech writer and White House aide to President Kennedy, ran into opposition from foreign policy hardliners. Although he hoped the President would offer him the Navy's top job, the post that Zumwalt had occupied, Turner accepted the CIA position. He was quickly and easily confirmed by the Senate.

Carter granted his new CIA chief unusual authority. For example, in addition to direct control over the CIA, he gave Turner budget control over all of the country's intelligence agencies.

But no sooner did Turner assume command than he noticed a gap between his official power and the way things actually worked. "When the first annual budget came to me for approval, everything had been decided," he writes in his book. "The three branches expected me to rubber stamp what they wanted."

Shortly afterwards, Turner's deputy, Frank Carlucci, compared the director's office with the control room of a power plant—except that all the switches were disconnected. The situation wasn't one that Turner could abide, and very quickly he started reasserting the director's authority and taking the steps that made his four-year reign such a controversial one.

Of all the actions taken by Turner, none stirred greater rancor than the so-called "Halloween Massacre"—his decision to eliminate 820 job slots from the espionage branch over two years. The step proved troubling in two ways. It seemed to lend credence to a view of Turner as a little ruthless, and it fostered the impression

that he emphasized technology at the expense of human agents.

"That's the usual charge against Turner and it's all wrong," says former CIA director Colby. "Along with new technology, he also put in human intelligence."

Turner believes the incident has been blown out of proportion. Although 820 positions were eliminated, he swears that only 17 people were actually fired, while another 147 were forced into early retirement (the other cuts occurred by attrition). While he concedes the dismissals could have been handled more sensitively, he insists the action had to be taken.

Not only was the CIA swollen with excess personnel, he says, but many of the individuals affected had an obsolete view of their craft. "I think there's a lesson here for older persons, in that a lot of these people hadn't changed with the times," says Turner. "Some of the more veteran employees wanted to run intelligence the way it was run back in the days of World War II"—when the CIA's predecessor agency, the Office of Strategic Services, had leeway to do just about anything it wanted. "Intelligence had changed over the years but these people hadn't."

Turner isn't spending all of his time now re-fighting old campaigns. He's moving on to new ones. For example, he doesn't like the way military decisions are made in the U.S. He feels planners are preoccupied with the Congressional budgetary process and give short-shrift to overall strategy—an approach that, he fears, is leading to distortions in spending and gaps in our security. The book he is now writing about the problem undoubtedly will raise hackles, but he is unfazed by the prospect.

Says Turner: "I would not be myself if I didn't enjoy these battles." ■

PLANTING SEEDS OF FREEDOM

Democracy may be less a choice that societies make than the result of a very limited variety of circumstances and histories. If this is so, one consequence is that the number of democracies in the world, and their resilience, is not likely to increase greatly. Another consequence is that the longtime grievance against American foreign policy—that the U.S. reflexively allies itself with undemocratic regimes and movements in parts of the world not yet at home with modernity or constitutionalism—loses much of its moral force. For if arbitrary rule is the destiny of the billions of people born outside the ambit of John Locke, then the character of our ties to other states may be judged primarily by the standards of *realpolitik*.

Those who reject the standards of *realpolitik* as callous and counter-historical must have a theory of how the great transformation can take place from governments that disregard the rights and trample the liberties of their people to governments that respect them. How does it happen?

Before 1917 and since, it has been thought by many millions of militants, and by more timid folk too, that revolution would do the trick. But in most countries that have experienced revolution, the result has been the increasing immiseration of the populace and its submission to forms of domination that are often more brutal, and only occasionally more subtle. The spark ignited by Lenin in Russia 70 years ago, therefore, no longer glows so brightly. The fires that spread from it have consumed too many lives and too much hope. The moral cachet of revolution hasn't survived the conflagration, at least among people who have seen it up close. This is the meaning of Solidarity, and of Charta 77, and indeed of the whole incandescently non-violent underground in Central and Eastern Europe.

But from afar, the prospect of salvation by fire still has its enthusiasts. Thus the El Salvador guerrilla movement recently proclaimed itself to be what any astute observer already knew it was, a Marxist-Leninist vanguard. Given the bloody histories of such vanguards, this is uncommon fair warning. More often these days, the agrarian reformer disguise is not shed until the rebels sit in the seats of the mighty. By then it is too late; a Democratic future is all but foreclosed.

Of course the struggle for democracy must still be waged against traditional privilege, as well as against the mesmerizing delusions of revolution. But democrats are always at a disadvantage when they compete with the ruthless. That is one reason why indigenous democratic forces are justified in expecting more than mere hand-wringing and moral support from mature democratic societies. They are entitled to concrete assistance. The United States succored the revival of democracy in postwar Europe and presided over its very creation in postwar Japan. Surely we should not be indifferent to the ordeal of struggling democrats around the world today.

The National Endowment for Democracy, a government-funded independent foundation, is an appropriate vehicle for solidarity with precisely such democrats who need help. It is an instrument of practical justice. The existence of NED does not preclude similar voluntary efforts by the vast networks of voluntary associations so characteristic of our democracy. What American churches are doing in South Africa is very similar to the mission envisioned by the legislation establishing the Endowment. But great public goals are never fulfilled solely by private action. Those who rightly criticize President Reagan's instinct to "privatize" every public purpose in the domestic arena seem worse than silly—and perhaps even insincere—when they argue that public solidarity with struggling democrats in the international arena should not be expressed in public acts or with public funds. Such abnegation would help only the dictatorships. The democrats of Spain and Portugal, once right-wing authoritarian regimes that are now full members of the brotherhood of democratic states, know just how important U.S. government assistance was in keeping them alive during the Franco and Salazar years. That assistance was directed to them by the CIA—yes, the CIA. And these were precisely the people who steered their countries away from the habits of fascism and the temptations of communism, into the constitutional mainstream of Western Europe. NED hopes that its support will sustain similar circles of democrats and their democratic activities in countries where the future has not yet been settled.

If you scrutinize any public or private bureaucracy, you are likely to find that it has made some mistakes. This is particularly so with a new agency. It turned out, for example, that the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute, using NED funds, has appropriated large sums to two French organizations, one of which has a shadowy history dating back to the *pieds noirs* of French Algeria. Reasonable questions might be raised about why U.S. money should be spent in vibrantly democratic France at all; there are also reasonable justifications for doing so. In any case, these particular errors, if errors they were, resulted from the initial legislation that gave NED little direct control over the congressionally mandated appropriations to the FTUI. In the new legislation continuing NED funding, this structural flaw has been corrected. (The flaw that puts arms of the Democratic and Republican parties into the decision-making process has not been corrected.)

By focusing on the French cases, however, critics tried to put into question the entire enterprise. This is fair neither to FTUI nor to NED. A few idiosyncratic connections notwithstanding, the historic role of the American trade union movement in bolstering trade unionism and democratic values internationally—and especially in the Third World, where a special sensitivity to the peasant sensibility

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ity was required—is nothing less than exhilarating.

NED has been functioning for a bit more than two years. It has assisted democrats in the Communist world and those driven into exile from it. The proportion of funds expended in such work has been small. In fact, the great burden of its funded activities has been in the less developed countries where false clichés have the U.S. collaborating against social and political change. Here the very idea of pluralist institutions must seem like something of a dream. But encouraging the critical habits of the press or the adversary stance of lawyers is just the kind of encouragement these societies need if freedom is to have a chance. Often NED supports democratic developments in countries whose governments, hardly unfriendly to the U.S., would prefer not to see democracy developing at all. This is essential to NED's purpose. This is the case now in the Philippines, where fully ten percent of NED's money is going. It is also the case in Paraguay, Chile, South Africa, and other countries where it takes bravery to want social and political change. To match the bravery of the kind of people we should want to help, NED may have to be more daring than public agencies are prone to be.

In Guatemala, NED aid was critical in mobilizing the population for the recent election, which has given that country its first hope in decades of ending the reign of terror. The election won't guarantee that democracy will flourish. But it has emboldened vast numbers of people, across the rigid stratifications of a poor and frightened polity, to believe that there is another way to live.

Such emboldening is the absolute precondition for democratic change. Without NED, the U.S. has no way to embolden the hopeless except with empty rhetoric or with guns.