CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONIT
28 October 1985

Spy wars: a year of discontent

By Warren Richey
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Soviet efforts to unleash a new breed of smooth-mannered, sophisticated Russian spies in the West may be backfiring.

This assessment by former US intelligence officials comes following an unprecedentedly large number of arrests, defections, and countermoves this year among spies on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

In the United States:

- John A. Walker is expected to plead guilty in a Baltimore federal district court today to charges that he masterminded a four-man US Navy spy ring for the Soviets. Included in the plea arrangement is a purported understanding that Walker will detail the extent of his alleged 20-years of spying in exchange for leniency for his son, Michael, who is also expected to plead guilty to espionage charges.
- In Los Angeles, Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Richard W. Miller is on trial on charges that he passed counterintelligence secrets to the Soviets.
- Edward L. Howard, a former Central Intelligence Agency employee, last month apparently fled the US amid allegations that he told the Soviets the identity of a key US undercover informant in Moscow.

The Americans have clearly not been alone in taking casualties. The Soviet Union is said by experts to be reeling as a result of the recent defections of three well-placed Soviet intelligence officers.

"We have had to cope with a small hail storm and the Soviets have had to deal with an earthquake measuring 7 on the Richter scale," says George Carver, a former senior US intelligence official now at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Retired Adm. Bobby R. Inman, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, adds, "The defections must be a bonanza to US counterintelligence."

The recent Soviet defectors are:

- Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior Soviet KGB official who defected to the US Aug. 1 while on assignment in Rome. He has extensive knowledge of KGB operations in North America: It was Yurchenko who identified Mr. Howard as a Soviet spy.
- Oleg Gordievsky, the top KGB officer in London, who had worked for 10 years as a double agent for the West, defected to Britain sometime last summer. Using information he provided, the British government expelled 31 Soviets for spying. Gordievsky is also reported to have helped uncover Arne Treholt, a senior Norwegian government official convicted last June of passing Norwegian and NATO secrets to the KGB between 1974 and 1983.
- Sergei Bokhan, deputy director of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) operations in Greece, defected to the US in May. He is said to have detailed Soviet infiltration of the Greek government and fingered three indivduals who were providing sensitive information and technology to the Soviets.

Experts stress there is a broader significance to these Soviet defections beyond the immediate counterintelligence gains for the west.

"When three rather high-level people defect from the Soviet Union's intelligence service in a relatively brief period of time . . . that is an indication that there is some kind of malaise within their system," says retired Adm. Stansfield Turner, CIA director during the Carter administration.

Mr. Turner, author of the recent book "Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition," says that the spy activities and defections of recent months point up "that we in democracies are vulnerable, but the Soviets are vulnerable too."

The Soviets' vulnerability stems from what Mr. Carver calls the "how are you going to keep them down on the farm once they've seen Paris" syndrome. "The major difficulty that the Soviets have is the stark contrast between the promise of the 1917 revolution and the facts and realities of the Soviet Union today," Carver says.

Soviet KGB and GRU agents are among the privileged few in Soviet society, experts say. A KGB career is viewed among the Soviets' best and brightest as a means of getting ahead quickly in the bureaucracy. These ambitious recruits are sent to the finest schools and are ushered into the ranks of the Russian elite. They are trained in foreign languages, given the opportunity to travel, and are inevitably posted overseas. Mr.Inman says simply, they are "people who could mingle" at Washington social affairs.

"Those intelligence agents who have contact with the West, who have their eyes and ears open, it looks like they are very much disillusioned with communism . . . and this brings people to dramatic decisions," says Zdzislaw Rurarz, a Polish ambassador to Japan who defected to the US in 1981.

"They are seeing the confrontation between the East and the West and they are changing sides. This is very significant," says Mr. Rurarz, who served 25 years as a Polish military intelligence officer.

"Across the board, the level of sophistication of KGB agents has gone up," says Inman. He attributes this in large part to the work of former Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, who pushed to upgrade the effectiveness of Soviet intelligence operations during his tenure as KGB chief. But Inman says the jury is still out on whether the KGB's new sophistication and style has made it more vulnerable to defections and western infiltration.

Carver is less tentative. "Others in the KGB must be thinking: 'If Gordievsky and Yurchenko can safely defect why can't we do it? If we can't trust a Gordievsky or a Yurchenko, who can we trust?' "

OMAHA CREIGHTONIAN (NE)
26 October 1985

Turner talks about CIA, covert actions

By Mary Kate Wells

Increasing U.S. involvement in covert activities in foreign countries has made headlines all over the world, stirring both question and concern.

A "covert action" is an effort by a government to influence the course of events in another country without being identified.

Admiral Stansfield Turner, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency spoke at Creighton Tuesday night about the role the CIA plays in covert activities. He addressed the terrorism in Beirut and the CIA support of the Contras against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua as two areas of specific concern.

Turner said that while it is unfortunate that terrorism exists, the issue is what the United States can do to stop it.

The CIA spies in efforts to find where and when terrorists will strike, Turner said. Technical devices — satellites and electronic eavesdropping instruments, -and agents are used to gather this information. Turner said the CIA predominantly uses agents to infiltrate and penetrate a terrotist regime.

Turner advocates a three-fold method to bring terrorism under control. In addition to the CIA efforts he recommends an increase in reliance on local circuits and an increase in attention to physical defense. Turner said a country's local police by forming a network of local contacts could help tip the CIA to unusual activity. "Only local people can do this," he said. Turner cited the second bombing of American Embassy in Beirut as proof of need for increases in physical defense. "There is no reason for this," he said.

The CIA's role is to collect information, not to enforce foreign policy. However, when covert action is involved the CIA acts in three ways, Turner said. The CIA publishes propaganda in newspapers to sway public opinion. The CIA takes political action through its support of governments favoring democracy. Para-military action is given by the CIA through the supplying of arms.

One [illegible]gulation on covert actions is the CIA shall not directly or by influence participate in assassinations, Turner said.

A system of checks monitors CIA involvement in covert activities. The president is briefed on each action and must sign his permission to the covert act.

Turner is a Rhodes Scholar and prior to this service as CIA director he served as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet and Commander in Chief of NATO's Southern Fleet.

More than 200 people attended the lecture sponsored by the SBG's Films, Lectures and Concerts Committee.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
23 October 1985

Espionage case heats up press-rights debate

Conviction of Navy analyst seen as restricting public's need to know

By Curtis J. Sitomer
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

The recent conviction of Samuel Loring Morison, a former US Navy intelligence analyst, on espionage and theft charges, has intensified debate on the issue of national security vs. the public's right to know.

The central question raised by the Morison case is: Does the United States now have, by judicial fiat, an Official Secrets Act (similar to laws in Great Britain that make it a crime to disclose government information without proper authorization)? If so, federal workers, the press, and others may be more easily indicted for leaking information the government deems vital to the nation's security.

Samuel Morison, Navy analyst convicted under US espionage law

Mr. Morison was found guilty of giving secrets to a British military journal, Jane's Defense Weekly. The information included US intelligence satellite photographs of a Soviet nuclear aircraft carrier under construction at a Black Sea shipyard, which were published by Jane's and widely distributed.

Many of those on both sides of the case, which was decided Oct. 17 by the US District Court in Baltimore, believe results of the trial should lead to two further actions:

- A congressional probe of the entire system of document and information classification with a view to striking a better balance between restrictions for defense purposes and disclosures in accord with the public's right to know. President Reagan, for example, used intelligence satellite photographs of Grenada, during a nationally televised 1983 news conference, to reveal the construction of a runway capable of handling Soviet and Cuban military aircraft.
- A rethinking of how the Espionage Act of 1917 and its amended version, the Internal Security Act of 1950 are used.

Civil libertarians argue that if an appeals courts, and ultimately the US Supreme Court, doesn't overturn the Morison ruling, the press will be stifled in reporting many government matters which it now routinely covers.

"It [the decision] is an Official Secrets Act," insists Morton Halperin, director of the Washington office of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). "This is the first indictment and conviction in the history of the Republic for giving things to the press," he adds.

"If the Supreme Court upholds the statute [the Espionage Act of 1917 under which Morison was prosecuted]," Halperin says the "ACLU will go to Congress and ask for an amendment ... to make it clear that the Act doesn't apply to publication."

This alarmed reaction is countered by the Justice Department, whose spokesmen insist that the First Amendment is not threatened by the verdict. Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott says his department has no hidden agenda aimed at hampering the media. "There has been a lot of arm-waving going on," adds Trott, who heads Justice's criminal division. "But this is not part of a plot to throw cold water on the press. We're fully mindful of the First Amendment." But the government official does see the decision as a clear signal to the public that "classified material must not be leaked."

Assistant US Attorney Michael Schatzow, chief pros

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ecutor in the Morison matter, also hopes the outcome will have a deterrent effect on government leaks. He downplays the possibility of widespread indictments against members of the press who disclose unauthorized information.

Robert Becker, staff attorney for the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press — an organization that staunchly defends First Amendment rights — says he does not now see the Morison ruling as having a "chilling effect" on journalists.

"This trial won't stop government officials from leaking stuff to the media. And reporters are not likely to say: If I publish this, I might go to jail," Mr. Becker explains.

But he quickly adds that if the government ever tries to impose media restrictions, "there would be a tremendous outcry."

Something of a middle ground is occupied by former Central Intelligence Agency chief Stansfield Turner. Admiral Turner feels that something must be done to plug the dike against the recent rush of leaks of classified data. But he also laments the "risks" of shutting off media access and debate about matters which the public should be aware of.

In his book, "Secrecy and Democracy, the CIA in Transition," Turner, a Carter White House appointee, criticized the Reagan administration for increased use of covert action around the world. Turner has also charged the government attempted to "censor" his book by deleting material it termed classified.

In an interview about the Morison verdict, Turner said, "This administration has gone to extremes in trying to classify that which [should not be] classified."

Of Morison himself, he added: "This man is not a spy. There is no evidence of [his being a] Soviet agent."

Turner stresses the government should take action not only against low-level government employees but against "high-level people who leak things." But he says this action need not be criminal indictment in the courts. He suggests that proper alternatives could range from reprimands, to removal of "top secret" clearances, to dismissal.

The former CIA chief suggests that it might be appropriate to form a national commission to examine the causes of security leaks — including "improperly classified" information and restrictions on those government officials who require prior "official" approval of memoirs and published writings.

The Morison case was only the second time in history the US government used espionage laws to prosecute a public employee for disclosures to the press.

In the mid-1970s, during the Pentagon Papers case, similar charges were filed against Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo who were accused of stealing and distributing secret government documents about the Vietnam War.

A mistrial resulted when Watergate-related instances of government misconduct against the defendants — including break-ins and several illegal wiretaps were revealed.

ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN DAILY (MI)
22 October 1985

'Intelligence is' only the start

By David Buchen and Mark Weinstein

One year ago, protests against the Central Intelligence Agency here at the University of Michigan helped to spark nationwide campus protests against CIA recruitment. In April, nearly 500 people were arrested at the University of Colorado for protesting the CIA. On campuses everywhere, the CIA has been met with active resistance to their attempts at recruitment.

This Tuesday and Wednesday the CIA is returning to Ann Arbor to recruit. And again they will be met by large crowds demanding that they leave.

Why does the CIA get such treatment from people all across the nation? Aren't they just an intelligence gathering agency for the government? What is wrong with that you might ask?

The CIA is the government department in charge of not only "intelligence gathering" but also more importantly overthrowing governments they don't like, assassinating people they consider a "threat" to our security, training the secret police of fascist countries to protect "democracy," influencing the elections of foreign countries, producing misinformation to manipulate public opinion in the U.S., keeping track of U.S. citizens opposed to government policies, and who knows what else.

Everything that we know of the CIA's activities is vehemently denied by the government. The operations of the agency are kept secret from the U.S. public. What we know of the CIA is only the tip of an iceberg.

The action of the CIA most prominent right now is the training, funding, and directing of the Somocista contra forces fighting to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. According to Edgar Chamorro, a former contra leader, the contras "have been subject to manipulation by the Central Intelligence Agency, which has reduced it to a front organization."

The CIA has trained the contras to be a highly effective terrorist force. The contras based in Honduras and Costa Rica make regular runs into Nicaragua with the help of U.S. air support to destroy farm cooperatives, health care clinics, schools. Over 7,000 people have been killed by the Contras.

A Stansfield Turner, former director of the CIA, has said that "The people they're supporting down there are committing murders and terrorism and so on. The CIA is supporting terrorism in Nicaragua. The contras are doing things that I'm ashamed of hearing that the United States is doing."

In 1984, the CIA mined the harbors of Nicaragua. This action was in direct conflict with international laws. Edgar Chamorro recalls, "After the CIA mined Nicaragua's harbors, I was awakened at my "safe house" in Tegucigalpa, Honduras at 2 a.m. by an anxious CIA agent. He handed me a press release written in perfect Spanish by CIA officials.... Of course we had no role in mining the harbors."

The mining of the harbors, the murder of health care workers, the rape and murder of wedding parties, the constant threats of invasion have all been justified by the claim that the U.S. is trying to stop arms shipments from Nicaragua to El Salvador. These two countries have no common border and the bay that separates them is filled with U.S. warships.

A David MacMichael, a former CIA analyst who had access to all reports from the region in the time that these arms shipments supposedly occurred, recently testified to the World Court that these allegations were complete fabrications.

Why then is the United States so involved in the contra war? Stansfield Turner says, "There's no doubt about it in anybody's mind. All along, there's only been one objective —— to overthrow the government of Nicaragua."

Overthrowing the democratically elected governments may seem like a strange thing for an "intelligence gathering" agency to be doing, but unfortunately the CIA has much practice in ousting democratic governments in favor of military dictatorships.

In 1954, the CIA brought about the overthrow of the government of Guatemala. A man named Arbenz had just been elected and he was "left-leaning." After he nationalized some land claimed by U.S. corporations, the CIA and the corporations worked together and brought about his overthrow. There have not been democratic elections since that time.

In 1972, the CIA led the coup which ousted Chilean president Salvador Allende. General Pinochet who took over the government still reigns today.

Of course the Bay of Pigs fiasco was a poor attempt by the CIA to overthrow Castro in Cuba. And in Iran, the Shah was put in power by the CIA in 1953.

The CIA also uses more subtle ways of affecting foreign affairs. In El Salvador, Jose Napolean Duarte received hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from the CIA. The CIA also subverts foreign labor unions, student groups, and political parties.

Of course as an "intelligence gathering" agency, the CIA has the obligation to share that information with our "friends." The CIA trained the South African secret police force, BOSS. In El Salvador and Guatemala, the CIA trained the right wing death squads which have killed thousands and "disappeared" 38,000 people in Guatemala alone. The CIA also has trained the secret police of South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and other countries such as the Phillipines.

During the Vietnam war, the CIA carried out the Phoenix program. The Phoenix program would identify key anti-government dissidents and then have them assassinated. This program alone brought about thousands of deaths. The CIA was also in Vietnam long before most of our troops were there. They were there as "advisors."

A According to Ralph McGehee, a CIA agent for 25 years, "The Agency forged documents, planted evidence of weapons shipments, and doctored documents to justify military intervention." Sound like Nicaragua?

Here in the United States, the CIA has illegally kept track of U.S. anti-government activists. Ralph McGehee says that the CIA's domestic programs often violated "U.S. law and the agency's own charter. The Agency also infiltrated labor, student, youth and religious groups: It had thousands of college professors and administrators working for it on hundreds of campuses."

One example of the CIA gathering intelligence was in one program they subjected U.S. citizens to mind altering drugs without their knowledge. According to the Church Commission, a mid-70s Senate committee investigating CIA abuses, the CIA opened over 28 million pieces of mail between 1953 and 1973. The CIA also has trained police forces across the United States in special tactics.

When the CIA comes to campus on October 22 and 23, people should realize that it is not an "intelligence gathering" agency coming to recruit librarians and analysts.

The CIA is the largest, best funded, best equipped, and most violent terrorist organization in the world. A terrorist organization which overthrows democraticly elected governments and then claims innocence in the U.S. media. A terrorist organization which teaches torture techniques to the secret police of fascist regimes to protect "democracy." A terrorist organization which funds the murder, torture, and rape of people in Nicaragua. A terrorist organization which keeps files on you and me.

These are the practices that the CIA is ultimately recruiting employees for here at the University.

Buchen is an Ann Arbor resident. Weinstein is a junior in LSA.

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NEW YORK TIMES
22 October 1985

A Note to Gorbachev

By Stansfield Turner

WASHINGTON — Dear Mr. President:

Abraham Lincoln drafted one of our country's most historic documents on the back of an envelope. You can do the same when you meet with Mikhail S. Gorbachev in November.

The Gettysburg Address helped hold our nation together. You could help avoid nuclear war. On your envelope you could write the following:

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and the United States of America hereby agree never again to test a ballistic missile."

And then slip it to Mr. Gorbachev.

Such an agreement would probably be the shortest and most explicit international protocol in history. It would also leave one of the most powerful legacies for peace.

If there were no testing of ballistic missiles for a number of years, neither we nor the Soviets would remain confident about the accuracy of these weapons. That would mean that we would both be uncertain about being able to conduct a surprise, precision attack to disable the other's strategic arsenal. Creating uncertainty about the success of surprise attacks would do much to diminish the most dangerous tensions over nuclear weapons and reduce the risk of mistakes during a crisis.

End testing of ballistic missiles

It would also signal your joint desire to curtail the arms race, at least in ballistic missiles. Today we're proceeding with the MX missile in order to catch up with the Soviet capability to hit hardened targets by surprise. With this approach, you would simply lessen the Soviet's hard target capability. It would not disarm either one of us, as we could each retain all the ballistic missiles we wanted. But these missiles would no longer be useful for surprise attacks.

True, the Soviets may not see this as an equitable bargain because about 87 percent of their strategic warheads are on ballistic missiles compared to about 78 percent on our side. That's not really a big issue, but you could always have an added sweetener in your pocket, such as withdrawing the Pershing missiles from West Germany. If Mr. Gorbachev turned down that combination, he would almost certainly lose the contest for world opinion, no matter what he is holding up his sleeve to drop on the Summit table.

The alternative to a simple proposal like this would appear to be protracted negotiations on a traditional arms control treaty. This proposal will enable you to get some momentum going more quickly and, in the process, markedly improve the entire tone of United States-Soviet relations.

It will also ensure your leaving a lasting mark for peace. □

Stansfield Turner, author of "Secrecy and Democracy — The CIA in Transition", was formerly director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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NEW YORK TIMES
11 October 1985

OFFICIALS SAY C.I.A. DID NOT TELL F.B.I. OF SPY CASE MOVES

The following article is based on reporting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel Brinkley and was written by Mr. Brinkley.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 — The Central Intelligence Agency failed to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation after it learned more than a year ago that Edward L. Howard was considering becoming a Soviet spy, Government officials said today.

According to court records, Mr. Howard told two agency employees in September 1984 that he was thinking of disclosing classified information to the Soviet Union.

Soviet Defector Was the Key

The bureau has sole responsibility for domestic espionage investigations and, under Federal law, the intelligence agency and all other Government agencies are supposed to report suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Federal agency to carry out surveillance or other actions within the United States to stop potential spies.

Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former intelligence agency officer who is now a fugitive, has been charged with espionage, accused of giving Soviet officials details of American intelligence operations in Moscow. Federal officials have called the disclosures serious and damaging.

'Bad Mistake,' Senator Says

Federal officials said the C.I.A. told the F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard until after the bureau began an investigation this fall based on information from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, who had been a senior official of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

The bureau began surveillance of Mr. Howard last month, but he slipped out of his home at night and is believed to have fled the country.

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not give the F.B.I. adequate information about this person, that's a bad mistake. It shows very, very serious problems within the C.I.A."

In the last few weeks the C.I.A. transferred the chief of its office of security, William Kotopish, to a new job at a level of equivalent seniority, but an official said the move had been planned "for some time" and was not related to the Howard case.

Mr. Howard worked for the agency from 1981 to 1983. He was told of classified American intelligence operations in Moscow because the agency was planning to assign him there, officials have said.

According to a criminal complaint on file in Federal District Court in Albuquerque, N.M., Mr. Howard told two current employees of the intelligence agency a year ago last month that he had "spent hours in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy trying to decide whether to enter the embassy and disclose classified information."

An F.B.I. affidavit says the conversation was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four days before that, the Government contends, Mr. Howard gave his information to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Austria.

George Lauder, a C.I.A. spokesman, said today that as a result of that conversation "action was taken" within the agency "and it seemed to be reasonable action at the time." He would not say what the action was, although an official said the agency kept in contact with Mr. Howard after his conversation with the two C.I.A. operatives. Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the time.

'A Few Blatant Cases'

The Senate and House intelligence committees are investigating the handling of the Howard case. A key issue in the study, committee members said, will be how the C.I.A. and other agencies deal with employees who leave Government service with detailed, classified knowledge about sensitive programs.

Another element of the investigations will be several recent espionage cases in which Government officials failed to heed warning signs that a current or former employee was planning to spy or was spying, committee members said.

"We've had a few blatant cases where we just didn't follow through, even with alarm bells going off," said Representative Dave McCurdy, Democrat of Oklahoma, chairman of the House committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluaton.

In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I. official said Mr. Howard's conversation with the two C.I.A. officers would have been sufficient to warrant an investigation.

"Anytime we get information that someone has considered such an act, we would take some action," said Phillip A. Parker, deputy assistant director of the bureau's intelligence division.

An intelligence official said the C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter internally rather than report it to the F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding, "If you reported every fantasy that people have, you'd have everyone under surveillance."

Law Bars C.I.A. Moves in U.S.

The C.I.A would not say whether it undertook any form of inquiry after Mr. Howard told the two C.I.A. employees he had considered becoming a Soviet spy. But Federal law and a Presidential executive order prohibit the agency from taking any steps inside the United States to investigate possible cases of espionage.

Mr. Howard was one of tens of thousands of people who retire from Government or industry each year after holding positions that gave them access to classified materials. More than 4.3 million people in government and industry associated with government now have clearances to use classified information.

Asked what procedures the Central Intelligence Agency uses to monitor former employees who have knowledge of classified programs, Mr. Lauder, the agency spokesman, said: "We haven't got any procedures. Once a person leaves here, he is John Q. Citizen, just like you and me. We don't keep a string on them. It's strictly an F.B.I. matter."

Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said his panel would also examine the problem presented by military officers who retire with knowledge of classified materials.

Most people with security clearances work for the Pentagon. At the Defense Department, L. Britt Snider, director of counterintelligence and security policy, said: "We don't have any jurisdiction of any kind over former employees, whether or not they had clearances. It's strictly the F.B.I."

At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said, "We are not concerned about Americans who have had clearances. We don't look at these people unless we detect an individual involved in espionage."

Ex-Intelligence Chief's Moves

Senator Leahy said: "I don't think anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain surveillance on the several hundred thousand people who leave the Government each year with security clearances. But there are a certain number of people in extremely sensitive positions, a handful of them, that we ought to do more with."

Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "certainly would have been one of those" because he held highly sensitive information and was being dismissedfollowing a polygraph examination that indicated drug use and petty thievery, according to Federal officials.

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When Adm. Stansfield M. Turner was Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration, he dismissed, transferred or forced to retire nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who held highly sensitive positions.

In an interview this week, he said that others in the agency had warned him that "we ran the risk of some of them selling their information to the other side." He said he had disagreed when it was suggested that some should be given other jobs, and proceeded with his original plans.

But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't think my rule should be totally rigid. If this guy had just been briefed, I'd say let's stick him in the Dominican Republic or someplace like that for a couple of years, until the information isn't valuable anymore."

Senator Leahy said: "We may need some sort of turkey farm for some of these former employees. Make them translate cables or something like that for a couple of years."

Admiral Turner said he thought C.I.A. officers ought to be required to agree when they are hired that "for three years or so after they leave, they will be subject to the same rules of intrusion as applied when they were in government. Make them come back for random polygraph examinations. That would give them one more thing to worry about before they turn."

A C.I.A. official said "it's conceivable" that that idea would work, adding that finding solutions to the problem "is certainly something we're thinking about now."

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WASHINGTON TIMES
3 October 1985

FBI seeking former CIA agent as a Soviet mole

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The FBI yesterday issued an arrest warrant for Edward Lee Howard, a 33-year-old former CIA officer in Moscow suspected of being a Soviet "mole."

Howard, who worked for the CIA from January 1981 until June 1983, was last posted in the Soviet capital, where he posed as a State Department budget analyst, according to sources.

He is charged, among other offenses, with conspiracy to deliver national defense secrets to a foreign government.

Howard is one of several suspected Soviet agents implicated as CIA moles by the KGB's No. 5 official, Vitaly Yurchenko. Mr. Yurchenko defected last August in Rome and is undergoing a debriefing by FBI and CIA officials.

Howard, a New Mexico native last seen near Albuquerque on Sept. 20, is on five years' probation for a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.

The FBI searched the Howards' home and Jeep for code pads, microdots and other spy paraphernalia between last Friday and Tuesday, an agency spokesman said. Howard is believed to have fled for Texas last week without leaving word with his wife or friends.

Intelligence experts believe Howard might be a "give-away" or relatively unimportant Soviet agent and that it is too soon after Mr. Yurchenko's defection to determine if other American agents will be uncovered.

A senior CIA official in Washington confirmed that Howard had been a CIA operative, but that he was expelled from the agency in 1983. The official gave no reason for the ouster.

Former CIA chief Stansfield Turner, who was director from 1976-80, said in a telephone interview from Norway yesterday that there were no Soviet agents in the CIA, "not in the four years I was there."

But Admiral Turner asserted that it is "not impossible" that a Soviet mole could penetrate the agency.

N. Scot Miler, a former CIA counterintelligence official until the mid-1970s, said an operational officer such as Howard would have had access to "significant" intelligence data about the CIA that would cause serious damage if passed on to the Russians.

While he had no direct knowledge of the case, Mr. Miler said in an interview that Howard, who has been identified as an "economic forecaster" could have given the Soviets secret financial data. Howard also would have known the names and identities of some U.S. and foreign agents working for the agency, he said.

Howard "was a friendly person in his professional dealings, but his private life was very private," said David Abbey, an economic analyst for the New Mexico state Department of Finance and Administration, where Howard worked.

He had close dealings with economists and other industry analysts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, an Energy Department laboratory operated by the University of California that is involved in weapons research, said co-workers.

"He was very much a serious-minded person and always worried about the declining oil and gas situation," said Bob Swerdling, also a finance department analyst.

In rural Eldorado, southeast of Santa Fe, a neighbor said Howard did not participate in neighborhood activities, though his wife, Mary, did.

COMMENTARY
October 1985

Who Killed the CIA?

The Confessions of Stansfield T

Edward Jay Epstein

ADMIRAL Stansfield Turner commanded a destroyer, a guided-missile cruiser, a carrier task force, a fleet, and the prestigious Naval War College before he was shunted away to a NATO post in Italy in 1975. When he was abruptly summoned back to Washington in February 1977 by his former classmate at Annapolis, President Jimmy Carter, he expected to be appointed to a high naval position or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Instead, the new President asked him to be Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

Although Turner had had little previous experience in intelligence, he viewed it simply as a problem of assessing data, or, as he described it to his son, nothing more than "bean counting." Accepting the position of "chief bean counter," he assumed that he could bring the CIA, and American intelligence, to the same standard of operational efficiency he had brought the ships under his command. The four-year effort to achieve this goal is the subject of his book, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*.[1]

He quickly found, however, that the CIA was a far more complex and elusive entity than he had expected. To begin with, the acting CIA Director, Henry Knoche, rather than behaving like a ship's "executive officer," surprised Turner by refusing his "captain's" first order: a request that Knoche accompany him to meetings with congressional leaders. As far as Turner was concerned, this was insubordination (and Knoche's days were numbered). When he met with other senior executives of the CIA at a series of dinners, he found "a disturbing lack of specificity and clarity" in their answers. On the other hand, he found the written CIA reports presented to him "too long and detailed to be useful." He notes that "my first encounters with the CIA did not convey either the feeling of a warm welcome or a sense of great competence"—an asse ment of many of these senior officers.

Turner was further frustrated by the system of secrecy that kept vital intelligence hermetically contained in bureaucratic "compartments" within the CIA. Not only did he view such secrecy as irrational, he began to suspect that it cloaked a wide range of unethical activities. He became especially concerned with abuses in the espionage division, which he discovered was heavily overstaffed with case officers—some of whom, on the pretext of seeing agents abroad, were disbursing large sums in "expenses" to themselves, keeping mistresses, and doing business with international arms dealers. Aside from such petty corruption, Turner feared that these compartmentalized espionage operations could enmesh the entire CIA in a devastating scandal. The potential for such a "disgrace," as he puts it, was made manifest to him by a single traumatic case that occurred in the 1960's—one which he harks back to throughout his book, and which he uses to justify eliminating the essential core of the CIA's espionage service.

The villain of this case, as Turner describes it, is James Jesus Angleton, who was chief of the CIA's counterintelligence staff from 1954 to 1974; the victim was Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who began collaborating with the CIA in 1962 and then defected to the United States in 1964, and who claimed to have read all the KGB files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The crime was the imprisonment of Nosenko, which, according to Turner, was "a travesty of the rights of the individual under the law." It all began in 1964, after Nosenko arrived in the United States. Turner states that Angleton "decided that Nosenko was a double agent, and set out to force him to confess. . . . When he would not give in to normal interrogation, Angleton's team set out to break the man psychologically. A small prison was built, expressly for him."

Nosenko was kept in this prison for three-and-one-half years, although he never admitted to being a double agent. He was then released and sub-

EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, whose books include *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald* and *Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth*, is currently completing a book on international deception. His articles in COMMENTARY include "Disinformation: Or, Why the CIA Cannot Verify an Arms-Control Agreement" (July 1982) and "The War Within the CIA" (August 1978).

[1] Houghton Mifflin, 304 pp., $16.95.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
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Has Reagan killed CIA ove

By Stansfield Turner

THREE times in the past 18 months Ronald Reagan, by his own admission, has employed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in ways that he regretted; and he has acknowledged using the National Security Council (NSC) staff to substitute for the CIA when the Congress had forbidden use of the CIA. Although there is no evidence that the President and his advisers have any intention of changing this pattern, the Congress and its intelligence oversight committees have done very little to restrict his freedom to misuse the CIA and the NSC again.

The first error was the President's orders to the CIA since late 1981 to support the "contras" in Nicaragua, one result of which was a manual that appeared to condone assassination. The President acknowledged that what he had set in motion had gone awry, and he walked away from the manual and reaffirmed his public order to the CIA to eschew any form of support for assassination. This was clear evidence that the CIA was not under close control, but the Congress did nothing.

The second error was a presidential order in late 1983 for the CIA to arrange for the mining of the harbors of Nicaragua. When this became public in early 1984, the President's rescinding of the order acknowledged that it had been a mistake. His agenda for Nicaragua had not changed, but apparently the reaction of the Congress and the public made him realize that this was not a reasonable way to achieve his objectives. There was a short-lived furor in Congress, but within weeks it had blown over. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, for instance, withdrew his resignation as vice-chairman of the Senate's intelligence committee.

The third mistake was that of directing the CIA in late 1984 to collaborate with Lebanese intelligence against terrorism. On March 8 of this year Lebanese intelligence agents drove a truck bomb into a Beirut apartment building, killing 80 innocent people in an abortive effort to assassinate one suspected anti-American terrorist. The CIA argues vehemently that it was not associated with this action, and I believe it. But the President, in hastily canceling the order, acknowledged the poor judgment behind it. The Congress satisfied itself that the CIA had not been directly involved in the incident, but did nothing to inhibit the CIA from working again with people who get out of control.

Finally, there was the use of the National Security Council to substitute for the CIA. Public Law 98-473 stipulates that no "agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" may support, "... directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua ...." That this prohibition includes the NSC is clear from the President's Executive Order on Intelligence, which describes the NSC as "the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence. ...." It certainly appears that the officer of the NSC who dealt with and for the contras acted illegally. At the least he was acting in defiance of Congress's intent. Congressional response has been quite restrained.

One does have to appreciate the fact that in many ways President Reagan has proved that presidents can be strong despite congressional opposition. Our Constitution forces the executive and the legislative branches into competition, and one is almost bound to dominate the other from time to time. There can be problems, though, when the executive and the legislature compete too much and cooperate too little over controlling the most secretive activity of our government, its intelligence apparatus.

From 1945 to 1975, there was almost no cooperation in overseeing intelligence, because Congress did not want to be involved. So there was almost no accountability over intelligence. When individuals working amid all the temptations of secret intelligence activities know they will not be held accountable, mistakes are likely. There were mistakes during those first 30 years after World War II, and, as is almost inevitable in our open society, the errors of government were uncovered. That uncovering in 1975-76, and the inevitable exaggeration accompanying it, did our intelligence community great harm.

The most serious harm was the least apparent. American human intelligence activities nearly ground to a halt. The CIA stopped taking the kinds of risks necessary for effective spying. Hunkering down and avoiding possible further criticism was the style of the day. The only way to avoid a repetition of that nadir in our intelligence capabilities is to avoid a repetition of similar errors.

President Reagan's three ill-planned CIA operations and their sudden cancellations, each within 18 months, are a disturbing indicator that we are heading down an old road. Presidents are tempted to resort to the CIA's bag of covert tricks when they are frustrated by one obstacle or another in trying to do what they deem necessary. Only Congress stands between such frustrations and the misuse of the CIA's secret powers. Presidents, then, should recognize that Congress plays a special role in overseeing secret intelligence activities and that the keen competition experienced in so many other areas of executive-legislative relations must be tempered here.

The Congress should recognize that its oversight of intelligence is a scant 10 years old and does not have strong foundations. If President Reagan continues to be indifferent about whether his use of the CIA is supported by Congress, and if Congress cannot take the bit in its teeth and exercise the latent authority it has, the oversight process will die. With it will go the best chance we have of averting another severe blow to our intelligence organizations, one from which recovery will not be easy or as quick as from the last.

Stansfield Turner, former director of central intelligence, discusses the problems of conducting secret intelligence in an open society in his new book, "Secrecy and Democracy."

TOLEDO BLADE (OH)
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Stansfield Turner Looks At Problem Of Secrecy

CIA Ex-Chief Says U.S. Out Of Bounds In Nicaragua

By JOHN NICHOLS
Blade Staff Writer

A former head of the Central Intelligence Agency criticized the Reagan administration's support for covert activities in Nicaragua in an interview with The Blade yesterday.

When he talks about Nicaragua, Adm. Stansfield Turner, who headed the CIA during the Carter administration, pulls no punches.

"We've gone far beyond the bounds of what is useful in Nicaragua," he said yesterday, in a far-reaching interview that touched on many foreign policy questions and the latest spy scandals in Europe and the United States.

U.S. Aid To Rebels

"I feel that we should draw back on our activities in Nicaragua in particular. I do not believe that the contras have any hope of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua and I've never heard anyone who seriously thought they could," he said, referring to U.S.-supported military forces that are trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

The United States has given millions of dollars to the contras, many of whom are former supporters of Anastasio Somoza, a much-criticized dictator who was overthrown in 1979 by revolutionaries known as the Sandinistas, who now control Nicaragua's government. The Reagan administration has been alarmed by the close relations that have developed between the Sandinistas and the governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

That alarm has led to support for the contras and to several covert operations that Admiral Turner said had embarrassed the United States and may have the effect of undermining trust in the Government and the CIA.

Publication Of Manual

He referred, in particular, to the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and the publication of a manual instructing contras on how to carry out terrorist attacks.

"I don't like to see the country doing something a large number of American citizens don't support and which contravenes our ethics. Something like mining the harbors seems to me to be state-sponsored terrorism," said Admiral Turner, who expressed support for diplomatic efforts aimed at convincing the Sandinistas to alter policies.

The emphasis on ethics may seem out of character for a man who once headed an agency that Admiral Turner says is responsible for spying and carrying out covert activities aimed at destabilizing unfriendly governments.

Some Secrecy Needed

But Admiral Turner has made the challenge of reconciling democratic aims and beliefs with the need for an agency such as the CIA the subject of his writings and speeches since he left the agency in 1981.

"Open societies, such as the United States, are always more vulnerable than closed societies. There's got to be some secrecy, but there also has to be a check on the amount of government secrecy or there is the potential for abuse. The question is, how do we reach the compromise?" he asked, echoing the theme of a speech he gave at the Toledo Club last night.

Admiral Turner said that recent revelations regarding spy networks that have operated in the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany made clear the difficulties a country that is reasonably open has in keeping secrets.

Widespread Spying

He said the recent revelations about widespread spying, while not all that surprising, might have a positive impact for western nations, in that they will make them more careful about who has access to secret information.

The challenge, Admiral Turner explained, will come in balancing the new emphasis on secrecy with the need to maintain basic freedoms.

"You don't want to be totally vulnerable. But you also don't want to be a gestapo state," he said. "The challenge is to make sure you don't risk too many of those freedoms you are working to protect."