

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-7WASHINGTON POST
28 October 1984

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The Blame Falls On Casey

The Central Intelligence Agency is going into the public pillory again. But this time nobody can blame those favorite whipping boys—the liberals of the 1970s.

This time the blame falls squarely on the CIA and its present director, William Casey. Under his tutelage, the agency has misled the White House and Congress, thus shattering the base of bipartisan support for intelligence activities.

The agency originally came into bad odor in the wake of Watergate and the Vietnam War. Investigation by a Senate committee headed by the late Frank Church of Idaho showed that the CIA had a hand in all kinds of dirty operations, including attempted assassinations.

In that period, those who tried to defend the agency as a valuable national resource could at least argue that the temper of the times was sour. Unfortunately, Jimmy Carter made one of his worst appointments in naming Adm. Stansfield Turner to be director of Central Intelligence. Turner very early began a feud, which he is still indulging in, with the "old boy" network of CIA veterans.

But there were figures in Congress, particularly among defense-minded Democrats, who saw the need to rebuild. They worked behind the scenes to make more money available to the agency and to restore morale. A good example is Sen. Daniel Moynihan, the New York Democrat, who has been serving as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

"When I came in," Moynihan recalled recently, "I asked myself whether we shouldn't scrap the CIA and start over again. The officers who came up here looked so damaged.

They couldn't think on their feet. They couldn't play checkers, let alone chess. They were good people who had been hurt. But of course we couldn't close it down. So we tried healing. We gave them money and told them they were first rate. And there were signs of progress."

The progress halted with the appointment of Casey as director in 1981, and the onset of covert operations in Nicaragua. Casey would have been an embarrassment to any bureau of government. Before becoming director, he was mixed up in charges of plagiarism and was hip deep in Watergate. At the agency, he was involved in smelly stock transactions, dubious testimony on the Carter briefing book and association with shabby characters. A former Republican secretary of state, trying to defend Casey, could only say, "He's not as sleazy as he looks."

As to Nicaragua, the right-wing dictatorship of the Somozas was ousted in 1979. The successor regime, democratic at first, quickly yielded to a group called the Sandinistas, with ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union and a background in Marxism-Leninism. The United States undertook to harass the Sandinistas by supporting against them a guerrilla force known as the *contras*.

"From the first it didn't feel right," Moynihan said of the CIA operation against the Sandinistas. "You knew you were dealing with one part of the agency, not the whole. Somewhere in that place were a group of people like an outfit in a Le Carré novel. They were looking for somebody to give them a job again. Some of their briefings about their plans came close to fantasizing. Then they began to hide things."

One operation hidden from the Senate committee was the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. When events disclosed the fact, Barry Goldwater, the committee chairman, fired off an angry message to Casey. Moynihan tried unsuccessfully to find out what had happened. Then, on April 12, 1984, President Reagan's national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, told a conference at Annapolis that "every important detail" of the mining had been "shared in full" with the congressional committee.

As a protest against being called a liar in public, Moynihan resigned as vice chairman. Casey, prodded by the White House, made a public apology to the committee. Moynihan claims that McFarlane told him that in reporting to the White House, the CIA had been "either disingenuous or outright wrong." A second case of "hiding" now surfaces with the manual written by a contract employee of the CIA which advised the *contras* to "neutralize," or assassinate, Sandinista officials. The Senate committee was not told of that manual, which sanctioned terrorism and violated a presidential order. In the foreign policy debate, President Reagan said the manual had been heavily excised both by the CIA in the field and at headquarters. He claimed only a handful of the original manuals was distributed.

That turns out to be a cock-and-bull story. There was little editing, and hundreds of manuals were distributed. But what the president said was what the CIA had told the White House.

Obviously something is very wrong. Congressional support for the agency is now almost nil. Moynihan says of Casey and the agency, "It breaks my heart. We need an intelligence capacity. But they're hurting themselves and they don't know it. They still don't understand they are damaging the president, not helping him."

FILE ONLYOMAHA GATEWAY (NE)
26 October 1984

Former CIA head addresses current issues in speech

By KAREN NELSON

The Central Intelligence Agency should suspend covert actions in Lebanon and Nicaragua, at least temporarily, according to a former CIA head.

Stansfield Turner, head of the CIA from 1977 until 1982, spoke at Creighton University last Tuesday night. Turner said that pulling out of Beirut temporarily would be one way to pressure the Lebanese government into providing more security for the American embassy.

"There was no excuse for that truck bomb in Beirut," Turner said. "We can't build ourselves into high walls and barricades."

Reliance on local informants, offering some intelligence services to the Lebanese government and paying more attention to physical defense of the embassy might have prevented some of the terrorism, Turner said.

"In Lebanon, we work with the local police," he said. "They become a small network of informants who turn in a small clue now and then. Eventually, the clues can be all pieced together."

Turner said the situation in Nicaragua was "out of control." Although the CIA knew about Cuban support for the Sandinistas when the takeover occurred in 1979, he said he doubted whether the takeover could have been prevented.

"The Carter administration did not choose to try to stop the takeover. Anti-Somoza feeling was too strong. Sometimes the U.S. can't wave a wand and get things the way we want. This kind of thing will happen again and again."

One place where a takeover of a government considered friendly to the United States may happen is the Philippines, Turner said. "Marcos is out of touch with what is going on. He should use intelligence to 'Gallup poll' the Philippines."

Such a poll would then be used to show Philippine leaders how and where attitudes are changing in hopes of getting leaders to become more democratic, Turner said. "We'll tell Marcos that we aren't going to stand on his bandwagon — you'll be where Somoza is, where the Shah (of Iran) is." He said there doesn't seem to be much hope of Marcos changing his positions.

Turner said the CIA engages in three types of covert action: propaganda, including planting stories in newspapers which would not be accepted if it were known the source was the United States; political action, including supporting candidates who are friendly to the United States; and paramilitary action, including supplying arms and other forms of military assistance.

The CIA-sponsored manual advocating assassination of members of the Sandinista government is not legitimate covert action, according to a 1974 law, Turner said. According to the law, the President must approve any major covert actions and notify Congress. The last three presidents (Ford, Carter and Reagan) issued an executive order forbidding the CIA to participate in assassinations.

Turner attributed the manual to "the over-enthusiasm of over-dedicated people wanting to do their best for their country." He said that with the increase in covert action, many retired CIA agents were called back to duty, and some were finding it difficult to adjust to the legal restraints.

"Twenty years ago, such a manual might have never sur-

facied," Turner said. The conflict between the need for secrecy in intelligence and the rights of people to know what kind of action their government is taking prompted the creation of committees which oversee the intelligence agencies. Turner called them "surrogates — a few who know the secrets and pass judgement on whether we are acting properly."

One case, where the "surrogates" — committees in the House, Senate and the White House — ruled against CIA action was the mining of Nicaragua harbors. "The mining was ruled out by the public. It was an action which could have harmed innocent third parties who weren't even armed."

Turner said the ultimate success of last year's invasion of Grenada may depend on how its next election turns out. "The main choice seems to be between the kooky right-wing government of Gary who is a believer in UFOs — he even offered to be Carter's mediator to outer space — or the socialists. We're banking on the centerists, but it could be that they'll elect the same government we helped get rid of."

The case for the invasion, according to Turner, was how seriously the American medical students were endangered. "I talked to some of the students after the invasion. It seems to me they were scared but weren't under a great threat. In one case, it took two days for the army to reach the campus. That was plenty of time for the Grenadians to massacre them if that's what they wanted to do."

Turner said the possibility of reaching a verifiable arms control agreement has become more remote since the days of SALT II. "Verifying SALT II would have been tough, but it could have been done," he said. "Since then, the Soviets have done some things which would make verification of such an agreement harder. It wouldn't have happened if SALT II were ratified because it's harder to break an agreement while negotiating a new one."

As for a nuclear weapons freeze, Turner said it probably isn't possible. "It isn't completely a bad thing to live under a nuclear threat. Without such a threat, you leave the field wide open for a Kadaffi and run the risk of World War III. Neither we nor the Soviets want to fight because it's too costly."

Seeking an answer to terrorism

WILLIAM BEECHER

WASHINGTON - Adm. Stansfield Turner, a former director of the CIA, was addressing the flap over a pamphlet advising anti-government guerrillas in Nicaragua on political assassinations and other dirty tricks.

He told reporters at a breakfast meeting this week that one of the problems was the Administration's recall to active service of "a lot of oldtime [CIA] employees," some of whom "have not been able to adapt" to the new restrictions on covert warfare.

It wasn't so many years ago when the CIA was running the Phoenix program during the Vietnam war. For those with short memories, that was a program which in effect adopted the Viet Cong's tactics of terrorism and assassination against its own infrastructure; of fighting fire with fire.

A succession of recent Presidents, by executive order, have barred assassinations, either directly by American operatives or by their foreign hirelings or associates.

The issue came up again in the televised campaign debate between Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale. The President tried to lay the blame at the doorstep of a CIA contract employee who was hired to teach tactics to the Contras and, he implied, overzealously produced a how-to pamphlet that contravened national policy. Higher-ups excised some particu-

larly egregious aspects, Reagan said, but somehow 12 copies of the original draft got out.

Subsequent reporting, however, makes clear that the advice on "neutralizing" Sandinista judges, security officials and others was not deleted. Guerrilla fighters certainly understand that neutralization does not mean social shunning or house arrest.

It is, of course, relatively easy and correct for a civilized society to condemn assassination as a tool of national policy in a situation such as the covert war in Nicaragua.

But that answer is not so easy in the case of state-sponsored terrorism, such as the truck-bombings of American diplomatic and military installations in Beirut. US officials are trying to come up with appropriate responses.

President Reagan, as he took office at a moment when the nation was frustrated over the hostage trauma in Iran, vowed that terrorists would no longer be free to strike at American personnel, facilities and interests without being visited with swift and harsh retaliation. That was before the acts of terrorism in Beirut.

In this week's TV debate, Mondale said: "The terrorists have won each time. The President told the terrorists that he was going to retaliate. He didn't. They called [his] bluff. And the bottom line is: the United States left in humiliation, and our enemies are stronger."

To which Reagan responded:

"I'm tempted to ask you what you would do . . . We are busy trying to find the centers where these operations stem from and retaliation will be taken. But we are not going to simply kill some people to say, 'Oh, look, we got even.'"

Officials charged with trying to find meaningful answers are nearly stumped. To be sure, they are trying to improve their intelligence. They are also urging Syria to block the movement of explosives to radical Shiites and Iranians in Lebanon, and Israel to pursue its own counterterrorist interests there.

But they know that to simply bomb a suspected terrorist training center near Baalbeck, Lebanon, may kill some innocent bystanders and perhaps lead to an escalation of anti-US violence throughout the Mideast and beyond. If the evidence should show that the truck-bombings were masterminded, say, in Tehran, should they consider sending bombers or assassins there?

Would that be moral, legal, justifiable or effective? Would stern private warnings suffice or be laughed off as a sign of weakness?

To the extent that state-directed terrorism increasingly becomes viewed as a low-risk, high-payoff, politically potent alternative to war-making against a strong, civilized society, it presents a threat that demands an answer - and not just television repartee.

William Beecher is the Globe's diplomatic correspondent.

Avoidable Damage to the C.I.A.

By Stansfield Turner

McLEAN, Va. — The Central Intelligence Agency is in the headlines again. The most recent episode involves the distribution of a pamphlet advising Nicaraguan rebels how to "neutralize" Nicaraguan officials. A few weeks ago, it was a question of whether it was right for President Reagan to blame yet another security failure in Beirut on the deterioration of our intelligence-gathering capabilities before he came to office.

On the latter point, the President was shouted down; indeed, he phoned Jimmy Carter to apologize. On the question of whether we urged the assassination of Nicaraguan leaders, the verdict is still out; the President himself suspects something is askew and has commissioned two investigations. But beyond what's right or wrong in these two cases, there are deeper issues here. Will there be a revival of public skepticism about whether the C.I.A. is operating under adequate control? And what impact will this have on the agency?

The record would say that public washings of C.I.A. linen can only damage the agency's ability to function effectively. That was what happened after the widespread public criticism of 1975-76. In those years, three investigative bodies uncovered past misdeeds by the C.I.A., the National Security Agency and Army intelligence — largely instances of improper and unnecessary intrusions into the privacy of Americans. The resulting uproar injured our espionage capability seriously. When the Carter Administration took office, espionage activities had sunk to a very low point, and covert actions, such as the current C.I.A. involvement in Nicaragua, even lower. The reason was not a lack of money or personnel. The C.I.A.'s espionage branch, composed of conscientious professionals, was simply hunkering down. Although it is obvious that risk-taking is essential to good intelligence, these professionals were reluctant to take risks that might lead to further criticisms and endanger the agency's future.

By about early 1979, criticism began to diminish. When the public sensed that it had come dangerously close to permanently damaging the C.I.A., the professionals began to take heart. From the nadir of 1975-76, espionage and covert action revived.

Along with that revival, though, came a new system of Congressional and White House oversight, designed to help the intelligence agencies avoid the excesses of the past that had been fostered by a near-total lack of accountability.

During the past three years, the oversight committees of the Congress have been arguing with the Administration over the C.I.A.'s covert role in Nicaragua. They have questioned whether the agency is funding the contras legally; whether the mining of Nicaragua's harbors was legal and proper; whether the C.I.A. should be providing assistance to American soldiers of fortune operating with the contras; whether the C.I.A. has been keeping the Congress adequately informed about its covert activities.

And there have been charges that the agency has been politicized, first when two senior analysts quit the agency after claiming they were being pressured to twist their analyses of Central America to suit domestic political requirements, and later when the President attempted to cast

blame for the lack of security in Beirut on failures of intelligence.

There is nothing wrong with the airing of such criticisms. That's what the oversight process is intended to do. What is wrong is that the Administration persists in the covert action in Nicaragua despite all evidence that it is getting progressively out of control.

In sum, we are ominously close to a replay of the 1975-76 public questioning of the C.I.A.'s integrity and judgment — questioning that damaged our espionage capabilities. There's little evidence President Reagan recognizes this as one of the costs of continuing the contra operation in Nicaragua or that he recognizes that by attempting to blame the latest Beirut incident on the Carter Administration he is politicizing intelligence. If, as a result of all this, the public should again lose confidence in the C.I.A., the agency may well lose its confidence in itself, leading to a repetition of the unwillingness of the professionals to take the risks associated with good espionage. That could be a disaster for intelligence on terrorism in Beirut and on everything else. □

Stansfield Turner, a retired admiral, was Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration.

CIA manual probbers split over meaning of 'neutralization'

By Terry Atlas

Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—A CIA review of its psychological-warfare manual for Nicaraguan rebels left intact language advocating "neutralization" of key Nicaraguan government officials, the agency told the Senate Intelligence Committee on Monday.

After a three-hour closed-door briefing, Sen. Sam Nunn [D., Ga.] said that while CIA officials made some deletions in the 90-page manual, "the term 'neutralization' was in all the documents."

Nunn said he interprets the word to mean assassination of government officials, but another member of the panel, Sen. Malcolm Wallop [R., Wyo.], said he thinks the word can cover a number of actions short of that, such as discrediting, blackmailing or kidnaping. "Sen. Nunn and I disagree over what that word implies," Wallop said.

But the CIA explanation to the senators appears to conflict with the scenario President Reagan offered in his debate with Walter Mondale in Kansas City Sunday night.

Reagan had said CIA officials had deleted portions of the text after they recognized that they were a "direct contravention" of an executive order prohibiting American officials from conducting or advocating political assassinations. He added that 12 copies of the original manual escaped that review, and "some way or other ... got out down there."

BUT NUNN said that even after the deletions had been made by CIA officials, the manual contained a reference to neutralization and encouraged the rebels to create a "martyr" among their members killed by Nicaraguan forces.

"There were deletions before some printings were made and before some distribution was made, but all of the documents presumably ... had some of what would be called questionable to some and to others offensive language, including language relating to so-called 'neutralization,'" he said.

Nunn and Wallop were the only members of the Senate Intelligence Committee who attended the

briefing by CIA officials on the agency's continuing investigation of the manual's production. The matter is also being investigated by the White House Intelligence Oversight Board.

Wallop said he was satisfied that the CIA is proceeding quickly with its review and said there is "no indication of any desire to hide anything." He said the psychological-warfare manual was prepared to help bring some order and discipline to the "wildly disorganized and wildly operating bunch of guerrillas" fighting the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

THE CIA knows the identity of the manual's author, a former Army officer from Ft. Bragg, N.C., but it is still tracking down who was involved in the review process, he said.

But the committee's vice chairman, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan [D., N.Y.], who was filled in on the CIA's briefing by the committee staff, criticized the agency late in the day for failing to tell the panel who was responsible. "The CIA has still not told us who ordered this manual, who wrote it and who approved it," he said.

In another development, Newsweek magazine reported in its current edition that key aides to United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and CIA Director William Casey and Defense Department officials discussed the need for a handbook on guerrilla warfare in meetings during August, 1983. About the same time, a U.S. expert in psychological warfare was sent to Honduras along with other CIA advisers to train Honduran-based Nicaraguan rebels, the magazine said.

Speaking in Dayton, Ohio, on Monday, Kirkpatrick called the Newsweek report "totally mistaken" and said "there is nobody on my staff who has had any such role."

LAST WEEK, after the existence of the manual became known, a senior White House official said it was the work of a "low-level" CIA contract employee, and was "not ever approved or condoned at any reasonable level" within the CIA.

He also said the administration maintains its prohibition on political assassinations.

Sunday night, attacked by Walter Mondale for producing a manual "ordering political assassinations ... and other forms of terrorism," Reagan replied that it was written by a "gentleman down in Nicaragua who is on contract to the CIA advising, supposedly on military tactics, the contras."

Reagan said only 12 copies escaped deletions made by the CIA "agency head" in Nicaragua and officials at CIA headquarters outside Washington. A minute later, Reagan said he "misspoke" about the CIA official in Nicaragua and simply meant to say, "It was a man down there in that area."

Speaking to reporters Monday morning, former CIA director Stansfield Turner said Reagan made a significant slip of the tongue. "I don't think that even after he corrected himself he really understood what he had given away," said Turner, who headed the agency during the Carter administration.

"We have never, to my knowledge, ever acknowledged having a CIA station in any country," he said. "It's just a matter of policy. You don't want the Nicaraguan government, or any government, to come along and say we don't want a CIA station in our country."

TURNER SAID Monday that the pattern of American covert activity in Central America suggests an effort by the CIA to topple the Nicaraguan government.

The CIA-prepared manual for U.S.-backed Nicaraguan rebels, which follows CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors earlier this year, seems to go beyond Reagan's publicly stated goal of preventing the Sandinistas from exporting their revolution to other countries in the region, he said.

"I don't believe the majority of the American people want to have the CIA overthrow the government of Nicaragua," he told a group of reporters. "But there is no way you can put what is going on in Nicaragua in any other terms."