ARTICLE APPEARED
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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
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KGB may have taken Soviet writer out of London, ex-CIA director says

By Ed Blanche
Associated Press

LONDON — Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner said yesterday that a Soviet journalist who spent the last year in Britain and then surfaced in Moscow on Tuesday accusing the British of kidnapping him may have been smuggled from London by the KGB.

Turner said journalist Oleg Bitov, who vanished from his London hideout Aug. 16 and turned up Tuesday in Moscow at a news conference, was probably forced to make the accusations against the British "or die."

"I'm sure they [the KGB] would have used torture too, if necessary, to get him to make his television appearance," Turner said in a telephone interview from the United States with Independent Radio News, a network that feeds commercial radio stations in Britain. The interview was broadcast on Capitol Radio in London.

The British government has said that Bitov had defected and been granted asylum in Britain after he disappeared on Sept. 9, 1983, while covering the Venice Film Festival. Britain protested strongly to Moscow after Bitov, 52, denied Tuesday that he had defected willingly. A Home Office statement branded Bitov's assertion that he was snatched in Venice by British agents as "absurd and offensive."

Turner said, "I would by no means rule out his having been drugged, locked up in some kind of a crate and taken out of Great Britain surreptitiously.

"We all know that you've had a case of that with a different country recently. The Soviets would have been much more skillful in clearing it up."

Turner was referring to an abortive attempt to smuggle former Nigerian Transport Minister Umaru Dikko, drugged, out of Britain in a crate July 5. A Nigerian and three Israelis have been charged with kidnapping him.

Turner said Bitov, former foreign cultural editor of Moscow's Literaturnaya Gazeta, or Literary Gazette, "from now on has no future ahead of him. He certainly isn't going to be reemployed in his old job. I think he's lucky if he avoids a prison camp in Siberia."

Four days after Bitov vanished from his London apartment last month, his car was found parked near the Soviet Embassy in London.

"He was settling in very nicely to quite an expensive lifestyle," said a British intelligence source, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "But he missed his wife and daughter very much." Bitov's wife and daughter were in the Soviet Union when Bitov disappeared in Italy.

"It seems likely that he was lured back to Moscow. His press conference had a dual purpose — to blacken our intelligence service and to discourage potential Soviet defectors," the British intelligence source said.

The source declined to say how the return of Bitov, viewed as a "significant defector" because of his links with top officials in Moscow, would affect Britain's chilly relations with the Soviet Union.

Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe was scheduled to meet Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko later this month in New York at the U.N. General Assembly. Gromyko also has an invitation to visit London next year.

The source dismissed the possibility that Bitov had been placed as a spy in the West by the KGB, the Soviet secret police and intelligence agency.

In Moscow, the gazette for which Bitov worked devoted a full page yesterday to his reappearance there and said Bitov soon would reveal more. It said Bitov would return to work for the gazette, although he may not regain the high post of foreign culture editor with the right to travel abroad.

In Britain, the Daily Mail said that Bitov identified seven alleged British operatives and two safe houses in London and that his return to Moscow had caused "considerable consternation to British intelligence."

Duff Hart-Davis, a writer with the Sunday Telegraph, edited some of the anti-Soviet articles Bitov had written when he was in Britain. Hart-Davis said, "One of his favorite phrases concerned 'the unmatchable pleasure' of being free. His friends ... feel certain that he was abducted or at the very least enticed."

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 3

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 September 1984
NATIONAL

US prepares new concessions, new initiatives on arms

ABM debate revived as both sides seem poised to break treaty

By Brad Knickerbocker
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

On Oct. 3, 1972, it seemed as though half the nuclear arms race had been halted.

That is when a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting antiballistic missile systems went into force. In essence, as Henry A. Kissinger said at the time, the idea was to give offensive missiles "a free ride to their target" and thereby ensure that both nuclear powers retained their retaliatory force.

Today, though, many arms-control doubters — including some key Reagan officials — wonder whether the ABM treaty ought to be changed, if not scrapped.

WEAPONS IN SPACE

They look at the continuing buildup in nuclear weapons on both sides (which the ABM treaty was supposed to slow), the big advances in technology since then, and the allegations that the USSR is violating the ABM treaty in fashioning a nationwide missile-defense system. They wonder if the 12-year-old treaty has not outlived its usefulness, if the US should not use its technological edge to defend against Soviet missiles.

In response, many nuclear strategists and former arms-control and defense officials have mounted a vigorous defense of the ABM treaty. They view President Reagan's controversial strategic defense initiative ("star wars") as a direct threat to what some see as the most successful superpower agreement in the nuclear age.

"The American people are being misled into believing there is a magical solution to the nuclear predicament," says Gerard C. Smith, the Republican who negotiated the first US-USSR strategic arms agreement as well as the ABM treaty.

"A US 'star wars' effort will prompt a similar effort by the Soviets," says Ambassador Smith, and "compel both sides to accelerate their race in offensive weapons, and increase the risk of nuclear war."

The essence of the 1972 ABM agreement (and its 1974 protocol) is that the superpowers should be limited to a single defense system of no more than 100 interceptor missiles around the national capital or one ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) field. These defensive missiles may not have more than one warhead, nor may their launchers be rapidly reloadable or mobile. Both countries also agreed not to develop, test, or deploy sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems, although research in these areas is allowed.

The treaty was an acknowledgment of the overwhelming destructive force of nuclear weapons.

"It is a *realpolitik* approach, not an ideal one," says Sidney Drell, physicist and codirector of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. "The ABM treaty is the formal recognition that mutual destruction could not be escaped if the superpowers were drawn by accident or design into nuclear war. . . . It accepts deterrence as a present necessity and objective condition, not as an active threat which would be intolerable."

Today's debate over missile defense — prompted by President Reagan's controversial speech last year — echoes the one heard in this country in the late 1960s. But there are several important reasons for its revival.

First, as even critics of the President's initiative acknowledge, there has been remarkable progress in those technologies (sensors, computers, directed energy, and ways to transport things into space) that could be part of an advanced defensive system.

Second, fears about the possibility of nuclear war — due in large measure to the lack of significant progress in limiting weapons of mass destruction — have heightened public interest in pursuing protective measures. Opinion surveys (including polls taken a few months before Reagan's "star wars" speech in March 1983 before the conservative Heritage Foundation) consistently show more than 80 percent of the public favoring strategic defense.

And third, there is mounting evidence that the Soviets may be positioning themselves to "break out" of the ABM treaty by deploying systems not allowed under the agreement. Among these is a large phased-array radar (which can track many targets at once), advanced mobile antiaircraft missiles that could possibly be used against other missiles as well, and ABM launchers that US intelligence sources suspect can be quickly reloaded.

The United States in the mid-1970s built its allowable ABM system (called Safeguard) around 150 Minuteman strategic nuclear missiles in North Dakota. But it was dismantled a few months later because of its high cost and the realization that Soviet missiles probably could penetrate it.

The Soviet Union has kept its Galosh missile defense facilities around Moscow and now is building an improved ABM-X-3 system with better interceptors and radars.

Critics of the President's strategic defense program are quick to point out that the US also may now be testing systems that encroach upon the ABM treaty. These

14

NEW YORK TRIBUNE
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Intelligence panel consi a new probe of Mondal

Ex-Carter official tied to loss of spy in

Political interference cited in 1980 inquiry

By Bill Gertz
NEW YORK TRIBUNE STAFF

WASHINGTON — The Senate Intelligence Committee recently weighed a congressional request to reopen its ultra-sensitive 1980 probe of Walter Mondale's top foreign policy adviser.

The committee denied the request despite charges that the investigation was obstructed by political tampering and unwillingness to air explosive, top-secret information, according to intelligence sources and congressional documents made available to the *New York Tribune*.

The investigation 4 years ago reportedly cleared the Mondale aide, David Aaron, of charges he revealed information that led to the loss of a deep-cover American spy working in the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

At the time, Aaron was President Carter's deputy national security adviser. He is currently a close adviser on foreign affairs to the Democratic presidential nominee.

David Aaron, left, was investigated by the Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Sen. Barry Goldwater, after the loss of a key CIA agent in Moscow.

Aaron, in a telephone interview, would not comment on the allegation. He confirmed that there was an "extensive investigation," but he denied that it was "an investigation of me." He referred questions to the office of Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

"He's the man who made the decision," Aaron said of the committee's recent determination not to reopen the 1980 probe. Goldwater could not be reached for comment.

A spokesman for the Mondale-Ferraro campaign refused to comment on the report. Aaron, who has been described as Mondale's most important foreign policy adviser, earlier served as his staff assistant on the Senate Intelligence Committee when it was headed by the late Sen. Frank Church. He recently returned from Israel where, according to a report in the *New York Times*, Aaron attempted to improve both Mondale's and his own relations with the Israelis.

In October 1983, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was first asked to provide records of the Aaron investigation by the House Post Office and Civil Service subcommittee on human resources. A letter from subcommittee Chairman Don Albosta, D-Mich., and the subcommittee's minority leader Dan Crane, R-Ill., requested records "relating to the possible compromise of highly classified information" involving "high-level personnel of the National Security Council at that time [1980]."

Report on leaks

In May, the subcommittee released its report on unauthorized disclosures during the 1980 election, specifically covering the transfer of former president Jimmy Carter's debate notes to the Reagan campaign. The leaks were traced to Carter's National Security Council (NSC).

According to congressional sources close to the investigation, "numerous allegations" of Carter NSC leaks during the subcommittee probe were ignored. The subcommittee's final report was described as "highly partisan" and incomplete. The report mentioned Aaron as the person responsible for preparing the foreign policy section of the purloined Carter briefing book.

A House staff member who pursued the NSC leaks on behalf of Crane was told by Intelligence Committee staff director Rob Simmons last June 22 that committee records were "too extensive to permit perusal by outsiders," including investigators with top-level security clearances. Simmons did not see the subcommittee's October request from Albosta and Crane, sources said.

Intelligence Committee Chairman Goldwater, in a reply to Crane

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 8-1

WASHINGTON TIMES
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MIND GAMES

ESPionage and the arms race

By Stephanie Voss
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Item: Hella Hammid, a photographer, sat in a room and accurately described a microscopic image contained in a sealed envelope a block away.

Item: Submerged in a submarine off the California coast, Ms. Hammid accurately described a cliff-hanging oak tree on shore as a partner toured the randomly chosen site.

Item: Painter Ingo Swann was given a set of geographic coordinates. From the figures (49 degrees 20 minutes south latitude and 70 degrees 14 minutes east longitude), he accurately described the rocky terrain and outhouse at a Soviet/French weather station on the antarctic island of Kerguelen.

These reportedly successful experiments are part of the controversial history of a field laughed at by most of the scientific community, yet closely watched — and perhaps heavily funded — by the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The field is called parapsychology: the study of ESP, clairvoyance, telepathy and mind-over-matter techniques. Now, after years of wondering how — and if — psychic powers work, researchers say they are ready to face the test of practicality.

Not only is the government reportedly working on ways to replace James Bond gimmickry with ESPioniage, but psychics are ready to offer their services to businesses, as well.

U.S. government interest is based largely on the results of a controversial series of experiments during the 1970s at the Stanford Research Institute in Menlo Park, Calif. (The institute originally was affiliated with Stanford University, but severed its connections and changed its name to SRI International after student protests against military research on campus.) Researcher Russell Targ said much of the institute's funds came from the federal government, but was coy about specifics, and most government agencies declined to comment.

Former CIA director Adm. Stansfield Turner confirmed that the Central Intelligence Agency funded psychic research under Vice President George Bush, the admiral's predecessor.

"The CIA had had a program of investigating psychic phenomena, before my time, ir which they had parapsychologists try to demonstrate if they could conjure up images of things they had never seen. Sometimes it worked; sometimes it didn't. The program was, by my time, one of keeping up with what was going on outside the CIA. We tried to monitor what was going on in the Soviet Union and also what was going on quite openly in the U.S.," Adm. Turner said.

"You've got two kinds of people," he continued, "Those who think it's kooky and those people who *are* kooky and think it can do much more than it can. I'm in the middle. I don't think it should be dismissed." That is why under Adm. Turner's tenure, from 1977 to 1980, the agency continued to monitor developments in psychic research both in the United States and abroad.

Psychic phenomena do have a "kooky" image and are linked by many with even more esoteric topics, such as UFOs, seances and cultism. Government agencies thus are understandably shy about using the vocabulary of parapsychology (literally "beside psychology"). It is not a topic the military, in particular, is anxious to discuss at all.

According to Ron McRae, the author of "Mind Wars," government and military reports tend to replace the term ESP, or extrasensory perception, with phrases like "novel biological information transfer systems." Thus, an accurate estimate of the U.S. government's spending on the subject is difficult to come by.

The National Security Council said tersely, "We do not engage in it [psychic research]."

The Pentagon, however, was not as certain.

"We don't find any items in the budget on psychic research," Pentagon spokeswoman Jan Bodanyi said last week, after checking indices for 1983, 1984 and 1985. There is no index, she said, for any of the various euphemisms more likely to have been listed.

Congress has gotten into the act also:

A 1981 précis prepared by the staff of the House Committee on Science and Technology blamed low funding for a lack of quality research on "the physics of consciousness." The brief report cited the remote viewing experiments at Stanford Research Institute, adding:

"In the area of national defense, there are the obvious implications of one's ability to identify distant sites and affect sensitive instruments or other humans. A general recognition of the degree of interconnectiveness of minds could have far-reaching social and political implications for this nation and the world."

One member of Congress has risked becoming a Capitol laughingstock by not laughing at psychic research. Rep. Charlie Rose, D-N.C., a former member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, is troubled by rumors that the Soviets have the jump on telepathic warfare. Some estimates place the USSR's support at the $30 million-a-year mark.

Some military officials share his concern about a possible "psycho gap."

"There are weapons systems that operate on the power of the mind and whose lethal capacity has already been demonstrated [in communist-bloc research]," according to Army Lt. Col. John B. Alexander. The colonel is credited by military spokesmen with spurring government interest in parapsychology.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14

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STAT

OPINION

Terrorism's new weapon: mines at sea

By Stansfield Turner

THE mining of the Red Sea is a new, unfortunate step in international terrorism that will bring added costs and inconvenience to all of us. Mines are a unique weapon, in that the terrorist can be many miles away before a ship passes over them and they explode. By the same token, they are indiscriminate weapons that cannot be aimed at a particular victim, only at a type of ship. There are two types of mines and three methods of planting them.

There are "contact" mines which explode only when a ship physically hits them, and "influence" mines which are detonated by the sounds, magnetism, or pressures a ship generates as it moves through the water. An acoustic mine waits until the noise rises to a peak indicating that the ship has come close and then detonates. If the ship is close enough, it will damage it. The mine can have a threshold of noise set into it. A low threshold will make it detonate when a small, quiet ship passes by; with a high threshold the mine will wait for a big, noisy ship. Similarly, magnetic mines sense the magnetic field that surrounds the metal of a ship; and a pressure mine feels the pressure created as a ship compresses the water it passes through.

Mines can be "planted" — anchored to the bottom with the mine floating somewhere below the water's surface, or laid right on the bottom. Drifting mines are usually contact mines. They have a limited life because winds and currents carry them in odd directions and eventually wash them ashore. It's more common for contact mines to be moored below the surface so that they will strike the hull of the type of ship they are intended to damage. Influence mines are usually laid on the bottom, but can be moored below the surface when the water is too deep for an explosion from the bottom to be effective.

Mines can be delivered by almost any ship, by bomber, or cargo aircraft. I estimate that those in the Red Sea are acoustic-influence mines laid on the bottom and delivered by a ship. The fact that they have done relatively little damage is because they are likely in waters too deep for the size of the mines.

How do we go about countering mines once they've been laid? Ships can just avoid passing near them. One way to do that is to stick to very deep waters whenever possible. Most of the Red Sea is too deep for mines. Only its extremities, the Gulf or Suez at the north, and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb at the south, can be mined. Naval ships can use sonar to find the mines and tell ships where not to go. Navies can also try to sweep mines. For moored mines, either a helicopter or a ship tows underwater cables which snag the mine's mooring line reaching down to its anchor. A cutter device on the towed cable severs the anchor line, the mine pops to the surface, and someone has to shoot it to make it sink or explode. For bottom mines, the helicopter or ship tows a device that makes a noise like a ship or creates a magnetic field like one. When the mine senses these artificial signals, it thinks it has a ship and detonates.

The United States Navy relies heavily on helicopter mine sweepers for just the reason that they can get places quickly, as they have to the Red Sea in the past few days. Mine-sweeper ships from the US would have taken almost three weeks to get there. Mine-sweeping by helicopter is also safer, as the copter is above, rather than in, the mine field when it tows its mine-sweeping equipment.

Over the longer run, the way to stop this form of terrorism is to prevent the laying of mines in the first place. We will have to do at sea much of what we do in airports to deter hijackers; that is, inspect ships before they pass through narrow, shallow, minable waters to ensure that they do not drop mines as they go and prevent suspicious aircraft from passing over such waters. Those precautions will be costly. If the mining of the Red Sea encourages other terrorists to mine other places one way or another, each one of us will pay those costs of inspections, delays, and higher insurance rates, because the international shipping that is affected is essential to our economic well-being.

In the US one of the best deterrents to terrorism has been an alert public that does not hesitate to report suspicious activities. Now the world faces the challenge of reporting suspicious movements of ships at sea and in ports. We all have a stake in defeating this new challenge to world order.

Stansfield Turner is a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and was president of the Naval War College from 1972 to 1974.