

Executive Register

76-8699

ADDRESS

by

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before

FORT LAUDERDALE COUNCIL

NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

Fort Lauderdale, Florida

16 June 1976

MORI/CDF

Thank you very much. I am very happy to have this occasion to talk to this Navy League Council, in the presence of so many distinguished guests, including representatives of the Royal Navy, who are here tonight.

I thought I would talk to you, but before I talk to you I must say that I speak with a certain sadness as I learned shortly before I came here that our Ambassador to Beirut, Lebanon, Francis Meloy, was kidnapped and murdered along with his economic counselor and his Lebanese driver this afternoon. It makes you wonder what kind of a world we live in. From the middle ages, the person of an ambassador has always been sacred. This is the second ambassador we have lost in just a few years. I think it is eloquent of the kind of a world in which we live and the anarchy and the winds of folly that are blowing around the world today that make all men who are concerned with the survival of freedom and with some kind of a system of international peace and justice concerned with what is going on.

I am going to talk to you tonight about what I truly believe to be the oldest profession in the world. There are others who believe that another profession, which has been receiving considerable attention in the press recently, is the oldest profession. But I would remind you that before this other profession could operate someone had to

know where it was. That was intelligence, which is therefore the oldest profession in the world.

The United States has always had a very ambivalent view of intelligence. We liked it but we don't like to admit that we did it. We sort of think it was all right for all those old British, French, Russians, and Germans to do it, but we fine, moral, upstanding Americans don't do that sort of thing. Well we have, fortunately, otherwise we would not be a free and independent nation today. We have always built up our intelligence during the conflicts in which we have participated and then we destroy it. A little while ago in my biography, you heard that I went to the Army Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie in 1942. Do you know who was running it? A British colonel. That was the state of American intelligence in August 1942. We didn't have anybody qualified to run it.

In the invocation Nathan Hale was mentioned. I must make a confession. The chaplain that made the invocation has departed so I can tell this story safely. Out at the CIA we have a statue of Nathan Hale. It was put up over my bitter protest. Not that he wasn't a very brave young man, he did utter a very immortal line that he regretted that he had only one life to give for his country. The problem with Nathan Hale was that he was a spy who was caught on his first mis-

sion and he had all the evidence on him. I am not sure that this is what we want to hold up to our young career trainees as an example. He was sent by Washington into Manhattan to find out when the British were going to land. They met him. They were already there. But we have always had this view and we have engaged in a sort of striptease of our intelligence that has stupefied our foreign friends. They have had problems with their intelligence services and when they do, they set up a discreet commission of inquiry which inquires, reports to the parliamentary body or to the responsible parties, and they sanction people who have done wrong, and they take corrective measures to prevent certain abuses.

I must tell you that not long ago a Congressman asked me how you could abolish abuses in intelligence, and I said that I had only one suggestion. That was to stop using human beings, because as long as you use human beings certain things are going to happen that you would prefer not to happen.

Why do we need this intelligence? We need this intelligence because we live in a very unsafe world. Less than 20 percent of mankind lives today in what we would call freedom. The others live in various forms of repression and tyranny. We in America face the situation we have not faced since our Revolution. For the first time we face a potential adversary who is a global power. Germany at the height

of its power was basically a continental European power, with no capability to harm the United States other than by submarines sinking some ships off our coasts. The Soviet Union is a global power. The Soviet Union is able and willing, as Angola shows, to project its powers 10,000 miles from the Soviet Union. We see the Soviet Union deploying five, perhaps six, new types of long-range, intercontinental ballistic missiles, all of them heavier and more accurate than the generation they replaced. We see the Soviet Union building very large numbers of submarines, equipping them with missiles which they can fire at the United States, not from mid-Atlantic, but right from their home port waters. We see a Soviet Navy that in a few years has gone from a coast guard-type Navy to a blue-water navy. We see the Soviets developing aircraft with capabilities against the United States, as well as against our European and Asiatic allies. We see the Soviet Union upgrading all of its conventional forces and spending considerably more money on defense than we do out of a gross national product less than half as big as ours. We see burgeonings of the same thing in China.

I feel that we in the Intelligence Community owe the American people the answers to four overriding questions: Who will be in control of the Soviet Union five years from

today? What will be their attitude toward us and toward our allies? What is there in Soviet research and development today that will impact on our lives tomorrow? And the same questions for China, a little further down the line. So this is the kind of a world in which we live. And the real issue before the American people is: do they want to have effective intelligence or do they want to wait until the day when we have to choose between abject humiliation and nuclear blackmail.

It is to many of our foreign friends a stupefying thing that someone in my position would be out talking to the general public. They come into my office with a slightly glassy stare after they have seen the road sign outside the building which says CIA. One of them said to me, "I don't believe it, it isn't possible, you're not pointing an arrow at your secret intelligence service." In most other countries, no one knows who's in them or even if they exist." It reminds me of a story that was told to me not long ago by the head of a foreign service. He said, "The Soviets recruited a spy in Naples, and they took him to Moscow and trained him in secret writing, shortwave communications, codes and everything else. Then they sent Agnello back to Naples and said, "Now you wait there, we'll be in touch with you in a couple of years." So, in a couple of years somebody came out from Moscow, went to

the address, looked at the names on the door, and he saw Agnello, ground floor right. He went in and pushed the button. The man opened the door and said, "Agnello, I have come from Moscow." The man looked at him and he said, "Signore, there is a big mistake. I am Agnello the tailor, Agnello the spy is on the third floor left." And the head of this foreign service said, "Sometimes I suspect that Agnello was really an American."

Be that as it may, we have come through this lengthy investigation. You have heard all about the allegations that were made. Let me talk to you about these allegations for a minute. I cannot tell you that there were not things done that should not have been done. I cannot tell you that there were not abuses. I cannot tell you that there were not kooks. I cannot tell you that there was not bad judgment. But I would like to put this a little bit into perspective. Everybody has talked about assassination. What was the ultimate finding of all of these investigations? Nobody was assassinated. Yes, a lot of people talked about it. Well, a lot of people talked about a lot of things. But nobody was assassinated. You all saw the picture of the dart gun which a Senator held up very cheerily. The dart gun was never used. That, of course, was played in the low key.

Then we get to those various allegations of what was going on. First, you heard about the massive wire taps which

gave you the impression that for the last thirty years everybody in the United States has had his phone conversations listened to by the CIA. What are the facts? The facts are that the Director of Central Intelligence is the only person in the United States who is charged by law with the protection of his sources and methods. These wire taps were against people from CIA who were suspected of taking things home or of communicating with foreign agents. How many were there? There were 32 wire taps in 27 years. That is one and a quarter wire taps a year. But the impression conveyed to the American people was that "big brother" was listening to everything they were saying.

Then we got the break-ins. All of the break-ins were against CIA employees who were suspected of taking documents home with them.

Then you heard about the drug experiments. Well, we saw a man like Cardinal Mindszenty, who had resisted every pressure the Nazis could bring to bear on him. Suddenly the communists brought him before the newsreel cameras, hollow-eyed, to confess every crime in the book. Those of us who were old enough to remember believed it was done with mind-bending drugs. We believed those drugs might be used against us, and we had to find out how to defend ourselves against it. And it was not just the armed forces and the CIA that

were engaged in such research. The National Institutes of Health and a great many very respectable, very liberal universities were doing exactly the same thing.

Then you had these toxins, so-called drugs. Well, the Russians used those to kill some people in Germany in the 50's. We were afraid they would be used on us, and, yes, we experimented to find out how they worked so that we could defend ourselves and, if need be, retaliate. You know the United States committed itself not to use poison gas before World War II. That did not prevent the United States from making many millions of poison gas shells to be used in retaliation in case they were used against us. Most of you who have been in the service know that every command and every country has contingency plans. A contingency plan does not mean that you intend to do it; it means that you have a plan for a certain set of circumstances.

These allegations have been used to try and demonstrate to the American people that the real threats to the freedom of the American people come from the CIA and the FBI. The CIA has never had the power to arrest anybody. How you are supposed to be a gestapo when you can't arrest anybody, I don't know. These facts are carefully, of course, not mentioned.

If we go back 2,500 years, we find a Chinese author, a man by the name of Sun Tzu, who wrote a book called The Art of War. He describes how to undo your enemies. Remember, this book is 25 centuries old. Let me just quote to you some of the things he said. The first general consideration was: "Fighting is the most primitive and crude form of making war on your enemies." And then he goes on to describe how to take them apart without fighting. "Cover with ridicule everything that is valid in your opponent's country. Denounce their leaders, involve them in criminal enterprises and at the right time turn them over to the scorn of their fellow countrymen. Aggravate by every means at your command all existing differences within your opponent's country. Agitate the young against the old." There are 13 of these and he concludes by saying, "The greatest excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles; the greatest excellence is to subdue your enemies without ever having to fight them."

I think not enough of us are prepared for what I believe are the new forms of war, which is the combination of the threat of the use of war with all kinds of activity to make us wonder about the justice of our own cause. It has been repeatedly proved that it is difficult to stop the United States from the outside. If you want to stop it, you have to stop it from the inside.

You know someone told me a story the other day that I thought was very good. It was about three sailors who were shipwrecked on an island in the Pacific. One was French, one was British, and one was American. They were immediately captured by cannibals. And the chief of the cannibals said to them, "I have some bad news and good news for you." The bad news is that we're going to have you for lunch tomorrow, and I don't mean as guests. The good news, and you need some good news after that bad news, is that I'll give you anything you want in the meantime." So, he turned to the Frenchman and he said, "What do you want?" The Frenchman said, "Well, if I am going to be killed in the morning I would just as soon spend the remaining hours with that beautiful cannibal girl over there." So they said, "Fine." They untied the Frenchman and he and the cannibal girl went off into the woods. Then they turned to the Englishman and they said, "What do you want?" The Englishman said, "I want a pen and paper." They said, "What do you want a pen and paper for?" He said, "I want to write a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations to protest against the unjust, unfriendly, and unsporting attitude you have adopted toward us." So they said, "Okay," and they took the Englishman to a hut and they untied him and gave him a pen and paper, and he sat down and started

his "Dear Mr. Waldheim" letter. Then they turned to the American and they said, "What do you want?" The American said, "I want to be led into the middle of the village, I want to be made to kneel down, and I want the biggest cannibal here to kick me in the rear end," and the chief turned to his vice-chief and he said, "Those Americans are a weird bunch; you never know what they will ask for. But since I promised, we've got to do it." So, they untied the American, they led him into the middle of the village, they made him kneel down, and the biggest cannibal took a running leap, kicked the American in the rear end, and knocked him 15 feet. As the American sprawled out, he pulled out a tommy gun he had been hiding under his clothes, and he cut down the nearby cannibals, and the rest fled. Well, hearing the gunfire, the Frenchman came out of the woods and the Englishman came out of his hut, and they looked at the American standing there with a smoking tommy gun in his hand, and they said, "My God, do you mean to say that you had that gun the whole time." The American said, "Sure." And they said, "Why didn't you use it before now?" And the foreigner who told me the story said, "The American looked at them with a hurt expression, and he said, 'But you don't understand, it wasn't until they kicked me in the rear end that I had any moral justification for such extreme action'."

Now, we have been lucky from time to time to get this kind of conveniently served up kick in the rear end. At Pearl Harbor we got it. We were able to recover from Pearl Harbor because the oceans were wide, there were other powers standing between us and our enemies, and we had the enormous advantage of the industrial power of the United States. I would like to know whether we could recover from a nuclear Pearl Harbor. The very existence of the Agency to which I belong was caused by the investigation into Pearl Harbor which proved, after the war, that a great many people in the United States Government had little pieces of information, which if they could have all been brought together into one central place, maybe wouldn't have avoided Pearl Harbor but would have made it a great deal less harmful to us than it was. And thus it was decided to create a central repository for this information.

Now there exists a widespread belief that the CIA is sitting on one little private pile of information and the Defense Intelligence Agency, the ONI and the Army G-2 on others. We are all working from the same data bank. We are all working from the same facts. No, we don't always agree. A military man always tends to view what the enemy's capabilities are. Non-military people sometimes put more emphasis on what his intentions are. The answer is that you need both.

We get a great deal of intelligence openly, through open publications, through open broadcasts, through our embassies, through public sources of all kinds, maybe even half, or more than half, but it is the easiest half. Then you get a considerable percentage through the great technical systems that have been developed in the last few years. But none of those will get you inside a man's head. None of those will tell you what people are thinking about. Only people can do that. And, you know, with that same ambivalence I was talking about the Congress created the CIA to engage in spying, to use the currently fashionable opprobrious word, it was called collecting intelligence previously. But they didn't say that. They said you will do such other things as the National Security Council may require.

Not long ago at the height of the discussion about assassination we had some Congressmen out at CIA and there was discussion of this question. Somebody said, "Well, of course, if anybody could have gotten Hitler in '43 or '44, he would undoubtedly have been the first joint recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor and the Victoria Cross." And one of the young Congressmen said, "Yes, but think if you could have gotten him in '35 or '36 of how many lives you would have saved." I said, "Congressman, do I understand you are advocating assassination in peacetime?" He

said, "Oh no, but that was different." It's different because we know what happened subsequently.

One of the great German intelligence agents, Otto Skorzeny, was tried by the Allies after the war and he was accused of sending people in British and American uniforms behind the British and American lines during the war, a dastardly crime. Two British colonels and one American colonel who had done the same thing with people in German uniform testified on his behalf and the case was thrown out of court, even in the immediate post-war atmosphere of 1947. Moses sent spies into the land of Canaan. As I said, it is the oldest profession. But we need it today more than we've ever needed it before.

America in the past has always been unreachable and therefore unbeatable. That is unfortunately no longer true. In the years following World War II we solved problems in one of two ways. We solved them either by military force or we solved them by overwhelming them with our great financial and economic resources. We can't do that anymore. We need judgment, we need understanding, we need the ability to establish a foreign policy on a sound basis.

We do have a very large intelligence community, but what does it cost the American people? I am not at liberty to give you the figures, although the budgetary process for the American intelligence organizations is the same as for the Department of Agriculture or the

Department of Commerce, within the Congress, within the appropriations committees, within the Office of Management and Budget. It is simply not made public. We have not gotten that far into the Agnello business. People say, "Why can't you make it public?" Well, if you made it public for one year, nothing would happen. But if you made it public over a series of years, you would have bulges in it of major programs like the U-2 or the raising of the Soviet submarine, and you would start an unraveling process because people would ask why there were differences.

There is no other country in the world that discusses its intelligence services as openly as we do. In fact, in most countries they don't comment on it nor do they discuss it. In our system we have decided to do so. A foreigner said to me once, "You Americans are the first people to have gone to the moon. You may well be the first people to run your intelligence service in Macy's window." Whether this is possible or not over a long period of time, I do not know. I personally do not believe it is.

I believe we can live with any form of oversight the Congress chooses, but I would devoutly hope that they would choose something like the Atomic Energy Committee where you have a Joint Committee of both Houses and which has been a model of discretion and responsibility.

Right now we are reporting to seven different committees which compose more than half the membership of both houses of Congress. How you can keep anything secret in that atmosphere I don't know.

John Jay, who ran the spies before the Revolution, was once called before the Committee of Secret Correspondence in the Congress and asked to lay before the Congress the names of his spies and how much he was paying them. John Jay's answer was, "Experience has shown that the Congress is composed of too many people to have this kind of disclosure made to the whole body. Such disclosures in the past have been fatal not merely to the project but to a great many of the people concerned." And he got away with it. Now as I say we've had this problem since the dawn of our history.

Not long ago not far from here I was having lunch with a former British Prime Minister, Lord Avon, Anthony Eden, and he was discussing the difficulties an ancestor of his had during the Revolution. Robert Eden was the Royal Governor of Maryland. He was in trouble with the British Government who thought he was overly sympathetic with the Americans and he was in trouble with the Americans who thought he wasn't sufficiently sympathetic with them. So I said to Lord Avon, "Yes, that may be true, but in the meantime his brother William in Paris had successfully

penetrated Benjamin Franklin's office." "Oh," he said, "You know about that, do you?"

When the French told Benjamin Franklin that France was entering the war against Great Britain in 1779, that information was in the hands of the British Government 42 hours later. And in those days if you rode a horse from Paris to the coast, took a boat across the Channel and rode from the Channel coast to London, it would take you about 42 hours.

You wouldn't believe some of the things the founding fathers did in the past. I've looked into it in the year of this 200th Anniversary of our Revolution, and some of our do-gooders would have been very upset with some of these people. Let me tell you about Benjamin Franklin, for instance. Benjamin Franklin for three years before the Revolution, when we were all loyal subjects of George III, was the Assistant Postmaster of British North America. Do you know what he was doing? He was opening that mail like crazy. The British caught him, they took him to London, they tried him before the Privy Council, and they found him guilty. But before they could sentence him, he skipped off to Paris. When he got to Paris, he designed and had the French build him a printing press. Do you know what he printed on the printing press? He printed some British passports and some British currencies, but mostly he

printed fabricated atrocity stories for insertion in the British press.

Now George Washington who understood the value of secrecy once wrote a letter to his Chief of Intelligence in New Jersey, Colonel Elias Dayton, and this is what he said: "The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged-- all that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue. I am, Sir, your obedient servant, George Washington."

One day in Connecticut, George Washington was spending the night at the home of some friends, sympathizers of the American Revolution, Mr. and Mrs. Holcomb, and in the morning he thanked the Holcombs and climbed up on his horse to ride on. Mrs. Holcomb came out to see him off and she said, "General, pray where do you ride tonight?" General Washington leaned down in the saddle and he said, "Madame, can you keep a secret?" She said, "Of course." He replied, "So can I, Madame," tipped his hat and rode on.

The idea that the founding fathers were dying to tell everybody everything is just historically inaccurate.

They weren't. Thomas Jefferson once got a group of men together and promised them five thousand pounds if they would go behind the British lines and kidnap Benedict Arnold. He said, "Don't go there and try to fight your way in. That will get you in trouble." He said, "Win his confidence and when you have worked your way in and won his confidence, bring him to me so that this greatest of traitors may receive the fate he so richly deserves."

You hear all about the opposition to our helping our friends abroad--so-called covert action, dirty tricks, or however they want to phrase it. I would just like a few Americans to reflect on how they think we got Texas or California or Hawaii. Americans should be the last people to denounce covert action since the French had 17,000 men in North America before France declared war on Great Britain during the Revolution. The Navy knows all about the battle between the Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis. What was the Bonhomme Richard? The Bonhomme Richard was a French ship that was slipped under the table to John Paul Jones, loaded with gunpowder and cannon, in complete violation of the state of neutrality with which France found itself with Great Britain at that time.

So they are trying to tell the American people that something terrible happened that had never happened before. Yes, there have been abuses. Yes, there have been wrong

things done. But if you put that up against the fact that we have provided our leaders with what I believe is as good information as has been placed before any government at any time in history. It isn't perfect. There are a lot of things that go wrong. President Kennedy once told us, "You are doomed to be pilloried for your failures and to have your successes passed over in silence."

What has the impact of all this been on us? I would like to be able to tell you that all of this has caused our foreign friends to shy away from us and have nothing to do with us. That is not true. They are steadfast and good friends and they have not done that. They have understood that this is a difficult time with us. We have assured them that we would not give away secrets which were not American secrets which had been entrusted to us by friendly foreign governments.

We have today four times as many young people applying to work in the Central Intelligence Agency as at any time in its history. We have a very small rate of people leaving. Yes, we have lost some people. Yes, we have lost some sources. But nothing like you would imagine from the hullaballo that was created here. Of course, I must say, the volume was louder here than anywhere else. Most foreigners were somewhat puzzled by this and wondered what these tribal penitential cyclic

American rites are where we beat ourselves in the bosom at regular intervals every 20 or 25 years.

Not long ago the Prime Minister of an Asiatic country said to me, "How can I be on your side. Your country is in complete disarray. Your President and your Congress are squabbling like cats. You are making a striptease of your intelligence service. How can I be on your side?" I said, "Prime Minister, I am astounded that an intelligent man like you could possibly fall into the same errors as Adolph Hitler and William II in taking seriously the cyclic penitential American tribal rites. You must not be deceived by these." I was a young corporal in the American Army in the summer of 1941. The Germans had occupied all of Western Europe. They were moving towards Moscow at 15 miles a day and the United States Congress voted universal military service by a majority of one vote. How do you think the Japanese read that message? The existence of an effective intelligence capability on the part of the United States and its allies is one of the greatest deterrents against anyone attempting any Pearl Harbor again. In the early '60s in this country, we had a great debate about a missile gap, whether there was a missile gap or not. That would be impossible today. We know what they have and they know that we know what they have.

In the past intelligence has always been thought of as part of making war on somebody. It is also a force for peace. No one could sign an arms limitation agreement if he didn't have the means of verifying whether it was being lived up to or not. And we have that means of verifying. I think we have come through a very considerable storm. I think we have come through it in remarkably good shape. As far as I can tell you about the people in the American intelligence community, in CIA, in the Defense Intelligence, in Service Intelligence, they are of good heart. They know what they are doing is essential if we are to survive and they know that if there is one thing that you cannot have at this time in this century, it is to have your nation cruelly and strategically surprised. If you look around at the situation in which we and our allies find ourselves, we cannot fail. If we do, who will pick up the torch of human freedom. Thank you very much.