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2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601290001-5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

The attached transcripts are the released testimony by Secretary Herter, Secretary Gates, and Dr. Dryden.

The classified transcripts were loaned to us by State, Defense, and NASA without the knowledge of the Congressional Committees. These transcripts have been returned to the Committee.

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13 Sept 1960

(DATE)

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 28 MAY 1960
TO: The Director		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: Attached is a copy of the transcript of Secretary Herter's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the afternoon session yesterday.		
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Assistant Legislative Counsel		
Noted by <i>30 May 60</i>		
FROM:		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:
Attached is a copy of the transcript of Secretary Gates' testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday as censored and released.

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Assistant Legislative Counsel

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks: Attached is a copy of the transcript of Dr. Dryden's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday as censored and released. Mr. Helms has indicated that by Committee agreement a substantial portion of Dryden's testimony involving NASA's knowledge of the U-2 program prior to the incident was deleted. In addition the Committee decided to censor the last part of the transcript in view of a considerable amount of personal disagreement among several of the Committee members.

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Assistant Legislative Counsel

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
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TESTIMONY BY

SECRETARY HERTER, SECRETARY GATES, AND DR. DRYDEN

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Vol. 3

31 May 60

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before
Committee on Foreign Relations

HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE
OF MAY, 1960
and Incidents Relating Thereto

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HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF MAY, 1960

AND INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO

Friday, May 27, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met at 10:07 a.m., pursuant to notice, Senator J. William Fulbright (Chairman of the full Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Mansfield, Gore, Lauche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Senators Javits, and Young (Ohio).

Also present: Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State; Livingston Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; Richard Heims, C.I.A.; Charles A. Bohlen, Special Adviser to the Secretary; Gerald Smith, State; Captain L. P. Gray, III, USN, Military Assistant to Chairman, JCS; Julian P. White, State Department.

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The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your willingness to come here today to discuss with the Committee the events of recent days and weeks which are related to the collapse of the long planned Summit Conference.

Chairman Khrushchev, who for months has promoted a Summit Conference and invited people throughout the world to believe that an easing of tensions between the free world and the Communist world might be possible, has now dashed those hopes. In a few short hours he destroyed the atmosphere of negotiation which had been built up over long months.

Mr. Secretary, you and the President have been frequent in your warnings in the past that our hopes must not rise too high lest they be dashed to pieces, as they have been, by a swing of the Soviet pendulum.

Despite the fact that there are few in the free world who doubt that the principal onus for the destruction of summit hopes must be born by Chairman Khrushchev, there are many who believe that our conduct has not been without fault. They believe there are things we might have done, which were not done. They believe there were things which we did, which might better have been left undone -- or delayed.

I have long believed that one of the basic strengths of our democracy is found in our capacity of self-appraisal -- our ability to be critical, without destroying our unity.

At this particular juncture of history, this Committee is

confronted with a most difficult task. Without furthering the objectives of the Soviet Union, we must subject our own activities to careful scrutiny to ascertain whether we have conducted ourselves in a way best calculated to promote the interests of this nation and to preserve the peace of the world.

I am sure there are some who will feel that any such scrutiny of our own activities can serve no good purpose. As for myself, however, I believe that failure now to review and assess our conduct would be to neglect our responsibility and to lose an opportunity to improve the procedures and the execution of our foreign policy.

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I take this occasion, Mr. Secretary, to assure you once again that I am certain there is no intention on the part of any member of this Committee to deal with this subject on a partisan basis. We are meeting here not as Republicans or Democrats, but as members of the Senate who in taking their oaths of office swore, as did you, to uphold the same Constitution.

We are concerned as you are, that nothing that takes place here in any way damage the conduct of our foreign policy. Above all, we should strive to avoid bitter partisan debate which might prejudice the reasonable and effective conduct of our foreign policy in the future. The motives of participants in events of recent weeks are not at issue. At the same time we seek, as I am sure you do, to conduct this review in such a way that we may learn from the events of the past weeks what we can do to improve our foreign policies and our governmental procedures for their formulation and execution.

I know that the subjects which we will be discussing are most sensitive and delicate. Indeed, we should acknowledge that there is one vast area of Executive Branch activity which is not subject to the usual type of Congressional control, or to the check of public opinion-- that is, the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Its operations, like similar activities of all great nations,

are divorced and separate from the normal standards and the usual restraints that are characteristic of other governmental operations.

There is no point in our pretending that the black arts of intelligence operations do now now, and have not throughout recorded history, involved violations of every Commandment. They do. Lying, cheating, murder, stealing, seduction, and suicide are part of the unpleasant business in which all great nations participate - not because they want to, not because they believe these acts are moral, but because they believe such activities are essential to their own self-preservation. This is one of the ugly facts of life in this world.

Acts of espionage are against the law of this nation as of all other nations. But these acts nevertheless take place, and it does not promote a clear understanding of international relations to pretend they do not.

Every member appreciates these facts. We hope that the procedures we have set up for the conduct of these hearings will make it possible for representatives of the Executive Branch to be candid and complete because unless there is such candor it is most difficult for the Senate to discharge its responsibilities in the field of foreign policy.

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As you know, the Committee has agreed that these sessions are to be executive. However, in order to make the maximum amount of information available to the public, which must in the final analysis understand our policies if they are to be supported by the people, we have arranged for a high ranking official of the Executive Branch to delete from the executive transcript any statements or information which might in any way jeopardize the national security. Should any question arise as to whether such deletions go beyond those necessary to protect the national security, I will appoint a bipartisan subcommittee to consider such questions.

I have urged members to limit their questions to those directly relevant to the recent Summit Conference and incidents related thereto. Although the Committee has not considered fully all witnesses it may wish to hear, I have expressed the personal opinion that there is no occasion for private witnesses to be heard on the matter before the Committee.

Finally, as you know, the Committee has decided that members should for the first time around, at least, limit their period of questioning to not to exceed ten minutes each.

It is my hope, Mr. Secretary, that our study can be focused on four principal areas; first, the events and decisions resulting from the U-2 incident; second, the effect of these events and decisions upon the summit; third, the policy of

t-2 our government regarding the Summit meeting; and fourth, the policy of the United States in the future and possible improvement in the execution thereof.

 Therefore, Mr. Secretary, we have some guests from the Senate who have requested to come as observers. I wish to admonish them that this is Executive, and that they are not to disclose on their own responsibility anything that takes place in these hearings, and I might also call the attention of the Committee that it was noted in the press that Tass, the official governmental news agency of Soviet Russia was the first applicant to purchase a copy of the transcript which will be later released, so we might keep this in mind.

 I suggest, Mr. Secretary that you proceed with your statement for the information of the Committee.

 The Secretary has a statement prepared which will be the presentation of his point of view.

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

SECRETARY OF STATE

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Secretary Herter. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate very much your willingness to allow me to make this statement.

This statement is guided very much as indicated by the Chairman in the remarks that he has just made in the next to the last paragraph with regard to divisions; namely, the genesis of the Summit; the U-2 incident, the events in Paris and the future.

A. The Threat to Berlin.

In order to understand what happened in Paris, we need to look back over the preceding eighteen months.

In November 1958, the USSR began a new strategy directed toward altering the situation in Berlin and East Germany in its favor. If the Western Powers refused to give up their present position in Berlin and make West Berlin a so-called "free city," the Soviet Union stated its intention to proceed unilaterally at the end of six months, turning over full sovereignty to the so-called GDR and thereby confronting the Allies with the alternative of capitulation or resort to force which would be met by Communist force.

Though the strategy as it unfolded proved to be more flexible than its original statement, it is still the official

policy of the USSR. Its force lies in the Soviet ability to threaten Berlin, where we are morally committed but physically exposed.

The Western Powers, of course, promptly rejected the Soviet proposal and reaffirmed their determination to stand by Berlin.

In the months that followed, while the USSR elaborated and pressed its strategy, the Western Powers concerted their plans to meet it. They sought to engage the USSR in negotiations, thereby clarifying its intentions and either attaining solutions acceptable to the West or, as a minimum, convincing it that unilateral action against Berlin would not be sound.

B. Engaging the USSR in Negotiation.

It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the USSR would negotiate on an acceptable basis. In January, 1959 the USSR proposed a conference to adopt a peace treaty with the two parts of an indefinitely divided Germany.

The Western Powers continued to maintain that a peace treaty could be negotiated and signed only with a united Germany, hence that the reunification of Germany must be settled first.

They also maintained that the only proper solution for Berlin lay in its becoming the capital of a unified Germany, and therefore, they were unwilling to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue. But the USSR had held for some time that

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reunification was solely the business of the Germans and therefore refused to discuss it.

The West persisted during February and March in its efforts to get the Russians talking somehow. It proposed a meeting of Foreign Ministers, with the prospect of a possible Summit meeting when due preparations had been made. The USSR had repeatedly indicated a desire for that Summit meeting since 1956. Finally, a compromise agenda, which did not prejudice the substantive views of either side, was adopted for a Foreign Ministers' meeting and a date was set in May, shortly before the expiration of the original Soviet deadline for meeting their arbitrary demands on Berlin.

C. Foreign Ministers' Deadlock.

During the intensive preparations for the meeting the Western Powers developed a new version of their basic position regarding Germany, which was submitted at Geneva as the Western Peace Plan. It consisted in approaching the unification of Germany through a series of stages, thereby offering the USSR a chance to adjust its position gradually to the eventual loss of its hold on East Germany which free elections would presumably bring.

The Plan showed flexibility and imagination; it appealed to world opinion; but its rejection by the USSR was none the less flat.

The USSR stuck adamantly to its previously announced

end T2 proposals for a peace treaty with a divided Germany. Thus, the basic positions remained totally unreconciled.

Finding no progress possible on Germany, the Western Powers and the USSR explored the possibility of an interim agreement on Berlin which, without contemplating a basic solution of Berlin as a separate issue, would do something to mitigate difficulties which the USSR professed to find there. Though some progress was made in this direction, the USSR insisted on language which would have implied the eventual erosion of the Western Position in Berlin.

Accordingly, despite the labor of three months with only one short adjournment, the Foreign Ministers' meeting ended in deadlock.

D. High level trips.

The failure of the Foreign Ministers' meeting did not result in a war crisis, however, because a parallel train of events had meanwhile brought hope in a different direction. We took the opportunity of Mikoyan's visit to the Soviet Embassy here in January to arrange informal exchange of views between the Soviet leader and top US officials.

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This was followed in June and July by further visits and exchanges of Kozlov to this country and the Vice President to the USSR. The fact that these visits took place without public incident and made possible somewhat more realistic communication than usual with the Soviet leadership seemed to offer a possibility -- only a possibility, of course -- that means of avoiding war and eventually getting Soviet-Western relations into somewhat less dangerous shape might be found by developing these informal contacts.

Secretary Herter. Accordingly the President decided to go ahead with a move which he and his advisers had long had in mind when the time seemed right. He invited Chairman Khrushchev to visit this country, and the visit was announced before the Foreign Ministers ended their Geneva meeting.

During that visit no progress was made, or indeed expected, on resolving outstanding problems, but a somewhat greater degree of mutual understanding was seemingly attained, particularly on the need to settle international questions by peaceful means rather than by force. There was also a suspension, later publicly acknowledged, of whatever was left of the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin.

E. Preparation for the Summit:

After the Khrushchev visit it was judged feasible and desirable by the Western Powers to move toward renewed

discussion, this time at the Summit. Some flicker of hope for progress on Berlin had appeared at Camp David, whereas Geneva had ended in deadlock. During his American visit Khrushchev had also evinced an interest in the equally vital field of disarmament, and even though disarmament talks were to start in the Committee of Ten at Geneva it was felt that Khrushchev might reserve his constructive moves if any for the Summit.

Accordingly after due consultations among the Western Heads of Government an invitation to a Summit was sent to Khrushchev and accepted by him, and after some difficulty over earlier dates the time was finally set for May 16. This move found broad support in Western public opinion.

Secretary Herter. There ensued an intensive and protracted series of preparations on the Western side, involving repeated meetings not only of the Foreign Ministers and of NATO but even of the Heads of Government. Without our own Government we also studied most carefully the possibilities of making progress not only on Berlin and Germany but most particularly in disarmament, as well as other aspects of general Soviet-Western relations.

At the December meeting of Western Heads of Government a consensus emerged that the May Summit might well be only one of a series of such meetings, and that it would be largely

exploratory. Some modest progress was hoped for, but no major solutions on any front. But if a beginning could be made, the series of talks, possibly in a gradually improving atmosphere over the years, might do substantially more.

F. Summit Prospects Dimmed

In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about "detente". There were comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-US cultural agreement was signed November 21, and on December 1 the US, the USSR and other powers signed the Antarctic treaty.

But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess, and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet pre-Summit tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our

German ally.

Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal bloc-wide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation on his speeches available to the Committee.

Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight -- notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments that he in fact had begun.

The unity of the four Western Powers on Berlin meanwhile presumably signalled to the USSR that prospects for eroding the Western position or obtaining Soviet terms on Berlin remained slight. President de Gaulle and other leaders were quite firm in discouraging expectations on this front. The NATO Council in Istanbul May 2-4 also reaffirmed the Western position on German

reunification and regretted Soviet refusal to discuss specific practical measures of disarmament. Thus as the Summit drew near the prospects for important agreement seemed slender, so long as the USSR remained committed to driving the Western powers out of Berlin and to discussing disarmament in terms of general principles rather than concrete steps.

The Western outlook consistently remained, however, that the Summit would be worthwhile. It would afford an opportunity for an exchange of views which would clarify each side's position; it might contribute to some reduction of tensions over Berlin and narrow some of our differences on disarmament. It could be at least a small first step in a long process of improving Soviet-Western relations.

II. THE U-2 INCIDENT

On May 1 occurred the unfortunate failure of an intelligence mission. The USSR at once seized on it to complicate the approach to the Summit. With regard to the role of the US Government in this matter, I cannot hope to improve on the lucid and straightforward account which the President gave to the nation Wednesday night. I will, therefore, not attempt to go into detail, although I am of course ready to answer questions concerning my responsibilities.

Here I would only like to re-emphasize four central points which stood out in the President's account:

1. The U-2 program was an important and efficient intelligence effort. We knew that failure of any mission under this program would have serious consequences but we considered that the great benefit derived justified the risks involved.

2. The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the Summit meeting approached, was a sound decision. Conditions at a later season would have prevented obtaining very important information. There is never a "good time" for a failure of an intelligence mission. We believe it unwise to lower our vigilance because of these political negotiations.

3. Initial statements by the US Government properly sought first of all to protect the pilot, his intelligence mission, and everything connected with it that might still be kept secret. But when it became clear that plane and pilot were in Soviet hands we believed the Congress and the American people should be given the facts. Thus up to May 7 US statements followed the general line of the cover story, and thereafter were adjusted to the situation as it developed.

4. Since the U-2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued as any other intelligence mission would be

in such a case. Announcement of its discontinuance was withheld until the President could convey the fact personally in Paris.

Based on these four points, I believe most Americans will agree that the main course of our actions, given what we knew at any particular time, was sound. In particular, I have doubts that any alteration in the language of U.S. statements would have made any difference in the arbitrary Soviet demands which followed.

III. THE EVENTS IN PARIS

A. Narrative

I should like to give you an account of the major developments at Paris. I shall be as brief as possible, since the details have been widely publicized. But I would like to tell you of those events which in my opinion had a determinant effect there, and particularly those which influenced the decisions of the President.

On my arrival in Paris on Friday, May 13, there was already considerable speculation at the news that Mr. Khrushchev was arriving in Paris on Saturday rather than on Sunday, the day on which the President and Mr. Macmillan were due to arrive.

Mr. Khrushchev's statement on arrival at Orly Airport gave no indication of his subsequent position. It was mild in character and conveyed the distinct impression that he would proceed with the Summit Conference despite the U-2 incident. Subsequent events showed that this was deliberately

4 designed to conceal his real purpose.

On Sunday at 11 a.m., at his request, Mr. Khrushchev, accompanied by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky -- which is in itself an unusual procedure which I shall revert to later -- called on President de Gaulle at the Elysee Palace.

During this meeting he left with President de Gaulle a memorandum setting forth the conditions which would have to be met by the United States before Khrushchev would be prepared to attend a Summit Conference. The French Delegation provided a copy of this memorandum to the American Delegation early that afternoon. The memorandum was subsequently presented by Mr. Khrushchev, without change, as the opening part of his statement to the Four Power meeting on Monday morning, May 16.

After visiting President de Gaulle Sunday morning, Khrushchev called on Prime Minister Macmillan at 4:30 p.m. on the same day and read the same statement of position to him.

The copy of the statement received from the French Delegation was, of course, the subject of immediate consultation with the President and with members of the American Delegation as to its significance and meaning.

It was our general conclusion, subsequently borne out by the facts, that the position and totally unacceptable

demands set forth in this document had been drawn up in
Moscow prior to Mr. Khrushchev's departure. In this sense
it represented a fixed



t4-2 the office he holds and which befitted the leader of a great country.

In connection with this decision, the President resolved to announce to the Conference his previously taken decision to suspend further flights of U-2 aircraft over the Soviet Union.

Although the original intention had been to restrict the first meeting of the Conference at the Summit to the Chiefs of State and Heads of Government and to their interpreters, the President, on learning Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky, asked Secretary Gates and myself to accompany him to this meeting.

I do not need to describe this meeting in detail beyond saying that Mr. Khrushchev read a statement which, with interpretation, took fully an hour. He read this entire statement from a prepared text before him. The first part of this statement was the memorandum which he had left with President deGaulle, plus certain additions which were in the same vein as regards the United States and which referred to Soviet willingness to hold a Summit Conference within six to eight months. The major addition was the cancellation of the invitation to the President to visit the Soviet Union.

Apart from his statement, which was made public, the President only once joined in the ensuing discussion -- in order to make clear to Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues that the suspension of the U-2 flights was not merely for the duration of the Conference, but for as long as he was in office.

T-4 Soviet governmental position from which even Mr. Khrushchev
1 would not have the authority to depart while in Paris.

I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the collective decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from Moscow. Any substantive changes in these positions apparently required reference back to Moscow before they could be undertaken.

I should like to emphasize the opinion which was thus unanimously arrived at in the American delegation, since it bore directly upon the position which the President took at the meeting on Monday morning.

It was out of the question, of course, that there should be any acceptance by the President of the humiliating and arrogant conditions of Mr. Khrushchev. We had very much in mind, however, the importance of showing the world that it was Mr. Khrushchev, and no one else, who was placing this Summit Conference in peril.

The President, therefore, decided before the Monday meeting that the proper course of action, consonant with the great responsibility which he bore and the seriousness of the issues not to engage in vituperation with Mr. Khrushchev but to demonstrate the restraint and dignity which was incumbent upon

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The balance of the discussion at this meeting, which I should point out was the only one during the entire period in Paris at which the Soviets were present, was largely devoted to attempts by President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan to dissuade Mr. Khrushchev from the irrevocable step of publishing his abusive statement, whose unacceptable conditions would render impossible any Conference at the Summit, and to Khrushchev's adamant insistence that he would publish this statement and do so at a time of his own choosing. The meeting broke up on the basis of a suggestion by President de Gaulle that the conferees should reflect on this matter for twenty-four hours and then examine the situation.

This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his departure from Moscow. It is significant in this connection that the statement he issued later that day, Monday, May 16, which was identical with the one he had made at the Conference, took no cognizance whatsoever of the discussion at the Conference, and in particular of the President's statement concerning the suspension of U-2 overflights.

Secretary Herter. The rest of the proceedings in Paris were anticlimactic. It was apparent to all the Western

representatives that there was no possibility of a Summit Conference short of a changed position on Mr. Khrushchev's part. On Monday, Mr. Macmillan visited Mr. Khrushchev in a fruitless effort to persuade him to withdraw his impossible demands.

On that same day, President deGaulle decided, with the agreement of the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, to call a session of the Summit Conference for 3 p.m. on Tuesday, May 17 which was after the twenty-four hour recess which he had proposed on Monday. He sent invitations in writing to the three other participants.

The President, in accepting, made clear his view that acceptance by the Soviet representative would mean that the Soviets had abandoned the demands which the President had previously found completely unacceptable.

Mr. Khrushchev did not show up at the appointed time for the Tuesday meeting. After a great deal of telephoning between the Soviet Embassy and the French Foreign Office it became clear that he was refusing to attend a Summit Conference and would only join in what he termed a preliminary meeting to ascertain if conditions could be created for a Summit Conference. By this reference to "conditions" he obviously meant the acceptance by the United States of all of the conditions he had set forth previously, and indeed he so stated in a written communication to President de Gaulle later that same day.

In the light of Mr. Khrushchev's refusal to attend the Summit Conference, except on terms which all three Western representatives deemed unacceptable, the three Western Heads of Government met briefly at 9:30 p.m., on May 17 to approve the final tripartite communique, a copy of which I should like to insert in the record, at this point.

The Chairman. Yes, it may be done.

(The document referred to follows:)

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

May 17, 1960

James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

(Paris, France)

COMMUNIQUE

The President of the United States, the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom take note of the fact that because of the attitude adopted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union it has not been possible to begin, at the Summit Conference, the examination of the problems which it had been agreed would be discussed between the four Chiefs of State or Government.

They regret that these discussions, so important for world peace, could not take place. For their part, they remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiation. They themselves remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.

Secretary Herter. Thus the Summit Conference was ended by Soviet intransigence before it began, without addressing the great international issues with which it was supposed to deal.

The following day, Wednesday, May 18, was marked by tripartite meetings of the Western Heads of Government and their Foreign Ministers to consider the situation. In these meetings we sought to analyze the reasons for the Soviet attitude, prospects for the future, and the measures that the three Western Powers might adopt.

This day was also marked by Mr. Khrushchev's press conference, which was fully reported by press, television and radio. It was apparently an unparalleled performance of vituperation, abuse, and loss of temper. It should be noted, however, that despite the apparently uncontrolled nature of his remarks and actions at this press conference, Mr. Khrushchev was very careful not to commit himself to any specific course of action in the international field.

B. Analysis.

We have naturally given a great deal of thought to the reasons for this extraordinary action by the Soviets in coming all the way from Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose of sabotaging the Conference.

I should like to say right off that there are many obscure aspects of this Soviet behavior and that we do not know all considerations and factors which went into its determination. We probably never shall. I hardly need to emphasize here to the members of this Committee the complete secrecy in which decisions are arrived at in the Soviet Government and in the hierarchy of the Communist Party, which is the effective ruler of that country. It is only possible to try to deduce from Soviet actions, after they are taken, the considerations which brought them about. What I give you now, therefore, is at best a tentative

estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an estimate which may have to be revised in the light of further information and future events.

There is one thing, however, that can be regarded as certain: This is that the decision to wreck the Conference was made prior to Khrushchev's departure from Moscow. At no point during his stay in Paris -- neither when he disclosed his true intentions to General de Gaulle at 11:00 a.m. on Sunday the 15th nor subsequently -- did Khrushchev deviate one inch from his demands that the United States (1) denounce the overflights, (2) apologize to the Soviet Union, (3) punish these flights. Neither the statement made by the President at the one meeting held on Monday nor the serious and responsible efforts of General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr. Khrushchev before and after the President's announcement of suspension of flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his behavior in Paris that he had no authority to modify his position to any significant degree.

The fact that he was accompanied everywhere, and literally everywhere, by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky is an interesting sidelight on this point. There is much speculation as to this change from his previous attitude during his visits both to the United

States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings alone with the President and with President de Gaulle, with only interpreters present. The best guess as to the significance of this new factor is that (1) in view of the brutal and threatening attitude he adopted at Paris it was considered desirable to have some tangible evidence of Soviet armed strength in the person of Marshal Malinovsky. Secondly, Gromyko and Malinovsky would be able to testify upon return to Moscow that he had stuck strictly to the agreed position.

It also seems certain that the decision to cancel the invitation to the President was made before Khrushchev left Moscow.

As to what led the Soviets to this extreme position, in regard to the Summit meeting which had previously appeared so much desired by Mr. Khrushchev, we enter into the realm of pure speculation, as I indicated earlier. The most we can hope to do in the absence of reliable information is to evaluate the elements and factors which appear to have entered into this decision. I shall try to list them briefly.

1. There was considerable indication, particularly during April that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was little likelihood of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the Summit. Evidence of Western

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determination and unity on this point in speeches and statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him to this conclusion. Thus in his Baku speech on April 25, he not only reiterated with the utmost finality his position on Berlin, including his intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German regime, but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success of the Summit. By this of course he meant success on Soviet terms.

2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive, there are a number of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy, particularly his over-personalization and in Communist eyes over-commitment through personal visits to the US and France, was arousing at least serious questioning if not opposition to the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the opposition to his conduct of foreign relations which was openly voiced by the Chinese Communists found a sympathetic response among some of his associates, and very probably among the Soviet military.

3. It was against this background that the U-2 incident occurred.

A combination of these three factors in our judgment is what resulted in the definite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris conference. To determine how each of these factors should be weighed is, for the moment, beyond

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our reach.

The U-2 incident was most certainly seized upon and magnified beyond its true proportions as a justification for this decision. It is debatable whether it would have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise another pretext for so radical and violent a position.

It might well be that a lack of success at the Summit would have confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult choice, for his point of view, than no conference at all. He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing the conference.

It may seem incredible to you that responsible leaders of a great power should have come all the way to Paris merely for the purpose of wrecking the Conference, thereby incurring worldwide condemnation of the Soviet Union and enhancing the sense of unity and purpose among not only the Western Powers represented there but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere.

I believe the answer lies in a basic miscalculation in Mr. Khrushchev's and the Soviet's thinking.

Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped -- and this explains his early arrival in Paris -- to divide the Allies and isolate the United States. He anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands he had set forth and that the Conference

3 would then collapse, with the United States bearing responsibility for the rupture before world opinion.

Secretary Herter. His plans miscarried because our two Allies stood solidly and loyally with the United States and refused to be parties to Mr. Khrushchev's scheme. The result, as the whole world knows, was that the position which Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted in the complete isolation of the Soviet Union rather than the United States and in placing the responsibility for the disruption of the Conference squarely where it belongs -- on his own shoulders.

This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior is strongly supported by the attack which he made at his press conference on General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan for what he termed their lack of objectivity, lack of will and subservience to the allied relationships -- in other words, in plain English, for their solidarity with the United States, their loyalty to our common purpose, and their refusal to play the Soviet game.

IV. The Future

What conclusions should we draw for the future?

I believe the signs are that there has been as yet no radical alteration in Soviet policy, though we can expect the continuance of a propaganda effort designed to split off

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the United States from its Allies. This conclusion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris statements, including those at his press conference. It is supported, somewhat more specifically and definitely, by the statements which he made in Berlin on his way home.

We must remember, however, that, given the nature of the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason that any statement about a phase of Soviet policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain valid in the future.

Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disappointed by the fact that the Summit Conference was not held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depends, as I have indicated, on actions of the leading communist countries.

Provisionally, however, I conclude that the implication for US policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be continued. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines with renewed effort.

Proponents within the Communist Bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part.

Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our

5 readiness to get on with outstanding international business

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We must remain prepared to withstand aggressive pressures, not only in Berlin but also elsewhere. I trust that our evident readiness will deter such pressures.

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Secretary Herter. Among the lessons of Paris, the most important for the free world, including ourselves, it seems to me, is fresh realization of the dangers we face and consequent need for closing of ranks and moving ahead with our own and our Allies' programs for strengthening the free world. We came back from Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have Allies, and I am sure that our Alliances will take new life from this experience.

At the same time I would stress equally the need to expand imaginatively and generously our collaboration with the newly developing countries.

On both accounts, I hope the Congress will give wholehearted support to our Mutual Security programs as authorized by this Committee, which are now more important than ever.

We must continue, as the President has said, to seek in a businesslike way to make progress on outstanding problems with the Soviet Union. We intend to go ahead with existing negotiations, to stand by our commitments, and to foster open communication and peaceful exchanges. Above all, we shall not cease from the most determined, patient, resourceful endeavor to

T5 find ways to bring the arms race under control and thus to meet the nuclear menace that hangs over mankind.

Secretary Herter. I believe in this period it is incumbent upon us, all of us, to keep a calm and steady gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions, statements and attitudes which might tend unnecessarily to increase international tension. If such an increase is to occur, it should be clearly the fault of the Soviets and we should not do them the favor of providing pretext for action by them which would have this effect.

We should not define as "hard" or "soft" our attitude or policy toward the Soviet Union. To do so is not only to deflect our gaze from the grim reality that confronts us, but even more to plunge us inevitably into fruitless and damaging domestic recrimination. We must now, as in the future, maintain a vigilant, calm and resolute posture and, insofar as it lies in our power to do so, be accurate in our estimates and effective in our actions.

I would close in expressing the hope that we will not become so fixed in preoccupation with the Soviet challenge as to lose sight of our own constructive purposes -- which are larger and more important than merely resisting or reacting to external threats. We have our own vision of the future toward which we want to see the world evolve. We have our own programs

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for helping to bring that future about -- for holding high
the light of freedom, for sharing its message and rewards with
emerging nations, for trying to create an international
community in which the rule of law will replace the rule of
force. It is to these programs that our talents and energies
should be rededicated in the uncertain times that lie ahead.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Reporter, I have the documentation mentioned by the Secretary on page 4, which will be inserted in the record at this point. They are the various documents and speeches.

(The documents referred to are as follows:)

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STATEMENTS BY KHRUSHCHEV SINCE VISIT TO US

The following is a collection of public statements made by Khrushchev from the time of his departure from the US until May 5, 1960 which are offensive or threatening in nature vis-a-vis the West, particularly the US. The statements are arranged under the following headings: 1) Berlin-Germany; 2) US and Western Policy; 3) The Summit; 4) Comments on West During Asian Tour. They have been extracted from the following statements and speeches:

Speech in Moscow, upon return from US, September 28, 1959
 Speech in Vladivostok, October 8, 1959
 Speech to Supreme Soviet, October 31, 1959
 Speech to Soviet journalists, November 14, 1959
 Speech at Hungarian Party Congress, December 1, 1959
 Speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960
 Letter to Chancellor Adenauer, January 28, 1960
 Speech to Indian Parliament, February 11, 1960
 Speech at Delhi Civic Reception, February 12, 1960
 Speech at Bhubaneswar, February 15, 1960
 Speech at Calcutta Dinner, February 15, 1960
 Speech at Jogjakarta, February 21, 1960
 Speech to Indonesian Parliament, February 26, 1960
 Press Conference at Jakarta, February 29, 1960
 Press Conference at Jakarta, March 1, 1960
 Speech at press luncheon, March 25, 1960
 Speech in Rheims, March 29, 1960
 Press Conference at Rambouillet, April 2, 1960
 Speech in Moscow, upon return from France, April 4, 1960
 Speech in Baku, April 25, 1960

It should be noted that this collection does not include private statements and criticisms of West Germany. On occasion, Khrushchev has been especially offensive and threatening in private talks. The Federal Republic, and Chancellor Adenauer personally were the chief targets of offensive public statements on Khrushchev's part during this period. Beginning with his November 14 speech to Soviet journalists, Khrushchev launched a vigorous campaign of slander against the FRG and Adenauer designed to discredit them and isolate the FRG from the West. At times these public statements were truly scurrilous, likening the Chancellor to Nazis, to Hitler, calling him senile, etc.

It is also important to note that in his December 1 speech in Budapest, after a lapse of 3½ months, Khrushchev renewed his threat of a separate peace treaty without any provocation on the part of the West.

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Apparently Khrushchev then concluded that the West would go ahead with a summit conference and that it was therefore timely to begin exerting pressure on the West on the key issue of Berlin. Moreover, Khrushchev's threat of a separate treaty, in terms of the consequences for the Allied position in Berlin, became more explicit and menacing with each succeeding major speech after the December 1 speech, culminating in his April 25 Salsu speech threat that the Allies would thereby not only be deprived of a legal basis for maintaining access, but would have no right to maintain troops in Berlin.

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Berlin-Germany

The only way [to settle the Berlin problem] is to sign a peace treaty with Germany, and we have submitted a proposal to that effect. There is no evading a peace treaty for anyone, if the other countries on whom the signing of a peace treaty depends stand for peace and coexistence. The vestiges of World War II must at long last be removed, since they constitute a source that nourishes the instigators of a third world war. We are not forcing a solution of the West Berlin problem in point of time; we are setting no deadlines, issuing no ultimatums; but at the same time we shall not slacken our efforts to come to terms with our allies.

If we try all means and they do not lead to the desired results, we shall have no other way out except signing a peace treaty with whichever of the two German states wants it. And in such a case we shall bear no responsibility for the refusal to sign the peace treaty. It will be borne by those who had an unreasonable approach to the solution of this problem, who did not take the road of easing tension in relations between states but, on the contrary, wanted to preserve the dangerous source threatening the outbreak of a third world war....

We are doing our utmost to make the Soviet proposals acceptable. We do not impose them, but wish to reach agreement through negotiations, though we have every right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany does not wish to sign a peace treaty.

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We have before our eyes the example of the United States of America, which has signed a peace treaty with Japan without us. However, it cannot be held that one side can unilaterally sign treaties while the other cannot, though a peace treaty with Japan was signed earlier to its detriment....

The liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin will undoubtedly be conducive to this [improving relations]. We wish to reach agreement with all our former allies. This is why we do not fix any time limits. We want the solution of this question to improve, not worsen, our relations. The Soviet Government is ready to try out any conceivable peaceful means to secure a reasonable solution of the German problem, to promote the improvement of the international atmosphere, and to create conditions for disarmament and the establishment of eternal peace on earth for the sake of mankind's happiness.

But if we do not meet with understanding, if the forces backing Chancellor Adenauer obstinately insist on the "positions of strength" policy, we shall have no other choice left but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The Soviet Union does not intend to connive with those who are for the continuation of the "positions of strength" policy. We and our allies would readily sign a treaty with West Germany, but if we do not succeed in this, we shall be compelled to sign a unilateral treaty with the GDR. (Speech at Hungarian Party Congress, December 1, 1959. Khrushchev's first public threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR after his US visit.)

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The Soviet Government considers that a peaceful settlement with Germany is an urgent international question, a question of the very foremost importance. We shall make every effort to have this question solved at last. We sincerely strive to find a solution for the German question together with our allies in the struggle against Hitler Germany. We consider that along with this the question of West Berlin too will be settled on an agreed basis. If, however, all our efforts to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states fail to be crowned with success after all, the Soviet Union, and other willing states, will sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the consequences proceeding from this.

(Khrushchev Supreme Soviet speech, January 14, 1960.)

But what if we do not meet understanding? Could it be that we should live forever without a peace treaty, and forever resign ourselves to an abnormal situation in West Berlin?

Of course, we cannot reconcile ourselves to such a situation. If the Soviet Union does not meet understanding it will have no other recourse but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the ensuing consequences, including those for West Berlin. That treaty would settle the German questions of Germany with the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic. With the signing of a peace treaty it would be clear to all that to strive to alter the existing frontiers means nothing else but to bring matters to a war. We shall not abet aggressive forces which cherish the dream of pushing German frontiers to the east. If some states refuse to

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sign a peace treaty it will also be clear to all what they stand for: peace or war, for relaxation of tension and friendly relations or for cold war. (Letter to Adenauer, January 26, 1960.)

AP Correspondent: Did you actually say that you will insist on a Western withdrawal from West Berlin regardless of the concessions they may make to Russia's position on disarmament? Did you make this statement to President Gronchi of Italy?

Khrushchev: The question is put in a not too correct way. The Western powers are allegedly to make concessions to the Soviet Union on questions of safeguarding peace, while we are to make concessions to the West with regard to Berlin. This is incorrect. These are two independent questions, each of which requires a separate solution.

Is it only the Soviet Union and the socialist countries that are interested in disarmament, in safeguarding peace? All the peoples are interested in safeguarding peace. This is why it is necessary to consider the disarmament question and solve it in a way beneficial for all countries, for all the peoples, for the cause of peace.

The question of West Berlin is entirely different. This is a question whose solution has been dragged out for 15 years since the end of the war. How much longer can we wait? A summit conference will meet shortly to strengthen peace, but the leftovers of the last war have not been done away with yet. This situation contradicts common sense. This is why we shall strive to wipe out the hangovers of war, shall try to convince our allies of the last war to sign a peace treaty with the two existing German

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states. If they fail to understand this need or if they realize it but refuse to agree, then we shall sign a peace treaty with the GDR.

When a peace treaty with the GDR is signed, all the consequences of the war against Germany will cease to exist in the territory of the GDR and with regard to West Berlin as well. West Berlin is on the territory of the GDR. (Jakarta press conference, February 29, 1960.)

Question of FRANCE-30TH correspondent Michel Cordet: You are regarded as an advocate of peaceful coexistence and territorial status quo between East and West. If this really is so, why do you question the status quo in Berlin where the military positions of the Western powers are weak?

...If all our possibilities are exhausted and our aspirations not understood, we shall unilaterally sign a peace treaty with the GDR. This will settle the problems connected with the liquidation of the remnants of the war in the territory of the GDR which will sign the peace treaty with us; the problem of liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin will also be settled. (Diplomatic Press Association luncheon in Paris, March 25, 1960.)

We are doing and shall continue to do our utmost to achieve understanding for our policy and to secure the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. I repeat, we shall do our utmost to this end. If the Western powers do not understand our peace-loving position, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR. (Rheims luncheon, March 29, 1960.)

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Fontaine of Le Monde: Mr. Chairman, you more than once intimated that the Soviet Union would sign a separate treaty with the GDR if the summit meeting did not lead to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Could you say more precisely to what extent such a treaty would affect the communications between the Western garrisons in Berlin and West Germany?

Khrushchev: If we do not meet with understanding on the part of the leaders of those countries with which the Soviet Union fought against Hitler Germany, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR alone. However, this is very undesirable for us; we should not like to do so. But if there is no other way out, we--and not only we but a number of other countries that fought against Nazi Germany--will be impelled to sign a peace treaty with the GDR alone, and all rights arising from the surrender of Nazi Germany would then become invalid on the entire territory under the sovereignty of the GDR. Hence, all countries now having garrisons in West Berlin on the basis of the surrender and defeat of Nazi Germany, would lose all rights connected with the occupation of the city. We have declared this more than once and we also reaffirm this today. (Rambouillet press conference, April 2, 1960.)

We shall do everything to solve this question [German peace treaty] on a basis acceptable to the Western powers. But if our efforts are fruitless, then the Soviet Union will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR. And we are sure that all those who understand the necessity of removing the abnormal situation in the center of Europe will sign it along with the Soviet Union.

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We are also convinced that, despite the efforts of Chancellor Adenauer, the Western powers, sooner or later, will arrive at the same conclusion we have. Life itself will compel them to understand that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states is the only correct solution insuring normal conditions of peace and tranquility in Europe. (Lenin Stadium speech on return from France, April 4, 1960.)

So that nobody should have any illusions, I would like to state sincerely and directly: those who think this, and those who are going to follow such a policy, are going to be disappointed. The Soviet Government, for its part, will do everything to make our position clear, and will spare no effort to convince our partners of the need to conclude a peace treaty and set up a free city in West Berlin. But if, in spite of all our efforts, the Western powers show themselves unwilling to seek together with the Soviet Union an agreed solution of the question of a peace treaty, and, contrary to common sense, ignore this question, then we shall of course go our own way and will conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

I think that the Soviet Union will not be alone in concluding this peace treaty. Along with us, it will be signed by many other states which are also convinced of the need for a peaceful settlement with Germany.

The supporters of an aggressive course where the socialist countries are concerned often reason that allegedly even after the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR, the three Western powers would retain the right

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as before to the maintenance of their troops in West Berlin. I must say that this is an incorrect interpretation, and a policy which is based on such calculations is doomed to failure.

It is generally known that the signing of a peace treaty will put an end to those conditions which were brought about by the capitulation of the country. Therefore, when a peace treaty is signed with the GDR, on the whole territory which is controlled by the government of that state, the conditions brought about by the surrender will no longer obtain. Thus in relation to this territory, the rights which the Western powers obtained as a result of the surrender of Hitlerite Germany will also lose effect, including the right to the further maintenance of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

Some politicians say that they, allegedly, do not recognize the GDR, and therefore they do not want to have anything to do with it. It even gets to the point where they call for insuring the stay of the troops of the three powers in West Berlin, and their rights in relation to that city, as based on the surrender and with the aid of force.

I must warn such hotheads, that when appeal is not made to right and law, when force is invoked, it is natural that force should be opposed by the force of the other side, a force which will rest on law, on right, and will consequently win the moral support of all countries. It cannot be otherwise.

Our policy is based on concrete conditions. The Soviet Government is guided by the good intentions of liquidating the remnants of World War II, of removing the occupation regime in West Berlin, and of giving West

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Berlin the status of a free city. Contrary to the assertions of unscrupulous propaganda in the West, nobody intends to encroach upon the freedom, property, and rights of the inhabitants of West Berlin. They will be given every opportunity and every condition for a free choice of the political and social system they desire.

But West Berlin lies within the territory of the GDR, and obviously when a peace treaty is signed, the GDR will exercise sovereign rights over its entire state territory. If, therefore, the Western powers should not wish to sign a peace treaty with the GDR, that would not preserve for them the rights on whose preservation they insist. They would then obviously lose the right of access to West Berlin by land, water, or air. (Khrushchev speech at meeting in Baku, April 25, 1960.)

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U.S. and Western Policy

There are forces in the U.S. which are acting against us, against the easing of tension, and for the continuation of the cold war. To shut one's eyes to this would mean showing weakness in the struggle against these evil forces, against these evil spirits.

... I have gained the impression that there are forces in the United States which act not in the same direction as the President. These forces want a continuation of the cold war and the armaments race. Whether these forces are big or small, influential or not influential, whether the forces which support the President can win -- and he is supported by the absolute majority of the U.S. people -- are questions to which I would not hasten to give a final answer.

(Speech in Moscow, upon return from U.S. visit, September 28, 1959.)

Some militant American generals are trying to frighten us. They are making many speeches with threats against us I have already said many times that to make militant speeches in our day, when terrible means of destruction have been created, is an extremely dangerous business. (Speech in Vladivostok, October 8, 1959.)

However, the most bellicose leaders in the West cannot in any way give up the old methods. Echoes of the past are still heard here and there. Take for example the lamentable decision of the U.S. Congress to hold a so-called "captive nations week" and to offer prayers for their liberation."

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Herter and Assistant Secretary of State Dillon in speeches began something in the nature of psychological attack against the Soviet Union, trying deliberately to distort the character of relations between our country and China I do not know how it sounds in English, but in Russian attempts of this kind may be called "Devine Logic." (Speech to Supreme Soviet, October 31, 1959.)

Our policy is not a position of strength policy By the way, I shall reveal -- and let people abroad know it, I am making no secret of it -- that in one year 200 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in a factory he visited. This represents millions of tons in terms of conventional explosives. You can well imagine that if this lethal weapon is exploded over some country there will be nothing left there at all. (Speech to Soviet journalists, November 14, 1959.)

During our talks in Washington I told Mr. Eisenhower that his position differed from mine, of course. I was authorized by the Soviet Government, in conformity with the desire of our people, to immediately sign an agreement on disarmament I believe that the President also wants this, but apparently he cannot do it because there are still strong quarters in the U.S. that oppose disarmament. We must not be deceived in this respect. Yesterday I read Mr. Nelson Rockefeller's statement But Messrs. Imperialists, if you try to return to the positions of the cold war, Rockefeller will not save you, just as

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Dulles could not save you. (Speech to Soviet Journalists, November 14, 1959.)

Even now the enemies of socialism are not abandoning their plans for smashing the socialist camp and are, of course, looking for the weak links in it. They want to rout the socialist countries one by one. We must bear this in mind, because it is real, and we must do everything to deprive our enemies of these hopes, to thwart these hopes. (Speech to Hungarian Party Congress, December 1, 1959.)

Thirst for profit is pushing some imperialistic circles toward continuing the arms race and maintaining the cold war. These circles are sufficiently influential to harm the cause of easing international tension in certain conditions. Those political leaders who have joined their interests with the policy of the arms race are afraid of the easing of international tension and regard it as undesirable that this easing could become a fact.... It is clear that the imperialists will try again to rally the forces of the advocates of cold war. (Speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960.)

As to the questions to be discussed at the conference of the heads of governments, I should like to express some reservations. The nearer July 16, the day of the meeting of the heads of government, approaches, the more one-sided becomes the approach of some statesmen of the Western powers to the problems the participants of the conference will have to face. They talk about and fear those aspects

of this or that problem which, if attention is focused on them, cannot further the search for mutually accepted solutions. It goes without saying that such an attitude does not help the search for ways of solving important international issues. On the contrary, it leads to a maintenance of tension and consequently hinders the normalization of relations between states.

There is no need to look far to find an example. Let us take a speech, recently made by the U.S. under secretary of state, Dillon, and offered as a summary of U.S. policy before the summit conference. This speech positively smelled of the spirit of the cold war. Dillon's speech reminds us, if anything, of a collection of prefabricated arguments, against the USSR and socialist countries, rather than of a responsible political statement. He kicked up a hullabaloo about the constant communist threat to peace, proposed that the conception of peaceful coexistence be thrown overboard, and grossly distorted the Soviet proposals on disarmament, the conclusion of a German peace treaty, and on West Berlin's transformation into a free city.

Dillon tried to introduce a stream of unfriendliness and mistrust on the very eve of the summit conference, when it is so important to be consistent, to create and support an atmosphere of trust between states. Dillon described the summit conference as a check on the sincerity of the intentions of the USSR. He tried to make out that the outcome of the conference depends entirely on the USSR and not on all the participants. But nobody will succeed in undermining the trust

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In the good will of the USSR, the policy of which is clear, is permeated by love of peace and has gained the firm sympathy of the peoples.

In the eyes of the peoples, the summit conference is truly a serious testing of the policies of the States represented at that conference, perhaps, most of all, of the policy of the United States itself. The peoples will judge sincerity of intention on what each of the four powers brings with it to the conference, and what contribution each power is ready to make to the cause of the lessening of international tension.

But if one goes by the statement of Mr. Dillon, who understandably is not an outsider to government circles in the United States, it turns out that the U.S. Government is ready to come to an agreement on the disarmament question and on the improvement of relations between the states of East and West only if its own viewpoint is accepted on the Berlin question.

Why did Dillon have to make a statement which is obviously out of harmony with the atmosphere established between the Soviet Union and the United States after my talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David? Maybe this is simply a manifestation of pugnacity by a diplomat who has got it stuck in his head that if one attacks the other side before talks begin, the other side will become more yielding? One would like to say to Mr. Dillon, and to those who may share his

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opinion, that such methods are most unsuitable in dealing with the
Soviet Union. (Speech in Baku, April 25, 1960.)

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The Summit

Some in the West claim that the Soviet Union has changed its policy and, therefore, it has become easier to talk with us. This is wrong, of course. We were born Communists, we live as Communists, and will not die, but will continue to march onward as Communists. (Khrushchev speech at Soviet journalists' meeting, November 14, 1959, (referring to a deGaulle statement made at a November 10 press conference))

We have recently reached an agreement ... on convening a conference of heads of government on May 16 in Paris. It is envisaged that this conference will be followed by a number of summit meetings. It would be improvident to try to guess beforehand the possible results of the forthcoming conference.... (Khrushchev speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960.)

As for the imminent summit meeting ... naturally we must not think that all controversial issues can be regulated in one or two meetings between the leaders of Western and Eastern powers. (Khrushchev speech at Paris press luncheon, March 25, 1960.)

Note: For Khrushchev's last public statement on the summit before May 1, see his comments of April 25 in Baku quoted under "U.S. and Western Policy."

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Comments on West During Asian Tour

"Everyone sees how the plans of the reactionary circles of certain Western powers which pursued a foreign policy 'from positions of strength' are coming to grief. Common sense and the understanding that the policy of 'brinkmanship' is a fatal policy under present conditions are beginning to gain ground.

It is known that there are circles in the West who are unwilling to reconcile themselves to the beginning of the relaxation of international tension and seek to reverse the march of time and revert the world to cold war times. Especially dangerous in this respect are the activities of the military blocs of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, the holding of military maneuvers in various parts of the world and the establishment of new bases, including those for nuclear-tipped rockets. In this connection it is impossible to overlook the actions of the Japanese ruling circles, which are a danger to the cause of peace.

The question of peace is the main question of our time. Closely connected with it is the question of the abolition of the colonial system. The sooner the colonial powers are deprived of their colonies -- and the colonialists will then be unable to plunder and oppress other nations -- the quicker peace on earth will be established....

In our time, the colonialists cannot act as they did in the past when the destinies of people throughout the world were decided in European capitals. They are casting about for new ways and means of enslaving countries which recently achieved independence....

Especially dangerous to the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America are various forms of collective colonialism. It is impossible not to mention such manifestations of colonialism as military-political blocs.

Provocations against Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos are but a few of the shameful deeds of the SEATO bloc operating in your area." (Speech to Indonesian Parliament, February 26, 1960.)

"The struggle for strengthening peace is not an easy job, for still active in some countries are influential forces interested in the continued arms race, and in wrecking the prospect now in evidence of a decrease in international tension and in rekindling the cold war.

Some of the Western countries are advanced just because those of Asia, Africa and Latin America are underdeveloped. It would be only fair for the Western nations to repay at least a portion of the looted wealth to the peoples whom they held in bondage." (Khrushchev speech to Indian Parliament, February 11, 1960.)

"Whereas all the peace-loving peoples want a further relaxation of international tension, the cold and hot war advocates continue galvanizing such aggressive blocs as NATO, SEATO and CENTO." (Khrushchev speech at Civic Reception in Delhi, February 12, 1960.)

"The Soviet Union and the West have two different approaches to aid. The Soviet Union strives to achieve economic aid which promotes economic independence. But some people in the West utilize assistance as a weapon of new colonial policy." (Khrushchev speech at Bhubaneswar, February 15, 1960.)

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"I do not think all of you understand when we show bitterness toward colonialists. For some ages you have been oppressed by colonialists, but still you do not feel as strongly as we do, though we have never in the strictest sense been a colony." (Khrushchev speech at a dinner in Calcutta, February 15, 1960)

"Peace is also sought by the greater part of the peoples of the capitalist states in Europe and North America, even in the United States of America whose people for long have been influenced by the propaganda of those on the side of the cold war, where expressions of agreement with peace are considered almost akin to traitorous acts towards the interest of the state...." (Khrushchev speech at Jogjakarta (State University of Gadjah Mada) February 21, 1960.)

"The European colonialists implanted their so-called civilization in Asia by the sword and the gun and for centuries they held up the development of the countries they enslaved." (Statement at Press Conference, Djakarta, March 1, 1960.)

"However, to be frank, one must say that the Western countries, having pumped out incalculable wealth from the colonies as a result of centuries of plunder and are continuing to pump out wealth in one way or another...might be fair enough to allocate at least a portion of this wealth for aid to underdeveloped countries." (Khrushchev speech to Indonesian parliament, February 26, 1960.)

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"[Afro-Asian countries] are important suppliers of raw materials for the Western powers. The supporters of aggression understand that when the majority of Afro-Asian countries follow a peace-loving policy, they are unable to count on the use of the rich resources of Afro-Asian countries in their aggressive plans." (Khrushchev speech to Jogjakarta University, February 22, 1960.)

"The capitalist states are guided by the law of their society -- no cheating, no sales -- in other words help the weak today so that tomorrow the weak will again come to you for assistance. That is not assistance, but striving to hook by the ear and drag into slavery, to win one or another country the object of exploitation by a state or group of persons." (Khrushchev press conference, Djakarta, February 23, 1960.)

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ADDITIONAL KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENTS

The following Khrushchev statements all made after his return from the US, do not fit easily into the four categories listed above. They do, however, illustrate his interpretation of "peaceful coexistence," "coexistence," "capitalism," "exchange of ideas," etc.

There were very many good things [in the US], but we must not forget the bad things. This little worm, or, rather, giant worm is still alive, and can display its vitality in the future as well.

(Moscow speech on return from US, September 28, 1959)

We must realize clearly that the struggle for the consolidation of peace will be a long one. Peaceful coexistence must be understood correctly. Coexistence means the continuation of the struggle between two social systems, but of a struggle by peaceful means, without war, without the interference of one state into the domestic affairs of another state. One should not be afraid. We must struggle resolutely and consistently for our ideas, for our way of life, for our socialist system. The partisans of capitalism too will not, of course, abandon their way of life, their ideology, they will fight. We hold that this struggle must be economic, political, and ideological, but not military.

(Keweenaw speech, October 10, 1959)

He who does not recognize peaceful coexistence wittingly or unwittingly slips down into the positions of the cold war and the armaments race, of deciding international problems by force of arms and not by way of peaceful negotiations. Hence it is clear that it is essential to tear off the masks from all those who wish to subvert the policy of the

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imperialist states who continue the arms race. Things must be called by their names. The aggressive circles of these countries are striving to decide disputed international questions by means of war. All the pacts and alliances set up by the imperialist states are camouflaged by false statements to the effect that they are allegedly defensive, against the threat of aggression. But such statements are not new and have been repeatedly exposed by life itself. (Khrushchev speech, October 10, 1959.)

The supporters of capitalism are trying to put a new coat on the bourgeois capitalist system, but nothing will come of it; just like a snake, you know, that is getting old and is unable to keep its tail up like a young spirited horse. But the bourgeois capitalist system will not see a new surge of energy. (Khrushchev speech, October 6, 1959.)

In the course of these visits, during the past summer we visited certain American representatives especially spoke about the so-called free dissemination of ideas. They talked to us about the need for wider dissemination in our country of books and films especially selected by them, and of the need for their broadcasting. They want to foist upon us all kinds of trash that would poison the minds of Soviet people. Can we agree to this? Of course not! Our people do not want to consume bad food poisoned with the venoms of bourgeois ideas.

(Khrushchev speech, October 9, 1959.)

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In his October 31, 1959 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev assessed the relative relaxation of international tension and gave his interpretation of the causes for it. These remarks were not directly linked to his NS trip, but it was clear that this was his intention.

"Only recently, the foreign policy of some Western powers was built on openly aggressive calculations, on the 'positions of strength' policy. The inspirers of this policy wanted to impose their will on the peace-loving peoples" -- i.e., the communist bloc countries. "Sometimes this approach to international affairs was styled a 'policy of pushing back' or 'rolling back,' but the essence remained the same...." The advocates of this policy favored direct military intervention in the affairs of the socialist and other possible states. From this stemmed the policy of a continuous arms race, illusory hopes of building up 'nuclear supremacy,' etc.... Now things have changed. Even some of the active exponents of this 'positions of strength' policy see its futility.... At the present time a more sober evaluation of the situation, a more reasonable understanding of the balance of forces on the international scene is gaining ascendancy in the West." This inevitably leads to the conclusion that plans involving the use of armed forces against the socialist world should be relegated to oblivion. Life itself demands that the states with different social systems should know how to...coexist peacefully... The main reason [for these recent changes] lies in the growing might and international influence of the Soviet Union, of all countries of the world system of socialism."

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Khrushchev's remarks made clear that Moscow regarded the detente (and prospective high-level East-West talks) as a consequence, and not a repudiation of its position of strength policy. Furthermore, by claiming that the improved international atmosphere was due mainly to the West's accommodation to growing Soviet power, Khrushchev implied that there would be further improvement only if the West made further concessions.

The Chairman. Proceeding, Mr. Secretary, under our agreed regulations, can you tell the Committee when the decision to suspend any further flights over Russian territory was taken?

Secretary Herter. My impression is that it was taken on the Thursday before the President went to Paris.

The Chairman. That would be Thursday, is that it, the 12th?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

The Chairman. What were the considerations which led to this decision?

Secretary Herter. Excuse me?

The Chairman. What were the considerations which led to the decision taken on the 12th, I believe, Thursday the 12th of May, that there should be no further flights over the ---

Secretary Herter. Mr. Chairman, I think I answered that in my own statement, in which I said that since the U-2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case.

The Chairman. It had been compromised sometime before the 12th, wasn't it?

Secretary Herter. No, sir.

The Chairman. Was a moratorium on flights agreed upon prior to May the first to be effective at any time after May the first?

Secretary Herter. Not that I know of.

The Chairman. You would know of it if it had been taken, wouldn't you?

Secretary Herter. I am sorry? I couldn't hear the question, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Was any moratorium on the flights agreed upon prior to May the first, to be effective at any time after May the first?

Secretary Herter. I have heard reports to that effect, but of my own knowledge I do not know.

The Chairman. Was such a moratorium ever discussed or considered by anyone in the State Department?

Secretary Herter. Not by Mr. Dillon nor myself.

The Chairman. Or anyone?

Secretary Herter. I don't know of anyone.

The Chairman. Do you know whether the CIA considered such a moratorium?

Secretary Herter. I do not, sir.

The Chairman. Did Mr. Dulles or anyone else order a suspension of flights after the loss of the plane on May the first?

Secretary Herter. That, sir, he will be able to testify

to. I can't tell you as of what date he did that.

The Chairman. Were any other planes lost on these same ventures prior to May the first?

Secretary Herter.

not over Soviet territory.

The Chairman. None had been shot down or lost over Soviet territory?

Secretary Herber. No.

The Chairman. The flight referred to, that Chairman Khrushchev referred to on April the ninth, you were aware of that, were you?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

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The Chairman. It was a successful flight over?

Secretary Herter. It was.

The Chairman. If the President decided to suspend the flights prior to Monday, May 16, which you stated he did on the 12th, why was this announcement delayed until the meeting with Chairman Khrushchev on the 16th?

Secretary Herter. Because the President reserved that decision to make the announcement in Paris.

The Chairman. What was the reasoning for doing that?

Secretary Herter. I cannot give you the answer, sir.

The Chairman. I believe you stated very convincingly that Chairman Khrushchev came to the conference determined to wreck it. Do you believe that the U-2 incident contributed to this determination on the part of Chairman Khrushchev?

Secretary Herter. Might I say because I have got a little cold and can't hear too well, can that question be repeated?

The Chairman. You have said that Chairman Khrushchev came to the conference determined to wreck it. Do you believe the U-2 incident contributed to this determination?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I believe it did. It was one of the factors as I tried to explain in my statement.

The Chairman. Why do you think --

Secretary Herter. Mr. Chairman, might I for a moment

go back to the previous question you had asked as to the President's delay in announcing the suspension of the flights?

You may recall that he at the summit or at the so-called meeting in Paris, coupled that with the offer of bringing into the United Nations a proposal for general overflight program superintended by the United Nations and wanted to couple those two things together.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, why do you think Chairman Khrushchev left a way out for the President by suggesting in one of his earlier statements that he believed the President did not know about these flights?

Secretary Herter. I can there, of course, only speculate that he had himself committed himself very strongly in Russia with regard to his friendship for the President, and wished to in that way continue the possibility of the President disclaiming any responsibility for the flight.

The Chairman. What was the reason for not accepting this way out on our part? Why didn't we accept that suggestion?

Secretary Herter. Mr. Chairman, that was a question, as you know, of judgment.

The Chairman. That was what?

Secretary Herter. It was a question of judgment. As to when the essential facts had been revealed by the

capture of the pilot and the plane with all its instrumentation and tact, the United States Government should admit the fact that this overflight had taken place, that it was an intelligence overflight, and that decision was made, of course, by the President himself.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you are a long time devotee of international relations and thoroughly familiar with precedents in this field. Is the public assumption and responsibility for espionage by the head of a state the usual and customary practice among nations?

Secretary Herter. No, the general practice has been, I think, for a long period of time to deny any responsibility whatever.

The Chairman. Do you know of any precedent in our history or in the history of any great nation in which the head of state has assumed personal responsibility for espionage activities?

Secretary Herter. No, I do not know of any first hand. It may be that there have been some. On the other hand, I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that this particular incident was of a very unusual nature.

The Chairman. As a general policy, do you believe it is wise for the head of state to assume responsibility for espionage activities?

Secretary Herter. Well, very frankly, I don't think it makes a great deal of difference from the point of

view of what the public believes.

On the other hand I believe in a case of this kind the telling of the truth was the better course than getting deeper into fabricating excuses or disavowing responsibility.

The Chairman. What precisely were the reasons that persuaded you to depart from precedent in this case? What were the unusual circumstances you referred to?

Secretary Herter. The unusual circumstances were the facts that the materiel and the statement of the pilot, not every bit of which was accurate, but a great part of which was accurate, had been revealed, and were being presented to impartial tribunals for examination.

Under those circumstances, which was very different from the ordinary ~~espionage case~~ I think it would have become extremely evident and was extremely evident that this incident had taken place.

The Chairman. Well, in our spy cases, isn't it a fact that the evidence of the particular person being a spy, of some of those we had, was not in question. The difference is in whether or not the head of state takes responsibility for it, not that it was convincingly he was a spy. Isn't that the difference?

Secretary Herter. That is a difference.

The Chairman. We often catch a spy. We have

ourselves, it has been related and there is no doubt he is a spy with all the paraphernalia which usually accompanies a spy, but the point I thought that would be very interesting to the committee to know is why in this particular case, in spite of the convincing nature of the evidence that he was a spy, that the President and the head of state should assume responsibility for it.

Secretary Herter. The first was that it was obvious from the facts as to what had occurred. Second was that the situation which had led to this entire activity was the one which is probably disturbing the peace of the world the most, and leads to the greatest tensions in the world, namely the danger of surprise attack, and the secrecy behind the Soviet Union.

The Chairman. Was it not after the President said that he did know and took full responsibility for these flights that Chairman Khrushchev became completely intransigent and wrecked the conference.

Secretary Herter. That is very difficult to determine. If I may, I would like to cite at this point just one piece of evidence that I mentioned yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

On May 6 the Soviet Embassy in Washington, before any statement had been made accepting any degree of responsibility, before the President had made any statement,

this was on May 6, cancelled from the magazine which is published in the United States similar to the magazine which is published by the United States in Russia, called the USSR, stopped a press run of that magazine and took out of it all references to the coming visit of the President to Soviet Russia. The magazine had in it a welcome to the President in his visit to Russia, pictures of the places that he was going to, and a good many photographs indicating what a great success his visit was going to be. That was canceled and taken out of the magazine entirely.

The Chairman. My time is up. Senator Green.

I recognize you for ten minutes.

Senator Green. May I ask a few more questions about the same matter, because I do not understand and perhaps it is my fault, how far did the President act alone and how far the State Department acted alone before they came together and agreed on the situation?

Secretary Herter. Well, I would say that there was consultation right through this period.

Senator Green. I didn't understand.

Secretary Herter. I would say there was consultation right through in this period. May I make this observation, Mr. Chairman: From the point of view of firsthand knowledge on these matters, I asked Mr. Dillon to come up with me because for the -- until May 6, I was out of the United States, he

was acting Secretary of State and some of the questions that may be directed to that period when I was out of the country he can answer from firsthand information, whereas I would have to do it only from secondhand information.

The Chairman. We would be very glad to have Mr. Dillon supplement the statement whenever you would like.

Senator Green. Mr. Dillon, then will you take up the answer to my question?

Mr. Dillon. All I can say is that in the period that I had responsibility we were in contact regularly with the President with full coordination.

Senator Green. Well, the division of authority seems to have resulted in a great many misunderstandings which have well been spread in the press, and the people are anxious to be informed on how it happened, what was the lack in organization or otherwise that was responsible. If you can explain it I would be glad to have you.

Mr. Dillon. If it would be helpful, I will be glad to explain briefly the course of events in the few days after the plane was missing.

We first received news that this plane was missing, was overdue, at its home base on Sunday, which was the day that the Soviet Union later said the plane was shot down.

At that time, it was determined that a cover story would be used as was stated by the President the other night, which had been previously prepared for such instance.

There was full coordination in this. I knew that the cover story was to be issued and it was discussed that it would be issued as usual when a plane was lost at the base from which the plane was lost. There would be no statement from Washington, and this statement this information was given to the people who would be in charge of the flight at the base where it flew from in Turkey.

in due course, the statement was put out there that a plane was missing and I can give you the general content of that statement which was that, by the Base Commander at Adana at Turkey that U-2 aircraft on the weather mission originating at Adana, Turkey, was missing, that the plane, the purpose of the plane's flight had been a study of clear air turbulence, that during the flight in Southeast Turkey the pilot reported he had oxygen difficulties, that the last word heard from MDB at 7 o'clock London Time, Greenwich Time, that the aircraft did not land at Adana, as planned, and that it could only be assumed that it was now done.

A search effort, he said, was under way in the Lake Van area and that the pilot's name was being withheld pending notification of the next of kin.

After that statement was made no further action was taken here because we did not know the circumstances of how the plane had been lost, where it had been lost, whether it had been actually lost over Soviet territory or not, although the presumption was that it had been lost over Soviet territory, because that was apparently where it was going to be the greater part of the time in the flight.

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The next incident occurred on the morning of Thursday, the 5th of May when we heard of the first speech by Mr. Khrushchev in which it was stated that they had shot down a plane. They didn't say where the plane had been shot down, but they said that an American plane was shot down. This required action and statements on our part. The news of that was received by me at last, during the course of a meeting, a regular meeting of the Security Council, National Security Council which was being held that day as you will remember, somewhere out of Washington, as a part of a Civil Defense Exercise.

A series of Civil Defense Exercises were under way at that time which had been long scheduled. When we heard that news, it was decided that the State Department would handle all questions regarding it and taking part in the discussion at that time, present at that time were myself, Secretary Gates, and Mr. Allen Dulles. So we were all three aware of this decision.

Meanwhile, back in Washington, members of the State Department were meeting with members of the Central Intelligence Agency to try and work out a proper statement.

When we returned to Washington, as soon as we returned to Washington, that statement was finalized in agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House was obviously kept informed of the contents of the statement, and

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the statement was then put out at 12:45 in the State Department. The text of that statement was this:

"The Department had been informed by NASA that as announced on May 3rd, an unarmed plan, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, had been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plan, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U. S. plan had been shot down over the USSR on that day. It may be that this was the missing plan. It is entirely possible that having a failure in the oxygen equipment which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and evidently violated Soviet air space. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot."

Meanwhile, prior to that, in the days immediately before that, there had been also conversations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency regarding information that might be given to NASSA in case there were further questions of them in Washington, for confirmation of statements regarding where the plane was down, something of that nature.

General guidelines on this were prepared. This was prior to the 5th, in the period of the 2nd and 4th, and these, I understand, were transmitted to NASA by the Central

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Intelligence Agency.

The State Department at no time worked directly with NASA on any of this publicity or anything regarding these flights.

Senator Gore. Did you say did, or did not?

Mr. Dillon. Did not. This is part of the cover operation.

So then the next item on this was that shortly after this statement, NASA was asked a lot of questions about the plane and they, following the cover story that had been prepared earlier, put out the statement which appeared in the press that same day. I think that came out about three quarters of an hour after our statement. They apparently utilized the general guidelines which they had been given, to answer questions and put them together into a statement which was then put out.

Senator Humphrey. What was the date of that?

Mr. Dillon. This was done on May 5th. This was right after Mr. Khrushchev's first speech in which he said a plane was down somewhere and this was -- you will recall also at that

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time the Soviets printed a photograph of a plane that was supposedly a wreck and we very rapidly learned, I would say within twenty-four hours, that this photograph was a fraudulent photograph and was not a photograph of the U-2 wreckage, but was a photograph of some Soviet type plane.

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Senator Humphrey. Mr. Chairman, may I get a correction?

The Chairman. The time of the Senator from Rhode Island has expired.

Senator Humphrey. Just a technical point. I couldn't follow the sequence. I was wondering about the bulletin we had before us and the sequence of relays.

The Chairman. You will have an opportunity.

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Senator Green. I would like to have the witness proceed and finish his statement.

Mr. Dillon. Yes. Could I finish this statement?

Almost immediately, I would say on Friday the 6th, we were aware that this was a fraudulent picture, and so that gave us some concern that the Soviets might have a greater knowledge regarding the aircraft than we had previously suspected, and that maybe they had in their possession more of the aircraft and possibly had the pilot in their possession. So this was then followed on Saturday morning, the seventh, by Khrushchev's speech in which he stated that they did have the pilot, and gave for the first time actual information as to where it was shot down and so forth.

The Secretary returned to Washington on the afternoon of Friday, May 6th, from Istanbul and Greece, and I reported to him on the situation as of that time, and at that time he naturally took over. Therefore, on Saturday morning, we met with him to determine what to do next, and at that moment as we met, we were faced with this new Soviet statement saying that they had the pilot, and a new situation had arisen, and his action at that time the Secretary will answer for. But that was when the decision was made to tell, to reveal the fact that this was an American plane.

Senator Green. If I understand you correctly --

The Chairman. The Senator has run considerably over his

2 time.

Senator Green. May I ask one more question?

The Chairman. We are under a time limitation.

Senator Green. I thank you for what you have said.

As I understand it, your explanation is that too many cooks spoil the broth.

The Chairman. The Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator Wiley. I want to congratulate you, gentlemen.

It seems to me that the facts as developed this morning, plus the President's address, gives us what we have practically all known from the newspapers as descriptive of this situation. I want to ask just a few questions, Mr. Secretary.

In your opinion, do you think that when Khrushchev went to Paris he had already made up his mind to blow up the conference?

Secretary Herter. I do, sir, and I think that the bulk of the evidence indicates that he was under instructions to do so.

Senator Wiley. In your opinion, is the matter of using what we have used in the past, the U-2's for a mere period of years, all in the interest of preserving the integrity of the United States and the integrity of the West?

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Secretary Herter. I do indeed.

Senator Wiley. And, in your opinion, if the U-2 incident hadn't happened -- this is sort of a duplication of the question but I want to get to the main question -- would Khrushchev have had an adequate excuse or would he have drummed up one?

Secretary Herter. That can only be a matter of speculation. I think that Mr. Khrushchev has indicated by his Baku speech, felt that from his point of view the Summit would not turn out satisfactorily, and that the U-2 incident was a convenient handle for him to use to torpedo the conference.

Senator Wiley. Isn't it a fact that from his remarks that he made in his talk in Berlin that he knew that we were using what has been called spy planes, had been using the same for some time?

Secretary Herter. It certainly does, and that was repeated yesterday by Mr. Gromyko in the statement that he made at the United Nations in which he said they had known of this for some time, that they had known of it at the time that Mr. Khrushchev was at Camp David,

Senator Wiley. Then because of previous conferences, as

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you have outlined in your remarks, it is very clear that there was no real reason to think that a conference could have accomplished anything, because isn't it a fact that both parties were adamant?

Secretary Herter. That is true, sir, insofar as Berlin and the German situation was concerned. It might have been possible to work out some interim agreement for Berlin. I am rather doubtful whether it would have been. There was some hope that in the field of disarmament, the East and the West could have agreed on directives to those who were negotiating in Geneva to get down to specific disarmament measures to make a start, and to break away from the deadlock that had occurred over pure generalities. That is a hope that we had, that something of that kind might come out of the Paris conference. But, as you may recall, in our public statements we had made it very clear that people should not expect, not have too great hopes of what might come out of it. But as the President has himself said, he had hoped perhaps from this and perhaps from succeeding summit conferences there might be some easing of the over-all atmosphere, which in time would lead to a solution of some of these problems.

Senator Wiley. What do you think is the reason that if Khrushchev was as het up as he claims he was, that he said in six or eight months there would be another opportunity

5 for a conference.

Secretary Herter. I think with the admonition that we have been given earlier in the day with regard to not bringing political matters into this discussion, the inference would have to be drawn by each individual for himself on that.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take more time except I do believe that into the minutes of this meeting should go the address of the President of May 25th, which is already attached to this summation or these background documents. But in view of the fact that we are asking ourselves certain questions about, let us say, where do we go from here, and that is my last question, I ask that this be incorporated in the minutes of this meeting.

The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

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70 BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS ON SUMMIT CONFERENCE

20. ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAY 25, 1960

(White House press release)

(As actually delivered)

My Fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk with you about the remarkable events last week in Paris, and their meaning to our future.

First, I am deeply grateful to the many thousands of you, and to representatives in Congress, who sent me messages of encouragement and support while I was in Paris, and later upon my return to Washington. Your messages clearly revealed your abiding loyalty to America's great purpose—that of pursuing, from a position of spiritual, moral, and material strength—a lasting peace with justice.

You recall, of course, why I went to Paris ten days ago.

Last summer and fall I had many conversations with world leaders; some of these were with Chairman Khrushchev, here in America. Over those months a small improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the West seemed discernible. A possibility developed that the Soviet leaders might at last be ready for serious talks about our most persistent problems—those of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control, and Germany, including Berlin.

To explore that possibility, our own and the British and French leaders met together, and later we agreed, with the Soviet leaders, to gather in Paris on May 16.

Of course we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening peace, there can be no higher obligation than to pursue it.

Nor had our own policies changed. We did hope to make some progress in a Summit meeting, unpromising though previous experiences had been. But as we made preparations for this meeting, we did not drop our guard or relax our vigilance.

Our safety, and that of the free world, demand, of course, effective systems for gathering information about the military capabilities of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free world security.

This has long been one of my most serious preoccupations. It is part of my grave responsibility, night and day, the overall problem of protecting the American people, to guard ourselves and our allies against surprise attack.

During the period leading into World War II we learned from bitter experience the imperative necessity of a continuous gathering of intelligence information, the maintenance of military communications and contact, and alertness of command.

An additional word seems appropriate about this matter of communications and command. While the Secretary of Defense and I were in Paris, we were, of course, away from our normal command posts. He recommended that under the circumstances we test the continuing readiness of our military communications. I personally approved. Such tests are valuable and will be frequently repeated in the future.

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Moreover, as President, charged by the Constitution with the conduct of America's foreign relations, and as Commander in Chief, charged with the direction of the operations and activities of our Armed Forces and their supporting services, I take full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by our government to secure and evaluate military intelligence.

It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programs that the widely publicized U-2 incident occurred.

Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work has been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it. Chairman Khrushchev has stated that he became aware of these flights several years ago. Only last week, in his Paris press conference, Chairman Khrushchev confirmed that he knew of these flights when he visited the United States last September.

Incidentally, this raises the natural question: Why all the furor concerning one particular flight? He did not, when an American last September charge that these flights were any threat to Soviet safety. He did not then see any reason to refuse to confer with American representatives.

This he did only about the flight that unfortunately failed, on May 1, far inside Russia.

Now, two questions have been raised about this particular flight: first, as to its timing, considering the importance of the Summit meeting; second, our initial statements when we learned the flight had failed.

As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack.

Next, as to our government's initial statement about the flight, this was issued to protect the pilot, his mission, and our intelligence processes, at a time when the true facts were still undetermined.

Our first information about the failure of this mission did not disclose whether the pilot was still alive, was trying to escape, was avoiding interrogation, or whether both plane and pilot had been destroyed. Protection of our intelligence system and the pilot, and concealment of the plane's mission, seemed imperative. It must be remembered that over a long period, these flights had given us information of the greatest importance to the Nation's security. In fact, their success has been nothing short of remarkable.

For these reasons, what is known in intelligence circles as a "covering statement" was issued. It was issued on assumptions that were later proved incorrect. Consequently, when later the status of the pilot was definitely established, and there was no further possibility of avoiding exposure of the project, the factual details were set forth.

I then made two facts clear to the public: first, our program of aerial reconnaissance had been undertaken with my approval; second, this government is compelled to keep abreast, by one means or an-

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other, of military activities of the Soviets, just as their government has for years engaged in espionage activities in our country and throughout the world. Our necessity to proceed with such activities was also asserted by our Secretary of State who, however, had been ~~assured~~—as was I—not to say that these particular flights would be continued.

In fact, before leaving Washington, I had directed that these U-2 flights be stopped. Clearly their usefulness was impaired. Moreover, continuing this particular activity in these new circumstances could not but complicate the relations of certain of our allies with the Soviets. And, of course, new techniques, other than aircraft, are constantly being developed.

Now I wanted no public announcement of this decision until I could personally disclose it at the Summit meeting in conjunction with certain proposals I had prepared for the conference.

At my first Paris meeting with Mr. Khrushchev, and before his trip was made public, I informed him of this discontinuance and the character of the constructive proposals I planned to make. These contemplated the establishment of a system of aerial surveillance operated by the United Nations.

The day before the first scheduled meeting, Mr. Khrushchev had advised President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan that he would make certain demands upon the United States as a precondition for beginning a Summit conference.

Although the United States was the only power against which he expressed his displeasure, he did not communicate this information to me. I was, of course, informed by our allies.

At the four power meeting on Monday morning, he demanded of the United States four things: First, condemnation of U-2 flights as a method of espionage; second, assurance that they would not be continued; third, a public apology on behalf of the United States; and, fourth, punishment of all those who had any responsibility respecting this particular mission.

I replied by advising the Soviet leader that I had, during the previous week, stopped these flights and that they would not be resumed. I offered also to discuss the matter with him in personal meetings, while the regular business of the Summit might proceed. Obviously, I would not respond to his extreme demands. He knew, of course, by holding to those demands the Soviet Union was scuttling the Summit Conference.

In torpedoing the conference, Mr. Khrushchev claimed that he acted as the result of his own high moral indignation over alleged American acts of aggression. As I said earlier, he had known of these flights for a long time. It is apparent that the Soviets had decided even before the Soviet delegation left Moscow that my trip to the Soviet Union should be canceled and that nothing constructive from their viewpoint would come out of the Summit Conference.

In evaluating the results, however, I think we must not write the record all in red ink. There are several things to be written in the black. Perhaps the Soviet action has turned the clock back in some measure, but it should be noted that Mr. Khrushchev did not go beyond invective—a time-worn Soviet device to achieve an immediate objective. In this case, the wrecking of the Conference.

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On our side, at Paris, we demonstrated once again America's willingness, and that of her allies, always to go to the extra mile in behalf of peace. Once again, Soviet intransigence reminded us all of the unpredictability of despotic rule, and the need for those who work for freedom to stand together in determination and in strength.

The conduct of our allies was magnificent. My colleagues and friends—President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan—stood sturdily with the American delegation in spite of persistent Soviet attempts to split the Western group. The NATO meeting after the Paris Conference showed unprecedented unity and support for the Western position and for the position taken at the Summit meeting. I salute my allies for us all.

And now, most importantly, what about the future?

All of us know that, whether started deliberately or accidentally, global war would leave civilization in a shambles. This is as true of the Soviet system as of all others. In a nuclear war there can be no winner—only losers. Even despots understand this. Mr. Khrushchev stated this week that he well realizes that general nuclear war would bring catastrophe for both sides. Recognition of this mutual destructiveness capability is the basic reality of our present relations. It is, however, a sobering reality, it does not mean that we shall ever give up trying to build a more sane and hopeful reality—a better world for all human relations.

To do this, here are the policies we must follow, and to these I am confident the great majority of our people, regardless of party, give their support.

First. We must strengthen up our strength, and hold it steady for the long haul—strength not neglected in complacency nor overbuilt in hysteria. We must do this, even if it takes it long to everyone that there can be no gain in this new age of pressure tactics or aggression against us.

Second. We must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts between our own and Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and compromise is still open if the Soviets will but use it.

Third. To improve world conditions in which human freedom can flourish, we must continue to work hard with positive programs at home and abroad, in collaboration with nations everywhere. In doing so, we shall continue to give our strong support to the United Nations and the great principles for which it stands.

As to the first of these purposes—our defenses are sound. They are tailored to the situation confronting us.

Their adequacy has been my primary concern for those past 7 years—indeed throughout my adult life.

In no respect have the composition and size of our forces been based on or affected by any Soviet blarney. Nor will they be. We will continue to carry forward the great improvements already planned in these forces. They will be kept ready—and under constant review.

Any changes made necessary by technological advances or world events will be recommended at once.

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This strength—by far the most potent on earth—is, I emphasize, for deterrent, defensive and retaliatory purposes only, without threat or aggressive intent toward anyone.

Concerning the second part of our policy—relations with the Soviet Union—and all the world realize, despite our recent disappointment, that progress toward the goal of mutual understanding, easing the causes of tensions, and reduction of armaments is as necessary as ever.

We shall continue these peaceful efforts, including participation in the existing negotiations with the Soviet Union. In these negotiations we have made some progress. We are prepared to preserve and build on it. The Allied Paris communique and my own statement on returning to the United States should have made this abundantly clear to the Soviet Government.

We conduct these negotiations not on the basis of surface harmony nor are we deterred by any bad deportment we meet. Rather we approach them as a careful search for common interests between the Western allies and the Soviet Union on specific problems.

I have in mind, particularly, the nuclear test and disarmament negotiations. We shall not back away, on account of recent events, from the efforts or commitments that we have undertaken.

Nor shall we relax our search for new means of reducing the risk of war by miscalculation, and of achieving verifiable arms control.

A major American goal is a world of open societies.

Here in our country anyone can buy maps and aerial photographs showing our cities, our dams, our plants, our highways—indeed, our whole industrial and economic complex. We know that Soviet attaches regularly collect this information. Last fall Chairman Khrushchev's train passed no more than a few hundred feet from an operational ICBM, in plain view from his window. Our thousands of books and scientific journals, our magazines, newspapers and official publications, our radio and television, all openly describe to all the world every aspect of our society.

This is as it should be. We are proud of our freedom.

Soviet distrust, however, does still remain. To allay these misgivings I offered five years ago to open our skies to Soviet reconnaissance aircraft on a reciprocal basis. The Soviets refused. That offer is still open. At an appropriate time America will submit such a program to the United Nations, together with the recommendation that the United Nations itself conduct this reconnaissance. Should the United Nations accept this proposal, I am prepared to propose that America supply part of the aircraft and equipment required.

This is a photograph of the North Island Naval Station in San Diego, Calif. It was taken from an altitude of more than 70,000 feet. You may not perhaps be able to see them on your television screens, but the white lines in the parking strips around the field are clearly discernible from 12 miles up. These lines are just 6 inches wide.

Obviously most of the details necessary for a military evaluation of the airfield and its aircraft are clearly distinguishable.

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I show you this photograph as an example of what could be accomplished through United Nations aerial surveillance.

Indeed, if the United Nations should undertake this policy, this program, and the great nations of the world should accept it, I am convinced that not only can all humanity be assured that they are safe from any surprise attack from any quarter, but indeed the greatest tensions of all, the fear of war, would be removed from the world. I sincerely hope that the United Nations may adopt such a program.

As far as we in America are concerned, our programs for increased contacts between all peoples will continue. Despite the suddenly expressed hostility of the men in the Kremlin, I remain convinced that the basic longings of the Soviet people are much like our own. I believe that Soviet citizens have a sincere friendship for the people of America. I deeply believe that above all else they want a lasting peace and a chance for a more abundant life in place of more and more instruments of war.

Finally, turning to the third part of America's policy—the strengthening of freedom—we must do far more than concern ourselves with military defense against, and our relations with, the Communist bloc. Beyond this, we must advance constructive programs throughout the world for the betterment of peoples in the newly developing nations. The zig and zag of the Kremlin cannot be allowed to disturb our worldwide programs and purposes. In the period ahead, these programs could well be the decisive factor in our persistent search for peace in freedom.

To the peoples in the newly developing nations urgently needed help will surely come. If it does not come from us and our friends, these peoples will be driven to seek it from the enemies of freedom. Moreover, those joined with us in defense partnerships look to us for proof of our steadfastness. We must not relax our common security efforts.

As to this, there is something specific all of us can do, and right now. It is imperative that crippling cuts not be made in the appropriations recommended for Mutual Security, whether economic or military. We must support this program with all of our wisdom and all of our strength. We are proud to call this a nation of the people. With the people knowing the importance of this program, and making their voices heard in its behalf throughout the land, there can be no doubt of its continued success.

Yellow Americans, long ago I pledged to you that I would journey anywhere in the world to promote the cause of peace. I remain pledged to pursue a peace of dignity, of friendship, of honor, of justice.

Operating from the firm base of our spiritual and physical strength, and seeking wisdom from the Almighty, we and our allies together will continue to work for the survival of mankind in freedom—and for the goal of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and openness among all nations.

Thank you, and good night.

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Senator Wiley. Now where do we go from here?

Secretary Herter. Sir, I tried to indicate that in the last part of my statement. That as the President has said, we hope to continue to do business on a businesslike basis with the Soviet Government. We intend to continue with the negotiations that are now underway. We intend to continue with our exchange agreements and our relationships. One thing I might put in the record at this point. From such information as we have received from our embassies in Moscow, and from our missions in other Soviet bloc countries, the attitude toward our people has remained unchanged. There has been no indication of hostility on a people to people basis that has been evidenced in any way from what happened in Paris.

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The Chairman. Senator from Minnesota.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, on page 4 of your statement, you indicate under the sub-title "Summit Prospects Dimmed", a series of developments that you believe indicated a change in the position or a possibility of a change in the position of the Soviet representatives, particularly Mr. Khrushchev about the Summit.

In the third paragraph you say "But clouds began to gather even then", referring to some developments in the Soviet Union.

If you will recall that period, isn't this about the same time that the United States was considering offering nuclear weapons again to West Germany?

Secretary Herter. I can't recall that we have ever done that.

Senator Humphrey. Well, there has been considerable talk about the offering of nuclear weapons to our allies.

Secretary Herter. We have not been offering them to our allies --

Senator Humphrey. I know you have not been offering them.

Secretary Herter. Under the law we cannot do that.

Senator Humphrey. I understand that. There has been considerable discussion here in the United States of changing the law and offering weapons to our NATO allies.

Secretary Herter. There may have been discussions on that subject, Senator, but we never made any specific proposal on that point.

Senator Humphrey. Are you denying there has been any discussion of it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Herter. Oh, no, I said there was some discussion.

Senator Humphrey. In official circles.

Secretary Herter. We have never made any specific proposals of any kind.

Senator Humphrey. There was enough talk about it so that resolutions have been introduced into the Congress, and the House of Representatives as you know to make sure that this didn't happen.

My question relates to this: Is there not a great fear in the Soviet Union of the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons to Western Germany?

Secretary Herter. I think that is true. I am not sure that it is confined to Western Germany. I think that it applies to the spread of nuclear weapons in other nations and it might well include Communist China.

Senator Humphrey. Yes, indeed.

Is it not possible that during this period that, of the dimming of the Summit prospects that you referred to, that you are saying here a little counter offensive on the

propaganda level by the Soviet.

Secretary Herter. Yes, that is possible. On the other hand, may I say this:

After the summit conference itself was not agreed upon until December after the President, Messrs. Macmillan, De Gaulle and Adenauer had met in Paris and a note was sent to the Soviet Government suggesting that a Summit Conference be held and the date was not agreed upon until later than that, the date of May 16.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, I want it quite clear I happen to believe, as you indicated, that the Soviets have made up their minds to scuttle this conference in light of certain developments, such as the visit of Mr. Khrushchev to De Gaulle and when he found out that the Americans and the French and the British were not going to back out on Berlin, and were not going to agree to a separate settlement in Germany, I think that Mr. Khrushchev did come to the conclusion as you have indicated that the Summit Conference could not be a success and therefore, he wanted to get out of it.

But the point that I am raising in light of your statement is, would we not expect Mr. Khrushchev to blast off, so to speak, on such subjects as Berlin, and a separate treaty with Germany, isn't this and hasn't this been a part of his general line for a considerable period of time?

Secretary Herter. Yes, it is not confined to Mr.

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Khrushchev. It has been almost a standard technique before any conference, to take a very adamant position before the conference.

Senator Humphrey. Yes.

Well, I only bring this up because while I recognize there was evidence of what you say, possibly a shift of opinion in the Kremlin, there was always a reason for this and there may very well have been the reason that the Soviet leaders constantly want to wage the propaganda war on this nuclear weapons distribution problem.

I want to just correct the record here, I am sorry to have interrupted, Senator Green, but Secretary Dillon, when you were discussing for us the sequence of events relating to the U-2 incident you talk about a press release of the Department of State on May 5, where is it?

Mr. Dillon. I noticed, I received this document after I made my statement, and I noticed that it was not included in this document.

I have here a full text of the on-the-record press and radio news briefing by the State Department spokesman on May 5 at 12:45 p.m., and I am perfectly willing, and I will be glad to submit that which includes not only this statement but also on the record questions and answers which he made, and that would go in either -- that would go in ahead of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

news release which was given out before that.

(The excerpt from the Press and Radio News Briefing follows:)

The Department has been informed by NASA that as announced May 3 an unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian has been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U. S. plane has been shot down over the USSR on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having a failure in the oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

That is the end of the statement.

Q What was the plane doing, weather reconnaissance?

A NASA is briefing reporters on the full details of that.

Q Link, when you say you are taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, do you mean you are asking for information on the pilot, or making a protest about the plane?

A This matter is being taken up with the Soviet Government, John (Hightower), through our Ambassador in Moscow.

Q Yes, but it is a protest or an inquiry?

A I can't say just what form it will take at this stage. I would think, initially, an inquiry.

Q Is this the report which the White House announced would be made?

A That is correct.

Q You say it may be that this was the missing plane?

A Yes.

Q There are other planes missing or --

A Not that I am aware of.

Q -- unaccounted for?

A No, not that I am aware of.

Q You say this plane was from Adana, Turkey. Is that the U. S. Air Force Base down there?

A As I say, you better get this information from NASA; but let me give you a brief rundown, which I do not wish attributed to State Department. This, in infinitely more detail is being given out at NASA. ✓

This plane is a Lockheed U-2, and it is used for upper air weather studies. It is a single engine airplane powered by Pratt & Whitney J-57. It was a test plane when it became obvious that it could maintain flight at a height of 55,000 feet for three to four hours. Arrangements were made by NASA, then NACA, to get a number of aircraft for the weather studies. The weather programs have been carried out by the Air Weather

service serving as executive agent for NASA, inasmuch as we do not have overseas facilities for such work. The pilots are Lockheed test pilots on contract to NASA. These flights have been made in the United States, in the Far East, and in the Middle East.

That is about the extent of it. You can get the information from NASA. I am doing this in consideration of those who are not able to be in two places at the same time.

Q Khrushchev also said an American plane violated the Soviet frontier by flying over the Afghan border on April 9. Do you have anything on that?

A We have absolutely no -- N-O, no -- information on that at all.

Q Wasn't this plane accompanied by another plane of the same type when it started out on the reconnaissance flight?

A I am not aware of that, if that is a fact, but I assume NASA can give you that information, Paul (Ward). I have nothing on it.

Q Link, the area where this plane disappeared is the same as the other plane --

A This is the Lake Van area.

Q Is that the same area where the earlier plane disappeared in 1958?

A In the neighborhood of it.

Q Link, how do you know the plane was having difficulty?

A He reported it.

Q He reported it by radio?

A That is right.

Q At the time did he give his position?

A In the Lake Van area.

Q Was his course such at that time that if continued it might have taken him over the Soviet Union?

A John (Hightower), I don't have those details.

Q Was that the last communication from him, Link?

A So far as I know.

Q What was the question?

A The question was, was that the last communication from the pilot, and to my knowledge it was.

Q Is the name of this pilot being released by somebody?

A Here I would like to go OFF THE RECORD. This man's mother is a cardiac patient, and her doctor is seriously concerned about her learning this news over the radio or in the papers before the doctor can quietly explain it to her. He has not yet had an opportunity to do this.

That is the situation.

Q His name has not been made public?

A No. I have it, and I would hope you would let me off on this until the doctor is able to inform the mother.

Q Link, has any protest been received from the Soviet Government?

A No, sir, it has not.

Q Link, do you have any comment on the rest of Khrushchev's speech, his statement that the Summit looks gloomy now because of aggressive American action?

A No.

Q Is this the first indication we had in Khrushchev's speech that the plane had been shot down? There was no previous communication from the Soviets?

A Nothing prior to this.

Q Thank you, very much.

A Yes, sir.

Lincoln White

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Senator Humphrey. Did the Department of Defense give out a release before you did, the State Department?

Mr. Dillon. The Department of Defense's news release was really only confirmation and repetition of the release that had been given out by the Air Base Commander at Adana, Turkey and added nothing to that. It merely repeated that that was accurate and that was the one that is in this document.

(At this point, Senator Mansfield left the hearing room.)

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, what agency or who is the person in, the official in this government, who is in charge of these flights such as the U-2 flights.

Secretary Herter. The Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Humphrey. Do you have constant information, do you have continuing information as to the number of these flights, the course of these flights, the purpose of these flights in the State Department?

Secretary Herter. The general programs had been gone over with the Department. Obviously it is impossible to tell when these flights are going to take place because they are so dependent on the season of the year and on weather conditions.

The agency has to plan numbers of alternatives so we never know at any particular time or any particular flight. But the general approval of the program had been received from the State Department, of course as one of the advisers to the President in this matter.

Senator Humphrey. Did you know of this specific flight ahead of time?

Secretary Herter. I did not, no, I didn't know it was in the air even when I was overseas nor do I think any of us did until it came down.

Senator Humphrey. Is that your understanding, Mr. Dillon?

Mr. Dillon. I was not aware that it was in the air until I was informed that it was -- it was overdue as I stated previously.

Senator Humphrey. When something goes wrong on one of these flights who is responsible to give the cover story, the cover-up story, so to speak?

Mr. Dillon. Central Intelligence Agency, but we are also responsible for agreeing with them that this is a reasonable story, and it is proper in the circumstances, but they have the responsibility for executing it,

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, what do you think would happen in the United States if on our radar screen we should discover a plane flying at high altitude in this age of the fear of surprise attack, over our territory.

Secretary Herter. I think we would do everything we could do to identify it right away.

Senator Humphrey. Just identify it.

Secretary Herter. Yes, identify it. We have the wherewithal, I think to do that.

Senator Humphrey. In other words we, would we dispatch interceptors?

Secretary Herter. I think so.

Senator Humphrey. What would be our view of such a flight?

Secretary Herter. certainly there is very little that such a flight could ascertain that would worry us much. Every bit of information that we have got in this country seems to be available through public means to anyone who wishes to collect documents. In fact in the whole Russian espionage system they have collected maps, documents, and photographs of every part of the United States.

Senator Humphrey. I realize this, but in light of the danger of surprise attack this is what I am getting at. This is a little different may I say of a spy working the railroad yard or taking photographs or even a submarine off our coast even though this gets to be a little serious, too. But in the light of danger of surprise attack by air power, there is some difference, is there not?

Secretary Herter. There is some difference. On the other hand I think we could identify it very quickly. This is the type of plane that no one could possibly mistake for a

bomber when you get close enough to look at it. This is entirely an unarmed glider type of plane.

Senator Humphrey. Have we ever shot down any Soviet planes over American territory or over any friendly territory in which we have bases or alliances?

Secretary Herter. Not that I am aware of.

Senator Humphrey. Have we ever intercepted any Soviet planes, in Korea, for example?

Secretary Herter. I think we have been able to identify them from time to time. Whether we could say that they were deliberate espionage planes or whether they wandered over the line from the border or not I can't tell you.

Senator Humphrey. Have we ever shot any down?

The Chairman. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

The Chairman. The Senator from Iowa.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, we hear a great many statements about this plane being shot down. What is the best evidence on that? Was it shot down from its maximum height or did they consider that it had a flame out at that height and then came down to a lower altitude or what?

Secretary Herter. Senator, there has been a good deal of speculation on that point. I think that we are very skeptical

as to whether it was shot down from a very high altitude

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I think there is considerable difference in a situation where this plane might have been shot down at 60- or 70,000 feet, or whether it was shot down or shot it at 5- or 7,000 feet.

Secretary Herter. We are very skeptical and there are certain evidences that it was not shot down from that altitude

Senator Hickenlooper. Now, the Russians, I think it has been quite well-established from Mr. Khrushchev's statements, that the Russians were aware for some time in the past that flights of this kind had gone over their territory.

I say I think it is quite evident that Mr. Khrushchev was aware or the Russians were aware that flights of this kind had gone on over their territory. At least they claim they were. Did they ever file a protest with the United States Government?

Secretary Herter. Not with respect to this type of flight

Senator Hickenlooper. I understand that we have

requested in Moscow that representatives of this government be permitted to interview the pilot. Have we had any replies from those requests?

Secretary Herter. As yet they have not given us that permission. They have said that when "We have finished interrogating him we will give consideration to it."

Senator Hickenlooper. Do we have a reasonable idea as to where he is held, he is being held?

Secretary Herter. That I can't tell you. We have been assured that he is in good health, and beyond that I can't tell you whether we know where he is held or not? Perhaps one of my colleagues knows that. I don't think we have any information on that.

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Senator Hickenlooper. Would you care to give an opinion on the value to this country, in our defensive posture of these flights, this series of flights which have gone on over Russian territory for the last several years?

Secretary Herter. Yes, sir, I will give you this opinion. It is a layman's opinion rather than an expert's opinion, but I think they were of very great value to us.

Senator Hickenlooper. Isn't it a fact that these flights have enabled us, through the knowledge that we have acquired, to reorient our defensive posture and our equipment and attitudes from time to time because we have been able to find out exactly, in many instances, what the Russians were apparently doing or proposing to do by way of armaments and weapons and installations?

Secretary Herter. I think that they have been of very great value to us.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, have you had any opportunity to get a reliable cross section reading on what other nations of the world think about the vulnerability of Russian defenses? In other words, on the theory that perhaps a part of Mr. Khrushchev's and the Kremlin's infuriation about this matter is an exposition to the world that they knew about these flights and that they could not stop them from going over the Russian territory with any consistency?

Secretary Herter. I think that undoubtedly that played

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a considerable part in his own state of mind with regard to the whole incident, the feeling of frustration that they had not been able to stop these during a period of four years.

Senator Hickenlooper. And that that exposure to the Russian people and to many other nations of the world that had been propagandized perhaps into thinking that the Russians were invulnerable may very well have had some effect on the attitudes within the Kremlin?

Secretary Herter. It may well have had very real effects.

Senator Hickenlooper. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The Chairman. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, do our experts believe that Russia has a land-air missile?

Secretary Herter. I think you are having both the Secretary of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency that can testify to that better than I could.

Senator Morse. Have they ever informed you as to what their opinion is as to whether or not Russia has a land-air missile?

Secretary Herter. We, I think, assume that they do.

Senator Morse. We assume that they do. Is it on the basis of that assumption that they have been asking Congress for some time for a speed up in our land-air missile program because of the assumption that Russia may have one?

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Secretary Herter. Yes, sir. I am being purposely cautious for security reasons, as you understand.

Senator Morse. I understand.

Secretary Herter. And possibly in Executive Session when you have talked to Mr. Dulles you could get further information on that point.

Senator Morse. And yet, I think from the standpoint of our own security, it is rather important that we have some information as to the possibility, on the line of Senator Hickenlooper's question, the possibility of whether or not this was shot down by a land-air missile.

Senator Lausche. A little louder, if the Senator please.

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Senator Morse.

What evidence do we have, Mr. Secretary, that Russia knew of previous American spy plane flights over Russian territory?

Secretary Herter. Only the statements of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko.

Senator Morse. When?

Secretary Herter. Mr. Khrushchev made it a number of times. He did so in his statements in Paris. He did so, I think, in his statements that he made to the Central Committee of the Presidium in Moscow before he left.

Mr. Gromyko made that statement again yesterday.

Senator Morse. What International law rights do we have, Mr. Secretary, over capture of American spies captured by foreign governments?

Secretary Herter. Excuse me, sir?

Senator Morse. I repeat it. What International law

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rights do we have over captured American spies that have been captured by a foreign government?

(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Williams leaves.)

Secretary Herter. We have no rights over them that are in contravention of domestic law. We have no international right.

Senator Morse. Therefore, Russia is under no International law requirement to make this American spy accessible to American government officials in Moscow.

Secretary Herter. I do not think so.

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, do you think the public knowledge now of these American spy plane flights over Russia has played into the hands of Communist propaganda with the Russian people themselves by increasing the fear, no matter how unfounded we know it is, the fear of the Russian people that our real objective is to make war against Russia?

Secretary Herter. I think that the Russian government will do its very best to work along that line in its propaganda.

As I said earlier, the evidence we have so far is that the attitude of the Russian people toward our officials, whether in Moscow or in our Missions in the Soviet bloc countries has shown no change.

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Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, what plans, if any, does the Administration have of carrying on a peace offensive against Khrushchev now in a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations?

Secretary Herter. That again is a matter of speculation. The fact that, as I indicated in my prepared statement, he had gone through this extraordinary press conference in Paris with very extreme language, that he did not contain any threats of any specific action; that he then went to East Berlin and called off a mass meeting there, and only invited to a meeting on the following day and made a statement with regard to the Berlin picture indicating that there would be no action taken for some time may well indicate that his position on specific things has not changed. However, only time will tell, and what his attitude will be, what the whole attitude will be at the time of the meeting of the Assembly, of course, can only speculate.

It is very possible that he may want at that time to make a more conciliatory gesture.

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Senator Morse. To what extent, if any, do you think Red China has put pressure on the Russian leaders to follow this adamant course of action?

Secretary Herter. That again, sir, is a matter of speculation.

Senator Morse. You have no evidence?

Secretary Herter. But the articles which have appeared in the Red Star Magazine, which is their official publication, have been of such a highly critical nature of the whole policy of so called peaceful coexistence, the whole detente policy that Mr. Khrushchev seemed to have been following, that they may well have a considerable influence.

Senator Morse. Do you have any reason to believe that we may be confronted with a diversionary movement now in Asia by Red China stepping up military activities in Asia seeking to embarrass us?

Secretary Herter. I think we should be very alert to that.

Senator Morse. Do we have any late information as to any progress Red China is making in the development of nuclear weapons, either on their own or assisted by Russia?

Secretary Herter. No, we do not.

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The Chairman, Senator, your time is up.

The Senator from Vermont.

Senator Aiken. Mr. Secretary, one of the missing links in that chain of information seems to be the circumstances surrounding the capture of the U-2 or parts of it and the pilot.

Has every effort been made on our part to see the pilot of the U-2 to interview him?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Humphrey leaves the hearing room.)

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Senator Aiken. Has the United Nations taken steps to interview him in view of the Russian resolution or demand now being made on the Security Council?

Secretary Herter. No, not that I know of.

Senator Aiken. Have they any right to?

Secretary Herter. Not that I would know of.

Senator Aiken. Have you any information at all regarding the condition of the pilot?

Secretary Herter. Only what we have been told, he is in good health.

Senator Aiken. That was Mr. Khrushchev's statement?

Secretary Herter. That was --

Senator Aiken. But Mr. Khrushchev very evidently, very obviously undertook to substantiate his first statement with a false photograph, and then, as I understand it, he later showed another fake photograph to the Russians, claiming that was taken from films developed by -- from the camera in the U-2 plane.

Secretary Herter. I am not quite so sure that second one was a fake.

Senator Aiken. You are not so sure -- well, I am not referring to the supposed remains of the U-2, but the photograph of the planes lined up on the ground and claimed to be photographs of Russian planes.

Secretary Herter. Even so, that could have been a genuine

2 development of film from the plane.

Senator Aiken. All right.

Isn't it a fact that the Russians had previously undertaken to secure a U-2, both by interceptors and rockets?

Secretary Herter. I can't tell you about that.

Senator Aiken. Don't you know anything about that, or don't you want to talk?

Secretary Herter. I can't tell you about rockets. I think there probably have been occasions when they might have tried by interceptor planes, but they couldn't reach that altitude.

Senator Aiken. Then you have no comment to say about that undertaking to get one by rockets?

Secretary Herter. No, I think I can point out one bit of evidence that perhaps will be supplemented when Mr. Dulles testifies here, and that is that the picture of what seemed to be the genuine U-2 plane had bullet holes in the wings and they are not likely to have bullet holes from any rocket.

Senator Aiken. No.

Does it seem unlikely to you that the U-2 was brought down with a one-shot rocket?

Secretary Herter. It seems to us very unlikely.

Senator Aiken. Leaving the pilot and much of the equipment intact as has been claimed?

Secretary Herter. It seems to us very unlikely.

Senator Aiken. Wasn't the list of equipment which

3 was given out by Mr. Khrushchev such equipment as would have been natural carried on any plane that was undertaking to secure information of this type?

Secretary Herter. That is right.

Senator Aiken. Of any country?

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

Senator Aiken. Didn't Mr. Khrushchev get himself on a rather untenable position relative to Berlin and East Germany? In fact a spot so untenable so he found it virtually necessary to scuttle the Summit Conference one way or the other?

Secretary Herter. That, of course, again is a matter of speculation. He had committed himself so strongly on these subjects that certainly under circumstances in most free countries, if the chief executive had committed himself to that extent it would have been very hard for him to retreat from that position. Whether or not he has a free enough hand in Soviet Russia to be able to say one thing and act differently the next day or not, I couldn't tell you.

Senator Aiken. In view of his previous speeches, wasn't he in position where he was in trouble regardless of what happened at the Summit Conference?

Secretary Herter. He had committed himself very firmly.

Senator Aiken. Yes.

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Are the United States, France, and Great Britain now in accord on, let's say, in accord with the future policy as set forth by the President the night before last?

Secretary Herter. They have expressed great satisfaction with that.

I beg your pardon. I haven't seen any comment of theirs with regard to his statement the night before last. I am speaking of his statement in Paris.

Senator Aiken. Yes.

Secretary Herter. The position that he took in Paris they expressed complete accord with that.

Senator Aiken. Have we received any reprimand or any statement in the nature of a reprimand from Britain or France?

Secretary Herter. None whatever.

Senator Aiken. Since the incidents of recent weeks.

Yesterday, I got a letter from a lady who I thought was somewhat misinformed, probably not indoctrinated, just misinformed, stating that it was the United States spy system that forced Russia to maintain a spy system. Do you go along with that theory? It seems to be shared by a good many people, and seems to be a theory which is quite generally distributed, it not believed in certain quarters.

Secretary Herter. I would think, sir, that going back into history that Russia has had a much longer history than

5 the United States and a spy system has been an integral part of Russia's policy,

Senator Aiken. It is my impression that Russia had an effective system before we did.

Secretary Herter. Long before.

Senator Aiken. And that we were very apologetic about our lack of a system up until now.

Well, that is about all.

One other thing that seems to bother some people.

Would you agree with anyone who stated that if the United States would disarm unilaterally that Russia would promptly follow suit?

Secretary Herter. If we disarmed unilaterally?

Senator Aiken. If the United States would disarm unilaterally as an example to the world Russia would promptly follow suit?

Secretary Herter. I do not.

Senator Aiken. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Long?

Senator Long. Mr. Secretary, I believe that U-2 flights should have been made. I have said that publicly and I have stayed by that statement.

I wondered if the Department and those responsible had

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not planned well in advance just what we were going to do when the Soviets ultimately got one of these U-2's. Had there been such plans made?

Secretary Herter. I believe they had.

Senator Long. Yes. But that also involves your responsibility because you would be the one who would give the explanation.

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

Senator Long. While I don't see how the great powers can avoid conducting espionage and military intelligence, as a practical matter as long as it is conducted on the other person's soil, isn't that a violation of international law?

Secretary Herter. All espionage is a violation of sovereignty, all forms of espionage.

Senator Long.

Secretary Herter. However, the Chicago Convention which is the principal convention dealing with this, has never been accepted by the Russians nor have they accepted any bilateral agreement with regard to air space over their country.

Senator Long.

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Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Long. Are these statements about this poison needle and the self-destruction devices correct?

Secretary Herter. I think so, but there, again, I think that the testimony of Mr. Dulles would be more accurate than anything I could give.

Senator Long. The question that occurs to me -- might I ask this question, also: What is your impression of the present condition of our intelligence behind the Iron Curtain? Do you believe that we have adequate information, or do you believe it is far from adequate as to what we feel we need to know about a potential opponent?

Secretary Herter. Well, I think I can answer that in only one way. I think that we are doing the best we can to secure such information as we consider vital. No intelligence service is ever considered perfect. No intelligence service

8 is ever considered completely adequate.

I think we are doing, as I said in connection with this particular operation, I felt we were doing a prudent and efficient job.

Senator Long. Well, I believe I had some information about these U-2 flights prior to this time, not as a member of this Committee, but this is information we have run across from time to time as a Senator of the United States. I did not seek to be informed officially and did not want to know directly any more than the hearsay information I had on the subject.

But the thought that occurs to me is, did we not -- would it not be the original plan that this nation would not under any circumstances admit that it was sending those planes behind the Iron Curtain in the event that one of those planes was captured?

Secretary Herter. I think that, as Mr. Dillon has explained, a cover story was prepared for that contingency. I think the actual circumstances turned out to be rather different from anything that had been anticipated in the preparatory work that had been done.

Senator Long. Well, the previous planning had been that we would not admit it, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Long. Now, of course, the Russians are in no

9 position to put us on trial. They won't go before the world court on anything with us, will they?

Secretary Herter. They have not.

Senator Long. As a matter of fact, have we not previously tried to get them before the world court on the shooting down of our planes?

Secretary Herter. We have tried to get Bulgaria before the world court and have offered to take one of the cases, the border cases, to court, and they have refused.

Senator Long. And they have declined?

Secretary Herter. They have declined.

Senator Long. In the absence of any admission on the part of this Government, how could they have possibly placed us in position to force us to admit that that plane was deliberately sent there?

Secretary Herter. Well, the other cases were all borderline cases of incursions over the edge of the border. This particular case the plane was shot down in the very center of Russia, some 2,000 kilometers inside of Russia.

Senator Long. But the point I have in mind, Mr. Secretary, is I don't see how they can force you to take the Fifth Amendment because they wouldn't get you before a tribunal to do it because they wouldn't do it themselves, and I don't see how they could have forced you to concede that that was an authorized mission unless somebody, the President or you,

10 elected to make that admission.

But do you see any way that they could have compelled you to admit that that espionage mission was a calculated plan and deliberately undertaken?

Secretary Herter. No, sir, the alternative for us was to continue denying any responsibility whatsoever for it. They would undoubtedly as they said they would do, take it before the United Nations, submit all the evidence to the United Nations, and we would have dug ourselves in deeper and deeper in a denial of something which was perfectly self-evident. That was the choice that we were faced with.

Senator Long. Well, denial of espionage, but you also have considerable indication that they would be denying espionage that you are in position to fairly well prove, could you not? Could you not try your espionage cases before the United Nations as well as they could?

Secretary Herter. We can. But espionage cases we try before our own courts.

Senator Long. Yes, but if they want to try to case before the United Nations, couldn't you just as well have insisted on trying the espionage cases with them in the United Nations simultaneously?

Secretary Herter. Yes, we could, but in that particular case the issue was a rather different one.

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Senator Long. Here is the thought that occurs to me, under the Russian system if he admits he made a mistake he has to resign more or less as Malenkov did or more or less throw himself on the mercy of the Party. But when we plead guilty to espionage in this case, how can we plead guilty on the one hand and contend that there is no punishment in order when we plead guilty to violating international law?

Secretary Herter. We have said we pleaded guilty to it entirely on the ground that for ourselves and for the free world it was essential for us to get information with regard to dangers of surprise attack or aggression.

Senator Long. The thought that occurs to me is that, and I am not sure in position that we are in position to be completely self-righteous about passing judgment on ourselves in our own case, that is what your own people have said we judge our own case and not let the world court decide these matters. I, for one, have been holding back because I am not sure we have a fair court. But how do you throw yourselves on the mercy of the court and deny the court the right to more or less judge what the penalty should be?

Secretary Herter. Senator, the cases to which you are referring, of which there have been quite a number, have all been border cases where there was not espionage involved, where it was a question of a border patrol or weather patrol

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or something of that kind where the issue was as to whether or not there was an intentional overflight or not which is entirely different from this particular case.

Senator Long. Yes, but the thought that occurs to me is we didn't have to plead guilty to anything, and I know lawyers represent guilty clients. Now, the lawyer, when you plead guilty, aren't you more or less in position that you do have to either apologize or take corrective action, or even under our system of law more or less offer to take your punishment if you are going to plead guilty?

Secretary Herter. As you may recall, the President had stated that he had taken corrective action. He has characterized this as a regrettable incident. When a demand was made on him, these other demands on him, I don't think you, sir, or anyone else could have accepted those demands.

Senator Long. I don't require my part of your examination be made a part of the public record, Mr. Secretary. I don't insist on it at all, but I don't very well see how we can take the attitude we are going to plead guilty in the matter and then take the attitude that no apology is forthcoming.

Secretary Herter. I think this, sir, the circumstances which were required our guilt, are the most important thing of all.

Senator Gore. Would you restate that, please, sir?

Secretary Herter. That the circumstances which required

13 our taking this action of espionage, namely the tremendous importance to the whole free world and to ourselves of having some knowledge as to whether a sudden surprise attack is going to hit us or what form of aggression was likely to be perpetrated, justified the action.

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But my time is up.

The Chairman. The Senator from Kansas.

Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask questions on two items that I have selected from the mail I have received on the Summit Conference.

The first is that people that write me are concerned because of the fact that Mr. Khrushchev hurled such epithets at us, ~~our~~ President and the nation as they have -- a coward -- a bandit and aggressor.

Will that influence our course of action in getting information that is necessary for our security?

Secretary Herter. I think we will do whatever we feel is essential for our security. I am not saying in that respect that we are going to deliberately utilize the U-2 again. I have never said that.

Senator Carlson. That is one of the questions that concern our people at the present time.

I was wondering -- can we assure the American people that despite all this tirade, there will be no slackening in our efforts to secure, by any measures or means, the information

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that is necessary for the security of this nation?

Secretary Herter. I think both the President -- I think the President in particular, has made that very clear.

Senator Carlson. I have selected from the mail this question: Can Mr. Khrushchev be counted on to keep his word on maintaining the status quo in Berlin until another Summit Meeting?

Secretary Herter. That is one, sir, that I cannot answer.

Senator Carlson. That is one of the questions that we are getting.

Now, we are treaty bound to protect Berlin. Furthermore, we have in recent months assured West Berlin that we will never forsake them. Mr. Khrushchev has said plainly that he would meet force with force in Berlin.

Can the American people be assured that the United States has the full cooperation of our Allies in maintaining our position on the Berlin status?

Secretary Herter. Senator, one of the most impressive things that I have ever seen was the meeting of NATO that took place after the aborted, so-called Summit Conference. I have never seen such unanimity, such firmness, such determination as exhibited at that meeting.

Senator Carlson. That statement should be at least encouraging to those of us who are concerned about the situation.

Another thing that I have picked from my mail is this

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that the people are concerned about.

Will the United States continue to press for controlled disarmament and nuclear test suspension?

Secretary Herter. Yes, sir. I have indicated in my prepared statement that we will continue to do this.

As you know, however, the conditions that we have always adhered to is that the controls have got to be controls that one can rely upon. In other words, reliable controls on both sides.

I think that with the very real danger that exists in the world today of accidental events that may lead to a nuclear war, that we should pursue the course of doing whatever we can to minimize within the bounds that we have stated; namely, that of reciprocal and effective control.

Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are making any progress on these nuclear test suspensions at the Geneva Conference and other places?

Secretary Herter. During the last few weeks, really the last few days, they have been meeting in Geneva examining a coordinated program of research for improving instrumentation so that small shots can be detected underground.

Those conferences have moved, I think, pretty satisfactorily. They are halted at this moment, awaiting some instructions from Moscow.

In the next few days we should know better whether or not

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there has been any radical change of position on the part of the Russians or not. There is some chance of reaching agreement. It will be a limited agreement at best, but that again depends on full agreement with regard to the control mechanisms.

As you know, those talks have been going for a long time. Until they are shown to be hopeless, I think we will continue with them.

Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee.

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that three crucial questions here are these: Did the policy of resort to Summitry and personalized diplomacy fail?

Who, if anyone, was in charge?

Three, was there a lack of coordination --

Senator Wiley. A little louder, please.

Senator Gore. Would you like me to repeat all of them?

I said that there were three questions, it seemed to me, three crucial questions.

One, did the policy of Summitry and personalized diplomacy fail?

Two, who, if anyone, was in charge?

Three, was there a lack of coordination?

I should like to explore these three questions in inverse order.

When did the Department first receive information that the

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U-2 flight was down in Russia?

Mr. Dillon. Senator, since I was Acting Secretary at that time, I think it is proper for me to answer that.

That information was received in the Department during the day, on Sunday, the 1st of May, at about the middle of the day, our time.

Senator Gore. What was the nature of that information?

Mr. Dillon. The nature of the information as conveyed to me, which had been received in the Department through the Central Intelligence Agency, was that this plan was overdue at its destination, and that the time beyond which its fuel supply would carry it, had run out and so therefore, it was presumed down somewhere.

Senator Gore. The question I ask is when did you first have some notice, some information, some hint that the plan was actually down in Russian territory? I was not referring to your presumption that because of its flight pattern and the amount of fuel that it must be down.

When did you actually receive some intelligence, some hint that the Soviets had the plane?

Mr. Dillon. That the Soviets had the plane, I think the first information we received on that was at the time Mr. Khrushchev made his statement on Thursday morning before the, I think it was the Supreme Soviet, on the 5th day of May.

Senator Gore. Are you sure you received no hint, no

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information, no report from either your Embassy in Russia or the Intelligence Agency that the plane might actually be down in Russia?

Mr. Dillon. It was our assumption, since most of the flight pattern of the plane, its mission was to spend most of its time over the Soviet Union, it was our assumption that that was most likely right from the first, from when the plane did not return. But we did not receive any specific information that it was down over the Soviet Union, in the Soviet Union, the Russians had either the plane, the pilot or any parts of it, until Mr. Khrushchev made the statement on Thursday morning.

Senator Gore. When did you first receive some hint, some information, some indication that the Soviets might have the pilot alive?

Mr. Dillon. The first information we received on that was received in the Department in the afternoon of the 5th day of May, after we had put out our first statements.

This was in the form of a report from our Embassy in Moscow saying that various other foreign diplomats had heard at cocktail parties or receptions from various Soviet officials that this plane was down and at one time, to one of these foreign diplomats, a Soviet official said that they had the pilot and that report reached us.

We didn't know whether it was accurate or not, but it

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gave us pause. That reached us the afternoon of Thursday, and I think it was own Friday that we identified the fact that a photograph of the wreckage as put out by the Soviets was a fraud and so then at that time we assumed, we acted on the assumption from then on, that they probably had the pilot and that they possibly had a good deal of the plane.

Senator Gore. A member of your Department informed me in the offices of the Committee on Friday morning of the 6th that the Department did, in fact, have information indicating that the Soviets may have this pilot alive.

Mr. Dillon. That was probably reporting the information which I said was received the afternoon of the 5th regarding that.

Senator Gore. Yes. Now you say that you knew of the flight, you knew of the flight pattern, and you assumed that the plane was down in Russia.

You say now that on the 5th you received this information that the pilot was probably alive and yet, on the afternoon of the 6th, this Mr. Lincoln White, official spokesman for the Department said this:

"There was absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet air space and there has never been."

Did you authorize that statement?

Mr. Dillon. No, not specifically. Mr. White was not one of those in the Department of State that had any knowledge of

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these operations.

The statement which we authorized the day before, which is in the record, was not that catagoric. But I don't think that Mr. White, that there was any reason why he shouldn't have made such a statement. He drew that conclusion from the NASA statement of the day before and when he was asked questions -- he didn't volunteer this statement. He was being questioned apparently in a press conference and he made that statement.

We did not authorize a statement, specifically. He did not ask us for it, but he thought he was carrying out the NASA story.

Senator Gore. Is Mr. White authorized to speak to the United States press on behalf of the Department of State?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, he is.

Senator Gore. Are you now saying that he was making statements about this, but that he was not informed on the subject?

Mr. Dillon. I am stating that he was not informed as to the facts of this intelligence operation any more than the people who made the press statements for NASA were informed of the facts of it.

Senator Gore. Do you call that responsible and coordinated performance?

Mr. Dillon. We are getting at this stage, Senator, into another question, the key question of intelligence. When you

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have something as important and secret as this, it is important to limit the knowledge to the minimum number of people and this was strictly limited throughout the government and we did limit it in the State Department.

We did not think it was proper to inform our press people. There was a special procedure for people who were informed of this, and the press people were not so informed.

(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Carlson leaves the hearing room.)

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, I am not questioning you about the initial cover statement issue you had in Turkey. I am asking you about an official falsehood on May 6, after you say the Department knew of the flight pattern, assumed the plane was down, a whole day after you received information that the pilot was probably alive and in the afternoon of the day after even I had been informed. I ask you again if you think this is an example of the coordination which you earlier told us the Department had.

Mr. Dillon. Senator, I will answer that. I think it took a major decision to reach a decision which was reached the following day; that we were going to abandon our cover story and tell the truth. That decision could not be reached rapidly and quickly. It was reached after long sessions with the Secretary on Saturday and until that was reached, we saw no reason to inform our press officer of anything but the cover

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story which is what we were standing by up until that time.

The Chairman. Senator, may I interrupt? I didn't understand why Mr. White wasn't required to clear his statement at this time with you.

Mr. Dillon. I am glad to answer that. Mr. White sees the p r e s s every day, and he does not know in advance necessarily the detailed questions that he may ask.

If a question comes that he thinks he does not know the answer to, he does clear it with us.

Now, the day before, when we put out our statement, it was given to him and he followed exactly what he had been told. He did not make any statement that was quite as catagoric as this statement he made the following day.

The Chairman. Why didn't he stand on the one that had been cleared?

Mr. Dillon. This was just an answer to a question. Why he did it, he thought he was telling the truth. I think he acted perfectly all right. He did not think that this was a new question. He thought he was following the cover story, which he was. So he made this statement. It wasn't a statement; it was in answer to a question. I want to emphasize that.

The Chairman. It was a very catagorical statement that went far beyond the other statement. That is what begins to complicate your situation, doesn't it?

Mr. Dillon. Possibly to some extent, yes.

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The Chairman. The Senator from Ohio.

Senator Lausche. First of all, I want to pursue this question. Shall we abandon or modify our efforts of gathering intelligence, covering the military activities of potential aggressors?

First, I ask Mr. Herter this question. At any time during the appearance of Mr. Dulles, the Central Intelligence Chief before this Committee, do you know of him at any time being challenged or asked about how he acquired intelligence?

Secretary Herter. That I cannot answer at first hand. My impression is that there was a very small group in the Senate with whom he conferred. He has got this responsibility under the law, which was written by the Congress.

Senator Lausche. You have answered my question. Have you ever heard of any member of this Committee or any member of the Congress asking the Central Intelligence Agency to discontinue acquiring intelligence or modify its methods?

Secretary Herter. No, I do not.

May I qualify that to this extent? I think that Senator Mansfield had introduced a measure which would provide for a different method of coordinating with the Congress. That is the only thing I do know of.

Senator Lausche. Would it be right to assume that at this very moment there is great probability that there are Soviet intelligence agents in our country operating?

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Secretary Herter. I would assume so.

Senator Lausche. Do you know of any member of our Defense Department in responsible position or any person in any government who is responsible for security, taking the position that intelligence of a potential enemy's conduct is not essential for the proper development of a nation's own defense?

Secretary Herter. I do not.

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Senator Lausche. Do I understand that you subscribe to the statement made by the President that for the protection of the security of our country it is essential that intelligence of potential enemies conduct be acquired.

Secretary Herter. I do.

Senator Lausche. Now then, this question: Do you feel that it would be wise for our government in the face of the discussions about peace and disarmament and banning of nuclear tests that we discontinue our intelligence activities?

Secretary Herter. I do not.

Senator Lausche. Would it be a danger to our country if at this moment while we are discussing disarmament and banning of nuclear tests that we scuttle the Central Intelligence Agency?

Secretary Herter. I certainly would not advocate anything of the kind.

Senator Lausche. What is it historically concerning men in a responsible position for the protection of a country, beginning from the earliest days of recorded battles about the use of scouts and intelligence agents, so as to properly guide a country in what it ought to do?

Secretary Herter. It is a custom, sir, that has grown up, I imagine, ever since warfare began.

Senator Lausche. Now then, the second question: It is your considered opinion that when Khrushchev came to Paris he had

already decided not to participate in the summit conference.

Secretary Herter. That is our best judgment.

Senator Lausche. Now, and that judgment is formulated not upon what he has said but what he has done, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. It is a combination of both. But it is mostly in what he has said, and the assumption is that he had received his orders before he went to Paris.

Senator Lausche. It is a fact that beginning in December 1959 and going down into April, he has made statements indicating that the probability was that there would never be a conference.

Secretary Herter. Not that, the probability that, there would never be a conference but that if a conference were held it would not turn out to his satisfaction.

Senator Lausche. He was scheduled to arrive in Paris on Sunday May 14, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

Senator Lausche. But instead of coming there on Sunday, May 14, he came there on Saturday, May 13.

Secretary Herter. That is right.

Senator Lausche. And on Sunday morning he, with Malinovsky, at the early hour of 11 o'clock already made an appointment to see DeGaulle.

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

Senator Lausche. And at that meeting read this vigorous statement about what they expected of Eisenhower if Khrushchev was to attend the conference.

Secretary Herter. Yes. That was not only read but a copy of it was given to General DeGaulle.

Senator Lausche. Why do you think that he came there before his scheduled visit of Sunday and made it Saturday?

Secretary Herter. Why he came to Paris at all is the real question. That is a question that General DeGaulle asked him at the time of the one meeting when the four were present and to which the answer was completely unsatisfactory.

Senator Lausche. So that at 11 o'clock in the morning he met with DeGaulle and laid down these four demands upon Eisenhower.

Secretary Herter. That is right.

Senator Lausche. Then at the hour of 4:30 in the afternoon he went to Macmillan and to Macmillan repeated those demands that unless they were met he would not attend the conference.

Secretary Herter. That is right.

Senator Lausche. Is it reasonable to assume that anything, or did anything happen between his visit on Saturday, his arrival on Saturday, his action at 11 o'clock in the morning on Sunday, and 4:30 on Sunday, that would have

caused him to change his mind from what it was when he left Moscow.

Secretary Herter. Not a thing.

Senator Lausche. Now then, Mr. Secretary, getting down to these demands that he made, that is, he demanded that Eisenhower denounce the overflights, is that correct; and two, that he apologize to the Soviet Union.

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Lausche. And three, that he punish those directly responsible.

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Lausche. And four, that Eisenhower promised not to repeat these flights.

Secretary Herter. Yes, may I add there, sir, that the demand for the apology was added, it was not in the original document. It was one that was added by him while he was in Paris as a fourth condition.

Senator Lausche. Can we assume that Khrushchev honestly expected that these demands would be complied with that he made upon Eisenhower?

Secretary Herter. He could not have possibly.

Senator Lausche. That is additional proof confirming the assumption that when he left Moscow he never intended to participate in the conference.

Secretary Herter. You are quite right, sir.

Senator Lausche. Why couldn't he have issued this statement while he was in Moscow, and why did he go to Paris instead of making the statement in Moscow?

Secretary Herter. There it is a matter of speculation but I think that the desire to dramatize himself, the fact that there would be 3,000 correspondents in Paris, that he would have a larger audience in that place, led him to take this particular route.

Senator Lausche. Was anything said anywhere about his train of misdeeds, of the Communist Reds beginning from the very day that they were established as a country in breaking treaties, in mass murdering of people, including our American boys --

Secretary Herter. That was not in the brief meeting of the four. The only statements that were made by the President were the statements which were publicized, plus another statement that with regard to the U-2 being -- not being again used for this purpose. That commitment of the President could last, of course, only so long as he was President.

Senator Lausche. You have seen certain questions that I said I would like to get information about. To the extent that it can be done, I would like answers to those questions prepared and put into the record. One, broken treaties. Two, participation of Red, not Red Russia but

Red Communism, that is broken treaties, participation in the Red Chinese-Soviet provocation of trouble throughout throughout the world, their activities in the Katyn Forest, in Quemoy and Matsu, in South Korea where thousands of our American boys were killed, their activities in Red Hungary, East Germany and in Poland when the Liberty fighters rose to procure liberty for themselves.

Secretary Herter. Senator, I saw those questions as they are incorporated in the Congressional Record and we will be prepared to answer them.

Senator Lausche. I want to say I am not prepared to put a halo of honesty and holiness on Khrushchev and one of scorn and disgrace upon my country, not in this hearing or any other place.

That is all I have to say.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the time is a quarter to 1:00. I think it would be a proper time to adjourn until 2:30.

Senator Wiley. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. All right, the Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for a question.

Senator Wiley. We say that the first law of human nature is the law of self-preservation. You have heard that said, have you?

Secretary Herter. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. That applies to nations as well as individuals, does it not?

Secretary Herter. It does.

Senator Wiley. And in wartime we speak of what we have called spying here, it is called spying, but in peacetime it is espionage, is it not?

Secretary Herter. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. But there are different rules that apply, too, are there not? In wartimes then it generally means the penalty is death. In peaceful times like we have now, the penalty depends entirely more or less upon the court administering it, is that right?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Wiley. Is it generally conceded that the Kremlin has been engaging in espionage not only in our own country but in all the countries virtually on earth and is still doing it. That is correct, is it not?

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

Senator Wiley. As demonstrated by ambassador Lodge in the United Nations the other day they even tried to pull a stunt on our embassy in Russia. Did you see that?

Secretary Herter. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Just this one thing. Now then if the first law of human nature is the law of self-preservation,

then the best means that we can use to preserve the freedom of America, the CIA has been using when it has been using the overflight, the U-2 means, is that right?

Secretary Herter. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We will return here at 2:30.

Secretary Herter. 2:30.

The Chairman. Yes, sir. I may say to the committee that the Secretary has very kindly agreed to go on today and if the questioning is not completed, to come back in the morning, and we will determine that at the end of today's session.

I hope we can make progress.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)