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## The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #6840-83/1 22 September 1983

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NIC 6840-83 21 September 1983

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

## SUDAN

From time to time over the past year, the Warning Report has highlighted periods of crisis in Sudan. These periods have for a variety of reasons generally passed without incident. Nevertheless, the Acting NIO for Africa believes that these episodes have had a delibitating effect on the Nimeiri regime and that Sudan, because of its close relations with the U.S., should be watched closely in the coming months.

Growing shortages of essentials, an overall decline in the standard of living and recent evidence of discontent within the military over poor living conditions and benefits have all come together to present President Nimeiri with new challenges. In an apparent attempt to gain support for the regime from Sudan's important Muslim Brotherhood, Nimeiri has reaffirmed the primacy of Islamic law throughout the country. In doing so, he may well have further antagonized the non-Muslim south, an area already engulfed in turmoil following the President's decision to divide the area into three regions.

Community analysts have seen Nimeiri weather political storms in the past and expect him to do so this time. Over the longer term, analysts are concerned that Nimeiri's problem will be compounded by new threats from Ethiopian and Libyan-supported dissidents. Dissident infiltration, if it should occur from either Chad or Ethiopia, will be difficult to detect and counter.

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CHAD.		

Despite dissident activity in southern Chad, Community analysts generally agree that Habre can retain control over that part of the country and describe the accounts of growing dissidence as overdrawn and attribute them to the French. The dissidence is poorly organized and smacks more of localized banditry than any concerted effort to unseat the Habre regime. The NSC representative expressed some concern over Habre's determination to recapture northern Chad, which he would have to do without French assistance. Such a move on the part of the headstrong Habre, either in the form of a conventional offensive or a guerrilla campaign--which some analysts throught would not succeed against the greatly expanded Libyan presence in the north--would jeopardize chances for a settlement in Chad. Analysts were in general agreement that the French would have to remain in Chad for a long time before an accommodation is arranged that would permit their departure.

## SOUTH AFRICA:

Analysts expect the South African white electorate to pass Prime Minister Botha's proposed constitutional reforms in the referendum scheduled for 2 November. The referendum is a critical test for Botha's blueprint for limited reforms, but he is likely to garner the votes of English-speaking South Africans who see the alternative--no change at all--as unacceptable.

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NGOLA:		
recent months that are o defenses against the gro	stepped up Soviet arms deliveries to Angola in designed to enhance the Angolan government's owing threat from UNITA. At the same time, g stretched increasingly thin as UNITA tries to	

Approved For Release 2008/11/05 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000100020027-0

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