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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #01558-87

6 April 1987


MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: William R. Kotapish  
National Intelligence Office for Narcotics

SUBJECT: Report on 19 March 1987 NIO/Narcotics Warning and  
Forecast Meeting

Representatives of the Intelligence Community and appropriate law enforcement representatives met on 19 March 1987 to discuss the following: Colombian insurgencies and implications for counternarcotics programs; Latin American media reaction to Operation Blast Furnace; and the Community response on narco-terrorism in compliance with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.



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National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics  
Intelligence Coordination and Strategy Meeting

19 March 1987

Narco-Terrorism

1. The NIO/Narcotics briefed the meeting on the Community's draft response for the FBI on combating narco-terrorism. This draft memorandum, following coordination with the intelligence components of the law enforcement community, will be sent to the Attorney General to satisfy Section 2014 of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-570.

2. In meeting the recommendation advocated in the draft paper discussed above, the NIO/Narcotics and NIO/Counterterrorism will jointly form an ad hoc task force to assess the current state of intelligence collection, analysis, data retention and data retrieval on the narco-terrorism target. The findings of this ad hoc review will be forwarded to the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board.

Colombia: Developments in the Insurgency and Implications for  
Counternarcotics Programs

3. [REDACTED] CIA/ALA, briefed the meeting on this complex issue. She emphasized the major dilemma Colombian President Barco faces in maintaining pressure on drug traffickers without risking a major clash with insurgents involved in the drug trade. [REDACTED] detailed the problems Barco has encountered in building up the capabilities of his security forces. For the benefit of those attending this meeting, an outline of [REDACTED] excellent briefing is included as an attachment to this report.

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Latin American Media Reaction to Operation Blast Furnace

4. [REDACTED] CIA/FBIS, briefed the meeting on this issue. South American media coverage of the U.S.-Bolivian antidrug Operation Blast Furnace beginning in July 1986 ranged from moderate to heavy; reaction ranged from tacit support to strong disapproval. The Uruguayan media was not reviewed, and Venezuela ignored the operation. None of the countries voiced a need for additional joint operations involving U.S. military

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forces. Most saw the drug problem as a consumer country problem and felt that international cooperation, including drug agreements with the United States and among the Latin American countries, was a necessity. Criticism of the joint military operation was generally in the context of the violation of national sovereignty, the futility or "ineffectiveness" of the military effort (mentioned in Ecuador, Chile and Colombia), and the idea of "we can do it on our own and with our own resources" (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay).

#### Community Report

5. Following are comments from representatives of the narcotics intelligence community:

- o State reported on the certification process, noting that certification was withheld from Iran, Afghanistan and Syria. State noted that strong sentiment existed on the Hill for overriding the certification of Mexico, Panama and the Bahamas.
- o Customs reported on threats to US Customs personnel in Bogota, Colombia.
- o US Coast Guard reported on a recent USCG survey which indicated that the availability of domestic marijuana in the US had increased and that cocaine availability had also increased with prices remaining steady.

Attachment  
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NIO/Narcotics Warning Meeting  
19 March 1987

COLOMBIA: Developments in the Insurgency and Implications  
 for Counternarcotics Programs

I. Defining the insurgency.

- Complex phenomenon rooted in tradition; groups began to form in late 1949, beginning of La Violencia. Today, several major groups, best known of which are Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), M-19.
- Major groups:
  - FARC, armed wing of PCC, 1966. Conservative estimate 3,500-4,500, plus at least 5,000 supporters. Military estimates 7,500--surge factor. Maintains nominal truce with government, first negotiated by Betancur in 1984.
  - Other groups outside truce; some originally signed, later rejected; others never signed. Formed alliance in late 1985, National Guerrilla Coordinator (CNG). CNG has been active since; concentrating on economic targets.
  - M-19. Nationalist, anti-US; 1974. Despite losses, still dangerous. [redacted] probably 1,000 strong. Founder of CNG and America BN, which is still fighting in SW CO. However, has apparently lost CNG leadership to:
    - National Liberation Army (ELN). Formed with Cuban help, 1963. Has grown rapidly during past two-three years. Probably 1,000 combatants; hard-line Marxist-Leninist; violently anti-US. Since pipeline finished March 1986, has attacked aggressively. Group to watch.
    - National People's Army (EPL). Armed wing PCC/ML; 1967. 450-600, but recent reporting suggests expanding.
- Impact of truce: Before then, violence cyclical, proportion fairly constant. Truce disrupted balance; groups--esp FARC--have expanded. Violence increasing; both sides buying time. Important factor: political legitimization of FARC through creation/participation of Patriotic Union, which won minority congressional rep last year.

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II. Guerrilla-narcotics links.

- All major groups linked to some extent, but best documented with FARC. [redacted] seven fronts in major coca-growing areas. Protects and taxes drug producers; occasional cultivation, role as middleman. Extent unknown; at least one instance lab/camp.
- FARC dominant in SE CO where major labs located. Poses major problems for drug enforcement--mil/pol role, mil action; police often outgunned.
- M-19. [redacted] drug involvement, arms trafficking. Palace of Justice; may have taken payoffs to destroy records. Appears to be active in MJ shipments lately. Disturbing: [redacted] M-19/CNG have contracted with major

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- [redacted] 25X1
- ELN. [redacted] involved in cocaine/arms traffic, VE border. 25X1
  - EPL. [redacted] Last year ambushed police patrol on lab search near EC border. 25X1

### III. Recent developments/trends in insurgency.

- Truce with FARC increasingly deteriorating; tension growing. FARC has stepped up attacks on military/police (by order), thrown series of challenges at government. UP has declared independence to protect political gains, but strategy only. UP/FARC closely identified; UP won votes through intimidation last year.
- Point of contention: mayoral elections, first time, 1988. FARC/UP want to consolidate control; Barco wants disarmament before elections. Face-off; has become battle of nerves.
- Other factor: lab raids. Barco says no areas off limits; UP has reportedly warned off. [redacted] 25X1
- [redacted] 25X1
- [redacted] Per press, UP to meet with Barco again yesterday. Tension rising. 25X1
- Indicative comment: Barco [redacted] gov't no longer says truce, but ceasefire. Army everywhere. 25X1
- At same time, increasing unity in insurgency; CNG, with help from Castro, has apparently resolved conflicts. Leaders of FARC and CNG making progress toward united front; likely to see open political alliance within year. Plans for joint military offensive this year, Feb/Mar; [redacted] 25X1
- FARC may be preparing to join ELN/CNG in attacks on major oil facilities--refinery, Barrancabermeja.
- [redacted] 25X1

### IV. Important factor: security forces capabilities.

- Barco hurrying to improve limited counterinsurgency, antidrug capabilities. Has approved unprecedented \$156 million emerg appropriation, authorized creation of new mil units. Mil leaders shopping for new equipment. Army estimates will need 15,000 more troops if truce breaks down; long-term plans to expand Army to 100,000.
- Meanwhile, race with time. New defense plan attempts to mass gov't troops against groups outside truce in areas where most active--major challenge for widely scattered troops, serious mobility problems. Critical lack of helos.
- Sec forces fully engaged against CNG--ELN in NE oil region, M-19 in SW CO, EPL joining in. Stretched thin already; not capable of taking on FARC, which mil believes has weapons as good as or better than Army.

### V. Implications for antidrug efforts.

- Major problem is FARC involvement in drug processing, SE

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- jungle. Barco walking knife edge.
- FARC will continue testing, but will try to prolong truce as long as UP maintains credibility. While in effect, Barco will have to continue reactive, ad hoc tactics against both insurgents and trafs associated with them. Point: Llanos.
  - Barco will not halt erad or drug ops in cities; drive to elim corruption continues. Despite brave words, may continue to delay strikes at FARC-controlled labs to try to forestall truce break. Will try to show resolve without sparking major conflict.
  - Continued public support; media keeping heat on trafs. Don't expect pressure against drug enforcement.
  - Barco will continue drive to improve counterinsurg/antidrug capabilities; already turning to US. Concern over growing power of trafs--esp insurgent drug inv--may make him more receptive to US mil assistance, such as training, equip, poss greater advisory presence.
  - On extradition, Barco firm, but pressure mounting against. [REDACTED] extradition 25X1  
efficient, trafs afraid of it, serves both countries. Future uncertain, but think Barco will keep fighting.
  - [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] Andean Parliament recommending 25X1  
unified policy/legal approach, regional strike force. Looks promising for more cooperation--in long term, only hope.
  - Short term: outlook grim. Barco genuinely committed, but formidable political/logistic obstacles to improvements.

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