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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #03099-87/1
27 July 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Walter L. Barrows
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 21 July 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.



Walter L. Barrows

Attachment:
NIC #03099-87

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NIC #03099-87
21 July 1987

WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following topics at the monthly warning meeting on 21 July.

2. Brief Items:

(1) Angola - Government Offensive. Although Angola was not on the agenda, the NIO asked if the apparent start of the long-awaited government offensive warranted another warning. DIA agreed that Luanda's forces appear to be making limited advances, but argued that it is unclear if a major offensive has begun. All agreed that the campaign is likely to proceed slowly, in part because UNITA is well prepared and the Angolans/Cubans will be cautious.

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(2) Chad - Coming Attack on Aozou. DIA led the discussion of prospects for a Chadian attack on the remaining Libyans in the Aozou Strip. There was consensus that:

- An attack is likely in August, after the OAU Summit ends. The exact timing probably depends upon the return from Paris of Habre's commanders, time needed to reconnoiter a new Libyan minefield around Aozou Airbase, and Chadian progress in solving logistic and command and control problems. Habre's tactical plans are unknown; his options include overrunning the southern outposts before attacking Aozou Airbase, bypassing the outposts to hit the airbase first, or softening up Libyan defenses with airstrikes and raids before mounting a ground assault. He probably will select the best tactics available, even if his troops must traverse Libyan territory to reach a vulnerable point in the defenses.
- Habre probably will win, but the Libyans are likely to put up a better defense at Aozou than they did at Ouadi Doum or Faya Largeau. The Libyans have had ample warning and time to improve their defenses. Their troops at Aozou are somewhat better than the ones routed earlier; they probably will make better use of air power; and they may have organized a counterattack force. Habre must provide adequate logistic support and properly analyze how to deal with the Libyan minefields and covering weapons; his casualties are likely to be high.
- If Habre seizes the airbase, he probably will garrison it with a small force. It is too distant and isolated to convert into a major base.

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Warning Note: Although we expect Habre to win, his margin for error will be narrow and he could suffer a major defeat at Aozou. He probably cannot achieve tactical surprise, and the Libyans are likely to make effective use of their superior airpower and heavy weapons. A major Chadian defeat might restore the Libyans' confidence and lead to renewed aggression in Chad. Even if successful, Habre's losses will be high.

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(3) Sudan - How Long will Sadiq Last? DIA began the discussion of political instability in Sudan, which produced consensus that:

- The Sudanese armed forces remain unlikely to topple Sadiq and accept responsibility for the country's intractable military, economic, and political problems unless they suffer new major defeats in the south or there are widespread disturbances in Khartoum. Particularly vulnerable are the government bases at Akobo and Nasir; if they do not fall, however, the government probably will regain the tactical initiative in a few months when the dry season begins. Although agreements on student issues ended some recent protests in Khartoum, other issues surfaced and the demonstrations have resumed.
- Sadiq continues to suffer sagging political support. His recent visits to the Gulf states apparently did not gain any new military assistance for Sudan, although Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reportedly agreed to provide some petroleum to ease the severe fuel shortage. Sadiq's ruling Umma party could suffer a damaging split, and the rival National Islamic Front (NIF) may gain some support.
- Although analysts agree that senior army officers in Khartoum remain reluctant to move against Sadiq, CIA noted that junior officers who are carrying the burden of the fighting in the south could attempt to take power if they suffer more major defeats there and continue to see Sadiq's support of the military effort as inadequate.
- All agreed that a warning notice is not needed at present, but CIA suggested several indicators that would signal increased potential for a coup: (1) if civil servants and the NIF join the continuing student riots in Khartoum; (2) if shortages of essential food, water, electricity, and petroleum worsen (IMF mandated austerity measures would likely aggravate these shortages); or (3) if recent small ethnic clashes in Khartoum grow into large confrontations.

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(4) Uganda - Can Museveni Cope? CIA led the discussion of Uganda's deteriorating security situation, economy, and relations with Kenya. There was consensus that:

- Insurgent activity in the north and east probably will increase in the coming months but not affect the capital. Eighty percent of the government forces are committed in the north, but they have been relatively inactive. The army may become more aggressive now that Uganda is receiving new MI-17 helicopters from the USSR and more SF-260 aircraft and armored personnel carriers from Libya. In Kampala, there is no significant military or terrorist threat other than indiscipline among the government forces. Museveni is seeking to replace the army troops in the capital with police.
- Any new economic reforms are likely to be too little and too late, and corrupt officials will attempt to circumvent them. Incentives to smuggling remain, and the recent currency devaluation was too small. Museveni's advisers either do not want to implement more reforms or cannot agree on what steps to take.
- Museveni's dealings with Libya and several Soviet Bloc states will continue to irritate Kenyan President Moi. No Soviet personnel are scheduled to remain with Uganda's new helicopters, but Ethiopia may send a training team. (Moreover, several Ugandan pilots have returned from MI-17 training in Libya, according to a report received subsequent to the warning meeting.)

Warning Note. Kenya may get tougher with Uganda and begin to provide military assistance to the insurgents. Museveni's latest economic reforms and the new foreign funding promised in June 1987 probably will provide the Ugandan economy a short-term stimulus, but they are unlikely to result in long-term improvement.

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(5) Liberia - Backsliding on the OPEX? INR led the discussion of prospects for US-backed economic reforms in Liberia. There was consensus that:

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- Monrovia and Washington may be at an impasse, with the Liberians insisting on changes to the operational experts (OPEX) agreement that would emasculate the program. Doe's diplomatic note said that the US experts should not have co-signature authority or legal immunity, and the US said these changes were unacceptable. Some dishonest Liberian policymakers are opposed to the agreement because it would curb their graft, and most of the Cabinet resent the infringements on Liberian sovereignty. (Information received since the warning meeting suggests a compromise may be possible, although the OPEX issue will continue to strain the US-Liberian "special relationship.")
- Liberia's financial situation and bilateral relations will continue to worsen. Monrovia was expected to miss a Brooke deadline on 21 July, which would block other disbursements to Liberia. Doe's Foreign Minister is again demanding that the US pay more rent for the use of facilities in Liberia. Finance Minister Bestman is insisting that US aid go through a Liberian bank--not a US one. Ambassador Bishop has been denied access to Doe, and AID Administrator McPherson's telephone call to Doe's office was cut off.
- Doe apparently believes that he can increase government revenues and avoid accepting the bitter OPEX medicine, but he has poor prospects for alternative financing.

Warning Note: Liberia is trying to sabotage the OPEX agreement, and prospects are poor that it will go through. Demands for increased rent for facilities no doubt intensify, and Doe will seek new sources of assistance, perhaps even from the Soviet Union in an attempt to extract concessions from the United States. Depending upon how combative Doe becomes, US citizens in Liberia may even become targets of an anti-American campaign.

4. Main Item: Soviet Inroads in Southeastern Africa. CIA led the discussion of Soviet activity in the region, which produced consensus that:

- The Soviets have recently become more entrepreneurial, opportunistic, and risk-taking in southeastern Africa. Analysts do not believe that the Soviet behavior is intended as a major new challenge to the United States, although it is designed to exploit US weaknesses and take advantage of low-cost opportunities to "cause Washington pain." Moscow is capitalizing on new opportunities to sell arms to the Africans and gain influence with them; in particular, it wants monetary payment for arms and political support on issues such as Afghanistan.
- The USSR and Tanzania signed a \$200 million arms deal last November, and the Soviet ambassador has tried recently to drive a wedge between Tanzania and the US by expressing Moscow's concern about alleged US military activity in neighboring Kenya. The ambassador's action probably was not aimed at Kenya, with which Moscow probably would like to improve ties.

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- Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe sounded very upbeat during his visit to Moscow. He seems committed to concluding an arms deal with the USSR--not the UK. The deal may not be concluded or cancelled for several more months, however. Some analysts continue to doubt that Moscow will provide MIG-29s to Zimbabwe; they think that Zimbabwe may settle for MIG-23s that can be provided earlier and at lower cost. Other analysts believe that




if Zimbabwe presses Moscow to provide the better airplane, the Soviets may agree. Zimbabwe is probably the only state in the region that Moscow would consider providing with sophisticated new arms.

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- In Mozambique, the Soviets continue to support African multilateral initiatives without sharply increasing Soviet and Cuban costs. President Chissano is scheduled to visit Moscow in August 1987; he probably will be criticized for his overtures to the West, but should stick to his argument that Mozambique must accept help wherever it is offered. Reporting on Chissano's Moscow visit may provide clues of what to expect if he comes to Washington in October--although Chissano probably will say favorable things about his hosts in both capitals.

- DIA noted that this pattern of Soviet activity is based on a long-term strategy. Moscow probably aims to build up its position in southern Africa gradually, to ensure that it plays a major role in a future settlement in South Africa.



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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

- DIA/DIO
- DIA/DE-4
- DIA/DB-8D
- DIA/DB-5
- Army/OACSI
- Army/ITAC
- Air Force
- State/INR
- NSA

INTERNAL:

- DDI/ALA/AF
- DDI/CRES
- DDI/OIR
- DDI/OGI
- DDI/LDA
- DDI/NESA
- DDI/SOVA
- NPIC
- FBIS
- DDO/AF

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ICS/OHC

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